# TOC Parfit AC

## 1AC

### Part 1- Contractualism

A meta-ethical constraint on all moral theories is that it must deal with the relation of being able to justify our conduct to each other.

First, this conception of morality flows directly from the nature of value. Nagel[[1]](#footnote-1) 02:

Nagel, Thomas [University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University]. “Scanlon’s Moral Theory” in *Concealment and Exposure & Other Essays*. Oxford University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 148-9.

The central claim is that the motivational source of morality is something quite different from the impartial universal benevolence most naturally expressed by a utilitarian system—a system whose ultimate standard is the maximization of overall, aggregate well-being. In fact he sets himself against the natural but simplistic idea that well-being is the domin ant value or that any other measure of the good, conceived as an end to be promoted by everyone, is the basic form of value. Value takes many forms other than that of something to be promoted or maximized. One would not, he observes, show an appreciation for the value of friendship by betraying one friend in order to make several new ones. Morality[’s], too, is not identiﬁed with promoting the good—human happiness, for example. Its motivating aim, according to Scanlon, is a certain kind of relation with our fellow human beings, the relation of being able to justify our conduct to each other, as individuals, in what he describes as a form of “codeliberation.” That is how we show our appreciation of the distinctive value of persons—not by promoting a collective human good in which the interests of a minority may be out-weighed by the greater aggregate interests of a majority.

Second, only moral theories based in justifiability to other persons recognize that there is no universal moral point of view by accounting for individual reasons.

Nagel[[2]](#footnote-2) 89:

 Nagel, Thomas [University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University]. *The View from Nowhere*. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. Print.

In the pursuit of this goal, however, even at its most successful, something will inevitably be lost. If we try to understand experience from an objective viewpoint that is distinct from that of subject of the experience, then even if we continue to credit its perspectivial nature, we will not be able to grasp its most specific qualities unless we can imagine them subjectively. We will not know exactly how scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach even if we develop a detailed objective phenomenology of the cockroach sense of taste. When it comes to values, goals, and forms of life, the gulf may be even more profound. Since this is so, no objective conception of the mental world can include it all. But in that case it may be asked what the point is of looking for such a conception. The aim was to place perspective and their contents in a world seen from no particular point of view. It turns out that some aspects of those perspectives cannot be fully understood in terms of an objective concept of mind. But if some aspects of reality can’t be captured in an objective conception, why not forget the ambition of capturing as much of it as possible? The world just isn’t the world as it appears to one highly abstracted point of view that can be pursued by all rational beings. And if one can’t have complete objectivity, the goal of capturing as much of reality as one can in an objective net is pointless and unmotivated. I don’t think this follows. The pursuit of a conception of the world that doesn’t put us at the center is an expression of philosophical realism, all the more so if it does not assume that everything real can be reached by such a conception. Reality is not just objective reality, and any objective conception of reality must include an acknowledg[e]ment of its own incompleteness. (This is an important qualification to the claims of objectivity in other areas as well.) Even if an objective general conception of mind were developed and added to the physical conception of objectivity, it would have to include the qualification that the exact character of each of the experimental and intentional perspectives with which it deals can be understood only from within or by subjective imagination. A being with total imaginative power could understand it all from inside, but an ordinary being using an objective concept of mind will not. In saying this we have not given up the idea of the way the world really is, independently of how it appears to us or to any particular occupant of it. We have only given up the idea that this coincides with what can be objectively understood. The way the world is includes appearances, and there is no single point of view from which they can all be fully grasped. An objective conception of mind acknowledges that the features of our own minds that cannot be objectively grasped are examples of a more general subjectivity, of which other examples lie beyond our subjective grasp as well.

#### Thus, since the nature of morality’s demands involves justification between persons, my standard is upholding principles that everyone could rationally consent to. Only this standard accounts for justifiability because for an action to be moral, it must be consistent with the reasons of all parties that are affected by the action.

#### Additional Reasons to prefer the standard:

#### 1. It is morally wrong to act in any way in which anybody could not rationally consent because that would mean there are stronger moral reasons in favor of an alternative act.

PARFIT 1 [Derek Parfit, “On What Matters”, 2011, DDA]

Whenever someone could not rationally consent to some act, there must be certain facts that give this person decisive reasons to refuse consent. These facts provide moral objections to this act. These objections must be significantly stronger than the objections to any other possible act to which everyone could rationally consent. Whenever there are significantly stronger moral objections to one of two acts, this act is wrong. Therefore It is wrong to act in any way to which anyone could not rationally consent. This principle also has many plausible implications, since it condemns many of the acts that are most clearly wrong, such as many acts of killing, injuring, coercing, deceiving, stealing, and promise-breaking. Many of these acts treat people in ways to which they would not have sufficient reasons to consent.

#### 2. Contractualism incorporates individual subjective perspectives into an objective morality and ensures that individual reasons are given weight. Scanlon[[3]](#footnote-3) 2k [Thomas Scanlon “*What We Owe to Each Other*” Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print.]

We cannot respond to all the reasons that every human creature has for wanting his or her life to go well;so we must select among [them] these reasons; and we should do this in a way that recognizes the capacity of human beings**,** as rational creatures, to assess reasons and to govern their lives according to this assessment. In my view the best response to these two considerations is this: respecting the value of human (rational) life requires us to treat rational creatures only in ways that would be allowed by principles that they could not reasonably reject insofar as they, too, were seeking principles of mutual governance which other rational creatures could not reasonably reject. This responds to the problem of select[s]ing among reasons in a way that recognizes our distinctive capacities as reason-assessing, self-governing creatures.

#### Thus, contractualism accounts for the source of morality as an interpersonal undertaking—it accounts for the need to justify *individual* reasons to others by generating rules based on reasonable cooperation between persons.

3. Morality must respect agents as having value because the point of a moral code is to regulate interpersonal conduct, which wouldn’t matter if people had no value. Contractualism is key to treating people as valuable ends

ASHFORD AND MULGAN [Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan “Contractualism” 2007. SEP]

Moral requirements determine what it is to respond properly to the value of persons as rational agents. The distinctive value of human life lies in the human capacity to assess reasons and justifications. Therefore, appreciating the value of a person involves recognising her capacity to appreciate and act on reasons. The way to value this capacity is to treat persons in accord with principles they could not reasonably reject. In doing so, the agent is guided by a principle that can rightly be characterised as one that the person herself authorised that agent to be guided by, in thinking about the appropriate way to relate to her. Contractualism illuminates the compelling Kantian insight that we ought to treat persons never as mere means but always as ends in themselves. It interprets this as treating them according to principles they could not reasonably reject.

