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#### Colleges are successfully limiting anti-war speech now – it’s key to boosting recruitment

SW 5 [(Socialist Workers) Cracking down on student protests, International Socialist Review10-7-2005] AT

CAMPUS ADMINISTRATORS are cracking down on student activists who stand up against the presence of military recruiters at their schools. In late September, peaceful protests by students at three campuses--Holyoke Community College (HCC), George Mason University (GMU) and the University of Wisconsin-Madison--were met with police repression that denied students their right to free speech. -- At Holyoke Community College in western Massachusetts, about 30 students were conducting a peaceful picket of an Army National Guard recruiting table in the school cafeteria. The activists had been assured by campus officials that they could leaflet and chant during their picket of the recruiters. But they were attacked by campus security after a few approached the recruiters' table to inquire if their homosexuality would make them ineligible to enlist. One student, Charles Peterson, was put in a chokehold by campus officer Scott Landry--and maced. Landry, who assaulted several other students and bystanders, happens to serve as a staff advisor to the HCC College Republicans, who were enthusiastically encouraging the attack from behind the police lines. Landry then saw another activist wearing a gay and lesbian liberation button, and loudly commented to another officer, "He'll have fun in jail." The counter-recruitment demonstration was called by the HCC Anti-War Coalition (AWC), an affiliate of the Campus Antiwar Network (CAN). A diverse group of activists--black, white, Latino, gay and straight--answered the call. "I was there to speak for my brother," said one student, a member of the AWC Steering Committee. "He was wounded in Iraq...He was promised money for college and a chance to see the world. But he went to Iraq, and he wasn't the same when he came back." Rather than take action against the officers who attacked protesters, campus police threatened Peterson with arrest if he came back to campus. Though an administration official later told him that he is welcome on campus, Peterson has yet to receive any such assurance from the campus police. Peterson says he won't back down, though. "The next time the recruiters are there, I'll be on the front ranks," he said. Following a successful October 3 press conference, preparations were underway for an October 6 solidarity action organized by student antiwar activists from University of Massachusetts-Amherst. -- Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away, campus police at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va., used the same sort of violent tactics against student Tariq Khan, a former airman turned counter-recruitment activist. Khan, who has protested recruiters on his campus before, taped a sign to his chest that read "U.S. out of Iraq, U.S. out of Palestine, U.S. out of North America: Resist tyranny" and silently sat down in a chair several feet away from recruiters. For this modest protest, Khan was exposed to abuse and battery from campus police and other students, pushed off a stage, subjected to pain compliance, and charged with disorderly conduct and trespassing--at his own school! As right-wing students shouted epithets in his face, his sign was ripped off his chest. A former Marine who had been to Iraq told Khan to "shut up," and when Khan asked him how many people he'd killed, the Marine responded "not enough." As Khan began to make another sign, an officer told him, "You're not allowed to do that" and ordered him to leave. When Khan refused, the officer tried to arrest him. Some students repeatedly chanted "Let him go!" as Khan squirmed out of various headlocks and grips, and other students began to jump in with the police, according to several witnesses. "I am being nonviolent while they are using violence against me!" shouted Khan. After finally handcuffing Khan, police dragged him to a police car. Khan, who is half Pakistani, said he received the worst racist abuse at the police station. "You people are the most violent people in the world," he recalls one cop telling him. Another told him not to mouth off in jail because they "will hang you from the ceiling by your feet," a veiled allusion to prisoner torture at Guantánamo Bay. -- At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 25 people mobilized to confront military recruiters at a career fair on one day's notice last week. But the police and administration were intent on preventing the protest from taking place. Ten cops were already inside, and building managers distributed a copy of the administrative code for protests in UW buildings to protesters on their arrival. But this code didn't seem to matter much, since the protesters weren't violating any part of it--they weren't preventing the event from taking place, blocking the recruiters' tables, using signs with sticks, or blocking entrances and exits. Police refused to give protesters any justification for their imminent arrest, and after some time, the protesters decided to move outside and began chanting and handing out leaflets for another hour. With enlistment slumping, military officials are increasingly desperate to find potential recruits. As of September 30, the military had fallen some 7,000 recruits short of its goal for fiscal year 2005--and the National Guard and Army Reserve did even worse. Military officials predict that meeting the coming year's goal will be even more difficult. "I think there's been a big shift in U.S. politics over the last few months," said Elizabeth Wrigley-Field, a student at New York University and member of the Campus Antiwar Network. "The resurgence of the antiwar movement--especially among students who are focusing on counter-recruitment--promises to erect even more barriers to filling the ranks of the military. The antiwar movement has gone from feeling like an embattled minority to feeling like the majority we are. "But we're running up against college administrations that don't want to lose control of the campuses. And they may be facing pressure from a government that's seeing the Army in its worst recruiting slump since 1979--and telling administrators that they need to do whatever it takes to guarantee their success on campuses. "Last semester, there were cases of repression against counter-recruiters, and some of them sparked defense campaigns that were successful and showed the administration that they couldn't get away with repressing student protests. This time, what's amazing is how quickly the schools seemed prepared to deal with the protesters and how happy they were to collude with right-wing students who were singling out individual protesters. "But now we have the successes of last spring to draw on, so HCC and GMU students can have a connection to City College of New York and San Francisco State students who won. Most importantly, the whole student antiwar movement is growing and becoming more confident, and that means the HCC and GMU students have a more powerful movement that's got their back."

#### Campus activism against war undermines morale and forces withdrawal – collapses American presence abroad and causes massive instability that culminates in extinction

Janet Levy 7 [(Janet Levy, ) Iraq’s only Similarity to Vietnam: Its Dangerous Anti-War Movement, Accuracy in Media 2-28-2007] AT

Contrary to media reports and the perception of a majority of Americans, the United States was winning the war in Vietnam following the successful watershed battle known as the Tet Offensive. Sadly, the Vietnam War was not lost on the battlefield. The carnage and repressive regimes that followed the U.S. exit may have been avoided had the truth been known by the American public. The United States was defeated by a carefully conceived, multi-pronged propaganda campaign that set the stage for America’s eventual failure in the region. The ingredients for the U.S. defeat consisted of the funding and encouragement of the anti-war movement by Hanoi and Communist splinter groups, enlistment of “useful idiots” in Hollywood to publicize and popularize the movement, media complicity with negative portrayals of the war, anti-American proselytizing by professors and students on American university campuses, denigration and demonizing of the military and, ultimately, withdrawal of support and appropriations by the U.S. Congress. All these factors led to the perceptual reframing of the Vietnam War as an ignoble imperialistic atrocity, a far cry from its launch as a fight to extinguish communism in Southeast Asia. Today, many of these same elements have reappeared as the United States struggles to defeat Islamic terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan and to apprehend a fifth column of jihadists at home. Inherited from the Vietnam experience, they are now evident within the new conflict. This time, the risks to our country’s future are even greater should they succeed. Anti-War Groups As was true during the Vietnam War, today’s anti-war groups hide their anti-Americanism behind the politics of peace. Recruiting others on a platform of “peace,” they ally themselves with radical Islamists, glorify the enemy’s goals and identify themselves as “freedom fighters,” battling an imperialistic world power. In the lead up to the war against Iraq, anti-war activists effectively mobilized some of the largest protests and demonstrations since the Vietnam War. They attacked the war effort abroad and security measures at home, sympathized with Saddam Hussein as a victim of American war-mongering and even served as strategically-placed human shields. Although Operation Iraqi Freedom was welcomed by the vast majority of Iraqis and succeeded in liberating 25 million people from the ravages of a murderous despot, anti-war protestors decried the U.S. “occupation” of Iraq and the alleged subjugation of the Iraqi people. Their steadfast position was that any use of American military power was an attempt to establish American hegemony in the region and exploit Iraq’s oil resources. The discovery of Saddam’s mass graves and torture chambers were ignored by the anti-war movement in the service of demonizing the actions of the evil, American empire. Hollywood Similarly, in the tradition of Hanoi Jane Fonda, Hollywood plays a highly visible role in opposing the Iraq war and in spearheading demonstrations. Fonda is back in the anti-war fray as Jihad Jane joined by actors Susan Sarandon, Tim Robbins, Sean Penn and others. Before the invasion by coalition forces, Penn embarked on a “fact finding mission” in Iraq, where he met with Saddam Hussein. In a propaganda coup for the anti-war movement and the Baathists, Penn proclaimed to the media that the United States had initiated the war effort on false and illegitimate premises and declared that Iraq was free of weapons of mass destruction. Since then, the Hollywood anti-war cabal has threatened the political future of elected representatives unwilling to support the recent, nonbinding resolution against the war. As Hollywood stars use their celebrity in their attempts to sabotage the U.S. war effort, they fail to mention Saddam’s rape rooms, gassing of Kurds and murder of children in front of their parents. These movie stars deny the valiant purpose of the U.S. mission and its committed and brave soldiers. Instead, they give aid, comfort and legitimacy to the enemy. Mass Media As in the Vietnam era, the media has become the propaganda machine for the anti-war movement, using the same tactics of the 1960s and 1970s. The overwhelmingly negative and biased reporting of the Vietnam War era is very much in evidence in today’s Iraq coverage. The press continually advances the notion that life was better for the Iraqis under Saddam, minimizes the atrocities committed by Saddam and his henchman, and focuses instead on the U.S. role in “destabilizing” Iraq. The “good news” about economic recovery, business successes, progress made by the Iraqi government and improvements in public services are ignored in favor of stories of civil strife. Every attack on American soldiers and Iraqis is magnified and featured prominently, while successes are largely ignored or reported in passing. Few news stories focus on the heroism and generosity of American troops. Any hint of malfeasance, allegations of combat errors or misconduct on the part of the U.S. military gets center stage. U.S. forces are portrayed as an enemy as dangerous or even more so, than the terrorist groups they fight. U.S. soldiers are portrayed as acting without regard to the rule of law and abusing the rights of captured “insurgents.” Schools Equally reminiscent of the ’60s and ’70s, university and high school campuses are hotbeds for anti-American and anti-war sentiments. Prior to the inception of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the “Books Not Bombs” strike was coordinated on campuses nationwide by the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition, whose members include the Young Communist League, USA, and the Muslim Students’ Association of the U.S. and Canada. This anti-war protest was endorsed by professors in a wide variety of disciplines, from economics to biology, who cancelled classes or assured anti-war students they would not be penalized for absences. Some professors even focused the day’s class material on the potential war. Thus, a majority of institutions of higher education appeared to expect conformity of anti-war opinion and, in some cases, actually imposed the strike on the student population. This behavior continues today as literature and anthropology professors use classroom time to express their opinions against the war and pressure students to toe their ideological line. Often, students who agree with the Bush administration’s policy in Iraq jeopardize their grades by coming forward. They are treated with disdain and even disrespect in the classroom. Returning Iraq war veterans have been insulted, harassed and called “baby killers” in university classrooms. The Military Finally, as was the case during the U.S. fight against communism in Southeast Asia, the mission of the military has been undermined by blatant hostility and blanket condemnations. Venomous slurs have been directed toward the dedicated servicemen and women who toppled a brutal dictator, struggled against radical Islamists, and fought for a better life for the Iraqi people. Politicians have been extremely negative. For example, Illinois senator Barrack Obama referred to the “wasted” lives of our soldiers. Massachusetts Senator John Kerry insulted the intelligence of our armed forces by proclaiming that people end up in the military if they’re not smart or studious. Anti-military groups have tried to stop military recruitment drives and job fair participation in high schools and on college campuses. Even though all recruits today are committed volunteers who believe in the U.S. mission, anti-war activists portray them as victims, mercenaries or butchers. Isolated military improprieties committed by a few soldiers, like the Haditha incident and the Abu Ghraib scandal, receive outsized attention and are portrayed as representative of all military conduct. The slightest hint of misconduct is used to characterize all recruits and to malign the entire military mission. Anti-militarism has even been expressed by sweeping, local government measures. The city of San Francisco has engaged in various actions to rid itself of any relationship whatsoever to the military. Residents recently passed a symbolic measure demanding the withdrawal of troops from Iraq and prohibiting recruitment at high schools and colleges. City residents tried to stop Navy sponsorship of a summer concert, successfully blocked the docking of the USS Iowa at the Port of San Francisco and are trying to eliminate Fleet Week and the Blue Angels air shows. Congress In Congress, many Democrats and several Republicans are invoking the Vietnam “quagmire” descriptive to support demands to curtail the Iraq war and withdraw U.S. troops. The Democrat electorate has chosen to interpret recent election results as a sign that the public is opposed to the war, rather than opposed to the way the war is being fought. According to a recent national survey by Public Opinion Strategies, a majority of Americans (57%) wants to win the war in Iraq and makes the connection between Iraq and the global jihad. Fifty-three percent feel the Democrats are acting precipitously in pushing for immediate withdrawal and a majority (56%) also believes that Americans should stand behind the president in times of war. Most telling, 74% of those surveyed disagreed with the statement, “I don’t care what happens in Iraq after the U.S. leaves. I just want the troops brought home.” Last week, on the same day that Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki told Bush that the new security plan and heightened troop presence in Baghdad were “a dazzling success,” the House passed a non-binding resolution rejecting Bush’s 21,500-troop surge in Iraq. In the Senate, the resolution was just four votes short of the sixty required for cloture, which would have limited debate on the resolution and ensured passage. As a consequence of this narrow defeat, Democrats have pledged to repeal a 2002 measure authorizing and defining the mission of U.S. troops in Iraq. With no consideration of how this plays with the enemy, the morale of U.S. troops and the U.S. ground troops’ ability to build alliances with Iraqis, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid issued a statement that the invasion of Iraq was “the worst foreign policy mistake” in U.S. history. In further attempts to block the deployment of more troops, House Democrats hope to restrict parts of a $100 billion emergency military funding request by the President. Rep. John Murtha (D-PA) and other Democrats have joined forces with anti-war groups to limit the President’s powers as Commander-In-Chief. Murtha and company plan to attach stipulations to any military appropriations; embark on a multi-million dollar, anti-war advertising campaign; and target vulnerable Republicans. Murtha is also seeking legislation as part of what he calls his “slow bleed strategy.” It would prevent military units from being deployed unless they meet certain standards and receive a break of at least one year between deployments. This damaging action by politicians and their failure to support the U.S. government “destroys morale, stymies success and emboldens the enemy,” says Rep. Sam Johnson (R-TX), a former Vietnam prisoner of war. “Words cannot fully describe the horrendous damage of the anti-American efforts against the war back home to the guys on the ground,” Johnson said. “We must stick by ‘the troops.’ We must support them all the way. To our troops we must remain always faithful.” This inattention to the message being sent to our soldiers is part of the broader failure by Iraq war opponents to recognize the dire consequences of U.S. withdrawal. It completely escapes opponents of the war on all fronts anti-war activists, Hollywood, colleges and universities and politicians that the conflict is not regional and one from which we can walk away without harm. It is positively stunning that they fail to recognize that Iraq could fall to Islamic terrorists. If this happened, Iraq would be a fertile base for Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups and a haven from which emboldened terrorists could attack U.S. allies and interests and threaten the very existence of our nation.

