## NC TPP Shell

The Bali agreement gives the WTO momentum now. WTO is key to fairness toward developing countries. **McClanahan 13** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**After** more than **a dozen years of negotiations in** the **Doha** round trade talks – and a final push over the past four days during a high-level meeting in Bali – it seems the World Trade Organisation (**WTO**) has finally achieved something: the organisation's 160 **members** appear to have **reached an agreement** (pdf), which should be made official on Friday evening. The implications for developing countries are huge. The Bali meeting's tense final moments came down to a standoff over food security, an issue that had divided developing countries. On one side, India was arguing that it should be allowed to pay its farmers above-market prices for the crops that it buys for the government's domestic food stockpiles. In a country where more than half of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector, farming is very big politics. With elections looming in the first half of next year, Indian officials didn't want to look as though they were selling out Indian farmers on the world stage. On the other side, developing countries such as Thailand, Pakistan, and Uruguay – all of which, like India, are major exporters of rice – contended that overpaid farmers in India could undercut producers in their own countries. The US was also a vocal opponent, arguing that India was asking for allowances that went against the spirit of the free trade talks, which generally aim to reduce – not increase – government intervention in the marketplace. After closed-door meetings that lasted well into the early hours of Friday, the negotiators in Bali finally came to a provisional agreement (pdf), which is due to be finalised on Friday evening. Countries agreed to a four-year peace clause, meaning that they won't challenge India's food security measures before December 2017. In return, India has vowed to ensure that its policies "do not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other [WTO] members", among a few other conditions. By ironing out their differences on food security, negotiators paved the way for deals on two other topics that will have big impacts in the developing world. The first is trade facilitation, which could add $1tn to the global economy by cutting red tape – which tends to be at its thickest in poor countries – at border crossings. The second is a package of issues that are relevant to Least Developed Countries (LDCs); these include allowing LDC exports easier access to rich-country markets. Although the language in those texts has been diluted by years of bargaining, negotiators now appear ready to finalise both agreements. But taking a step back from the nitty-gritty of the negotiations themselves, the biggest news to emerge from Bali is the mere fact that trade officials managed to agree on anything at all. For at least the past five years, as the global trade talks have continued to stumble, **the WTO has appeared** to be **on a** slow but **seemingly inexorable slide toward** total **irrelevance**. The organisation's Doha talks have barely made any progress since 2001, even as regional and bilateral trade agreements – which some see as more realistic alternatives to the global negotiations – have flourished. **But something changed in Bali** today: negotiators proved that they could actually get something done. The so-called Bali package represents just a tiny fraction of the issues that negotiators set out to tackle in the Doha Round talks. But still, it's progress. And who knows how many more breakthroughs Friday's agreement might inspire. The Bali package ends with a commitment for trade officials to develop a "clearly defined work programme" to tackle the remaining issues in the Doha talks. In time, that work could lead to progress on any number of issues that affect developing countries, including deeper cuts to rich countries' farm subsidies and easier access for developing country exports to foreign markets. The WTO has long come under fire from anti-globalisation protestors, and such criticisms continue today, albeit to a lesser extent. But **the WTO remains the only** international **economic forum in which developing countries are on** an **equal footing** with their rich-country counterparts. **Because all decisions** at the WTO **are taken by consensus, every country** that takes part in the global trade talks **has the opportunity to block a deal. The same cannot be said of** the **regional and bilateral negotiations** that have become so popular of late. So the WTO has lived to see another day, and perhaps another decade. Developing countries certainly have their work cut out for them in the negotiations that lie ahead. But progress, as we've seen, is at least possible; it just might take a dozen years to achieve.

Environmental protection makes WTO shutdown more likely.

