Neuroscientific evidence undermines the cognitivist account of moral truth and specifically Kantians like Korsgaard. **Schroeder 10** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

What, then, is left? **The cognitivist holds** the view **that moral motivation begins with** occurrent **belief**. In particular, it begins with beliefs **about what** actions **would be right.** The cognitivist holds that, at least in cases of morally worthy action, such beliefs lead to motivation to perform those actions, quite independently of any antecedent desires. The cognitivist is happy to call this motivational state ‘‘a desire,’’ but thinks of it as entirely dependent upon the moral belief that created it. The cognitivist position has recognizable afﬁnities to familiar positions in the philosophical literature (e.g. **Korsgaard**, 1994; McDowell, 1998: ch. 4; Smith, 1994). These philosophers, of course, hold that much more is going on in the mind of a morally worthy agent than the simple picture painted by our cognitivist. They generally **agree[s]**, however, **that moral**ly worthy **action is not dependent** up**on** antecedent **desires, but** stems in the ﬁrst instance from one’s **judgments.** On the cognitivist’s view, Jen’s desires are not irrelevant to her action, but they are not the initiating engines of her action either. Instead, her desires are mere data that she considers (perhaps) in coming to be motivated. Given what is available to her, perhaps she comes to believe that it would be right to give the homeless man money, and it never occurs to her to even consider her desires. This consideration of the rightness of giving money to the homeless man motivates Jen to give him some money, and she does. Because she is moved by the right sort of belief, her action has moral worth.

[…]

Of our four caricature theorists, it is obviously **our cognitivist** who **is most likely to have difﬁculties accommodating the neuroscientiﬁc evidence.** Although it was pointed out earlier that the theoretical possibility exists that moral cognition can lead directly to moral motivation independently of the reward system (and so independently of desire), this theoretical possibility proves to be problematic upon closer inspection. We begin with evidence from Parkinson disease. As will be familiar to many, Parkinson disease is a disorder that results in a number of effects, including tremor, difﬁculty in initiating movement, and (if taken to its limit) total paralysis. Parkinson disease is caused by the death of the dopamine-producing cells of the substantia nigra pars compacta (the SNpc in Figure 3.1), the very cells that make up the reward system’s output to the motor basal ganglia. Thus, on the interpretation of the reward system advocated earlier, **Parkinson disease is a disorder in which intrinsic desires slowly lose their** capacity to causally inﬂuence **motivation.** As it turns out, **Parkinson** disease impairs or **prevents action** regardless of **whether the action is moral**ly worthy **or not,** regardless of whether it is intuitively desired or intuitively done out of duty, regardless of **whether the individual** trying to act **gives a law to herself. Thus Parkinson** disease **appears to show that intrinsic desires are necessary to** the production of **motivation** in normal human beings, and this would seem to put serious pressure on the cognitivist’s position. The cognitivist might allow that intrinsic desires must exist in order for motivation to be possible, but hold that intrinsic desires normally play no signiﬁcant role in producing motivation. After all, Parkinson disease shows that intrinsic desires are necessary for motivation, but it does not clearly reveal the role played by intrinsic desires in producing motivation when the desires exist. If sustainable, this would be just a minor concession, and so it is well worth investigating. What might motivation of the cognitivist’s sort look like, if desires play no substantive role in it? It was suggested in the previous section that it might look like motivation that stems directly from activity in the higher cognitive centers—like motivation that stems from choosing a law for one’s action, in other words. And it turns out that motivation derived from higher cognitive centers independently of desire is possible—but also that the only known model of it is pathological. It is the sort of motivation found in Tourette syndrome. Tourette syndrome is a disorder characterized by tics: eye blinks, shoulder jerks, barks, obscenities, profanities, and so on. Something like 70–90% of sufferers report that they often voluntarily produce their tics, because the effort of not ticcing is unpleasant and often doomed to failure in any case. But a typical sufferer from Tourette syndrome will also report that tics are quite capable of forcing themselves out regardless of how fiercely they are resisted. Tourette syndrome appears to be caused by a dysfunction in the motor basal ganglia, in which the motor basal ganglia inhibit most motor commands initiated by perceptual and higher cognitive centers, but not quite all. Some motor commands initiated by perceptual or higher cognitive centers get through in spite of the inhibition, and in spite of the fact that reward signals (intrinsic desires) have not released these inhibitions. A tic is the result (Schroeder, 2005). Thus direct causation of **motivation by higher cognition** via this pathway, quite independently of desire, **is the sort of thing that results in a Tourettic tic, but a Tourettic tic is anything but** the paradigm of **morally worthy action. This seems a very unpromising parallel** to be drawn **for** a **cognitivist** picture of **motivation.** There are other ways to investigate the biological plausibility of our cognitivist’s position as well. **If reason alone were responsible for moral motivation,** one would expect that **injuries that spare reason would also spare moral motivation, but** there are clinical **case studies** that **suggest otherwise.** Damage to the ventromedial (VM) region of prefrontal cortex (located in the OFC in Figure 3.1), a form of brain damage studied extensively by Damasio and colleagues (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994), impairs cognitive input to the reward system, and so alters the output of the reward system to the motor basal ganglia. Such damage seems to render subjects incapable of acting on their better judgments in certain cases—a finding that we think ought to capture the imagination of any moral psychologist. In a well-known non-moral experimental task, subjects with this sort of injury were asked to draw cards from any of four decks of cards. Each card was marked with a number indicating a number of dollars won or lost, and subjects were asked to draw as they liked from the four decks, attempting to maximize their winnings. Normal control subjects tended to draw at first from two of the decks, which quickly revealed themselves to have high-paying cards when drawn from. But those same decks also had high-costing cards in them, and normal subjects soon enough learned to stay away from these decks and shift to the other two decks, where returns were lower but penalties less punitive (Bechara et al., 1997). **Subjects with** VM **prefrontal injuries**—with injuries to structures that are crucial input to the reward system—started their play just as normal subjects did, but strongly tended not to switch to the safer decks, instead staying with the high-paying, high-costing decks until they ran out of money. Fascinatingly, these same subjects sometimes **reported being aware of** what **the better strategy** would be, **but** they nonetheless **failed to follow it** (Bechara et al., 2000). **This** sort of finding **should** once again **give our cognitivist pause**, for it suggests that, at least in non-moral contexts, **reason alone does not** suffice to **guide action independently of reward information**; it is reasonable to speculate that reason may fail to produce motivation in moral cases as well. Damasio himself interprets these findings as specifically vindicating the role of felt emotional responses in decision-making, a more personalist than instrumentalist conclusion. However, the precise interpretation of the mechanism by which VM prefrontal cortical injury leads to its own peculiar effects is not yet well understood. We return to a discussion of these people with VM damage after exploring the consequences for the cognitivist thesis of another population of people with disorders of moral motivation: psychopaths. Psychopaths are people who seem cognitively normal, but evince little remorse or guilt for morally wrong actions. Psychopaths are identified by scoring high on a standard psychopathy checklist (Hare, 1991), and seem to be deficient in two respects: (1) emotional dysfunction, and (2) antisocial behavior. **Psychopaths** seem able to **comprehend** social and **moral rules, and** they typically **do not** seem to **have impaired reasoning** abilities. (Recent studies suggest that limbic system damage is correlated with psychopathy, and this is consistent with the fact that psychopaths show diminished affective response to cues of suffering in others, but it does not suggest any particularly cognitive impairment [Kiehl, 2006; but see Maibom, 2005].) As a population apparently **capable of** making **moral judgments but not** at all **motivated by them, psychopaths present a**n obvious **challenge to the cognitivist.** However, research suggests that psychopaths’ moral cognition is deficient in at least the following respect: they show a diminished capacity to distinguish moral from conventional violations (Blair, 1995, 1997). For instance, children with psychopathic tendencies are more likely to judge moral violations as authority-dependent (so the morality of hitting another child in a classroom will be held to depend on whether or not the teacher permits it, rather than held to be independent of such rules, as it is by normally developing children). This deficit has led some to argue that psychopaths have impaired moral concepts (Nichols, 2004: 113). Although they are able to say whether an action is right or wrong, permitted or prohibited, philosophers such as these suggest that psychopaths merely mouth the words, or make moral judgments in the ‘‘inverted commas’’ sense: judgments of what is called ‘‘moral’’ by others. The ability of psychopaths to stand as counter-examples to cognitivism rests upon some argument to the effect that psychopaths really do make moral judgments. If psychopaths indeed lack moral concepts or moral knowledge, then their failure to act morally or to appear to lack motivation is no challenge to cognitivism, for it can plausibly be argued that to make moral judgments at all, one must have moral concepts and possess some modicum of moral knowledge (Kennett & Fine, 2007). However, if the ability to make the moral/conventional distinction is not required for moral concepts or moral knowledge, then psychopaths appear to be candidate counter-examples to our cognitivist (see, e.g., Kelly et al., 2007). Although some arguments have been offered to suggest that psychopaths have requisite abilities to make moral judgments (Roskies, 2007), these arguments remain indecisive. On our view, **it remains unclear whether psychopaths are competent moral judges.**

