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#### The aff’s invocation of unpredictable threats to national existence is a futile drive for ontological certainty – this makes endless violence inevitable and turns humans into mere tools as it destroys the world

Burke 7 [(Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales) “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007] AT

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth' in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28 The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness': Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30 Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist: Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33 Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition: the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35 Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36 When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification. This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39 Identity, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.') It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians. On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples: When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42 Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44 The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46 The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48 Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues, the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50 Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state: The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52 A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state. Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66 Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics, human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter. This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81 Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices? I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Vote negative to reject the 1AC’s enframing and interrogate its epistemological failures---this is a prereq to successful policy and prevents extinction

Ahmed 12 Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development (IPRD), an independent think tank focused on the study of violent conflict, he has taught at the Department of International Relations, University of Sussex "The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society" Global Change, Peace & Security Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011 Taylor Francis

While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a 'human security' approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of 'surface' impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad. The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies - as a discourse - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question. As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance' (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves. There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them. Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation. Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others', newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

## CP

### Testing + UQ CP

#### The Kingdom of Belgium should authorize the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators to run nuclear power plants as test facilities for new nuclear technologies when they are scheduled to close. The Kingdom of Belgium should continue production of nuclear power

#### The counterplan allows the development and testing of new tech that solves meltdowns.

Terry 16 [(Jeff Terry, Jeff Terry is a professor of physics at the Illinois Institute of Technology, where his main research focus is on energy systems) Use failing power plants to improve the safety and efficiency of clean energy, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March 31 2016] AT

Nuclear energy is currently the largest generator of low-carbon electricity in the United States. It could play an important role in mitigating climate change, but fears about safety impede its spread. These fears aren’t always grounded in reality. The US nuclear energy industry is overseen by two industry groups—the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators—and multiple government regulators dedicated to passing on lessons learned from nuclear accidents. It is one of the safest industries around in terms of occupational hazards. Severe accidents are rare, and nuclear professionals embrace a strong culture of safety. But is a culture of safety enough? And if it’s not, what can be done to improve? The answer may be found in some of the many US nuclear power plants in danger of closing their doors. The nuclear power industry could take a lesson from the history of car safety. The automobile industry saw a dramatic reduction in fatalities in recent years: From 1995 to 2009, the rate of fatalities per 100 million miles driven fell by 26 percent, with much of the decrease taking place from 2005 onward. What contributed to this large improvement in driver safety over such a short period? Certainly, there were big changes in cultural attitudes toward car safety. From 2006 to 2010, seat belt use by drivers increased from 81 to 85 percent. Calculations by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration suggest a change of this magnitude would save around 800 to 900 lives per year. In fact, though, by 2010, fatalities were down by nearly 10,000 lives per year, as shown in Figure 1. So while the change in safety culture was significant, another factor must have also contributed to improved driver safety. During the 2000s, car manufacturers implemented many technical improvements to increase safety. These measures were aimed at both improving the odds of surviving a crash and avoiding accidents in the first place. Airbag technology and better passenger restraint systems are now the norm in automobiles. Advanced technology such as lane-change warnings and front collision avoidance systems were also deployed during this time. It took both improved safety culture and technological advances to significantly reduce car fatalities. There is a strong culture of safety in the nuclear power industry, but as the auto industry shows, you need technological improvement as well. Terry-auto-industry-graph.jpg That’s where those old power plants come in. It still remains difficult to implement new technology in the nuclear industry. One reason is that US nuclear plants are producing electricity at more than 90 percent of capacity. It is hard to justify experimenting with commercial reactors running so reliably. That makes it hard to test new technology, such as new fuels or claddings designed to improve safety on a commercial scale. A number of US commercial nuclear reactors are either likely to close or have already. The James M. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant in New York is among those on the shutdown list. As it is a significant source of low-carbon electricity for the region, the state is trying to save it, in part by providing $100 million for fuel purchase. For the moment, though, that doesn’t seem to have reversed plant operator Entergy’s decision to close in less than a year. (Entergy has said it is closing for financial reasons, but some of us remain skeptical.) It may be, though, that struggling nuclear facilities offer a way to improve safety across the industry. The sector needs to be able to test new technology. In order to do that, the US Energy Department could take over soon-to-close reactors and run them as commercial-scale test facilities that also continue to produce clean electricity. One useful test, for example, would involve new claddings. Claddings are the materials around the radioactive fuel pellets that prevent the coolant from being contaminated. During the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster, Zircaloy cladding reacted with steam at high temperature, which produced hydrogen that exploded. The industry would like to prevent this kind of thing from happening again. As a test, a plant operator could rotate fuels with new, non-hydrogen-producing claddings into different bundles in the reactor. By monitoring the process, researchers could see how the new claddings performed under normal operating conditions, and use the process to develop and test new sensors. In short, an Energy Department takeover of this kind would enable researchers to test new safety technologies on a commercial scale, while still allowing states to meet their clean energy goals. For the inconvenience of dealing with a test site, electricity for those living with 15 miles of the reactor could be provided for free or at reduced cost, as has been suggested in relation to a proposed public-private nuclear project in South Australia. This would be a novel use of a reactor that would otherwise just be closed and allowed to sit and decay for decades. Outgoing nuclear power plant operators would still be financially responsible for decommissioning, as laid out by US law, but they would benefit from the arrangement: While the Energy Department used the reactor as a testbed, the previous operator’s decommissioning fund would grow, so that by the time of final decommissioning, the original owner would have more funds and newer technology available for the task. In fact, the Energy Department could bring commercial-scale testing to other industries, too. Recent reports put California’s Ivanpah concentrated solar power plant in danger of closing. It would be a tremendous waste to allow the $2.2 billion dollar facility to close without giving researchers the ability to study what problems occurred. The ability to data mine Ivanpah’s weather and production information would be invaluable for improving future facilities. The site could also be used to test methods for preventing bird deaths and mitigating visual impact on pilots. Instead of wasting away in the desert, Ivanpah would be of valuable service to society. The Energy Department should not pass up the opportunity to take over closing facilities as commercial-scale testbeds to improve current energy technology. Having seen how new technology has improved safety in other industries, we need to make sure there is a method for testing new methods and materials in the energy sector as well. Resources like the FitzPatrick nuclear plant and the Ivanpah solar plant are too valuable to let fade away. It is in our best interest to allow researchers to collect data using these facilities. Subjecting that trove of information to new experimental techniques and computational data mining will allow scientists and engineers to make other facilities more efficient and safe. The Energy Department should take a lead role in keeping these no-longer-competitive commercial facilities alive. The data they provide can be used to improve our future.