**Mokhiber and Weissman 99** write[[2]](#footnote-2)

The WTO eviscerates the Precautionary Principle. **WTO rules** generally **block countries from acting in response to potential risk** -- requiring a probability before governments can move to resolve harms **to** human health or **the environment**. The WTO squashes diversity. WTO rules establish international health, environmental and other standards as a global ceiling through a process of "harmonization;" countries or even states and cities can only exceed them by overcoming high hurdles. The WTO operates in secrecy. Its tribunals rule on the "legality" of nations' laws, but carry out their work behind closed doors. **The WTO limits governments' ability to use their purchasing dollar for** human rights, **environmental**, worker rights and other non-commercial **purposes**. In general, **WTO rules state that governments can make purchases based only on quality and cost** considerations. The WTO disallows bans on imports of goods made with child labor. In general, WTO rules do not allow countries to treat products differently based on how they were produced -- irrespective of whether made with brutalized child labor, with workers exposed to toxics or with no regard for species protection. The WTO legitimizes life patents. WTO rules permit and in some cases require patents or similar exclusive protections for life forms. Some of these problems, such as the WTO's penchant for secrecy, could potentially be fixed, but the core problems -- **prioritization of commercial** over other **values**, the constraints on democratic decision-making and the bias against local economies -- cannot, for they **are inherent in the WTO itself**. Because of these unfixable problems, the World Trade Organization should be shut down, sooner rather than later. That doesn't mean interim steps shouldn't be taken. It does mean that beneficial reforms will focus not on adding new areas of competence to the WTO or enhancing its authority, even if the new areas appear desirable (such as labor rights or competition). Instead, the **reform**s to pursue are those **that** reduce or **limit the WTO's power -- for example, by denying it** the **authority to invalidate laws passed pursuant to international environmental agreements**, limiting application of WTO agricultural rules in the Third World, or eliminating certain subject matters (such as essential medicines or life forms) from coverage under the WTO's intellectual property agreement. These measures are necessary and desirable in their own right, and they **would help generate momentum to close down the WTO.**

The WTO Bali agreement is key to the Trans-Pacific Partnership succeeding.

**Schuman 13** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

Beyond the numbers, **the deal tells us** a lot about what’s happening in the global economy today. For much of the past decade, the entire notion that the **nations of the world**, with their varied interests, **could come together on a common set of trade principles** seemed increasingly unlikely, and the WTO more and more irrelevant. Governments frustrated with the lack of progress turned instead to easier-to-achieve bilateral free-trade agreements or regional pacts. Saturday’s victory shows that a truly international approach to trade issues is actually possible. A renewed spirit of cooperation infected **the WTO conference in Bali** that made the deal possible. After months of heated debate, a last-minute (albeit interim) compromise between the U.S. and India over its controversial national food-security program allowed the greater pact to move ahead. The WTO success also **raises hopes that** such **cooperative spirit will spill over into other trade deals** now being negotiated. **The White House is pushing** two big pacts, one with the E.U., the other with a collection of Pacific Rim nations called **the T**rans-**P**acific **P**artnership**. The** two **agreement**s, if reached, **would be the most ambitious achieved by the U.S. since** the **N**orth **A**merican **F**ree **T**rade **A**greement 20 years ago. Republicans and Democrats are trying to overcome their recent acrimony to stiffen President Barack Obama’s negotiating power by granting “fast-track” approval of these deals through Congress.

TPP key to US economic leadership.

