**Plan**: The USFG ought to grant access to Pell Grants to inmates in the United States criminal justice system.

Funding through normal means. I reserve the right to clarify, so no theory violations until he checks in CX. No legal violations link because affirming means amending the laws to make the aff world consistent with them.

**Aff gets RVIs** on I meets and counter-interps because

(a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and still have a fair shot on substance.

(b) no risk theory would give neg a free source of no risk offense which allows him to moot the AC.

**Advantage 1** is **Hegemony**

There’s two internal links.

A. Crime

Lack of Pell Grants decimates post-secondary prison education programs which jacks crime rates. **Buzzini 09**[[1]](#footnote-1)

[Brackets in original text] It’s no secret that the education system in the United States is in shambles – and not just for inmates. Students aren’t receiving a proper education, which encourages the nation’s youth to get involved in gangs, drugs, and violence. **Many inmates can’t** even **read well, ranking** in **at** “maybe a **seventh-grade level**” (Leder 1). **Were it possible** for inmates **to receive a**n education while serving time (a GED if an equivalent had not been attained, followed by a post-secondary **degree**) **they would have a much greater chance of escaping** the clutches of **poverty and** their ties to **illegal activity when** they are **released** back into society. This must have been the line of thinking that inspired the inception of the first post-secondary correctional education program, which began in 1953 at the University of Southern Illinois in Menard. Such a program must have been a bit ahead of its time, because **by 1965 only 11** more post-secondary correctional **education** (PCSE) **programs appeared.** 19**65** was a landmark year for PCSE it **marked the first** time that inmates were eligible to receive **Pell Grants** to fund their college aspirations. **Thanks to** the availability of **federal funding, programs began popping up nationwide. In 1973 there were 182 programs;** by 1982 there were 350. Programs reached their peak when, **in the** early 19**90s, there were** a total of **772** on-site college programs **in 1,287 prisons** (Taylor “Pell Grants” 2). **The majority of inmates covered their costs with** the aid of **the Pell Grant. However, in** 19**94, thanks to** the prevailing **“tough on crime” attitude** of the time, **inmates** were **no longer** able to **receive** federal aid in the form of **Pell Grants. While peak enrollment** in PCSE programs **totaled at 12 percent** of inmate populations, **the** s0-called **“deteriorated state” counted less than 4 percent** (Taylor “Pell Grants” 3). There is **myriad statistical data** to **show that education programs** inside prisons **aid in** actual **rehab**ilitation **and** do **reduce recidivism** rates. But these facts were glossed over as politicians wowed their constituents with their tough policies regarding crime. However, they didn’t bother to mention to their constituents that “**Massachusetts, Maryland, and New York** are among the states [that **reported**] **reductions in recidivism of** as high as **15.5 percent for inmates** who participated **in education programs** (Freedman 6).” That 15.5 percent reduction means 15.5 percent of inmates were *actually* rehabilitated, as opposed to merely punished, during their time on the inside. The numbers are even more impressive on a national scale, as “**inmates with** at least two years of **college had a 10 percent re-arrest rate; the national average is 60 percent**” (“Statehouses Debate…”). That means 50 percent less people went back to prison, simply because they completed some form of higher education. It is for reasons such as this that “critics lament the loss of **Pell Grants** as short-sighted in light of studies documenting **lower recidivism** and misconduct rates among inmates who pursue post-secondary education” (Freedman 8). It truly is a serious loss, for the depletion of funding via Pell Grants for PSCE has resulted in a devastating loss of programs nationwide, despite such programs’ ability to reduce recidivism **and** markedly **rehabilitate** many **inmates who participate.** Should the Pell Grant be re-instated, corrections in America would see a much-needed turn for the better.

Crime kills soft power. **Falk 12**[[2]](#footnote-2)

This unabashed avowal of imperial goals is the main thesis of the article, perhaps most graphically expressed in the following words: "The United States can increase the effectiveness of its military forces and make the world safe for soft power, America's inherent comparative advantage." As the glove fits the hand, **soft power** complements hard power within the wider enterprise of transforming the world in the United States' image, or at least in the ideal version of the United States' sense of self.

