My interpretation is that the topic is a question of whether the ideal of rehabilitation is more valuable than the ideal of retribution. It’s not a question of policy, so implementation is irrelevant. Prefer the aff interp; 3 reasons.

First is textuality. “Ought” followed by the verb “to be” implies an ideal valuation, not a moral imperative. **Robinson 71** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**Many ought-sentences are not prescriptive** at all, either prudentially or morally, **but express valuations. Such is "Everybody ought to be happy".** This is not a prescription or command to anybody to act or to refrain. **There is no possible act that would** count as the fulfillment of the command, if it were a command. Neither individually nor collectively can we **make everybody happy. But the state of universal happiness is an ideal that we cherish;** and **the sentence expresses this ideal. It is thus a valuation.** A valuation is something distinct from a prescription, though they share the negative property of not being descriptions. Even when there is a possible act, the ought may be more ideal than prudential. The question "Do you think the hem of this dress ought to be higher?" suggests the practical possibility of raising the hem; but what the speaker has in mind is rather the question of beauty, of better- ness, of the ideal dress-length. "A clock ought to keep good time" is obviously not an imperative to clocks. Nor is it, except indirectly, a prescription to clockmakers and clockminders. It is a platitudinous restatement of the obvious ideal of a clock. (I take this example from Mellor's discussion of knowledge in Mind, 1967.) "You ought to feel ashamed" might be a moral ought if the speaker believed that we can feel what we will when we will; but usually it is the ideal ought. A man who feels shame after doing such an act is, in the speaker's opinion, a less bad man than one who does such an act and feels no shame. "Feel ashamed" does not refer to an action, a doing. Wherever ought is followed by a nondoing infinitive, as "to feel ashamed", it is likely to be the ideal ought. An outstanding case of the nondoing infinitive is "'to be"; and **"ought to be" usually belongs to a sentence that expresses an ideal, not a command. [Such as] "Everyone ought to be happy." "There ought to be a chicken in every pot."** "Ought to have" is nearly the same. "Everyone ought to have a motor-car." "Everyone ought to have equal opportunity." "There ought to be a minimum wage" can perhaps be interpreted as a command to Parliament, and hence as the moral ought. Still more so the common phrase "There ought to be a law against it". But probably those who use such phrases rarely think of themselves as prescribing to Parliament; and **what they say ought to exist** is **often** something that **cannot be brought into existence by the** passage of a **law. They are expressing an ideal.**

Textuality is a prima facie issue. It doesn’t matter how fair he is; if he isn’t debating the topic, then he hasn’t met his burden. Also, textuality link turns other theory standards because it is the basis for claims to predictability and ground.

2. Reciprocity – Aff and Neg have equal ground. We each defend a moral theory and prove it more likely true than false. Forcing aff to defend implementation allows neg to go for either framework or contention level offense which allows him to moot half of the AC and answer the part I spend less time on.

3. Philosophical education. My interp allows us to focus the entire debate on pure ethics. Forcing the aff to defend implementation of a policy kills philosophical education because we spread ourselves too thin and can’t cover either issue in depth. Philosophy is the best form of education because (**a**) it's the only education applicable to everyone all the time, whereas most of us won’t be policy-makers, (**b**) it's the only education unique to LD; you can get policy-making and current events education in policy or PF, and (**c**) philosophical education is a prereq to policy education; learning the util benefits of rehabilitation wouldn’t matter unless util is the correct moral theory. (**d**) The last two topics were both questions of policy which non-uniques policy making education. Debating pure ethics is key to diversity of education because the jan/feb topic is the only chance we have to do so.

(**e**) Philosophy debate is key to solve extinction. The brink is now. **Muehlhauser 11**[[2]](#footnote-2)

Barring a major collapse of human civilization (due to nuclear war, asteroid impact, etc.), many **experts expect the intelligence explosion Singularity to occur within 50-200 years.**

That fact means that **many philosophical problems**, about which philosophers have argued for millennia, **are suddenly very urgent.**

Those concerned with the fate of the galaxy must say to the philosophers: "Too slow! Stop screwing around with transcendental ethics and qualitative epistemologies! Start thinking with the precision of an AI researcher and solve these problems!"

**If** a near-future **AI will determine the fate of the galaxy, we need to figure out what values** we ought **to give it.** Should it ensure animal welfare? Is growing the human population a good thing?

But those are questions of applied ethics. More fundamental are the questions about which normative ethics to give the AI: How would the AI decide if animal welfare or large human populations were good? What rulebook should it use to answer novel moral questions that arise in the future?