#### US leadership prevents great power war and existential governance crises

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth ’13 (Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferationchanges as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary **for peace** is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

### Military Research DA—1NC

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Police refused to give protesters any justification for their imminent arrest, and after some time, the protesters decided to move outside and began chanting and handing out leaflets for another hour. With enlistment slumping, military officials are increasingly desperate to find potential recruits. As of September 30, the military had fallen some 7,000 recruits short of its goal for fiscal year 2005--and the National Guard and Army Reserve did even worse. Military officials predict that meeting the coming year's goal will be even more difficult. "I think there's been a big shift in U.S. politics over the last few months," said Elizabeth Wrigley-Field, a student at New York University and member of the Campus Antiwar Network. "The resurgence of the antiwar movement--especially among students who are focusing on counter-recruitment--promises to erect even more barriers to filling the ranks of the military. 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#### Anti-war sentiment on campuses decreases military funding for research at colleges

Winograd 87 [Terry Winograd (CS professor at Stanford), "Strategic Computing Research and the Universities," 1987] AZ

Finally, more subtle but potentially more dangerous is the effect of military funding on the open political activity of students and faculty within the universities. University administrators know that an atmosphere of student antimilitary activism may well lead military sponsors to fear the disruption of research activities, or at least to see the university as a less congenial environment for the research. Although direct pressure is rarely applied against student activities, it would be naive to think that university administrators were immune to such important financial considerations. At the individual faculty level, such pressure has been more overt. In his Senate confirmation hearings in 1985, Undersecretary of Defense Donald Hicks (the head of research for the Pentagon) sharply criticized opponents of the Strategic Defense Initiative and stated: “I am not particularly interested in seeing department money going someplace where an individual is outspoken in his rejection of department aims, even for basic research.” Hicks was later quoted in Science as saying, “Those who want to accept the money to help us with programs we need, we want to have. But I don’t particularly view it as appropriate when somebody says we don’t like the way you’re running the department, but we sure like your money.” He said later that he was principally upset by computer scientists who depend in part on DOD support, but voice skepticism about the feasibility of the software demanded by a comprehensive missile defense. “If they want to get out and use their roles as professors to make statements, that’s fine, it’s a free country,” Hicks said. “But freedom works both ways. They’re free to keep their mouths shut...[and] I’m also free not to give them money. . . I have a tough time with disloyalty.“‘9

#### Continued government funding and support is critical for continued university research programs, which is the lynchpin of innovation and competitiveness

NSB no date (National Science Board, “Research and Development: Essential Foundation For U.S. Competitiveness in a Global Economy”, “Global Competition in Science and Technology: A Strong National Response Required”, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsb0803/start.htm, EmmieeM)

Innovation is a key to economic competitiveness and the technological breakthroughs that improve our lives

AND

is imperative that patterns and trends of RandD investments be monitored.

#### Innovation solves great power war

Taylor 4 – Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Mark, “The Politics of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 4/1/2004, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor>) //RGP

I. Introduction Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost every aspect of the sub-field. First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states, and hence have a role in calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile, affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. Third, insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. Thus, in broad theoretical terms, technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if theory alone does not convince, then history also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence, such as Britain during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth century. Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally drift and fade from influence on international scene. This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute technological capability have a major impact on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists. Technology is rarely the sole or overriding causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. At the very least, they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology is the very cornerstone of great power domination, and its transfer the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. Jervis tells us that the balance of offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. Walt agrees, arguing that technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the international balance of threats. Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information, technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. Meanwhile, over at the “third debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue, from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology inevitably drives nations to form a world state. However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt, arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society, and sometimes even creates new cross-national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as running between economic classes rather than nation-states. Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place.

### Readiness DA—1NC

#### Colleges are successfully limiting anti-war speech now – it’s key to boosting recruitment

SW 5 [(Socialist Workers) Cracking down on student protests, International Socialist Review10-7-2005] AT

CAMPUS ADMINISTRATORS are cracking down on student activists who stand up against the presence of military recruiters at their schools. In late September, peaceful protests by students at three campuses--Holyoke Community College (HCC), George Mason University (GMU) and the University of Wisconsin-Madison--were met with police repression that denied students their right to free speech. -- At Holyoke Community College in western Massachusetts, about 30 students were conducting a peaceful picket of an Army National Guard recruiting table in the school cafeteria. The activists had been assured by campus officials that they could leaflet and chant during their picket of the recruiters. But they were attacked by campus security after a few approached the recruiters' table to inquire if their homosexuality would make them ineligible to enlist. One student, Charles Peterson, was put in a chokehold by campus officer Scott Landry--and maced. Landry, who assaulted several other students and bystanders, happens to serve as a staff advisor to the HCC College Republicans, who were enthusiastically encouraging the attack from behind the police lines. Landry then saw another activist wearing a gay and lesbian liberation button, and loudly commented to another officer, "He'll have fun in jail." The counter-recruitment demonstration was called by the HCC Anti-War Coalition (AWC), an affiliate of the Campus Antiwar Network (CAN). A diverse group of activists--black, white, Latino, gay and straight--answered the call. "I was there to speak for my brother," said one student, a member of the AWC Steering Committee. "He was wounded in Iraq...He was promised money for college and a chance to see the world. But he went to Iraq, and he wasn't the same when he came back." Rather than take action against the officers who attacked protesters, campus police threatened Peterson with arrest if he came back to campus. Though an administration official later told him that he is welcome on campus, Peterson has yet to receive any such assurance from the campus police. Peterson says he won't back down, though. "The next time the recruiters are there, I'll be on the front ranks," he said. Following a successful October 3 press conference, preparations were underway for an October 6 solidarity action organized by student antiwar activists from University of Massachusetts-Amherst. -- Meanwhile, hundreds of miles away, campus police at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va., used the same sort of violent tactics against student Tariq Khan, a former airman turned counter-recruitment activist. Khan, who has protested recruiters on his campus before, taped a sign to his chest that read "U.S. out of Iraq, U.S. out of Palestine, U.S. out of North America: Resist tyranny" and silently sat down in a chair several feet away from recruiters. For this modest protest, Khan was exposed to abuse and battery from campus police and other students, pushed off a stage, subjected to pain compliance, and charged with disorderly conduct and trespassing--at his own school! As right-wing students shouted epithets in his face, his sign was ripped off his chest. A former Marine who had been to Iraq told Khan to "shut up," and when Khan asked him how many people he'd killed, the Marine responded "not enough." As Khan began to make another sign, an officer told him, "You're not allowed to do that" and ordered him to leave. When Khan refused, the officer tried to arrest him. Some students repeatedly chanted "Let him go!" as Khan squirmed out of various headlocks and grips, and other students began to jump in with the police, according to several witnesses. "I am being nonviolent while they are using violence against me!" shouted Khan. After finally handcuffing Khan, police dragged him to a police car. Khan, who is half Pakistani, said he received the worst racist abuse at the police station. "You people are the most violent people in the world," he recalls one cop telling him. Another told him not to mouth off in jail because they "will hang you from the ceiling by your feet," a veiled allusion to prisoner torture at Guantánamo Bay. -- At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 25 people mobilized to confront military recruiters at a career fair on one day's notice last week. But the police and administration were intent on preventing the protest from taking place. Ten cops were already inside, and building managers distributed a copy of the administrative code for protests in UW buildings to protesters on their arrival. But this code didn't seem to matter much, since the protesters weren't violating any part of it--they weren't preventing the event from taking place, blocking the recruiters' tables, using signs with sticks, or blocking entrances and exits. Police refused to give protesters any justification for their imminent arrest, and after some time, the protesters decided to move outside and began chanting and handing out leaflets for another hour. With enlistment slumping, military officials are increasingly desperate to find potential recruits. As of September 30, the military had fallen some 7,000 recruits short of its goal for fiscal year 2005--and the National Guard and Army Reserve did even worse. Military officials predict that meeting the coming year's goal will be even more difficult. "I think there's been a big shift in U.S. politics over the last few months," said Elizabeth Wrigley-Field, a student at New York University and member of the Campus Antiwar Network. "The resurgence of the antiwar movement--especially among students who are focusing on counter-recruitment--promises to erect even more barriers to filling the ranks of the military. 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#### Recruitment key to military readiness

