Note: AC speech time at the Beltway round robin was 5 minutes. Hence the shorter case.

Morality must take the form of a universal rule. **Singer 09** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**When I prescribe something**, using moral language, **my prescription commits me to a** substantive **moral judgment about all** relevantly **similar cases. This includes hypothetical cases in which I am in a different position from my actual one. So to make a moral judgment, I must put myself** in the position of the other person affected by my proposed action – or to be more precise, **in the position of *all* those affected** by my action. Whether I can accept the judgment – that is, whether I can prescribe it universally – will then depend on whether I could accept it if I had to live the lives of all those affected by the action.

Universalizability justifies util. **Singer 93**[[2]](#footnote-2)

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. **In accepting that ethical judgments must be** made from a **universal** point of view, **I am accepting that my own interests cannot,** simply because they are my interests, **count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my** very natural **concern that my own interests be looked after must**, when I think ethically, **be extended to** the interests of **others.** Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. **This requires me to weigh** up **all** these **interests and** adopt the course of action most likely to **maximize the interests of those affected.**

Thus the standard is **maximizing happiness**. There are six additional warrants.

**First**, respect for human worth would justify util. **Cummiskey 90**[[3]](#footnote-3)

We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract “social entity.” It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive “overall social good.” Instead, the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that “to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has.” But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? **By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to** sufficiently **respect** and take account of **the many other** separate **persons**, each with only one life, **who will bear the cost of our inaction**. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that “rational nature exists as an end in itself”. Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible. In order to avoid this conclusion, the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter 1, however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non- value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant’s normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, I do not use them arbitrarily, and I do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. **Persons** may **have “dignity**, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth” **that transcends any market value, but persons also have** a fundamental **equality that dictates that some must** sometimes **give way for the sake of others.** The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others.

**Second,** util is the only moral system available to policy-makers. **Goodin 90**[[4]](#footnote-4)

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. **Public officials** are obliged to **make** their **choices under uncertainty**, and uncertainty **of a** very **special sort** at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, **[they] are** relatively **poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they** typically **do know are** generalities: **averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people** as a result of their various possible choices, **but that is all. That** is enough to **allow[s]** public **policy-makers to use** the **util**itarian **calculus** – assuming they want to use it at all – to chose general rules or conduct.

Third, conflicting moral side-constraints would paralyze state action, so states must use util to weigh deontological violations.

Fourth,there’s no act-omission distinction. 2 reasons.

(A) act-omission distinction does not apply to states.

**Sunstein and Vermuele 5** write[[5]](#footnote-5)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses** a set of **policy** instruments **that do not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

(B) act-omission distinction is paradoxical. **Persson 1** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

There are two ways in which **the act‐omission doctrine**, which implies that it may be permissible to let people die or be killed when it is wrong to kill them, **gives rise to a paradox. First, it may be that when you let a victim be killed, you let yourself kill this victim.** On the assumption that, if it would be wrong of you to act in a certain fashion, it would be wrong of you let yourself act in this fashion, **this yields the paradox that it is both permissible and impermissible to let yourself act** in this fashion. **Second, you may let yourself kill** somebody **by letting an action you have already initiated cause death, e.g., by not lending a** helping **hand to somebody you have pushed. This, too, yields the paradox that it is both permissible and impermissible to let yourself kill** if you are in a situation in which killing is impermissible but letting be killed permissible.

This means side constraint-based theories reduce to util because any reason not to violate a side constraint oneself is an equally good reason to minimize side constraint violations.

Fifth, Happiness is objectively good. **Sidgwick 1**[[7]](#footnote-7)