### Part 2- Value-Based Reasons

#### Rational consent is determined by impartial value-based reasons rather than subjective desire-based reasons.

#### *Part two is the meta-ethic of objective value based reasons.* There are two possible types of reasons- subject-based and object-based reasons.Reasons must be value-based, meaning they are based on facts of our objectives rather than on subject-based facts about our present subjective desires.

PARFIT 2 **[Ibid, DDA]**

There are two main kinds of view about what I shall call practical reasons. According to one group of views, there are certain facts that give us reasons both to have certain desires and aims, and to do whatever might achieve these aims. These reasons are given by facts about the objects of these desires or aims, or what we might want or try to achieve. We can therefore call such reasons object-given. If we believe that all practical reasons are of this kind, we are Objectivists about Reasons, who accept or assume some objective theory. Object-given reasons are provided by the facts that make certain outcomes worth producing or preventing, or make certain things worth doing for their own sake. In most cases, these reason-giving facts also make these outcomes or acts good or bad for particular people, or impersonally good or bad. So we can also call these objective reasons and theories value-based. These two kinds of theory are very different. According to Objectivists, though many reasons for acting can be claimed to be given by the fact that some act would achieve one of our aims, these reasons derive their force from the facts that give us reasons to have these aims. These are the facts that make these aims relevantly good, or worth achieving.

#### Desires are not responses to reasons. Hedonic likings and dislikings of various sensations are distinct from our desires. Such hedonic likings or dislikings can’t be derived from reasons because we don’t have reasons to like or dislike these sensations.

PARFIT 3 **[Ibid, DDA]**

When we want something, we are often responding to the features of this thing that give us reasons to want it. But we have some desire-like states that are not, in this way, responses to reasons. Three examples are the instinctive states of hunger, thirst, and lust. Another important set of mental states, though they are often assumed to be desires, are better regarded as being in a separate [from desires] category. These are the hedonic likings and dislikings of certain actual present sensations that make our having these sensations pleasant, painful, or in other ways unpleasant, or in which their pleasantness or unpleasantness partly consists. It is sometimes claimed that these sensations are in themselves good or bad in the sense that their intrinsic qualitative features, or what they feel like, gives us reasons to like them or dislike them. But we do not, I believe, have such reasons. Nor could these likings or dislikings be either rational or irrational. That is clearest in the case of some sensations that some people love and others hate, such as the sensations that we can give ourselves by eating milk chocolate, taking strenuous exercise, and having cold showers. Some of these likings or dislikings are odd. Many people hate the sound of squeaking chalk. I hate the feeling of touching velvet, the sound of buzzing house-flies, and the flattening, deadening effect of most overhead lights. The oddness of these dislikes does not make me less than fully rational. Whether we like [or], dislike, or are indifferent to these various sensations, we are not responding or failing to respond to any reasons.

#### Our desires are unable to give us reasons- when we are in pain what is bad is not the sensation, but the state of having that sensation that we dislike. Our hedonic likings make states good or bad, not our meta-hedonic desires, so sensations such as pleasure and pain don’t prove that our desires give us reasons.

PARFIT 4 **[Ibid, DDA]**

Since these claims are controversial, we can return to those non-aesthetic sensations that people like or dislike. Though these sensations are not in themselves good or bad, they are parts of complex mental states that are good or bad. When we are in pain, what is bad is not our sensation but our conscious state of having a sensation that we dislike. If we didn’t dislike this sensation, our conscious state would not be bad. What these sensations feel like may in part depend on whether we dislike them. Such sensations might be claimed to be in themselves bad when their quality is affected in certain ways by our disliking them. On this view, it would still be true that, if we didn’t dislike these sensations, neither they nor our conscious state would be bad, nor would we be failing to respond to some reason. When we are having some sensation that we intensely like or dislike, most of us also strongly [we] want to be, or not to be, in this conscious state. Such desires about such conscious states [are] we can call meta-hedonic. Many people fail to distinguish between hedonic likings or dislikings and such meta-hedonic desires. But these mental states differ in several ways. What we dislike is some sensation. What we want is not to be having a sensation that we dislike. Our desire could be fulfilled either by our ceasing to have this sensation, or by our continuing to have it but ceasing to dislike it. No such claims apply to dislikes, which, unlike desires, cannot be fulfilled or unfulfilled. Another difference involves time. Suppose that some flame is moving towards our hand, threatening us with great pain in the near future. Most of us would strongly want to avoid this future pain. But we cannot now dislike this future pain. Nor can we now like some future pleasure. Unlike our meta-hedonic desires, our hedonic likings or dislikings cannot be aimed at the future, or at what is merely possible. That is another reason why I do not call these mental states desires. If we call these states desires, we should remember that, given the differences between these states and our other desires, true claims about these states may not apply to our other desires. There are some other important and often ignored differences between these states and our meta-hedonic desires. First, many people believe that our desires can create or confer value or disvalue. Korsgaard, for example, writes that something can be ‘objectively good as an end because it is desired for its own sake’. On this view, we create value by valuing things, and things matter by mattering to us. This view may seem to be supported by the examples of pleasure and pain. Our hedonic likings and dislikings do, as I have said, make some of our conscious states good or bad. If we fail to distinguish between these likings or dislikings and our meta-hedonic desires, we may believe that these desires make their objects good or bad. That may seem to support the general view that our desires can create value. Korsgaard’s remarks provide one example. To illustrate her claim that something can be good ‘because it is desired for its own sake’, Korsgaard writes: ‘chocolate gets its value from the way it affects us. We confer value on it by liking it.’ Such examples do not, I believe, show that our desires can create or confer value, or disvalue, by making what we want to have, or to avoid, good or bad. Our future pleasures or pains are not made to be good or bad by our present desires to have these pleasures, and to avoid these pains. And when we are in great pain, by having some sensation that we intensely dislike, what makes our conscious state bad is our intense dislike, not our present desire not to be having the sensation that we dislike. Since o[O]ur meta-hedonic desires do not make their objects good or bad, the examples of pleasure and pain do not decisively, or even, I believe, strongly support the view that our other desires have such value-creating power. Though it is good to have sensations that we like, nothing is good merely because we want this thing. There is another important difference between these two kinds of mental state. Unlike our hedonic likings or dislikings, our meta-hedonic desires are responses to reasons, since we can have strong reasons for and against having such desires. This difference is enough to show that we should distinguish these two kinds of mental state. When we are experiencing intense pleasure, by having some sensation that we intensely like, we have no reason to be liking this sensation. If we did not like this sensation, we would not be being irrational, or making any mistake. But we have strong reasons to want to be having, and to go on having, sensations that we intensely like. We have even stronger reasons to want not to be in agony, by having sensations that, for no reason, we intensely dislike.