## DA

### Prices DA

#### The plan moves too fast- causes massive energy price hikes, the CP better transitions to renewables IEA 16

(International Energy Agency, 5-19, https://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2016/may/iea-urges-belgium-to-take-a-long-term-approach-to-energy-policy-.html)

Belgium should adopt a national long-term energy strategy without delay, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said today, stressing that such a plan was required to respond to the challenge of decarbonising the economy while ensuring security of supply and affordability of energy. Speaking at the launch of an IEA review of Belgium’s energy policies, IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol encouraged Belgium’s federal and regional governments to work decisively together. “Our review rings alarm bells due to the lack of private-sector investment in the electricity sector,” Dr. Birol commented. “Government efforts to mobilise investment should include an electricity market design that ensures a viable business model for power generation. And to avoid a lack of generation capacity in the medium term, Belgium could consider operating their nuclear power plants as long as they are certified to be safe by the regulator.” The new IEA report, Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Belgium 2016 Review, acknowledges Belgium’s recent progress in several areas of energy policy. Competition has increased in the electricity and natural gas markets. The use of fossil fuels has declined and the supply of renewable energy has grown. The country´s economy is becoming less energy-intensive, and its energy-related carbon emissions are declining. A major issue to be addressed, however, is the country’s nuclear phase-out policy. Nuclear energy accounts for around half of Belgium’s electricity generation, but the current policy is to close its nuclear power plants between 2022 and 2025. The report cautions that this would seriously challenge Belgium’s efforts to ensure electricity security and provide affordable low-carbon electricity. Allowing the plants to run as long as they are considered safe by the regulator would ease electricity security pressures, would reduce the costs of electricity generation in the medium term, would likely reduce the costs of the phase-out itself and would create time for investments in alternative generation options. “It is of the utmost importance that Belgium’s policy on nuclear power is consistent with its objectives regarding electricity security and climate change mitigation,” Dr. Birol stressed.

