# Aff—Virtue

# 1AC

## 1AC Yale

### FW

#### *Framework—*

#### Ethics must use ways of life to explain good and bad—it is impossible to constitute value from a value-free world—this takes out “super natural” theories of reason.

 Reader 2k (Soran Reader, Department of Philosophy @ Durham, “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalisms, Reasons and Virtue”, 2k)//Miro

First-nature explicatory accounts are increasingly popular. Aspects of work from Michael Thompson (1995), Philippa Foot's recent unpublished work, and Alasdair Maclntyre's (1999a and b) fall into this category. Writers explicating ethics in this way take as their core notion the idea of human life. They start, in Aristotelian fashion, with other organisms, and, by describing the lives of those organisms in compelling ways, persuade us to notice two things: the presence of norms in animal lives, and continuities between those lives and human life. Thus Michael Thompson argues that there is a distinct logical category for talk about life, which is characterised by talk of 'the species' having this or that property. Such talk, he argues, reveals a distinct kind of natural norm which he calls the 'Aristotelian categorical'. When we use a phrase like 'wolves hunt in packs', or 'the swallow migrates in winter', we are making a statement that is normative in the sense Thompson has isolated. In such talk, he argues, we are committed to the claim that there is something wrong with the wolf or swallow that doesn't hunt in the pack or migrate, it suffers, in Foot's phrase, from a natural defect. Foot takes this up to argue for a continuity: just as 'good' in talk of animal lives says that their lives are going as they 'should' in Thompson's sense, so 'good' in human life says that human life is going as it 'should'. Possession of the virtues is an Aristotelian categorical for human beings. Privation of virtue, or vice, is a natural defect of human beings, on a par with other natural defects, like short-sightedness or poor co-ordination. There is something wrong with human beings who lack virtue, and something normatively right with those who possess them. Alasdair Maclntyre (1999a) also emphasises the continuities between the lives of higher social mammals and human life, and asks us to notice how the life of these animals involves recognition of and response to norms. He is especially interested in norms of care for members of the social group who are dependent, that is, unable to care for themselves. The inescapable first-natural facts of vulnerability and dependency, and the implications they have for what our norms can be, have been too little noticed by moral philosophers, who in his view need to update their 'naturalisms' to accommodate these facts. Some naturalist writers place more emphasis on the differences between the social life of animals and that of human beings. First nature is what we share with higher mammals: so, at least, biology, and being vulnerable to the vagaries of a particular physical environment. Second nature is here conceived as something different, something extra. Writers who highlight differences include David Wiggins (1987), John McDowell (1995), Joseph Raz (1999), Thomas Scanlon (1999), and Peter Railton (2000). The difference between humans and the rest of first nature that all these writers agree is crucial to understanding ethics, is our rationality- our capacity to act in the light of reasons. We are unique in being able to take considerations to be reasons, and in being able to justify our actions to ourselves and each other though socially supported dialogue about reasons. Where Maclntyre (1999a) thinks that unless higher animals took things to be reasons and acted virtuously, there would not be enough in first nature for rational, moral second nature to develop from, McDowell (1995) thinks that higher animals and human beings are, literally, a world apart: where animals have only an environment, mature human beings have a world, full of meanings and reasons with practical significance. These accounts are still naturalistic, so long as they claim that our ethical second nature is natural part of worldly nature, not supernatural. Second nature is the set of features installed in the course of ordinary socialisation and education. But 'education' here is doing a lot of work: it is richly understood, as no less than the creating and shaping of the virtuous person in childhood. Our 'second nature' is our rationality, our character, our skills, and our reactive attitudes. Although it is not thought of as rigid in adulthood, mechanically determining everything we do in the way that first nature is thought by some to determine the behaviour it governs (whether human or animal), second nature is sometimes thought of as pretty robust - it determines what we (can) take to be reasons, and determines what virtues or vices (or neutral habits) our actions express.7 Some writers see 'second nature' rather differently. They see it as ‘super natural', coming from outside the natural world, different in kind from it and not explicable in terms of it. Kant held that kind of view, and modern contractarianism inherits much of it. To the extent that modern contractarians, like John Rawls, David Gauthier and Thomas Scanlon conceive of the ethics-creating contract as something independent of our first-and-second natural history, it seems right to say that they are 'super naturalists' in McDowell's sense. To the extent that modern Kantians, like Onora O'Neill, Christine Korsgaard and Barbara Herman think of the rational deliberation that goes into ethical action as independent of our animal nature, they, too, propose a form of supernaturalism. But notice that even supernaturalists about ethics are committed to the naturalistic platitude with which this section began: ethical behaviour expresses (part of) our nature. It is just that these writers take our ethical nature to be something beyond the ordinary world of first and second nature. Another aspect of human second nature has been mentioned in some recent writing: human relationships. It has been suggested, by David McNaughton (1996) and David Wiggins (1998) that W.D. Ross offered the concept of relationship as the key which shows how his list of protanto moral duties is not arbitrary. Each relationship generates duties. One might see this in a first-natural or second-natural way: kinship duties and shared environment duties might be held to arise out of our first-natural connections; duties of friendship, citizenship, civility and educating the young, arise out of relationships that are part of second nature. The idea that even second-natural relationships may be morally explanatory and fundamental, is only just beginning to be explored, but promises to be fruitful. I have sketched different forms the claim that ethics is 'natural' can take. But an important part of the starting motivation to say that ethics is natural was a scientistic drive to reduce ethics to first nature, to explain ethics as a matter of atoms swerving in the void, as it were. And an important part of the motivation behind the development of second-natural explicatory accounts, has been to resist that reductive drive. It remains to say something about that debate. In (1995) and elsewhere McDowell provides a helpful diagnosis of the reductive impulse. He links Wittgenstein's work on rule-following with a reading of Aristotle, suggesting that the crucial insight was already there in Aristotle: explanation and justification are, and can only be, internal to a way of life. But the insight has been forgotten, as a result of the Modern turn in Western philosophy, which inclines us to take experimental science to be the fundamental mode of knowledge, and to measure other discourses against its standards. It stipulates that 'the world' is the world seen from the perspective of completed natural science, containing only entities with 'primary qualities', considered under the aspect of how they would ap pear 'from nowhere', as in Nagel (1986) or from a God's eye view or Archimedian point, as in Williams (1985). The Modern turn has generated two problems: how can value be constituted by a value-free world? and how can value be expressed in the value-free world as action? If McDowell is right, two projects in contemporary ethics are bogged down by an error that originates in the 18th Century. Those who offer first nature explanatory accounts are seeking an answer to the first unanswerable question, of how the value-free can constitute value. On a proper conception of 'the world', there is no 'value-free'. And action-theorists, perhaps especially Humeans, are trying to answer the second unanswerable question, of how nature-free value can get into the value-free natural world. That all this results from the same mistake, McDowell suggests, can be seen in Aristotle- but we need to have the insights of Wittgenstein in mind to read him properly. The Modern picture is so powerful that it is almost impossible not to read Aristotle as either attempting to 'ground' ethics in the non-ethical, or attempting to 'explain' moral motivation via a strong internalist thesis about moral beliefs. What is the alternative? To understand ethics in its own terms. This deprives us of explanatory naturalism. We can't without error expect to understand ethics in any terms but ethical. This has seemed to many philosophers to be unduly restrictive, and to threaten relativism.8 But in fact it does not lead to these difficulties or, more accurately, it doesn't exacerbate them. The problem of displaying the rationality of ethics in a compelling way is real. But it is also general. It is the same as the problem of displaying the rationality of all the other things we do-- playing games, conducting scientific enquiry, writing philosophy papers. We might be able to make connections between activities using an analogy with another game, say, to illuminate the game of chess for someone. But all we will ever be able to lay our hands on in the activity of explaining, is more of the same: parts of our life. The idea of our being able to use 'the world as it is in itself to explain any of our activities is practically contradictory. And the idea that rationality -- supernature, rather than first nature -- can be used to explain ethics in this way, involves a similar error. The way we think, acquire beliefs, deliberate, justify ourselves, is also part of our life. It is as 'fundamental' in that life as ethics is, but no more so--no more knowable 'in itself, as Aristotle, in the grip of a similar error to our own, would have put it, than it is 'to us', here and now, living as we live. So explanatory accounts of ethics, whether they invoke first-nature or super natural reason, are mistaken. Explicatory naturalism is as far as we can go. And as far as we need to go.

#### This is the *only way* to bridge the “is-ought” gap-- it is not that we ought to act a certain way because those actions are observed; rather we discern what a species is meant to be like through empirical observations.

#### Thus inherent characteristics are the basis for any conception of human goodness—ethics requires an orientation to the good.

Foot 3 (Foot, Philippa. British philosopher, known for her work in Aristotelian ethics. “Natural Goodness.”)//Miro

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by . . . other means.’ 18 Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called an ‘Aristotelian necessity’: that which is necessary because and in so far as good hangs on it.19 We invoke the same idea when we say that it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill. These ‘Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do that which they should do.20 And for all the enormous differences between the life of humans and that of plants or animals, we can see that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do. We do not need to be able to dive like gannets, nor to see in the dark like owls; but our memory and concentration must be such as to allow us to learn language, and our sight such that we can recognize faces at a glance; while, like lionesses, human parents are defective if they do not teach their young the skills that they need to survive.

#### This means that since the resolution concerns what “ought” to be for adolescents--saying what we ought to do can only be done with reference to the purpose of our form.

#### Thus, the standard is promoting human flourishing. 2 more reasons:

#### Moral perception—virtue controls the internal link to other moral theories, we can’t act morally if we can’t recognize situations as deserving of action.

Lindemann 5 (Monica A. Lindemann, B.A. University of North Texas, “ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE EDUCATION: ANCIENT WISDOM APPLIED”, 2005)//Miro

One of the major problems that ethical theories face today is to determine the precise connection between the recognition of ethical dilemmas by a moral agent and [her] subsequent motivation to act. Frequently, philosophers argue, it is not enough for a moral agent to know ethical principles that apply only to universalized situations; something else has to occur for the agent to truly jump into gear. Simply knowing theoretical ethical principles does not provide the agent with the fine-tuned perception necessary to actually recognize a specific situation as deserving of action. This is one of the reasons why rule-based systems of ethics are problematic, as they already assume that the moral agent has discerned ethical salience in a given situation. However, that is not necessarily the case. In other words, knowing that “one should be benevolent to those less fortunate” does not give any specific information as to what action to take when one is faced with a homeless person on the street, for instance. In such a situation, one first has to recognize that the other person has a good of his or her own, is in need, and thus deserving of help. In the same way, the rule does not provide information regarding what form the aid should take: should one simply give the person money for food? Or should one try to help in more profound ways, such as finding him or her a job etc.? All these scenarios already depend on the moral perception of the moral agent; that is, the situation first has to be perceived to be a moral one, for otherwise moral activity is not at all required. As Blum puts it: The point is that perception occurs prior to deliberation, and prior to taking the situation to be one in which one needs to deliberate. It is precisely because the situation is seen in a certain way that the agent takes it as one in which he feels moved to deliberate.40 Therefore, the significance of moral perception for subsequent action is undeniable. The question now becomes: What is moral perception and how does it develop in a moral agent? Clearly, rules and regulations in and by themselves are not guides to moral perception, since they only prescribe how to act once a moral situation is already perceived as requiring action. Therefore, deontological and utilitarian theories of ethics generally begin too far down the road, as they already presuppose the moral perception of the moral agent. The principles provided can only be applied if the situation has been recognized as a moral one. However, moral perception appears to be a component of the characteristics and dispositions of a person, as they are an integral part of how a person dwells in and interacts with the world. Thus, moral perception, which is essential and prior to any moral judgment, is closely linked to ethical theories of virtue, as the virtues are generally regarded to shape an agent’s understanding of his or her moral environment. In other words, a person who has cultivated the virtues of love and benevolence perceives the world in a distinctly different way than a person who is lacking these qualities. As Sherman states: Preliminary to deciding how to act, one must acknowledge that the situation requires action. The decision must arise from a reading of the circumstances. This reading, or reaction, is informed by ethical considerations expressive of the agent’s virtue. Perception thus is informed by the virtues. The agent will be responsible for how the situation appears as well as for omissions and distortions. Accordingly, much of the work of virtue will rest in knowing how to construe the case, how to describe and classify what is before one. An agent who fails to notice unequivocal features of a situation which for a given community standardly require considerations of liberality, apparently lacks that virtue. It is not that she has deliberated badly, but that there is no registered response about which to liberate.41 In other words, many situations that clearly deserve the moral consideration of the virtuous person might not elicit any emotional or ethical response by the person lacking the appropriate virtue. Take, for instance, the following scenario: Kate and John are sitting next to each other on a very crowded bus. An elderly lady gets on the bus, but unfortunately there are no more seats available. All John notices at that time is that additional passengers have gotten on the bus; he barely acknowledges the presence of the elderly lady. Kate, however, immediately perceives the situation as requiring action, since she feels empathetic for the woman in need. In other words, she can recognize that the good (comfort) of the woman is in jeopardy, and accordingly decides to act. As this example shows, the recognition of a situation as being a moral one is the prerequisite of any moral action altogether. Apparently, the particular scene looked decidedly different to John than it appeared to Kate due to their different moral sensitivities. One could rightly argue that in the context John was rather insensitive regarding the needs of other passengers, and thus exhibited some sort of moral defect, although a minor one.

#### Absolutist moral theories fail—moral knowledge is ultimately uncodifiable.

Silva 11 (Rui Silva, University of the Azores. “VIRTUE ETHICS AND COMMUNITARIANISM” 2011. DIACRÍTICA)

But what went wrong with modern moral theories? We may say that, according to virtue ethicists, modern moral philosophy commits a fundamental sin when it tries to ground moral action on a set of universal rules or principles. Such an approach to moral life is subject to two major objections. In the first place, it promotes an abstract account of the ethical domain that neglects some vital aspects of moral life: education, character, motivation, happiness or emotions. In fact, virtue ethics is characterized by a focus on real agents, in contrast to the deontological focus on duties or actions (considered independently of their consequences) and the consequentialist focus on the results of actions. In the second place, virtue ethics claims that moral knowledge cannot be reduced to a system of rules and principles; in other words, moral knowledge is uncodifiable. The quotes in epigraph help us to understand the appeal of virtue ethics in comparison with deontological and consequentialists approaches to ethics. These approaches, which dominated modern moral philosophy, suffer from what John Cottingham called a “depersonalizing tendency” (1996: 58). In fact, both perspectives are impersonal accounts of moral action: deontological theories are based on a list of universally valid duties or obligations, whereas consequentialism is guided by equally impersonal rules that are supposed to promote, for instance, collective happiness or welfare. On the contrary, virtue ethics, far from abstracting from the character, motivations and even emotions from the agent, tries to ground moral action in the real agent. This point has a good illustration in McDowell's claim that ethics should be “approached via the notion of a virtuous person. A conception of right conduct is 3 grasped, as it were, from the inside out” (McDowell, 1998: 50). A similar idea is sometimes expressed by saying that virtue ethics focuses on being, whereas deontological and consequentialist perspectives focus on doing. In other words, the central question for virtue ethicists is “what sort of person should I be?”; in contrast, the key question for modern moral philosophers is “how should I act?”2 In the philosophy of the human sciences, there is a distinction between cold methodologies and hot methodologies; in similar vein, we can speak of cold (consequentialism/deontologism) and hot (virtue ethics) approaches to ethics.

#### I defend the resolution as a general principle and can clarify in cross-x.

### C1

#### Contention [1] is *Living Donation*—

#### Adolescent autonomy is key to development of altruism.

Hartman 8 (Rhonda Gay Hartman, holds a faculty appointment at Duquesne University in both the School of Law and at the Center for Healthcare Ethics, “Gault's Legacy: Dignity, Due Process, and Adolescent's Liberty Interests in Living Donation”, 2008)//Miro

Through state-designed processes that recognize their decision making about medical donation, adolescents perceive an importance in their own right and a respect for their choices. As the Court in Gault suggested when it underscored the propriety of the decision-making process, adolescents derive benefit from the process of decision making that responds to basic values of self-respect and autonomy, separate and apart from the ultimate choice about donation. I3 ° A decision-making process that fosters adolescents' development is closely connected to the dignity value underlying due process, reflecting an ethic of reverence for human beings and their personal decisions that express individuality and self-identity. Adolescents ascribe value to engaging with others about matters affecting their lives that enhance their developing self-image and self-identity. Engaging in decision making about living donation would also enrich adolescents by heightening consciousness about service to others and by imbibing moral values about selfless acts that transcend into other areas of their lives. The very nature of living "donation" involves an act of giving a gift to another. For living donors, it is a profound personal gift of the body. Donations are driven by motives and desires shaped by personal values. Some decisions about donation are based on perceived advantage or disadvantage to oneself. Other decisions may derive from an unselfish regard for the welfare of another person, as when an adolescent, without being asked, wants to donate to a friend or classmate who may die if he does not receive a kidney; the benefit derived is the benefit to the person receiving the kidney. This is altruism, although the concept is not a simple one. Quite to the contrary, its complexity warrants scrutiny in terms of its meaning in specific contexts. For example, altruism is not present with young children whom parents compel to serve as donors for siblings. Unlike a child, an adolescent is capable of acting on altruistic desires by agreeing to a surgical harvest of her kidney for transplant in her sibling. Yet these altruistic motives seem purer when an adolescent desires to be a living donor for someone, such as a classmate, who is not connected to her family unit.13' Thus, among the benefits adolescents may derive from participating in decision making about living donation is an appreciation of altruism. Altruism engenders self-sacrifice and an unselfish devotion to others' welfare. As such, it is revered in any civilized society because it finds expression through social interactions that reflect mutual respect and dignity.'32 The act of donating human tissues suggests the value of altruism.'33 Yet, altruism in the context of tissue donations merits closer examination in terms of its meaning and limitations. For example, living donation can entail a form of self-interest in which the donor derives a benefit (e.g., reputation enhancement, good feelings about oneself, or defining a relationship with the recipient) from the act of donation. Altruism in a pure sense portends a selflessness in which an altruist derives no self-benefit from donation;' 34 otherwise, the selflessness of the act is marginalized. Altruism also implies a personal awareness and decision about offering one's self for another's benefit, rather than being compelled to give of one's self to another. " 5 Normative judgments about altruism toward others give meaning to donative decision making, no less for adolescents than for adults in identical situations. Decision-making processes about living donation provide opportunities to adolescents for learning about self-sacrifice, for reaching for something that had seemed beyond them, and for gaining deep understanding about themselves in relation to altruistic acts and others' needs. Society, therefore, has an interest in cultivating altruism in adolescents as they develop into adults, which suggests that decision-making schemes about living donation further the state's parens patriae role in "the totality" of its relationship with adolescents. 136 Processes designed to facilitate adolescents' decision making for medical donation also further the norms of autonomy (selfdetermination), beneficence (health and well-being promotion), and nonmaleficence (harm prevention) underlying bioethical policy.137 The doctrine of informed consent, which is the primary legal implementation of bioethical norms, envisages a process through which physicians disclose relevant information to patients in ways they can comprehend and understand, and in settings conducive to deliberation about available treatment options so that choices reflect their views and values.13 8

#### Two implications—

#### Questions of competence are irrelevant—prefer studies specific to adolescents ability to act altruistically.

#### I access categorical NCs—living donation decisionmaking key to dignity.

#### Only full adolescent autonomy solves—piecemeal approaches ultimately undermine fairness and impartiality

Hartman 8 (Rhonda Gay Hartman, holds a faculty appointment at Duquesne University in both the School of Law and at the Center for Healthcare Ethics, “Gault's Legacy: Dignity, Due Process, and Adolescent's Liberty Interests in Living Donation”, 2008)//Miro

