# Hobbes NC

I negate and defend the status quo.

It is impossible to derive morality from academic reflection

A. We are always bound by our individual perspectives- language and other basic assumptions are not bounded externally

Parrish 05, Rick. "Derrida's economy of violence in Hobbes' social contract." Theory & Event 7.4 (2005).

The point, as Richard Beardsworth (one of Derrida’s most noteworthy commentators) explains, is that “a decision is always needed because there is no natural status to language, and that given this irreducibility of a decision, there are different kinds of decisions — those that recognize their legislative and executive force and those which hide it under some claim to naturality qua ‘theory’ or ‘objective science’.”22 In the first case the person recognizes and embraces its status as a creator of meaning, but in the second case the person more closely resembles Nietzsche’s scientific ascetic who, while still a person and thus a creator, denies his nature and instead claims to discover fact. But in either event, a person “is always . . . a legislator and policeman,”23 a creator and subsequent enforcer of its creations of meaning and value. So for Derrida, any discursive positioning is the outcome of an ordeal of the undecidable that is itself necessary because there is no objective, transparently discoverable truth. Rather, persons exist as the choosers, the creators, of discursive positionality (meaning; value). Violence is then the unavoidable denial of the other as a source of meaning independent of oneself. Derrida argues that both pure violence and pure non-violence are paradoxical, but before explaining this point I shall lay out why Hobbes agrees that humans are the creators of meaning and value, and proceed from there. Perhaps the single most telling quote from Hobbes on this point comes from The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (usually known by its Latin name, De Cive), in which he states that “to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words.”24 “For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality,”25 so the “connections between names and objects are not natural.”26 They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms “are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves.”27 Since “there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil,”28 these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts.

1. Using academic frameworks presupposes values itself such as the value of truth or good scholarship. Thus any attempt at deduction would beg the question by assuming value in the first place.

The sovereign must reconcile different values by asserting a normative truth.

Parish 06, Rick, Violence Inevitable: The Play of Force and Respect in Derrida, Nietzsche, 2006, https://books.google.com/books?id=YC6OxLoixdgC&pg=PA55&lpg=PA55&dq=the+sovereign%27s+job+is+to+be+an+ultimate+definer+peace+is+only+possible&source=bl&ots=3RPGXKlMNh&sig=TjzxedcCuuvmUIpqa5O1ZwqsFPw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAGoVChMIuZXujP7lyAIVU9ZjCh3JOgvd#v=onepage&q=the%20sovereign's%20job%20is%20to%20be%20an%20ultimate%20definer%20peace%20is%20only%20possible&f=false

All of the foregoing pints to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’s first and most fundamental job is to be the ultimate definer. Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that peace “is possible only if the ambiguity and disagreement that pervade general thinking and acting are eliminated by the stipulations of a sovereign.” Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that “one of the primary functions of the sovereign is to provide the necessary unity of meaning and reference for the‘ primary terms in which [people] men try to conduct their social lives.” “The whole [purpose in the sovereign’s ruling] raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic defusing of interpretive clashes,” without which humans would “fly off in all directions” and fall inevitably into the violence of the natural condition.

Thus the standard is consistency with the sovereign’s authority

Prefer

1. It’s impossible to escape the neg fw- even if we removed the sovereign each person would become their own individual sovereign

Parish 2, Rick, Violence Inevitable: The Play of Force and Respect in Derrida, Nietzsche, 2006, https://books.google.com/books?id=YC6OxLoixdgC&pg=PA55&lpg=PA55&dq=the+sovereign%27s+job+is+to+be+an+ultimate+definer+peace+is+only+possible&source=bl&ots=3RPGXKlMNh&sig=TjzxedcCuuvmUIpqa5O1ZwqsFPw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCAQ6AEwAGoVChMIuZXujP7lyAIVU9ZjCh3JOgvd#v=onepage&q=the%20sovereign's%20job%20is%20to%20be%20an%20ultimate%20definer%20peace%20is%20only%20possible&f=false