#### Rapid switch from nuclear causes massive economic damage and missing CO2 targets. WNA 16

WNA writes, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/belgium.aspx

However, due to political factors in the governing coalition, [T]he Belgian Senate approved the Federal Act of 31 January 2003, which prohibited the building of new nuclear power plants and limited the operating lives of existing ones[.] to 40 years (to 2014-2025). This can be overridden by a recommendation from the electricity and gas regulator (Commission de Régulation de l'Électricité et du Gaz, CREG) if Belgium's security of supply is threatened. In 2007, the Commission on Energy 2030d energy policy study set up by the government said that a fundamental review of energy policy was required and in particular that nuclear power should be utilised long-term in order to meet carbon dioxide (CO2) reduction commitments, enhance energy security[,] and maintain economic stability. It also said that the 2003 phase-out decision should be reconsidered as it would double the price of electricity, deny Belgium a cheap way of meeting the country's CO2 emission reduction targets and increase import dependency. Instead, the operating lives of the seven nuclear units should be extended.

#### Germany confirms – Wilson 14

(Robert, Jan 20th, PhD Student in Mathematical Ecology at the University of Strathclyde, “Why Germany’s Nuclear Phase Out is Leading to More Coal Burning”, the Energy Collective, <http://www.theenergycollective.com/robertwilson190/328841/why-germanys-nuclear-phase-out-leading-more-coal-burning>

A terse history lesson. In the year 2000 the government of Gerhard Schröder announced that all of Germany’s nuclear power plants must close by 2022, and this was passed into law in 2002.. This policy was revised by Angela Merkel in September 2010 to extend the lives of nuclear power plants so that the phase out would occur by 2032. Then after Fukushima, Merkel wisely or opportunistically – take your pick – decided to revert largely to the earlier phase out plan, closing eight nuclear power plants immediately and ruling that all would close by 2022.¶ The policy to phase out nuclear power was vital to the decisions to build new coal power plants. Closing down a quarter of your electricity generation leaves a gap that must be filled by something, and Germany realised it would largely have to be filled by one thing: coal. This is more or less beyond doubt, because Germany’s then Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel said so. Gabriel, now Germany’s Minister for Energy and Economics told climate scientist James Hansen that Germany had to build new coal power plants because of its nuclear phase out, and stated elsewhere that Germany would have to build 8 to 12 coal power plants to replace its nuclear fleet.

### Warming DA

#### Nuclear power key to stop emissions in Belgium

Toobin 16 [Adam Toobin, "Why Target Belgium? For Terrorists, the Answer Is Complicated and Nuclear" Inverse Magazine, 3/22/2016] AZ

Belgium remains heavily reliant on nuclear power to reach its clean energy goals under the Kyoto and Paris protocols, and support for the programs remains high. Some areas in Belgium even obtain as much as 50 percent of their energy from nuclear power. Despite the current old age of Belgian nuclear power reactors, the country has no plans for new plants once the current facilities expire.

#### Nuclear power is key to Belgian energy – makes half of its electricity and prevents carbon emissions

IEA 16 [International Energy Association, "Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 2016 Review Belgium," 2016] AZ