#### Pain is bad because there is some fact about pain that makes it intrinsically disvaluable. Since we believe pain is bad and try to avoid it, object-given reasons give better explanation of why.

#### Subjective desire-based moral theories fail because they lead to implausible implications such as people having no reason to avoid future agony.

#### PARFIT 5 [Ibid, DDA]

Subjective theories can have implausible implications. Suppose that, in Case One, I know that some future event would cause me to have some period of agony. Even after ideal deliberation, I have no desire to avoid this agony. Nor do I have any other desire or aim whose fulfilment would be prevented either by this agony, or by my having no desire to avoid this agony. Since I have no such desire or aim, all subjective theories imply that I have no reason to want to avoid this agony, and no reason to try to avoid it, if I can. According to these theories, it is only certain facts about our own present desires, aims, or choices that give us reasons, or on which our reasons depend. We are supposing that, in Case One, I have carefully considered all of the relevant facts about my possible future period of agony. Since I have no present desire or aim whose fulfilment would be prevented either by this agony, or by my having no desire to avoid this agony, all subjective theories imply that I have no reason to want to avoid this agony. Similar claims apply to my acts. Even if I could easily avoid this agony—perhaps by moving my hand away from the flames of some approaching fire—I have no reason to act in this way. Such a reason would have to be provided by some relevant present desire, and I have no such desire. We are discussing the views of Non-Analytical Subjectivists. These people use the phrase ‘a reason’ in the normative sense that we can also express with the phrase ‘counts in favour’. These Subjectivists agree that it would make sense to claim that I have a reason to want and to try to avoid this future agony. But these people’s theories imply that, since I have no relevant present desire, I have no such reason. No fact counts in favour of my wanting and trying to avoid this agony. Similar claims apply to other such cases. According to these Subjectivists, when we have no relevant present desires, we would have no reason to want to avoid some period of future agony. We can now argue: We all have a reason to want to avoid, and to try to avoid, all future agony. Subjectivism implies that we have no such reason. Therefore Subjectivism is false.

#### ADD THE ALL OR NONE ARGUMENT

CHAPTER 4 FURTHER ARGUMENTS

12 The All or None Argument

Subjective theories could also imply that we have decisive reasons to cause ourselves to be in agony for its own sake, to waste our lives, and to try to achieve other bad or worthless aims. In response to this objection, Subjectivists might claim that, for some desire or aim to give us a reason, we must have some reason to have this desire or aim. But these people cannot defensibly make this claim. On subjective theories, all that matters is whether some act would fulfil our present fully informed desires or aims. It is irrelevant what we want, or are trying to achieve. Either all of these desires give us reasons for acting, or none of them do. Since it is clear that some of these desires could not give us reasons, we should conclude that none of them do.

Some of our desires can be claimed to give us reasons to have other desires, but any such chain of desire-based reasons must begin with some desire that we have no reason to have. Since such desires cannot be defensibly claimed to give us reasons, Subjectivists cannot defensibly

￼￼￼￼￼￼Summary 5 claim that we have desire-based reasons to have any desire or aim, or to

act in any way.

#### Only value-based theories can give us reasons to act because desires would give us reasons to cause ourselves to be in agony.

#### PARFIT

If all such desires gave us reasons, our desires could give us decisive reasons to cause ourselves to be in agony for its own sake, to waste our lives, and to try to achieve countless other bad or worthless aims. We could not have such reasons. Therefore None of these desires gives us any reason. We have no such desire-based reason to have any desire, or to act in any way. We can call this the All or None Argument. Similar arguments apply to aim-based and choice-based reasons. When we want to avoid agony, or to be happy, or we have other good or rational aims, we do indeed have reasons to try to fulfil these desires and achieve these aims. But these reasons are provided, not by the facts that these acts would fulfil or achieve these desires or aims, but by the features of what we want, or have as our aims, that make these events good or worth achieving.

### Part 3- Impact Analysis

#### Because desires don’t provide reasons for action, employers and employees have to consider all parties affected by wage levels rather than merely their own desires.

#### The two criteria to determine parties’ ability to rationally consent are benefits and burdens and number of people affected.

#### PARFIT 6 [Ibid, DDA]

As these examples suggest, whether we could rationally consent to some act depends in part on the benefits or burdens that would come to us or other people in the different outcomes that would be produced by this and the other possible acts. It makes a difference both how great these benefits or burdens would be, and to how many people they would come. It also makes a difference, I believe, how badly off we and the other people are. And it may make a difference whether we or the others are responsible for various features of our situation. That might be true, for example, if some of us have worked to produce the possible benefits, or are responsible, through negligence or recklessness, for the possible burdens. There may be other acts to which we would not have sufficient reasons to consent even though these acts would not impose any significant burden on us. We can have strong reasons, for example, to refuse consent to other people’s deciding how our lives will go, even when these people’s decisions would not be bad for us. Whenever people could not rationally give informed consent to being treated in some way, there must be facts about these acts which give these people decisive reasons to refuse consent. White, I have claimed, could not rationally consent to my saving Grey’s leg rather than White’s life, given the fact that White’s loss would be so much greater than Grey’s. This fact can also be plausibly claimed to make this act wrong. Similar claims apply to other cases. Whenever certain facts would give some people decisive reasons to refuse consent to being treated in some way, these facts would also provide moral objections to these acts.

#### And, two groups are affected by whether living wage is imposed by the government presumed- the employer and employee.

#### When making a choice affecting multiple parties under a value-based objective theory there are sufficient reasons to make things impartially better or better for ourselves. Under this paradigm, all people would rationally consent to what would always stop the greatest possible harm that could occur to any single person affected.