Neg doesn’t get his outdated enlightenment meta-ethics. Appeals to universal capital-T truth are both unnecessary for pragmatic political action and a proactive cause of policy paralysis. **Kratochwil 8** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Firstly, **a pragmatic approach does not begin with** objects or “things” (**ontology**), **or** with **reason** and method (epistemology), **but with** “**acting”** ( prattein), thereby preventing some false starts. Since, **as historical beings** placed **in a specific situations, we do not have the luxury of deferring decisions until we have found the “truth”, we have to act** and must do so always **under time pressures** and **in the face of incomplete information**. Precisely because the social world is characterised by strategic interactions, **what a situation “is”, is hardly ever clear** ex ante, **because it is being “produced” by the actors and their interactions**, **and** the multiple **possibilities are rife with** incentives for (**dis)information. This puts a premium on quick diagnostic and cognitive shortcuts** informing actors about the relevant features of the situation, and on leaving an alternative open (“plan B”) in case of unexpected difficulties. **Instead of relying on** certainty and **universal validity** gained through abstraction and controlled experiments, we know that completeness and attentiveness to **detail**, **rather than** to **generality**, **matter**. To that extent, likening practical choices to simple “discoveries” of an already independently existing “reality” which discloses itself to an “observer” – or relying on optimal strategies – is somewhat heroic. These points have been made vividly by “realists” such as Clausewitz in his controversy with von Bülow, in which he criticised the latter’s obsession with a strategic “science” (Paret et al. 1986). While Clausewitz has become an icon for realists, only a few of them (usually dubbed “old” realists) have taken seriously his warnings against the misplaced belief in the reliability and usefulness of a “scientific” study of strategy. Instead, most of them, especially “neorealists” of various stripes, have embraced the “theory”-building based on the epistemological project as the via regia to the creation of knowledge. A pragmatist orientation would most certainly not endorse such a position. Secondly, since **acting in the social world** often **involves acting “for” someone,** special **responsibilities arise** that aggravate both the incompleteness of knowledge as well as its generality problem. Since **we owe** special **care to those entrusted to us**, for example, as teachers, doctors or lawyers, **we cannot** just rely on what is generally true, but have to pay special attention to the particular case. Aside from avoiding the foreclosure of options, we cannot ***refuse* to act on the basis of incomplete information or insufficient knowledge**, and the necessary diagnostic will involve typification and comparison, reasoning by analogy rather than generalization or deduction. Leaving out the particularities of a case, be it a legal or medical one, in a mistaken effort to become “scientific” would be a fatal flaw. Moreover, there still remains the crucial element of “timing” – of knowing when to act. Students of crises have always pointed out the importance of this factor but, in attempts at building a general “theory” of international politics analogously to the natural sciences, such elements are neglected on the basis of the “continuity of nature” and the “large number” assumptions. Besides, “timing” seems to be quite recalcitrant to analytical treatment.