**Suominen 12** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

In the 20th century, beginning with the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, America's great contribution was to champion an economic paradigm and set of institutions that promoted open markets and economic stability around the world. The successive Groups of Five, Seven, and Eight, first formed in the early 1970s, helped coordinate macroeconomic policies among the world's leading economies and combat global financial imbalances that burdened U.S. trade politics. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) spread the Washington Consensus across Asia and Latin America, and shepherded economies in transition toward capitalism. Eight **multilateral trade rounds brought down barriers to global commerce**, culminating in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.¶ Meanwhile, a wave of bank deregulation and financial liberalization began in the United States and proliferated around the world, making credit more available and affordable while propelling consumption and entrepreneurship the world over. The U.S. dollar, the world's venerable reserve currency, economized global transactions and fueled international trade. Central bank independence spread from Washington to the world and helped usher in the Great Moderation, which has produced a quarter-century of low and steady inflation around the world.¶ **Globalization** was not wished into being: It **was** the **U.S.-led** order that generated prosperity unimaginable only a few decades ago. Since 1980, global GDP has quadrupled, world trade has grown more than sixfold, the stock of foreign direct investment has shot up by 20 times, and portfolio capital flows have surged to almost $200 trillion annually, roughly four times the size of the global economy. Economic reforms and global economic integration helped vibrant emerging markets emerge: The "Asian Tigers" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) that boomed in the 1980s were joined in the 1990s by the awakening giants of Brazil, China, and India.¶ **It was the U**nited **S**tates **that quarterbacked the play, brokering differences among nations** and providing the right mix of global public goods: a universal reserve currency, an open-trade regime, deep financial markets, and vigorous economic growth. Trade liberalization alone paid off handsomely, adding $1 trillion annually to the postwar U.S. economy.¶ Talk about American decline notwithstanding, the economic order created by the United States persists. In fact, at first blush, it appears to have only been reinforced in the past few years. New institutions such as the G-20, a forum for the world's leading economies, and the Financial Stability Board, a watchdog for the international financial system, are but sequels to U.S.-created entities: the Group of Five and the Financial Stability Forum. Investors still view America as a financial safe haven, and the dollar remains the world's lead currency. Open markets have survived, and 1930s-style protectionism has not materialized. The WTO continues to resolve trade disputes and recently welcomed Russia as its 154th member, while the mission and resources of the Bretton Woods twins -- the World Bank and IMF -- have only expanded. No country has pulled out of these institutions; instead, emerging nations such as China and India are demanding greater power at the table. Countries have opted in, not out, of the American-led order, reflecting a reality of global governance: There are no rival orders that can yet match this one's promise of mutual economic gains.¶ **Still,** while **the American order** is peerless, it **is** also **imperiled**. The deepening European debt crisis, discord over national policies to restore growth, and the all-but-dead Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations speak to the failures of the global economy's existing instruments to manage 21st-century challenges. Instead of coordinating policies, leading countries are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma, elbowing for an edge in world trade and jockeying for power on the world stage. **Tensions simmer over** issues such as exchange-rate manipulation, capital controls, creeping protectionism, and **financial nationalism**.¶ Right at the moment when we most need to shore up the troubled global economic order, **America** -- the architect of this very order -- **is failing to lead**. Even as the United States remains pivotal to global growth, U.S. corporations -- the engines of the American economy -- are stifled by taxes, regulations, and policy uncertainty. Gaping fiscal deficits in the United States are undermining the dollar, exacerbating trade deficits, and undercutting U.S. economic dynamism and credibility in world affairs, but political posturing has obstructed the country's path to solvency. Earlier this week, the IMF warned that if political deadlock takes America to the so-called fiscal cliff of automatic tax hikes and spending cuts in January 2013, it could have a devastating impact on the U.S. and world economies. No wonder America's image as the global economic superpower is receding around the world.¶ Europe's travails, meanwhile, are reducing U.S. companies' exports and overseas profits, threatening America's recovery. And yet Congress has balked at boosting the IMF's resources to fight the eurozone crisis while the Obama administration has deflected responsibility, framing the crisis as Europe's to manage. It has fallen to countries such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia to instead build the firewall that will shield the rest of the world from Europe.¶ The welcome momentum in negotiations between the United States and Pacific Rim countries on the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement does not undo over three years of drift in U.S. trade policy that has jeopardized the very global trading system that the United States built and powered in the postwar era. **The only trade deals that** the **Obama** administration **has passed** -- with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea -- **were** launched and **negotiated by** the **Bush** administration.¶ **The world is** now **facing** a triple threat of global economic instability, divisions among top powers, and **a global leadership vacuum**. This perfect storm could produce a world disorder of mercurial financial markets, widening global imbalances, spreading state capitalism, and beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism -- a scenario with a sorry past and few safe exits.¶ In the late 1940s, a new world order arose because of American strength, vision, and leadership, not because global governance was in vogue. Leadership was never easy: Resistance from allies, protectionist pressures at home, and resource-draining wars all stood in the way. But capitalism spread, trade and financial markets were liberalized, and emerging-market crises were defeated. Global economic integration forged ahead.¶ Today, American leadership is again essential. China prioritizes mercantilism over multilateralism, and emerging nations have yet to fully step up to the plate when it comes to global governance, while Europe and Japan are neither able nor willing to lead. In placing their faith in multilateralism, liberal institutionalists often fail to realize that the world economic order is built on American primacy and power, and Washington's willingness to project it.¶ To lead abroad, the United States must reform at home by imposing ironclad fiscal discipline, cutting taxes and red tape for businesses, and locking in long-term policies -- summoning the private sector to reform schools and rebuild infrastructure, for instance -- that harness the productivity of America's future generations.¶ Abroad, the United States needs to focus on pre-empting instability and integrating the global economy. It should push the IMF to address financial risks before they mushroom into catastrophes, revise the multilateral trade regime to allow for fast deals among a critical mass of members rather than agonizing, decade-long talks requiring the consent of the full membership, and work toward unfettered global financial markets -- all the while deepening access to U.S. goods, services, and investment around the world. **A T**rans-**P**acific **P**artnership **agreement** and a transatlantic free trade pact are low-hanging fruits that **can jump-start global growth** without any new stimulus dollars.¶ The quintessential challenge facing U.S. policymakers is to convince other nations to buy into a rules-based order rather than respond to the siren calls of currency wars and capital controls. For example, with most emerging economies uneasy about Beijing's trade and foreign policies, Washington must incentivize others to take the high ground and strengthen investor protections, enforce intellectual property rights, and adhere to trade rules. With others playing by the rules of the game, a misbehaving China would be turned into a pariah.¶ A stable, integrated, and growing world economy serves our national interests. But **such a world is America's to make.**

