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# NC

## O/V

To negate means “**to deny the truth of**” which implies **a)** that you presume neg since negating has no positive connotation and permissibility negates **b)** that indicting assumptions negates since it denies the fact that the resolution can be true by making it logically incoherent **c)** when you sign the ballot you are saying the better debating was done by the neg, which is only sensical under truth testing so that’s the only paradigm in your jurisdiction.

## Analytic FW

There exist two types of knowledge, practical and theoretical. Theoretical concerns immutable features of the world like gravity, whereas practical concerns the “ought,” as to how moral agents should act in situations they have control over. To determine morality, we’re only concerned with practical knowledge, since theoretical knowledge is out of our control and just concerns descriptive facts.

All knowledge has both subjective and objective universal validity. If I am a meteorologist, subjective validity tells me that any other meteorologist should be able to tell the direction a hurricane will spin. Objective validity says that different types of hurricanes would still lead me to the same conclusion of the hurricane spinning in a particular direction. Thus, for every agent, their knowledge of a given situation would be the same as mine. Practical reason has both features, since every moral agent should reason in the same way regardless of which role they play in the same scenario.

These basic principles entail that agents must intend to take universalizable actions, i.e. non-contradictory when all agents act as they do. Universalizability is true for every agent and of every agent, meaning that all agents must act in accordance with it, but also can necessarily deduce it from their reason. Thus, the standard is **consistency with universalizable maxims**, or those that can be applicable to every moral agent.

Impact calc:

1. The framework isn’t aggregative since it’s not a question of minimizing violations to universalizability, but rather a side constraint to action. That also implies obligations are only on you yourself, so it isn’t relevant whether one person’s actions cause other people to act inconsistent with the standard.

2. The standard is based on logical consistency when our actions are applied to everyone. We cannot will a contradiction because then we would will both an action and the opposite, which cannot be practical. The question that we ask isn’t “if we did this, would this create a bad world,” meaning foreseen consequences aren’t relevant.

## Long FW

### Unity of Action

Actions are expressions of an agent’s will and derive from their practical reason. The only reason why we can label actions like crossing the street as that is because my intention for crossing the street, e.g. to get bread, unifies the infinitely divisible steps involved in the action. So, we can only evaluate intentions. Thus, use practical reason since it allows us to will something in accordance with our principles, i.e. to intend something. And even if they win the AC framework, if I win that intentionality unifies action, then all their offense must still be conceptualized through intents. Prefer practical reason:

### Infinite Regress

We can question any moral principle, we can ask “why should I look to this desire?” or “why should I follow this rule?” which means ethical statements are infinitely regressive because we can always keep questioning. Only reason escapes this regress because if I ask “why should I look to reason?” I’m asking for a reason to obey reason which concedes its own authority.

### Practical Identity

Only practical identities can ground the unconditional value of human action, Korsgaard:[[1]](#footnote-1)

Those who think that **the** human **mind** is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self- consciousness” because it **forces us to have a conception of ourselves.** As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that **the principle** or law **by which you determine** your **actions is one that** you regard as being **[is] expressive** of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself. **[How] an agent** might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she **thinks of herself will determine** whether it is **the law** of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of **one’s identity** in question here **is not** a **theoretical** one, a view about what **as** a matter of inescapable **scientific fact** you are. It is better understood as **[but] a description under which you value yourself**, a description under which you find your life to be worth living **and your actions** to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of **these identities give rise to** reasons and **obligations.** Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

### Furrow

Physical facts and empirical realities, like desires and consequences, cannot be the basis of morality because we’re not responsible for descriptive characteristics of the world. Only a priori practical reason solves, **Furrow:**[[2]](#footnote-2)