Ignore skepticism and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action. This also creates a reciprocal 1 to 1 burden structure, so it’s key to fairness.

Focus on concrete problems and solutions is the only meaningful form of philosophy. Ivory tower philosophy theorizes itself into irrelevance. **Edet 03**[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Too much class time is occupied with questions like** ‘’What did Hegel mean by …?’’ and ‘**’What was your** third **criticism of util**itarianism**?’’** While such an approach may have paedeutic value its relevance is nonetheless questionable. The students must be encouraged to develop independent thinking ability and form opinions of their own. Pedagogical techniques, including small group discussions, debates, films and ‘’clever’’ essay examination need to be employed to illustrate the difference between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Also practical computer and information technology (IT) training needs to be made compulsory. The students may be asked to go on a compulsory period of attachment in a computer school and show evidence of successful completion of the training before resuming their philosophical studies.

The point made here is that **philosophy must be** ‘’problem focused’’ and attempt to be **“problem solving”** in socially important problems and establish its integrative function with other disciplines. By so doing philosophy will affirm its relevance, significance and value with the fresh insights and perspectives it reveals to these other disciplines. The philosopher’s skills and attitude which makes him far-sighted and extra perceptive will earn him recognition and respect. The non-philosophy major groomed in the inter-disciplinary approach and who has properly cultivated the critical skills and attitude of Philosophy will bring this to bear on his major disciplines and then ultimately come to the realization that habitually and persistently he must keep an open-mind and rethink the possibilities of his discipline, he might well come to accept as legitimate some new ways of relating to other disciplines –ways which would be consistent with and employ insights of the traditions of his major discipline but still would allow a more fruitful complementary existence. The philosophy major properly groomed in the interdisciplinary approach to studying philosophy and having adequately cultivated the necessary skills and attitude is pragmatic, dynamic, mobile and versatile. He it is who can “bake bread’’. It is to this calibre of trained philosophers that Ozumba states, ‘’can work any where’’ (Ozumba;2002:3). Ozumba’s work, *A Philosophy Handbook for Beginners: Value Application and Career Opportunities for Philosophers* is a ‘’must read’’ for Nigerian undergraduates of philosophy. Conclusion So far I have distinguished between ‘’Ivory tower’’ Philosophy and ‘’market place’’ Philosophy. **Ivory tower Philosophy** is academic Philosophy which **insists that Philosophy must** be done in the traditional professional manner with systematicity, analytic rigour, logical coherence, and technicality, mainly **address**ing problems and issues in **the classical traditions** of Philosophy**.** **“Market place” Philosophy**, on the other hand, though not discountenancing the need for rigorousness and systematicity, **maintains that academic Philosophy can** be done in the non-traditional manner and made to **address concrete existential problems** within our cultural circumstance **which encourages the** professional **philosopher to participate in public debate of issues of contemporary relevance.** I have also maintained that **“ivory tower” philosophy is the reason for** the **isolation**, alienation, marginalization **and perceived irrelevance of academic philosophy today.** I posit that professionalism in philosophy and its teaching should be reconceived and restructured. I propose that the interdisciplinary strategy for teaching philosophy should be promoted so as to establish the integrative function of philosophy and its integral connection with other disciplines and ultimately interdisciplinary integration. This approach, I maintain, should also stress the utilitarian aspects of the study of philosophy.

The resolution is a practical imperative. “Ought” can only refer to action, even when used in the context of “ought to be.” **Prichard 12** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that the apprehension that something good which is not an action ought to be involves just the feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the thought of the action which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) **The word "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone.** The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." **Even if we** are sometimes moved to **say** that the world or **something** in it **is not what it ought to be, what we really mean is that** God or **some human** being **has not made something what he [or she] ought to have made it.** And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that **we can only feel the imperativeness** upon us **of something which is in our power; for** it is **actions and actions alone** which, directly at least, **are in our power.**

Political philosophy specifically must be grounded in historical realities.

**Rhonheimer 05** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy. **Political philosophy** belongs to ethics, which **is practical, for it both reflects on practical knowledge and aims at action. Therefore,** it is not only normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of **political institutions** and action **must be understood** as embedded **in concrete** cultural and, therefore, **historical contexts** and as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A normative political philosophy which would abstract from the conditions of realizability would be trying to establish norms for realizing the “idea of the good” or of “the just” (as Plato, in fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such **a purely metaphysical view**, however, **is doomed to failure.** As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political. 14 Briefly: political philosophy is not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which deals with partly contingent matters and aims at action. **Moreover,** unlike moral norms in general—natural law included,—which rule the actions of a person—“my acting” and pursuing the good—, the logic of **the political is** characterized by acts like **framing institutions** and establishing legal rules **by which** not only personal actions but the actions of **a multitude of persons are regulated** by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. **Political actions are, thus,** both actions **of the whole of the body politic** and referring to the whole of the community of citizens. 15 Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which some persons are by nature rulers while others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the “domestic” and the “political” kind of rule: unlike domestic rule, which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same good and, therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially “despotic,” **political rule is exercised over free persons who represent a plurality of interests** and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of consent among those who are ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers.

