I value morality. Intuitions determine our beliefs. Huemer:[[1]](#footnote--1)

Other things being equal, it is reasonable to assume that things are the way they appear. I call this principle 'Phenomenal Conservatism' ('phenomenal' meaning 'pertaining to appearances'). I have discussed the principle elsewhere, so here I will be relatively brief.(1) There is a type of mental state, which I call an 'appearance', that we avow when we say such things as 'It seems to me that p', 'It appears that p', or 'p is obvious', where p is some proposition. Appearances have propositional contents--things they represent to be the case--but they are not beliefs, as can be seen from the intelligibility of, 'The arch seems to be taller than it is wide, but I don't think it is'. Nevertheless, appearances normally lead us to form beliefs. 'Appearance' is a broad category that includes mental states involved in perception, memory, introspection, and intellection. Thus, we can say, 'This line seems longer than that one', 'I seem to recall reading something about that', 'It seems to me that I have a headache', and 'It seems that any two points can be joined by a single straight line'.(2) All of those statements make sense, using the same sense of 'seems'. Appearances can be deceiving, and appearances can conflict with one another, as in the Müller-Lyer illusion: It initially seems that the top line is longer than the bottom line. But if you get out a ruler and measure them, you will find them to be of the same length. The top line will seem, when holding a ruler next to it, to be 2 inches long, and the bottom line will similarly appear to be 2 inches long. So, all things considered, it seems that the two lines are of the same length. As this example illustrates, an initial appearance can be overruled by other appearances (this does not mean the initial appearance goes away, but only that we don't believe it), and only by other appearances. Some appearances are stronger than others--as we say, some things are 'more obvious' than others--and this determines what we hold on to and what we reject in case of conflict. Presumably, it more clearly seems to you that the result of measuring the lines is accurate than that the result of eyeballing them is, so you believe the measurement result (this may have to do with background beliefs you have about the reliability of different procedures--which would themselves be based upon the way other things seem to you). Things can become complicated when many different beliefs and/or appearances are involved, but the basic principle is that we are more inclined to accept what more strongly seems to us to be true. Appearances can be intellectual, as opposed to sensory, mnemonic, or introspective. It seems to us that the shortest path between any two points must be a straight line; that time is one-dimensional and totally ordered (for any two moments in time, one is earlier than the other); and that no object can be completely red and completely blue at the same time. I accept those things on intellectual grounds. I am not looking at all the possible pairs of points and all the possible paths connecting each pair and seeing, with my eyes, that the straight path is the shortest in each case. Instead, I am 'seeing' intellectually that it must be true--that is, when I think about it, it becomes obvious. Logical judgments rest[s] on intellectual appearances. We think the following inference logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion, regardless of whether the premises are true): Socrates is a man. All men are inconsiderate. Th[us]erefore, Socrates is inconsiderate. but the next one invalid: Socrates is inconsiderate. All men are inconsiderate. Therefore, Socrates is a platypus. We 'see' this, not with our eyes, but with our intellect or reason. All judgments are based upon how things seem to the judging subject: a rational person believes only what seems to him to be true, though he need not believe everything that seems true.(3) The function of arguments is to change the way things seem to one's audience, by presenting other propositions (premises) that seem true and seem to support something (the conclusion) that may not initially have seemed true to the audience. An argument has force only to the extent that its premises seem true and seem to support its conclusion. Intellectual inquiry presupposes Phenomenal Conservatism, in the sense that such inquiry proceeds by assum[es]ing things are the way they appear, until evidence (itself drawn from appearances) arises to cast[s] doubt on this. Even the [skeptic’s] arguments of a philosophical skeptic who says we aren't justified in believing anything rest upon the skeptic's own beliefs, which are [are] based upon what seems [true] to the skeptic to be true.

Thus, you can’t abandon intuitions. The basis of logic isn’t justified by more logic; logic is just intuitive. We have more reason to reject than accept cases that say the Holocaust could be permissible. This is true for even dropped a priori’s. If I think Bob owns a Ford since I’ve checked the documentation, but a hobo tells me I’m wrong: I don’t discount this evidence, but given my stronger justification I retain my belief. All moral traditions share intuitions that justify util. Haines1 explains the argument:[[2]](#footnote-0)

Arguably consequentialism [Util] is implicit in the very familiar conception of moralit[ies]y, shared by many cultures[:] and traditions, which holds that moral perfection means loving all people, loving others as we love ourselves. For what is meant by “love” here? [Not] Forming many romantic attachments hardly seems like the path toward perfection; nor perhaps does the widespread spiritual exercise of focusing on wishing people well without actually helping them. If there is truth in the saying that we should “love all people,” perhaps it is simply that we should actively do what is good for people and not bad for them, as much as possible. If we try to [and] produce the greatest total benefit, then we are loving “all people” in the sense that we are being impartial, caring for people in general, promoting each person’s well-being insofar as that is at stake in our actions and insofar as our helping one does not hurt others more. A similar line of thought starts from the idea that morality is at bottom two things. First, abstractly, to be moral is to do one’s rational best to do what is objectively right. Second, more concretely, to be moral is to care about people. Now, rationality and objectivity are impartial; they do not favor one person over another. Hence to be moral is to care [and help] about people equally or impartially, so far as one can, which means trying to benefit people as much as one can. So [util] consequentialism is correct.