**But even more fundamental are** the **questions of meta-ethics.** What do moral terms mean? **Do moral facts exist? What justifies one normative rulebook over the other?**

The **answers to these meta-ethical questions will determine the** answers to the questions of **normative ethics, which**, if we are successful in planning the intelligence explosion, **will determine the fate of the galaxy.**

Eliezer Yudkowsky has put forward one meta-ethical theory, which informs his plan for Friendly AI: Coherent Extrapolated Volition. But what if that meta-ethical theory is wrong? The galaxy is at stake.

Princeton philosopher Richard Chappell worries about how Eliezer's meta-ethical theory depends on rigid designation, which in this context may amount to something like a semantic "trick." Previously and independently, an Oxford philosopher expressed the same worry to me in private.

Eliezer's theory also employs something like the method of reflective equilibrium, about which there are many grave concerns from Eliezer's fellow naturalists, including Richard Brandt, Richard Hare, Robert Cummins, Stephen Stich, and others.

My point is not to beat up on Eliezer's meta-ethical views. I don't even know if they're wrong. Eliezer is wickedly smart. He is highly trained in the skills of overcoming biases and properly proportioning beliefs to the evidence. He thinks with the precision of an AI researcher. In my opinion, that gives him large advantages over most philosophers. When Eliezer states and defends a particular view, I take that as significant Bayesian evidence for reforming my beliefs.

Rather, my point is that **we need lots of smart people working on** these **meta-ethical questions**. We need to solve these problems, **and quickly. The universe will not wait for** the pace of traditional **philosophy to catch up.**

Historical genealogy of criminal justice shows that rehabilitation is an explicitly utilitarian value. **Raynor and Robinson 9** write[[3]](#footnote-3)

As Garland (1985) points out, the early part of **the 20th century was already seeing the emergence of a ‘penal-welfare complex’ which**, among other developments, **began to involve the State** as a key actor **in** the business of **rehabilitating offenders. No longer was the offender** to be **rehabilitated to save a soul for God; instead, he or she was** to be **helped towards ‘competence**, character **and usefulness’ in the service of** the proper **collective goals** of a secular State – a good citizen rather than merely a good person. This was to emerge most clearly around the middle of the century, when two major wars separated by an economic crisis had led to the development, particularly in Europe and the United States, of forms of government which practised a high degree of intervention in the economic and social life of citizens. Those citizens had learned to work together in the common (national) interest, and increasingly expected Governments to develop collective solutions to social problems. The dominance of the machinery of government, and the dominant economic role of government expenditure which had developed during the war years, were turned in the 1940s to the new task of social reconstruction through the development of Welfare States (Sullivan, 1996), and the construction of the citizens of the future through publicly funded education. The criminal justice system was only a small part of the system of Government but was also touched by this reformist vision, in which new models and methods for the rehabilitation of offenders were enthusiastically advocated and practised. A good example is provided by the work of Herman Mannheim, a refugee from Nazi Germany who brought his experience of German jurisprudence and continental criminology with him to Britain and, in turn, became one of the pioneers of British criminology (Hood, 2004). In one of his books, ‘Criminology and Social Reconstruction’ published in 1946, he sets out a programme for the development of the criminal justice and penal systems in the ‘reconstructed’ post-war societies. Along with a chapter on making the administration of criminal justice ‘more democratic’, he provides a set of recommendations for making it ‘more scientific’. **The aim, firmly in the Utilitarian tradition, is a penal system which will have the best effects for society as a whole. The transformation of offenders into** decent and **useful members of the community** by the most efficient means, whether that involves reducing the reach of the criminal law or changing the behaviour of offenders, **is a project in the** best **Utilitarian tradition**, which always attempted to apply clear principles to the practical business of social administration (Bentham, 1823). **It** also **offers a clear justification for rehabilitative efforts: they are undertaken in the interests of society as a whole**, to maximise the availability of ‘decent and useful members of the community’ (Mannheim, 1946, p. 62) for the collective task of social reconstruction.

Therefore, valuing rehabilitation is equivalent to valuing the maximization of happiness.

I contend that a state of affairs with maximum happiness has intrinsic value.