This requires a change in the way education itself is conceived. The education system is dominated by the banking concept of teaching which relies on alienating, abstract truths. **Freire 70**[[6]](#footnote-6)

A careful analysis of the teacher-student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, reveals its fundamentally narrative character. This relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient listening objects (the students). The contents, whether values or empirical dimensions of reality, tend in the process of being narrated to become lifeless and petrified. **Education is suffering from narration sickness. The teacher talks about reality as if it were** motionless, **static**, compartmentalized, **and predictable. Or** else **he expounds on a topic completely alien to the existential experience of the students.** His task is to "fill" the students with the contents of his narration -- contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated, and alienating verbosity. The outstanding characteristic of this narrative education, then, is the sonority of words, not their transforming power. "Four times four is sixteen; **the capital of Para is Belem." The student** records, **memorizes, and repeats these phrases without perceiving** what four times four really means, or realizing **the true significance of** "capital" in **the affirmation** "the capital of Para is Belem," that is, what Belem means for Para and what Para means for Brazil. Narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated account. Worse yet, it turns them into "containers," into "receptacles" to be "filled" by the teachers. The more completely she fills the receptacles, the better a teachers she is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are. Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which **the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor.** Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. **This is the "banking' concept of education, in which** the scope of **action allowed to** the **students extends only as far as receiving**, filing, **and storing** the **deposits.** They do, it is true, have the opportunity to become collectors or cataloguers of the things they store. But in the last analysis, it is the **people themselves** who **are filed away through** the **lack of** creativity, **transformation**, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system. For apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, individuals cannot be truly human. Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other. In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. The teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence. The students, alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their ignorance as justifying the teachers existence -- but unlike the slave, they never discover that they educate the teacher. The raison d'etre of libertarian education, on the other hand, lies in its drive towards reconciliation. Education must begin with the solution of the teacher-student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simultaneously teachers and students. This solution is not (nor can it be) found in the banking concept. On the contrary, **banking education maintains an**d even stimulates the contradiction through the following attitudes and practices, which mirror **oppressive society** as a whole**:** the teacher teaches and the students are taught; the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; **the teacher talks and the students listen -- meekly;** the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply; the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher; **the teacher chooses the program content, and the students** (who were not consulted) **adapt** to it; the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students; the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects. It is not surprising that the **banking** concept of **education regards men as** adaptable, **manageable beings. The more students work at storing** the **deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop** the **critical consciousness** which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more **they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is** and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them. The capability of banking education to minimize or annul the student's creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed. The oppressors use their "humanitarianism" to preserve a profitable situation. Thus they react almost instinctively against any experiment in education which stimulates the critical faculties and is not content with a partial view of reality always seeks out the ties which link one point to another and one problem to another. Indeed, the interests of the oppressors lie in "changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them," (1) for **the more the oppressed can be led to adapt** to that situation**, the more easily they can be dominated.** To achieve this the oppressors use the banking concept of education in conjunction with a paternalistic social action apparatus, within which the oppressed receive the euphemistic title of "welfare recipients." They are treated as individual cases, as marginal persons who deviate from the general configuration of a "good, organized and just" society. The oppressed are regarded as the pathology of the healthy society which must therefore adjust these "incompetent and lazy" folk to its own patterns by changing their mentality. These marginals need to be "integrated," "incorporated" into the healthy society that they have "forsaken." [Footnote #1: Simone de Beauvoir. La Pensee de Droite, Aujord'hui (Paris); ST, El Pensamiento politico de la Derecha (Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 34. The truth is, however, that the oppressed are not "marginals," are not living "outside" society. They have always been "inside" the structure which made them "beings for others." The solution is not to 'integrate" them into the structure of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can become "beings for themselves." Such transformation, of course, would undermine the oppressors' purposes; hence their utilization of the banking concept of education to avoid the threat of student conscientizacao.

Critical pedagogy is key to solve oppression. The Arab Spring proves. **Barmania 11**[[7]](#footnote-7)

Frantz Fanon, Iconic psychiatrist and author of books such as “Wretched of the Earth”, wrote that “literature increasingly involves itself in its only real task, which is to get society to reflect and mediate”. Paulo Freire’s landmark book, “Pedagogy of the Oppressed” is a prime example of literature that makes one reflect, cogitate and ponder all at once. In addition, **Freire’s “Pedagogy” is** also the archetypal case in point of a book, which isjust as **relevant** today as it was decades ago. Freire was a Brazilian educator, who grew up during the poverty of the Great Depression in the 1930s and published one of his seminal works “Pedagogy of the Oppressed”, in English in 1970. Freire’s book, rooted in his experience of liberation in Brazil is equally apt **in the context of the Arab Spring,** and particularly after the death of Gaddafi last week. One of Freire’s central tenets was that “education is freedom” that leads toward true liberation and that the “banking” concept of education- where students are empty vessels to be filled, acts as an instrument of oppression. **He called on** the **cultivation of** a **critical consciousness** (conscientizacao), enabling those to reflect upon their own reality and thereby transform it. “How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation” Freire asks? It is this concept of **the oppressed** initiating and **participating in their** own **liberation**, aswas the case in the Arab Spring, which **was central to Freire’s writing.** Freire explains: “Revolution is born as a social entity within the oppressor society…Every entity develops (or is transformed within itself, through the interplay of its contradictions. External conditioners, while necessary, are effective only if they coincide with those potentialities”. It is a sentiment shared by many involved in the Arab Revolution, including Ahmed Farid, an Egyptian lawyer and peace activist working in Alexandria, Egypt. Speaking with Farid he speaks optimistically and passionately: “**For centuries** the **Arab countries lived in a**n automatic and **dictatorial regime. People were yearning for** justice and equality for democracy and **freedom**s **but with no effective result UNTIL the revolution came.** It was not a revolution of the hungry or the miserable, though lots of people were in need, but it was a revolution for dignity and self respect”. Farid continues: “from Tunisia when a police woman slapped Mohamed Bo Azizi when he asked for his rights and he decided to commit a suicide then all the **Tunisians** went out from their homes and **demonstrated against the regime and they succeeded. Then it** [the revolution] **came to Egypt and** the regime said Egypt is not like Tunisia but **the Egyptians** made it, they **made it in a peaceful** and modern **way that attracted the attention of the whole world.** Freire also highlights the “culture of silence” and strategies that are enacted in order that oppression of the people is maintained. “Manipulation, sloganizing, depositing, regimentation, and prescription cannot be components of revolutionary praxis, precisely because they are the components of the praxis of domination” Freire’s work, often cited in peace education discourses, also highlights the real potentiality of the oppressed becoming the oppressors, which seems particularly timely given the discovery of 53 bodies of executed Gaddafi loyalists, reported by Kim Sengupta. Freire’s words seem almost like a forewarning: “[Dehumanization of the oppressed] …is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so. In order for this struggle to have meaning, the oppressed must not, in seeking to regain their humanity, become in turn oppressors of the oppressors, but rather restorers of the humanity of both”. Paulo Freire’s “Pedagogy of the oppressed” is timeless, as pertinent to the revolution in the Middle East now as to those in South America decades ago. Moreover, most importantly it makes one reflect and in Freire’s words it is this “reflection- **true reflection** which **leads to action**”