Due process essentials for minors in medical donation settings entail normative judgments about informed consent and the roles of transplant surgeons and institutions. In addition to traditional lawmaking about child and family matters, state legislatures oversee at once professional practice and adolescents' decision making in medical settings; 16 ' a logical extension of that oversight is a positive scheme that fosters due process essentials for adolescents' living donation and also minimizes effects of perceived institutional biases. 7 ° Plainly, institutional approaches to adolescents' donative decision making should be a matter of principle, not caprice. In addition to reducing arbitrary abrogations of minors' liberty interests, legislative schemes signaling cohesive, consistent approaches to adolescents' liberty interests in medical contexts promote Gault's principles. In contrast, ad hoc approaches by medical practitioners and institutions can undermine those principles in significant ways. It seems incontrovertible under Gault that state-engineered processes for decision making involving adolescents' protected liberty interests are vital for vindicating values underlying due process. These values are central to the state's parens patriae relationship with minors. These values must have some meaning that transcends the contexts in which they are applied. Piecemeal, incremental approaches to adolescents' donative decision making are simply at odds with the Court's view that the essentials of due process must guide consistently the way in which the government acts toward minors.' 7 ' Furthermore, retrospective post hoc approaches make it difficult to assess whether a given approach is fair, impartial, and orderly because it is highly unlikely that acts will occur in factually identical situations. Fairness, impartiality, and orderliness cannot serve as meaningful standards unless they are articulated in terms that transcend any given action or context. Although the difficulty of articulating a coherent model of due process essentials for any specific decision-making context should not be underestimated, state legislators are better positioned than doctors, institutions, or even state court judges to delineate the contours of decision-making processes that customize these essentials. 17

#### Altruism is an Aristotelian necessity.

Adams 6 (ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, American analytic philosopher of metaphysics, religion and moralit, “A Theory of Virtue”, 2006)//Miro

Most of us will probably find this suggestion intuitively implausible. The most clearly decisive objection to it, perhaps, is that one’s engagement with one’s own good will be truncated and impoverished so long as one has no altruistic motivation. That is because so much of the good we can enjoy in life depends on the breadth of our interests, and particularly on our benevolent interest in other persons. Unless we are as unluckily isolated as Robinson Crusoe without his man Friday, there will be a great proportion of our own possible good that we will not have engaged in any depth if we do not care about the good of others. It is not a focus on one individual’s good as such that gives a richer object for a deeper love. The rich object of love is the individual’s life, which will be much richer if it is rich in aspects that you cannot care about without caring about the good of other people. Thus my caring, however intensively, about my own good alone could not have sufficient richness to compensate for its narrowness. Really excellent self-love must be integrated with unselfcentered concerns. In this way it resembles really excellent love of cultural goods, which (as I argued in chapter 3) must be integrated with concern for the good of persons. (3) An important part of what is to be accounted for here is that we do not just think altruistic motivation excellent; we think not caring for the good of other people, for its own sake, is morally bad —in extreme cases even wicked. If it is a settled motivational pattern, it is a vice (in the sense explained in chapter 3), and not just the absence of a virtue. Most of us think a purely egoistic pattern of motivation is morally bad. One reason for thinking it so is that it seems idolatrous. It lacks a certain flexibility and readiness to subordinate one interest to another, when appropriate, that we rightly expect of excellent motivation. We may count it idolatry, in a moral sense, to be so bound to any particular good or type of good as object of concern that one is not sensitive to reasons for diverting attention to some other good, or even for preferring the other good. Such idolatry compromises, or even cancels, the excellence of caring for the good that one does care for. Because of the salience and magnitude of other goods that can compete with one’s own personal well-being as objects of concern, a settled pattern of motivation that is purely egoistic can hardly fail to be an idolatry in this sense. And not only that, but even a qualified egoism will be idolatrous in the indicated sense if it allows altruistic motives but confines them within the straitjacket of the constraint, ‘But me first, always.’ (4) Another way in which it is bad not to care at all, for their sake, about the good of other persons within the range of one’s knowledge, is that it is a way of relating badly to them. Conversely, and positively, there is an excellence of personal relationship in altruistic motivation. Whether or not it is reciprocated, caring for another person’s good constitutes an interpersonal relationship (in a broad sense) which is richer and more excellent than the more reflexive relationship to oneself involved in caring for one’s own good.

### C2

#### Contention [2] is *Moral Development*—

#### An ethic of mutual respect afforded by adolescent consent is key to effective moral development.

Hartman 8 (Rhonda Gay Hartman, holds a faculty appointment at Duquesne University in both the School of Law and at the Center for Healthcare Ethics, “Gault's Legacy: Dignity, Due Process, and Adolescent's Liberty Interests in Living Donation”, 2008)//Miro

The freedom for determining boundaries of bodily integrity and the dignity that is derived from decision making about one's body, whether adult or adolescent, involve liberty interests that trigger procedural safeguards.8 7 Minimally, this includes the due process essentials of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness required by the Court in Gault whenever minors' liberty interests are implicated.8 By explicitly including minors in due process's protections, the Court implied that adolescents, like adults, must experience an ethic of mutual respect and self-esteem-in a word, dignity.8" One could even say that dignity is the most fundamental of all values anchored in the liberty protections of the Due Process Clause.90 B. Dignity's Centrality to Liberty Interests Courts historically have recognized dignity's salience to liberty interests and to the meaning found in decision making about significant personal matters.9" Decision-making processes are tightly connected to a dignity norm underlying due process. Underscoring the personal meaning found in participating in decision-making processes is the state's commitment "to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders."' 2 Liberty interests embrace dignitary values of self-identity and individualism, and thus due process of law must be defined in terms of its impact upon the dignity of those persons whom it affects. An ethic of reverence underlies the idea of dignity because our capacities for reasoning afford moral development through which relationships with others, our environments, and especially ourselves are understood.9 Even at very young ages, children develop levels of moral reasoning, including understandings of right and wrong concerning themselves and others.94 As a value underlying due process, dignity is reflected through fair, impartial, and orderly processes, 95 which is why it is not only central to constitutional interpretation as in Gault but also to medical consent.96 Adolescents realize personal dignity in large measure by participating in decision-making processes that impact matters of importance to them and in having their participation regarded and respected by others who talk with rather than to them.97 An inability to express their voices and views about significant personal matters or a perception of unjust deprivations of their interests demoralizes adolescents. The demoralizing effects from withered self-concepts and damaged identities can harm adolescents in the long-term. Deprivations of dignity are not inconsequential for anyone, let alone adolescents who seem more sensitized to perceiving affronts to their abilities and hence to their worth. Particularly for adolescents, a sense of dignity springs not necessarily from the outcomes of government determinations but from the interactions between them and the government that occur through decision-making processes. In Gault, the Court underscored that both the appearance and the actuality of fairness, impartiality, and orderliness are impressive to minors.98 Even when outcomes are viewed as unjust, the results may be accepted as legitimate if the decision-making processes reflect dignitary values of individualism, self-identity, and self-respect. This was the thrust of Gault wherein the Court directed that stateengineered decision-making processes regarding minors must comport with "essentials of due process and fair treatment."9 9 93. [Footnotes] RAwLs, supra note 89, at 22-25, 251-57. 94. See generally ROBERT COLES, MORAL INTELLIGENCE OF CHILDREN (1997). 95. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967). 96. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900-01 (1994). 97. According to John Rawls, Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense that one's plan is worth carrying out. Now our self-respect normally depends on the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing. RAwLs, supra note 89, at 178. 98. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26. 99. Id. at 30.

#### This is supported by cognitive psychology—medical decisionmaking allows adolescents to practice moral reasoning.

Mutcherson 5 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Vice Dean and Professor of Bioethics @ Rutgers “Whose Body Is It Anyway - An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents”, 2005)//Miro (edited for grammar)

Where the need is great enough, resourceful young people will find the means to pay for care that they need but are unwilling to share information about with their parents. Already, in the context of abortion and STI treatment, young women who seek to terminate pregnancies without the knowledge or consent of their parents and young people who seek treatment for STIs must find the financial resources to pay for their own care.' 98 Lack of financing does not mean that the right should be withheld. To the extent that young people seek out health care for which they cannot pay and which they do not wish to discuss with their parents, it may be appropriate to allow them access to public benefits programs that can cover the cost of their healthcare. 199 Similarly, physicians may wish to refer patients to facilities that provide care on a sliding scale, may be willing to set up payment plans for young patients, or may even choose to provide low or no-cost services in some cases. 200 Some would also decry the increased pressure placed on adolescents by this proposal because it may require them to participate in conversations with which they are uncomfortable or that require complex decision- making. First, the proposal involves young people in a variety of decision-making processes thus [gives] giving them opportunities to "practice" their skills in less charged environments and making them more likely to make informed, reasoned decisions when faced with more challenging questions. Second, increasing autonomy is a step in the process of moral development for young people: Both cognitive-developmental and social learning theorists emphasize that significance of participation in roletaking in determining the rate of moral development. Essentially, moral-development theorists conceptualize achievement of milestones in cognitive development as necessary but not sufficient for progress in moral development. For example, from a cognitive developmental perspective, formal operational thought (the capacity to think abstractly) is necessary for the attainment of principled moral reasoning. However, attainment of such reasoning based on abstract ethical principles also requires extensive experience with resolving ethical problems in social interaction and exposure to diverse, "higher" points of view. 201 Thus, by allowing young people to give consent to routine care, we create better healthcare consumers over the long-term

#### Autonomy itself is a human good—reject conflations of autonomy and independence, autonomous decisions can be made in conjunction with others.

Mutcherson 5 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Vice Dean and Professor of Bioethics @ Rutgers “Whose Body Is It Anyway - An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents”, 2005)//Miro

The personal autonomy at issue in this context refers to "[t]he realm of inviolable sanctuary most of us sense in our own beings. '78 Personal autonomy, as manifested in the healthcare context by requiring informed consent, is widely understood to be of enormous value and benefit to individuals. As one philosopher has noted, "Whatever else we mean by autonomy ... it must be a good and admirable thing to have, not only in itself but for its fruits-responsibility, self esteem, and personal dignity. Autonomy so conceived is not merely a 'condition,' but a condition to which we aspire as an ideal."'79 While debates have raged in philosophy and law about the meaning or usefulness of autonomy, particularly when the concept is subjected to critique based on gender or age,80 for purposes of this article, I assume that autonomy is overall a good thing and that it embraces the notion that "[t]he autonomous person, as the saying goes, is 'his own man' or 'her own woman.' He/she doesn't 'belong' to anyone else, either as property or as possession. Anyone who would deal in her affairs must come to terms with her, or her agent. It will not do to negotiate only with her parents or her boss, and she has no 'keeper.'"81 This is not to say, however, that an autonomous individual is without connection, community, or allegiance. As recognized by many feminist theorists, one of the myths of autonomy is the insistence by some that dependence is the antithesis of an autonomous existence. 82 Martha Fineman explains: [A]utonomy is often presented as a state of being that is attainable by all. It is also perceived as an individually (and autonomously) developed characteristic that ulti-mately reflects the worth (or lack thereof) of the person. In this simplistic version of autonomy, the realities of... dependency are absent. In fact, the world that this vision of autonomy imagines is a world that can only be populated by adults, and then only by those adults possessing sufficient capabilities and competencies to make it possible that their only demand of government (aside from the provision of security and courts of law) be for rules that guarantee their right to be left alone to realize the gains and glory their individual talents may bring. . . [S]uch a vision is a chimera, and [ ] this version of autonomy is both undesirable and unattainable on an individual level, and therefore, destructive from a policy perspective. We all experience dependency, and we are all subsidized during our lives (although unequally and inequitably so). 83 As used in this article, autonomy does not demand a rugged or radical individualism in which people are outside of communities, but instead embraces individuals who make decisions with the support of and in conjunction with the communities, large and small, to which they belong. As philosopher Joel Feinberg elucidates: [I]f we so desire, we can minimize our commitments and thus achieve a greater amount of de facto moral independence. We may, if we wish, go through life unmarried, or forgo having children, or near neighbors. We may make as few promises as possible to others, incur no debts, join no partnerships. The picture that emerges from all of this is that of an uncommitted person, maximally independent of the demands of others. Yet it is hard to imagine such a person with the moral virtues that thrive on involvement-compassion, loyalty, cooperativeness, engagement, trust. If we think of autonomy as the name of a condition which is itself admirable, a kind of ideal condition, then the uncommitted person is subject to demerits on this score. He is clearly no paragon. 84 Few well-functioning human beings can, or would wish, to claim a completely independent existence. We live in various webs of interdependence formed by families, friendships, employment, and citizenship in various communities and countries. 85 Feinberg explains, There is a danger in discussing, in the abstract, the ideal qualities of a human being. Our very way of posing the question can lead us to forget the most significant truth about ourselves, that we are social animals. No individual person selects "autonomously" his own genetic inheritance or early upbringing. No individual person selects his country, his language, his social community and traditions. No individual invents afresh his tools, his technology, his public institutions and procedures. And yet to be a human being is to be part of a community, to speak a language, to take one's place in an already functioning group way of life. We come into awareness of ourselves as part of ongoing social processes .... 86 One could, then, accurately describe all human beings who do not live completely isolated lives as being simultaneously autonomous and dependent, with the balance between the two shifting based on changes in age, location, health status, and other factors

### U/V

#### Underview—

#### Aff gets RVIs on I meet and counter-interps because (a) 1AR timeskew means I can’t cover theory and substance, (b) no risk theory lets the neg moot the AC

#### Neg gets one unconditional advocacy—condo makes the neg a moving target which kills 1AR strategy, <<they>>’ll kick it if I cover it. It’s unreciprocal because I can’t kick the aff

#### Default to competing worlds—Neg burden is to win offense to a post-fiat advocacy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education.

Nelson 8 (Adam F. Nelson, J.D.1. Towards a Comprehensive Theory of Lincoln-Douglas Debate. 2008)

And the truth-statement model of the resolution imposes an absolute burden of proof on the affirmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the negative need only prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seem fundamentally unfair, as they provide the negative with **functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole. Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of competing world-views rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the negative retains equal flexibility while being denied access to those skeptical arguments indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way. Such a model of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer their worldview, thereby further enforcing **a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate the truth of ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world. They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

#### Reasonability— Voting for theory encourages theory prolif—any aff abuse must be weighed against this DA which sets a non-arbitrary voting threshold.

#### Err in favor of small schools on theory to account for resource disparity.

#### Best meta-studies show that adolescents are competent.

Mutcherson 5 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Vice Dean and Professor of Bioethics @ Rutgers “Whose Body Is It Anyway - An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents”, 2005)//Miro

Finally, voluntariness refers to a person's ability to provide consent "that is not merely an acquiescent or deferent response to authority."' 18 Ultimately, a healthcare provider should base an evaluation of decisionmaking capacity for a young person upon her "ability to understand and communicate relevant information, ability to think and choose with some degree of independence, ability to assess the potential for benefit, risks, or harms as well as to consider the consequences and multiple options, and achievement of a fairly stable set of values."119 One study of healthcare provider practices made several useful findings about the relationship between healthcare providers and their adolescent patients. First, over half of the healthcare providers responding to the survey reported that their adolescent patients "understand information about medical treatment and conditions, engage in rational deliberation during the decisional process, and communicate choices and concerns clearly." 120 Even more importantly, "more than four fifths of physicians (86.7 percent, n=150) agreed that adolescent patients demonstrate an ability to understand information about their medical condition and treatment."1 21 Other study findings reflected healthcare provider perceptions that their adolescent patients possessed communication skills that allowed them to successfully discuss and share their healthcare preferences and that these choices were the product of rational thought.122 Further, the majority of healthcare providers did not believe that their adolescent patients were more prone to risk taking in their medical decision- making than are adults. 123 While it would be inappropriate to base a change in law solely upon one small study of healthcare provider attitudes and perceptions, the study results provide a basis for questioning the extent to which the law's attempt to protect young people from their own potentially detrimental medical decision-making is necessary or steeped in reality. Current laws ignore what many healthcare providers know from experience with young patients and what research has shown, mainly that adolescents possess a developed capacity for decision-making that is on par with that of young adults. One study compared the decision-making of two groups of minors, the first group consisting of nine and ten year old children and the second consisting of fourteen and fifteen year olds, against a group of young adults aged twenty-one through twenty-five. 124 Of the three groups, only the latter consisted of individuals presumed competent to make healthcare decisions.1 25 The study authors were particularly concerned about the ability of young people to make voluntary decisions given the strong influence of parents and sought to discover how readily a minor could engage in independent decision-making in the face of parental influence or conflict. 126 Each study participant, all of whom provided written consent to the study along with the parents of the minor participants, was asked to respond to three hypothetical medical dilemmas by selecting a treatment option after being apprised of the nature of the disease and its available treatments. 127 While the researchers offered several caveats about the findings, including the fact that the study group was largely middle and upper-middle class and of average intelligence and that the participants were asked to respond to hypothetical situations, 128 the study does offer some small insight into directions for policymaking. First, the lead study author, David Scherer, notes, "[y]oung adults and adolescents. . . appear to be approaching medical decision making with a quality of intentionality that is not seen in the decisions made by children."1 29 He adds, "the law can be notified. that, at least in regard to medical decisions presented in this research, there is no conclusive evidence to presume that adolescents are incapable of a voluntary consent comparable to that of young adults."'130 He also includes the caveat that, "it cannot be totally refuted, particularly with younger adolescents, that there may be important differences between adolescents and young adults in the quality and quantity of decision-making autonomy that they may exercise in medical treatment decisions. Consequently, there may be a need for continued state over[s]ight in these matters."' 3' Scherer raises a specific concern about the degree of parental influence acting as a coercive force thus negating the voluntary element of a young person's consent.132 The author notes, "[t]here appears to be minimal risk to family integrity by including minors in routine medical decisions affecting them. Even young adult offspring seem inclined to defer to parental judgment in routine medical matters, when parents feel strongly about a decision." 133 This finding suggests that concerns about adolescent rebellion leading to bad choices may be overblown and inaccurate. In another study in which the researchers asked a group of young people to respond to hypothetical health care dilemmas, the researchers reported that: In general, minors aged 14 . . . demonstrate a level of competency equivalent to that of adults, according to four standards of competency (evidence of choice, reasonable outcome, rational reasons, and understanding), and for four hypothetical dilemmas (diabetes, epilepsy, depression, and enuresis). Younger minors aged 9, however, appeared less competent than adults according to the standards of competency requiring understanding and a rational reasonable process. Yet, according to the standards of evidence of choice and reasonable outcome, even these younger minors appeared competent.134 The study authors wrote: The findings of this research do not lend support to policies which deny adolescents the right of self determination in treatment situations on the basis of a presumption of incapacity to provide informed consent. The age of 18 or 21 as the "cutoffs" [sic] below which individuals are presumed to be incompetent to make determinations about their own welfare do not reflect psychological capacities of most adolescents. 135 A comprehensive review and analysis of literature in developmental psychology also found that "there is little evidence that minors of age 15 and above as a group are any less competent to provide consent than are adults."' 136 The authors concluded: "[M]inors are entitled to have some form of consent or dissent regarding the things that happen tothem in the name of assessment, treatment or other professional activities that have generally been determined unilaterally by adults in the minor's interest." 137 In a similar vein, yet another review of the literature on child development led a researcher to determine that "by age 14 years, many minors attain the cognitive developmental stage associated with the psychological elements of rational consent" and further concluded that "minors between 11 and 14 years of age appear to be in a transition period [and] there appear to be no psychological grounds for the general assumption that minors 15 years of age or older cannot provide competent consent." 138 Professional groups have taken note of the literature on the cognitive development of adolescents. The American Academy of Pediatrics ("AAP") notes that "review of the limited relevant empirical data suggests that adolescents, especially those age 14 and older, may have as well developed decisional skills as adults for making informed health care decisions."' 39 The Society for Adolescent Medicine ("the Society") has also indicated that its membership shares the view that adolescent decisional skills may be as developed as those of adults. 140 Based on this data and their own experience with young patients, these medical professionals have expressed support for granting young people, specifically those who are fourteen or older, greater rights to participation in decisions about their own healthcare.' 4 1

# Aff—Contention

### 1AR—AT: what is a virtue

#### The AC meta-ethical framing issue answers this—through explicatory naturalism we can engage in empirical investigation to determine the purpose of our form—that is, what virtues are good, such as altruism.

#### Even if you buy this, moral development is a pre-requisite to developing specific virtues which means that I dodge the link.