Empirics prove economic hegemony solves global conflict. **Hubbard 10** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. **I** then **matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts** in the international system **since 1815**. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. **Regression** analysis of the data **revealed** that there was **a statistically significant negative correlation between** relative **heg**emonic power **and conflict** levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further **analysis revealed** that in both cases, **military power was a less accurate predictor of** military **conflict than economic power**. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, **weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily** than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the **most important** implication of this research **is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power** than through the exercise of military force. II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the **heg**emon **acted as a stabilizing force** by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. **It** also **avoids** some of **the pitfalls** associated **with the case study method, such as selection bias and** the inherently **subjective** nature of **qualitative analysis.**

## NC Econ Shell

The Bali agreement gives the WTO momentum now. This is key to global growth and fairness toward developing countries.

**McClanahan 13** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

**After** more than **a dozen years of negotiations in** the **Doha** round trade talks – and a final push over the past four days during a high-level meeting in Bali – it seems the World Trade Organisation (**WTO**) has finally achieved something: the organisation's 160 **members** appear to have **reached an agreement** (pdf), which should be made official on Friday evening. The implications for developing countries are huge. The Bali meeting's tense final moments came down to a standoff over food security, an issue that had divided developing countries. On one side, India was arguing that it should be allowed to pay its farmers above-market prices for the crops that it buys for the government's domestic food stockpiles. In a country where more than half of the workforce is employed in the agricultural sector, farming is very big politics. With elections looming in the first half of next year, Indian officials didn't want to look as though they were selling out Indian farmers on the world stage. On the other side, developing countries such as Thailand, Pakistan, and Uruguay – all of which, like India, are major exporters of rice – contended that overpaid farmers in India could undercut producers in their own countries. The US was also a vocal opponent, arguing that India was asking for allowances that went against the spirit of the free trade talks, which generally aim to reduce – not increase – government intervention in the marketplace. After closed-door meetings that lasted well into the early hours of Friday, the negotiators in Bali finally came to a provisional agreement (pdf), which is due to be finalised on Friday evening. Countries agreed to a four-year peace clause, meaning that they won't challenge India's food security measures before December 2017. In return, India has vowed to ensure that its policies "do not distort trade or adversely affect the food security of other [WTO] members", among a few other conditions. By ironing out their differences on food security, negotiators paved the way for deals on two other topics that will have big impacts in the developing world. The first is trade facilitation, which could add $1tn to the global economy by cutting red tape – which tends to be at its thickest in poor countries – at border crossings. The second is a package of issues that are relevant to Least Developed Countries (LDCs); these include allowing LDC exports easier access to rich-country markets. Although the language in those texts has been diluted by years of bargaining, negotiators now appear ready to finalise both agreements. But taking a step back from the nitty-gritty of the negotiations themselves, the biggest news to emerge from Bali is the mere fact that trade officials managed to agree on anything at all. For at least the past five years, as the global trade talks have continued to stumble, **the WTO has appeared** to be **on a** slow but **seemingly inexorable slide toward** total **irrelevance**. The organisation's Doha talks have barely made any progress since 2001, even as regional and bilateral trade agreements – which some see as more realistic alternatives to the global negotiations – have flourished. **But something changed in Bali** today: negotiators proved that they could actually get something done. The so-called Bali package represents just a tiny fraction of the issues that negotiators set out to tackle in the Doha Round talks. But still, it's progress. And who knows how many more breakthroughs Friday's agreement might inspire. The Bali package ends with a commitment for trade officials to develop a "clearly defined work programme" to tackle the remaining issues in the Doha talks. In time, that work could lead to progress on any number of issues that affect developing countries, including deeper cuts to rich countries' farm subsidies and easier access for developing country exports to foreign markets. The WTO has long come under fire from anti-globalisation protestors, and such criticisms continue today, albeit to a lesser extent. But **the WTO remains the only** international **economic forum in which developing countries are on** an **equal footing** with their rich-country counterparts. **Because all decisions** at the WTO **are taken by consensus, every country** that takes part in the global trade talks **has the opportunity to block a deal. The same cannot be said of** the **regional and bilateral negotiations** that have become so popular of late. So the WTO has lived to see another day, and perhaps another decade. Developing countries certainly have their work cut out for them in the negotiations that lie ahead. But progress, as we've seen, is at least possible; it just might take a dozen years to achieve.