A similar view may be plausibly taken of many rules prescribing what are sometimes called " duties to oneself " : it may be said that they are given on the assumption that a man regards his own Happiness as an ultimate end : that if any one should be so exceptional as to disregard it, he does not come within their scope : in short, that the ' ought ' in such formula^ is still implicitly relative to an ojotioncd end. It does not, however, seem to me that this account of the matter is exhaustive. We do not all look with simple indifference on **a man who** declines to take the right means to attain his own happiness, on no other ground than that he **does not care about happiness**. **Most** men **would regard** such a refusal **as irrational**, with a certain disapprobation; **they would thus implicitly assent** to Butler's statement **that** "interest, one's own happiness, is a manifest obligation." In other words, they would think that **a man ought to care for his own happiness. The word ' ought ' thus used is no longer relative : happiness now appears as an ultimate end**, the pursuit of which at least within the limits imposed by other duties appears to be **prescribed by reason ' categorically**,' as Kant would say, i.e. without any tacit assumption of a still ulterior end. And it has been widely held by even orthodox moralists that all morality rests ultimately on the basis of " reasonable self-love " ; " i.e. that its rules are ultimately binding on any important part of duty or virtue in general. Common moral opinion recognises and inculcates other fundamental rules e.g. those of Justice, Good Faith, Veracity which, in its ordinary judgments on particular cases, it is inclined to treat as binding without qualification and without regard to ulterior consequences. And, in the ordinary form of the Intuitional view of Ethics, the " categorical " prescription of such rules is maintained explicitly and definitely, as a result of philosophical reflection : and the realisation of Virtue in act at least in the case of the virtues just mentioned is held to consist in strict and unswerving conformity to such rules. On the other hand it is contended by many Utilitarians that all the rules of conduct which men prescribe to one another as moral rules are really though in part unconsciously prescribed as means to the general happiness of mankind, or of the whole aggregate of sentient beings ; and it is still more widely held by Utilitarian thinkers that such rules, however they may originate, are only valid so far as their observance is conducive to the general happiness. This contention I shall hereafter examine with due care. Here I wish only to point out that, if the duty of aiming at the general happiness is thus taken to include all other duties, as subordinate applications of it, we seem to be again led to the notion of Happiness as an ultimate end categorically pre- scribed, only it is now General Happiness and not the private happiness of any individual.

Sixth, all moral theories devolve to util. **Mill 63** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

To inquire how far the bad effects of this deficiency have been mitigated in practice, or to what extent the moral beliefs of mankind have been vitiated or made uncertain by the absence of any distinct recognition of an ultimate standard, would imply a complete survey and criticism, of past and present ethical doctrine. It would, however, be easy to show that whatever steadiness or consistency these moral beliefs have, attained, has been mainly due to the tacit influence of a standard not recognised. Although the non-existence of an acknowledged first principle has made ethics not so much a guide as a consecration of men’s **[people’s] actual sentiments**, still, as men’s sentiments, both of favour and of aversion, **are greatly influenced by** what they suppose to be the **effects** of things up**on their happiness, the principle of utility**, or as Bentham latterly called it, the greatest happiness principle, **has had a large share in forming** the **moral doctrines** even **of those who** most scornfully **reject its authority. Nor is there a**ny **school of thought which refuses to admit that** the influence of actions on **happiness is a** most material and even **predominant consideration in** many of the details of **morals, however unwilling to acknowledge it as** the fundamental principle of morality, and **the source of moral obligation.** I might go much further, and say that to all those a priori moralists who deem it necessary to argue at all, **util**itarian arguments are **[is] indispensable.**

Util calc is not infinitely regressive. **Hardin 90** writes[[9]](#footnote-9)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[10]](#footnote-10)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same.[[11]](#footnote-11) This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked.

Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Ignore skepticism and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

Thus the **Plan**: The USFG ought to provide Pell Grants to eligible prisoners in the United States criminal justice system. Funding through normal means. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until he checks in CX. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

Advantage 1 is Crime

Lack of Pell Grants decimates post-secondary prison education programs which jacks crime rates. **Buzzini 09**[[12]](#footnote-12)