Nuclear power plays a key role in Belgium’s energy supply, constituting about half the electricity generation and 16.6% of total primary energy supply (TPES) in 2014. In 2015, nuclear power generation fell further, to 26 terawatt-hours (TWh), according to FPS (Federal Public Service) Economy. In recent years, electricity generated from nuclear power, and consequently the share of nuclear energy in the generation mix, has significantly decreased because of long-term outages of several nuclear units. Despite that, the share of nuclear power in Belgium remains one of the highest in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Seven units, all pressurised water reactors (PWRs), are currently operating in Belgium for a total net installed capacity of 5 913 megawatts (MW) at the end of 2015. The reactors are located at the sites of Doel, on the Scheldt estuary close to Antwerp, and of Tihange, on the river Meuse between Liège and Namur. Since the last (International Energy Agency (IEA) in-depth review in 2009, total net capacity has increased by about 100 MWe as a result of capacity upgrades at Doel 1, Doel 4 and Tihange 3. All nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Belgium are operated by Electrabel, a 100% subsidiary of Engie since 2003. Electrabel is the sole owner of Doel 1 and 2 units, and owns 50% of Tihange 1 and 89.8% of the other four units. The remaining 50% of Tihange 1 is owned by EDF which controls also the remaining 10.2% share of the other four units (see Table 10.1). Belgium has a long tradition in nuclear research and in civil nuclear power, dating from the early 1960s, and for many years the Belgian industry covered almost all activities in the nuclear fuel cycle. In 1962, the BR3 (Belgian Reactor 3) was the first pilot PWR connected to the grid in Western Europe. Belgium co-operated with France in the construction of the first full-scale PWR in Europe (Chooz A). The development of nuclear power in Belgium started at the end of the 1960s with the decision to build three nuclear units at the two sites of Doel and Tihange. Following the first oil crisis, another four units were ordered and connected to the grid by the end of 1985. The whole Belgian nuclear capacity has been commissioned in a relatively short period of about ten years, from February 1975 to October 1985; the lifetime of the nuclear fleet is therefore quite homogeneous, with an average of 35 years of operation. Over the course of operation, the Belgian nuclear fleet has generated about 1 420 TWh of baseload electricity and contributed significantly to the security of energy supply (see Figure 10.1). Nuclear power has also helped avoid emissions of large quantities of carbon dioxide2 , and had an important role in Belgium’s efforts to reduce air pollution (sulphur dioxide SO2 and oxides of nitrogen NOx).

#### Nuclear power is key – no renewables

Waldman 15 - Susanne, PhD in Risk Communication at Carleton University (“Why we Need Nuclear Power to Save the Environment” <http://energyforhumanity.org/climate-energy/need-nuclear-power-save-environment/>) RMT

The idea we might need nuclear power to save the environment may have seen farfetched thirty years ago, at the height of the anti-nuclear movement. But it’s an idea that more and more scientists of all stripes as well as energy experts and even environmentalists are coming to share.

Last month, 75 biodiversity scientists signed an open letter imploring the environmental and conservation communities to rethink “idealistic” opposition to nuclear energy, given the threats to global ecosystems set in motion by climate change. This open letter follows in the wake of another published a year ago in the New York Times by climate scientists with a similar message: “there is no credible path to climate stabilization that does not include a substantial role for nuclear power.”

These scientists who study the earth and the life on it are concerned it is too risky to rely solely on wind, solar and other so-called “green” power to replace fossil fuels, which are still the fastest growing energy sources by a long shot. As these scientists point out, renewable power sources would require enormous amounts of land, materials, and money to meet the world’s current and growing energy needs.

Wind and solar power are especially problematic because they are intermittent and can’t be dispatched to match demand. While the quest is on for grid storage options, there has not yet been a significant storage breakthrough, and any contribution it ends up making may only be modest.

In the meantime other power sources that can run full time are required to take up the slack. Options for doing so are limited to fossil fuels, biomass that is comparatively bulky and limited in scale, hydro power that is largely tapped out in some places, and nuclear power. The advantage of nuclear power is there is no shortage of suitable sites and it is the most low-footprint form of power generation, taking into account land use, materials, carbon footprint, and fuel density.

History has shown the most effective way to replace fossil fuel power over a 15-year-period is to build up nuclear. Ontarians, who rely on nuclear plants to deliver roughly three-fifths of our power every day, and have become coal-free, know this. So do people in France, where nuclear energy supplies around three quarters of power needs.

The problem is that as a complex form of technology, nuclear plants are relatively pricey to build. Few have been constructed of late in the Western world, during an era of cheap coal and gas, liberalized energy markets, cash-strapped governments, and hyped-up renewables. Experienced work forces who can put them up quickly have become hard to assemble on the fly.

These patterns can alter, though, as people come to recognize that once nuclear plants are up they can churn out steady carbon-free power for over half a century. Moreover the power they provide is typically quite cheap and not sensitive to fuel price volatility.