This is because the source of human dignity is our capacity for freedom. We are distinguished from all other beings by our capacity to rationally choose our actions. If God, nature or other persons imposed moral[s] requirements on us, against our will, our freedom would be fatally compromised. What is more, if our moral decisions were not free but imposed on us, we would not be morally responsible for them, thus undermining the system of praise and blame that is central to our moral framework. Thus, according to Kant, the basic condition for moral agency is moral autonomy – the capacity that each of us has to impose moral constraints on ourselves. Thus far, Kant’s thrilling praise of moral freedom seems compatible with ethical egoism. If moral decisions are up to me then it would seem that I am free to choose in accordance with my self-interest. However, Kant goes on to argue that **I cannot achieve moral autonomy if desires**, emotions **and inclinations govern my moral judgements.** Kant was convinced that **nature is a mechanical system governed by deterministic, physical laws** – causal relationships determine the behaviour of plants, animals and inanimate objects. They have no capacity to choose. But human desires, emotions and inclinations are also part of that deterministic universe, since they are a function of our bodily nature. When we act in accordance with desires, emotions and inclinations, we are simply responding to physical urges much as an animal does. How can human beings escape this deterministic physical world? **The only way** we can **[to] exercise** our **freedom** and autonomy **is to rationally assess** our **actions independent**ly **of** our **desires**. Moral reasoning will set us free – free from desires **and** emotions that chain us to nature. In contexts where moral judgement is required, by reasoning independently of desires, I am imposing **[impose] moral principles on [ourselves]** myself. My actions are self-directed rather than caused by external forces. Kant is not arguing that we should never act on our desires or inclinations. In fact, most of the time we act on what he calls hypothetical imperatives, which involve desires. ‘If you want to earn money, go to work.’ ‘If you are afraid of tigers, then stay out of the jungle.’ These are perfectly acceptable as a basis for action. Actions based on these hypothetical imperatives have instrumental value – they get us something we want. But such actions have no moral value. **When our actions reflect only** our **desires** and inclinations, **and not** our capacity for moral **reason, they are not free and thus** they **have no moral worth, since morality requires freedom.**

### Rules Must Be Known

Any rule must be known by all actors the rule governs, two warrants. A. Just as you wouldn’t blame for not getting you a present if I didn’t know it was your birthday, we wouldn’t hold someone responsible for failing to meet a standard that they didn’t know. B. Rules guide action but they can never guide action if we don’t know what to use to guide our actions. Takes out descriptive standards because some people won’t know the literal fact or document that morality is based upon and thus won’t know the moral rule. Only practical reason solves because all agents possess rationality and can act upon the conclusions of reason.

### Ground Judgments

A priori practical reason is necessary to ground all moral judgments, **Kant**:[[3]](#footnote-3)

We have therefore wanted to say that **all our intuition is nothing but** the **representation** of appearance; that **the things** that **we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be**, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that **if we remove** our own subject or even only **the subjective constitution of** the **senses** in general, **then all constitution**, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves **would disappear**, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. **We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them**, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure **it pertains to every human being**. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can **cognize[d]** only the former **a priori**, i.e., prior to all actual perception, **and** they are **therefore** called **pure** intuition.

### Universalizability

Means external description can never be relevant since our knowledge of the physical world is necessarily filtered. And, such externalist theories can’t evaluate moral properties, **Korsgaard**:

There is another reason why the idea of a constitutive standard is important—or rather, this is the same reason, described a different way, coming from a different direction. It is that we *need* the concept of the *defective*, in the sense described above. Say we have two objects, call them A and B, and they are in some respect different from each other. They have some different non-accidental properties. Now we need to distinguish two ways that A and B can be different from each other in this way: A can be a different *kind* of thing from B, or A can be a *defective instance* of the same kind of thing as B. Suppose A is a defective instance of the same kind of thing as B. Then say we have two objects Y and Z, which differ in regard to the same property, but which areof different kinds. Should we treat these two cases, the case of A and B and the case of Y and Z, any differently? Does it matter what *kinds of things* things are? Why shouldn't all that matters be the properties themselves? If properties are all that matter, then we need not—and cannot—distinguish the different from the defective: different collections of properties will just be different•

Theories reliant on external description can’t reconcile defective and different actions, so under such a framework, moral imperfection is impossible. My framework is the only way to guarantee culpability of actions.

Next, agents must act by universal rules since they must view themselves as the cause of their actions for the coherence of their own agency, so they must identify with their principles and reject non-universal rules, **Korsgaard**:

“The first step is this: [t]o conceive yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. **A rational will is** a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is **aware of itself as a cause.** To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the princxiple of choice. For instance, **suppose** you experience a conflict of desire: **you** have a **desire** to do both **A and B,** and they are incompatible. **You have some principle which favors A** over B, **so you** exercise this principle, and you **choose** to do **A.** In this kind of case,you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. **You regard the choice as yours,** as the product of your own activity, **because you regard the principle of choice as expressive**, or representative, **of yourself.** You must do so, for **the only alternative** to identifying with the principle of choice **is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you,** another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. **But then you are not the cause of the action.”**

**And,** prefer this view because if rationality serves as the basis for normative claims, anything that is asserted to be a maxim must be universalizable because it’s arbitrary to reject a maxim for one person or circumstance while making it sufficient to guide other actions. Thus, the standard is **respecting individual freedom** since willing a violation of freedom couldn’t be universal since you simultaneously extend your own freedom while limiting another’s.