**First,** the traditional Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that light waves instantaneously collapse into particles, which is a finite length over zero time, which is impossible. Only the Many-Worlds Interpretation escapes this dilemma and is thus more consistent with the rest of physics. **Vaidman 02**[[4]](#footnote-4)

**The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave.** (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) **The collapse postulate** is a physical law that **differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves** some kind of **action at a distance.** According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions of the Universe prior to the experiment: only the probabilities are governed by the initial state. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions. **There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI. We need not assume that Nature plays dice. The MWI is a deterministic theory** for a physical Universe **and it explains why a world appears** to be **indeterministic for** human **observers.**

MWI undermines the notion of personal identity. **Vaidman (2)**[[5]](#footnote-5)

"I" am an object, such as Earth, cat, etc. **"I" is defined at a particular time by a complete (classical) description of the state of my body** and of my brain. "I" and "Lev" do not name the same things (even though my name is Lev). **At the present moment there are many different [me's]** "Lev"s **in different worlds** (not more than one in each world), but it is meaningless to say that now there is another "I". I have a particular, well defined past: I correspond to a particular "Lev" in 2002, but **I do not have a well defined future: I correspond to a multitude of [me's]** "Lev"s in 2010. In the framework of the MWI it is meaningless to ask: Which Lev in 2010 will I be? I will correspond to them all. Every time I perform a quantum experiment (with several possible results) it only seems to me that I obtain a single definite result. Indeed, Lev who obtains this particular result thinks this way. However, this Lev cannot be identified as the only Lev after the experiment. Lev before the experiment corresponds to all "Lev"s obtaining all possible results. Although this approach to the concept of personal identity seems somewhat unusual, it is plausible in the light of the critique of personal identity by Parfit 1986. Parfit considers some artificial situations in which a person splits into several copies, and argues that there is no good answer to the question: Which copy is me? He concludes that **personal identity is not what matters when I divide.**

Independently, corpus callosotomies prove reductionism. **Parfit 84** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’**

**This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states can matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[7]](#footnote-7)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

Reductionism undermines desert-based theories of punishment. **Dresser 90** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

The provocative implications of Parfit's theory for criminal law emerge in his discussion of the moral principle of desert. Desert is a principle governing the distribution of burdens and benefits to individuals. An all-or-nothing, determinate view of **personal identity seems a necessary underpinning to desert; the state can justifiably hold a person responsible for past criminal acts only if that person committed the acts.** The non-reductionist may argue, then, that desert is incompatible with reductionism because without the existence of a separate, persistent self, desert lacks a metaphysical and moral base. If the reductionist view is true, **if personal identity can be indeterminate** and a matter of degree, **then no one can deserve punishment for past criminal acts.** Parfit labels this the "Extreme Claim."

**Second,** happiness is objectively good. Its denial is epistemologically impossible.

**Nagel 86**[[9]](#footnote-9)

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory **pleasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are.** The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure, either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then it is at least possible that I have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove. But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all. And he would be motivated to reduce pain for other reasons—because it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to him. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. **Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is.** What seems to be going on here is that **we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold** a certain kind of **endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken** in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. **No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases.** There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

**Third**, consistency requires we extend our own desire for happiness to others.

**Sayre McCord 1** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

According to the second argument, the evaluative starting point is again each person thinking "my own happiness is valuable," but this fact about each person is taken as evidence, with respect to each bit of happiness that is valued, that that bit is valuable. **Each person** is seen as **ha[s]**ving **reason to think that the happiness she enjoys is valuable, and** reason to think of others -- given that they are in a parallel situation with respect to the happiness they enjoy -- that each person's happiness is such **that there is the same evidence** available to each **for the value of the happiness that another person enjoys** as there is for the value of one's own happiness. **If** happiness is such that **every piece of it is desired by someone, then** it seems as if, **in** taking ourselves to have reason to **see[ing] the bit we value as valuable, we are committed to acknowledging the value of all the rest.**

**Fourth,** respect for human worth would justify util.

**A.** Only util gives all people due weight. **Cummiskey 90**[[11]](#footnote-11)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

**B.** If we respect others, it follows that we should respect their desire for happiness.

**Cummiskey-2**[[12]](#footnote-12)

Now, **according to Kant,** the formula of the end-in-itself generates both negatives and positive duties. In the negative sense we treat persons as ends when we do not interfere with their pursuit of their (legitimate) ends. In the positive sense **we treat persons as ends when we** endeavor to **help them realize their** (legitimate) **ends.** Kant describes the positive interpretation of the second formulation of the categorical imperative as a duty to make others’ ends my own.