#### Global warming causes extinction

Sharp and Kennedy 14 – (Associate Professor Robert (Bob) A. Sharp is the UAE National Defense College Associate Dean for Academic Programs and College Quality Assurance Advisor. He previously served as Assistant Professor of Strategic Security Studies at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) in the U.S. National Defense University (NDU), Washington D.C. and then as Associate Professor at the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, collocated with NDU. Most recently at NESA, he focused on security sector reform in Yemen and Lebanon, and also supported regional security engagement events into Afghanistan, Turkey, Egypt, Palestine and Qatar; Edward Kennedy is a renewable energy and climate change specialist who has worked for the World Bank and the Spanish Electric Utility ENDESA on carbon policy and markets; 8/22/14, “Climate Change and Implications for National Security,” *International Policy Digest*, <http://intpolicydigest.org/2014/08/22/climate-change-implications-national-security/>, Accessed 7/11/16, HWilson)

Our planet is 4.5 billion years old. If that whole time was to be reflected on a single one-year calendar then the dinosaurs died off sometime late in the afternoon of December 27th and modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago, or at around lunchtime on December 28th. Therefore, human life on earth is very recent. Sometime on December 28th humans made the first fires – wood fires – neutral in the carbon balance.

Now reflect on those most recent 200,000 years again on a single one-year calendar and you might be surprised to learn that the industrial revolution began only a few hours ago during the middle of the afternoon on December 31st, 250 years ago, coinciding with the discovery of underground carbon fuels.

Over the 250 years carbon fuels have enabled tremendous technological advances including a population growth from about 800 million then to 7.5 billion today and the consequent demand to extract even more carbon. This has occurred during a handful of generations, which is hardly noticeable on our imaginary one-year calendar. The release of this carbon – however – is changing our climate at such a rapid rate that it threatens our survival and presence on earth. It defies imagination that so much damage has been done in such a relatively short time. The implications of climate change is the single most significant threat to life on earth and, put simply, we are not doing enough to rectify the damage.

This relatively very recent ability to change our climate is an inconvenient truth; the science is sound. We know of the complex set of interrelated national and global security risks that are a result of global warming and the velocity at which climate change is occurring. We worry it may already be too late.

Climate change writ large has informed few, interested some, confused many, and polarized politics. It has already led to an increase in natural disasters including but not limited to droughts, storms, floods, fires etc. The year 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record according to an American Meteorological Society (AMS) report. Research suggests that climate change is already affecting human displacement; reportedly 36 million people were displaced in 2008 alone because of sudden natural disasters. Figures for 2010 and 2011 paint a grimmer picture of people displaced because of rising sea levels, heat and storms.

Climate change affects all natural systems. It impacts temperature and consequently it affects water and weather patterns. It contributes to desertification, deforestation and acidification of the oceans. Changes in weather patterns may mean droughts in one area and floods in another. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, sea levels rise but perennial river water supplies are reduced because glaciers are retreating.

As glaciers and polar ice caps melt, there is an albedo effect, which is a double whammy of less temperature regulation because of less surface area of ice present. This means that less absorption occurs and also there is less reflection of the sun’s light. A potentially critical wild card could be runaway climate change due to the release of methane from melting tundra. Worldwide permafrost soils contain about 1,700 Giga Tons of carbon, which is about four times more than all the carbon released through human activity thus far.

The planet has already adapted itself to dramatic climate change including a wide range of distinct geologic periods and multiple extinctions, and at a pace that it can be managed. It is human intervention that has accelerated the pace dramatically: An increased surface temperature, coupled with more severe weather and changes in water distribution will create uneven threats to our agricultural systems and will foster and support the spread of insect borne diseases like Malaria, Dengue and the West Nile virus. Rising sea levels will increasingly threaten our coastal population and infrastructure centers and with more than 3.5 billion people – half the planet – depending on the ocean for their primary source of food, ocean acidification may dangerously undercut critical natural food systems which would result in reduced rations.