Dunn 13 [Richard Dunn (senior analyst at the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center), "The Impact of a Declining Defense Budget on Combat Readiness," Heritage Foundation, 6/18/2013] AZ

Personnel. High-quality, well-trained, and motivated personnel in the necessary numbers and ranks are essential to combat readiness. In the U.S. all-volunteer force, the first task is to recruit sufficient numbers of citizens with the required motivation and physical and mental capabilities to perform complex tasks under austere and often dangerous conditions. Here, the services compete with other opportunities afforded by the civilian economy. The challenge, then, is to provide appropriate incentives to make military careers attractive. While patriotism should never be underestimated as a motive for service, the armed forces have found it necessary to provide salaries, educational opportunities, quality of life, retirement benefits, and health care to attract and retain the required numbers of quality recruits. The recent economic recession has reduced civilian opportunities, and the reductions in force size have reduced the number of recruits required to sustain personnel numbers and quality. However, if the economy recovers and generates more civilian opportunities, recruiting and retaining quality personnel may become increasingly more difficult. Once recruited, service personnel must be taught the individual skills unique to their military missions. Teaching all of these required skill sets is a task of immense scale and scope, ranging from teaching rifle proficiency to Army privates to training naval aviators to operate high-performance aircraft from aircraft carrier flight decks. This requires relatively large training organizations staffed with the highest quality instructors, facilities, and equipment. Moreover, personnel require individual training throughout their careers. Initially, junior officers must be taught basic tactics and leadership skills. As they become more senior and assume higher-level responsibilities, they must learn advanced skills ranging from organizational management techniques to national-level strategy. Enlisted personnel must also progress to become effective and mature leaders and managers at higher and higher levels. As military operations and their enabling technologies become increasingly sophisticated and complex, the training required to master them demands even more time and resources. Thus, it is more effective and efficient to retain trained personnel by motivating them to remain in the service than it is to recruit and train replacements. Recruiting and training activities are both resource and time intensive, and limited assets are available to perform them. This reinforces the requirement to make continued military careers attractive by providing adequate salaries and benefits, especially for more mature personnel with families.

#### Readiness solves global war – deters states from escalating conflicts

Hanson 14 [Victor Hanson (classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University), "Only Deterrence Can Prevent War," National Review, 9/4/2014] AZ

The world seems to be falling apart. Only lunatics from North Korea or Iran once mumbled about using nuclear weapons against their supposed enemies. Now Vladimir Putin, after gobbling up the Crimea, points to his nuclear arsenal and warns the West not to “mess” with Russia. The Middle East terrorist group the Islamic State keeps beheading its captives and threatening the West. Meanwhile Obama admits to the world that we “don’t have a strategy yet” for dealing with such barbaric terrorists. Not long ago he compared them to “jayvees.” Egypt is bombing Libya, which America once bombed and then left. Vice President Joe Biden once boasted that a quiet Iraq without U.S. troops could be “one of the great achievements” of the administration. Not now. China and Japan seem stuck in a 1930s time warp as they once again squabble over disputed territory. Why all the sudden wars? Conflicts rarely break out over needed scarce land — what Adolf Hitler once called “living space” — or even over natural resources. A vast, naturally rich Russia is under-populated and poorly run. It hardly needs more of the Crimea and Ukraine to screw up. The islands that Japan and China haggle over are mostly worthless real estate. Iran has enough oil and natural gas to meet its domestic and export needs without going to war over building a nuclear bomb. Often states fight about prestigious symbols that their own fears and sense of honor have inflated into existential issues. Hamas could turn its back on Israel and turn Gaza into Singapore — but not without feeling that it had backed down. Putin thinks that grabbing more of the old Soviet Republics will bring him the sort of prestige that his hero Stalin once enjoyed. The Islamic State wants to return to 7th-century Islam, when the Muslim world had more power and honor. The great Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges once summed up the Falklands War between his country and Britain as a fight “between two bald men over a comb.” In fact, Britain went to war over distant windswept rocks to uphold the hallowed tradition of the British Navy and the idea that British subjects everywhere were sacrosanct. The unpopular Argentine junta started a war to take Britain down a notch. But disputes over honor or from fear do not always lead to war. Something else is needed — an absence of deterrence. Most aggressors take stupid risks in starting wars only when they feel there is little likelihood they will be stopped. Hitler thought no one would care whether he gobbled up Poland, after he easily ingested Czechoslovakia and Austria. Saddam Hussein went into Kuwait believing the U.S. did not intervene in border disputes among Arab countries. Deterrence, alliances, and balances of power are not archaic concepts that “accidentally” triggered World War I, as we are sometimes told. They are the age-old tools of advising the more bellicose parties to calm down and get a grip. What ends wars? Not the League of Nations or the United Nations. Unfortunately, war is a sort of cruel laboratory experiment whose bloodletting determines which party, in fact, was the stronger all along. Once that fact is again recognized, peace usually follows. It took 50 million deaths to remind the appeased Axis that Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1941 were all along far weaker than the Allies of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The Falklands War ended when Argentines recognized that boasting about beating the British was not the same as beating the British. Each time Hamas builds more tunnels and gets more rockets, it believes this time around it can beat Israel. Its wars end only when Hamas recognizes it can’t. War as a reminder of who is really strong and who weak is a savage way to run the world. Far better would be for peace-loving constitutional governments to remain strong. They should keep their defenses up, and warn Putin, the Islamic State, Iran, North Korea, and others like them that all a stupid war would accomplish would be to remind such aggressors that they would lose so much for nothing. Even nuclear powers need conventional deterrence. They or their interests are often attacked — as in the case of Britain by Argentina, the U.S. by al-Qaeda, or Israel by Hamas — by non-nuclear states on the likely assumption that nuclear weapons will not be used, and on the often erroneous assumption that the stronger power may not wish the trouble or have the ability to reply to the weaker. If deterrence and military readiness seem such a wise investment, why do democracies so often find themselves ill-prepared and bullied by aggressors who then are emboldened to start wars?

### Readiness = heg

#### Readiness is key to heg

Spencer 00 [Jack Spencer (Vice President, the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity), "The Facts About Military Readiness, Heritage Foundation, 9/15/2000] AZ

In recent months, the major foreign policy issue of the 2000 presidential election campaign has been military readiness, with Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. Bush each addressing the subject. Governor Bush has accused the Clinton Administration of military neglect, referring to the U.S. armed forces as "a military in decline."1 Vice President Gore, on the other hand, has countered that "Our military is the strongest and the best in the entire world."2 While there are clear signs that readiness is a problem for the U.S. military, Al Gore is factually correct when he contends that the U.S. armed forces stand far above any other military force. He is missing a more important point, however. The United States, as the most powerful nation in the world, has responsibilities and national security concerns far beyond those of any other nation. U.S. military readiness cannot be gauged by comparing America's armed forces with other nations' militaries. Instead, the capability of U.S. forces to support America's national security requirements should be the measure of U.S. military readiness. Such a standard is necessary because America may confront threats from many different nations at once. America's national security requirements dictate that the armed forces must be prepared to defeat groups of adversaries in a given war. America, as the sole remaining superpower, has many enemies. Because attacking America or its interests alone would surely end in defeat for a single nation, these enemies are likely to form alliances. Therefore, basing readiness on American military superiority over any single nation has little saliency. The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. 1r, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives,3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames."4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy.5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War.6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

### Recruitment High

#### Recruitment at colleges high

Tomsic 12 [Michael Tomsic, "In Weak Economy, College Grads 'Surge' Into Military," NPR, 8/18/2012] AZ

The weak economy is helping to drive thousands more college graduates into the U.S. military. Since the recession began in 2007, there's been a steady increase in the number of college graduates joining the armed forces. The Navy and Army have seen the biggest jumps. About 60 percent more college grads joined the Navy last year than in 2007. For some of them, it's a job some would never have imagined for themselves just a few years ago. Not 'What I Thought I'd Be Doing' Louis Lam fits that bill. He's your typical good college student. He's on the dean's list at the University of Maryland, where he studies electrical engineering. He's active in campus organizations. To save money, he lives at home. He even helps his mom make dinner. "Generally I would just get the dishes and stuff ready," Lam says as his mother drips sauce onto meat sizzling in a skillet. OK, maybe he's not helping with the actual cooking. Mom jokes there's a reason for that. "He's not very good," Mydung Lam laughs. But Lam is a great son, she says. And that son's plans have changed drastically since he got to college. "What I thought that I'd be doing, going into college as an electrical engineer," Lam says, "I thought that I'd be working with gadgets, making robotic things, [tinkering with] groundbreaking technology." The idea of joining the military had never even crossed his mind, Lam says. But that was before both his parents lost their jobs. Unemployment benefits held them over for a while, but they ran out in April. "I was like, I really need to get this job as soon as possible," Lam says. "Otherwise, we might lose the house. We might have to sell some stuff." He saw his college friends struggling to find jobs or internships and says his family couldn't afford for him to go through that. Instead, he turned to the military. As the U.S. has struggled to recover from the worst recession since World War II, tens of thousands of other college students and graduates have made a similar choice. Bad Economy Drives Recruitment "When the economy worsens, as it has in recent years, we certainly see a surge in the number of young people who are highly qualified, who want to join the military," says Beth Asch, who researches military recruitment for the RAND Corp. It has studied U.S. military recruitment for more than 40 years. Asch says the surge in college graduates looks especially large this time around because of just how far the economy fell. "Since the mid-2000s, the unemployment rate has essentially doubled," she says. And since then, the Army and Navy have seen a more than 50 percent rise in recruits with college degrees, according to their latest numbers. Asch says college graduates make up a relatively small portion of total recruits. But as long as the economy stays weak, their numbers will go up. Part of the reason is that it always pays to have a job with Uncle Sam. "In order to sustain a volunteer force with high-quality people, the military finds it has to pay people more than they would get in the civilian world," Asch says. "That gap has actually increased in recent years, in part because of the continuing rise of military pay and partly because the economy has stagnated, and so civilian pay has stagnated as well." More People Than Positions At a naval-recruiting station near the University of Maryland, Lt. Mary Neal says it's almost easy right now for military recruiters. "We have more people coming than we have positions for," she says. "That's just how busy we are. It's sad when we actually have to tell them, 'Sorry, we've already met goal for this year.' " Neal says almost all the people being turned away have college degrees. She says the perks of a military job are especially appealing right now — good pay, free health care, a tax-free housing allowance and a pay raise every year. Another recruiter at Neal's station pitched all that to Louis Lam before his parents' unemployment benefits ran out. He signed up and is in for five years. Working On Ships From Home Lam says the recruiter also said he could stay close to home. He'll use his engineering background to work on nuclear reactors on submarines and ships, and he can do that from the D.C. area. While he finishes college this year, Lam says, the Navy will pay him about $50,000. "That specifically was very important to me because of our financial situation," he says. "I definitely wanted to say, 'Hey, is this what I'm going to be making? And if it is, then this is exactly what I need right now.' " Lam says the checks started coming a few months ago, and he's been spending most of them on his parents' mortgage and his student loans. For now, he's giving up the goal he had before he got to college: a career in the private sector with a big-name company. Lam says he's OK with that. There's a much better payout for helping his family and serving his country.