### 1AR—AT: Self centered

### 1AR—AT: Adolescents aren’t competent

#### Altruism-- Conceded framing issue coming out of the NC means that the question of adolescent competency doesn’t matter for accessing my framework—the only thing that matters is adolescent ability to act *altruistically.* Only the AC has comparative evidence on this specific virtue—that’s our Hartman evidence. Even if they win that adolescents aren’t competent generally, if I win altruism then I have offense on my framework—that’s Hartman.

#### Prefer my studies—I have the scientific gold standard- (a) Controlled studies comparing children and adolescents show that only the latter have competence, (b) Meta-studies prove that the scientific consensus backs adolescent competency—pref meta-studies because they’re a review of the lit, that’s Mutcherson.

#### <<opt>> Prefer the informed consent doctrine—best contextual definition of autonomy.

Mutcherson 5 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Vice Dean and Professor of Bioethics @ Rutgers “Whose Body Is It Anyway - An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents”, 2005)//Miro

Equally as important is a recognition that an autonomous actor need not always act rationally, or with kindness or compassion. For, "[a] self-governing person is no less self-governed if he governs himself badly, no less authentic for having evil principles, no less autonomous if he uses his autonomy to commit aggression against another autonomous person. The aggressor is morally deficient, but what he is deficient in is not necessarily autonomy." 9' In this way, then, it is false to suggest that young people lack autonomy because they may make decisions that appear irrational, cruel, or otherwise deficient. Autonomy need not rest on an assessment of the decision that might have been made by another, but instead is premised upon the process by which an actor reaches a decision.92 In the end, then, to appreciate and protect the moral status of adolescents as persons, it is necessary to recognize that: [T]he dichotomy between protecting children and protecting their rights to autonomy is false. Children who are not protected, whose welfare is not advanced, will not be able to exercise self-determination: on the other hand, a failure to recognize the personality of children is likely to result in an undermining of their protection with children reduced to objects of intervention. '93 Ultimately, to serve faithfully the dual purposes of protecting the public health and preserving moral status, the law must seek to regulate adolescent access to healthcare in a manner that is both practical and ethical. Focusing solely on a public health rationale ignores the protection and enhancement of moral status that logically flows from healthcare emancipation statutes. Moral lawmaking requires reflecting on the way in which the law can de-humanize and harm by failing to embrace fully the personhood of a group of people-here, adolescents

# Aff—NCs

## Virtue (Ext)

### 1AR—Moral Motivation

#### *Moral Perception--* I control the internal link to their theory—any moral theory is ultimately inaccessible unless we first determine that a situation is in need of moral action. Their framework starts “too far down the road”, moral theories that prescribe action based on rules presuppose moral perception. That means that virtue comes first—it allows people to develop the fine-tuned understanding of their moral environment that is necessary for them to act as ethical agents under the NCs framework because it is focused on promotion of character—that’s Lindemann.

### 1AR—Explicatory Naturalism

#### *Explicatory Naturalism—*The NC framework seeks to answer a fundamentally unanswerable question—by divorcing the normative from the empirical, it seeks to constitute value from what it presumes to be a value-free world. Only the AC bridges this “is/ought” gap—we discern what we are meant to be like, that is what virtues we are supposed to hold, through empirical observations—just like we can create normative statements like “wolves hunt in packs” from observation, so too can we determine human virtue – that’s Reader.

### 1AR—Codified Theory/Absolutism

#### Codified moral theory fails— any attempt to create absolute ethical rules neglects moral character and doesn’t access explicatory naturalism or our intuitions. Prefer ethics centered on being.

## Util

### 1AR—Util F/L

#### The AC framework slays this—

#### *Explicatory Naturalism—*The NC framework seeks to answer a fundamentally unanswerable question—by divorcing the normative from the empirical, it seeks to constitute value from what it presumes to be a value-free world. Only the AC bridges this “is/ought” gap <<opt>>—we discern what we are meant to be like, that is what virtues we are supposed to hold, through empirical observations—just like we can create normative statements like “wolves hunt in packs” from observation, so too can we determine human virtue – that’s Reader. They have *no justification* for where they derive ethics from which means that you should prefer explicatory naturalism.

#### Codified moral theory fails— any attempt to create absolute ethical rules neglects moral character and doesn’t access explicatory naturalism or our intuitions. Prefer ethics centered on being.

#### *Moral Perception--* I control the internal link to their theory—any moral theory is ultimately inaccessible unless we first determine that a situation is in need of moral action. Their framework starts “too far down the road”, moral theories that prescribe action based on rules presuppose moral perception. That means that virtue comes first—it allows people to develop the fine-tuned understanding of their moral environment that is necessary for them to act as ethical agents under the NCs framework because it is focused on promotion of character—that’s Lindemann.

#### <<Line-by-line/Why you access their meta-ethics>>

### 1AR—Vaccine add-on

#### Aff key to vaccine uptake.

English 13 (Abigail English co-investigator on a research project funded by GlaxoSmithKline, Carol Ford, M.D. co-investigator, Jessica Kahn, M.D., co-chair of two HPV vaccine clinical trials, Amy Middleman, research grant funding from Novartis and MedImmune, Adolescent Consent for Vaccination: A Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine”, 2013)//Miro

The currently recommended adolescent vaccines have the potential to greatly improve the health of youth and their contacts by preventing conditions such as: tetanus, pertussis, meningococcal disease, influenza, as well as cervical and other HPV-related cancers in adulthood, and genital warts. However, adolescent vaccine coverage lags behind that for younger children. According to the 2011 National Immunization Survey-Teen, among a cross-sectional sample of 13e17 year olds, 78% had received a single Tdap dose and 71% had received at least one dose of MCV4; approximately half of girls age 13e17 years (53%) had received at least one HPV vaccine dose and only 35% had completed the three-dose vaccine series [3]. In contrast, at least 90% of children 19e35 months of age have received at least one dose of measles/mumps/rubella and varicella vaccine, as well as three doses of DTP/DT/Tdap, Haemophilus influenza type B, hepatitis B, and pneumococcal conjugate vaccine [4]. For some vaccines, additional disparities in adolescent and young adult vaccine coverage by race, ethnicity, and poverty status are present [3]. It is clear that further efforts are needed to reduce barriers and promote vaccination for adolescents. Barriers to vaccination include both individual (teen, parent, or provider) beliefs, such as concerns about vaccine efficacy and safety [5], and inadequate system-level practices that facilitate vaccination [6]. Although beliefs about vaccines may be modified through education, system-level barriers require changes in policies. One barrier to immunizing teens is that many do not present for identified routine preventive health care. For younger patients, vaccines are primarily administered during well-child check-ups. However, surveys have estimated that only 15% of adolescents have an identified annual preventive health visit [7,8]. In addition, a recent study demonstrated that one third of adolescents with continuous enrollment in a large Midwestern health plan had no specifically designated preventive health visits between the ages of 13 and 17 years [9]. On the other hand, most adolescents do have contact with the medical system at least once a year [7e9]. Many teenagers present to their medical home for sports physicals (which can be used as preventive health visits) or for management of acute or chronic medical issues. In addition, teenagers may receive additional care in school-based health centers, family planning clinics, and public health clinics. A requirement to obtain parental consent for vaccination can present a significant barrier to improving adolescent vaccine uptake in both traditional and nontraditional health care settings [10]

#### Extinction

**Discover 2k** (“Twenty Ways the World Could End” by Corey Powell in Discover Magazine, October 2000, http://discovermagazine.com/2000/oct/featworld)

If Earth doesn't do us in, our fellow organisms might be up to the task. Germs and people have always coexisted, but occasionally the balance gets out of whack. The Black Plague killed one European in four during the 14th century; influenza took at least 20 million lives between 1918 and 1919; the AIDS epidemic has produced a similar death toll and is still going strong. From 1980 to 1992, reports the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, mortality from infectious disease in the United States rose 58 percent. Old diseases such as cholera and measles have developed new resistance to antibiotics. Intensive agriculture and land development is bringing humans closer to animal pathogens. International travel means diseases can spread faster than ever. Michael Osterholm, an infectious disease expert who recently left the Minnesota Department of Health, described the situation as "like trying to swim against the current of a raging river." The grimmest possibility would be the emergence of a strain that spreads so fast we are caught off guard or that resists all chemical means of control, perhaps as a result of our stirring of the ecological pot. About 12,000 years ago, a sudden wave of mammal extinctions swept through the Americas. Ross MacPhee of the American Museum of Natural History argues the culprit was extremely virulent disease, which humans helped transport as they migrated into the New World.

## Kant

### 1AR—Kant F/L

#### This debate comes down to where we derive morality from.

#### Prefer explicatory naturalism—

#### Kantian ethics seek to answer a fundamentally unanswerable question—how do we constitute value from a value free world?—by divorcing the normative from the empirical, it seeks to constitute value from what it presumes to be a value-free world. Only the AC bridges this “is/ought” gap—we discern what we are meant to be like, that is what virtues we are supposed to hold, through empirical observations—just like we can create normative statements like “wolves hunt in packs” from observation, so too can we determine *human virtue* – that’s Reader.

#### And only I access *moral perception—* Any moral theory is ultimately inaccessible unless we first determine that a situation is in need of moral action. Their framework starts “too far down the road”, moral theories that prescribe action based on rules presuppose moral perception. That means that virtue comes first—it allows people to develop the fine-tuned understanding of their moral environment that is necessary for them to act as ethical agents under the NCs framework because it is focused on promotion of character—that’s Lindemann.

#### Kantianism goes aff—giving adolescents the right to make autonomous medical decisions is key to respecting their dignity as rational agents—any other interp violates side constraints—that’s Hartman.

## Skep

### 1AR—Error Theory

#### Skep is only true if you assume explanatory naturalism—of course ethics isn’t real if you try derive it from a value-free world or practical reason. Explicatory naturalism avoids this by looking to empirical realities to try to determine the purpose of our form—hold them to this standard: if they don’t have indicts of explicatory naturalism, assume it solves.

#### Doesn’t negate-- Skep doesn’t justify the desirability of a competitive post-fiat advocacy, and offense-defense is key to fairness and education, that’s Nelson 8.

#### Skep prevents us from criticizing racism or the Holocaust—that’s an independent reason to reject it.

#### Skepticism is avoided by accepting a margin of error in our moral statements.

Parfit 97(Parfit, Derek 'Reasons and motivation', Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, vol. 71 (1997), pp. 99-130.)

We may not be able to prove that our normative epistemic beliefs are not illusions. We may also be unable to prove that we are not brains in a vat, or being deceived by some demon. But if we claim less than absolute certainty, we can justifiably reject such skeptical views. In arguing that we can know some normative epistemic truths, we must appeal to some of these truths. We must claim that we have reasons to believe that we can respond to reasons. Such arguments are in one way circular, but that does not make them fail. Any justification must end somewhere. Justifications of beliefs can best end with intrinsic credibilities and decisive epistemic reasons. We do not have to show that we have further reasons to believe that we have these reasons, and further reasons to believe that we have these further reasons, and so on forever. Some beliefs seem indubitable, and we seem to have decisive reasons to accept many other beliefs. Nor do we seem to have any strong reason to doubt that we do have such reasons. Given these facts, if we can understand how it might be true that we are responding to such reasons, we can justifiably believe that we are responding to such reasons. We can justifiably believe that there are some truths about what we ought to believe, and that we know some of these truths.

#### Ignore skepticism because non-zero credence in the existence of morality means there’s always a risk of offense in favor of one moral action.

####  Skep is self-defeating.

 **Wedgwood 10** writes[[1]](#footnote-1)

**If there is no objective fact of the matter** about a certain question p, **it is** surely **pointless to** engage in debate about p, trying to **persuade** other **people who disagree** with you about p. (It would be at least as pointless as trying to persuade someone that vanilla ice cream is yummier than chocolate ice cream.) **These** other **people should just ignore your attempts to persuade them** about p. So Leiter’s argument implies that people who are inclined to believe that there are no meaningful questions on which there are “no objective facts” should just ignore any attempt to persuade them that there are questions of this kind. Several of Leiter’s opponents on this issue will be philosophers who are inclined to believe that there are no meaningful questions on which there is no objectively correct answer. (Indeed, I am one of these philosophers myself.) But Leiter’s argument is itself an attempt to persuade the readers of this web site that there are some questions of this kind – namely, moral questions. **So,** it seems, **the** Nietzschean **argument is** effectively **telling its opponents that** it is an argument **that they should** simply **ignore [it]. In this way,** as it seems to me, **the argument is** entirely **self-defeating.**

### 1AR—External World Skep

External world skep is implausible and self-defeating

**Bragues 6** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

Impressive as his synthesis might seem, one wonders whether Rorty actually believes in his own sophism. Beyond a few reflective moments, **not even** the most **enthusiastic anti-objectivists can stop believing that there is** in fact **a world independent of our minds and language** and that it is pretty much the same structure as we sense and describe it. **Nor can they** really **doubt that**, say, **fire causes heat or that unprotected sex with an AIDS-infected individual will cause** the **transmission** of the virus, while sustaining the opinion that such relationships are only narratives we happen to find appealing. It is child’s play randomly to comb Rorty’s works and cite statement after statement in which he does affirm various phenomena as realities. “It is just not true that the sequence of texts which make up the canon of the ontotheological tradition has been imprisoned within a metaphorics . . . unchanged since the Greeks.”8 “It is a familiar fact that the term ‘literary criticism’ has been stretched further and further in the course of our century.”9 “The real and passionate opposition is over the question whether loyalty to our fellow-humans presupposes that there is something permanent.”10 “[M]orality is associated both with human solidarity and tragedy.”11 Telling, too, is how Rorty describes himself as indignant about the extent of greed in our society, repeating the word indignant three times.12 Such strong feelings could hardly be supported if a person truly thought equating greed with vice was just part of a good story, instead of reflecting some fundamental moral reality about the human condition. It is true that **to escape** the **self-referential inconsistency** being alleged here, **of saying “I think it is true that there is no truth,” Rorty would** remind us how his rhetorical stance enables him to **say** instead**: “I’m just selling the idea** that there is no truth**.”** He would also point out that successfully to market his opinions he must work within the dominant worldview of our time, exploiting its tensions by using the very modes of expression that he’s trying to overcome. **Even so, the best salesmen**—and no one can doubt the quality of Rorty’s salesmanship—**believe in the truth of what they are pitching**, leaving us to conclude that Rorty is deceiving himself.

Look at your hands; now back at me. Vote aff.

**Cobb 13** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

G. E. Moore begins the paper by saying that, even though Kant claimed that there could be only one possible proof of the external world (the one Kant gave), to Moore it seems that many perfectly rigorous arguments can be given. Suppose he holds up his right hand and says, “Here is one hand”; and then he holds up his other hand and says, “Here is another hand.” To Moore, this is a perfectly rigorous proof of the proposition “There now exists two hands.” Here is Moore’s argument: **Here is a hand. Here is another hand. Therefore,** there now exists two hands. (3) implies that **an external world exists**, so the argument proves the existence of the external world. **Three things are necessary for a proof** to be considered rigorous: **The premises must be known. The conclusion must be different than the premise**(s). **If the premises are true,** then **the conclusion must be true**. Moore says that **these arguments are met** in the “Here is a hand argument,” **because**: (The First Requirement) When he is holding up one hand and then another, he certainly **he knows that “here is one hand” and “here is another.”** He knows this as well as he knows that he is standing there. Surely there is nothing more certain than that he is holding up his hands. (The Second Requirement) Although he recognizes that there might be some people who would think the conclusion “There exists a hand” to be no different than the premise “Here is a hand,” Moore argues that the conclusion is different from the premise because the conclusion could be true even if the premise is false. (**If he had his hands amputated, “Here is a hand” would be false, but** “There exists a hand” would be true in our world. In fact, **many hands exist**.) **So, the premise and** the **conclusion are not identical**, since one can be true and the other false. (Third Requirement) **If the premise “Here is a hand” is true,** then **surely the conclusion “A hand exists” is true**. Moore says that, if this argument is perfectly rigorous, as he thinks it is, then it should be obvious that many more can be given.

We should be moderate skeptics and recognize that even if neg evidence is correct, acting as if reality is real is inevitable

**Bragues 6** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Yet the moderate skeptic offers a way of acknowledging philosophy’s lack of foundations without having to assume the dangers of Rorty’s rhetorical project. Instead of trying to flee from reason, the skeptic begins by taking seriously the claim made, both by philosophy and common sense, that the mind can grasp truth. The skeptic uses reason to analyze the relations between the facts that are thought to justify commonly made inferences. Except for a few trite observations, however, the skeptic does not find any relations in the realm accessible to our senses that necessitate one fact to follow from another. Reason undermines itself. Thus, **reason shows that** my **having the sensation of the** same **bed** whenever I walk into my bedroom **does not mandate concluding that the bed exists independently of my mind**. Nor does the fact that I have seen a thousand instances of a pool ball hitting another give rise to motion in the impacted ball necessarily mean that the first ball’s movement is the cause of the second. The truth is there is no truth. But this statement ceases to be paradoxical, though not, as Rorty would have it, because one is simply telling a story. Rather, it ceases to be paradoxical because the moderate skeptic understands that statement to only signify the following: there are in fact no significant, inherent connections between the objects of experience. **Having reached this point, though, the moderate skeptic still finds himself with sensations**, desires, and passions **impelling him to make judgments about the world. Sensing it is pointless to fight these natural inclinations, the moderate skeptic forgets about** his **skep**ticism**, accepts the commonsense notion that we are in touch with** a **causally driven reality**, and even, particularly if he is a Humean skeptic, adopts scientific rules of reasoning to better assess the merit of assenting to his sensations and better serve his passions and desires. Where science does not, or cannot, definitively pronounce a verdict, the moderate skeptic will defer to the accumulated experience of humanity, to that which has passed the test of time. As Hume put it, “speculative reasons, which cost so much pains to philosophers, are often form’d by the world naturally, and without reflection.”17 With Edmund Burke, and against postmodernists like Rorty, **the moderate skeptic will thus discern**, amidst the multiplicity and uniqueness of historical events, **a repository of universal** and abiding **insights**, and not just view the past as a scene of utter particularity and contingency.18 All the while, however, the moderate skeptic, whether in appealing to science or history, is very careful in forming his conclusions and is always open to having his views revised by new arguments and experience, ever mindful of the mental limitations uncovered in philosophical analysis. It is in this spirit that the moderate skeptic evaluates democracy.

# Aff—CPs

## Joint Decisionmaking

### 1AR—Joint Decision Making

#### First, Perm: Give adolescents medical decision making autonomy through a joint decisionmaking process—this is not mutually exclusive:

#### Their solvency advocate, Mutcherson, believes in the perm—

#### She says arguments of mutually exclusivity rely upon a faulty conflation of autonomy and independence—*none* of their evidence speaks to why you can’t make autonomous decisions while still being dependent. Any other conception of autonomy makes autonomy impossible because we are all inevitably dependent on others.

#### Second is the Impartiality DA—

#### Ad-hoc and piecemeal approaches to adolescent autonomy in medical decisionmaking like the counterplan fail to solve because adolescents perceive them as unfair and arbitrary—this takes out the development of virtue, only full autonomy allows for moral development. This pre-empts their implementation claims, it’s a question of adolescent perception, not actual implementation.

#### Finally, the counterplan doesn’t access virtue—only full autonomy allows for a true act of giving, outside influence means that the motivation isn’t altruistic—that’s Hartman.