Climate change also carries significant inertia. Even if emissions were completely halted today, temperature increases would continue for some time. Thus the impact is not only to the environment, water, coastal homes, agriculture and fisheries as mentioned, but also would lead to conflict and thus impact national security. Resource wars are inevitable as countries respond, adapt and compete for the shrinking set of those available resources. These wars have arguably already started and will continue in the future because climate change will force countries to act for national survival; the so-called Climate Wars.

As early as 2003 Greenpeace alluded to a report which it claimed was commissioned by the Pentagon titled: An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for U.S. National Security. It painted a picture of a world in turmoil because global warming had accelerated. The scenario outlined was both abrupt and alarming. The report offered recommendations but backed away from declaring climate change an immediate problem, concluding that it would actually be more incremental and measured; as such it would be an irritant, not a shock for national security systems.

In 2006 the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) – Institute of Public Research – convened a board of 11 senior retired generals and admirals to assess National Security and the Threat to Climate Change. Their initial report was published in April 2007 and made no mention of the potential acceleration of climate change. The team found that climate change was a serious threat to national security and that it was: “most likely to happen in regions of the world that are already fertile ground for extremism.” The team made recommendations from their analysis of regional impacts which suggested the following. Europe would experience some fracturing because of border migration. Africa would need more stability and humanitarian operations provided by the United States. The Middle East would experience a “loss of food and water security (which) will increase pressure to emigrate across borders.” Asia would suffer from “threats to water and the spread of infectious disease. ” In 2009 the CIA opened a Center on Climate Change and National Security to coordinate across the intelligence community and to focus policy.

In May 2014, CNA again convened a Military Advisory Board but this time to assess National Security and the Accelerating Risk of Climate Change. The report concludes that climate change is no longer a future threat but occurring right now and the authors appeal to the security community, the entire government and the American people to not only build resilience against projected climate change impacts but to form agreements to stabilize climate change and also to integrate climate change across all strategy and planning. The calm of the 2007 report is replaced by a tone of anxiety concerning the future coupled with calls for public discourse and debate because “time and tide wait for no man.”

The report notes a key distinction between resilience (mitigating the impact of climate change) and agreements (ways to stabilize climate change) and states that:

Actions by the United States and the international community have been insufficient to adapt to the challenges associated with projected climate change. Strengthening resilience to climate impacts already locked into the system is critical, but this will reduce long-term risk only if improvements in resilience are accompanied by actionable agreements on ways to stabilize climate change.

The 9/11 Report framed the terrorist attacks as less of a failure of intelligence than a failure of imagination. Greenpeace’s 2003 account of the Pentagon’s alleged report describes a coming climate Armageddon which to readers was unimaginable and hence the report was not really taken seriously. It described:

A world thrown into turmoil by drought, floods, typhoons. Whole countries rendered uninhabitable. The capital of the Netherlands submerged. The borders of the U.S. and Australia patrolled by armies firing into waves of starving boat people desperate to find a new home. Fishing boats armed with cannon to drive off competitors. Demands for access to water and farmland backed up with nuclear weapons.

The CNA and Greenpeace/Pentagon reports are both mirrored by similar analysis by the World Bank which highlighted not only the physical manifestations of climate change, but also the significant human impacts that threaten to unravel decades of economic development, which will ultimately foster conflict.

Climate change is the quintessential “Tragedy of the Commons,” where the cumulative impact of many individual actions (carbon emission in this case) is not seen as linked to the marginal gains available to each individual action and not seen as cause and effect. It is simultaneously huge, yet amorphous and nearly invisible from day to day. It is occurring very fast in geologic time terms, but in human time it is (was) slow and incremental. Among environmental problems, it is uniquely global. With our planet and culture figuratively and literally honeycombed with a reliance on fossil fuels, we face systemic challenges in changing the reliance across multiple layers of consumption, investment patterns, and political decisions; it will be hard to fix!