This also operates independent of intuitions since, textually, it clarifies the common usage of “should”, which is util. Thus the standard is Expectable Consequentialism. Haines2 explains the argument:[[3]](#footnote-1)

Is that point an objection to consequentialism? On the one hand, one might think it is an objection, since we are responsible for doing what is morally right and so we must be able to know what is morally right. On the other hand, one might think it is impossible to know what is morally right; morality seems permanently controversial and mysterious. It is unclear, then, whether the standard to which we should hold theories of morality is that they must explain why morality is easy to know about or why morality is terribly hard to know about! The fact that we do not know the overall consequences of our actions makes room for further versions of consequentialism. Suppose I donate $100 to Malaria Aid, but it turns out this group aids malaria and I have funded an outbreak. Now, Plain Consequentialism implies that what I did is morally wrong, and Plain Scalar Consequentialism implies that it is morally very bad. But you might think that whether my action was morally wrong depends on what consequences it would have been reasonable for me to expect, not on the actual consequences. If the evil group was so cleverly deceptive that even the Better Business Bureau’s web site said they do good work fighting malaria, then you may think the damage done by my money was not my fault. So you may prefer a different version of consequentialism. Expectable Consequentialism: The morally right action is the action whose reasonably expectable consequences are best. (There can also be a scalar version of this view and of the others introduced below.) Reasonable estimates of consequences seem to involve a different kind of probability from that discussed in 1.b above. For example, suppose there is a machine that tosses a fair coin with such precision that whenever you press the Toss button, the coin always comes up heads. Now, suppose that you do not happen to know whether this machine always yields heads or always tails. (Or perhaps you do not even know that it is a precision machine.) When you press Toss, your action will have heads as a consequence, but you do not know that. So far as you can tell, heads and tails are equally likely, even if objectively there is a 100% chance of heads. This point can be expressed by saying that there is a 50% epistemic probability of heads, or that the reasonably expectable consequences of pushing the Toss button include a 50% epistemic chance of heads.

Also if I win the normative ethic, I hijack their whole ethical system. Haines is creating a constraint that every moral system needs to use for it to truly blame an agent and not just a bad situation. You have to look to what countries actually understand, not absurd politics DA’s or abstract ethics. Objective probability and epistemic probability are not the same. Even if you do the objectively right thing, doing them for bad reasons is still wrong under Haines ONE. Killing baby Hitler might be objectively good, but not expectably good if you only it did because you enjoy killing babies.

## Contention

Thus, countries signed off because everyone came together and decided environmental protection benefits the entire world. However, resource extraction occurs due to bribery. Drummond ’10:[[4]](#footnote-2)

This week at the UN in New York world leaders are reviewing progress on the millennium development goals (MDGs). Previous meetings have been focused on drumming up more aid. Times are doubly inauspicious for such a purpose: in the OECD fiscal deficits are squeezing aid budgets, while in the poorest countries faster growth is enabling governments to finance more from their own revenues. International aid is still very important, but such summits should no longer be confined to discussions of aid. The key driver of that faster growth, the bonanza of natural resource extraction, is a two-edged sword. The value of the resources to be extracted from impoverished economies is enormous: if it translates into revenues that are well-spent it will be transformational. But the historical record of resource extraction in these [poor] societies is abysmal: money that could have [helped the needy] delivered the millennium development goals instead corroded governance. In the poorest societies nearly all resource extraction is done by non-national companies. Only they have the skills and finance necessary for what are often large and complex undertakings. It takes two to tango: the corrosion of governance depended upon the misconduct of these companies. Of course, most employees in resource extraction companies are honest, yet it is very difficult for the industry to police itself. The incentives for rogue behaviour are intense: executives know that if their company refrains from corruption they are likely to lose contracts to less scrupulous rivals. They know that even if they get a contract, public officials are liable to block implementation unless bribes are paid. In such murky waters murky companies thrive, doing doubtful deals, often ones which they themselves would be unable to implement, but then selling on to the major companies once the bribery is successfully concluded.

Developing countries extract resources to line their coffers instead of helping those most in need. TTI:[[5]](#footnote-3)

Increasing global demand is driving new oil and gas discoveries. Over the next 20 years, it’s expected that 90 per cent of production will come from developing countries. Yet many countries rich in oil and gas are home to some of the world’s poorest people. [since] How can this happen? Too often, wealth stays in the hands of politicians [when] and industry insiders. Revenues don’t get published. Payments made to governments to exploit resources remain secret. Bribery and embezzlement go unchecked. Many oil and gas companies protect the identities of their equity holders and subsidiaries. This allows corrupt leaders to hide stolen funds unnoticed. Inadequate financial statements make it easy to disguise corrupt deals, and impossible for any of us to monitor them. Many oil and gas companies don’t publish information country by country. This allows them to hide the royalties, taxes and fees they pay. But without this information, we can’t hold governments to account for the money they receive. Stolen oil and gas income has terrible consequences. It benefits an elite few [not]. But for everyone else, it fuels conflict over resources. And it traps people in poverty they’d otherwise avoid.

1. http://spot.colorado.edu/~huemer/5.htm [↑](#footnote-ref--1)
2. William Haines Email: hainesw@hkucc.hku.hk The University of Hong Kong China www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/#SH1c [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
3. William Haines Email: hainesw@hkucc.hku.hk The University of Hong Kong China www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/#SH1c [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
4. Tackling corruption will fast-track progress on the millennium development goals Making natural resource extraction more transparent will accelerate progress on the MDGs. Britain can be the springboard for change in this area www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2010/sep/22/millennium-development-goals-resources-corruption [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
5. <http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/oil_and_gas> In 1993, a few individuals decided to take a stance against corruption and created Transparency International. Now present in more than 100 countries, the movement works relentlessly to stir the world’s collective conscience and bring about change. Much remains to be done to stop corruption, but much has also been achieved, including: We are politically non-partisan and place great importance on our independence. We alone determine our programmes and activities – no donor has any input into Transparency International’s policies. Our sources of funding are made transparent as is our spending. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)