The authors acknowledge (rather parenthetically) that their strategy **may not work if the US continues** much longer **to be seen unfavourably abroad as a national abode of** drugs, **crime**, violence, fiscal irresponsibility, family breakdown, and political gridlock. **They make a** rather meaningless **plea to restore "a** **healthy democracy" at home as a prelude to** the heavy lifting of **democratising the world, but they** do not pretend medical knowledge, and **offer no prescriptions for restoring the health of the American body politic.** And now, 16 years after their article appeared, it would appear that the adage, "disease unknown, cure unknown", applies.

Soft power is key to heg. **Nye 04** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Soft power has always been a key element of leadership.** The power to attract—to get others to want what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda—has its roots in thousands of years of human experience. Skillful **leaders have always understood that attractiveness stems from credibility and legitimacy.** Power has never flowed solely from the barrel of a gun; **even the most brutal dictators have relied on attraction** as well as fear. **When the United States paid insufficient attention to** issues of legitimacy and **credibility in** the way it went about its policy on **Iraq,** polls showed a dramatic drop in American soft power. That did not prevent the United States from entering Iraq, but it meant that **it had to pay higher costs** in the blood and treasure than would otherwise have been the case. Similarly, if Yasser Arafat had chosen the soft power model of Gandhi or Martin Luther King rather than the hard power of terrorism, he could have attracted moderate Israelis and would have a Palestinian state by now. I said at the start that leadership is inextricably intertwined with power. Leaders have to make crucial choices about the types of power that they use. Woe be to followers of those leaders who ignore or devalue the significance of soft power.

Soft power independently solves multiple scenarios for extinction.

**Nye and Armitage 07**[[4]](#footnote-4)

Soft power is the ability to attract people to our side without coercion. Legitimacy is central to soft power. **If a** people or **nation believes American objectives to be legitimate, we are more likely to persuade them to follow our lead** without using threats and bribes. **Legitimacy can also reduce opposition to**—and the costs of—**using hard power when the situation demands.** Appealing to others’ values, interests, and preferences can, in certain circumstances, replace the dependence on carrots and sticks. Cooperation is always a matter of degree, and it is profoundly influenced by attraction…The information age has heightened political consciousness, but also made political groupings less cohesive. Small, adaptable, transnational networks have access to tools of destruction that are increasingly cheap, easy to conceal, and more readily available. Although the integration of the global economy has brought tremendous benefits, **threats such as pandemic disease and the collapse of financial markets are more distributed and more likely to arise without warning. The threat of** widespread physical harm to the planet posed by **nuclear catastrophe** has existed for half a century, though the realization of the threat **will become more likely as the number of nuclear weapons states increases.** The potential security challenges posed by **climate change raise[s]** the possibility of an entirely **new** set of **threats** for the United States **to consider**… **States** and non-state actors who improve their ability to draw in allies will gain competitive advantages in today’s environment. Those **who alienate potential friends will stand at greater risk.** China has invested in its soft power to ensure access to resources and to ensure against efforts to undermine its military modernization. **Terrorists depend on** their ability to attract **support from the crowd** at least as much as their ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.

B. Competitiveness

US economic competitiveness is declining now due to lack of skilled workers. Increased investment in education is key. **Cooper et al. 12**[[5]](#footnote-5)