# Aff—DAs

## Vaccine

### 1AR—Vaccine DA

#### Adolescent consent key to vaccine uptake.

English 13 (Abigail English co-investigator on a research project funded by GlaxoSmithKline, Carol Ford, M.D. co-investigator, Jessica Kahn, M.D., co-chair of two HPV vaccine clinical trials, Amy Middleman, research grant funding from Novartis and MedImmune, Adolescent Consent for Vaccination: A Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine”, 2013)//Miro

The currently recommended adolescent vaccines have the potential to greatly improve the health of youth and their contacts by preventing conditions such as: tetanus, pertussis, meningococcal disease, influenza, as well as cervical and other HPV-related cancers in adulthood, and genital warts. However, adolescent vaccine coverage lags behind that for younger children. According to the 2011 National Immunization Survey-Teen, among a cross-sectional sample of 13e17 year olds, 78% had received a single Tdap dose and 71% had received at least one dose of MCV4; approximately half of girls age 13e17 years (53%) had received at least one HPV vaccine dose and only 35% had completed the three-dose vaccine series [3]. In contrast, at least 90% of children 19e35 months of age have received at least one dose of measles/mumps/rubella and varicella vaccine, as well as three doses of DTP/DT/Tdap, Haemophilus influenza type B, hepatitis B, and pneumococcal conjugate vaccine [4]. For some vaccines, additional disparities in adolescent and young adult vaccine coverage by race, ethnicity, and poverty status are present [3]. It is clear that further efforts are needed to reduce barriers and promote vaccination for adolescents. Barriers to vaccination include both individual (teen, parent, or provider) beliefs, such as concerns about vaccine efficacy and safety [5], and inadequate system-level practices that facilitate vaccination [6]. Although beliefs about vaccines may be modified through education, system-level barriers require changes in policies. One barrier to immunizing teens is that many do not present for identified routine preventive health care. For younger patients, vaccines are primarily administered during well-child check-ups. However, surveys have estimated that only 15% of adolescents have an identified annual preventive health visit [7,8]. In addition, a recent study demonstrated that one third of adolescents with continuous enrollment in a large Midwestern health plan had no specifically designated preventive health visits between the ages of 13 and 17 years [9]. On the other hand, most adolescents do have contact with the medical system at least once a year [7e9]. Many teenagers present to their medical home for sports physicals (which can be used as preventive health visits) or for management of acute or chronic medical issues. In addition, teenagers may receive additional care in school-based health centers, family planning clinics, and public health clinics. A requirement to obtain parental consent for vaccination can present a significant barrier to improving adolescent vaccine uptake in both traditional and nontraditional health care settings [10]

#### No impact to disease – they either burn out or don’t spread

Posner ‘5 (Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_kmske/is\_3\_11/ai\_n29167514/pg\_2?tag=content;col1)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extiinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

## Ptx

### 1AR—Politics DA

#### Fiat means the aff happens immediately, so there’s no debate in Congress and no loss of polcap.

#### No shutdown—newest meetings prove.

French 9/17 (Lauren French, covers Congress for POLITICO. “Boehner, Pelosi huddle to talk shutdown strategy”, 09/17/15)//Miro

House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi huddled with Speaker John Boehner Thursday evening to discuss the looming government funding crisis. The roughly 20-minute meeting came after Pelosi had been pressuring him for weeks to start negotiations on legislation that would keep the government open past Sept. 30. Pelosi also met Thursday with President Barack Obama and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) at the White House. The California Democrat told reporters that the two sides were no closer to zeroing in on a budget deal after the meeting and there are no current plans for the two leaders to meet again. "We’re having a conversation about that, in close to how we negotiate," she said. Still, she expressed optimism that "saner heads will prevail" to avert a government shutdown before Oct. 1. Congressional Republicans are currently logjamed over funding for Planned Parenthood with a group of more than 30 conservatives refusing to vote for any spending bill that doesn't strip the health care organization of its federal money. But Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said that proposal is unlikely to pass the Senate meaning that Boehner may have to rely on Democratic votes to pass a continuing resolution. "I’m optimistic that saner heads will prevail, and we will have no shutdown of government, and we will form an agreement to go forth – to include jobs, promote growth, and meet the needs of the American people," Pelosi said. Boehner's office declined to provide details of the meeting. Pelosi also reiterated that she prefers a short-term funding measure that would allow Congress to debate a fuller budget bill.

#### Not intrinsic. A logical policymaker would just pass the plan and also support the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ bill.

#### Political Capital not real – Obama overestimates his influence – Winners win –no spillover

Hirsh 13(Michael, Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to [2012 Decoded](http://decoded.nationaljournal.com/contributors/michael-hirsh). Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital”, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207)

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through.¶ Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years.¶ Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.¶ What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.”¶ As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.¶ Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.¶ The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”¶ The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.¶ Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.¶ But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote.¶ Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of capital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?”¶ Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)¶ And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either.¶ At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country.¶ Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it.¶ The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood.¶ Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.¶ Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington.¶ Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories.¶ In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction.¶ Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.”¶ Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist.¶ After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote.¶ Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.¶ The future is wide open.

#### <<Impact D/Turn>>

# Aff—K

## Gen

### 1AR—Gen K

#### The role of the ballot is to decide whether adolescent medical autonomy is a good idea—that’s Nelson 8

#### 1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

#### 2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

#### 3. Time skew. Their framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

#### These all turn their education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

#### Perm: Do both—no reason we can’t <<do alt>> and affirm adolescent autonomy at the same time.

#### Link turn—struggles for adolescent autonomy are key to <<explain how relates to K>>

Mingus 8 (Mia Mingus, Co-Executive Director, SPARK! Reproductive Justice Now, “ON CLAIMING MY MOVEMENT: DISABILITY AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE”, 2008)//Miro

It is not a coincidence that I ended up working in a movement that is fundamentally rooted in the idea that certain bodies are valuable and others are not; in a movement that is so connected with the world of healthcare and medicine - the reproductive justice movement. Reproductive justice and disability are connected on a deeply fundamental level. Disabled people, issues, history, politics and analysis allow us to see parts of reproductive justice that we would otherwise never know. After all, how can you talk about bodies without talking about disability? How can you ignore the fact that disabled women are often forcibly sterilized or given dangerous contraceptives to control their menstrual cycles for the convenience of their caretakers and institutions? How can we learn to fight for not only the right to receive care, but also the right to refuse it? How can we forget that female bodies were historically coded as “disabled” because they were “different” and had “different abilities” than male bodies? Or that ableism is so easily and successfully used as a mechanism of reproductive oppression? As women of color, people with disabilities, LGBTI and queer people, and survivors of violence and trauma, the struggle to claim our bodies for ourselves--in all of our bodies’ curious, strange, beautiful and glorious ways--cannot be separated from reproductive justice. As communities whose bodies have been owned, experimented on, institutionalized, hospitalized, medicalized, colonized, imprisoned, enslaved and controlled, we have been told that our bodies are wrong, perverse, shameful, bad, and most importantly; that our bodies are not ours; that they belong to the state, our parents, husbands, partners, doctors, children, families, communities, god(s), and so on. I grew out of a very strong feminist, women of color, activist, close-knit community working to end violence against women and children. Early on, I learned about sexism, racism, economic injustice and homophobia; that there was no hierarchy of oppression; that systems of oppression were connected to each other, intersected and overlapped. Despite such a strong framework, no one ever taught me to think of disability in the same way and connect it to being Asian American, a woman, young or queer. No one ever taught me that being disabled was a powerful way to move through the world or that disabled communities had rich and vibrant cultures of their own. I was taught to claim my body as a girl, female, and woman, but not as a disabled person. When it came to my disability, my parents looked to doctors, healthcare providers, medical experts and brace makers. I was not the expert on my body; they were. It never occurred to anyone that the ability to claim my body as a girl was dependent on my ability to claim my disabled body as a disabled girl. No one ever realized that my experiences with the medical industrial complex as a disabled child would ultimately discourage me from seeking medical services (reproductive or not) in the future - or that standing in my underwear in front of male doctors as they studied me was any different than standing in my underwear in front of any old men as they studied me. Growing up disabled, my body profoundly affected how I viewed the world and in turn, how the world viewed me. School became a site where the politics of beauty, disability, race, sexuality and gender collided. I never saw disabled women (let alone disabled women of color) in powerful roles, being desired or desiring, raising families or claiming their disability as a political identity, rather than an individual flaw or tragedy. One of my earliest memories of consciously claiming my body for myself was deciding not to wear my brace any more. For years I wore a brace on my right leg; I had to get them re-made or re-fitted almost every year as I grew out of them. I had some that went from my foot to my knee and some that went all the way up to my hip. For a long time I did not question my brace. It was just the way things were, like stairs, people staring at me when I walked, or feeling ashamed of my disability. Among many things, my braces were hot (often made of plastic and or fiberglass), and in the Virgin Islands Caribbean weather, they itched, pinched my skin, and gave me painful blisters which I would try to prevent by wearing more socks or padding. Like my parents, I had come to believe that I “needed” to wear my brace. But something began to change as I entered middle school. I began to ask questions: why should I have to wear something so painful everyday that is supposed to “help” me? If they can send a man to the moon, then surely they can make a comfortable and useful brace for my leg? In the beginning I had small acts of resistance: the daily morning fight about putting my brace on or bringing a change of shoes and changing out of it once I was at school--this went on for years. Finally I was “allowed” to not wear my brace some days, and it was not until I was in college that I was able to choose not to wear my brace everyday. For me, my brace represented the medical establishment’s grubby little hands on my body, forcing me to adhere to a standardized, able bodied norm of how bodies are supposed to be, look, act and move. When I wore it, I could hear horrible brace maker’s voices in my head, “that’s an ugly walk,” “walk down the hallway again and this time, try and make it prettier,” “this brace will make you have a normal walk,” or “don’t worry, you’ll be able to hide the brace under your clothes--boys won’t even know it’s there.” It represented years of someone else deciding what was best for my body and the invasion (physical and mental) of my body at a young age by people who never asked me what I thought about having multiple surgeries done at the same time; how I felt being told that my body was “wrong” and “something to fix” over and over again. All that time, I never knew that there was a whole movement out there of disabled people demanding justice and human rights. The ownership and entitlement of the medical industrial complex of my disabled body is, in my mind, no worse than the ownership and entitlement of the system of white supremacy of my body of color; or the system of male supremacy of my female body. In fact, they are so connected and mutually interdependent that they are impossible to separate. Claiming my body has been and continues to be a pivotal process in my own life. Knowing and learning to understand my disabled body as powerful, beautiful, valuable and desirable has been central to my activism in the reproductive justice movement. For me, reproductive justice will always include a radical analysis of disability and ableist supremacy because they are part of each other and they are a part of me.

#### AC framework is a pre-req: We can never transform the <<oppressive conditions that the critique describes>> unless agents first have a moral perception that there is a problem and moral motivation to act upon it—the alternative is ethical egoism which only replicates the critiques impacts. Unless we first promote virtue, the <<alternative>> will never kick into gear—that’s Lindemann

#### <<Line by line>>

### 2AC—Radical Democracy

#### Statism is inevitable—innovative engagement can redirect power for emancipation

Martin and Pierce ’13 Deborah G. Martin, Joseph Pierce, “Reconceptualizing Resistance: Residuals of the State and Democratic Radical Pluralism,” Antipode, Vol. 45, Issue 1, pp. 61-79, January 2013, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.00980.x

The state offers a complex set of power structures against and with which resistance struggles (Holloway 2005; Scott 1988; Tormey 2004). Indeed, Holloway (2005) sees the state as so entrenched in power relations such that any resistance in or through the state is irrevocably bound up in its power logic. We acknowledge state power as always present, but not necessarily as monolithic.2 Despite—or perhaps because of— the power relations inherent in state frameworks, it is in part through laws and state regulations that activists can achieve reworked economic relations such as worker ownership, community banks, or cooperative housing (DeFilippis 2004). Hackworth explicitly acknowledges the possibility of a “neo-Keynesian” resistance which seeks to maintain relatively left-leaning state functions. Ultimately, though, he dismisses the resistive potential of such “neo-Keynesian” efforts, arguing that they have yielded “highly limited” successes (2007:191). We argue, however, that focusing on a state's ordering functions [the “police” component of states; as in Rancière (2004)] may provide a lens for examining how resistance through the state might destabilize or subvert neoliberal hegemony. We articulate the notion of residuals, or mechanisms of the state that can, or have historically, been wielded to mitigate inequalities of capitalism. In order to explore this arena as potentially productive for resistance, we first consider radical democracy as an already-articulated conceptualization of neoliberal resistance (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Purcell 2008). Radical democracy does not seek to enroll the state in resistance to capital, per se, but recognizes the simultaneous co-presence of a hegemonic (but always changing) state, and anti-hegemonic resistances. Radical Democracy: Responding to Hegemony? The concept of radical democracy provides a framework for articulating where residual state apparatuses stand amidst the myriad layers of state functions, power, and hegemony (cf Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Rancière 2004). We imagine a politics in which the state –whether capitalist or not— is always hegemonic, and thus always produces an outside or excluded that is resistant to the hegemonic order. Radical democracy as initially described by Laclau and Mouffe (1985) offered a theory of resistance—although they did not use that term—to capitalist hegemonies.3 Their goal was to identify a leftist, anti-hegemonic political project that did not rely on unitary categories such as class, in response to the identity politics of the 1970s to 1990s and post-structural theorizing of the absence of any common (structural or cultural) basis for political transformation. The theory of radical democracy posits that any order is an hegemonic order; the post-Marxist socialist project of Laclau and Mouffe seeks to destabilize the hegemonies of capitalism and work towards more democratic articulations that marginalize capital, even as forms of inequality may persist (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Nonetheless, they can seek more articulations, more opportunities for social protest and struggle over multiple inequalities. Each struggle will produce—or seek to produce—new orders, or hegemonies, but these will be unseated by other struggles; this process describes a democracy not defined solely by a capitalist hegemony. As scholars have increasingly taken neoliberalism as the distinct form of contemporary capitalism in response to which resistance is engaged, they have explored the ways that its intense market logic constricts possibilities for traditional political activism to engage the state: the state is responsive primarily to the logic of facilitating the work of private capital (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Harvey 2005; Mitchell 2003; Peck and Tickell 2002; Purcell 2008). At the same time, however, neoliberalism opens possibilities for resistance because of its internal contradictions (like all hegemonic orders); it simultaneously engages the state to facilitate capital expansion, yet rhetorically rejects the state as an active player in market logics (Leitner, Peck and Sheppard 2007; Peck and Tickell 2002; Purcell 2008). In doing so, the door is opened for alternative projects and resistances. Purcell (2008) takes up the ideals of radical democracy to focus on how it might provide specific means for resistance to neoliberalism. He wants to take the insights of Laclau and Mouffe and apply them to a particular, empirically informed framework for engaged activism that actually interrupts, if not challenges (and mostly not, in his examples), neoliberalism. As a result, Purcell engages specifically with the idea of “chains of equivalence”, which he defines as “entities [which] must simultaneously be both different and the same” (2008:74). Political coalitions and actors with shared or complimentary challenges to neoliberalism—but distinct in character, goals, and identities—form networks of equivalence [Purcell (2008), drawing from Hardt and Negri (2004) as well as Laclau and Mouffe (1985)]. Simply put, networks of equivalence conceptually allow for multiple groups with different specific interests and identities to band together to challenge the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism. The crucial point for Purcell, however, and the key radical pluralist component is that those groups can work together without having to resolve their internal differences; they need only share a common questioning of the neoliberal prioritizing of private capital. They share a struggle, then, for a different hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Purcell 2008). In the battle against global finance, for example, activists with different specific interests (agriculture or trade policy or environmental protections) confront the state in the form of police in the streets of Seattle or Cancun (Wainwright 2007); their objections are to the state policies and agreements which support and create frameworks for world trade. In Purcell's (2008) networks of equivalence in Seattle, a similar, yet more spatially circumscribed network of neighborhood community activists, environmental activists, and a Native American tribe work together to challenge the terms of the environmental clean-up of toxins in and around the Duwamish River. Their target is the corporate interests being held responsible for actually funding the clean-up. The agent helping to hold the corporate interests accountable is the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Seattle area environmental activists have been able to form a “chain of equivalence” with the EPA in the Duwamish clean-up in part by inserting themselves into an EPA framework that seeks stakeholder input through a participatory planning structure. The shared interests of the EPA and environmental activists are not obvious or easy to negotiate; the EPA, as a bureaucracy with many actors situated within the US federal system, is positioned as a complex institutional agent. But its particular mandate with regard to environmental protection offers a difficult relation to capital, one sometimes allied with non-state actors seeking limits to capital. Purcell's (2008) account of this case is insightful and engaging. We are highly sympathetic to his project of conceptualizing resistance and, by connection, a better, more complete democracy. But we differ over some of the details—essential details—of how best to enact successful resistances. In his case study of the Duwamish River clean up in Seattle, Purcell (2008) cites government policies as the factor enabling community resistance and involvement. His account is historically detailed—and necessarily so, for the complexities of the state have everything to do with the sedimented and sometimes inherently contradictory nature of its policies and procedures. In brief, he points to the EPA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (also known as “Superfund”), and associated environmental laws as a sort of “environmental Keynesianism” that the federal government enacted in the decade of the 1970s (through 1980) (Purcell 2008:137). For Purcell, the neoliberalisation of these laws is evident in the increasing local devolution of governance authority over particular Superfund sites, including his case of the Duwamish River, resulting in “a proliferation of ad hoc and special purpose entities [that] increasingly carries out the everyday decision-making in Superfund cleanups” (2008:137). At the same time, however, Purcell (2008:138) acknowledges “that such ‘flexibilization’ … tends to create political opportunities that social movements can exploit”. We want to engage the idea that such flexible—or Keynesian—tools of the state are levers that can force the state to act in ways that might be counter to capital and in the service of greater democracy. In particular, we hope for a more complex, and, we expect, more practically productive conceptualization of resistance in relation to the state. While Purcell (2008:38, 183, note 2,2) acknowledges resistive possibilities from engagement with the state, he also notes that “the state is fully imbricated in the project of neoliberalization” (a point also made elsewhere; cf Harvey 2005; Holloway 2005; Mitchell 2003; Smith 1996; Wainwright 2007). We do not disagree with the basic contention that the state regulates and administers a hegemonic political economic order of and for capital. But the state is complex; following the persuasive arguments of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and the example of the EPA in Purcell (2008), the state ought to be conceptualized like any actor: as multifaceted, with many possible subjectivities in relation to any particular conflict. This complexity offers the possibility that the state can be a tool for resistance, one we explore further in the rest of this paper.

### 1AR—Radical Democracy

#### State engagement is key to radicalism—that’s Martin and Pierce

#### Power is contradictory—reformulations of state power can resist market domination by exploiting its constitutive excesses—key to the K

#### Key to coalitions—the alt remains politically isolated—the perm leverages imperfect alliances towards justice

#### We control uniqueness—politics is always influenced by power—it’s only a matter of how we use it

#### This is most methodologically responsible

McGuirk and O’Neill ’12 Pauline McGuirk and Phillip O'Neill, “Critical Geographies with the State: The Problem of Social Vulnerability and the Politics of Engaged Research,” Antipode, Volume 44, Issue 4, pages 1374–1394, September 2012, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00976.x

Critical geography has been said to have a tradition of being “better at mapping current dystopias than mapping utopic alternatives” (Blomley 2007:56) and inclined towards “denunciatory analyses that repeatedly come to the same conclusions about the position of the powerless and the oppressed” (Ferguson 2009:166). Of course, many critical geographies have moved beyond these characterisations through diverse forms of critical praxis. From our perspective, such praxis cannot ignore engagement with states. States are terrains of contradiction and contestation, invested with intense institutional capacity to mobilise and propel diverse political projects (Larner, Le Heron and Lewis 2007; O'Neill and Moore 2005). The colonisation of the state by neoliberal policy forms and principles, and the mobilisation of particular texts, technologies and practices to enact these, must be recognised. But by equal measure we must recognise the possibility of mobilising alternative texts, technologies and practices towards progressive ends through the agency of state institutions. Thus, we argue that states must remain centred in our conversations and our praxis, rather than being sectioned out as systemically tainted or as overwhelmed by unpalatable political rationalities. As a contested terrain, progressive potentialities emerge naturally within the state apparatus. Progressive potentialities also emerge as the state changes, and there is growing evidence of the state's propensity to forge a different type of engagement with society. Giddens (eg 2006, 2007a, 2007b), for instance, makes claims for the arrival of a new political agenda focused on the dramatic social transformations and polarisations of prosperity in knowledge-based, services economies. He identifies a new European state intervention model where there is a shift away from income insurance and general state support towards interventions designed to inculcate successful personal risk management behaviours with social disadvantage best alleviated through life skills development and management programs delivered by the state apparatus through a package of sanctions and incentives. Clearly there is an analytical task in plotting and interpreting such changes. But there is also the opportunity to engage, contest and alter the course of these changes by actions within. In terms of practices for pursuing critical engagement, then, we have high lighted collaboration and the strategic development and deployment of texts and technologies. These are means whereby we can position ourselves as critical geographers in the formulation and operationalisation of progressive state interventions. Such research engagement is not confined to producing outcomes aimed solely at enhancing a narrowed list of modest state goals but, in line with critical theory, it enables exploration of the production of state-based knowledge, texts and metrics, including how these inform and enlarge state practices and the ends to which they are put.8 Importantly, they can involve the instillation of efficient and effective practices within state institutions so that progressive objectives are more often attained. We have an ongoing concern that only neoliberalist accounts of the state seem to worry publicly about state efficiency and effectiveness and support technologies for their advancement. As we argue elsewhere, the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness within the state apparatus does not have to be a neoliberalist act, these having been the objectives of reformers throughout history, be they of the right or the left. Most notably in an Australian context, making efficiency and effectiveness upfront concerns of state agencies was seen by iconic reformer H. G. “Nugget” Coombs as essential to the operation of a public service committed to equitable outcomes for itself and for society at large (see O'Neill and Moore 2005). Finally, the politics of critical research with the state are always uncertain, however well intentioned. The uncertain terrain of engagement demands that we navigate complex political situations and inevitably accept pragmatic, contingent compromise (see Woods and Gardner 2011). These demand critical reflection and that we remain clear eyed about what is possible in any given engagement. The SDAP, for example, was a moment of experimentation that could point to the shifts in governance practices, technologies and texts needed to enact more responsive and equitable ways of governing communities threatened with social vulnerability (see Healey 2004). To take hold, these practices will need to survive the ongoing contestations that define state institutions and produce embedded performances of governance. Nothing is guaranteed. Despite such uncertainties, critical research with the state cannot be discounted as a space for the production of critical geographies.