#### PARFIT 7 [Ibid, DDA]

What the Consent Principle implies depends on our assumptions about which facts give us reasons. If we assume either some desire-based subjective theory, or Rational Egoism, the Consent Principle would not be plausible, and would mistakenly condemn many permissible or morally required acts. Suppose, for example, that in Earthquake, two people, White and Grey, are trapped in slowly collapsing wreckage. I am a rescuer, who could prevent this wreckage from either killing White or destroying Grey’s leg. We ought, I have claimed, to accept some wide value-based objective theory. On such views, when one of two possible choices would make things go in a way that would be impartially better, but some other choice would make things go better either for ourselves or for those to whom we have close ties, we often have sufficient reasons to make either choice. Earthquake, I believe, is one such case. If Grey could choose how I would act, she would have sufficient reasons, I believe, to make either choice. Grey could rationally choose that I save her leg, since this choice would be much better for her. But she would not be rationally required to make this choice. Grey could rationally choose instead that I save White’s life. Grey could rationally regard White’s well-being as mattering about as much as hers, and White’s loss in dying would be much greater than Grey’s loss in losing her leg. White, in contrast, could not rationally choose that I save Grey’s leg. We could often rationally choose to benefit some stranger, I believe, even if our choice would make us lose a somewhat greater benefit. But there is too great a difference between the possible benefits to White and Grey. White would not have sufficient reasons to give up her life so that I could save Grey’s leg. So the Consent Principle rightly requires me to save White’s life, since this is the only act to which both Grey and White could rationally consent.

#### Additionally, the only choice all parties could rationally consent to is helping the larger group.

#### PARFIT 8 [Ibid, DDA]

Suppose next that, in Lifeboat, I am stranded on one rock, and five people are stranded on another. Before the rising tide drowns all of us, you could use a lifeboat to save either me or the five. We are all young, and would lose as much in dying. Though some people would believe that you ought to give me some chance of being saved—which might be a chance of one in six or even one in two — most people would believe, more plausibly, that you ought to save the other five people. We ought, I believe, to reject this view. Though I could rationally choose that you save me, I could also rationally choose, I believe, that you save the five. I would have sufficient reason to give up my life if I could thereby save five strangers. Could the five rationally consent to your saving me rather than them? The word ‘consent’ may be misleading here, since we may assume that each of the five could give consent only on her own behalf. But we should not make that assumption. When we apply the Consent Principle, we should ask whether, if each of the five could give or refuse consent to your act in the act-affecting sense, thereby choosing how you will act, this person could rationally choose that you save me rather than the five. The answer is clearly No. Suppose that Green is one of the five. Green would not have sufficient reasons to choose that you save me rather than saving [the five] both Green and four other people. Green would have [for] both strong personal and strong impartial reasons not to make this choice. On these assumptions, the Consent Principle rightly implies that you ought to save the five, since this is the only act to which both I and each of the five would have sufficient reasons to consent.

### Part 4- Offense

I contend that a just government requiring employers to pay a living wage is a principle that everybody could rationally consent to.

Contention 1 is benefits and burdens- Although the employer faces a burden when they have to pay more money to their employee, the benefit the employee gains outweighs. Because of the law of diminishing marginal utility, the extra money will always benefit the worker more than it will hurt the employer because the worker makes less money and has less assets than the employer, so receiving the same amount of money positively impacts the life of the worker to a greater extent than it negatively impacts the life of the employer. An employee is able to afford basic necessities in the aff world, which helps them more than the employer is hurt because the employer is already above the poverty line. Therefore, both the employer and employee could rationally consent to a living wage being required, but an employee couldn’t consent to a world where a living wage isn’t required.

Contention 2 is group size- The pool of employers that would be forced to pay a living wage is significantly smaller than the employees who would receive additional compensation. This is a priori true because every employee has one employer, so if a single employer has multiple employees then there are more employees, empirically proven because most companies have multiple employees and huge corporations have thousands. Therefore, employers and employees could rationally consent to a living wage because it helps the larger group, that’s explained in Parfit 9. However, employees could not rationally consent to not having a living wage because that benefits the much smaller group of employers.

### Part 5- Framing

The affirmative burden is proving the truth of the resolution that employers should be required to pay a living wage. That means the negative burden is to deny the truth of the resolution. Proving a contradictory statement to the resolution is insufficient to negate under truth testing, so vote aff if I prove the resolution true no matter what the neg proves. Use truth-testing

1. **To negate[[4]](#footnote-4) means** “to deny the **existence or** truth of,”, **so the most predictable burdens are is truth and falsity since the text is all we have going into the round.**
2. **Simplicity- Truth testing is the simplest framework. Alternatives introduce vagueness which kills predictability, pre-round prep, and judging objectivity.**

BALDWIN 09

[Jason Baldwin, PhD candidate in philosophy at Notre Dame, “Truth or Consequences: A Response to Nelson’s World Comparison LD Paradigm.”, December 2009]

Even granting that the world comparison paradigm is not a radical rejection of the role of truth in academic debate, it is obviously different from the resolutional truth paradigm. We have already seen that Nelson’s two reasons for preferring world comparison to resolutional truth do not really tell for or against either paradigm. So are there any reasons to prefer one paradigm to the other, or must the choice between them be arbitrary? Unsurprisingly, I believe there are good reasons to prefer the resolutional truth paradigm. These reasons are, in brief, that the resolutional truth paradigm is simpler to understand and apply than the world comparison alternative, and also that it preserves a wider range of interesting issues for students to debate. Let me expand on each of these points in turn. The resolutional truth paradigm, in combination with a reasonable specification of burdens (such as the symmetrical one I suggested above) is the picture of simplicity and common sense. There is no mystery about what proposition is to be the subject of the debate[d]. It is the resolution, the proposition that intuitively (I am tempted to say, blazingly obviously) the debate is supposed to be about. This fact allows everyone involved to begin with a shared understanding of burdens, of what will count as winning the LD game, and thus allows debaters to prepare effectively before rounds, and judges to assess arguments during rounds, within a common framework of predictable expectations**.** Rejecting the resolution as the subject of debate opens a Pandora’s Box of incompatible and less clear alternatives. For the reasons summarized above, insofar as we remain within the realm of academic debate, all of the alternatives will be propositions, and whatever debate occurs will involve arguments for their truth or falsity. Examples of such alternatives include the proposition that the world would be a better place if people routinely thought in terms of the concepts employed in the resolution, the proposition that the affirmative case successfully proves the resolution, the proposition that the world would be a better place if the judge behaved as if she believed the resolution, and the proposition that the judge should vote for the affirmative debater. Once we depart from the resolution itself as the proposition to be debated, I see [there is] no non-arbitrary way to select the relevant proposition from among these and many other possibilities. And insofar as many of these alternatives embed some interpretation of the resolution in a more complex framework, the[y**]** alternatives will necessarily be more complex and less clear than the resolution itself.