Environmental protection makes WTO shutdown more likely.

**Mokhiber and Weissman 99** write[[7]](#footnote-7)

The WTO eviscerates the Precautionary Principle. **WTO rules** generally **block countries from acting in response to potential risk** -- requiring a probability before governments can move to resolve harms **to** human health or **the environment**. The WTO squashes diversity. WTO rules establish international health, environmental and other standards as a global ceiling through a process of "harmonization;" countries or even states and cities can only exceed them by overcoming high hurdles. The WTO operates in secrecy. Its tribunals rule on the "legality" of nations' laws, but carry out their work behind closed doors. **The WTO limits governments' ability to use their purchasing dollar for** human rights, **environmental**, worker rights and other non-commercial **purposes**. In general, **WTO rules state that governments can make purchases based only on quality and cost** considerations. The WTO disallows bans on imports of goods made with child labor. In general, WTO rules do not allow countries to treat products differently based on how they were produced -- irrespective of whether made with brutalized child labor, with workers exposed to toxics or with no regard for species protection. The WTO legitimizes life patents. WTO rules permit and in some cases require patents or similar exclusive protections for life forms. Some of these problems, such as the WTO's penchant for secrecy, could potentially be fixed, but the core problems -- **prioritization of commercial** over other **values**, the constraints on democratic decision-making and the bias against local economies -- cannot, for they **are inherent in the WTO itself**. Because of these unfixable problems, the World Trade Organization should be shut down, sooner rather than later. That doesn't mean interim steps shouldn't be taken. It does mean that beneficial reforms will focus not on adding new areas of competence to the WTO or enhancing its authority, even if the new areas appear desirable (such as labor rights or competition). Instead, the **reform**s to pursue are those **that** reduce or **limit the WTO's power -- for example, by denying it** the **authority to invalidate laws passed pursuant to international environmental agreements**, limiting application of WTO agricultural rules in the Third World, or eliminating certain subject matters (such as essential medicines or life forms) from coverage under the WTO's intellectual property agreement. These measures are necessary and desirable in their own right, and they **would help generate momentum to close down the WTO.**

Economic crisis causes nuclear war. **Royal 10**[[8]](#footnote-8)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances **Modelski and Thompson**’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, **find**ing **that** rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous **shocks** such as economic crises could **usher in a redistribution of** relative **power** (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, **increasing** the risk of **miscalculation** (Fearon 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflicts as **a rising power may** seek to **challenge a declining power** (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remains unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggest that “future expectation of trade” is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, **if** the **expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace item such as energy resources, the likelihood for **conflict increases**, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg and Hess, 2002, p. 89) Economic **decline has also been linked with** an increase in the likelihood of **terrorism** (Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. “Diversionary theory” suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting **governments have** increased **incentive**s **to fabricate** external military **conflict**s **to create a “rally around the flag” effect**. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995) and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states due to the fact the democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. De DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States and thus weak Presidential popularity are statically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in economic-security debate and deserves more attention. This observation is not contradictory to other perspectives that link economic interdependence with a decrease in the likelihood of external conflict, such as those mentioned in the first paragraph of this chapter. Those studies tend to focus on dyadic interdependence instead of global interdependence and do not specifically consider the occurrence of and conditions created by economic crises. As such the view presented here should be considered ancillary to those views.

