# Theory – Coordination

### 1NC

**Interpretation:**

The AFF may not defend that the US federal government take an action in coordination with the fifty states

**Violation:**

**Standards:**

**1.** It’s extra T – The AFF involves extra planks that increase ban effectiveness but aren’t inherent to normal enforcement, like training programs and states sharing data. If congress banned handguns we wouldn’t assume that that entails funding for new training programs, initiatives, etc. – adding those types of coordination is something not inherent to a handgun ban.

And the way federal enforcement occurs due to the commerce clause in the resolution is that they can only threaten to withdraw funds for non-compliance – so partnerships between the ATF and local law agencies would have to be authorized through separate laws.

Extra T is a voting issue – they can coopt neg disads by patching holes and generating new advantages and it’s unpredictable since they’re divorced from the resolution – key to advocacy skills by ensuring they have to defend their position against well-researched objections.

**2.** Limiting fiat to either side of the federal/state boundary is key to test policies whose full implementation depends on multiple levels of government. Coordination is a form of utopian fiat – it’s like Bernie Sanders fiating that Republican governors volunteer state money to implement his free college tuition proposal. Giving the neg the ability to criticize this assumption promotes advocacy skills by forcing debaters to engage with process-based details of policies instead of severing them from the real world.

It’s empirically proven – states said they won’t enforce federal gun law. **Korth and Boehm 14**

ROBBY KORTH and JESSICA BOEHM. “Butt Out: State Legislatures Move to Nullify Federal Gun Laws.” AUG 21 2014. <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/butt-out-state-legislatures-move-nullify-federal-gun-laws-n185326>

Two types of bills are the primary vehicles for the nullification movement.¶ The first type holds that federal laws do not apply to firearms manufactured and sold within a given state. These bills cite the Constitution's interstate commerce clause to argue that the federal government has no power to regulate trade within states.¶ In Utah, for example, guns made, purchased and used in the state are exempt from federal laws under state legislation signed into law in 2010. Commonly known as the Firearms Freedom Act, similar versions of the law have been debated during 78 legislative sessions across 37 states since 2004.¶ The other approach says gun regulation falls outside the scope of the federal government's power, making it state territory. Such bills, often titled the Second Amendment Preservation Act, usually say state officials cannot enforce federal gun laws or limit their ability to do so. Some bills seek to punish any state employees or elected officials who help federal officials.¶ "It's basically saying, 'Federal government, if you want to enforce federal firearms laws in the state of Arizona, you're welcome to do it, but we won't give you any assistance. So in other words, no state police help with (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) raids, no local law enforcement enforcing a federal gun law, none of that," said Mike Maharrey, a spokesman for the Tenth Amendment Center, a for-profit nullification group based in California.

That’s also key to ground - a core part of the neg’s ability to challenge the aff is logistical problems with implementation – policymaking is based on implementation. Elmore 80,

Prof. Public Affairs at University of Washington, PolySci Quarterly 79-80, p. 605, 1980

The emergence of implementation as a subject for policy analysis coincides closely with the discovery by policy analysts that decisions are not self-executing. Analysis of policy choices matter very little if the mechanism for implementing those choices is poorly understood in answering the question, "What percentage of the work of achieving a desired governmental action is done when the preferred analytic alternative has been identified?" Allison estimated that in the normal case, it was about 10 percent, leaving the remaining 90 percent in the realm of implementation.

This means I lose most of my ability to generate DAs to the aff policy since most policymaking concerns implementation. This is especially egregious since bypassing the unpopularity of gun control in many states helps the aff more than the neg, so fiating coordination gives the aff a non-reciprocal strategic advantage.

D. Advocacy skills is a voter – there are a lot of messed up things in the world and we need to defend advocacies to learn how to fix them – it’s also the most important skill we develop from debate since it helps us outside the round

Drop the debater on T:

The round is already skewed from the beginning because their advocacy excluded by ability to generate NC offense– letting them sever doesn’t solve any of the abuse

Theory is an issue of competing interpretations because reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention based on preference rather than argumentation and encourages a race to the bottom in which debaters will exploit a judge’s tolerance for questionable argumentation.

### A2 Lets them read states CPs

1. Their interp doesn’t solve – defending both federal and states lets the neg read JUST states or JUST federal which is even harder to answer since it PICs out of the AFF so they can’t compare

2. Process discussion is good – it’s uniquely key on this topic since questions of implementation and which actors are better for gun control is a huge part of the literature with the states nullification movement, gridlock in congress, etc. – that’s Korth and Boem

3. Questioning implementation problems like alternative actors is key neg ground – policymaking is entirely based on implementation that the AFF waves a magic wand away from – that’s Elmore