Rejecting the banking concept of education is a pre-requisite to ethics. Status quo modes of thought only serve to legitimize an oppressive political order. **Giroux 10**[[8]](#footnote-8)

Against this regime of "scientific" idiocy and "bare pedagogy" stripped of all critical elements of teaching and learning, **Freire believed that** all **education** in the broadest sense **was** part of **a project of freedom**, and eminently political because it offered students the conditions for self-reflection, a self-managed life and particular notions of critical agency. As Aronowitz puts it in his analysis of Freire's work on literacy and critical pedagogy: Thus, for Freire **literacy was not a means to prepare students for** the world of subordinated labor or **"careers," but** a preparation for **a self-managed life.** And self-management could only occur when people have fulfilled three goals of education: self-reflection, that is, realizing the famous poetic phrase, "know thyself," which is an understanding of the world in which they live, in its economic, political and, equally important, its psychological dimensions. Specifically **"critical" pedagogy helps the learner become aware of the forces that have** hitherto **ruled their lives and** especially shaped their **consciousness.** The third goal is to help set the conditions for producing a new life, a new set of arrangements where power has been, at least in tendency, transferred to those who literally make the social world by transforming nature and themselves.[[4](http://archive.truthout.org/10309_Giroux_Freire#4)] What Paulo made clear in "Pedagogy of the Oppressed," his most influential work, is that pedagogy at its best is about neither training, teaching methods nor political indoctrination. For Freire, pedagogy is not a method or an a priori technique to be imposed on all students, but a political and moral practice that provides the knowledge, skills and social relations that enable students to expand the possibilities of what it means to be critical citizens, while expanding and deepening their participation in the promise of a substantive democracy. Critical thinking for Freire was not an object lesson in test taking, but a tool for self-determination and civic engagement. For Freire, **critical thinking** was not about the task of simply reproducing the past and understanding the present. On the contrary, it **offered a way of** thinking beyond the present, soaring beyond the immediate confines of one's experiences, entering into a critical dialogue with history and **imagining a future that did not merely reproduce the present.** Theodor Adorno captures the spirit of Freire's notion of critical thinking by insisting that "Thinking is not the intellectual reproduction of what already exists anyway. As long as it doesn't break off, thinking has a secure hold on possibility. Its insatiable aspect, its aversion to being quickly and easily satisfied, refuses the foolish wisdom of resignation.... Open thinking points beyond itself."[[5](http://archive.truthout.org/10309_Giroux_Freire#5)] Freire rejected those regimes of educational degradation organized around the demands of the market, instrumentalized knowledge and the priority of training over the pursuit of the imagination, critical thinking and the teaching of freedom and social responsibility. Rather than assume the mantle of a false impartiality, Freire believed that critical pedagogy involves both the recognition that human life is conditioned not determined, and the crucial necessity of not only reading the world critically, but also intervening in the larger social order as part of the responsibility of an informed citizenry. According to Freire, the political and moral demands of pedagogy amount to more than the school and classroom being merely the instrument of official power or assuming the role of an apologist for the existing order, as the Obama administration seems to believe - given its willingness to give Bush's reactionary educational policies a new name and a new lease on life. Freire rejected those modes of pedagogy that supported economic models and modes of agency in which freedom is reduced to consumerism and economic activity is freed from any criterion except profitability and the reproduction of a rapidly expanding mass of wasted humans. Critical pedagogy attempts to understand how power works through the production, distribution and consumption of knowledge within particular institutional contexts and seeks to constitute students as informed subjects and social agents. In this instance, the issue of how identities, values and desires are shaped in the classroom is the grounds of politics. Critical pedagogy is thus invested in both the practice of self-criticism about the values that inform teaching and a critical self-consciousness regarding what it means to equip students with analytical skills to be self-reflective about the knowledge and values they confront in classrooms. Moreover, **such a pedagogy** attempts not only to **provide the conditions for students** to understand texts and different modes of intelligibility, but also opens up new avenues for them **to make better moral judgments that** will enable them to **assume** some sense of **responsibility to the other** in light of those judgments. Freire was acutely aware that what makes critical pedagogy so dangerous to ideological fundamentalists, the ruling elites, religious extremists and right-wing nationalists all over the world is that, central to its very definition, is the task of educating students to become critical agents who actively question and negotiate the relationships between theory and practice, critical analysis and common sense and learning and social change. Critical pedagogy opens up a space where students should be able to come to terms with their own power as critically engaged citizens; it provides a sphere where the unconditional freedom to question and assert is central to the purpose of public schooling and higher education, if not democracy itself. And as a political and moral practice, way of knowing and literate engagement, **pedagogy attempts to "make evident the multiplicity and complexity of history." History** in this sense **is** engaged as a narrative **open to critical dialogue rather than predefined text to be memorized and accepted unquestioningly.** Pedagogy in this instance provides the conditions to cultivate in students a healthy skepticism about power, a "willingness to temper any reverence for authority with a sense of critical awareness."[[7](http://archive.truthout.org/10309_Giroux_Freire#7)] As a performative practice, pedagogy takes as one of its goals the opportunity for students to be able to reflectively frame their own relationship to the ongoing project of an unfinished democracy. It is precisely this relationship between democracy and pedagogy that is so threatening to so many of our educational leaders and spokespersons today and it is also the reason why Freire's work on critical pedagogy and literacy are more relevant today than when they were first published.