[Brackets in original text] It’s no secret that the education system in the United States is in shambles – and not just for inmates. Students aren’t receiving a proper education, which encourages the nation’s youth to get involved in gangs, drugs, and violence. **Many inmates can’t** even **read well, ranking** in **at** “maybe a **seventh-grade level**” (Leder 1). **Were it possible** for inmates **to receive a**n education while serving time (a GED if an equivalent had not been attained, followed by a post-secondary **degree**) **they would have a much greater chance of escaping** the clutches of **poverty and** their ties to **illegal activity when** they are **released** back into society. This must have been the line of thinking that inspired the inception of the first post-secondary correctional education program, which began in 1953 at the University of Southern Illinois in Menard. Such a program must have been a bit ahead of its time, because **by 1965 only 11** more post-secondary correctional **education** (PCSE) **programs appeared.** 19**65** was a landmark year for PCSE it **marked the first** time that inmates were eligible to receive **Pell Grants** to fund their college aspirations. **Thanks to** the availability of **federal funding, programs began popping up nationwide. In 1973 there were 182 programs;** by 1982 there were 350. Programs reached their peak when, **in the** early 19**90s, there were** a total of **772** on-site college programs **in 1,287 prisons** (Taylor “Pell Grants” 2). **The majority of inmates covered their costs with** the aid of **the Pell Grant. However, in** 19**94, thanks to** the prevailing **“tough on crime” attitude** of the time, **inmates** were **no longer** able to **receive** federal aid in the form of **Pell Grants. While peak enrollment** in PCSE programs **totaled at 12 percent** of inmate populations, **the** s0-called **“deteriorated state” counted less than 4 percent** (Taylor “Pell Grants” 3). There is **myriad statistical data** to **show that education programs** inside prisons **aid in** actual **rehab**ilitation **and** do **reduce recidivism** rates. But these facts were glossed over as politicians wowed their constituents with their tough policies regarding crime. However, they didn’t bother to mention to their constituents that “**Massachusetts, Maryland, and New York** are among the states [that **reported**] **reductions in recidivism of** as high as **15.5 percent for inmates** who participated **in education programs** (Freedman 6).” That 15.5 percent reduction means 15.5 percent of inmates were *actually* rehabilitated, as opposed to merely punished, during their time on the inside. The numbers are even more impressive on a national scale, as “**inmates with** at least two years of **college had a 10 percent re-arrest rate; the national average is 60 percent**” (“Statehouses Debate…”). That means 50 percent less people went back to prison, simply because they completed some form of higher education. It is for reasons such as this that “critics lament the loss of **Pell Grants** as short-sighted in light of studies documenting **lower recidivism** and misconduct rates among inmates who pursue post-secondary education” (Freedman 8). It truly is a serious loss, for the depletion of funding via Pell Grants for PSCE has resulted in a devastating loss of programs nationwide, despite such programs’ ability to reduce recidivism **and** markedly **rehabilitate** many **inmates who participate.** Should the Pell Grant be re-instated, corrections in America would see a much-needed turn for the better.

Recidivism is a systemic impact which harms every facet of society. **Wilson 07**[[13]](#footnote-13)

The effects of recidivism in the United States fall into four general categories. **First, recidivism imposes tremendous public safety costs** on American communities; high recidivism rates indicate additional victimizations (assuming that the crime for which the juvenile was arrested was in fact committed). **Second, increased recidivism results in extremely destructive social costs; increases in violence, crime, homelessness,** family destabilization, **and public health risks** are all associated with high recidivism rates. **Third, recidivism imposes a** considerable **financial burden on the** U.S. **D**epartment **o**f **J**ustice **and**, more **general**ly, on American **society**; our government spends an annual sixty billion dollars on correctional programs. **Fourth,** high recidivism indicates a failure to provide meaningful rehabilitation for **inmates** reentering the community; recidivist juveniles **lose out on crucial educational, social, and personal developments** that can rarely be regained. Additionally, studies show that recurrent offenses during teenage years can provide a dangerous inculcation leading to adult criminality. The tragedy of this cycle of criminality cannot be understated.

Prefer empirical studies that evaluate systemic impacts. Expert predictions alone should carry zero epistemological weight. **Menand 5**[[14]](#footnote-14)

Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The **respondents were asked to rate the probability of** three alternative **outcomes**: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an *x* per cent chance of happening happen *x* per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the **experts performed worse than** they would have **if they had** simply **assigned** an **equal probability to all** three **outcomes**—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. **Human** being**s who spend their lives studying** the state of **the world**, in other words, **are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys**, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than journalists or attentive readers of the New York *Times* in ‘reading’ emerging situations.” **And the more famous the forecaster the more overblown the forecasts.** “**Experts in demand**,” Tetlock says, “**were more overconfident than their colleagues** who eked out existences far from the limelight.”