1. **All neg offense is non-unique. World comparison relies on truth claims also.**

BALDWIN 2

It has turned out that neither of the considerations (burdens, value standards) that were supposed to motivate us to abandon the resolutional truth paradigm and embrace the world comparison paradigm really counts against the former and in favor of the latter. This result may be less surprising once we recognize that the world comparison paradigm is not as radically different from the resolutional truth paradigm as it might have initially appeared. In particular, the world comparison paradigm does not shift the focus of the debate away from truth claims. It simply moves the debate from one type of truth claim (the resolution) to another (the claim that some set of possible worlds is more desirable or choice-worthy than a different set of possible worlds). Moreover, both types of truth claims are propositions of value in the broad sense in which LD has traditionally been thought to center on propositions of value. So any weaknesses the resolutional truth paradigm has in virtue of its focus on normative truth claims will be shared by the world comparison paradigm, since it, too, focuses on normative truth claims.

1. **Critical thinking- Truth testing controls the link to critical thinking. All forms of reasoning rely on truth focus.**

BALDWIN 3

Less obviously, the activity of reasoning commits one to the reality of truth and falsehood. Reasoning just is the tracking ofconsistency and probabilityrelationships among sentences, andconsistency and probability are relationships between the truth values of sentences (the two basic truth values are true and false). Here is an example: Suppose I reason deductively from the two premises (1) If P, then Q, and (2) P, to the conclusion (3) Q. My reasoning is valid because (1) and (2) logically imply (3). But what does it mean for (1) and (2) to logically imply (3)? It means simply that if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) must also be true. Inferences can be deductively valid (or invalid) only if their component sentences can be true or false (I say can be true or false only to indicate that one need not know the actual truth value of a sentence to check the validity of an inference in which it figures). Andthe same thing goes, mutatis mutandis, for inductivereasoning: an inductive inference traces the probability of truth values rather than their consistency, but all reasoning is about the truth and falsehood of sentences.

1. **Philosophical education- world comparison excludes nonconsequentialist moral theories which kills philosophical education.**

BALDWIN 4

The problem is that the world comparison paradigm filters outsuchnonconsequentialistperspectives from the start. The affirmative defending the world in which fewer innocents die wins every round. The paradigm decrees,as a matter of the rules of the debate game rather than a substantive issue to be settled within in it, that all that matters is the relative desirability of the resulting worlds. Theresolutionaltruth paradigm, by contrast, remains properly neutral on the issue. It does not beg any questions about which normative theories are preferable to others. It leaves the appraisal of normative theories as work for the debaters to do in the course of proving or disproving the resolution. It therefore invites the discussion of a broader range of [philosophy]philosophically interesting issues than does the world comparison alternative. I believe this virtue of the resolutional truth paradigm, when coupled with its relative clarity and simplicity, gives us a decisive reason to prefer it to the world comparison paradigm. Nelson has granted in correspondence that the world comparison paradigm does exclude nonconsequentialist normative theoriesin just the way I have described. But he believes that this is an acceptable cost because he alleges that nonconsequentialist theories bestow an unfair advantage on the debaters who use them. I confess that I do not understand this objection. I do not see what could possibly be unfair about deploying a moral or political theory in values debate to argue that an assigned resolution is true or false. Nonconsequentialist theories are no more or less controversial in philosophical circles than are consequentialist theories. Consequentialist philosophers and legal scholars do not raise the white flag when they confront nonconsequentialist challengers. Nonconsequentialist positions (of which there are many) have been vigorously criticized, as have consequentialist positions. Such criticisms are available in accessible literature for debate students who are not prepared to generate them in the heat of battle. Moreover, nonconsequentialist positions 26 Vol 84, No. 4 are typically available on both sides of an LD resolution, as are consequentialist positions. Of course, a tightly constructed nonconsequentialist argument may have a powerful persuasive effect on an audience—but so may a tightly constructed consequentialist argument.

1. **AFC- A. Interpretation:** The negative must accept the aff’s paradigm for evaluating the resolution if that paradigm is truth-testing. **B. Violation:** The neg violates if they contest truth-testing.

**C. Standards:**

**1. Time skew**- my interp preserves the value of 100% of the 1AC. I’m forced to speak first and define the starting point for debate, so they can always shift paradigms to moot 6 minutes of AC offense and all pre-round prep. Time skew is the most important impact to fairness because if you don’t have time to make arguments, you can’t debate, making it a prerequisite to all other standards.

**2. Strategy skew**- The NC can adapt to the AC but the AC can’t adapt so the neg can maximize the use of its speech time by reading turns to my paradigm and offense to a different paradigm, but the 1ar has to respond to multiple layers of the debate to ensure the 6 minutes I committed to the AC stay relevant. Preventing strategy skews is key to fairness because if the neg can form strategy better than the aff, it has an easier shot at winning the round structurally.

### Part 6- Underview

#### Literature consensus proves that the poverty rate elasticity is negative, which means increasing the minimum wage reduces poverty.

#### DUBE 13 [Arindrajit Dube, Economist at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Minimum Wages and the Distribution of Family Incomes”, December 30, 2013, DDA]

To take stock, the results in this literature are varied and sometimes appear to be inconsistent with each other. But is it possible to filter out some of the noise and actually obtain a signal? First, I note that across these 12 studies, nearly all (48) of the 54 estimates of the poverty rate elasticity are negative in sign. Indeed, only one study by Neumark et al. (2005) suggests that minimum wages actually increase the overall poverty rate. Moreover, this study uses an unconventional methodology that is both different from all other studies, and is also problematic. Second, if we take an “average of averages” of the poverty rate elasticities for the overall population across the seven studies that provide such an estimate so that (1) each study is weighted equally, and (2) within each study, all specifications reported in Table 1 are weighted equally as well, we obtain an average poverty rate elasticity of -0.07.21 However, excluding Neumark et al. (2005), the “average of averages” of the poverty rate elasticities is -0.15. After excluding the one study that uses a highly unconventional technique, the existing evidence points towards a modest impact on the overall poverty rate. Besides these seven studies, five additional studies reviewed here provide estimates for subsets of the population. If we take an “average of averages” of the poverty rate elasticities across all 12 studies, while (1) weighting each study equally, and (2) weighting each specification and group within study equally as well, we also obtain an elasticity of -0.15. If we exclude Neumark et al. (2005), the “average of averages” across the 11 studies is -0.20. There are, of course, other ways of aggregating estimates across studies.22 However, when I consider the set of nearly all available estimates of the effect of minimum wages on poverty, the weight of the evidence suggests that minimum wages tend to have a small to moderate sized impact in reducing poverty.