### AT: State Bad

#### The state is radically contestable—internal contradiction belies the possibility for progressive redirection

McGuirk and O’Neill ’12 Pauline McGuirk and Phillip O'Neill, “Critical Geographies with the State: The Problem of Social Vulnerability and the Politics of Engaged Research,” Antipode, Volume 44, Issue 4, pages 1374–1394, September 2012, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00976.x

Poststructural theorisations suggest the impossibility of an essentialist or generalist state theory and argue for theorisations of states as peopled and dispersed, and as multiscalar, relational and assembled networks (Ferguson 2009; Painter 2006). Poststructural states are conceived not as pre-existing entities but as an effect of processes of discursive and practical production and spatial operationalisation (Kuss and Agnew 2008). While they can appear as actors with a more-than-provisional identity and coherency, such subjectivity belies their existence as fields of multi-vocal and multi-scalar, cross-cutting and conflicting interests (Clark and Dear 1984; Robertson 2010). For all this, state power—as a dispersed, fragmented and fractured event—is no less formidable (see Whitehead 2008:416). So we are comfortable with poststructural state theory as “weak” theory in which states are recognised as resolutely hybrid and multilayered, resistant to a common, singular rationality, driven by diverse ideologies, and holding on to multiple political projects and motivations mobilised simultaneously. Central to our argument in this paper is that such a view of the state means that aspirations, technologies and practices identifiable as neoliberal and as social democratic, disciplinary and progressive, can be embedded together in diverse programs and at different scales across state operations. We see states as cross-cut with intense fractures and conflicts expressed across scales, agencies and actors, as multiple strategies, texts and technologies jostle in the performance of administration and governance. In this complexity, governance capacity itself emerges through experimentation that might be as prone to failure, inefficiency and unintended consequences as it is to the achievement of specific political objectives. States are always in play, then, but are subject to reconstruction by the changing discourses, technologies and practices of governing. This view of the state as varied networks of governance programs involving numerous sites and scales does not lessen the presence, materiality and capacity of the “real” state institutions which comprise “the state apparatus” (see Clark 1992). While being relationally composed, state institutions have enduring institutional and regulatory forms and established mechanisms and technologies for their various projects. And these projects may well be contradictory in nature, arising both from the need to secure accumulation outcomes for capital (thereby entrenching inequalities) and from the desire to preserve public social services and advance progressive social interventions (thereby contesting inequalities). Indeed, for Offe (1984, 1985), state institutions are sites defined by the resolution of contests arising from these contradictory impulses. We would add that these contests are invariably played out in contexts of ongoing fiscal insufficiency and public sector obstinacy in addressing internal inefficiencies and purposelessness (see O'Neill and Moore 2005). So, like with any institution, state institutional capacity precipitates from its repeated practices, and the logics, rules, norms, technologies and waste that underpin them (see Gibson-Graham and O'Neill, 2001). But because this capacity arises in a field of contestation, it can never be ascribed to a singular rationality, harnessed to a single political project, or controlled by central direction, neoliberalised or otherwise (see Peck, Theodore and Brenner 2010; Robertson 2010). Indeed, by positing a specific resolution to sets of claims, state action is always contested by unsatisfied claims. Nothing is ever neatly resolved. Notwithstanding neoliberalism's reworking of states’ operations, then, state capacity for progressive social and redistributive interventions remains; and the practices, technologies and texts which mobilise progressive interventions are always available to be amplified. Thus states, and particularly the resources and agency of their institutions, should remain centred in our critical conversations and, more challengingly, in our critical praxis. Detached observation, however important, is insufficient. The question for critical geographies is how—rather than whether—we can intersect with the production of practices, technologies and texts through which the capacity for progressive interventions can be enhanced and operationalised.

### 2AC—AT: FW General

#### Normative advocacy outweighs methodological coherence

Wetzstein ’12 Steffen Wetzstein, “Grasping a Historical Moment: Western Societal Challenges, Self-referential Academic Knowledge Production, and Renewed Political Commitment,” Antipode, Volume 44, Issue 3, pages 560–563, June 2012, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.00993.x

One way out of academia's current societal leadership dilemma might be to actively seek cross-disciplinary and cross-theoretical alignments, alliances and collaborations around a renewed commitment to being political. In a post-political world (Swyngedouw 2009), the common denominator could be a real concern again with the material bases of people's lives. For me, this agenda would include—in fact urgently call for—an engaged and respectful dialogue between different critical political economy strands. Imagine, for example, if Marxist-inspired thinking (focus: materially determined class-based power relationships/politics of resistance), post-structural political economy (focus: broader sets of materially and discursively rooted power relationships/politics of emergence; Wetzstein and Le Heron 2010), more “practical” intellectual social justice movements such as Christian Social Teachings (focus: individual human dignity and just society, eg adequate work conditions and remunerations), and newer intellectual departures on “human flourishing” (focus: holistic view of human and societies’ needs, eg broader value of human work; Gasper 2009) could enter into serious conversations, co-operations and output production in search for alternative reference points for human awareness, understanding and aspiration. The point is to purposively create new academic platforms by looking to political commitment first rather than to philosophical, theoretical or methodological compatibilities. Such a normatively based collaborative intellectual strategy at least holds the promise to destabilise the tightly policed framings of societal problems and solutions by our consensus-fetishising managerial-technocratic elite and, crucially, put alternative framings into circulation. If the “crossroads” interpretation of the current historical moment is correct, then the majority of us have to materially lose more than to gain in the future. We are thus more likely to hold on to what we have, what we know, and who we know. In such a conservative, yes potentially dangerous historical epoch, the currently practised number-reifying and largely self-referential intellectual engagement in academia that often serves our financial masters rather than society at large must be challenged. It is therefore time to seriously contemplate a renewed academic commitment across disciplines to being political; in a normative, people-focused and alternative-promoting sense. Where will new progressive and human-centred societal reference points for making sense of life, re-prioritising goals, making decisions and negotiating trade-offs come from? Will academics be amongst them?

### 2AC—Walt

#### Empirical academic discourse is key to politics—the alt theoretical isolationism decimates applicability

Walt ’12 Stephen M. Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, “Theory and Policy in International Relations: Some Personal Reflections,” Yale Journal of International Affairs, September 2012, http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/theory-and-policy-in-international-relations-some-personal-reflections-by-stephen-m-walt/

Despite these limitations, academic scholars -- including IR theorists -- have at least three useful roles to play in the broader public discourse on international affairs. First, those who have thought longest and hardest about the nature of modern world politics can help their fellow citizens make sense out of our "globalized" world. Ordinary people often know a great deal about local affairs, but understanding what is happening overseas generally requires relying on the knowledge of specialists. For this reason alone, university-based academics should be actively encouraged to write for and speak to broader audiences, instead of engaging solely in a dialogue with each other. Second, an engaged academic community is an essential counterweight to governmental efforts to manipulate public perceptions. Governments have vastly greater access to information than most (all?) citizens do, especially when it comes to foreign and defense policy, and public officials routinely exploit these information asymmetries to advance their own agendas. Because government officials are fallible, society needs alternative voices to challenge their rationales and suggest different solutions. Academic scholars are protected by tenure and not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, so they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and conventional wisdoms. For these reasons, a diverse and engaged academic community is integral to healthy democratic politics. Third, the scholarly community also offers a useful model of constructive debate. Although scholarly disputes are sometimes heated, they rarely descend to the level of ad hominem attack and character assassination that increasingly characterizes political discourse today. Indeed, academics who use these tactics in a scholarly article would probably discredit themselves rather than their targets. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in contemporary public life.

### 1AR—Walt

#### Scholarship is useless if it’s not shaped to provide practical responses to pressing public issues—extend Walt—advocacies should be weighed according to their ease of implementation and directness of intellectual justification

#### Public passivity is inevitable—accessible policy scholarship checks governmental and media dogma

#### Specificity is key to practical implementation—only way to avoid cooption or marginalization

### AT: Unethical

#### Calls for state action act upon an ethics of social responsibility that can’t be reduced to the evils of the state

Staeheli ’12 Lynn A. Staeheli, “THE 2011 ANTIPODE AAG LECTURE Whose Responsibility Is It? Obligation, Citizenship and Social Welfare,” Antipode, published online 7/25/2012, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01026.x

Finally, in undertaking such explorations, we should avoid pre-judging the political stance taken by activists. The politics of care is not unified, in the sense of activists understanding care in the same ways. Furthermore, acting on the politics of care often involves conflict and dissent. The activists who tried to force the state to meet its obligations were not interested in consensus; they were fighting for social transformation, but their visions of what transformation entailed differed. Many of them believe they are involved in actions that deepen democracy and justice in the places they live, and they do so by challenging the state. In pursuing politics of care and obligation, many activists also pursue an insurgent politics they hope will unsettle the status quo. In answering the question “whose responsibility is it?”, they hope to disrupt the politics of responsibility talk and force the recognition of a public responsibility. Extending the comments from the activist in Denver, Mama may have told some of the activists to engage in politics, but it is a politics that insists on a public responsibility—and obligation—from which we cannot disengage.

### AT: Anarchism

#### Anarchistic scholarship double turns itself—causes political irrelevance and trades off with substantive engagement

Gordon ’12 Uri Gordon, “Anarchist Geographies and Revolutionary Strategies,” Antipode, Volume 44, Issue 5, pages 1742–1751, November 2012, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01036.x

The anarchademic enterprise, to use the terms suggested by Anthony Ince (2012) in this issue, distinctly involves its own process of territorialization. As anarchist academics squat various compartments of the intellectual establishment, we demarcate discursive space, marking turf through acts of bordering which separate ours from other cross-disciplinary perspectives—perhaps most prominently from Marxism, but also from any explicitly or implicitly statist variations of feminism, anti-racism, postcolonial studies, queer theory, and so on. This process is almost always noticeable alongside any substantive discussion of theories and case studies. On the more theoretical end of the enterprise, the postanarchist project has involved its own explicit act of bordering, this time between itself and the allegedly modernist and humanist tenets of the “anarchist tradition” (Newman 2001; but see Jun 2011). Being reflexive about the power-play we are engaging in within the professional intellectual establishment should also lead us to more troubling questions about the point of the exercise as a whole. That intellectual satisfaction is an insufficient rationale for anarchist intellectual labour seems to me uncontroversial. Is then the professional intellectual establishment a site of struggle in its own right? To be sure, most of the people who write for academic journals also have the opportunity of contact with students, whose critical thinking and openness to radical perspectives can be encouraged (and encouraging to see). Furthermore, as Rouhani (2012) argues in this issue, the tradition of anarchist pedagogy has much to contribute to our efforts to make the classroom experience itself a site of prefiguration, encouraging modes of learning that are “anti-hierarchical, non-coercive, autonomous and cooperative”. Struggles in the academic workplace, in which many of us are part-time, adjunct or otherwise precarious employees, are another area in which we can bring our politics to bear, alongside solidarity with students’ struggles over tuition fees and campus policing (Cause Commune 2012; Various 2012). But what of the core of original intellectual labour—researching, writing, and publishing? While the flowering of anarchist scholarship may be thought of as an intervention in the battle of ideas, it also runs the risk of irrelevance to wider political aims. Consider the process of neutralization-through-academization that western Marxism succumbed to from the 1970s onward. Is anarchism likely to go through the same process? To put things sardonically, our best defence against co-optation is the scant influence that anarchist academics have on the wider movement, making us less of an attractive target. On the one hand this derives from the nature of the anarchist intellectual enterprise itself: unlike its Marxist counterpart, it does not espouse claims to objectivity and scientific validity which inform, as well as divide, the “rank and file”. But on the other hand, the cause may also be circumstantial: if we are not enough of a threat to warrant co-optation, is it simply because nobody is listening?

### Pluralism Good

#### The radical chaos of the world demands theory which is honest about its own conceptual fragility—this means being willing to shed theoretical purity and intervening in specific struggles for political improvement

Connolly ’12 William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Steps toward an Ecology of Late Capitalism,” Theory & Event, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2012, Muse

Today we inhabit a world in which the fragility of things—from the perspective of the endurance and quality of life available to the human estate in its entanglements with other force-fields—becomes apparent while the categories and sensibilities through which we habitually come to grips with the world make it difficult to fold that sense deeply into theory and practice. Sixty-five million years ago, body surfing on a few favorable force-fields, two smart dinosaurs, interpreting the world through an efficient concept of cause and a simple metric of probability within a fixed set of possibilities, examined past trends and tendencies to gauge the probable future of their species. Their favorable assessment missed the huge asteroid hurtling toward them, set on its own tier of time. Nor did they realize that a massive volcano was about to erupt in India. Dinosaurs were smarter and more adaptable (more brightly colored, too) than they were said to be when I studied them as a young boy, but still not perhaps sensitive enough to the cosmos in which they were set. Is neoliberal political economy a dinosaur science?15 Neoliberal ideology is organized around the simplicity of a two slot system: self-organizing markets with beautiful powers of rational self-adjustment and states as clumsy agents of collective decision. It thus inflates the self-organizing power of markets by implicitly deflating the self-organizing powers and capacities of metamorphosis of all other systems. And it treats the state as necessarily clumsy and inept by comparison to its singular, utopian image of markets. It protects this ideological combination in part by downplaying the self-organizing powers of multiple other systems highly relevant to the performance of economic markets and states. Other familiar theories of political economy also deflate the importance of nonhuman force fields. True, Marx flirted with an aleatory image of nature in Epicurus before scrapping it.16 And some post-Marxists now reach in that direction. But, still, the fragility of the late modern order seems insufficiently articulated in radical theory today. Is that because radical theorists fear that coming to terms with fragility would undercut the political militance needed to respond to it? Perhaps. The issue, at least, is real, since a focus on the fragility of things is often associated with a drive to conserve what we already have. My sense, however, is that the contemporary condition requires both appreciation of the real fragility of things and political action on multiple fronts to act with resolution to change our patterns of identity, investment, consumption, income distribution, energy use, health care and the like. This, to me, is the living paradox of our time to engage and negotiate rather than a contradiction that vitiates one reading of the contemporary condition.

#### Intervening in the state is not weak reformism, but radical experimentation. Predetermining the government as an impenetrable structure repeats the worst of structuralist irresponsibility by needlessly bracketing leftist politics into irrelevance.

Connolly ’12 William E. Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Steps toward an Ecology of Late Capitalism,” Theory & Event, Vol. 15, Issue 1, 2012, Muse

A philosophy attending to the acceleration, expansion, irrationalities, interdependencies and fragilities of late capitalism suggests that we do not know with confidence, in advance of experimental action, just how far or fast changes in the systemic character of neoliberal capitalism can be made. The structures often seem solid and intractable, and indeed such a semblance may turn out to be true. Some may seem solid, infinitely absorptive, and intractable when they are in fact punctuated by hidden vulnerabilities, soft spots, uncertainties and potential lines of flight that become apparent as they are subjected to experimental action, upheaval, testing, and strain. Indeed, no ecology of late capitalism, given the variety of forces to which it is connected by a thousand pulleys, vibrations, impingements, dependencies, shocks and thin threads, can specify with supreme confidence the solidity or potential flexibility of the structures it seeks to change. The strength of structural theory, at its best, was in identifying institutional intersections that hold a system together; its conceit, at its worst, was the claim to know in advance how resistant those intersections are to potential change. Without adopting the opposite conceit, it seems important to pursue possible sites of strategic action that might open up room for productive change. Today it seems important to attend to the relation between the need for structural change and identification of multiple sites of potential action. You do not know precisely what you are doing when you participate in such a venture. You combine an experimental temper with the appreciation that living and acting into the future inevitably carries a shifting quotient of uncertainty with it. The following tentative judgments and sites of action may be pertinent.