Thus the **Plan**: The USFG ought to provide Pell Grants to eligible prisoners in the United States criminal justice system. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until he checks in CX. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

The federal ban on Pell Grants for prisoners encouraged emphasis on vocational training in favor of liberal arts education in prison. The plan revives liberal arts in prison, promoting critical pedagogy. **Yates 9**[[9]](#footnote-9)

In 1971, Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger spoke at the first National Conference on Corrections, “We know that today the programs of (prisoner) education range from nonexistent to inadequate, with all too few exceptions. However we do it, the illiterate and the unskilled who are sentenced for substantial terms must be given the opportunity, the means, and the motivation to learn his way to freedom” (Burger, 1985 p. 193). Prison-based programs have dated back to the 1800s as reformers sought to extend basic and vocational education, as well as moral education to those who had been convicted of crimes (Welch, 1996). Gehring and Wright (2003) propose that many of these early reformers were not just interested in improving the virtues of the inmates, but also had a sophisticated understanding of the anti-democratic nature of penal systems. They had the progressive notion that prisoners were capable of being agents in their own reformation by taking responsibility for education. Gehring and Wright call the presence of these early radical prison educators, “the hidden heritage of correctional education” (p. 52 5). They suggest this thread of progressiveness extended up through World War II after which Cold War pragmatism resulted in a return to basic education (Gehring & Wright 2003). Much of the **programs of the** 19**60s and** 19**70s** followed a functionalist approach that **equated an inmate’s** future **success** as a law-abiding citizen **with** the knowledge required to obtain lawful employment and negotiate legal society. These skill sets focused primarily on obtaining **vocational skills** and basic literacy. Howard Davidson describes this theory: “it propounds that crime results from individuals making poor (i.e. criminal) decisions when faced with life‟s many problems. Out of neoliberalism comes the market metaphor, in which individuals make rational decisions based on calculating benefits against costs” (Davidson, 1995, p.4). How did the modern functionalist approach to prisoner education take root? Much of the impetus seems to have arisen from human capital theory. One of the primary features of neoliberal thought and practice is the reliance upon human capital theory to explain the purpose of education. Human capital theory has been described by Robert Hart and Thomas Moutos (1995) as an investment of skills training in workers that seeks to balance the costs of training with the return on the investment. Even the proponents of human capital theory describe it as reductionist, mechanical and based upon “homogenized factors.” During the reign of neoliberalism, human capital theory slithered from its manufacturing origins into the corridors of education. Perhaps the most succinct description of the human capital theory of education is provided (without apparent irony) by Joop Hartog and Hessel Oosterbeek (2007): “The basic human capital model of schooling envisages two options (1) go to school for s years and earn an income Ys every year after leaving school, or (2) go to work right away and earn 53 annual income Yo” (p. 7). This reductionist view of the role of schooling does not take into account exogenous factors that can affect income level such as discrimination and availability of jobs in the market (Livingstone, 1997). The role of human capital theory in education reached a high level of urgency among neoliberals as concern arose regarding the United States competiveness in global markets. Chief among the proponents were Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton through the Goals 2000 project which set the priority for education to create the workers who could increase the U.S. efficacy in international capitalism (Briscoe, 2000). A center-piece of the thrust toward implementation of human capital theory in education was the No Child Left Behind legislation which narrowed the focus of educational curricula toward those basic skills required for technical society such as math, reading and science at the expense of those for an active, well-rounded life such as social studies, art, music and physical education. According to Pauline Lipman (2007) No Child Left Behind is “explicitly designed to meet the needs and technical rationality of business… symbolically, as well as practically, national testing constitutes a system of quality control, verifying that those who survive the gauntlet of tests and graduate have the literacies and dispositions business requires” (Lipman, 2007, p. 46). Lipman sees the legislation as a disciplinary process with the end product being docile workers, the ultimate in human capital. Prisoner job training programs fulfilled this need. In the 1970s and 1980s, **in part due to** the availability of **the Pell Grant,** a **liberal arts** curriculum **became a major component of** many **prison education** programs in a way that it never had before. According to Mary Wright (2001) the correction education liberal arts programs remained in favor well into the 1990s even as it was de-emphasized in the 54 larger academic world. She gives several reasons, including the slow pace of change in prisons, the lack of flexibility and increased cost of obtaining equipment for technical job training programs. However, **in the** 19**90s, liberal arts** in a correctional setting **fell into disfavor, and** adult basic education and **vocational education programs reasserted their primacy** in the penal system (Wright, 2001). Vocational programs in prison included plumbing, carpentry, electrical wiring, painting, heating and air conditioning as well as computer literacy. In addition, the emphasis on job training