#### Army boosting recruitment

Radford 3/29 [Jonathan Radford, "Army offers new recruitment incentive for high school juniors," NBC News, 3/29/2017] AZ

The U.S. Army is facing an uphill battle, but the battle isn't on the war front. It's right here at home. The executive branch has ordered the military to ramp up recruiting efforts for the first time in four years. The mission is not easy, but the latest round of recruitment incentives is making the process more appealing now than ever before. "$500, you know, that is a lot every month," said 17-year-old Jacorey Jackson. Jackson just signed up to fight for his country, and he's already relishing over the sign on bonus he'll get before he does his first pushup in boot camp. "The seniorship bonus consist of $500 for every month they are in what we call a delayed entry program,” said Doell Salcedo, commander of the Huntsville Recruiting Co. It's part of new recruitment initiative that starts Saturday. It allows high school juniors or rising seniors to enlist in the Army a year before they graduate. "It doesn't matter what job they pick. It doesn't matter what they score on their entrance exam. They all qualify for this,” said Salcedo. Capt. Doell Salcedo tells WAFF 48 News these bonuses apply to soon-to-be grads who are interested in being active duty or in the Army Reserve. And for a Bob Jones High School junior like Jackson, the timing, the bonus and the options couldn't be better. "I'm feeling pretty good about it. I think it's one of my best decisions I'm going to make in the future,” said Jackson. The Army is expected to spend $300 million on bonuses and ads to get 6,000 more recruits in accordance with President Donald Trump's request to increase the nation's military force.

## 2NR Materials

### 2NR Top Level – A2 Decline Inev

#### No heg decline

Salvatore Babones 15 [(Salvatore Babones, associate professor of sociology and social policy at the University of Sydney and an associate fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, ) American Hegemony Is Here to Stay, National Interest 6-11-2015] AT

Or so the story goes. In fact, reports of the passing of U.S. hegemony are greatly exaggerated. America’s costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were relatively minor affairs considered in long-term perspective. The strategic challenge posed by China has also been exaggerated. Together with its inner circle of unshakable English-speaking allies, the United States possesses near-total control of the world’s seas, skies, airwaves and cyberspace, while American universities, think tanks and journals dominate the world of ideas. Put aside all the alarmist punditry. American hegemony is now as firm as or firmer than it has ever been, and will remain so for a long time to come. THE MASSIVE federal deficit, negative credit-agency reports, repeated debt-ceiling crises and the 2013 government shutdown all created the impression that the U.S. government is bankrupt, or close to it. The U.S. economy imports half a trillion dollars a year more than it exports. Among the American population, poverty rates are high and ordinary workers’ wages have been stagnant (in real terms) for decades. Washington seems to be paralyzed by perpetual gridlock. On top of all this, strategic exhaustion after two costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has substantially degraded U.S. military capabilities. Then, at the very moment the military needed to regroup, rebuild and rearm, its budget was hit by sequestration. If economic power forms the long-term foundation for political and military power, it would seem that America is in terminal decline. But policy analysts tend to have short memories. Cycles of hegemony run in centuries, not decades (or seasons). When the United Kingdom finally defeated Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, its national resources were completely exhausted. Britain’s public-debt-to-GDP ratio was over 250 percent, and early nineteenth-century governments lacked access to the full range of fiscal and financial tools that are available today. Yet the British Century was only just beginning. The Pax Britannica and the elevation of Queen Victoria to become empress of India were just around the corner. By comparison, America’s current public-debt-to- GDP ratio of less than 80 percent is relatively benign. Those with even a limited historical memory may remember the day in January 2001 when the then chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, testified to the Senate Budget Committee that “if current policies remain in place, the total unified surplus will reach $800 billion in fiscal year 2011. . . . The emerging key fiscal policy need is to address the implications of maintaining surpluses.” As the poet said, bliss was it in that dawn to be alive! Two tax cuts, two wars and one financial crisis later, America’s budget deficit was roughly the size of the projected surplus that so worried Greenspan. This is not to argue that the U.S. government should ramp up taxes and spending, but it does illustrate the fact that it has enormous potential fiscal resources available to it, should it choose to use them. Deficits come and go. America’s fiscal capacity in 2015 is stupendously greater than Great Britain’s was in 1815. Financially, there is every reason to think that America’s century lies in the future, not in the past. The same is true of the supposed exhaustion of the U.S. military. On the one hand, thirteen years of continuous warfare have reduced the readiness of many U.S. combat units, particularly in the army. On the other hand, U.S. troops are now far more experienced in actual combat than the forces of any other major military in the world. In any future conflict, the advantage given by this experience would likely outweigh any decline in effectiveness due to deferred maintenance and training. Constant deployment may place an unpleasant and unfair burden on U.S. service personnel and their families, but it does not necessarily diminish the capability of the U.S. military. On the contrary, it may enhance it. America’s limited wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were hardly the final throes of a passing hegemon. They are more akin to Britain’s bloody but relatively inconsequential conflicts in Afghanistan and Crimea in the middle of the nineteenth century. Brutal wars like these repeatedly punctured, but never burst, British hegemony. In fact, Britain engaged in costly and sometimes disastrous conflicts throughout the century-long Pax Britannica. British hegemony did not come to an end until the country faced Germany head-on in World War I. Even then, Britain ultimately prevailed (with American help). Its empire reached its maximum extent not before World War I but immediately after, in 1922. Ultimately, it is inevitable that in the long run American power will weaken and American hegemony over the rest of the world will fade. But how long is the long run? There are few factual indications that American decline has begun—or that it will begin anytime soon. Short-term fluctuations should not be extrapolated into long-term trends. Without a doubt, 1991 was a moment of supreme U.S. superiority. But so was 1946, after which came the Soviet bomb, Korea and Vietnam. American hegemony has waxed and waned over the last seventy years, but it has never been eclipsed. And it is unlikely that the eclipse is nigh. WHEN PUNDITS scope out the imminent threats to U.S. hegemony, the one country on their radar screens is China. While the former Soviet Union never reached above 45 percent of U.S. total national income, the Chinese economy may already have overtaken the American economy, and if not it certainly will soon. If sheer economic size is the foundation of political and military power, China is positioned for future global hegemony. Will it build on this foundation? Can it? Much depends on the future of China’s relationships with its neighbors. China lives in a tough neighborhood. It faces major middle-tier powers on three sides: Russia to the north, South Korea and Japan to the east, and Vietnam and India to the south. To the west it faces a series of weak and failing states, but that may be more of a burden than a blessing: China’s own western regions are also sites of persistent instability. It is perhaps realistic to imagine China seeking to expand to the north at the expense of Russia and Mongolia. Ethnic Russians are abandoning Siberia and the Pacific coast in droves, and strategic areas along Russia’s border with China have been demographically and economically overwhelmed by Chinese immigration. Twenty-second-century Russia may find it difficult to hold the Far East against China. But that is not a serious threat to U.S. hegemony. If anything, increasing Sino-Russian tensions may reinforce U.S. global hegemony, much as Sino-Soviet tensions did in the 1970s. To the southeast, China clearly seeks to dominate the South China Sea and beyond. The main barrier to its doing so is the autonomy of Taiwan. Were Taiwan ever to be reintegrated with China, it would be difficult for other regional powers to successfully challenge a united China for control of the basin. In the future, it is entirely possible that China will come to dominate these, its own coastal waters. This would be a minor setback to an America accustomed to dominating all of the world’s seas, but it would not constitute a serious strategic threat to the United States. Across the East China Sea, China faces Japan and South Korea—two of the most prosperous, technologically advanced and militarily best-equipped countries in the world. Historical enmities ensure that China will never expand in that direction. Worse for China, it is quite likely that any increase in China’s ability to project power beyond its borders will be matched with similar steps by a wary, remilitarizing Japan. The countries on China’s southern border are so large, populous and poor that it is difficult to imagine China taking much interest in the region beyond simple resource exploitation. Chinese companies may seek profit opportunities in Cambodia, Myanmar and Pakistan, but there is little for China to gain from strategic domination of the region. There will be no Chinese-sponsored Asian equivalent of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Farther abroad, much has been made of China’s strategic engagement in Africa and Latin America. Investment-starved countries in these regions have been eager to access Chinese capital and in many cases have welcomed Chinese investment, expertise and even immigration. But it is hard to imagine them welcoming Chinese military bases, and equally hard to imagine China asking them for bases. The American presence in Africa is in large part the legacy of centuries of European colonialism. China has no such legacy to build on. Above all, however, the prospects for future Chinese hegemony depend on the prospects for future Chinese economic growth. Measured in per capita terms, China is still poorer than Mexico. That China will catch up to Mexico seems certain. That China will continue its extraordinary growth trajectory once it has caught up to Mexico is less obvious. In 2011, when the Chinese economy was growing by more than 10 percent a year, I predicted that China was headed for much slower growth. At the time, the IMF was projecting a long-term growth rate of 9.5 percent. Today, the same IMF projections assume 7 percent growth. Even at 7 percent annual growth, the Chinese economy would account for more than half of total global output by 2050. The United States in its post–World War II heyday never achieved that level of dominance. But exponential extrapolations are inherently tricky. If China continues to grow at 7 percent while the world economy as a whole grows by 3 percent per year, China will account for 90 percent of global economic output by 2100 and 100 percent by 2110. After that, China’s economy will be even larger than the world’s economy, which of course is impossible unless China moves a large portion of its production off-planet. A more reasonable assumption is that China’s economic growth will eventually settle down to global average rates. The only question is when. Existing demographic trends make it almost certain that the answer is: soon. The U.S. Census Bureau has projected that China’s working-age population would reach its peak in 2014 and then go into long-term decline. In the twenty years from 2014 to 2034, China’s working-age population will fall by eighty-seven million, while its elderly population will rise by 149 million. In the language of economic punditry, China will “grow old before it grows rich.” The U.S. population, by contrast, is young and growing. In 2034, the U.S. population is projected to be growing at a rate of 0.6 percent per year (compared to -0.2 percent in China), with substantial immigration of talented, productive people (compared to net emigration from China). The U.S. median age of 39.2 will be significantly younger than the Chinese median age of 44.8. Over the long term these trends may change, but the twenty-year scenario is almost certain, because for the most part it has already happened. Economic trends can turn on a dime, but demographic trends are mostly immutable: tomorrow’s child-bearers have already been born. IN THE ancient Mediterranean world, Rome rose to regional hegemony a century or two after the passing of the Athenian empire. The hegemonic Roman Republic was a hybrid political entity. It consisted of Rome itself, Roman colonies, Roman protectorates, cities conquered by Rome and cities allied to Rome. For four hundred years before 91 BC, the Italian cities allied to Rome were effectively part of the Roman state despite their formal political independence. They participated in Rome’s wars under Roman command. They did not pay taxes or tribute to Rome, but they were fully incorporated into a political system centered on Rome. When Hannibal crossed the Alps in 218 BC, most of the Italian cities did not rise up against Rome as he expected. They stood with Rome because they were effectively part of Rome. In a similar way, the effective borders of the American polity extend well beyond the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. If the Edward Snowden leaks have revealed nothing else, they have shown the depth of intelligence cooperation between the United States and its English-speaking allies Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. These are the so-called Five Eyes countries. These English-speaking allies work so closely with the United States on security issues that they resemble ancient Rome’s Italian allies. Despite their formal political independence, they do not make major strategic decisions without considering America’s interests as well as their own. Curiously, America’s English-speaking allies resemble the United States in their demographic structures as well. While East Asia’s birthrates have fallen well below replacement levels and parts of continental Europe face outright depopulation, the English-speaking countries have stable birthrates and substantial immigration. The most talented people in the world don’t always move to the United States, but more often than not they move to English-speaking countries. It doesn’t hurt that English is the global lingua franca as well as the language of the Internet. One surprising result of these trends is that the once-unfathomable demographic gap between China and the English-speaking world is narrowing. According to U.S. Census Bureau projections, in 2050 the U.S. population will be 399 million and rising by 0.5 percent per year while the Chinese population will be 1.304 billion and falling by 0.5 percent per year. Throw in America’s four English-speaking allies, and the combined five-country population will be 546 million—nearly 42 percent of China’s population—with a growth rate of 0.4 percent per year. No longer will China have the overwhelming demographic advantage that has historically let it punch above its economic weight. Is it reasonable to treat America’s English-speaking allies as integrated components of the U.S. power structure? Of course, they are not formally integrated into the U.S. state. But the real, effective borders of countries are much fuzzier than the legal lines drawn on maps. The United States exercises different levels of influence over its sovereign territory, extraterritorial possessions, the English-speaking allies, NATO allies, other treaty allies, nontreaty allies, client states, spheres of influence, exclusionary zones and even enemy territories. All of these categories are fluid in their memberships and meanings, but taken together they constitute more than just a network of relationships. They constitute a cooperative system of shared sovereignty, something akin to the power structure of the Roman Republic. No other country in the world possesses, has ever possessed, or is likely to possess in this century such a world-straddling vehicle for the enforcement of its will. More to the point, the U.S.-dominated system shows no signs of falling apart. Even the revelation that America and its English-speaking allies have been spying on the leaders of their NATO peers has not led to calls for the dissolution of NATO. The American system may not last forever, but its remaining life may be measured in centuries rather than decades. Cycles of hegemony turn very slowly because systems of hegemony are very robust. The American power network is much bigger, much stronger and much more resilient than the formal American state as such. A RECURRING meme is the idea that the whole world should be able to vote in U.S. presidential elections because the whole world has a stake in the outcome. This argument is not meant to be taken seriously. It is made to prove a point: that the United States is uniquely and pervasively important in the world. At least since the Suez crisis of 1956, it has been clear to everyone that the other countries of the world, whether alone or in concert, are unable to project power beyond their shores without American support. Mere American acquiescence is not enough. In global statecraft, the United States is the indispensable state. One widely held definition of a state is that a state is a body that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a territory. The German sociologist Max Weber first proposed this definition in 1919, in the chaotic aftermath of World War I. Interestingly, he included the qualifier “successfully” in his definition. To constitute a real state, a government cannot merely claim the sole right to use force; it must make this claim stick. It must be successful in convincing its people, civil-society groups and, most importantly, other states to accept its claim. In the twenty-first century, the United States effectively claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force worldwide. Whether or not it makes this claim in so many words, it makes it through its policies and actions, and America’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force is generally accepted by most of the governments (if not the peoples) of the world. That is not to say that all American uses of force are accepted as legitimate, but that all uses of force that are accepted as legitimate are either American or actively supported by the United States. The world condemns Russian intervention in Ukraine but accepts Saudi intervention in Yemen, and of course it looks to the United States to solve conflicts in places like Libya, Syria and Iraq. The United States has not conquered the world, but most of the world’s governments (with the exceptions of countries such as Russia, Iran and China) and major intergovernmental organizations accept America’s lead. Very often they ask for it. This American domination of global affairs extends well beyond hegemony. In the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom was a global hegemon. Britannia ruled the waves, and from its domination of the oceans it derived extraordinary influence over global affairs. But China, France, Germany, Russia and later Japan continually challenged the legitimacy of British domination and tested it at every turn. Major powers certainly believed that they could engage independently in global statecraft and acted on that belief. France did not seek British permission to conquer its colonies; Germany did not seek British permission to conquer France. Twenty-first-century America dominates the world to an extent completely unmatched by nineteenth-century Britain. There is no conflict anywhere in the world in which the United States is not in some way involved. More to the point, participants in conflicts everywhere in the world, no matter how remote, expect the United States to be involved. Revisionists ranging from pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine to Bolivian peasant farmers who want to chew coca leaves see the United States as the power against which they are rebelling. The United States is much more than the world’s policeman. It is the world’s lawgiver. The world state of so many fictional utopias and dystopias is here, and it is not a nameless postmodern entity called global governance. It is America. Another word for a world state that dominates all others is an “empire,” a word that Americans of all political persuasions abhor. For FDR liberals it challenges cherished principles of internationalism and fair play. For Jeffersonian conservatives it reeks of foreign adventurism. For today’s neoliberals it undermines faith in the primacy of market competition over political manipulation. And for neoconservatives it implies an unwelcome responsibility for the welfare of the world beyond America’s shores. In fact, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the United States has become an imperial world state—a world-empire—that sets the ground rules for smooth running of the global economy, imposes its will largely without constraint and without consideration of the reasonable desires of other countries, and severely punishes those few states and nonstate actors that resist its dictates. No one ever likes an empire, but despite Ronald Reagan’s memorable phrase, the word “empire” is not inseparably linked to the word “evil.” When it comes to understanding empire, history is probably a better guide than science fiction. Consider the Roman Empire. For several centuries after the ascension of Augustus, life under Rome was generally freer, safer and more prosperous than it had been under the previously independent states. Perhaps it was not better for the enslaved or for the Druids, and certainly not for the Jews, but for most people of the ancient Mediterranean, imperial Rome brought vast improvements most of the time. ANCIENT ANALOGIES notwithstanding, no one would seriously suggest that the United States should attempt to directly rule the rest of the world, and there is no indication that the rest of the world would let it. But the United States could manage its empire more effectively, which is something that the rest of the world would welcome. A winning strategy for low-cost, effective management of empire would be for America to work with and through the system of global governance that America itself has set up, rather than systematically seeking to blunt its own instruments of power. For example, the United States was instrumental in setting up the International Criminal Court, yet Washington will not place itself under the jurisdiction of the ICC and will not allow its citizens to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Similarly, though the United States is willing to use UN Security Council resolutions to censure its enemies, it is not willing to accept negotiated limits on its own freedom of action. From a purely military-political standpoint, the United States is sufficiently powerful to go it alone. But from a broader realist standpoint that takes account of the full costs and unintended consequences of military action, that is a suboptimal strategy. Had the United States listened to dissenting opinions on the Security Council before the invasion of Iraq, it would have saved hundreds of billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives. The United States might similarly have done well to have heeded Russian reservations over Libya, as it ultimately did in responding to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. A more responsible (and consequently more effective) United States would subject itself to the international laws and agreements that it expects others to follow. It would genuinely seek to reduce its nuclear arsenal in line with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would use slow but sure police procedures to catch terrorists, instead of quick but messy drone strikes. It would disavow all forms of torture. All of these policies would save American treasure while increasing American power. They would also increase America’s ability to say “no” to its allies when they demand expensive U.S. commitments to protect their interests abroad. Such measures would not ensure global peace, nor would they necessarily endear the United States to everyone across the world. But they would reduce global tensions and make it easier for America to act in its national interests where those interests are truly at stake. Both the United States and the world as a whole would be better off if Washington did not waste time, money and diplomatic capital on asserting every petty sovereign right it is capable of enforcing. A more strategic United States would preside over a more peaceful and prosperous world. In pondering its future course, Washington might consider this tale from the ancient world: When Cyrus the Great conquered the neighboring kingdom of Lydia, he allowed his army to loot and pillage Lydia’s capital city, Sardis. The deposed Lydian king Croesus became his captive and slave. After Cyrus taunted Croesus by asking him how it felt to see his capital city being plundered, Croesus responded: “It’s not my city that your troops are plundering; it’s your city.” Cyrus ordered an immediate end to the destruction.