**The** U.S. **economy is weakening relative to our global competitors.** Recent economic growth is 40 percent below any other growth period since World War II as other economies around the globe draw in more investment, both foreign and domestic. In contrast, despite still being the world’s leading recipient of direct foreign investment, business investment overall in the United States between 2001 and 2007 was the slowest in U.S. history. Meanwhile, competition is on the rise. From 1980 to 2011 **China increased** its share of world economic **output** from 2 percent to 14 percent. **And India more than doubled** its output during that period, from 2.5 percent of global production to 5.7 percent. The U.S. share of the world economy fell to 19 percent from 25 percent. While increasing global competition is inevitable, lackluster U.S. performance need not be. Indeed, rising growth and incomes in other countries present potential new opportunities and markets for American workers and companies. But if the United States means to continue to lead the world and to share our prosperity with it, U.S. **policymakers must deploy** an American strategy that is responsive to modern economic challenges—a strategy that makes it possible for every American family to ensure that children entering adulthood are prepared to find a successful place in the global economy. What should the strategy be? Economists of all stripes point to **a robust pipeline of skilled workers** as the essential ingredient of a strong and growing economy. Indeed, the two countries most rapidly gaining on the United States in terms of economic competitiveness—**China and India**—**have ambitious national strategies of** investing and **promoting** improved **education**al outcomes for children to strengthen their positions as contenders in the global economy. This is obviously a sweeping and complex topic, which we document in detail in the main pages of this report. But here is a brief summary of the report’s findings and recommendations. The U.S. competitiveness problem and the case for investing in children Competition from rapidly growing countries such as China and India are changing business norms and the links between national economies. We are quite familiar with what economists call “global labor arbitrage,” the substitution of high-wage workers in advanced economy countries with low-wage workers in developing economies. That’s led to a global re-ordering of production, jobs, and growth. More recently, **tech**nological **advances** in telecommunications and transportation, as well as **[and] skills development in the developing world**, are **drag**ging more **U.S. industries**—including computer programming, high-tech manufacturing, and service sectors—**into international competition.** This development is feeding a mounting demand for high-skilled labor around the world. To position the United States for the future, substantial investments are needed in d education. The most important of these areas to address is education. Why? Because as this report shows, the **overwhelming** economic **evidence points to education**—and human capital investments, generally—**as the key driver**s **of** economic **competitiveness in the long term.** Harvard University economist Gregory Mankiw, for example, has shown that **in** advanced countries such as **the U**nited **S**tates, **human capital investment had three times the positive effect on economic growth as did physical investment.** And educational investment is particularly important in early childhood development and learning, according to growth economists. The return on investment from interventions such as prenatal care and early childhood programs is higher than for virtually any class of financial assets over time, according to Nobel Prize winning economist James Heckman. The academic literature also shows that failing to provide broad opportunities for nurturing, learning, and productive development harms economic growth and national competitiveness.

Pell Grants for prisoners are key to competitiveness. **Chazelle 11**[[6]](#footnote-6)

The practical benefits of educating prisoners are well documented. **Over ninety percent of inmates eventually return to society; those who receive education**al programming **behind bars are more likely to find jobs** and do without government assistance. They have greater hcapacity to support relatives financially, contribute in positive ways to their communities, and help their kids succeed in school and stay out of trouble. The benefits extend to te wider public, as well, as study after study shows that educating inmates reduces recidivism – the rate at which they commit new crimes leading to re-arrest or re-incarceration. Although statistics vary, it appears that recidivism among offenders who complete some college work in prison drops by ten percent or more, even if they do not finish a degree. **Postsecondary** correctional **education is**, moreover, a **cost-effective** tool for improving public safety, **since it is** invariably **less expensive than prison** (an average of $25,251 per federal inmate in 2009). By lowering recidivism it saves taxpayers’ money, **and given our massive incarcerated population – over 2.3 million – it helps address the growing education gap between the US and other countries.** That prisons should offer postsecondary education would therefore seem common sense, yet this trait is in short supply among our politicians. The problem lies on both sides of the political spectrum: when it comes to educating inmates or, indeed, to implementing any reform that might mitigate the harshness of our penal system, Democrats, fearful of the soft-on-crime label, are as bad as – if not worse than – Republicans. The Clinton era illustrates this well. Our jail and prison population soared under Clinton, who signed **in**to law **the** Violent **Crime Control** and Law Enforcement **Act of 1994**, a bill sponsored by Democrat Representative Jack Brooks and written by then-Senator Joe Biden. Among the measures of this legislation, sometimes called the “Biden Law,” was a $9.7 billion plan to build new prisons and a sharp increase in the number of crimes subject to the death penalty. Although the bill provided $6.1 billion for prevention initiatives, it contained a bipartisan amendment egregiously counter-prevention: **inmates were** henceforth **barred from Pell grants**, the major federal source of college financial assistance for low-income students. The average grant was small, only about $1500 per student in 1994, yet the cumulative impact was huge. With passage of the 1965 Higher Education Act, on which Pell grants were based, the number of postsecondary correctional education programs shot up from twelve that year to 350 during the Reagan presidency. **Ending Pell grants to inmates saved** enough to increase grants to **non-prison students** by **a paltry $5 each** per semester, **while decimating prison postsecondary education programs. After 1994, only eight remained open.**