## Contention

Negate:

1. From universality it follows we may not coerce with our own *unilateral* force, we must concede authority to an *omnilateral* will, that is, the state, since when one will dominates another that’s a contradiction. **Kant**:[[4]](#footnote-4)

 **“When I** declare (by word or deed), “I **will** that **an external thing** shall **be mine,” I** thereby declare it **obligat[e]**ory for **everyone** else to **refrain from using the object** of my will.This is an obligation that no one would have apart from this juridical act of mine. **Included** in this claim, however, **is** an **acknowledgment** of being and **that I’m reciprocally bound to** everyone else to exercise a similar and equal restraint with **respect** to **what** i**s theirs. The obligation** involved here **comes from** a **universal rule** of the external juridical relationship that is, the civil society.  Consequently, I am not bound to leave what is another’s property untouched if everyone else does not in turn guarantee to me with regard to what is mine that he will act in accordance with exactly the same principle.  This guarantee does not require a special juridical act, but is already contained in the concept of being externally juridically bound to a duty Verpflichtung on account of the universality, and hence also the reciprocity, of an obligation coming from a universal rule. Now, with respect to an external and contingent possession, **a unilateral Will cannot serve as** a coercive **law for everyone, since that would** be a **violat[e]**ion of **freedom** in accordance with universal laws.  Therefore, **only a Will binding everyone else—that is**, collective **universal** (common), and powerful **Will**—is the kind of Will that **can provide the guarantee required.**The condition of being subject to general external (that is, public) legislation that is backed by power is the civil society. Accordingly, a thing can be externally yours or mind only in a civil society.

Unrestricted speech enables subversive speech against the state, which means restricted speech is key to maintaining the omnilateral will’s legitimacy. **Varden**:[[5]](#footnote-5)

To understand Kant’s condemnation of seditious speech, remember that Kant, as mentioned above, takes himself to have shown that justice is impossible in the state of nature or that there is no natural executive right. Since Kant considers himself to have successfully refuted any defense of the natural executive right, he takes himself also to have shown that no one has the right to stay in the state of nature. This, in turn, explains why Kant can and does consider[s] seditious speech a public crime. The intention behind seditious speech is not merely to criticize the government or to discuss theories of government critically, say. In order to qualify as seditious, the speaker’s intention must be to encourage and support efforts to [it] subvert[s] the government or to [and] instigate[s] its violent overthrow, namely revolution. To have such a right would be to have the right to destroy the state. Since the state is the means through which right is possible, such a right would involve having the right to annihilate right (6: 320). That is, since right is impossible in the state of nature, to have a right to subversion would be to have the right to replace right with might.

2. The aff’s maxim necessarily violates the public right and permits infinite violations of freedom. **Varden 2**:[[6]](#footnote-6)

Kant’s distinction between public and private right can also be used to make sense of controversial issues of hate speech, speech amounting to harassment, and blackmail. First, an explanation why all these kinds of speech will not only be regulated in relation to public spaces, but also private (non-governmental) workplaces. The reason why public spaces of interaction and private workplaces are equally important targets of public law issues from the fact that in capitalist economies, at least, the state has permitted its citizens to become dependent upon private employment to secure access to means and hence to exercise external freedom. Just as the state must ensure that all public spaces are spheres within which its citizens can interact as free, equal and independent bearers of rights, the state must also ensure that [and] an economy on which its citizens are dependent for access to material means functions in the same way. That is to say, insofar as the state permits the capitalist system to become part of the public solution to enabling rightful private property for all, it must also govern that economic system by public law. The state cannot permit such systemic dependence without also ensuring that the systems are not under private control. To permit this would be to permit some private citizens to obtain coercive control over the freedom of other citizens, which is precisely not to ensure that universal law regulates all citizens’ interactions.13 Such private dependency relations are therefore necessarily in conflict with the state’s function, namely to reconcile its monopoly on coercion with each citizen’s innate right to freedom. The right to freedom, as we saw, is the right to independence from rather than dependence upon any private person’s arbitrary choices, which is realized only by subjecting interacting persons’ freedom reciprocally to universal laws of freedom as enabled by the public authority. By issuing public law to govern any systems, including private [systems] ones, upon which the citizens’ exercise of their rights is dependent, the state secures rightful conditions for all.

Outweighs – hindrances on initial hindrances to freedom are necessary to ensure the system of equal freedom, else infinite violations of freedom are inevitable.