## NC Protectionism Shell

Environmental protection makes WTO shutdown more likely.

**Mokhiber and Weissman 99** write[[9]](#footnote-9)

The WTO eviscerates the Precautionary Principle. **WTO rules** generally **block countries from acting in response to potential risk** -- requiring a probability before governments can move to resolve harms **to** human health or **the environment**. The WTO squashes diversity. WTO rules establish international health, environmental and other standards as a global ceiling through a process of "harmonization;" countries or even states and cities can only exceed them by overcoming high hurdles. The WTO operates in secrecy. Its tribunals rule on the "legality" of nations' laws, but carry out their work behind closed doors. **The WTO limits governments' ability to use their purchasing dollar for** human rights, **environmental**, worker rights and other non-commercial **purposes**. In general, **WTO rules state that governments can make purchases based only on quality and cost** considerations. The WTO disallows bans on imports of goods made with child labor. In general, WTO rules do not allow countries to treat products differently based on how they were produced -- irrespective of whether made with brutalized child labor, with workers exposed to toxics or with no regard for species protection. The WTO legitimizes life patents. WTO rules permit and in some cases require patents or similar exclusive protections for life forms. Some of these problems, such as the WTO's penchant for secrecy, could potentially be fixed, but the core problems -- **prioritization of commercial** over other **values**, the constraints on democratic decision-making and the bias against local economies -- cannot, for they **are inherent in the WTO itself**. Because of these unfixable problems, the World Trade Organization should be shut down, sooner rather than later. That doesn't mean interim steps shouldn't be taken. It does mean that beneficial reforms will focus not on adding new areas of competence to the WTO or enhancing its authority, even if the new areas appear desirable (such as labor rights or competition). Instead, the **reform**s to pursue are those **that** reduce or **limit the WTO's power -- for example, by denying it** the **authority to invalidate laws passed pursuant to international environmental agreements**, limiting application of WTO agricultural rules in the Third World, or eliminating certain subject matters (such as essential medicines or life forms) from coverage under the WTO's intellectual property agreement. These measures are necessary and desirable in their own right, and they **would help generate momentum to close down the WTO.**

The WTO seeks to promote free trade.

**FOE 3** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

The last Uruguay Round of negotiations led to the formation of the WTO. Whereas the GATT was an agreement with 'contracting parties' and served as a negotiating forum, **the WTO is** a recognised international body with 'members', which is **responsible for monitoring and enforcing the** World Trade Agreement (**WTA**) **which sets out the legal basis for trade policy**. The Uruguay Round was the longest, most tortuous and most controversial set of negotiations in the GATT's history. The Uruguay Round was concluded in 1994 and the WTO formed in 1995. By 2001, the WTO's membership stood at 142. **The WTO is responsible for administering** these **agreements and, according to the WTO Secretariat, it has three main objectives; "...to help trade flow as freely as possible,** to **achieve** further **liberalisation** gradually **through negotiation, and** to **set up an impartial means of settling disputes**" (WTO, undated).

Protectionism causes multiple scenarios for extinction. **Panzner 8** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Rising angst will also wreak havoc with links among markets, financial systems, economies, and countries. Many people could find themselves subject to stricter government controls or even find avenues closed off as a result of attempts to stem contagion effects. The widespread urge to withdraw will feed rising xenophobia, already inflamed by illegal immigration, unfair trade practices, and leaking borders. Playing to populist sentiment, politicians around the country will respond enthusiastically to calls for restrictions on foreigners. This will further feed a brain drain, as scientists, students, and other temporary visa holders are left with little choice but to uproot and go elsewhere, further sapping America’s economic resiliency. Continuing **calls for curbs on** the flow of finance and **trade will inspire the U**nited **S**tatesand other nations**to spew forth protectionist legislation**like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. **The rise in**isolationism and**protectionism will bring about** ever more heated arguments and **dangerous confrontations over** shared sources ofoil, gas, and other **key commodities** as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, **efforts to secure adequate supplies will take** increasing **precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply.** Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such **tensions will give rise to full scale military encounters**, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. **Enabled by** cheap technology and **the waning threat of American retribution,** **terror**ist **groups will** likely **boost the frequency and scale of their** horrifying **attacks**, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. **China will** likely **assume a**n increasingly **belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on** overt **colonization of its neighbors** in the Mideast. **Israel**, for its part, **may look to draw a dwindling list of allies** from around the world **into** a growing number of **conflicts.** Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an **“intense confrontation” between the U**nited **S**tates **and China is “inevitable”** at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. **Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces** using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. **Many will interpret [this]** stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies **as the beginnings of a new world war.**

# Frontlines

## AT Not RE-Specific

The WTO is using its trade authority to challenge environmental protection and prioritize resource extraction.