But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that **in the state of nature persons must** not only try to control as many objects as possible -- they must also try to **control as many** persons **as possible**. "There is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, **by force** or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among [persons in the state of nature] there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. **Persons,** as rationally self-interestedbeings **who** "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and **value themselves above all** others, attempt to **force that valuation on others.** "The **human desire** for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," **is** therefore primarily **about subsuming others beneath one'**s own personhood**, as** direct **objects** or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase."Hobbes argues that **this discursive struggle** rapidly **becomes physical** by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 **The ultimate violence**, the surest and most complete way **of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person,** and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaningThree

Multiple impacts

a. Non-uniques disads to the framework. The sovereign exists regardless or not.

b. Turns the aff fw at the highest layer- absent a sovereign we live in a state of nature with no rights or freedoms whatsoever, justifying infinite violations of the aff fw.

c. err negative on the framework debate- the sovereign will always exist so our default position should be to listen to them, unless we have a very strong reason to disagree.

## Contention

1. The Sovereign has a unique obligation to suppress dissenting speech

Bejan 10 Bejan, Theresa M. (Yale University). “Teaching the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on education.” Oxford Review of Education. 36: 5, 2010. pp. 607–626.

University reform for Hobbes did not concern higher education alone, but rather the civic education of the entire commonwealth, and hence it was a matter of supreme political importance. As the recent civil wars had demonstrated, “where the people are not well instructed in their duty”, the peace of the commonwealth will be perpetually disturbed (Leviathan, 19:9 p. 122). In order to maintain peace, force was not enough; subjects must also be taught (Behemoth, p. 59). Sovereigns who failed to exercise their rights in overseeing the people’s education were not only shortsighted; they were guilty of neglecting the very end for which sovereignty was instituted. “The actions of men proceed from their opinions,” Hobbes explained, and “in the well-governing of opinions consisteth the well-governing of men’s actions, in order to their peace and concord” (Leviathan, 18:9 p. 113). Hence education of the people in true civic doctrine was, he insisted, an essential duty of the sovereign power (30:6 p. 222). The conclusion that popular education was of paramount political importance derived for Hobbes from his conviction that the sovereign’s authority rested ultimately on the public opinion of his power and hence was “grounded on the consent of the people and their promise to obey him” (Leviathan, 40:6, p. 319). Far from being merely a curious digression or megalomaniacal outburst, Hobbes’s proposed reform of the universities in Leviathan was instead a central and urgent conclusion of his civil science, and despite the prominence of the universities in his discussion, his educational aspirations extended well beyond hopes for a trickle-down enlightenment. His writings reveal instead a program for truly universal civic education, effected through a variety of channels. This comprehensive instruction of the commonwealth would require Hobbes’s civil doctrine to be taught to people at all levels of society and at every stage of life. Not only the universities, but also the pulpit and the family must be made to serve the educational aims of the commonwealth, and these must furthermore be supplemented with sovereign assiduity in suppressing dissent. Hobbes hoped that the sovereign might thereby educate a true “public”, characterized not only by consensus, but “a real unity of them all” (Leviathan, 17:13 p. 109).

2. Err negative on the contention debate. Public colleges are the sovereign

Buchter 73, Jonathan. “Contract law and the student-university relationship.” *Indiana Law Journal,* vol. 48, issue. 2, article 5, Winter 1973.

“This theoretical mixture was applied in student-university litigation until Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education was decided in 1961. Dixon held, generally, that a public university’s actions were state actions and therefore subject to constitutional restraints and, more particularly, that a student must be afforded procedural due process prior to expulsion. However, the state action doctrine in Dixon has not replaced the implied contract theory. Courts still view the student-university relationship as one of contract with certain constitutional protections required if the institution is public. Thus, there may currently be some limits on what the public university may demand from the student. For example, a public university may not be able to deny a student certain first amendment rights. However, since the Dixon holding is limited to public institutions, a private university may be able to contract in such a way as to limit these constitutional rights.”

Our default should be that the sovereign can do whatever they please, because they have ultimate power. And status quo proves that they want restrictions.