# Add-Ons

## Ideal Theory Good

The role of the ballot is to determine, through fair arguments, who best disproves or proves the resolution via linking into the winning, substantively justified ethical framework

1. We need fixed principles to have any meaningful application. Just as you cannot measure something with a ruler constantly changing length, you need a standard by which to judge real world events. Otherwise your framework is incoherent because it cannot measure moral progress at all.

2. Some conversations about ideal theory are good. Broad principles change peoples minds in inclusive ways and allow previously-excluded groups to claim political agency. **Holmstrom[[7]](#footnote-7)**

We have to speak to people where they are, he says, and that means appealing to core values of liberalism: individualism, equal rights and moral egalitarianism. Against what he calls the conventional wisdom among radi- cals, he argues that there is no inherent incompatibility between these values and a radical agenda. If these values are suitably interpreted, I think he is absolutely right. Over two hundred years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft and Toussaint Louverture took the abstract universalistic principles of the French Revolution and extended them to groups they were intended to exclude. Gradually and incompletely women and blacks and landless men have achieved the democratic rights promised to all (in words) by the anti-feudal revolution. So I agree with Charles that such universalistic principles have great value; even if usually applied in self-serving ways, they have a deeply radical potential and it would be foolish of radicals to reject them, any more than we should reject all of the technological developments of the Indus- trial Revolution which also developed with the rise of capitalism. in fact, few American radicals have rejected these aspects of liberalism in their politi- cal practice but have been their strongest champions since the Revolution; socialists of all kinds helped to build the labor and civil rights movements.‘

3. Abstraction is key to stopping oppression. **Wood[[8]](#footnote-8):**

There is no plausibility at all, for example, in the suggestion that such **Kantian principles as** human **equality**, rationalism, **universalism**, and cosmopolitanism **are [not]** in their content **favorable to racism**, sexism, **or** other forms of **oppression**, and such a thesis needs only to be stated explicitly to discredit itself. But this highly implausible thesis may be put forward by implication if it can be associated with the quite distinct but correct point that *even* a cosmopolitan and universalistic ethical theory, such as Kant’s, can be combined with racist or male-supremacist views in its application. It is also true that **[these principles]** egalitarianism, rationalism, universalism, and cosmopolitanism **are** especially **liable to rhetorical** **abuse** by those who advocate policies in direct violation of them, because subscribing to the correct principles at an abstract level is often enough a shabby ploy used to protect contrary policies from criticism. **The thought that this point has any** *philosophical***significance**, however, **rests on** an **error** of abysmal proportions about philosophy and its relation to human practices. **If someone thinks there is a** philosophical **theory** of morality **whose** uncritical **adoption** and mechanical application **would suffice to**  **protect us from evil,** then **that person is looking for something that could never exist. The correct standard for an ethic**al theory **is whether it get things right** at the level of basic principles and values, **not whether it contains some** **magical property that protects us**, in the application of the theory, **from every perversion** or abuse through the influence of tradition and prejudice or the infinite human ingenuity of rationalization. **All theories are** about **equally subject to** such **abuse**, and no theory is immune to it. In fact, if we **[To] think** that the adoption of **a certain philosoph[y]**ical theory, or a certain set of religious dogmas, **will protect us from all** **moral error**, that way of thinking itself **is** extremely dangerous, quite irrespective of the content of the theory or dogma with which we associate it. That thought itself is actually **responsible for** a lot of **the evil** that **people do.**

Any theory, including yours, can be misused – but that’s not a problem with theorizing, that’s a problem with us – also means we should reclaim the true function of these ethical concepts in places like debate to challenge the way they are misunderstood. Your argument is only uniqueness for mine.

1. Korsgaard, Christine M. The Sources of Normativity. THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University. November 16 and 17, 1992. Pg. 81-85 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Dwight Furrow. “Moral Agency.” Ethics. 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Critiqueof Pure Reason. Immanuel Kant. 1781. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Immanuel Kant (leading Kantian scholar) The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, trans. John Ladd. 1797. Indianapolis: Hackett Publsihing, 1999. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Varden, Helga. "A Kantian Conception of Free Speech." Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World. Springer Netherlands, 2010. 39-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Varden, Helga. "A Kantian Conception of Free Speech." Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World. Springer Netherlands, 2010. 39-55. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Holmstrom, Nancy [Prof. Emeritus @ Rutgers]. "Response to Charles Mills's." Radical Philosophy Review 15.2 (2012): 325-330. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Kantian Ethics ALLEN W. WOOD Stanford University [↑](#footnote-ref-8)