Difference between revisions of "Permissibility and Presumption"
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== Important Note == | == Important Note == | ||
Permissibility and presumption are ''not the same concept.'' They should not be grouped together in the form of "presumption and permissibility affirm/negate" because the arguments that justify presumption are distinct from the arguments that justify permissibility. If your opponent does group the justifications for presumption and permissibility together, you should take advantage of that by articulating which of the warrants actually apply to presumption or permissibility when arguing that one affirms or negates. | Permissibility and presumption are ''not the same concept.'' They should not be grouped together in the form of "presumption and permissibility affirm/negate" because the arguments that justify presumption are distinct from the arguments that justify permissibility. If your opponent does group the justifications for presumption and permissibility together, you should take advantage of that by articulating which of the warrants actually apply to presumption or permissibility when arguing that one affirms or negates. | ||
== Presumption == | == Presumption == | ||
=== Description === | === Description === | ||
Presumption determines which way the judge should vote in the absence of offense in the debate round. If neither debater has any offense, the judge would have no way of making a decision. Instead, the judge votes on presumption. If the judge votes on presumption, they would affirm if presumption is said to affirm, or they would negate if presumption is said to negate. Naturally, the affirmative should argue that presumption affirms, and the negative should argue that presumption negates. | Presumption determines which way the judge should vote in the absence of offense in the debate round. If neither debater has any offense, the judge would have no way of making a decision. Instead, the judge votes on presumption. If the judge votes on presumption, they would affirm if presumption is said to affirm, or they would negate if presumption is said to negate. Naturally, the affirmative should argue that presumption affirms, and the negative should argue that presumption negates. | ||
There are typically two ways to justify whether presumption affirms or negates: theoretically or substantively. Theoretical justifications will argue that presumption should affirm or negate for reasons based in fairness or education. Substantive justifications will argue that presumption should affirm or negate based on philosophical or textual reasons. | There are typically two ways to justify whether presumption affirms or negates: theoretically or substantively. Theoretical justifications will argue that presumption should affirm or negate for reasons based in fairness or education. Substantive justifications will argue that presumption should affirm or negate based on philosophical or textual reasons. It is considered that the theoretical reasons are stronger justifying why presumption affirms, whereas the substantive reasons are stronger at justifying that presumption negates. | ||
=== Presumption Affirms === | |||
==== Substantive ==== | |||
[1] We assume that statements (i.e. the resolution) are true unless we are given a proactive reason to deny them. For instance, you would assume that my name is <math>X</math> unless you head a reason to doubt me. | |||
[2] The negative's burden is to negate the affirmative. If the negative hasn't met their burden, you should affirm. | |||
==== Theoretical ==== | |||
Theoretical reasons will argue that since affirming is harder than negating, the judge should vote aff on presumption to compensate for the difference in difficulty. That affirming is harder can be justified through analytical arguments or by empirical side-bias studies that show the negative debaters win more rounds. | |||
=== Presumption Negates === | === Presumption Negates === | ||
==== Substantive ==== | |||
[1] We only take an action if we are given a proactive reason to do so; otherwise, we would stick with the status quo, which means the affirmative needs offense. | |||
[2] There are an infinite number of ways a statement could be false but only one way for a statement to be true, which means it is more probable the resolution is false. | |||
==== Theoretical ==== | |||
Theoretical reasons will argue negating is harder than affirming. However, this is typically harder to win because most empirical side-bias studies show that the negative wins a higher percentage of rounds. | |||
== Permissibility == | == Permissibility == | ||
=== Description === | === Description === | ||