Reject specific disad link chains in favor of analysis of complex systems. Linear scenario planning is more likely to cause extinction than solve it. **Skyttner 5** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

Today the socio-technical **systems** of the modern society **are** increasingly all embracing and tighter **integrated**. System-relations **more and more** stand out as untransparent, incomprehensible and **unmanageable.** Furthermore, the world around is so rapidly changed that **circumstantial planning** often **is a thing of the past.** The **uncertainties** regarding the nature of future combat therefore **bring** about great **demands of flexibility** and adaptability of our command and control systems. That qualities like information-advantage and a realistic surrounding-world apprehension call for increased integration of different sensors, arms and communication systems are nevertheless given. As given is that success in combat always is a function of how command is executed and how danger, stress, obscurity and general confusion which constantly exist will be handled. When the enemy no longer is seen in our binoculars and when we not even know who has released an attack against us, the need for creative thinking is of highest priority. Today an event of war even can lack the attacking component and imply hitherto unknown social phenomena. As compared with such circumstances, traditional military thinking could not be considered particularly successful. There tactical problems always have been reduced to easily recognizable situations with a well-learned standard response. Quite natural, critical thinking, questioning and creativity have not got a prominent role in this kind of education. Today the security policy situation of Sweden is radically different from the situation only ten years ago. New, extremely fragmented scenarios of a threat exist. A military threatening picture still exists even if it has deteriorated substantially after the end of the cold war. **Russia still has attacking capability** via distant and NBC-weapons. A military recovery in this country can result in nonmilitary information operations within a ten-year period. The development is difficult to judge but is coherent with the democratic development and the relations to the West. Just now the most probable threat comes from terrorism. The last years have signified a development towards an ever increasing extent of **terrorist groups** with better and better armaments. No doubt, some of these groups **have NBC-weapons**. Those who not have access to such weapons strive for them. Attacks resulting in thousands of victims among innocent people, today is a reality which has been demonstrated by the assault upon World Trade Centre. It is quite possible that such groups will choose to locate internal controversies to neutral ground like Stockholm with pertinent consequence like taking hostages, etc. When such things happen, the odds are against the anti terrorist forces. The terrorists only need to have success once while the combatting forces must be successful every time. A third kind of security policy threat are those which are information technology related. **States** as well as criminal gangs and terrorist organisations already today **use IT**-related systems as **weapons** apart from their ordinary use. Attacks can be targeted toward our own IT systems, electricity supply systems, telecommunications and economical systems. In our highly computerized society, a small group can cause damages which early required an army. That the danger of IT-attacks has increased can be related to the simple fact that the more something is exposed, the more the threatening picture is reinforced. A special problem in this context is the difficulty to discover if an attack exists at all. The defence against such information warfare will be a big problem in the foreseeable future for our vulnerable society. It is also not possible to leave out of account the threats coming from economical warfare. Even if the country today has a reasonably stable economy and is supported by the membership of EU, strongly increased fuel price during a period will destabilize society. Large-scale economical crimes pursued for example by the powerful drug mafia in Colombia can also be a real threat. This organisation has scarcely an interest to capture a geographical area. However, they want to consolidate and expand their economical flows. It is necessary to bear in mind that their financial annual turnover is bigger than most European countries. Consequently, it is necessary to realise that the old and exact security-policy classification into “war” and “peace” hardly is relevant today. **A war**-like terror action with disastrous consequence **can happen without early warning** in a situation which we apprehend to be in deepest peace. The goal can be to crush our basic values – not our geographical area. An enumeration of what the modern societies consider these values to be, can be the following: territorial integrity in the livingspace; political sovereignty and democracy; freedom of thought, religion and speech; a state governed by law with human rights and minority rights; free market economy; and the free university. In the protection of these values, the extensive invasion and mobilization defence with its mass army no longer has a justification. Not including the frontiers of land, sea and air combat, a new frontier has emerged where the battle is fought with global information systems. There the strategic goals have changed so that destruction has been replaced by manipulation, infiltration and assimilation. All this taken together is the reason why **big-scale problem solving seldom work as before.** The traditional way of managing war with a large quantity of troops fighting a well defined and localized enemy is barely no longer possible. The **lack of success** for traditional methods **is visible** also **on** civil frontiers like the war against **poverty**, the war against drugs, **and** the attempts to extinct **AIDS.