Since, if one wills an end, on also wills the necessary means, it follows that the positive interpretation requires that we do those acts which are necessary to further the permissible ends of others. **Since Kant also maintains that “to be happy is** necessarily **the desire of every rational** but finite **being”, we have a positive duty to promote the happiness of others.** Thus, in addition to any constraints on action which Kant’s principle might generate, it also provides a rationale for a moral goal that we are obligated to pursue.

**Fifth,** there’s no act-omission distinction.

**A.** Act-omission isn’t morally relevant. **Gewirth 82** writes[[13]](#footnote-13)

**To be responsible for inflicting** lethal **harms, a person need not intend or desire to produce such harms**, either as an end or a means. **It is sufficient if the harms come about as an unintended but foreseeable** and controllable **effect of what he does. For since he knows** or has good reasons to believe **what** **actions** or policies under his control **will lead to the harms in question he can control whether the harms will occur**, so that it is within his power to prevent or at least lessen the probability of their occurrence by ceasing to engage in these actions. Thus, just as all persons have the right to informed control, so far as possible, over the conditions relevant to their incurring cancer and other serious harms, so the causal and moral responsibility for inflicting cancer can be attributed to persons who have informed control over other persons’ suffering the lethal harms of cancer.

**B.** The act-omission distinction is incoherent. **Rachels 1** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

So **what is the difference between causing and allowing?** What real difference is marked by those words? The most obvious ways of attempting to draw the distinction won’t work. For example, suppose we say it is the difference between action and inaction--when we cause an outcome, we do something, but when we merely allow it to happen, we passively stand by and do nothing. This won’t work because, **when we allow something to happen, we** do **perform at least one act: the act of allowing it** to happen. The problem is that the distinction between doing something and not doing something is relative to the specification of what is or is not done--if I allow someone to die, I do not save him, but I do let him die. **It is tempting to say the difference** between action and inaction **is** the difference between **moving one’s body [or]** and **not** moving one’s body; **but** that does not help. **When we allow something to happen, we are** typically **moving our bodies in all sorts of ways. If I allow you to die by running away, I may be moving** my body **very rapidly.**

**C.** The act-omission distinction does not apply to governments.

**Sunstein and Vermuele 5**[[15]](#footnote-15)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

**D.** The act-omission distinction is paradoxical. **Persson 4** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

There are two ways in which **the act‐omission doctrine**, which implies that it may be permissible to let people die or be killed when it is wrong to kill them, **gives rise to a paradox. First, it may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim.** On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong of you let yourself act in this fashion, **this yields the paradox that it is both permissible and impermissible to let yourself act** in this fashion. **Second, you may let yourself kill** somebody **by letting an action you have already initiated cause death, e.g., by not lending a** helping **hand to somebody you have pushed. This, too, yields the paradox that it is both permissible and impermissible to let yourself kill** if you are in a situation in which killing is impermissible but letting be killed permissible.

This means side constraint-based theories reduce to util because any reason not to violate a side constraint oneself is an equally good reason to minimize side constraint violations.

**Sixth**, Skepticism is avoided by accepting a margin of error in our moral statements.

**Parfit 97**[[17]](#footnote-17)

**We may not be able to prove that our normative** epistemic **beliefs are not illusions. We may also be unable to prove that we are not brains in a vat**, or being deceived by some demon. **But if we claim less than absolute certainty, we can** justifiably **reject such skeptical views.** In arguing that we can know some normative epistemic truths, we must appeal to some of these truths. We must claim that we have reasons to believe that we can respond to reasons. Such arguments are in one way circular, but that does not make them fail. Any justification must end somewhere. Justifications of beliefs can best end with intrinsic credibilities and decisive epistemic reasons. We do not have to show that we have further reasons to believe that we have these reasons, and further reasons to believe that we have these further reasons, and so on forever. Some beliefs seem indubitable, and we seem to have decisive reasons to accept many other beliefs. Nor do we seem to have any strong reason to doubt that we do have such reasons. Given these facts, if we can understand how it might be true that we are responding to such reasons, we can justifiably believe that we are responding to such reasons. **We can justifiably believe that there are some truths** about what we ought to believe, **and that we know some of these truths.**

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

I’m willing to clarify or alter my advocacy in cross-ex if neg asks.

Err Aff on theory. Negs won 6% more prelims at VBT, so Neg has side bias on this topic.

Finally, neg must unconditionally advocate a single, consistent moral theory. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. The neg will kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. It also kills clash because the neg will shift out of whichever moral theory I answer best.

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