#### Evidence proves minimum wage increases income equality—my models are best.

#### DUBE 2 [Ibid, DDA]

Table 5 provides the estimates for the impact of minimum wages on the proportions under alternative income-to-needs cutoffs. For ease of interpretation, I report the estimates as elasticities (“ˆ ) by ˆc dividing the regression coefficients (—c) by the sample proportion under each cutoff; this is true both for the point estimate and the standard errors.32 The underlying regression coefficients, or semi-elasticities, and standard errors are reported in Appendix Table A1. I use eight different regression specifications that range from the canonical two-way fixed effects model in column (1) to the most saturated specification in column (8) which includes (a) division-specific year eects, (b) state-specific recession-year dummies, and (c) state linear trends. The six specifications in columns (2) through (7) exhaust all intermediate combinations of controls and provide us with evidence on how the inclusion of various types of time-varying controls affects the estimates. First, I note that there is robust evidence that minimum wage increases reduce the share of individuals with very low family incomes. For income-to-needs cutoffs between 0.50 and 1.25 (i.e., between 50 and 125 percent of the official poverty threshold), and across the eight specifications, 30 out of the 32 estimates are negative in sign, and 22 are statistically significant at least at the 10 percent level. The canonical model in specification 1 stands out as the only one where none of the estimates for these income-to-needs cutoffs are statistically significant. Moreover, in the range where there are the strongest effects (i.e., income-to-needs cutoffs between 0.50 and 1.25), the point estimates from specification 1 are uniformly the smallest in magnitude. For example, specification 1 suggests a poverty rate elasticity of -0.12, which is similar to the average estimate of -0.13 in Burkhauser and Sabia (2007). However, for all other specifications (2-8), we find statistically significant poverty rate elasticities between -0.13 and -0.30. Moreover, we generally find evidence of reductions in the share under 75, 100 and 125 percent of the federal poverty threshold across specifications 2-8. The share under 50 percent of the poverty threshold is also estimated to fall substantially when using within-division variation as in specifications 5-8. Figure 5 provides corresponding visual evidence on how minimum wages affect the bottom half of the income-to-needs distribution. The most saturated specification 8 suggests that the distribution of family incomes with higher minimum wages first-order stochastically dominates the distribution with a lower value of the minimum. The shares below cutoffs are smaller for cutoffs up to 2.00 or so, and unchanged thereafter. Specification 1 suggests a different (and anomalous) pattern, with a rise in the share below cutoffs in the middle of the distribution. However, analogous graphs for most intermediate specifications, as shown in Figure A1, also corroborate the evidence that minimum wages tend to reduce shares of individuals with low incomes without significantly affecting the rest of the distribution. The range of estimates raises the issue of model selection. There is an a priori case for using more saturated specifications that better account for time-varying heterogeneity across states. Allowing for time-varying regional effects and state-specific trends makes both intuitive sense, and receives strong support in existing work. For example, Allegretto et al. (2013) show that the inclusion of these controls mitigates contamination from pre-existing trends when it comes to estimating the effect of minimum wages on teen employment. They also provide evidence that synthetic control methods tend to put substantially more weight on nearby states in constructing a control group, providing additional validity to the intuition that nearby states are better controls. They further show that the amplitude of business cycles tend to be greater in states with higher minimum wages, suggesting that business cycle heterogeneity may be an important factor to control. The main argument against using more saturated models would be that they lack the statistical power to detect an effect.33 In reality, however, for the relevant range of income-to-needs cutoff, the point estimates in specifications 2-8 are larger in magnitude than the canonical specification 1, while the standard errors are not necessarily so. Based on both a priori and a posteriori considerations, it is difficult to argue for the least saturated specification, while there is a strong case for preferring the most saturated model.34

#### No employment effect from the aff—their models are oversimplistic and don't account for multiple factors.

#### KONCZAL 14 [Mike Konczal, Mike Konczal is a fellow with the Roosevelt Institute, where he works on financial reform, unemployment, inequality, and a progressive vision of the economy. His blog, Rortybomb, was named one of the 25 Best Financial Blogs by Time Magazine. His writing has appeared in the Boston Review, The American Prospect, the Washington Monthly, The Nation, Slate, and Dissent, and he's appeared on PBS NewsHour, MSNBC's Rachel Maddow Show, CNN, Marketplace, and more, “7 Bipartisan Reasons to Raise the Minimum Wage”, Boston Review: A Political and Literary Forum, “7 Bipartisan Reasons to Raise the Minimum Wage”, March 3, 2014, DDA]

In the world of economics beyond introductory supply and demand, you can find an explanation for why small changes in the minimum wage have little effect on employment. The economist John Schmitt notes three such explanations. The first is consistent with the Economics 101 model but considers more factors. Here the higher price for labor is simply pushed onto customers. This is what people assume will happen when they say they are willing to pay a few extra cents for a hamburger if doing so will help millions of people escape poverty. In this story, a minimum wage increase would result in a one-time bump in the prices of goods produced by low-wage industries. And in these disinflationary times, a small boost to the price level might help with the greater problems in our stagnating economy. The second explanation for the small impact of minimum wage increases is institutional. Here people look at mechanisms within firms that adjust to a higher minimum wage—for example, an increase in the productivity of workers that compensates for their extra pay. The minimum wage becomes an incentive for bosses to do a better job managing their employees. Higher earnings also encourage employees to work harder. Economists call this the “efficiency wage”: when workers have more to lose, they do their jobs better in an effort to keep their gains. The third explanation adds two complications to the Economics 101 model. First, it is a pain to search for a new job. Second, employers pick the wages they offer their employees. This sounds obvious, but you won’t find it in Economics 101, according to which bosses pay a “market wage.” In such a scenario, if your boss paid a dollar less than the market wage, he wouldn’t be able to hire anyone at all, and if he tried to pay you a dollar less than the going wage for your labor, you would effortlessly get a new job at that old rate. Yet this is not how things work. People celebrate when they find a job because that search took real effort. It is not like buying a bag of apples or gas to fill your tank, tasks so simple that one can speak realistically of a market price. This helps to explain why there are so many vacancies in the low-wage job market—vacancies that would be filled if the minimum wage were raised, thereby combating the fear of unemployment that accompanies any discussion of minimum wage hikes. A more generous minimum wage is not essential to hiring for these open jobs; employers could fill vacancies by offering higher wages, but they would in turn have to pay other workers this higher wage as well, meaning that filling vacancies would produce a higher overall wage either way. And since workers have to search for jobs, a higher minimum wage will increase the rate at which employees search for, take, and keep jobs. Empirical work by Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich has found that a higher minimum wage leads to less turnover in low-wage jobs. This effect is visible in the international data as well.