spilled over into the **language arts and math** programs as they **were retooled to focus on technical** and applied **reading and writing** (Steuer, 2001). Between 1995 and 2000, **the percentage of state prisons offering college courses decreased** from 31% to 26% **while** those offering basic adult education increased from 76% to 80%. State prisons offering **vocational education increased** from 54% to 55% and in private prisons it increased from 25% to 44% in the same time period (Harlow, 2003). Several reasons are given for this change in addition to the dissolution of prisoner Pell Grants. One is the perceived threat liberal arts curricula pose to the penal institution. Wright (2001) states that “a **liberal arts** curriculum, **which** often **emphasizes critical thinking,** intellectual **and moral reasoning** and development of an inmate’s sense of self may **pose a challenge to the established order of a correctional facility**” (p. 13). In addition, **with Pell Grants gone, prison**er **education** programs **became** more **dependent** up**on outcome-based funding.** Performance-based management of these programs, like the parallel evolution in public schools, led to “school report cards” that evaluated the effectiveness of the programs in turning out their product (Linton, 2005). Curricula that can lend to empirical studies, such as testing in basic adult education, were given priority 55 over liberal arts, which seemingly has more nebulous outcomes. According to John Linton (2005) of the U.S. Department of Education‟s Correction Education division: “The current climate [requires] that expenditure of public funds be restricted to „scientifically proven‟ effective interventions” (p. 91). **Job training fits well to this regime because** the **results of the program could be measured empirically through** the **numbers** of the test group who are **able to obtain work.** In addition, recidivism rates could be obtained. Numerous studies have pointed to the inverse relationship between vocational technical programs and recidivism (Hall & Bannatyne, 2000; Mattuci & Johnson, 2003; Young & Mattuci, 2006, Gordon & Weldon, 2003). Empirical studies focusing strictly on recidivism as a measurement of achievement have not been without their faults. In his examination of the more recent works, Charles Ubah (2002) has found a tendency for the inmates to self-select into the programs. These participants were probably more motivated, as a whole, to succeed upon their release, than those who did not participate (Ubah, 2002). Ubah‟s findings bring up another important question: What about those who slip through the cracks in the empirical studies? An example may be found in Robert Mattuci‟s (2003) description of the vocational program that he set up in a New York state prison. It consisted of an eight session program to teach the students basic plumbing skills in order to increase their employment prospects upon release. Mattuci, who had a bachelor‟s degree in education and twenty years experience as a plumber, appeared to incorporate a well-thought out system of pedagogy. He relates that “many inmates have never known a positive schooling experience so they lack the needed confidence to succeed at learning something new. A key to the program is therefore validating their differences as 56 individuals and accommodating their multiple learning styles” (p. 16). Mattuci had them work in groups for all hands-on activities and encouraged group brainstorming and problem solving. Yet, despite the care in which the teacher took in order to facilitate a sense of community on the shop floor, there were a significant number of inmates who did not take to the class. “Especially for the younger inmates, gang activity is very evident. The dropout rate of the male youth in three of the groups was 90%. For those influenced by gangs, there is a total lack of respect for the process of setting goals and working toward them” (Mattuci & Johnson, 2003, p. 17). A conventional vocational program may not reach this group of inmates who, as dropouts of the program are more likely to return to prison. While recidivism is an important issue, it must be understood within context of the many variables that exist both within the inmates and, just as importantly, the conditions that exist once they are released. Barriers to post-release employment include lack of current job skills in a rapidly changing market, lack of available jobs in a tight market, the large hole in the employment history created by incarceration, and perhaps most significantly, the criminal record. With the rise of the information society, even jobs considered “menial,” require criminal background checks. The perceived and actual impediments to employment can decrease the seeker‟s motivation and self image (Pavis, 2002). Combined with conditions that facilitated a life of crime in the first place: poverty, discrimination, substance abuse, the deck is stacked against the average inmate. Conventional job training in itself is clearly not going to arm these people against the challenges of life on the outside. The attributes previously described that led some 57 prisons to reject liberal arts education; the “critical thinking, intellectual and moral reasoning” leading to a “sense of self,” must be cultivated (p. 1). **Friere** (2004), Giroux (2006) **and others have called for** a **pedagogy** that is **freed from the bonds of the “bottom-line**.**”** Mike Cole (2005) puts it succinctly, **calling for schools to become sites where “teachers,** other school workers **and** pupils/**students** not only **agitate for changes** within the classroom and within the institutional context of the school, but also support a transformation in the objective conditions in which students and their parents labor” (p. 16). In this vision, there is no room for docile workers. **Schools would be transformed into emancipatory institutions where workers would** not only be provided basic literacy, vocational skills and liberal arts, but would also **learn to advocate for a better world.** I explore this possibility further in Chapter 5.