**Global Exchange 11** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

5. The WTO Is Destroying the Environment **The WTO is being used** by corporations **to dismantle** hard-won local and national **environmental protections**, which are **attacked as “barriers to trade.”** The very first WTO panel ruled that a provision of the US Clean Air Act, requiring both domestic and foreign producers alike to produce cleaner gasoline, was illegal. The WTO declared illegal a provision of the Endangered Species Act that requires shrimp sold in the US to be caught with an inexpensive device allowing endangered sea turtles to escape. **The WTO is attempting to deregulate industries including logging, fishing, water** utilities**, and energy distribution, which will lead to further exploitation of** these **natural resources.**

1. Paige McClanahan (freelance journalist covering economics, politics, and development). “Why the WTO agreement in Bali has finally helped developing countries.” The Guardian. December 6th, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/dec/06/wto-agreement-bali-helped-developing-countries-india [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Russell Mokhiber (editor of *Corporate Crime Reporter*) and Robert Weissman (editor of *Multinational Monitor*). “Top 10 Reasons to Shutter the WTO.” Mother Jones. November 24th, 1999. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1999/11/top-10-reasons-shutter-wto [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Michael Schuman (“writes about Asia and global economic issues as a correspondent for TIME in Beijing, China. In his 16 years as a journalist in Asia, he has reported from a dozen countries, including China, India, Japan and Indonesia. Assignments have taken him into Gobi Desert sandstorms, Malaysian mosques, Indian call centers and Chinese shirt factories and to a North Korean state dinner (complete with Kim Jong Il himself). Schuman is the author of The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia's Quest for Wealth. Before joining TIME in 2002, he was a correspondent for the Wall Street Journal and a staff writer for Forbes. Originally from New Jersey, he has a B.A. in Asian history and political science from the University of Pennsylvania and a master of international affairs from Columbia”). “All 159 WTO Members Have Agreed on Something, for the First Time Ever.” Time. December 9th, 2013. http://world.time.com/2013/12/09/all-159-wto-members-have-agreed-on-something-for-the-first-time-ever/ [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Kati, German Marshall Fund of the United States resident fellow 7-6-12, Foreign Policy, “America the Absent,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/06/america\_the\_absent?page=full [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Hegemonic Stability Theory: An Empirical Analysis By: Jesse Hubbard Jesse Hubbard Program Assistant at Open Society Foundations Washington, District Of Columbia International Affairs Previous National Democratic Institute (NDI), National Defense University, Office of Congressman Jim Himes Education PPE at University of Oxford, 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Paige McClanahan (freelance journalist covering economics, politics, and development). “Why the WTO agreement in Bali has finally helped developing countries.” The Guardian. December 6th, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/dec/06/wto-agreement-bali-helped-developing-countries-india [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Russell Mokhiber (editor of *Corporate Crime Reporter*) and Robert Weissman (editor of *Multinational Monitor*). “Top 10 Reasons to Shutter the WTO.” Mother Jones. November 24th, 1999. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1999/11/top-10-reasons-shutter-wto [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Jedediah, director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives, pg 213-215 [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Russell Mokhiber (editor of *Corporate Crime Reporter*) and Robert Weissman (editor of *Multinational Monitor*). “Top 10 Reasons to Shutter the WTO.” Mother Jones. November 24th, 1999. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1999/11/top-10-reasons-shutter-wto [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Friends of the Earth International. “The world trade system: How it works and what’s wrong with it.” August 2003. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Michael Panzner (Faculty Member at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase) 2008 Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Global Exchange (international human rights organization dedicated to promoting social, economic and environmental justice around the world). “Top Reasons to Oppose the WTO.” 2011. http://www.globalexchange.org/resources/wto/oppose [↑](#footnote-ref-12)