Permissibility is a common argument in philosophy (phil) debates. The central claim of permissibility arguments is that there is a moral 'middle ground' between an action being obligatory and prohibited. Permissibility occurs when a moral agent can choose whether or not to do an action and retain their moral status regardless of their choice. Essentially, permissibility is what you ''can'' do as opposed to what you must or cannot. Debaters often argue that permissibility either 'affirms' or 'negates.' Some affirmative arguments claim that ought statements are modal, and therefore to disprove an 'ought' you must prove a prohibition true. Alternatively, negative arguments generally revolve around the definition of the word 'ought.' | Permissibility is a common argument in philosophy (phil) debates. The central claim of permissibility arguments is that there is a moral 'middle ground' between an action being obligatory and prohibited. Permissibility occurs when a moral agent can choose whether or not to do an action and retain their moral status regardless of their choice. Essentially, permissibility is what you ''can'' do as opposed to what you must or cannot. Debaters often argue that permissibility either 'affirms' or 'negates.' Some affirmative arguments claim that ought statements are modal, and therefore to disprove an 'ought' you must prove a prohibition true. Alternatively, negative arguments generally revolve around the definition of the word 'ought.' | ||
=== Permissibility Affirms === | === Permissibility Affirms === | ||
==== Substantive ==== | |||
==== Theoretical ==== | |||
=== Permissibility Negates === | === Permissibility Negates === | ||
==== Substantive ==== | |||
==== Theoretical ==== | |||
Revision as of 03:22, 18 January 2022
Important Note
Permissibility and presumption are not the same concept. They should not be grouped together in the form of "presumption and permissibility affirm/negate" because the arguments that justify presumption are distinct from the arguments that justify permissibility. If your opponent does group the justifications for presumption and permissibility together, you should take advantage of that by articulating which of the warrants actually apply to presumption or permissibility when arguing that one affirms or negates.
Presumption
Description
Presumption determines which way the judge should vote in the absence of offense in the debate round. If neither debater has any offense, the judge would have no way of making a decision. Instead, the judge votes on presumption. If the judge votes on presumption, they would affirm if presumption is said to affirm, or they would negate if presumption is said to negate. Naturally, the affirmative should argue that presumption affirms, and the negative should argue that presumption negates.
There are typically two ways to justify whether presumption affirms or negates: theoretically or substantively. Theoretical justifications will argue that presumption should affirm or negate for reasons based in fairness or education. Substantive justifications will argue that presumption should affirm or negate based on philosophical or textual reasons. It is considered that the theoretical reasons are stronger justifying why presumption affirms, whereas the substantive reasons are stronger at justifying that presumption negates.
Presumption Affirms
Substantive
[1] We assume that statements (i.e. the resolution) are true unless we are given a proactive reason to deny them. For instance, you would assume that my name is unless you head a reason to doubt me.
[2] The negative's burden is to negate the affirmative. If the negative hasn't met their burden, you should affirm.
Theoretical
Theoretical reasons will argue that since affirming is harder than negating, the judge should vote aff on presumption to compensate for the difference in difficulty. That affirming is harder can be justified through analytical arguments or by empirical side-bias studies that show the negative debaters win more rounds.
Presumption Negates
Substantive
[1] We only take an action if we are given a proactive reason to do so; otherwise, we would stick with the status quo, which means the affirmative needs offense.
[2] There are an infinite number of ways a statement could be false but only one way for a statement to be true, which means it is more probable the resolution is false.
Theoretical
Theoretical reasons will argue negating is harder than affirming. However, this is typically harder to win because most empirical side-bias studies show that the negative wins a higher percentage of rounds.
Permissibility
Description
Permissibility is a common argument in philosophy (phil) debates. The central claim of permissibility arguments is that there is a moral 'middle ground' between an action being obligatory and prohibited. Permissibility occurs when a moral agent can choose whether or not to do an action and retain their moral status regardless of their choice. Essentially, permissibility is what you can do as opposed to what you must or cannot. Debaters often argue that permissibility either 'affirms' or 'negates.' Some affirmative arguments claim that ought statements are modal, and therefore to disprove an 'ought' you must prove a prohibition true. Alternatively, negative arguments generally revolve around the definition of the word 'ought.'