#### No heg decline – the US is still on top

Joseph S. Nye 16 [(Joseph S. Nye, American political scientist. He is the co-founder, along with Robert Keohane, of the international relations theory of neoliberalism) Politicians Say American Leadership Is In Decline. They’Re Wrong., Washington Post 1-29-2016] AT

As Henry Kissinger has recently written, there has never been a truly global world order. World order itself is a slippery term. Nevertheless, since World War II, the United States has been the most powerful state in the world and produced a partial world order. It has, albeit imperfectly, led in the production of global public goods, such as a balance of military power, international monetary stability and an open system of trade. The U.S. Navy is crucial in policing the laws of the seas, and in the 2008 financial crisis, the crucial lender of last resort was the Federal Reserve. If you believe that international politics is not yet (nor will ever be) ready for world government, then global public goods such as security and welfare will depend on the actions of the most powerful states. But a new crop of transnational issues will call for cooperation among all — both the powerful and those gaining in strength. Many scholars point out that the one thing worse than American leadership is no leadership at all. Order does not produce justice, but some degree of order is often a precondition for it. In that sense, George H.W. Bush’s proclamation of a “new world order” in 1991 was really a statement about the continuation of the post-1945 order. The fact that the world’s richest country after World War II had a liberal economy and system of government had important implications not only for the creation of an open international economic system, but also for the spread of democratic values and human rights. In that sense, despite our flaws and policy mistakes, it mattered that the United States was an open society. American primacy allowed freedom of choice to others and an openness that was not always true of previous forms of hegemony. Had Hitler or Stalin prevailed, today’s world order would look very different. States that have benefited from this liberal world order may preserve its institutional framework — its institutions, norms and commitments — out of self-interest. But will they do so if they believe that American power is in decline? The current conventional wisdom, exaggerated by American campaign rhetoric, is that this is the case. Yet although the United States has many problems (and always has), we are not in absolute decline like ancient Rome, which had no productivity growth. Thanks to immigration, we are the only major developed country that will not suffer a demographic decline by midcentury; our dependence on energy imports is diminishing rather than increasing; we are at the forefront of the major technologies (bio, nano, information) that will shape this century; and our universities dominate the world league tables. We have more allies and connections than any other country. No single country is poised to overtake the United States in overall power. The real challenge we face could be called “the rise of the rest.” Even though the growth in emerging markets is unlikely to create a single challenger that will overtake the United States, the growing power of these countries creates a more complex global landscape. The problem of leadership in such a world is how to get everyone at the table and still have action possible. There are more participants, more goals and more issues. In addition to many more actors — both state and non-state — the world agenda will also become more complex. Not only do traditional issues of security and the economy remain important, but the number of other transnational issues has increased — and many of these cannot be fixed through traditional “hard power.” For example, military power is of little help on climate change, pandemics or governance of the Internet. While American leadership will continue to be important, success in solving the new transnational challenges will require the cooperation of others. In this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game. If the liberal world order is to continue, it will not be enough to think in terms of American power over others. One must also think in terms of combining strength to accomplish joint goals. The United States will remain central to the balance of power, and American leadership will continue to matter in the production of public goods. But the liberal world order of the future will look very different from that of 1991.