** The new, multinational and **complex** threatening **pictures** which have replaced the old ones, **can only be met with** a smaller, more modern and flexible elite-force. The heavy striking-force with small command and intelligence resources will be reduced in favour of a network-defence based on the development within information and communication technology. The designation network will, however, not in the first instance represent the connecting of different technical systems. Instead it will represent a more **flexible** way of **handling** a new situation – to combine different entities and components for more complex tasks. One of its main duties will be peace-keeping international contributions. Another task will be to handle attacks realised with nerve-gas or bacteria. High-technological data-virus should also be possible to combat. The building up of such a defence will demand an entirely new way of thinking regarding decision-making, command and control and use of modern technology. Internationally, this kind of thinking has attracted great interest and got the designation “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The term is based on a number of technological breakthroughs which have occurred after the end of the cold war about 1990. In several ways, these have changed the ground for modern warfare. Here the most important achievements have been the information-technological progresses which will permit the use of lots of sensors and the capability to transfer and manage big information-flows. Realistic training with the aid of virtual three-dimensional computer scenarios (“Battlefield Computer Games”), has signified a pronounced increase in the combat-skill of tank-crews. Some important trends within the RMA-concept is presented below: Unmanned fighting vehicles and aircrafts. Automated, computerized technology will replace drivers and pilots. Start navigation, interpreting of the surrounding world, target-interpretation, target combatting and possible landing, is handled completely automatic. The opportunity of human handling and target combats remain. No consideration regarding the weight of the pilot, G-forces and life-supporting systems is necessary. The construction can be lighter, stronger, more rapid and cheaper. The instruction time can be shorter. Data-streams, threat-analyses and military preparedness. Miniaturized networks of cheap sensors deliver data from areas which earlier have not been accessible. Immediate processing creates information which is distributed via coded broadband to all units needing it. Chemical, bacteriological, radiological detection and protection. Micro sensors integrated in new protective clothes will dramatically increase the ability to move and increase freedom of action in contaminated areas. High sensibility and selectivity will make possible an immediate detection of the threat. Body-armour for fighting soldiers. Extremely strong and light bullet proof materials increase the survival on the battlefield. Field-equipment of lightweight type. New, lightweight materials will decrease the total carrying load for the soldier. Hence endurance and strength will increase. This holds well for uniforms, personal weapons, communication equipment and darkness-optics. New bio-treatment for augmented performance. Without the use of drugs, human staying power can be doubled. Lack of sleep and impaired vigilance now can be compensated for as well as the impact of physical damage. A science of command and control Today's military command and control embrace different kinds of affairs from battle conduct to more administrative activities. It takes place on different strata from lower tactical levels to the highest strategical level. In contrast to civil command and control it includes fundamental questions regarding life and death for involved persons. In battlefields the unmasked principle of causality always rules. There the connection between conclusions and orders and their consequences are terrifyingly short. A simple definition of the aim of command and control could be the coordination of human actions with different resources to get effects. In practise, this is often considered as something diffuse. Difficulties often arise when analysing the content and form of the activity. Problem solutions too often are seen as applied science without either theories or scientific method. Obstacles to attain a comprehensive view with hitherto used frames of reference have been experienced by both commanders and military theorists. With this background, an attempt to regard command and control as part of “The Art of War” may be understandable. As an art, it can only be developed and reach its fulfilment inside the born leader with his special creativity, intuition capability and the divine vestige, existing in very few persons. However, such a view will have some less successful consequences, especially for the education of higher commanders. The divine vestige is scarcely possible to gauge and the number of born leaders is not in enough supply for the demands of society. At all events it cannot be the foundation for the recruitment of general staff candidates. Here more measurable and tangible properties must be decisive. A more fruitful attitude therefore has appeared to be an integration of the problems of military management into a general scientific educational frame and denote it a science of command and control. The military competent at once realise that this area has two central questions at issue, on the one hand to make relevant decisions and on the other to carry them out adequately. With a slight reformulation it is possible to say that decision-making is to determine what should be done. The realization, the command, concerns how it should be done. Here the continuous existing aspect of time is present with its deadlines for thinking, planning, decision-making, taking measures, etc. This kind of activity always embraces the old truism of the equal importance of making the right things as doing things right. Regarding civil decision-making and execution, it often differs marginally (in principle) from the military counterpart. Thus, it is possible to speak of a general science of command and control. In English, the area is denoted by the words command, control, communication and information with the acronym C3I. Command implies goal-oriented conduct and action, executed by people over people who all are living creatures and thereby process information for their survival. The process of life is to adapt the own situation to an ever-changing environment and a relation between information and control. Control comprises the processing of information, programming, decision and communication. Two-way communication between the controller and the controlled feeds back the result of the action for necessary justification and new activity. In reality, the described control and command process is a very complex phenomenon. The physical and mental status of the decision-maker as well as deeply existing conceptions and preferences influence the procedure. Also organisational structures