#### Adopting particular poststructural frameworks produces theoretical blindness which cannot acknowledge objects which pre-exist its symbolic foundations—this is anthropocentric and silly—mixing differing modes of critique solves

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, teaches philosophy at Collin College, “RSI, Discursivity, Critique, and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 7/18/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/rsi-discursivity-critique-and-politics/

So in response to a previous post, a lot of folks gave me grief about the following passage: I do think, however, that OOO can problematize our current political thought and open new avenues of political engagement and theorization. As it stands, cultural studies is dominated by a focus on the discursive. We hear endless talk about signs, signifiers, “positions” or positionality, narratives, discourses, ideology, etc. Basically we see the world as a fetishized text to be decoded and debunked. None of this should, of course, be abandoned, but I do think we’re encountering its limitations. In the few years I’ve been writing on these issues, I’ve been surprised to discover just how hard it is to get people to sense that there is a non-discursive power of things; a form of power that is not about signs, ideology (as text), beliefs, positions, narratives, and so on. It’s as if these things aren’t on the radar for most social and political theorists. I get the sense that the reason for this has something to do with what Heidegger diagnosed in his analysis of the ready-to-hand. Heidegger argues that when the ready-to-hand is working it becomes invisible. We don’t notice it. It recedes into the background. Us academics live in worlds that work pretty well as far as material infrastructure goes. We are, for the most part, in a world where things work: food is available, electricity and water function, we have shelter, etc. As a consequence, all this disappears from view and we instead focus on cultural texts because often this is a place where things aren’t working. In response to these remarks, I was told that 1) of course no one has the naive belief that everything is text (what a relief! of course, the question is whether this belief registers itself in theoretical practice), and 2) that, in fact, these things are all the rage in the world of theory. I’m well aware that there is a tradition of theorists that don’t fit this mold, and perpetually refer to many of these theorists in my own work. Theorists that come to mind are figures such as Haraway, Stengers, Latour, Kittler, Ong, McLuhan, Elizabeth Grosz, Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, Karen Barad, Kevin Sharpe, Jennifer Andersen et al, Cathy Davidson, Braudel, DeLanda, Pickering, etc. They exist. The point is not that they don’t exist, but that these forms of theory, I think, have been rather marginal in the academy; especially philosophy. In discussing these things, I’m not making some claim to being absolutely original or to be originating something full cloth. I’m more than happy to play some small role in bringing attention to these things; things that I believe to be neglected. I think, for example, that the new materialist feminists predate OOO/SR by 5-10 years, have many points of overlap with OOO, and have not nearly gotten the attention that they deserve. I think Latour and Stengers are almost entirely invisible in the world of philosophy conferences and departments; and I think that there are systematic reasons for this pertaining to the history of continental theory coming out of German idealism, the linguistic turn, and phenomenology. In German idealism you get a focus on spirit and the transcendental structure of mind. In the linguistic turn, you get a focus on how signifiers and signs inform our relation to reality (for example, Lacan’s famous observation that the difference between the men’s room and lady’s room results from the signifier in “The Agency of the Letter”, and Barthes’ claim that language is a primary modeling system in The Fashion System). In phenomenology you get a focus on the lived experience of the cogito, Dasein, or lived body and how it “constitutes” (Husserl’s language, not mine) the objects of its intentions. read on! In each instance we get a focus on the differences that humans are contributing, with a relative indifference to the differences that non-humans contribute. Material entities, as Alaimo observes in Bodily Natures, are treated as blank screens for human intentions, language, concepts, signs. The metaphor of the screen is here important, for a screen is that which contains no difference of its own beyond being a smooth and white surface, and is therefore susceptible to whatever we might wish to project upon it with a camera. This has been the dominant mode of theorizing that I’ve encountered in the last decade in my discipline of philosophy (and I have a fair background in rhetoric and literary theory as well). Phenomenology and the linguistic turn, I think, are the dominant positions represented at SPEP, for example, the main professional conference for continental philosophy (though thankfully things are beginning to change). When it is said that something is “dominant”, the claim is not that nothing different from it exists, but merely that a certain style of theorizing enjoys hegemony among that population. In media studies, I think, the situation is better. I think it’s better in geography as well. It depends on what population of theorists we’re looking at (a point entailed, incidentally, by my thesis that signifiers are material entities that must travel throughout populations). The point is not to get rid of these modes of analysis. I believe they’ve made tremendous contributions that ought to be preserved and continued (I say as much in the introduction to The Democracy of Objects). My instinct is never to abolish or extinguish, but to integrate and see how we can have both. And. And. And. The point is that theories are frames, windows, and like all windows, they bring some things into relief and obscure other things. I can only see what is in the window and not what is outside of the window. If my theoretical practice is focused on accounting for norms and the role that norms play in binding us together, then it’s likely that I’ll ignore the role that lab equipment plays or that the real properties of rice play in binding people together in particular ways. If I spend my time interpreting cultural artifacts like movies, comic books, and clothing styles, it’s likely I’ll have a hard time seeing the importance of roads, rivers, and fiber optic cables. If I’m focused on narratives and the stories we tell, then I’ll probably have a difficult time discerning the material effects of Hurricane Katrina on the people of New Orleans. If I focus on the critique of ideology, then I’ll probably have a difficult time seeing the power that arrangements of things exercise over us. If I focus on systems of categorization in say the discourse of mental health as in the case of Foucault’s Order of Things when talking about the human sciences, then it’s likely I’ll be blind to material realities pertaining to mentality. Theories have a cost because they always require distinctions and every distinction implies a blind spot or a thing that falls out of visibility. My desire is not to abolish critiques of ideology, analyses of signs and texts, analyses of lived experience, narrative, discursivity, etc., but to practice a sort of theoretical humility akin to what Laruelle describes under the title of “non-philosophy”. I call this alethetics. Rather than claiming to be the one framework that gets at the real, alethetics moves between different frames and windows; now discussing the way narrative informs our relation to the world, now the way our systems of categorization influence lives and nonhumans, now looking at lived experience as Sarah Ahmed does, now at the physical properties of fiber optic cables, the bubonic plague bacteria, etc. Paraphrasing Latour in the open to We Have Never Been Modern, “is it our fault [the STS theorists] that the ozone hole is simultaneously a narrative, semiotic, produced, and real?”

#### Non-human objects function in ways irreducible to anthropocentric notions of meaning—this indeterminacy means we should refuse to accept any single theory above all others

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, teaches philosophy at Collin College, “RSI, Discursivity, Critique, and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 7/18/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/rsi-discursivity-critique-and-politics/

What we need– or what I want –is something like the Lacanian Borromean Knot. Here the Imaginary would be the way in which one entity encounters another entity. For example, the way in which mantis shrimps encounter the world about them or the way in which people of another culture encounter the world around them. Each machine or object (the two are synonyms for me), encounters the world around it in a particular way. Each discipline encounters the world around it in a particular way and is blind to other aspects of the world. There are as many phenomenologies and transcendental structures of cognition as there are types of machines. There’s even a transcendental aesthetic, analytic, and dialectic for flowers. The symbolic would be the way in which entities capable of language signify the world through narratives, signifiers, signs, texts, etc. Who knows whether this is restricted to humans? As I’ve increasingly argued, I believe aliens live among us. They go by names like “corporation”, “army”, “government”, “institution”, etc. These beings, I believe, are irreducible to humans (the influence of Niklas Luhmann on me), and perhaps have their own symbolics. Just as we don’t know the language of dolphins, we don’t know the languages of these entities. They have their own symbolic. And perhaps likewise with bees, dolphins, octopi, and birds. Finally, the real is the dimension of irreducibility of a think to how it is perceived by another being (imaginary), or symbolized by another entity. It is the irreducible difference that a road has to affect us, for example, despite being created by us. The important caveat is 1) that there is no one borromean knot or RSI, and that 2) all three orders don’t need to be present for there to be being at work. The orders can become unglued, and in many instances some of the orders aren’t present at all. For example, I suspect that the order of the symbolic isn’t operative for bacteria (though the symbolic is at work for us when we talk about bacteria), though the order of the real and imaginary is at work for bacteria. How we work with bacteria in the symbolic, of course, does not undermine the real of bacteria or their ability to contribute differences irreducible to knowledge, signification, or belief. What’s important is that we practice something like what Bogost has call “alien phenomenology”, thinking the experiential world of nonhumans and others, and refusing to privilege one point of view on the universe.

### Pragmatism Good

#### Pragmatic experimentation is better than methodological unity—fallabilistically discarding theoretical purity in favor of contingent action solves best

Jones ‘8 Owain Jones, “Stepping from the wreckage: Geography, pragmatism and anti-representational theory,” Geoforum 39 (2008) 1600–1612, doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2007.10.003

Calls to theory and research as creative action seem de rigour in geography. For example, as Hinchcliffe (2007) pleads in Geographies of Nature, rather than offering interpretations of nature, or analytical concepts, the injunction must be to join the doings, to experiment, to engage in the doings of environments, to environ them in better ways (p. 191). It seems we are all pragmatists now – or should be. Note here there is creativity with judgment – ‘better ways’. How are we to pursue better ways without foundational grounds? Whitford (1991, p. 14) points out that to envisage ‘new social or ethical forms’ is to confine the future within the conceptualisations of the present. ‘Progress’ is not about moving towards utopia, it is about moving away from dystopia, as Bauman (1993, p. 224) puts it, ‘what we want is to get away from here. Where we hope to land [ ] is a ‘there’ which we thought of little and knew of even less’. We need a restless, radical incrementalism. As the Johnny Mercer/Harold Arlen song has it; ‘you’ve got to accentuate the positive, eliminate the negative, latch on to the affirmative’. This can be done by modest, fallibilistic, experimentation, with a constant toing and froing between idea and practice (this is Rorty’s summation of Dewey’s work), a constant will to act and to judge the consequences in the settings of the particular. Thrift (2005), with some added ingredients, sets out a similar trajectory. This work [NRT] earns a living from a relational view of reality [and] a constructionism of a particular kind, namely a transcendental empiricism (or pan-experimentalism) in which construction never takes place in general but always in relation to a matter of concern and commitment, a lure to our attention which provides an intensification of feeling (p. 474). In his paper on Wittgenstein, Harrison (2002) turns to the idea of witnessing to begin to build an ethical/political momentum for NRT (see also Thrift, 2004a). This essentially asks, what can be said about – or done with, Wittgenstein’s call for the event to be taken seriously (in and of itself), the call to describe and not to explain, or worse, to abstract or seek meaning elsewhere/prior to the event. Harrison feels that the direction to readers ‘to pay attention to whatever is taking place in front of them’ (Harrison, 2002, p. 500) can be understood as a call to witness, and that to witness is more than just observing and reporting on an event, it can be to share and deeply empathize with pain and suffering – the negative (although it could be applied to joy and love – the positive) and otherness – without fully knowing it. Pause to think how often it is that understandings of and responses to current/historical events are not prompted by explanation or analysis but by witnessing of one kind or another. Witnessing is often expressed as narrative. And here we connect to the long running tension between explanation (representation) and certain forms of narrative. NRT is drawn to towards ethological narratives – a sort of ‘radical ecological empiricism’. Serres, an influential figure in NRT thinking (Bingham and Thrift, 2000), has made narrative a central means of exploring the flowing interconnectedness of life – ‘what better way to describe this fluctuation than with everyday words, concrete experiences – in short, by narrative?’ (Serres 1995, p. 65). There is a strong affinity between narrative, artistic practice and NRT (see Thrift, 2004a) and related approaches such as hybrid geographies (Whatmore, 2002). More generally the developing of linkages between geographical and artistic interests and methods is going on apace in the pursuit of methodologies sensitive to process, performativity and affect. Writers, painters, photographers, performers, and poets are often commenting upon, ‘analysing’ – witnessing the world and their and/or other people’s place in it, but through affective/creative narratives rather than rational/representational registers. They do this by generating new accounts of/in the world which might witness eloquently. They add new accounts to the world (e.g. images, movements, sounds, artefacts) which at the same time reposition current forms of being (e.g. Dion, 2007). Thrift is not the only one who considers that ‘performances’ are often more telling (of the world) and more ethically and politically alive than much social science and academia. Rorty (1991a)/Rorty (1991b) has been at pains to point out that art, particularly in the form of literature, can have much more telling effect on society than centuries of precisely argued metaphysical philosophy and, latterly, realist social science. Witness and narrative are being explored as means of generating new political and ethical languages within poststructuralism and NRT. Barnett (2005) suggests that, at worst, poststructuralist theory can ‘generate [ ] an epistemological and ethico-political impasse for itself’ through the generic device of ‘essentializing the logic of exclusion as the ontological foundation of all modes of subjectivity’ (p. 8). Barnett suggests that a reading of Levinas alongside Derrida can point to ways beyond this impasse by which the other is excluded. The ethical relationship, he suggests is inevitably (and) ‘irreducibly asymmetrical’ (p. 18), and rests on an openness towards the Other in which temporal dimensions of being are critical. Within this temporal being in relationship to other, Barnett sees ‘acknowledgement’ (knowledge which includes recognition of suffering and sympathy and the demands of the other) as a means by which the gulf between self and other can be crossed. Why should we want the world given to us or revealed to us when we can do it (or, at least, bits of it)? Correspondence theories, essentialist, universal truth claims are always going to be claims. Proof is always a kind of rhetoric, and can always be willfully ignored anyway. Secondly who/what is to say that if there are universal, essential truths that they are going to be comfortable for us or even take any notice of us. Relativism means we are freer to build our own world. Of course there are a myriad constraints, but there are a myriad opportunities as well (science can narrate both). And within this there are surely many possible futures some of which will be better and some worse. Our efforts should be geared to the former. If we get grounded on foundations movement is less possible. Conflicts are bound to occur, and conflicts based on fundamentalisms are extremely difficult to resolve and are the most destructive. Radical incrementalism implies working with, yet away from the present, without any great plans as to where we are going. How do we respond then to the present in this kind of relation? If we keep witnessing (engaging with the practices of the world) and folding these accounts back into ongoing practice, who knows where the world goes? Of course there will be explanations, representations, and plans for action, but these are always framed in an openness and an incremental experimentation which relies on re-witnessing or constant witnessing. And how do we judge as we have to in the end? The judgment is in what we choose to witness and the rewitnessing of the consequences of actions taken. Is this working? How do these stories compare? Where/when/how would I like to live? We need not be too sceptical; we can build on the common currencies of pain, suffering, well being, happiness and love. As Louis MacNeice (1988) put it in the poem ‘London Rain’ – ‘We need no metaphysics/To sanction what we do’ (p. 72). We need to engineer new formations (Thrift, 2005) and pragmatism (like NRT) is a philosophy of heterogeneous engineering. According to Peirce, the most fundamental engine of the evolutionary process is not struggle, strife, greed, or competition. Rather it is nurturing love, in which an entity is prepared to sacrifice its own perfection for the sake of the wellbeing of its neighbor (Burch, 2006, p. 1). This is the idea of ‘‘agapeism” – ‘growth comes only from love’ (Peirce (1893), in Menand, 1997, p. 52).

### Cede the Political/Perm

#### Refuse the simplistic binary between reformism and radicalism—doing so stunts politics and cedes the electoral sphere to conservatives—the perm’s experimental approach is key to a revolutionary ethos

Connolly ‘13 William E. Connolly, “The Dilemma of Electoral Politics,” The Contemporary Condition, 3/20/2013, http://contemporarycondition.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-dilemma-of-electoral-politics.html

There is, nonetheless, a dilemma of electoral politics confronting the Left: 1) It is tempting to forgo electoral politics because it is so dysfunctional. But to do so cedes even more power both to independent corporate action and to the radical right within the state. The right loves to make electoral politics dysfunctional so that people lose confidence in it and transfer confidence to the private sector. (2) Nonetheless, the logic of the media-electoral-corporate system does spawn a restrictive grid of power and electoral intelligibility that makes it difficult to think, experiment, and organize outside its parameters. Think of how corporations and financial institutions initiate actions in the private sector and then use intensive lobbying to veto efforts to reverse those initiatives in Congress or the courts, just as financial elites invented derivatives and then lobbied intensively to stop their regulation; think of how media talking heads concentrate on candidates rather than fundamental issues; recall the central role of scandal in the media and electoral politics; consider the decisive electoral position of inattentive “undecided voters”; note how states under Republican rule work relentlessly to reduce the minority and poor vote; recall those billionaire super pacs; and so on. The electoral grid cannot be ignored or ceded to the right, but it also sucks experimental pursuits and bold ventures out of politics. Can we renegotiate the dilemma of electoral politics? That is the problematic within which I am working. I do not have a perfect response to it. Perfect answers are suspect. Perhaps it is wise to forge multimodal strategies that start outside the electoral grid and then return to it as one venue among others. Strategic role experimentations at multiple sites joined to the activation of new social movements provide possibilities. Indeed, these two modes are related. Consider merely a few examples of role experimentation tied to climate change and consumption available to many people in the shrinking middle class. We may support the farm-to-table movement in the restaurants we visit; we may participate in the slow food movement; we may frequent stores that offer food based on sustainable processes; we may buy hybrid cars, or, if feasible, join an urban zip-car collective, explaining to friends, family, and neighbors the effects such choices could have on late modern ecology if a majority of the populace did so; we may press our workplace to install solar panels and consider them ourselves if we can afford to do so; we may use writing and media skills to write graffiti, or produce provocative artistic installations, or write for a blog; we may shift a large portion of our retirement accounts into investments that support sustainable energy, withdrawing from aggressive investments that presuppose unsustainable growth or threaten economic collapse; we may bring new issues and visitors to our churches, temples, or mosques to support rethinking interdenominational issues and the contemporary fragility of things; we may found, join, or frequent repair clubs, at which volunteers collect and repair old appliances, furniture, and bikes to cut back on urban waste, to make them available to low income people and to increase the longevity of the items; we may probe and publicize the multimodal tactics by which twenty-four-hour news stations work on the visceral register of viewers, as we explain on blogs how to counter those techniques; we may travel to places where unconscious American assumptions about world entitlement are challenged on a regular basis; we may augment the pattern of films and artistic exhibits we visit to stretch our habitual powers of perception and to challenge some affect-imbued prejudgments embedded in them. A series of intercalated role experiments, often pursued by clusters of participants together. But don’t such activities merely make the participants “feel better”? Well, many who pursue such experiments do feel good about them, particularly those who accept a tragic image of possibility in which there is no inevitability that either large scale politics, God, or nature will come to our rescue. Also, could such role experiments ever make a sufficient difference on their own? No. These, however, may be the wrong questions to pose. What such experiments can do as they expand is to crack the ice in and around us. First, we may now find ourselves a bit less implicated in the practices and policies that are sources of the problems. Second, the shaky perceptions, feelings, and beliefs that authorized them may thus now become more entrenched as we act upon them. Third, we now find ourselves in more favorable positions to forge connections with larger constituencies pursuing similar experiments. Fourth, we may thus become more inspired to seed and join macropolitical movements that speak to these issues. Fifth, as we now participate in protests, slowdowns, work “according to rule” and more confrontational meetings with corporate managers, church leaders, union officials, university officers, and neighborhood leaders, we may become even more alert to the creeds, institutional pressures and options that propel these constituencies too. They, too, are both enmeshed in a web of roles and more than mere role bearers. Many will maintain an intransigence of viewpoint and insistence of interpretation that we may now be in a better position to counter by words and deeds with those outside or at the edge of the intransigent community. One advantage of forging links between role experimentations and social movements is that both speak to a time in which the drive to significant change must be pursued by a large, pluralist assemblage rather than by any single class or other core constituency. Such an assemblage must today be primed and loaded by several constituencies in diverse ways at numerous sites. It is necessary here to condense linkages that may unfold. But perhaps movement back and forth between role experiments, social movements, occasional shifts in the priorities of some strategic institutions, and a discernible shift in the contours of electoral politics will promote the emergence of a new, more activist pluralist assemblage. Now, say, a new, surprising event occurs. Some such event or crisis is surely bound to erupt: an urban uprising, a destructive storm, a wild executive overreach, a wide spread interruption in electrical service, a bank melt down, a crisis in oil supply, etc. Perhaps the conjunction of this new event with the preparatory actions that preceded it will prime a large constellation to resist the protofascist responses the intransigent Right will pursue at that very moment. Perhaps the event will now become an occasion to mobilize large scale, intensive support for progressive change on some of the fronts noted at the start of this piece. It is important to remember that the advent of a crisis does not alone determine the response to it. So waiting for the next one to occur is not enough. The Great Depression was followed by the intensification of fascist movements in several countries. Those with strong labor movements and progressive elected leaders proved best at resisting them. The most recent economic melt-down was met in many places by the self-defeating response of austerity, and worse. That is why the quality and depth of the political ethos preceding such events is important. The use of the “perhaps” in the above formulations suggests that there are no guarantees at any of these junctures. Uncertainties abound. These points, however, also apply to any radical perspective that counsels waiting for the revolution, as it surrounds its critiques of militant reform with an aura of certainty. Today the need is to curtail the aura of certainty of all perspectives on the Left. The examples posed here, of course, are focused on primarily one constituency. But others could be invoked. The larger idea is to draw energy from multiple sources and constituencies. The formula is to move back and forth between the proliferation of role experiments, forging social movements on several fronts, helping to shift the constituency weight of the heavy electoral machinery now in place, and participating in cross-country citizen movements that put pressure on states, corporations, churches, universities and unions from inside and outside simultaneously. Indeed, perhaps the severity of the issues facing us means that we should prepare for the day when we are strong enough in several countries to launch a cross-country general strike. The proliferating approach adopted here, again, is replete with uncertain connections. That’s politics. The point is to resist falling into the familiar game of optimism vs. pessimism and to minimize that tempting blame-game within the Left, folding more attraction and inspiration into our activities. The point is to appraise the severity of the needs of the day and to attract people to join in different ways and degrees a multifaceted movement to respond to them.

## Ableism

### 1AR—Ableism K

#### The role of the ballot is to decide whether adolescent medical autonomy is a good idea—that’s Nelson 8

#### 1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

#### 2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

#### 3. Time skew. Their framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

#### These all turn their education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

#### Perm: Do both—no reason we can’t <<do alt>> and affirm adolescent autonomy at the same time.

#### The neg throws out the baby with the bathwater-- struggles for adolescent autonomy are key to the alt, it’s a microcosm of resistance against a society that tells disabled people that their bodies are not their own.