Empirics prove that competitiveness creates economic hegemony which solves global conflict. **Hubbard 10** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. **I** then **matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts** in the international system **since 1815**. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. **Regression** analysis of the data **revealed** that there was **a statistically significant negative correlation between** relative **heg**emonic power **and conflict** levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further **analysis revealed** that in both cases, **military power was a less accurate predictor of** military **conflict than economic power**. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, **weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily** than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the **most important** implication of this research **is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power** than through the exercise of military force. II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the **heg**emon **acted as a stabilizing force** by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. **It** also **avoids** some of **the pitfalls** associated **with the case study method, such as selection bias and** the inherently **subjective** nature of **qualitative analysis.**

Heg solves every impact. Decline causes extinction. **Barnett 11**[[8]](#footnote-8)

Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S.** military **has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed** from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the **mass murder never would have ended.** Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be no** identifiable human **civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered** the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, **America** stepped up and **changed everything by ushering in** our now-perpetual **great-power peace. We introduced** the international liberal trade order known as **globalization** and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. **What resulted was** the collapse of empires, an explosion of **democracy**, the persistent spread of **human rights**, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold **increase in** adjusted global **GDP and a profound** and persistent **reduction in** battle deaths from state-based **conflict**s. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these **calculations suggest a** 90 percent absolute drop and a **99 percent** relative **drop in death**s **due to war.** We are clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come. To continue the historical survey, after salvaging Western Europe from its half-century of civil war, the U.S. emerged as the progenitor of a new, far more just form of globalization -- one based on actual free trade rather than colonialism. America then successfully replicated globalization further in East Asia over the second half of the 20th century, setting the stage for the Pacific Century now unfolding.

Heg decline causes massive transition wars, US lashout, and global arms races. We’ll never make it to multipolarity alive. **Brzezinski 12**[[9]](#footnote-9)

The leaders of the world's second-rank powers, among them India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters and China rises. Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States. Others may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. **No**ne of these **countries**, however, will **have the** requisite combination of **economic,** financial, **tech**nological, **and military power** even **to** consider **inherit**ing **America's** leading **role.** China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. **Beijing**'s leaders themselves have **repeatedly emphasized that** on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, **China will still be** a **modernizing** and developing state several **decades from now**, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. **A swag**gering, nationalistic **Beijing would** unintentionally **mobilize a powerful** regional **coalition against itself. None of** China's key neighbors -- **India, Japan, and Russia** -- is ready to **acknowledge China**'s entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position -- including **Georgia, Taiwan,** South **Korea,** Belarus, Ukraine, **Afghanistan, Pakistan, Israel, and the** greater **Middle East -- are** today's geopolitical equivalents of nature's most **endangered species**. Their fates are **closely tied to the** nature of the international environment left behind by a **waning America**, be it ordered and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the narcotics trade. A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems. **A waning U**nited **S**tates **would** likely **be** more nationalistic, more defensive about its national identity, **more paranoid about its homeland security**, and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development. The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents. Another consequence of **American decline could** be a **corro[de]**sion of the generally cooperative management of the global commons -- **shared interests such as sea lanes, space, cyberspace,** and **the environment**, whose protection is imperative to the long-term growth of the global economy **and** the continuation of basic **geopolitical stability.** In almost every case, the potential absence of a constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict.

Existential risk outweighs every other impact by orders of magnitude because of the lost potential for future generations. **Bostrom 11**[[10]](#footnote-10)

Even if we use **the most conservative** of these **estimates,** which entirely ignores the possibility of space colonization and software minds, we **find that the expected loss of an existential catastrophe is greater than** the value of **1018 human lives.  This implies that** the expected value of **reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least ten times the value of a billion human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 1054 human-brain-emulation subjective life-years (or 1052 lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives.