and technical equipment will influence the result. “**Everything is connected to everything else**”. Later in the text, it will be evident that the used English keywords can represent subsets of a comprehensive theory. Without this theory the term science in the label “A science of command and control” should be irrelevant. To synthesize a **new** subject field like **command and control will imply** the finding and **understanding** of the **joint factors** existing within different kinds of the area. It also demands definitions regarding basic terms and concepts as **a starting point for problem-solving** and various kinds of reasoning. Below some fundamental concept are presented. The theory of command and control is founded on a number of related academic areas. The integration of these creates the theoretical basis which allows a commander to understand the function of command and control. That is to master the prerequisite for relevant decisions and their transformation into reality. The science of command and control is the application of the theory in a real world. It indicates how a system of command and control should be designed and used for decision-making, execution, followup, and government in a mainly unpredictable and chaotic environment (especially the combat). A system of command and control is an integrated gathering of people, functions, procedures and equipment which together constitute the function of command and control. This system is the tool of the commander and secures that the capacity of the directed unity is utilized in the best manner in order to fulfill the goal. The research problem of the science of command and control can be formulated as: How should the intentions of the commander be converted into reality as completely as possible? Something which must be elucidated in the definitions above is the concept of a commander. The presumption that one can count with an unambiguous, conclusive commander as in military units, civil service departments or oil-tankers are not always correct. A committee, a board or some kind of collective often is the equivalent. This must be considered the rule when controversial political problems should be solved. The concept of a commander implies that somebody (sometimes several) can formulate a criterion for the best problem solution and take the responsibility for a decision. Likewise that this (or these) people finally shoulder the responsibility for execution even if this can be transferred to other instances. Today a science of command and control is necessary to adapt managing power and exercise of command to new kinds of organisations and new operational principles. The area is transformed at a rapid pace by social changes and new trends like the internationalisation of economies and knowledge production, globalization of media and knowledge mediation and also changed forms of cooperation and conflicts. Moreover, modern leadership is often executed at a distance which implies both possibilities and risks. Today's communication technology will permit operations (both surgical and military!) to be literally managed and controlled from the other side of the globe. Modern dispersed organisations thus have their specific problems which cannot be neglected. How should social relations be managed when the personal encounter becomes a rare event and directors are dematerialized to a voice in a satellite-mediated phone call? Regarding military command and control systems, they are today typically multi-component phenomena. The deciding functions are performed by people, simple decision-support systems in computer-based algorithms and advanced expert-systems. The decision-components are geographically dispersed dependent on the appearance of the environment but also for reason of survival. This distributed system gets its character by the quality of the sensors together with velocity and effectiveness of actual weapons. The need for a comprehensive theory For the military scientist it is obvious that studies in such a complex area as command and control scarcely are possible without the help of a theory of generalization, a meta-theory. Such a theory must be able to sum up and explain common factors and problems existing in all kinds of command and control. It must also be able to integrate different knowledge and reflections from various subject fields, which apparently do not seem to be related. In addition it must preferably furnish a hierarchy of theories and models where key-variables and their changes are intelligible and measurable. The supply of relevant models to facilitate studies, simulations and calculations defines the limits for both knowledge acquisition and information-dispersal. A meta-theory likewise must supply general definitions and a common language, joining all subareas which taken together, will constitute a science of command and control. The application must take place in an area which has an ever growing need for rapid decisions and the mastering of very complex processes despite tight margins, ambiguous and disturbed information. As a frame of reference it must also be able to answer the same questions like other scientific areas, namely: what theories represent the core of the field? which methods are used? which sources are used? and to what extent are these theories, methods and sources universally applicable? Does such a theory exist? From the viewpoint of the systems-scientist, the answer is affirmative. General **Systems Theory** (GST) studies patterns which do not relate to a specific area. It **examines generalizations**, applicable on specific problems, e.g. in command and control. As meta-discipline **it can transfer** its **knowledge**-structure **to other areas** without calling in question their content. It can supplement a great number of areas and integrate phenomena which had not been successfully handled. Above all this theory will support the generalist, who often is found to solve today's problem better than the specialist with his narrow limits. A popular formulation could be that systems theory creates a knowledge structure which facilitates the providing of fact to the right place and creates possibilities to see a connected whole. A locution is that **its main task is to** help scientists to **elucidate** the **complexity** of the existence, technologists to make use of it and generalists to learn to live with it.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat United States policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 8** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