Mingus 8 (Mia Mingus, Co-Executive Director, SPARK! Reproductive Justice Now, “ON CLAIMING MY MOVEMENT: DISABILITY AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE”, 2008)//Miro

It is not a coincidence that I ended up working in a movement that is fundamentally rooted in the idea that certain bodies are valuable and others are not; in a movement that is so connected with the world of healthcare and medicine - the reproductive justice movement. Reproductive justice and disability are connected on a deeply fundamental level. Disabled people, issues, history, politics and analysis allow us to see parts of reproductive justice that we would otherwise never know. After all, how can you talk about bodies without talking about disability? How can you ignore the fact that disabled women are often forcibly sterilized or given dangerous contraceptives to control their menstrual cycles for the convenience of their caretakers and institutions? How can we learn to fight for not only the right to receive care, but also the right to refuse it? How can we forget that female bodies were historically coded as “disabled” because they were “different” and had “different abilities” than male bodies? Or that ableism is so easily and successfully used as a mechanism of reproductive oppression? As women of color, people with disabilities, LGBTI and queer people, and survivors of violence and trauma, the struggle to claim our bodies for ourselves--in all of our bodies’ curious, strange, beautiful and glorious ways--cannot be separated from reproductive justice. As communities whose bodies have been owned, experimented on, institutionalized, hospitalized, medicalized, colonized, imprisoned, enslaved and controlled, we have been told that our bodies are wrong, perverse, shameful, bad, and most importantly; that our bodies are not ours; that they belong to the state, our parents, husbands, partners, doctors, children, families, communities, god(s), and so on. I grew out of a very strong feminist, women of color, activist, close-knit community working to end violence against women and children. Early on, I learned about sexism, racism, economic injustice and homophobia; that there was no hierarchy of oppression; that systems of oppression were connected to each other, intersected and overlapped. Despite such a strong framework, no one ever taught me to think of disability in the same way and connect it to being Asian American, a woman, young or queer. No one ever taught me that being disabled was a powerful way to move through the world or that disabled communities had rich and vibrant cultures of their own. I was taught to claim my body as a girl, female, and woman, but not as a disabled person. When it came to my disability, my parents looked to doctors, healthcare providers, medical experts and brace makers. I was not the expert on my body; they were. It never occurred to anyone that the ability to claim my body as a girl was dependent on my ability to claim my disabled body as a disabled girl. No one ever realized that my experiences with the medical industrial complex as a disabled child would ultimately discourage me from seeking medical services (reproductive or not) in the future - or that standing in my underwear in front of male doctors as they studied me was any different than standing in my underwear in front of any old men as they studied me. Growing up disabled, my body profoundly affected how I viewed the world and in turn, how the world viewed me. School became a site where the politics of beauty, disability, race, sexuality and gender collided. I never saw disabled women (let alone disabled women of color) in powerful roles, being desired or desiring, raising families or claiming their disability as a political identity, rather than an individual flaw or tragedy. One of my earliest memories of consciously claiming my body for myself was deciding not to wear my brace any more. For years I wore a brace on my right leg; I had to get them re-made or re-fitted almost every year as I grew out of them. I had some that went from my foot to my knee and some that went all the way up to my hip. For a long time I did not question my brace. It was just the way things were, like stairs, people staring at me when I walked, or feeling ashamed of my disability. Among many things, my braces were hot (often made of plastic and or fiberglass), and in the Virgin Islands Caribbean weather, they itched, pinched my skin, and gave me painful blisters which I would try to prevent by wearing more socks or padding. Like my parents, I had come to believe that I “needed” to wear my brace. But something began to change as I entered middle school. I began to ask questions: why should I have to wear something so painful everyday that is supposed to “help” me? If they can send a man to the moon, then surely they can make a comfortable and useful brace for my leg? In the beginning I had small acts of resistance: the daily morning fight about putting my brace on or bringing a change of shoes and changing out of it once I was at school--this went on for years. Finally I was “allowed” to not wear my brace some days, and it was not until I was in college that I was able to choose not to wear my brace everyday. For me, my brace represented the medical establishment’s grubby little hands on my body, forcing me to adhere to a standardized, able bodied norm of how bodies are supposed to be, look, act and move. When I wore it, I could hear horrible brace maker’s voices in my head, “that’s an ugly walk,” “walk down the hallway again and this time, try and make it prettier,” “this brace will make you have a normal walk,” or “don’t worry, you’ll be able to hide the brace under your clothes--boys won’t even know it’s there.” It represented years of someone else deciding what was best for my body and the invasion (physical and mental) of my body at a young age by people who never asked me what I thought about having multiple surgeries done at the same time; how I felt being told that my body was “wrong” and “something to fix” over and over again. All that time, I never knew that there was a whole movement out there of disabled people demanding justice and human rights. The ownership and entitlement of the medical industrial complex of my disabled body is, in my mind, no worse than the ownership and entitlement of the system of white supremacy of my body of color; or the system of male supremacy of my female body. In fact, they are so connected and mutually interdependent that they are impossible to separate. Claiming my body has been and continues to be a pivotal process in my own life. Knowing and learning to understand my disabled body as powerful, beautiful, valuable and desirable has been central to my activism in the reproductive justice movement. For me, reproductive justice will always include a radical analysis of disability and ableist supremacy because they are part of each other and they are a part of me.

#### Deconstruction can’t solve the material disadvantages that disabled bodies face

Vehmas and Watson 14 write[[5]](#footnote-5)

If the principles of CDS are evaluated critically in the light of disadvantage, its analytical and political value becomes questionable. Its relativism and its suggestions that impairments are ethically and politically merely neutral differences are false. Impairments often have very tangible effects on people’s well-being, many of which cannot be explained away by deconstruction (for example, Shakespeare 2006; Thomas 1999). Recognizing impairment effects is necessary in order to secure proper treatment and social arrangements that enhance disabled people’s well-being and social participation. CDS runs the risk of dismissing not only the personal experiences of living with impairment, but also the significance of the differences between socially created disadvantages. These disadvantages that often result from oppressive social arrangements, are very much real and take place in different ways for different disadvantaged groups. **Disabled people typically experience disadvantage in relation to** the market and **capitalism**, and they have to a large extent been excluded from employment and from equal social participation, respect and wealth (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007, 26). **On top of** these **materialist disadvantages, disabled people are stigmatized as** deviant and **undesirable**, and also subordinated to various oppressive hierarchical relations. **For disabled people to achieve participatory parity, they require more than recognition**; they need material help, targeted resource enhancement, and personal enhancement (Wolff and De-Shalit 2007). Disability is rooted in the economic structures of society and demands redistribution of goods and wealth. In contrast to some other oppressed groups, disabled people require more than the removal of barriers if they are to achieve social justice. This extra help might be small – for example, allowing a student with dyslexia extra time in an examination – through to complex interventions such as facilitated communication, a job support worker or 24-hour personal assistance. Whatever the size, it is an extra cost both to employers and to the state. These are real needs and represent real differences. Without an acceptance of these differences it is hard to see how we could move forward. Whilst these ‘real differences’ can be presented as the result of dominant ableist discourses where disabled people’s needs are regarded as extra cost, this does not solve the problem. The problems disabled people face require more than ideological change, and **ideological change is of little use if it does not result in material change.** CDS fails to account for the economic basis of disability and offers only the tools of deconstruction and the abolishment of cultural hierarchies to eradicate economic injustice. This, as Fraser (2000) has argued, would be possible in a society where there were no relatively autonomous markets and the distribution of goods were regulated through cultural values. In such a society, oppression based on identity would translate perfectly into economic injustice and maldistribution. This is far from the current reality where ‘marketization has pervaded all societies to some degree, at least partially decoupling economic mechanisms of distribution from cultural patterns of value and prestige’ (Fraser 2000, 111). **Markets are not controlled by** nor are they subsidiary to **culture; ‘as a result they generate** economic **inequalities that are not mere expressions of identity hierarchies’** (Fraser 2000, 111–112). The disadvantage related to disability is to a great extent a matter of economic injustice, and before this injustice can be corrected we have to be able to identify those individuals and social groups that have been disadvantaged by social arrangements. Whilst this does create and foster categories and binaries between groups of people, it also requires some sort of categories to start with; namely, the various categories of disadvantage. Both the **social and physical mechanisms that produce** human **diversity are real, and** they **produce tangible differences that cannot be challenged**, let alone abolished, **merely by** pointing out the wanton nature of difference, and **deconstructing** the **meanings attached to disability**. Changing the social conditions that disadvantage and disable some people demands that the diverse, sometimes dualistic, reality of social advantage and disadvantage between different groups of people is recognized. This is exactly why group identities based on, for example, impairment, gender, or sexuality have been invaluable tools in the resistance against discrimination and oppression – in the fight against socially produced disadvantage. Confident, positive disability identity has enabled many disabled people to actively challenge the status quo that disadvantages them and to claim rights and power and participation in dominant institutions. Being different from the so-called normal majority is no longer considered to conflict with a good life, equality and respect. Quite the opposite, positive realization of one’s difference has been liberating and empowering to many disabled people (Shakespeare 2006; Morris 1991). For a radical and active disability movement to emerge and for disabled people to take action on their own account, they have to see themselves as an unfairly marginalized or disadvantaged constituency and a minority group (Shakespeare and Watson 2001). The category disabled/ non-disabled is a good abstraction that can enable the development of communities of resistance, and without it is hard to see how these could develop.

## Cap

### 1AR—Cap K

#### The role of the ballot is to decide whether adolescent medical autonomy is a good idea—that’s Nelson 8

#### 1. Aff choice. Provides a stasis point which forces the neg to clash.

#### 2. Predictable limits. There’s unlimited roles of the ballot and kritik alts. Topic focus is the only way to create a limited lit base which makes research possible.

#### 3. Time skew. Their framework moots the AC and forces a 1AR restart.

#### These all turn their education claims because they’re pre-requisites to effective dialogue.

#### Perm: Do both—no reason we can’t <<do alt>> and affirm adolescent autonomy at the same time.

#### The neg throws out the baby with the bathwater— the medical-industrial complex is an institution driven by an insatiable desire for profit—carving out spaces for autonomy is a microcosm in a broader resister against cap—vote aff to endorse grassroots.

Peace 9 (William Peace, PhD 1992 in anthropology Columbia University, Interested in disability rights and bioethics, “The Medical Industrial Complex: Normalcy Rules!”, 2009)//Miro

I wish I could write that I have the solution to our health care woes. However, no single individual is that smart; not even Peter Singer, the media darling who has an insidinary impact on the health care debate. To me, the problem with our health care system is directly related to the human penchant to fit into the mainstream, to be normal, that is healthy. This thought came to me after reading Stephen Kuusisto's post "What Disability Knows: Part One and Part Two" (see Planet of the Blind). Kuusisto points out that all those with a visible disability can never be perceived as normal. Disability is thus mistakenly married to normativity. Divorce is not possible. I, and many others who study disability, agree. The stigma attached to the calamity known as disability is as unfortunate as it is unnecessary. We humans are a diverse bunch and this diversity is the essence of our strength. Yet we fear difference and particularly disability. In disability I see only potential, adaptation, and the best that humanity has to offer. I do not see illness, infirmity, or limits. In Kuusisto's estimation the idea of normal or mainstream is destructive and he recently "told a group of artists and advocates for people with disabilities at the Kennedy Center for the Arts in Washington, DC that the mainstream is one of the great, tragic ideas of our time. There is no mainstream. No one is physically solid, reliable, capable as a solo act, protected against catastrophe; there is only the stream in which each one of us must work to find solace in meaning". This is not only eloquent writing but brilliant thinking in terms of health care: who decides what is "normal" or "mainstream"? The answer is as simple as it is dangerous: the medical industrial complex. The medical industrial complex is much like the military industrial complex I study in my historical work about anthropology. For a military industrial complex to exist, war or the fear of war must be present. Since 1941, the attack on Pearl Harbor and the more recent events of September 11, 2001 we have had an abundance of fear mongering and war. In the medical industrial complex fear is required as well. What do we humans fear? Ill-health, disease, the absence of normalcy and disability. Ill-health is why the medical industrial complex exists. The sick, infirm, and disabled are the primary consumers. The big bucks and profit is in abnormality, exactly what we fear. Healthy people, the mainstream, need not apply. Healthy people are the worst customers. What I want to know is how do we determine what is normal? Who is normal and why are they normal? As one who has not been perceived to be "normal" in thirty years I ask this question because I know power rests among the normate to use Rose Marie Garland-Thompson's awkward term. The normates define and control what it means to be different. These people, normates, dictate not only what is healthy but how ill health is treated. Certain illnesses carry great stigma, AIDS for instance, while others are deemed so rare they are not worth researching (think ALS or Lou Gehrig's Disease). This is why disability studies has much to offer the debate about our health care system--our bodies, disabled bodies, have been medicalized. Disability studies is the one field that is devoted to this subject in the form of why. Why is the disabled body so objectionable? What are the practical and theoretical implications of the rejection of the disabled body? Policy makers, if they were smart, would listen carefully to what disability studies scholars have to say. We people with a disability are the best customers of the medical industrial complex. The problem is that we people with a disability and by extension disability studies scholars are outsiders. The debate over health care is dictated by people like Peter Signer and others who want to get the most bang for their buck and know nothing about disability. I am not dismissing the great cost involved in disability. I am intimately familiar with this. Rather, I want to point out what many know but do not acknowledge: the greatest economic savings do not rest among those that are ill or disabled. If we want to save money and lives the greatest economic and human savings are to found keeping people healthy. Healthy people, normates, are cheap and powerful. The normate, those that control the medical industrial complex, profit from illness. The largest profits are made diagnosing and treating the sick who get well. Just ask anyone that has undergone basic diagnostic testing, medical treatment and been deemed healthy afterwards. The money, capitalistic profit and core of our medical industrial complex, is dependent upon abnormality. Money is made when the medical industrial complex finds perceived pathology. Our perception of what is normal has become increasingly narrow. The reason is simple--profits. The more abnormal one becomes the greater the profit margin. We crippled people have become too costly and will be the direct targets of cost saving measures. Worse, our costly asses are not valued and it is all too easy to moan and groan about the costs of disability and old age. Why treat an elderly person who will die in the near future? Why should an insurance company pay for a $5,000 wheelchair when a wheelchair for $500 will suffice? These sorts of decisions are short sighted savings and laden with value judgments that keep me up at night. If we want to save money this is what I propose: make basic health care affordable. Lower the price of medications for conditions such as high blood pressure so that even the poorest Americans can afford it. If we did this, perhaps what is known as the stroke belt among black Americans in the Southeast would not exist. Force people to live a healthy life style via gut wrenching taxes. If you want to smoke make it cost prohibitive. Raise the price of cigarettes by $10 a pack every year for the next five years and few people will smoke. If we don't want kids to drink soda and eat unhealthy foods ban them from schools. Tax soda and junk foods so severely they are unaffordable. I am not naive. I know we lack the resolve to follow through on my outlandish suggestions. I also know if we did it would have a profound and unsettling impact on our economy; in other words corporations would suffer. Our government will never let this happen and this is part of the problem I am trying to emphasize with my extreme examples. Disability has been eliminated from the discourse on health care reform or perhaps more accurately it is framed only as it pertains to "savings". That is disability is abnormality, costly, and must be reduced. To me, this is akin to targeting and eliminating what makes us so special and diverse. The advances in our medical industrial complex have created more diversity--I see people at adaptive sports programs that are amazingly unique. I marvel at the human spirit and adaptive ability we all possess. I am equally sad to know that physical and cognitive disability is stigmatized and there are times this knowledge makes me ashamed to be human. Let me make one final point in this long and rambling post. I am not opposed to rationing health care. I can live with rationing health care but I can only do so if all are treated equally. Based on what I read and sense, we people with a disability are in for a very rough experience. Disability scholars may not have all the answers or even some of the answers but they must be part of the debate. The elderly, chronically ill, long term cancer survivors, people with a disability all have experience with our flawed health system and yet they are not sitting down to talk with President Obama or his advisors. This has me worried. People with first hand experience need to play a central role in any discussion about the medical industrial complex. I do not see this taking place and cannot help but conclude the so called health care reform in retrospect may seem like the biggest corporate grab for wealth our nation will ever witness. And who will get hurt the most? Why of course those that are the most vulnerable.

## Race

### 1AR—Afropess

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#### Perm: Do both—no reason we can’t <<do alt>> and affirm adolescent autonomy at the same time.

#### The neg throws out the baby with the bathwater-- struggles for adolescent autonomy are key to the alt, it’s an intersectional strategy of resistance against white supremacy.

Mingus 8 (Mia Mingus, Co-Executive Director, SPARK! Reproductive Justice Now, “ON CLAIMING MY MOVEMENT: DISABILITY AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE”, 2008)//Miro

It is not a coincidence that I ended up working in a movement that is fundamentally rooted in the idea that certain bodies are valuable and others are not; in a movement that is so connected with the world of healthcare and medicine - the reproductive justice movement. Reproductive justice and disability are connected on a deeply fundamental level. Disabled people, issues, history, politics and analysis allow us to see parts of reproductive justice that we would otherwise never know. After all, how can you talk about bodies without talking about disability? How can you ignore the fact that disabled women are often forcibly sterilized or given dangerous contraceptives to control their menstrual cycles for the convenience of their caretakers and institutions? How can we learn to fight for not only the right to receive care, but also the right to refuse it? How can we forget that female bodies were historically coded as “disabled” because they were “different” and had “different abilities” than male bodies? Or that ableism is so easily and successfully used as a mechanism of reproductive oppression? As women of color, people with disabilities, LGBTI and queer people, and survivors of violence and trauma, the struggle to claim our bodies for ourselves--in all of our bodies’ curious, strange, beautiful and glorious ways--cannot be separated from reproductive justice. As communities whose bodies have been owned, experimented on, institutionalized, hospitalized, medicalized, colonized, imprisoned, enslaved and controlled, we have been told that our bodies are wrong, perverse, shameful, bad, and most importantly; that our bodies are not ours; that they belong to the state, our parents, husbands, partners, doctors, children, families, communities, god(s), and so on. 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One of my earliest memories of consciously claiming my body for myself was deciding not to wear my brace any more. For years I wore a brace on my right leg; I had to get them re-made or re-fitted almost every year as I grew out of them. I had some that went from my foot to my knee and some that went all the way up to my hip. For a long time I did not question my brace. It was just the way things were, like stairs, people staring at me when I walked, or feeling ashamed of my disability. Among many things, my braces were hot (often made of plastic and or fiberglass), and in the Virgin Islands Caribbean weather, they itched, pinched my skin, and gave me painful blisters which I would try to prevent by wearing more socks or padding. Like my parents, I had come to believe that I “needed” to wear my brace. But something began to change as I entered middle school. I began to ask questions: why should I have to wear something so painful everyday that is supposed to “help” me? If they can send a man to the moon, then surely they can make a comfortable and useful brace for my leg? In the beginning I had small acts of resistance: the daily morning fight about putting my brace on or bringing a change of shoes and changing out of it once I was at school--this went on for years. Finally I was “allowed” to not wear my brace some days, and it was not until I was in college that I was able to choose not to wear my brace everyday. For me, my brace represented the medical establishment’s grubby little hands on my body, forcing me to adhere to a standardized, able bodied norm of how bodies are supposed to be, look, act and move. When I wore it, I could hear horrible brace maker’s voices in my head, “that’s an ugly walk,” “walk down the hallway again and this time, try and make it prettier,” “this brace will make you have a normal walk,” or “don’t worry, you’ll be able to hide the brace under your clothes--boys won’t even know it’s there.” It represented years of someone else deciding what was best for my body and the invasion (physical and mental) of my body at a young age by people who never asked me what I thought about having multiple surgeries done at the same time; how I felt being told that my body was “wrong” and “something to fix” over and over again. All that time, I never knew that there was a whole movement out there of disabled people demanding justice and human rights. 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# Misc

## Misc

### Contentions

#### Information lack -> Alienation

Mutcherson 5 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Vice Dean and Professor of Bioethics @ Rutgers “Whose Body Is It Anyway - An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents”, 2005)//Miro