### 2NR Link Work—Resolve Key

#### Resolve is the THE determiner of American hegemony – it’s key to deterrence and conflict effectiveness – dissent prolongs violence

Eyago ‘5 7 / 8 / 05 Political Commentary – Sound Politics Reporter [http://www.soundpolitics.com/archives/004721.html, Sound Commentary on Current Events in Seattle, Puget Sound and Washington State]

Finally, I am angry at those who undermine our efforts to conduct this war. I am angry at people, who through their words, and efforts contribute to the injury and death of our soldiers, who provide encouragement to the enemy, who weaken our efforts and prolong the war, who, for political gain put our soldiers, our people, and our nation at greater risk. There is a LOT of anger going on. Many times it is inappropriately acted upon. Islamists are angry, so they blow up people. Conservatives are angry so they advocate indiscriminate retaliation. Liberals are angry so they advocate undermining the war. All this anger is misdirected. We can see how the killing of innocents is wrong, but sometimes we cannot see how allowing innocents to be killed is wrong. One should seriously consider the impacts of certain types of dissention in this country before embarking on said dissentious course. I have many issues with the war in Iraq, but I will focus on just a couple. When President Bush pronounced to the world that he would defeat terrorism, he made a promise. He promised that he would not only pursue the terrorists wherever they may be, but he promised to go after the countries that enable those terrorists. When the UN made resolution after resolution against Iraq those too were promises. The difference comes in whether one follows up a promise or not. You see, no one embarks on a major undertaking with the expectation of losing. The choices any person or group are almost always predicated on the fact that the reward exceeds the price or risk. Hitler would not have invaded Czechoslovakia unless he though he could get away with it. He would not have invaded Poland unless he though he could get away with it. The success of those events and reaction of Europe convinced him that he could press on and take all of Europe. Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait unless he thought he could get away with it. He would not have defied the UN unless he though he could get away with it. In those cases, the acting party decided that they could attain their goals using the methods employed. The same thing goes for the terrorists. The methods they employ are based on the expectation of ultimate success. The methods they employ are also based on their own capabilities, capabilities that stem from the support of governments both passive and active, the support of moneyed benefactors, and the support of powerful influencers such as media and high profile personalities. This brings me back to promises made. Part of the reason these terrorists became so bold is that there were few significant reprisals for their actions. In the same way Hitler moved on Poland and Hussein defied the UN, Al Qaeda flew planes into our buildings. Ultimately it was because they could and that the reprisals had insufficient deterrent effect. Now, when President Bush announced that he would pursue the nations that supported terrorism, he basically set the stage for action. The choice was, rattle the saber and hope it is enough, or draw the saber and demonstrate our commitment to living up to our promises. It is fair to debate whether Iraq was the best choice for an operation, but the stage had also been set there as well. With promises being made at the UN, the choice was to continue to prove that promises meant nothing or to prove that they did. I believe that the lack of consequences in the past was a key factor in the terrorist activity leading up to and including 9/11. Without the resolve to back up our promises, our enemies will be emboldened to act. It does not get any simpler than that. Iraq was a promise kept. Now, some people want us to renege on that promise and others. That is a dangerous position to be advocating. The thing is, the debate about Iraq belongs BEFORE we took action. And that debate DID occur. It occurred BEFORE the war. And the result was overwhelmingly in FAVOR of action. The congress granted President Bush the authority to act. The fact that they did not like his decision is moot. If they did not trust his ability to act, they were wrong to have given him the authority to do so. NOW they are wrong for challenging his decision after the fact. That brings us back to the concept of one's expectation of the results of one's actions. In many cases throughout history, the winner of a conflict was not always the one with the bigger army, the better equipment, and the best trained, or any of those factors. The winner quite often was the one with the greater will to win. Wars are won by will in far greater weight then in anything else. I would say that will is THE determining factor in success in any conflict. Obviously will is not enough. A greater force can sap the will of another army, but not always. The revolutionary war was won by will, not by military might. Vietnam was lost by will not by military might. And, Iraq will be won or lost by will alone. The consequences of this outcome will have long lasting impacts on the security of our nation. At this point, it does not matter whether we should have gone into Iraq. The fact is we are there now. We either complete the job and fulfill our promises to rebuild that nation and leave it with a stable and free society or we cut and run and have the world know with certainty that our word is null and void and that we have no resolve. That is the stakes. That is the goal of the terrorists: to prove they have resolve, to prove that we do not. Their victory will ensure increased attacks on all nations because the terrorists will have unimpeachable proof that their tactics will ultimately succeed. Bombings, beheadings, gross atrocities will be the weapons of choice in the future. Tactics that have been proven to bring down the mighty. If will is the factor that determines the outcome, then will is the place where we must consider here and now. As far as our enemy is concerned, we MUST make them believe that they cannot succeed. We MUST make them sure that WE will prevail. We MUST prove to them that their tactics are ineffectual. There is a down side to that. Once an enemy realizes their tactics are not succeeding, they will change them. With an enemy of this nature, that could result in greater atrocities than we have yet seen. Yet, even then we must prevail. We must continue to demonstrate OUR resolve and OUR willingness to see this to the end and DEFEAT them. Since they have shown little regard for decency and life, since they have shown that our very existence is provocation to them, no amount of diplomacy or concessions will achieve an end satisfactory to our nation. The only solution is the demonstration of our willingness to defeat them despite their tactics. Our goal is to defeat the will of the enemy. His goal is to defeat ours. Any indication that the enemy's will is faltering will bolster our own will. However, the opposite is true as well. Any indication that our will is faltering will embolden the enemy's will. Unfortunately, from the very first minute of this conflict, parts of our country have shouted from the very mountain tops just how little will they have to win the war. They demonstrate clearly for our enemies that we don't want to fight. They give clear indication that enemy tactics are successful. In effect, they give aid and comfort to the enemy and spur them on to continued fighting because they tell the enemy in clear messages that if they continue in their tactics, the United States will be defeated. As I said before, the debate about whether we go to war is over. We are now at war, and the ONLY debate we should have is on what tactics are most appropriate for prosecuting that war. It is marginally fair to state that you are unhappy about our decision to go to war, but beyond that, anything else will embolden the enemy. Think very long and about what is at stake here. It is almost IMPOSSIBLE to be pro America while actively dissenting on ongoing conflict. It is bordering on treason for a public official to undermine the war effort, the Commander in Chief and the military publicly for all the world to see. We have started down this path, and there are but two choices: to win or to lose. There is no "suing for peace" with this enemy. Now, that does not mean you have to become militaristic and be a war monger. You can be a peacenik, but you need to consider that unless you want to see the United States harmed, you should cease criticism of the war itself until after it is won. There is plenty of time to castigate the people who made what you perceive as errors AFTER we have finished the job. However, if you persist in presenting disunity and a weakened resolve to the enemy, you take direct responsibility for the lives of all Americans, Iraqis and foreign terrorists that will die subsequently. The quickest way to end the war is to be united, to demonstrate unshakable resolve, and to have the enemy surrender. Or, YOU can surrender to the enemy. Anything else will just prolong the killing. This goes infinitely more so for our public leaders. What they do for political gain is completely unconscionable.

#### Empirics prove – political pressure to fight a limited war resulted in failure in Vietnam and Somalia

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**Why does the press systematically ignore America's history of military success, obsessing instead over a few failures**? Note that **these failures all have the same cause: political restrictions that deprived our soldiers of the tools they needed to win.** **Take Mogadishu. In the "Black Hawk Down" scenario, the disaster was not caused by the mere downing of a helicopter. It was caused by the Clinton administration's refusal to authorize the use of armor and AC-130 gunships, which would have provided crucial support for our soldiers. The reason? The politicians did not want to appear to be "escalating" our involvement, for fear of sinking into a "quagmire"** -- and they were afraid that the use of gunships would cause civilian casualties among the enemy. **Does any of this sound familiar? These are the same demands commentators are making on our military** today **in Afghanistan. Win the war, but don't get involved in fighting on the ground, don't take any casualties, and above all, don't cause any civilian deaths, because that would be bad PR. The press is especially certain about this last point, because they will make sure that any civilian deaths** -- an unavoidable by-product of war -- **are splashed over the front pages and presented as evidence of American barbarity.** **Or take** the other bogeyman of American military failure: **Vietnam. Our military was told that it could not eliminate the source of the enemy's power by invading North Vietnam. Instead, our soldiers were ordered to fight a defensive war** of attrition, **while we bombed the enemy** -- not to destroy his capabilities, but merely **to bring him to the bargaining table. Sound familiar? This is the strategy we have helped foist on Israel in its current war with terrorists. This is why**, for example, **the Israelis bomb empty Palestinian Authority offices,** not to kill enemy soldiers or destroy Yasser Arafat's ability to fight, but merely to "pressure" him to return to the "peace process." Similarly, **commentators in the press have warned us that we have to fight the War on Terrorism with an eye on world opinion, in consultation with our squeamish European allies and our hostile Arab coalition, that we have to avoid civilian casualties and coddle al-Qaeda prisoners to maintain the "moral high ground." The only kind of war they think it is proper to wage is a restricted, non-lethal, self-effacing conflict.** **It is no wonder that these same people fear that the war will end in failure. On their terms, it would.**

### 2NR Link Work—Political Pressure Key

#### Political opposition shapes foreign policy

**Hansen, pol sci prof, 6** – associate professor and director of the PhD program in the department of political science at the University of Copenhagen (Lene, “Security as practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war”, p. 6-7)

If representations of identity are always employed in the legitimization of foreign policy,  where do representations come from and how do official representations relate to those  argued by oppositional political parties and groups, the media, and public intellectuals?  Poststructuralist discourse analysis argues that **foreign policy decision-makers are  situated within a larger political and public sphere, and that their representations as a  consequence draw upon and are formed by the representations articulated by a larger  number of individuals, institutions, and media outlets. Top politicians rarely have detailed  knowledge about the issues put before them and therefore rely upon their advisors, media  coverage, and, in some cases, background literature to establish a representational  framing of the policy (to be) adopted. In ‘speaking back’ their representation of a foreign  policy issue, politicians are in turn influencing what count as proper representations  within a particular foreign policy issue.**This is not to say that there is necessarily a  complete congruence between official foreign policy discourse and the representations  argued from other sources: politicians do not always (or even rarely) reproduce media  and expert representations slavishly, nor does official discourse determine which  representations can be argued by other sources and agents, at least not in democratic  societies. **It would, however, be extremely unlikely—and politically unsavvy—for  politicians to articulate foreign policy without any concern for the representations found  within the wider public sphere as they attempt to present their policies as legitimate to  their constituencies.  Understanding official foreign policy discourse as situated within a wider discursive  field opens up a theoretical and empirical research agenda that examines how foreign  policy representations and representations articulated by oppositional political forces, the  media, academe, and popular culture reinforce or contest each other** (Hansen and Wæver  2002; Holm 1993, 1997; Shapiro 1988, 1997; Der Derian 1992; Hansen 1996; Neumann  1996a). Some foreign policy questions are less contested than others, leading to less  diversity in terms of the representations argued. One might therefore be prone to focus  the analysis on official policy and discourse as not much new will be uncovered when  including a larger set of actors and media.6 But, **such a hegemonic situation might also be  seen as worthy of an extensive study of nongovernmental sources in as much as this  generates important knowledge of the way in which governmental representations are  dispersed and reproduced.7 To study foreign policy by examining patterns of  reproduction and contestation across official discourse, political oppositional parties, and  media discourses, as well as more popular forms of writing, also points to the importance  of genre. Official foreign policymakers seek to constitute themselves as having authority  to speak about a foreign policy issue: their formal authority is derived from their  institutional location, but authority is also built on knowing about a particular issue.  Knowledge, therefore, becomes important for establishing authority, and this in turn  creates a new analytical optic for discourse analysis of foreign policy, as different  genres—policy speech, journalistic reportage, and academic analysis, for instance—  establish particular forms of knowledge as acceptable.**How texts construct acceptable  knowledge becomes an empirical question in need of analysis; it is not a matter of  deciding upon a proper social science epistemology as in the rationalist-  constructivistpoststructuralist debate. That different genres of foreign policy writing  adopt different forms of knowledge becomes particularly salient when foreign policy  discourses are seen as intertextually  ed. An intertextual understanding of foreign  policy argues that texts build their arguments and authority through references to other  texts: by making direct quotes or by adopting key concepts and catchphrases.8 In making   s to older texts, new texts rely upon the status of the older, but this process of reading  and  ing also produces new meaning: references never reproduce the originals in a  manner which is fully identical, but weave them into the present context and argument.