Moral uncertainty is high now, but there’s room for improvement. **Parfit 84** writes[[11]](#footnote-11)

Some people believe that there cannot be progress in Ethics, since everything has been already said. Like Rawls and Nagel, I believe the opposite. How many people have made Non-Religious Ethics their life's work? Before the recent past, very few. In most civilizations, **most people have believed in** the existence of a **God**, or of several gods. A large minority were in fact Atheists, whatever they pretended. But, **before the recent past, very few Atheists made Ethics their life’s work.** Buddha may be among this few, as may Confucius, and a few Ancient Greeks and Romans. After more than a thousand years, there were a few more between the Sixteenth and Twentieth centuries. Hume was an atheist who made Ethics part of his life's work. Sidgwick was another. **After Sidgwick,** there were several **atheists** who were professional moral philosophers. But most of these **did not do Ethics. They did Meta-Ethics.** They did not ask which outcomes would be good or bad, or which acts would be right or wrong. They asked, and wrote about, only the meaning of moral language, and the question of objectivity. **Non-Religious Ethics has been systematically studied**, by many people, **only since the** 19**60s. Compared with the other sciences**, Non-Religious **Ethics is** the youngest and **the least advanced.**

Adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks. **Bostrom 9** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction:

**The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

I don’t need to win that weighing values is possible. Extinction precludes all values, so it is wrong under any moral code. **Seeley 86**[[13]](#footnote-13)

In moral reasoning prediction of consequences is nearly always impossible. One balances the risks of an action against its benefits; one also considers what known damage the action would do. Thus a surgeon in deciding whether to perform an operation weighs the known effects (the loss of some nerve function, for example) and risks (death) against the benefits, and weighs also the risks and benefits of not performing surgery. Morally, however, **human extinction is unlike any other risk. No conceivable human good could be worth** the **extinction** of the race, **for** in order **to be a human good it must be experienced by human beings.** Thus extinction is one result we dare not-may not-risk. Though not conclusively established, **the risk of extinction is real enough to make nuclear war** utterly **impermissible under any** sane **moral code.**

Infinite values don’t paralyze calculation. **Lauwers and Vallentyne 04** write[[14]](#footnote-14)

**Zero Independence holds that the ranking of two worlds is determined by** the pattern of **differences in local value. This**, we claim, **is highly plausible** in the context of finitely additive value theories. In the finite case, finitely additive value theories always satisfy Zero Independence. Although they typically get expressed as judging a world as at least as good as another (having the same locations) if and only if its total value is at least as great, the **reference to the total is not needed.** An equivalent statement is that one world as at least as good as the second if and only if the sum of the differences in value is at least as great as zero. **Only the pattern of differences matters**. **Even in the infinite case**, Zero Independence is “partially” implied by Sum and Loose Pareto. Sum ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if Sum ranks U-V as at least as good as its zero world. Moreover, if two worlds U and V satisfy the antecedent clause of Loose Pareto, then Loose Pareto ranks U as at least as good as V if and only if it ranks U-V above its zero world. Zero Independence is thus, we claim, highly plausible for finitely additive theories.

Zero Independence is equivalent to a condition in social choice theory known as Translation Scale Invariance when it is restricted to the case where locations are the same. This latter condition holds that interlocational comparisons of zero points are irrelevant to the ranking of worlds. The zero point for value at each location, that is, can be set independently of how it is set for other locations (although, of course, when comparing two worlds, the zero point used for a given location in one world must also be used for that location in the second world). For example, if a location has values of 10 in world U and 5 in world V, both measured on the basis of some particular zero point (the same for both worlds), those values could be changed to 7 and 2 (by making the zero point 3 units higher for that location), and this, according to Translation Scale Invariance, would not alter how the two worlds are ranked.

Zero Independence is equivalent to Translation Scale Invariance (restricted to the case where locations are the same), since any change in the zero points for the locations in worlds U and V can, for some W, be represented by U+W and V+W. (For example, if there are just two people, and the first person’s zero point is decreased by two units, and the second person’s zero point is increased by one unit, then the resulting two representations of the value of U and V are simply U+W and V+W, where W is <2,-1>.) Zero Independence and Translation Scale Invariance thus each hold that U ≥ V if and only if U+W ≥ V+W.

Translation Scale Invariance (and hence, Zero Independence) is highly plausible for finitely additive value theories. (Recall that our goal is to defend a particular extension of finite additivity, not to defend finite additivity against non-additive theories.) **If there is no natural zero point that separates positive from negative value** (if there is just more or less value with no natural separating point), **then any particular zero point is arbitrary** (not representing a real aspect of value). In this case, interlocational comparisons of zero-points are uncontroversially irrelevant. **If**, on the other hand, **there is a natural zero for value, it is still** plausible for finitely additive value theories to hold that it is **irrelevant** for ranking worlds. **What matters** (e.g., **from** a **util**itarian perspective), as argued above, **are** the **differences in value at each location between two worlds—not the absolute level of values** at locations. No interlocational comparison of zero points is needed for this purpose.