**Plan focus is good** for education because:

(a) Plans increase depth of education because we can focus on one specific issue each round instead of touching briefly on each aspect of the topic.

Depth is better than breadth. If we go in-depth on a *different* issue each round, then we’ll get a breadth of info any way, but if we spread ourselves thin discussing a breadth of issues each round, we’ll never have an in-depth discussion of the topic.

(b) Plans are key to incentivize continued research. If the same stock arguments are going to apply every round, there’s no incentive to do new work.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

Plans are key to textuality. “Resolved” means a policy.

**Words and Phrases 64** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Definition of** the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

“Ought” can only refer to action, even in the context of “ought to be.”

**Prichard 12** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that the apprehension that something good which is not an action ought to be involves just the feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the thought of the action which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) **The word "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone.** The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." **Even if we** are sometimes moved to say that the world or something in it is not what it **ought to be, what we really mean is** that God or **some human** being has not made something what he **ought to have made it**. And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that we can only feel the imperativeness upon us of something which is in our power; **for** it is actions and **actions alone** which, directly at least, **are in our power.**

1. Peter Singer [Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, Princeton], “The Groundwork of Utilitarian Morals: Reconsidering Hare’s Argument for Utilitarianism,” draft prepared for the Conference on Issues in Modern Philosophy: “The Foundations of Morality,” NYU Philosophy Department, November 7, 2009, 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Peter Singer, “Practical Ethics,” Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 13-14 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Cummiskey, David. Associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago. “Kantian Consequentiaism.” Ethics 100 (April 1990), University of Chicago. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2381810> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Robert Goodin, fellow in philosophy, Australian National Defense University, THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE, 1990, p. 141-2 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermuele, “Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life‐Life Tradeoffs,” *Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory* Working Paper No. 85 (March 2005), p. 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ingmar Persson, “The Two Act‐Omission Paradox,” 2004. Jul. 2004. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The Methods of Ethics. Henry Sidgwick (utilitarian). Sixth Edition. 1901. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. John Stuart Mill (Member of Parliament, godfather of Bertrand Russell). Utilitarianism. 1863. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Hardin, Russell (Helen Gould Shepard Professor in the Social Sciences @ NYU). May 1990. Morality within the Limits of Reason. University Of Chicago Press. pp. 4. ISBN 978-0226316208. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Luc Lauwers (Center for Economic Studies, K.U.Leuven) Peter Vallentyne (Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia). “Infinite Utilitarianism: More Is Always Better\*.” *Economics and Philosophy* 20 (2004): 307-330. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See, for example, Bossert and Weymark (forthcoming 2003). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Anne Buzzini, JD, Southwestern University School of Law. “Education in Prisons,” April 21st, 2009. http://www.docstoc.com/docs/5576868/Education-in-Prisons [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Jane Wilson, Stanford's Strauss Scholar, developing educational programs for inmates in cities across the US. Roosevelt Review, “Reducing Juvenile Recidivism in the United States,” 2007. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/19695235/Juvenile-Recidivism> [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Louis Menand, “Everybody’s An Expert,” The New Yorker. December 5th, 2005. <http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/12/05/051205crbo_books1> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Lars Skyttner, professor of natural science – University of Gâvle, professor – Royal Swedish Military Academy, “Systems theory and the science of military command and control,” Kybernetes Vol. 34, Issue 7/8, 2005, p. 1240-1260 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Adam F. Nelson, J.D.1. Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate. 2008. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Prichard, Harold. 1912. “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 21:21-37. Gendered language modified. <http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-18)