### 2NR – A2 Readiness Low

#### Readiness high

Tritten 16 [Travis Tritten (reporter), "Military readiness crisis: Is it reality or just politics?" Stars & Stripes, 9/18/2016] AZ

WASHINGTON — The ongoing debate over whether the military is sufficiently ready to fight and defend the country was shaken up in August. Retired Army Gen. David Petraeus and Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the nonprofit Brookings Institution think tank, said the readiness “crisis” being hammered home by Republicans in Congress is a myth. “While there are areas of concern, there is no crisis in military readiness,” Petraeus and O’Hanlon wrote in a joint column published by the Wall Street Journal in August. The claim runs contrary to the growing alarm among lawmakers, dire warnings from military brass testifying to Congress and recent media reports of Marines scavenging museum parts to keep aircraft flying. Petraeus and O’Hanlon argued defense spending is still comparable to Cold War-era spending, sufficient money is being spent on new hardware and the hardware the military already owns is in good shape. Furthermore, training is increasing and the all-volunteer force attracts high-quality troops. It was a striking departure from the GOP chairmen of the Armed Services Committees in the House and Senate.

#### Even if readiness is low now, Trump guarantees combat preparation is growing

Herb 1/27 [Jeremy; defense reporter for POLITICO, covered defense and national security for The Hill, graduated with a bachelor’s degree from Santa Clara University and received a master’s degree from Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism; POLITICO; 1/27/17; “Trump order sets military buildup in motion”; <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-rebuild-military-executive-action-234288>; JLB (2/6/17)]

President Donald **Trump** on Friday **took the first** formal **step to undertake a costly military buildup**, signaling what could be **a major turnaround from** years of **relying on a smaller,** more agile **force** and **within strict spending limits** mandated by Congress. **In an ex**ecutive **m**emorandum **he signed during his first visit to the Pentagon, Trump detailed plans to** fulfill his campaign promises to **invest in a bigger military** — including more troops, warships and a modernized nuclear arsenal — declaring he was beginning "a great rebuilding of the armed services of the United States." "Developing a plan for new planes, new ships, new resources and new tools feor our men and women in uniform — and I’m very proud to be doing that," Trump said at a ceremonial swearing in of Defense Secretary Jim Mattis. "As we prepare our budget request for Congress — and I think Congress is going to be very happy to see it — our military strength will be questioned by no one, but neither will our dedication to peace." Trump's proposed military buildup is one of the key ways he's planning for a major departure from the Obama administration on national security issues. The new president also signed an executive action Friday on stricter immigration vetting, and there have been draft executive orders floating around Washington this week that call for safe zones in Syria, a review U.S. interrogation policies and the use of "black sites" for captured terror detainees. “There’s no doubt he’s trying to signal a new direction,” said Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute. Trump’s order to make preparations for a military buildup — and to craft a budget plan to support it — will ultimately require the backing of Congress. But the Pentagon will have significant influence on setting the foundation and building the political support, according to experts. “When you have an outfit with $500 [billion] or $600 billion a year to play with, there are a lot of possibilities to reprogram immediately,” said retired Army Col. Joseph Collins, who teaches national security strategy at the Pentagon’s National Defense University. “That takes the permission of Congress, but **Congress is not going to say no to improving the readiness of the armed forces.** Congress would undoubtedly support many of the measures that are on the Pentagon’s wish list here.”

### 2NR — A2 Alliance Commitments

#### No impact to “alliance entanglement” — empirics.

Michael Beckley 17, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” *International Security* 39(4), Spring 2015, pp. 7-48, doi:10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00197

American concerns about entangling alliances are as old as the Republic itself. During the post–World War II era, however, there have been only five ostensible episodes of U.S. entanglement, and even these cases are questionable. The case in which alliance obligations had the largest impact on U.S. decision- making (the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis) entailed minimal military action, and the case that entailed the most military action (the Vietnam War) contained only a marginal role for alliance politics in U.S. decision-making. In the other three cases (the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis and the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo), both the effect of alliance obligations on U.S. policy and the costs suffered by U.S. forces were moderate. And beyond these cases, entanglement was virtually nonexistent in U.S. foreign policy.

Against this limited evidence of entanglement are numerous cases in which alliances restrained the United States. Allies dissuaded the United States from escalating the Korean War and crises in Laos and Berlin, and struggled in vain to prevent the United States from entering or escalating other conflicts, the 2003 Iraq War being only the latest major example. Indeed, instances of alliance-induced restraint are evident even within the five cases of entanglement discussed above: in the 1954–55 Taiwan Strait crisis, concerns about European alliances discouraged U.S. policymakers from bombing the Chinese mainland and publicly committing to defend Jinmen and Mazu; in the Vietnam War, allies impeded U.S. entry into the war and then repeatedly implored the United States to get out; and in Bosnia and Kosovo, U.S. allies initially restrained the United States from lashing out violently and then provided all of the NATO ground forces and most of the postconflict peacekeepers for the eventual operations.

#### US dodges inconvenient commitments — foreign policy is controlled by leaders at home.

Michael Beckley 17, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tufts University, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” *International Security* 39(4), Spring 2015, pp. 7-48, doi:10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00197

There also are several cases in which the United States sidestepped inconvenient alliance commitments, restrained an ally from attacking a third party, or openly sided against an ally—and this list could probably be expanded by looking within other cases, including the five ostensible cases of entanglement. As explained earlier, the United States blatantly retracted a pledge to Taiwan to defend Jinmen and Mazu in 1955, refused to save the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, delegated ground operations and most of the postconflict peace-keeping in Bosnia and Kosovo to allies, and waited for eight months and the receipt of private security assurances before responding militarily to China’s provocative behavior near Taiwan in 1995–96.

In sum, the empirical record shows that the risk of entanglement is real but manageable and that, for better or worse, U.S. security policy lies firmly in the hands of U.S. leaders and is shaped primarily by those leaders’ perceptions of the nation’s core interests. When the United States has overreached militarily, the main cause has not been entangling alliances but rather what Richard Betts calls “self-entrapment”—the tendency of U.S. leaders to define national interests expansively, to exaggerate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention.188 Developing a disciplined defense policy therefore will require the emergence of prudent leadership, the development (or resurrection) of guidelines governing the use of force,189 the establishment of domestic institutional constraints on the president’s authority to send U.S. forces into battle, or some combination of these.190 Scrapping alliances, by contrast, would simply unleash the United States to act on its interventionist impulses while leaving it isolated diplomatically and militarily.

### 2NR – A2 Trump Kills Heg

#### **Trump's foreign policy shores up American hegemony – fears are overblown**

Jakobsen 17 [Peter Jakobsen (Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and Professor at the Center for War Studies at University of Southern Denmark), "DOOMSDAY CANCELLED: TRUMP IS GOOD NEWS FOR ALLIES AND WORLD PEACE," 3/2/2017] AZ