## 1AR

### AT- AC Collapses to Util

1. The AC framework examines whether each employer and employee could rationally consent to a living wage being paid by or to them, not whether they would consent to a general rule of everybody paying a living wage. Individuals can make utilitarian decisions that the government should accept, but the government shouldn’t determine consent on utilitarian bases.
2. When making consent decisions, individuals don’t consider the effects of universalizing their action. For example, if I consent to a surgery I wouldn’t consider what would happen if everybody consented to getting that same surgery because I can’t know their medical circumstances.
3. Extend PARFIT 7- all persons could only rationally consent to stopping the greatest possible harm that could occur to any individual person affected. Under a value-based objective theory there are sufficient reasons to make things impartially better or better for ourselves. This means a larger group suffering smaller harms could rationally consent to 1 person not suffering an extreme harm because they recognize the greater impartial harm that person suffers, but the 1 person would have no reason to accept a greater harm for themselves to stop small harms to others.

#### The AC doesn’t collapse to util—it rejects aggregation

ASHFORD AND Mulgan [Elizabeth Ashford and Tim Mulgan “Contractualism” 2007. SEP]

The remaining two differences between contractualism and utilitarianism relate to content. (2) Contractualism does not aggregate, but rather focuses on the standpoint of individual persons. (3) Contractualism does not regard well-being as a basic moral concept, but instead allows a variety of personal reasons. The only reasons for and against a principle that count when we are judging whether or not it can be reasonably rejected are “various individuals' reasons for objecting to that principle and alternatives to it” (Scanlon 1998, p. 229). The acceptability of a principle depends on a one-by-one assessment of the strength of the reasons that individuals would have for rejecting the principle, compared to the alternatives to it. Since individuals must be objecting on their own behalf and not on behalf of a group, this restriction to single individuals' reasons bars the interpersonal aggregation of complaints; it does not allow a number of lesser complaints to outweigh one person's weightier complaint. Unlike utilitarianism, therefore, contractualism rejects the interpersonal aggregation of burdens. (We discuss some important exceptions below.) This is one of the main respects in which it differs from utilitarianism. Contractualism thus captures a key feature of our moral life that, as Rawls famously argues, utilitarianism ignores: the feature he calls “the separateness of persons” (Rawls 1971). Instead of lumping everyone together and allowing one person's rights to be trampled to provide greater aggregate benefits to others, contractualism recognises that each of us has a unique life to live. The contractualist objection to utilitarianism is that it does not guarantee principles that benefit each individually, and that command each person's free assent. Aggregation (in some form) is essential to utilitarianism. Situations frequently arise where one person's pleasure is in conflict with another's, or where the only way to secure one person's pleasure is to cause someone else pain, or where we must choose which person suffers which pain. We must find a way to balance the moral reasons generated by different people's pleasures and pains. If we retain a utilitarian perspective, then it is hard to see how we can do this without some kind of aggregation—adding different pleasures and pains together. By contrast, contractualism seems able to avoid aggregation, because it begins, not with individual pleasure and pain, but with the more flexible concept of reasons. Unlike my pleasures and pains, my reasons can be responsive to the situation of others. To see this, we explore two features of Scanlon's use of reasons: rejection must be reasonable, and reasons are not limited to well-being.

#### AT- All reasons come from pleasure-pain

#### PARFIT

Psychological Hedonists claim that, at the beginning of all such chains of instrumental desires, there is some telic desire for pleasure, or the avoidance of pain. That is false. Of those who hold this view, some confuse it with the view that we always get pleasure in advance from the thought of our desire’s fulfilment, or are pained by the thought of its non-fulfilment. That is also false. And even if it were true, that would not show that what we really want is always to get pleasure, or avoid pain. If I want posthumous fame, for example, I may get pleasure from thinking about how, after my death, people will remember me and admire my great novel. But that would not show that I want such fame for the sake of this pleasure. On the contrary, this pleasure would depend on my wanting such fame for its own sake. Another example is the fact that, to enjoy many games, it is not enough to want to enjoy them, since we shall enjoy these games only if we also want to win.

As well as wanting such other things, some people do not even want pleasure as an end. Suppose that we know some relentlessly ambitious politician, whom we find basking in the sun, sipping champagne. When we ask this man what he is doing, he replies ‘Enjoying myself’. Given our knowledge of this man’s character, this reply is baffling. This man never does anything merely for enjoyment. He then explains that his doctor warned that, unless he allows himself such pleasures, his health will worsen, thereby hindering his pursuit of power. Our bafflement disappears. This man wants these pleasures, not for their own sake, but only as a means.2

### AT- Autonomy NC

#### Reject the framework- arguments that we have to give people the power to choose how they are treated are self-defeating because multiple people can give conflicting choices, which paralyzes action.

PARFIT [Derek Parfit, “On What Matters”, 2011, DDA]

When we treat people in some way, they can often give or refuse consent in a declarative sense, by telling us or others that they do or don’t consent. Korsgaard and O’Neill use ‘consent’ in a different and more important sense. People can give or refuse consent in this act-affecting sense if they have what Korsgaard calls ‘power over the proceedings’, because they will be treated in some way only if they consent. So we can restate (B) as the Choice-Giving Principle: It is wrong not to give other people the power to choose how we shall treat them. If this were what Kant meant, we would have to reject Kant’s claim, since the Choice-Giving Principle is clearly false. This principle mistakenly implies, for example, that we ought to let other people choose whether or not we give their student essays low grades, buy what they are trying to sell us, take back what they stole from us, report their crimes, or vote against them in some election. In most morally important cases, moreover, our choice between different possible acts would have significant effects on [multiple] two or more people. We could not give to more than one of these people the power to choose how we shall act, as would be shown if two of these people made conflicting choices. So the Choice-Giving Principle also mistakenly implies that, in all these cases, whatever we did would be wrong.