This article advocates that laws regulating adolescent access to healthcare should encourage, or at least not impede, healthcare decisionmaking that avoids unnecessary fracturing of families, respects the capacity of the involved parties, supports positive healthcare provider-patient relationships, minimizes the need for state interference through the child welfare system or courts, and provides for an environment in which affected parties can make decisions that protect the physical and emotional health of the patient. The primary goal of law in the arena of adolescent healthcare should be to facilitate sound medical decision-making by and for young people through ethically sound legislation. This overarching goal can best be achieved by encouraging family communication, recognizing and supporting real-life decision-making patterns put in place by well-functioning families, and facilitating optimal healthcare provider/patient relationships to maximize the potential for good health outcomes. This section will address the importance of each of these factors and the ways in which the current system of laws fails to achieve them. The law as currently configured discourages family communication in at least two ways. First, by making the parent the only party legally capable of consenting to most adolescent healthcare, the law allows parents to avoid difficult conversations with young people about illness, including terminal illnesses or diseases with particularly difficult treatments. 95 Parents in crisis may choose to keep information from their child that the parents feel would be overwhelming or discouraging. 96 Anthropologist Myra Bluebond Langner observed in a study of children dying from leukemia that "[s]ome parents felt that protection also meant shielding the children from knowledge of the prognosis. They rationalized withholding information ... even using deception with statements like 'You'll get better'. . . on grounds that this protected children from unhappiness and the possibility of an inadvertent premature death. '97 Often, young people will be well aware that something very serious is wrong with them, and the deception by caregivers and parents will heighten the patient's sense of alienation, disconnect, and powerlessness created by the illness. 98

### fwk

#### Moral motivation

Lindemann 5 (Monica A. Lindemann, B.A. University of North Texas, “ENVIRONMENTAL VIRTUE EDUCATION: ANCIENT WISDOM APPLIED”, 2005)//Miro

One of the major problems that ethical theories face today is to determine the precise connection between the recognition of ethical dilemmas by a moral agent and [her] subsequent motivation to act. Frequently, philosophers argue, it is not enough for a moral agent to know ethical principles that apply only to universalized situations; something else has to occur for the agent to truly jump into gear. Simply knowing theoretical ethical principles does not provide the agent with the fine-tuned perception necessary to actually recognize a specific situation as deserving of action. This is one of the reasons why rule-based systems of ethics are problematic, as they already assume that the moral agent has discerned ethical salience in a given situation. However, that is not necessarily the case. In other words, knowing that “one should be benevolent to those less fortunate” does not give any specific information as to what action to take when one is faced with a homeless person on the street, for instance. In such a situation, one first has to recognize that the other person has a good of his or her own, is in need, and thus deserving of help. In the same way, the rule does not provide information regarding what form the aid should take: should one simply give the person money for food? Or should one try to help in more profound ways, such as finding him or her a job etc.? All these scenarios already depend on the moral perception of the moral agent; that is, the situation first has to be perceived to be a moral one, for otherwise moral activity is not at all required. As Blum puts it: The point is that perception occurs prior to deliberation, and prior to taking the situation to be one in which one needs to deliberate. It is precisely because the situation is seen in a certain way that the agent takes it as one in which he feels moved to deliberate.40 Therefore, the significance of moral perception for subsequent action is undeniable. The question now becomes: What is moral perception and how does it develop in a moral agent? Clearly, rules and regulations in and by themselves are not guides to moral perception, since they only prescribe how to act once a moral situation is already perceived as requiring action. Therefore, deontological and utilitarian theories of ethics generally begin too far down the road, as they already presuppose the moral perception of the moral agent. The principles provided can only be applied if the situation has been recognized as a moral one. However, moral perception appears to be a component of the characteristics and dispositions of a person, as they are an integral part of how a person dwells in and interacts with the world. Thus, moral perception, which is essential and prior to any moral judgment, is closely linked to ethical theories of virtue, as the virtues are generally regarded to shape an agent’s understanding of his or her moral environment. In other words, a person who has cultivated the virtues of love and benevolence perceives the world in a distinctly different way than a person who is lacking these qualities. As Sherman states: Preliminary to deciding how to act, one must acknowledge that the situation requires action. The decision must arise from a reading of the circumstances. This reading, or reaction, is informed by ethical considerations expressive of the agent’s virtue. Perception thus is informed by the virtues. The agent will be responsible for how the situation appears as well as for omissions and distortions. Accordingly, much of the work of virtue will rest in knowing how to construe the case, how to describe and classify what is before one. An agent who fails to notice unequivocal features of a situation which for a given community standardly require considerations of liberality, apparently lacks that virtue. It is not that she has deliberated badly, but that there is no registered response about which to liberate.41 In other words, many situations that clearly deserve the moral consideration of the virtuous person might not elicit any emotional or ethical response by the person lacking the appropriate virtue. Take, for instance, the following scenario: Kate and John are sitting next to each other on a very crowded bus. An elderly lady gets on the bus, but unfortunately there are no more seats available. All John notices at that time is that additional passengers have gotten on the bus; he barely acknowledges the presence of the elderly lady. Kate, however, immediately perceives the situation as requiring action, since she feels empathetic for the woman in need. In other words, she can recognize that the good (comfort) of the woman is in jeopardy, and accordingly decides to act. As this example shows, the recognition of a situation as being a moral one is the prerequisite of any moral action altogether. Apparently, the particular scene looked decidedly different to John than it appeared to Kate due to their different moral sensitivities. One could rightly argue that in the context John was rather insensitive regarding the needs of other passengers, and thus exhibited some sort of moral defect, although a minor one.

Any account of ethics fails unless it uses fundamental aspects of life to explain good and bad.

#### Ethics must use way of life in order to explain good and bad—takes out “super natural” theories of reason.

Reader 2k (Soran Reader, Department of Philosophy @ Durham, “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalisms, Reasons and Virtue”, 2k)//Miro

First-nature explicatory accounts are increasingly popular. Aspects of work from Michael Thompson (1995), Philippa Foot's recent unpublished work, and Alasdair Maclntyre's (1999a and b) fall into this category. Writers explicating ethics in this way take as their core notion the idea of human life. They start, in Aristotelian fashion, with other organisms, and, by describing the lives of those organisms in compelling ways, persuade us to notice two things: the presence of norms in animal lives, and continuities between those lives and human life. Thus Michael Thompson argues that there is a distinct logical category for talk about life, which is characterised by talk of 'the species' having this or that property. Such talk, he argues, reveals a distinct kind of natural norm which he calls the 'Aristotelian categorical'. When we use a phrase like 'wolves hunt in packs', or 'the swallow migrates in winter', we are making a statement that is normative in the sense Thompson has isolated. In such talk, he argues, we are committed to the claim that there is something wrong with the wolf or swallow that doesn't hunt in the pack or migrate, it suffers, in Foot's phrase, from a natural defect. Foot takes this up to argue for a continuity: just as 'good' in talk of animal lives says that their lives are going as they 'should' in Thompson's sense, so 'good' in human life says that human life is going as it 'should'. Possession of the virtues is an Aristotelian categorical for human beings. Privation of virtue, or vice, is a natural defect of human beings, on a par with other natural defects, like short-sightedness or poor co-ordination. There is something wrong with human beings who lack virtue, and something normatively right with those who possess them. Alasdair Maclntyre (1999a) also emphasises the continuities between the lives of higher social mammals and human life, and asks us to notice how the life of these animals involves recognition of and response to norms. He is especially interested in norms of care for members of the social group who are dependent, that is, unable to care for themselves. The inescapable first-natural facts of vulnerability and dependency, and the implications they have for what our norms can be, have been too little noticed by moral philosophers, who in his view need to update their 'naturalisms' to accommodate these facts. Some naturalist writers place more emphasis on the differences between the social life of animals and that of human beings. First nature is what we share with higher mammals: so, at least, biology, and being vulnerable to the vagaries of a particular physical environment. Second nature is here conceived as something different, something extra. Writers who highlight differences include David Wiggins (1987), John McDowell (1995), Joseph Raz (1999), Thomas Scanlon (1999), and Peter Railton (2000). The difference between humans and the rest of first nature that all these writers agree is crucial to understanding ethics, is our rationality- our capacity to act in the light of reasons. We are unique in being able to take considerations to be reasons, and in being able to justify our actions to ourselves and each other though socially supported dialogue about reasons. Where Maclntyre (1999a) thinks that unless higher animals took things to be reasons and acted virtuously, there would not be enough in first nature for rational, moral second nature to develop from, McDowell (1995) thinks that higher animals and human beings are, literally, a world apart: where animals have only an environment, mature human beings have a world, full of meanings and reasons with practical significance. These accounts are still naturalistic, so long as they claim that our ethical second nature is natural part of worldly nature, not supernatural. Second nature is the set of features installed in the course of ordinary socialisation and education. But 'education' here is doing a lot of work: it is richly understood, as no less than the creating and shaping of the virtuous person in childhood. Our 'second nature' is our rationality, our character, our skills, and our reactive attitudes. Although it is not thought of as rigid in adulthood, mechanically determining everything we do in the way that first nature is thought by some to determine the behaviour it governs (whether human or animal), second nature is sometimes thought of as pretty robust - it determines what we (can) take to be reasons, and determines what virtues or vices (or neutral habits) our actions express.7 Some writers see 'second nature' rather differently. They see it as ‘super natural', coming from outside the natural world, different in kind from it and not explicable in terms of it. Kant held that kind of view, and modern contractarianism inherits much of it. To the extent that modern contractarians, like John Rawls, David Gauthier and Thomas Scanlon conceive of the ethics-creating contract as something independent of our first-and-second natural history, it seems right to say that they are 'super naturalists' in McDowell's sense. To the extent that modern Kantians, like Onora O'Neill, Christine Korsgaard and Barbara Herman think of the rational deliberation that goes into ethical action as independent of our animal nature, they, too, propose a form of supernaturalism. But notice that even supernaturalists about ethics are committed to the naturalistic platitude with which this section began: ethical behaviour expresses (part of) our nature. It is just that these writers take our ethical nature to be something beyond the ordinary world of first and second nature. Another aspect of human second nature has been mentioned in some recent writing: human relationships. It has been suggested, by David McNaughton (1996) and David Wiggins (1998) that W.D. Ross offered the concept of relationship as the key which shows how his list of protanto moral duties is not arbitrary. Each relationship generates duties. One might see this in a first-natural or second-natural way: kinship duties and shared environment duties might be held to arise out of our first-natural connections; duties of friendship, citizenship, civility and educating the young, arise out of relationships that are part of second nature. The idea that even second-natural relationships may be morally explanatory and fundamental, is only just beginning to be explored, but promises to be fruitful. I have sketched different forms the claim that ethics is 'natural' can take. But an important part of the starting motivation to say that ethics is natural was a scientistic drive to reduce ethics to first nature, to explain ethics as a matter of atoms swerving in the void, as it were. And an important part of the motivation behind the development of second-natural explicatory accounts, has been to resist that reductive drive. It remains to say something about that debate. In (1995) and elsewhere McDowell provides a helpful diagnosis of the reductive impulse. He links Wittgenstein's work on rule-following with a reading of Aristotle, suggesting that the crucial insight was already there in Aristotle: explanation and justification are, and can only be, internal to a way of life. But the insight has been forgotten, as a result of the Modern turn in Western philosophy, which inclines us to take experimental science to be the fundamental mode of knowledge, and to measure other discourses against its standards. It stipulates that 'the world' is the world seen from the perspective of completed natural science, containing only entities with 'primary qualities', considered under the aspect of how they would ap pear 'from nowhere', as in Nagel (1986) or from a God's eye view or Archimedian point, as in Williams (1985). The Modern turn has generated two problems: how can value be constituted by a value-free world? and how can value be expressed in the value-free world as action? If McDowell is right, two projects in contemporary ethics are bogged down by an error that originates in the 18th Century. Those who offer first nature explanatory accounts are seeking an answer to the first unanswerable question, of how the value-free can constitute value. On a proper conception of 'the world', there is no 'value-free'. And action-theorists, perhaps especially Humeans, are trying to answer the second unanswerable question, of how nature-free value can get into the value-free natural world. That all this results from the same mistake, McDowell suggests, can be seen in Aristotle- but we need to have the insights of Wittgenstein in mind to read him properly. The Modern picture is so powerful that it is almost impossible not to read Aristotle as either attempting to 'ground' ethics in the non-ethical, or attempting to 'explain' moral motivation via a strong internalist thesis about moral beliefs. What is the alternative? To understand ethics in its own terms. This deprives us of explanatory naturalism. We can't without error expect to understand ethics in any terms but ethical. This has seemed to many philosophers to be unduly restrictive, and to threaten relativism.8 But in fact it does not lead to these difficulties or, more accurately, it doesn't exacerbate them. The problem of displaying the rationality of ethics in a compelling way is real. But it is also general. It is the same as the problem of displaying the rationality of all the other things we do-- playing games, conducting scientific enquiry, writing philosophy papers. We might be able to make connections between activities using an analogy with another game, say, to illuminate the game of chess for someone. But all we will ever be able to lay our hands on in the activity of explaining, is more of the same: parts of our life. The idea of our being able to use 'the world as it is in itself to explain any of our activities is practically contradictory. And the idea that rationality -- supernature, rather than first nature -- can be used to explain ethics in this way, involves a similar error. The way we think, acquire beliefs, deliberate, justify ourselves, is also part of our life. It is as 'fundamental' in that life as ethics is, but no more so--no more knowable 'in itself, as Aristotle, in the grip of a similar error to our own, would have put it, than it is 'to us', here and now, living as we live. So explanatory accounts of ethics, whether they invoke first-nature or super natural reason, are mistaken. Explicatory naturalism is as far as we can go. And as far as we need to go.

#### This is the only way to bridge the “is-ought” gap-- it is not that we ought to act a certain way because those actions are observed; rather we discern what a species is meant to be like through empirical observations.

#### Pettit

Reader 2k (Soran Reader, Department of Philosophy @ Durham, “New Directions in Ethics: Naturalisms, Reasons and Virtue”, 2k)//Miro

Reductive first-nature explanatory accounts of ethics are less popular now than they used to be. One strand does survive, to be seen for example in Frank Jackson (1995), and in Jackson and Pettit (1998) and (2000), although the claim that a complete reduction of the ethical to the natural is possible, is progressively weakened. Jackson explores the idea that value in the form of teleology is present in first nature, and that this can ground ethics, to argue for a (non-eliminative) reduction of the evaluative to the descriptive, which exploits the notion of function. But in response it can be argued that while explication is possible, no explanatory reduction can be achieved in this way: either the concept of function is already ethical, or ethics cannot be grounded in it.6 If this is right, an explanatory reduc tion is blocked, and explication, with its benign informative circularities, is all that is available. Berys Gaut (1997) argues for something like this: an explicatory first-natural picture which has the ideological notion of function at its core. For him, the evaluative is built into the natural, in the natural concept of flourishing, and the ethically demanding concept of need which is conceptually connected to it.

#### the subject of ethical thought must provide the initial ethical premise from which the further ethical conclusions may be deduced.

Macintyre 81 (Alasdair MacIntyre, Renowned Scottish Philosopher, “After Virtue,” 1981)//Miro

Some later moral philosophers have gone so far as to describe the thesis that from a set of factual premises no moral conclusion validly follows as 'a truth of logic'. understanding it as derivable from a more general principle which some medieval logicians formulated as the claim that in a valid argument nothing can appear in the conclusion which was not already in the premises. And, such philosophers have suggested, in an argument in which any attempt is made to derive a moral or evaluative conclusion from factual premises something which is not in the premises, namely the moral or evaluative element, will appear in the conclusion. Hence any such argument must fail. Yet in fact the alleged unrestrictedly general logical principle on which everything is being made to depend is bogus-and the scholastic tag applies only to Aristotelian syllogisms. There are several types of valid argument in which some element may appear in a conclusion which is not present in the premises. A.N. Prior's counter-example to this alleged principle illustrates its breakdown adequately; from the premise 'He is a sea-captain', the conclusion may be validly inferred that 'He ought to do whatever a sea-captain ought to do'. This counter-example not only shows that there is no general principle of the type alleged; but it itself shows what is at least a grammatical truth - an 'is' premise can on occasion entail an 'ought' conclusion. Adherents of the 'no "ought" from "is" view' could however easily meet part of the difficulty raised by Prior's example by reformulating their own position. What they intended to claim they might and would presumably say, is that no conclusion with substantial evaluative and moral content and the conclusion in Prior's example certainly does lack any such content-can be derived from factual premises. Yet the problem would remain for them as to why now anyone would accept their claim. For they have conceded that it cannot be derived from any unrestrictedly general logical principle. Yet their claim may still have substance, but a substance that derives from a particular, and in the eighteenth century new, conception of moral rules and judgments. It may, that is, assert a principle whose validity derives not from some general logical principle, but from the meaning of the key terms employed. Suppose that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the meaning and implications of the key terms used in moral utterance had changed their character; it could then turn out to be the case that what had once been valid inferences from or to some particular moral premise or conclusion would no longer be valid inferences from or to what seemed to be the same factual premise or moral conclusion. For what in some sense were the same expressions, the same sentences would now bear a different meaning. But do we in fact have any evidence for such a change of meaning? To answer this question it is helpful to consider another type of counter-example to the 'No "ought" conclusions from "is" premises' thesis. From such factual premises as 'This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping' and 'This watch is too heavy to carry about comfortably', the evaluative conclusion validly follows that This is a bad watch'. From such factual premises as 'He gets a better yield for this crop per acre than any farmer in the district', 'He has the most effective programme of soil renewal yet known' and 'His dairy herd wins all the first prizes at the agricultural shows', the evaluative conclusion validly follows that 'He is a good farmer'. Both of these arguments are valid because of the special character of the concepts of a watch and of a farmer. Such concepts are functional concepts; that is to say, we define both 'watch' and 'farmer' in terms of the purpose or function which a watch or a farmer are characteristically expected to serve.

#### Thus, inherent characteristics are the basis for any conception of human goodness.

Foot 3 (Foot, Philippa. British philosopher, known for her work in Aristotelian ethics. “Natural Goodness.”)//Miro

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by . . . other means.’ 18 Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called an ‘Aristotelian necessity’: that which is necessary because and in so far as good hangs on it.19 We invoke the same idea when we say that it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill. These ‘Aristotelian necessities’ depend on what the particular species of plants and animals need, on their natural habitat, and the ways of making out that are in their repertoire. These things together determine what it is for members of a particular species to be as they should be, and to do that which they should do.20 And for all the enormous differences between the life of humans and that of plants or animals, we can see that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do. We do not need to be able to dive like gannets, nor to see in the dark like owls; but our memory and concentration must be such as to allow us to learn language, and our sight such that we can recognize faces at a glance; while, like lionesses, human parents are defective if they do not teach their young the skills that they need to survive.

#### Codification bad

Silva 11 (Rui Silva, University of the Azores. “VIRTUE ETHICS AND COMMUNITARIANISM” 2011. DIACRÍTICA)

But what went wrong with modern moral theories? We may say that, according to virtue ethicists, modern moral philosophy commits a fundamental sin when it tries to ground moral action on a set of universal rules or principles. Such an approach to moral life is subject to two major objections. In the first place, it promotes an abstract account of the ethical domain that neglects some vital aspects of moral life: education, character, motivation, happiness or emotions. In fact, virtue ethics is characterized by a focus on real agents, in contrast to the deontological focus on duties or actions (considered independently of their consequences) and the consequentialist focus on the results of actions. In the second place, virtue ethics claims that moral knowledge cannot be reduced to a system of rules and principles; in other words, moral knowledge is uncodifiable. The quotes in epigraph help us to understand the appeal of virtue ethics in comparison with deontological and consequentialists approaches to ethics. These approaches, which dominated modern moral philosophy, suffer from what John Cottingham called a “depersonalizing tendency” (1996: 58). In fact, both perspectives are impersonal accounts of moral action: deontological theories are based on a list of universally valid duties or obligations, whereas consequentialism is guided by equally impersonal rules that are supposed to promote, for instance, collective happiness or welfare. On the contrary, virtue ethics, far from abstracting from the character, motivations and even emotions from the agent, tries to ground moral action in the real agent. This point has a good illustration in McDowell's claim that ethics should be “approached via the notion of a virtuous person. A conception of right conduct is 3 grasped, as it were, from the inside out” (McDowell, 1998: 50). A similar idea is sometimes expressed by saying that virtue ethics focuses on being, whereas deontological and consequentialist perspectives focus on doing. In other words, the central question for virtue ethicists is “what sort of person should I be?”; in contrast, the key question for modern moral philosophers is “how should I act?”2 In the philosophy of the human sciences, there is a distinction between cold methodologies and hot methodologies; in similar vein, we can speak of cold (consequentialism/deontologism) and hot (virtue ethics) approaches to ethics.

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5. Simo Vehmas and Nick Watson. “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies.” Disability and Society. 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)