Cost-benefit analysis is feasible. Ignore any util calc indicts. **Hardin 90** writes[[15]](#footnote-15)

**One** of the **cute**r **charge**s **against util**itarianism **is that** it is irrational in the following sense. **If I take the time to calculate** the consequences of various courses of action before me, **then** I will ipso facto have chosen the course of action to take, namely, to sit and calculate, because while I am calculating the other **courses of action will cease to be open to me. It should embarrass philosophers that they have ever taken this** objection **seriously. Parallel considerations in other realms are dismissed** with eminently good sense. Lord Devlin notes, “If the reasonable man ‘worked to rule’ by perusing to the point of comprehension every form he was handed, the commercial and administrative life of the country would creep **to** a standstill.” James March and Herbert Simon **escape** the quandary of **unending calculation** by noting that often we satisfice, **we do not maximize: we stop calculating** and considering **when we find a merely adequate choice** of action. **When**, in principle, **one cannot know what is** the **best** choice, **one can nevertheless be sure that** sitting and **calculating is not the best choice.** But, one may ask, How do you know that another ten minutes of calculation would not have produced a better choice? And one can only answer, You do not. At some point the quarrel begins to sound adolescent. It is ironic that **the point** of the quarrel **is almost never at issue in practice** (as Devlin implies, **we are** almost all **too reasonable** in practice **to bring the world to a standstill**) but only in the principled discussions of academics.

Ignore permissibility and presumption because moral uncertainty means we’ll always have a non-zero credence in the existence of morality, so there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one action.

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat United States policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism. **Nelson 8** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

The neg must defend one unconditional advocacy. Conditionality is bad because it makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy. He’ll kick it if I cover it and extend it if I undercover it, meaning I have no strategic options. Also, it’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the AC.

**Plan focus is good** for education because:

(a) Plans increase depth of education because we can focus on one specific issue each round instead of touching briefly on each aspect of the topic.

Depth is better than breadth. If we go in-depth on a *different* issue each round, then we’ll get a breadth of info any way, but if we spread ourselves thin discussing a breadth of issues each round, we’ll never have an in-depth discussion of the topic.

(b) Plans are key to incentivize continued research. If the same stock arguments are going to apply every round, there’s no incentive to do new work.

Plans are key to fairness.

1. Wiki solves predictability.

2. Pell grants are the core of the topic. They’re the primary obstacle to education in the squo. Federal ban on Pell Grants passed because of a retributive mindset. That’s Buzzini 09.

3. Pell grants are the only federal aff. Any other interp forces me to defend simultaneous 50 state action which is bad because it’s utopian and not real world. Also kills my ground since no one in the lit defends 50 state action.

4. Plans are key to stable advocacy so that neg can’t moot the AC with definitional tricks.

5. Whole rez is incoherent. The state can’t use every competing rehab policy on every prisoner.

6. Plans are key to textuality. “Resolved” means a policy.

**Words and Phrases 64** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

**Definition of** the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

“Ought” can only refer to action, even in the context of “ought to be.”

**Prichard 12** writes[[18]](#footnote-18)

But this argument, if it is to restore the sense of obligation to act, must presuppose an intermediate link, viz., the further thesis that what is good ought to be. The necessity of this link is obvious. An "ought," if it is to be derived at all, can only be derived from another "ought." Moreover this link tacitly presupposes another, viz., that the apprehension that something good which is not an action ought to be involves just the feeling of imperativeness or obligation which is to be aroused by the thought of the action which will originate it. Otherwise the argument will not lead us to feel the obligation to produce it by the action. And, surely, both this link and its implication are false.[1](http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html#1) **The word "ought" refers to actions and to actions alone.** The proper language is never "So and so ought to be," but "I ought to do so and so." **Even if we** are sometimes moved to say that the world or something in it is not what it **ought to be, what we really mean is** that God or **some human** being has not made something what he **ought to have made it**. And it is merely stating another side of this fact to urge that we can only feel the imperativeness upon us of something which is in our power; **for** it is actions and **actions alone** which, directly at least, **are in our power.**

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