The election of Donald Trump as U.S. president has rocked the U.S. security establishment and its allies around the world. President Trump has questioned the security guarantees that underpin the Pax Americana in speeches, personal conversations with world leaders, and – of course – on Twitter. He has claimed that allies are “ripping the United States off,” dismissed NATO for being “obsolete,” and mused that the time may have come for Japan and South Korea to develop their own nuclear weapons. He insists that U.S. allies have to pay and do more for their defense. Many in the United States and abroad have decried these statements as destabilizing and dangerous; The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists captured the general mood by moving their doomsday clock 30 seconds closer to midnight in response to Trump’s inauguration. This concern is massively overblown. Rather than weakening America’s web of alliances, Trump’s aggressive statements and erratic behavior will most likely strengthen the American-led security architecture during his presidency. This is good news for world peace because strong American alliances and strong American allies can deter rivals from launching destabilizing challenges to the predominant order. Trump’s aggressive communications strategy and his “America First” approach to international negotiations have already frightened allies into doing something his predecessors could not: increase defense spending. Fear of abandonment has changed the nature of the defense debate in allied capitals in Asia and Europe. The question is no longer whether defense spending should increase, but how much. U.S. allies in Europe are now scrambling to produce concrete plans for how they will increase defense spending in time for President Trump’s first visit to NATO in late May 2017.. His perceived unpredictability is also making military provocations and risk-taking by America’s adversaries less likely. Trumpology is Misleading The concern triggered by Trump’s election stems in no small part from the rise of what I call “Trumpology” – the incessant scrutiny of Trump’s personality, his statements, and his tweets. Trumpology is a new growth industry and the media embraces it because it fits their definition of a newsworthy story perfectly. Trump’s communications generate all the criteria journalists look for in a good story: conflict, anxiety, comedy, theater, and outrage. This helps media companies, even those attacked by Trump, sell advertising like hotcakes. Many experts now spend their time putting Trump’s words under the microscope, seeking to identify all the disasters they might create. In addition, psychologists have been busy analyzing his personality and upbringing in order to explain why he is acting so weird. The American intelligence community has used personality profiling since World War II to better understand how leaders in closed authoritarian systems such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Russia think and act. The results have been useful on occasion, but the study of personalities and intentions is insufficient with respect to predicting foreign policy actions and outcomes. One must also analyze the consequences and the opposition that proposed actions are likely to generate. If one considers the consequences of undermining existing U.S. alliances and how much opposition such action would trigger, one gets a far more positive picture of Trump’s impact on world security than the doomsday scenarios that Trumpologists have mass-produced since his election. Consequences for U.S. Allies Since the late 1940s, U.S. allies in Europe and Asia have based their national security on the assumption that the United States will assist them in a crisis. This assumption and the post-Cold War downsizing of Europe’s military forces have rendered Europeans incapable of conducting even relatively small-scale military operations without substantial American support. NATO’s air war against Libya (2011) and the French intervention in Mali (2013) are two recent cases in point. Neither operation would have been possible without American logistics, lift, munitions, intelligence, and other forms of support. The situation in the same in Asia: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have all based their defense forces and defense spending on the assumption that the U.S. cavalry will come to their rescue if necessary. If Trump degrades or withdraws these security guarantees, the allies will face a stark choice between deterrence and appeasement. In Europe deterrence is the most likely choice because the big three (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) are strong enough to constitute the core of a new alliance that can credibly deter Russia. In Asia, China will become so strong that most states bordering the East China Sea will have no choice but to appease Beijing and accept its hegemony. Regardless of the outcome, both Europe and Asia would face a period characterized by high instability and a heightened risk of war. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would seek to develop nuclear weapons. In Europe, Germany and Poland would have a strong incentive to do the same unless France and Britain extend their nuclear umbrellas over them. Indeed, all of these countries, except Poland, either contemplated the development of nuclear weapons (Germany and Japan) or had active nuclear weapons programs during the Cold War (South Korea and Taiwan). Consequences for the United States Prominent American scholars such as John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt have long recommended that the United States withdraw most of its forces from Asia and Europe because the costs of the existing onshore presence dwarf the benefits. In their view, the existing security guarantees amount to “welfare for the rich” and increase the risk of entrapment in wars that do not involve American national interests. They believe that the United States would be much better off by copying the offshore balancing strategy that the British Empire employed in Europe before World War II. This would involve providing support to shifting alliances and coalitions in order to prevent a single power from establishing a regional hegemony on the European continent. Offshore balancing has clear limitations and did not serve the British well in the end: it threw them into two world wars that brought the empire to its knees. Britain’s fate highlights the weakness of offshore balancing: a loss of the ability to shape the security politics onshore decisively. The failure of British offshore balancing dragged the United States into both world wars. America’s decisions to help its allies in Europe defeat Germany proved costly in blood and treasure. Since then the United States has benefitted tremendously from the onshore balancing strategy it adopted after World War II in both Asia and Europe, where it stationed its forces permanently to deter aggression. This presence, coupled with the allies’ military dependence, enabled Washington to shape development in both regions to align with U.S. interests. Washington repeatedly gave their allies offers they could not refuse. U.S. economic assistance programs provided to allies in the wake of World War II came with conditions that forced the recipients to buy American goods and liberalize their markets in ways that were highly beneficial to American firms. Washington forced Great Britain and France to withdraw their troops from Egypt during the Suez Crisis (1956), coerced Germany to support U.S. monetary policy (1966 to 1969), and leaned on many allies to stop their nuclear weapons programs and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) that made such weapons illegal, including Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. Military dependence on the United States also induced many allies to support U.S.-led wars in faraway places that did not affect their national security directly. The Afghan War and Iraq War are two recent cases in point. The allies closed their eyes to issues like secret detention and extraordinary rendition programs, the use of torture, and the massive surveillance of their own citizens that has characterized the War on Terror since 9/11. Allies have given the United States access to bases, facilities, as well as their airspace and territorial waters. This facilitates U.S. power projection globally. Finally, many allies buy American weapon systems as a way of maintain inter-operability and their security guarantees. The F-35 is the latest and greatest example of this. The consequences of a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe and Asia would be dramatic. The United States would lose most of its military bases in Asia and Europe, American firms would find it much harder to gain access to Asian and European markets, the American defense industry would lose billions of dollars, and European allies would stop supporting the United States militarily in faraway conflicts. As a result, the United States would lose its global power status and be reduced to a regional power with limited say in the management of Asian and European security. This is why it will not happen. This outcome is not only at odds with America’s economic interests, but it is also completely at odds with the widely shared belief in American exceptionalism and greatness. This is a belief that Trump and his supporters also embrace. Most Americans continue to view their nation as the greatest power on earth with an obligation to lead and make the world safe for America’s universal values. Trump is Scaring Allies into Spending But if the costs of abandoning allies are prohibitive, why is Trump threatening to do so? Nobel Prize laureate Thomas Schelling’s work on game theory suggests an answer. Schelling demonstrated in his seminal Strategy of Conflict (1960) that it may be advantageous to appear mad or unpredictable, because it may induce your negotiating partners or opponents to give greater concessions that they otherwise would. In this perspective, Trump’s statements and seemingly erratic behavior make a lot of sense as a negotiation tactic aimed at pressuring U.S. allies to increase their defense spending. Trump’s predecessors in the White House have tried to do this for years without success; previous administrations have repeatedly warned its European allies that NATO was in danger of becoming irrelevant if the Europeans continued to cut their defense spending. Yet most European allies paid scant attention to demands from the Obama administration to stop freeriding and honor their own commitments to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. Few European governments saw a pressing need to increase defense spending because the Obama administration reacted to the Russian annexation of the Crimea by enhancing its military presence in Europe. Trump has changed the game completely. In line with Schelling’s expectations, his perceived unpredictability is adding credibility to the threat that he might actually withdraw U.S. forces even if it is not in the United States best interest to do so. There is genuine concern among U.S. allies about what Trump might do if they do not take immediate steps to increase their defense spending. Many have already taken steps in this direction, or signaled their intention to do so. In December 2016, Japan adopted a record high defense budget, which allocated considerable funds to the procurement of American equipment, notably F-35s and missiles. The South Korean government reacted to Trump’s election by vowing to increase defense spending significantly if he insists on it. Likewise, the Danish Prime Minister Lars Loekke Rasmussen promised to increase defense spending after his first phone conversation with Trump. In Germany Trump’s election triggered a hitherto unthinkable debate on whether Germany should develop nuclear weapons. Trump cannot take sole credit for the newfound allied attentiveness to longstanding U.S. demands. The Japanese defense budget has been increasing in recent years due to growing concerns about China. Russia has had a similar effect on the defense budgets of the eastern NATO members. However, Trump has made a crucial difference by completely changing the debate on defense spending in allied capitals, significantly strengthening the hands of the proponents of increased defense spending in allied governments. The 2016 IHS Jane’s Defence Budgets Report consequently expects European NATO allies and partners such as Finland and Sweden to boost their defense spending by about $10 billion over the next five years. Trump’s Unpredictability Deters Rival Risk-Taking That Schelling’s logic applies equally well to President Trump’s dealings with America’s opponents has already been pointed out by other commentators. They have referred to Nixon’s madman theory of negotiation, which holds that America’s opponents will tread more carefully if they perceive the president to be unpredictable or crazy. It has been debated at some length whether Trump is using this theory in a rational manner to extract concessions from U.S. adversaries, or if he is “a madman in practice.” Regardless, the point is that President Trump’s unpredictability makes it next to impossible to calculate the risk of escalation involved in challenging the United States militarily, a concept also highlighted by Schelling. President Obama’s reluctance to threaten and use force likely emboldened China and Russia to take greater military risks in Eastern Ukraine, Syria, and in the East and South China Seas. While Beijing and Moscow could be fairly confident that Obama would not take military counter-measures, they have no way of knowing what President Trump might do. It is very easy to imagine him giving the order to down a Chinese or Russian plane to demonstrate that “America is great again.” In this way, Trump (intentionally or not) reduces the risk of military confrontations with China and Russia. This gives both states greater incentive to prioritize diplomacy over coercion in their efforts to settle disputes with the United States and its allies. Similarly, Trump’s characterization of the nuclear agreement with Iran as “the worst deal ever negotiated” gives Tehran strong incentive to honor it in both letter and spirit for fear of a potentially much worse alternative if it collapses. Some are deeply worried that Trump versus Kim Jong-un will prove a highly explosive combination, which is understandable since North Korea has employing the same negotiating tactics as Trump for decades with considerable success. While the outcome of this confrontation is difficult to call, the disastrous consequences of war are likely to lead to mutual restraint. Moreover, concern about what Trump might do will induce Beijing to redouble its efforts to persuade Pyongyang to be less provocative. Good News for World Peace Paradoxically, Trump’s tweets and the theatrics are most likely to enhance world peace. They create unpredictability and anxiety that the United States can use to obtain greater concessions from friends and foes. It is admittedly still early days, but all indications are that Trump will succeed in coercing his allies in both Asia and Europe to increase their defense spending significantly. Few of them will reach 2 percent of GDP in the next year or two, but he has set in motion a process that will make most allies spend far more much faster than they otherwise would have. His unpredictability is also an asset in America’s dealings with its opponents such as China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. They will all need to think twice about provoking the United States and its allies militarily because they have no way of calculating how President Trump will react. Neither friends nor foes can be certain that Trump will not do something that a rational cost-benefit calculating actor would not. U.S. allies used to regard American threats to withdraw its forces as bluff because the costs of doing so would be prohibitive, and the same logic has induced American opponents to engage in military risk-taking with little fear of U.S. military retaliation. With Trump in the White House, this logic no longer applies. This is good news because the likely result is strengthened U.S. alliances and U.S. opponents that are more likely to favor negotiation over provocation in their efforts to settle differences with the United States and its allies.

### 2NR – A2 Offshore Balancing

#### Offshore balancing causes war—and it's not happening now

Jakobsen 17 [Peter Jakobsen (Associate Professor at the Royal Danish Defence College and Professor at the Center for War Studies at University of Southern Denmark), "DOOMSDAY CANCELLED: TRUMP IS GOOD NEWS FOR ALLIES AND WORLD PEACE," 3/2/2017] AZ

Consequences for the United States Prominent American scholars such as John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, and Stephen Walt have long recommended that the United States withdraw most of its forces from Asia and Europe because the costs of the existing onshore presence dwarf the benefits. In their view, the existing security guarantees amount to “welfare for the rich” and increase the risk of entrapment in wars that do not involve American national interests. They believe that the United States would be much better off by copying the offshore balancing strategy that the British Empire employed in Europe before World War II. This would involve providing support to shifting alliances and coalitions in order to prevent a single power from establishing a regional hegemony on the European continent. Offshore balancing has clear limitations and did not serve the British well in the end: it threw them into two world wars that brought the empire to its knees. Britain’s fate highlights the weakness of offshore balancing: a loss of the ability to shape the security politics onshore decisively. The failure of British offshore balancing dragged the United States into both world wars. America’s decisions to help its allies in Europe defeat Germany proved costly in blood and treasure. Since then the United States has benefitted tremendously from the onshore balancing strategy it adopted after World War II in both Asia and Europe, where it stationed its forces permanently to deter aggression. This presence, coupled with the allies’ military dependence, enabled Washington to shape development in both regions to align with U.S. interests. Washington repeatedly gave their allies offers they could not refuse. U.S. economic assistance programs provided to allies in the wake of World War II came with conditions that forced the recipients to buy American goods and liberalize their markets in ways that were highly beneficial to American firms. Washington forced Great Britain and France to withdraw their troops from Egypt during the Suez Crisis (1956), coerced Germany to support U.S. monetary policy (1966 to 1969), and leaned on many allies to stop their nuclear weapons programs and join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) that made such weapons illegal, including Japan, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan. Military dependence on the United States also induced many allies to support U.S.-led wars in faraway places that did not affect their national security directly. The Afghan War and Iraq War are two recent cases in point. The allies closed their eyes to issues like secret detention and extraordinary rendition programs, the use of torture, and the massive surveillance of their own citizens that has characterized the War on Terror since 9/11. Allies have given the United States access to bases, facilities, as well as their airspace and territorial waters. This facilitates U.S. power projection globally. Finally, many allies buy American weapon systems as a way of maintain inter-operability and their security guarantees. The F-35 is the latest and greatest example of this. The consequences of a U.S. military withdrawal from Europe and Asia would be dramatic. The United States would lose most of its military bases in Asia and Europe, American firms would find it much harder to gain access to Asian and European markets, the American defense industry would lose billions of dollars, and European allies would stop supporting the United States militarily in faraway conflicts. As a result, the United States would lose its global power status and be reduced to a regional power with limited say in the management of Asian and European security. This is why it will not happen. This outcome is not only at odds with America’s economic interests, but it is also completely at odds with the widely shared belief in American exceptionalism and greatness. This is a belief that Trump and his supporters also embrace. Most Americans continue to view their nation as the greatest power on earth with an obligation to lead and make the world safe for America’s universal values.

### XBabones – Notes

#### Heg decline is not inevitable:

#### -No financial constraints – empires recover from debt and overstretch all the time, Britain proves, and deficits can change in years so our financial situation isn’t locked in – it takes a long economic trend to reverse huge gaps in military strategy

#### -Chinese growth will slow down and isn’t large – China is per-capita poor and can’t keep up growth. They’re losing the most immutable resource – demographics – an aging population will strain its resources

#### -No military gap – our military is way bigger and Iraq gave us vital experience other countries lack – improves warfighting effectiveness and deterrence

#### -Global governance is extremely power – we assert influence over every territory in the world – this soft power is unmatched and overwhelms economic resouces