Pell Grants are designed to promote critical pedagogy. Pell Grant-funded prison education encourages prison students to become aware of their material conditions and struggle against their oppression. **Yates 9**[[10]](#footnote-10)

The **Pell-sponsored education** programs, which can range from vocational to liberal arts, **provided** the **students with** a degree of agency in that they had the **potential to choose what** level or kind of **education was offered.** As will be described later, prisoner students could initiate and help establish educational programs that were relatively autonomous to the institutions where they were housed. **Because the student has** some **control over where** she wants **to apply her grant, there is** a certain level of **academic freedom** that seems to be almost entirely absent in the Second Chance Act education program.

**[…]**

**In the** 19**70s and** 19**80s,** a trend arose in prisoner education in which **prisoners were** viewed as active participants in their own learning (Davidson, 1995). It was the inmates themselves who were often **at the forefront of** initiating a new prison **pedagogy that was highly critical of** both **the criminal justice system as well as** the wider **social and economic institutions that gave rise to** the **inequities** that constituted the police/penal state. Within this school of thought, prisons are seen as an integral part of a politico/economic system that survives, as Germanotta, (1995) suggests, by “maintaining unequal relations at the level of production. Penal institutions are the ultimate vehicle used to police the borderlines of these unequal relations.” It should not come as a surprise that inmates are at the forefront of the push for a critical prison pedagogy since, “living and working within [correctional] settings will make this abundantly clear” (p.104). James Morse (2002), a former prisoner in New York State, examines the unequal relations manifest in the Harlem, Bedford Stuyvesant, Lower East Side, and South Bronx neighborhoods of New York City. These urban sectors are not neighborhoods in the traditionally middleclass sense of socially stable, economically viable residential areas. Owing largely to the polarizing effect of conservative economics during the Reagan/ Bush debacle whereby the rich become super-rich and the poor become super-poor - these sectors are principally pockets of extremely low income and dependency, exhibiting a constant and rapid turnover of residents that establishes social instability as the prevailing norm. Promoting this social instability, and characterizing these enclaves as prisoner specific, is the perpetual outflow and influx of myriads of individuals to and from the state‟s prison system.” (p. 129) Educators have described some of the many forms that critical prison pedagogy can take, from **inmates becom[e]**ing self aware and **aware of societal ills through** the reading; 179 distribution and analysis of **radical literature** of the industrial trade unions, Black Power and other resistance movements; to the influx of volunteer educators in the 1970s inspired by the well publicized prisoner resistance activities of that period. Other forms of emancipatory education include **self-taught inmate “lawyers”** who **educate their peers on** the vagaries of negotiating **the legal system.** Another account regards a group of women prisoners who staged a successful protest when their writing workshop was threatened with cancellation (Davidson, 1995). Education of this kind has the potential to help prisoners to become active, involved citizens. Paulo Freire (1970) describes the possibilities of emancipatory education, “people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation” (p. 83). What better place to facilitate transformational pedagogy than prison? Thom Gehring (2000), a longtime prison educator, describes the potential for innovative programs in the penal environment, “Democratic programs in correctional education are compelling to the human spirit – they conjure up ancient aspirations.” These aspirations include “freedom” and a “just/democratic society” (Eggleston & Gehring, 200, p.310). One means of facilitating emanicipatory education for those incarcerated is by putting into place **funding mechanisms that have few curricular strings attached** and can **allow for innovation.** These could give the prisoners themselves, some level of autonomy in choosing what kind of education they would receive. Necessary to the establishment of democratic education is reliable non-program specific funding. **An example** of such a funding mechanism **was the Pell Grant program.**180 Prisons are representative of “total institutions,” characterized by authoritarianism and regimentation and close observation of its inhabitants (Goffman, 1961). Thomas James (1988) has suggested that schools can also be totalizing organizations, marked by their ability to cause “dissolution of the self as the corporate identity of the total institution emerges from within and becomes a way of life” (p.2). While authoritarianism provides a common thread between many schools and all prisons, there is one major difference, most schools are day schools, allowing egress on a daily basis. Freedom of movement has the potential to provide access to new ideas through exposure to nonsanctioned media and new associations. Prisons, at least in theory, are set up to strictly regulate both the bodies and the minds of the inmates by controlling whatever passes through the gates. **Foucault** (1995) **suggests that prisons** function to **create “docile bodies” through continuous observation.** Because the gaze tends to be one way, toward the prisoners, they never know when they are being observed. This process tends to discipline the mind as well as the body. **The result is** to create a compliant person, with a **diminution of agency.**

The role of the ballot is to vote for the best political strategy for liberation of the oppressed. Critical pedagogy requires revolutionary political action.

**Giroux 10**[[11]](#footnote-11)

Paulo was a cosmopolitan intellectual, who never overlooked the details in everyday life and the connections the latter had to a much broader, global world. He consistently reminded us that political struggles are won and lost in those specific yet hybridized spaces that linked narratives of everyday experience with the social gravity and material force of institutional power. **Any pedagogy that called itself Freirean had to acknowledge the centrality of** the particular and contingent in shaping historical contexts and **political projects.** Although Freire was a theoretician of radical contextualism, he also acknowledged the importance of understanding the particular and the local in relation to larger, global and cross-national forces. For Freire, literacy as a way of reading and changing the world had to be reconceived within a broader understanding of citizenship, democracy and justice that was global and transnational. **Making the pedagogical more political** in this case **meant** moving beyond the celebration of tribal mentalities and **developing a praxis that foregrounded "power, history,** memory, relational analysis, **justice** (not just representation), **and ethics as** the issues **central to** transnational **democratic struggles**."[[14](http://archive.truthout.org/10309_Giroux_Freire#14)] But Freire's insistence that education was about the making and changing of contexts did more than seize upon the political and pedagogic potentialities to be found across a spectrum of social sites and practices in society, which, of course, included but were not limited to the school. He also challenged the separation of culture from politics by calling attention to how diverse technologies of power work pedagogically within institutions to produce, regulate and legitimate particular forms of knowing, belonging, feeling and desiring. But Freire did not make the mistake of many of his contemporaries by conflating culture with the politics of recognition. **Politics was** more than a gesture of translation, representation and dialogue, it was also **about creating** the **conditions for** people to govern rather than be merely governed, capable of mobilizing **social movements against** the **oppressive economic, racial and sexist practices** put into place by colonization, global capitalism, and other oppressive structures of power. Paulo Freire left behind a corpus of work that emerged out of a lifetime of struggle and commitment. Refusing the comfort of master narratives, Freire work was always unsettled and unsettling, restless yet engaging. Unlike so much of the politically arid and morally vacuous academic and public prose that characterizes contemporary intellectual discourse, Freire's work was consistently fueled by a healthy moral rage over the needless oppression and suffering he witnessed throughout his life as he traveled all over the globe. Similarly, his work exhibited a vibrant and dynamic quality that allowed it to grow, refuse easy formulas and open itself to new political realities and projects. Freire's genius was to elaborate a theory of social change and engagement that was neither vanguardist nor populist. While he had a profound faith in the ability of ordinary people to shape history and to become critical agents in shaping their own destinies, he refused to romanticize the culture and experiences that produced oppressive social conditions. Combining theoretical rigor, social relevance and moral compassion, Freire gave new meaning to the politics of daily life while affirming the importance of theory in opening up the space of **critique,** possibility, politics and practice. Theory and language were a site of struggle and possibility that **gave experience meaning and action a political direction, and any attempt to reproduce the binarism of theory vs. politics was** repeatedly **condemned by Freire.** Freire loved theory, but he never reified it. When he talked about Freud, Marx or Erich Fromm, one could feel his intense passion for ideas. And, yet, he never treated **theory** as an end in itself; it **was always** a resource, the value of which lay in understanding, critically engaging and transforming the world as **part of a larger project of freedom and justice.** To say that his joy around such matters was infectious is to understate his own presence and impact on so many people that he met in his life.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat United States policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 8** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

**Plan focus is good** for education because:

(a) Plans increase depth of education because we can focus on one specific issue each round instead of touching briefly on each aspect of the topic.

Depth is better than breadth. If we go in-depth on a *different* issue each round, then we’ll get a breadth of info any way, but if we spread ourselves thin discussing a breadth of issues each round, we’ll never have an in-depth discussion of the topic.

(b) Plans are key to incentivize continued research. If the same stock arguments are going to apply every round, there’s no incentive to do new work.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

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