### AT- Levinas NC

[read “must have standard text” vs uschool/jake if they still don’t have one]

- abuse supercharged by having offense that den’t intuitively link back to a totalization framework e.g. the 4-point about individual freedom

#### FRAMEWORK:

#### 1. I control the internal link to the NC framework— AC framework says that we can only take actions that all individuals would rationally consent to, which means my framework is key to protecting all categories of people, including the Other.

#### CONTENTION:

#### 1. TURN-

#### THEORY:

#### Evaluate theory through competing interpretations- this means the debater with the most offense to their interp wins theory:

**1.** Reasonability invites judge intervention because what’s reasonable is subjective.

2. Brightline doesn’t solve- Maximization of fairness and education avoids the illogical and arbitrary cutoff of reasonability.

**3.** Reasonability creates a race to the bottom since it motivates debaters to use increasingly unfair strategies and get away with them with defense on theory.

4. Reasonability begs the question of their interp. If I win offense, they are unreasonable. So a. even under reasonability the debater with the most offense wins and b. it collapses to competing interps because the debater has to win their interp / counterinterp first.

5. collapses to competing interps because we have offense-defense debates about the correct brightline

Possibly NIBS bad if showing that I don’t totalize the other would just trigger permissibility—also try to combine the two theory argumnts into one—esp bad if the NC offense is uncontestable+

#### A. INTERPRETATION: All frameworks must be able to evaluate some actions as obligatory and others prohibited.

#### B. VIOLATION: They say it’s morally prohibited to totalize the other but don’t give an account of what would be morally obligatory—showing that living wage doesn’t totalize the other isn’t sufficient to affirm.

#### C. STANDARDS:

#### 1.

#### A. INTERPRETATION: All NC contention-level arguments must be open to link turns and can’t be based on a definitional link back to the standard IF aff contention-level arguments meet the aforementioned constraint.

#### B. VIOLATION: They say living wage is bad because by definition a living wage constructs a totalizing conception of life.

#### C. STANDARDS:

#### 1. Reciprocity-

#### a) 2-1 quantitative ground skew because they link turn AC contention arguments, but I can’t link turn their offense since it’s a definitional truth about the living wage. Always easier for them to win because they can win under the AC and NC but I can only win under the AC.

#### b) I have to win the AC contention AND the AC framework, but they only have to win NC framework OR turns on AC contention

#### Reciprocity key to fairness because it ensures both debaters have an equal number of routes to the ballot.

#### 2. Time skew- I have to win the framework debate in the 1AR, so they can always go 6minutes in the 2N on the AC contention or AC framework for at least a 6-2 time advantage. Kills fairness because they have 3x as much time to make arguments on the most critical issue.

D. VOTER:

Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that requires an equal opportunity for the judge to know who’s doing the better debating, which is impossible if one debater has an advantage.

Drop the debater

a) gateway issue- Drop the argument asks you to evaluate a round without the abuse or theory, but it’s impossible evaluate a round that never occurred because every aspect of the debate in terms of strategy and arguments would have been different had the abuse not happened. Vote on theory because it’s the only unskewed layer.

b) time skew- Rejecting the argument furthers the abuse because they kick it for a positive time tradeoff. I lose all the time I invested on theory and I had to cover the argument substantively to cover my bases.

c) deterrence- only giving the loss will deter future abuse, otherwise they drop the arg and exploit the time tradeoff of me reading theory. Minimizing abuse comes first because it’s the purpose of theory.

d) norms- to set a precedent for the best norms of debate, which is the purpose of establishing theoretical interps

Finally, There’s no impact to over-punishment. Abuse is prevention of equal access to the ballot but punishment is a response to already unequal access which means it’s impossible for it to be abusive itself.

### Universalizability 🡪 Util

#### From an impartial standpoint, rule consequentialist principles are the only principles that everyone could rationally will to be accepted by all agents.

#### ROSS

[Jacob Ross, “Modern Philosophers”, University of Southern California, 2009, DDA]

The Kantian Contractualist Formula presupposes that there are principles whose universal acceptance each of us would have sufficient reason to will, or to choose, were we in a position to choose the principles that are to be accepted by everyone. But whether there are any such principles depends on what our reasons are, and on the strength of these reasons. Suppose, for example, that our only reasons are prudential reasons. In this case, it is unlikely that there would be any principles whose universal acceptance everyone would have sufficient reason to choose, since everyone would have decisive reason to choose the universal acceptance of principles that would be optimal in relation to her own interests, and it is unlikely that any principles would be optimal in relation to everyone’s interests. Suppose, however, that apart from any prudential or other partial reasons we may have, we also have impartial teleological reason to choose outcomes that are best from a point of view that is valid for everyone. And suppose, further, that it is always rationally permissible (though perhaps not rationally obligatory) to give significant weight to these impartial reasons. In this case, Parfit argues, there will be principles whose universal acceptance everyone would have sufficient reason to will. And these will be precisely those principles whose universal acceptance would have the best consequences from an impartial point of view; that is, these will be the rule-consequentialist principles. For these rule-consequentialist principles are the ones that each agent would have strongest impartial reason to choose, and these impartial reasons would in each case constitute sufficient, though perhaps not decisive, reason for the agent in question to choose these principles. But if the acceptance of these principles would not make things go best from an impartial point of view, then there will always be someone who has decisive reason not to choose their universal acceptance. Thus, the only principles that everyone has sufficient reason to choose that everyone accept are the rule-consequentialist principles. And so it follows from Kantian Contractualism that one acts rightly just in case one acts on rule-consequentialist principles.

1. Nagel, Thomas [University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University]. “Scanlon’s Moral Theory” in *Concealment and Exposure & Other Essays*. Oxford University Press, 2002. Print. pp. 148-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Nagel, Thomas [University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University]. *The View from Nowhere*. New York: Oxford UP, 1989. Print. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Scanlon, Thomas. *What We Owe to Each Other*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2000. Print. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. "negate." Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. 2010. Merriam-Webster Online. 18 August 2010. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)