#### Weak grid exacerbates the effects of cyber-attacks

Bennet & Williams 16 [Katie Bo Williams and Cory Bennett, “Why a power grid attack is a nightmare scenario,” The Hill, May 30, 2016, <http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/281494-why-a-power-grid-attack-is-a-nightmare-scenario>]

 Stores are closed. Cell service is failing. Broadband Internet is gone. Hospitals are operating on generators, but rapidly running out of fuel. Garbage is rotting in the streets, and clean water is scarce as people boil water stored in bathtubs to stop the spread of bacteria. And escape? There is none, because planes can’t fly, trains can’t run, and gas stations can’t pump fuel. This is the “nightmare scenario” that lawmakers have been warning you about. The threat of an attack on the nation’s power grid is all too real for the network security professionals who labor every day to keep the country safe. “In order to restore civilized society, the power has got to be back on,” said Scott Aaronson, who oversees the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC), an industry-government emergency response program. While cybersecurity experts and industry executives describe such warnings as alarmist, intelligence officials say people underestimate how destructive a power outage can be. The most damaging kind of attack, specialists say, would be carefully coordinated to strike multiple power stations. If hackers were to knock out 100 strategically chosen generators in the Northeast, for example, the damaged power grid would quickly overload, causing a cascade of secondary outages across multiple states. While some areas could recover quickly, others might be without power for weeks. The scenario isn’t completely hypothetical. Lawmakers and government officials got a preview in 2003, when a blackout spread from the coastal Northeast into the Midwest and Canada. “If you think of how crippled our region is when we lose power for just a couple of days, the implications of a deliberate widespread attack on the power grid for the East Coast, say, would cause devastation,” said Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine). Researchers have run the numbers on an East Coast blackout, with sobering results. A prolonged outage across 15 states and Washington, D.C., according to the University of Cambridge and insurer Lloyd’s of London, would leave 93 million people in darkness, cost the economy hundreds of millions of dollars and cause a surge in fatalities at hospitals. The geopolitical fallout could be even worse. “If [a major cyberattack] happens, that’s a major act of war, bombs are starting to fall,” said Cris Thomas, a well-known hacker who is now a strategist at security firm Tenable. A former senior intelligence official who spoke to The Hill echoed that assessment. The specter of a catastrophic attack on the electrical grid looms large for utilities and the federal government. They all agree that a “cyber Pearl Harbor” would be a deliberate attack, most likely from a foreign adversary. “It’s an act of war, not an act of God,” Aaronson said. One of the most fearful aspects of a cyberattack is that they can be difficult to spot, even when they are happening. At first, power providers may only notice a cascade of overloaded transmission lines failing in rapid succession — something that happened during the 2003 blackout, which was caused by an ordinary software bug.

### Belgium Key

#### Belgium key to EU policy on climate change

Gayard 13 [Gregoire Gayard (Centre Thucydide – Analyse et recherche en relations internationales Université Panthéon-Assas), "How Regions Contribute to Belgium's International Climate Policy: A Comparison of Belgian and Canadian Multi-Level Climate Politics," 2013] AZ

It is very important to note that the European Union is clearly the main arena through which Belgium defends its international positions on climate change27 The EU's influence on its Members' climate policies works on two levels. On the intra-European level, the large competences of the EU in the environmental domain have furthered a high level of harmonization between the member states. On the global level, the EU has managed to reach a high degree of unity among its members during international climate change negotiations. During the multilateral negotiations on climate change, the EU states organise two-hour long coordination meetings every morning. This European coordination, and the level of cohesion between the member states, have meant that it would now be “unacceptable” for an individual State to undermine the European consensus by speaking for itself28. Therefore, most of the Belgian efforts to defend its positions on climate change take place at the European level. Belgium does send delegations at the multilateral discussions on climate change, but there, Belgium, like the other Member States, mainly defends its positions during the European coordination meetings.

#### Belgium is key – it's a lynchpin in international climate changeNCC 10 [National Climate Commission of Belgium, "BELGIAN NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGY," December 2010] AZ

Since 2008, the Belgian development cooperation has explicitly included the fight against climate change in its policy as a priority. This is due to the fact that the consequences of climate change in many countries in the south are an important source of instability in terms of food security, biodiversity loss, land degradation and desertification, (environmental) migration, public health and tensions that could lead to conflicts. Developing countries, especially the least developed countries, are the first victims of climate change, even though they are less responsible for the causes and have fewer tools to combat climate change or to adapt their societies. In many developing countries, especially African countries, climate change adds additional pressure to difficulties resulting from long existing problems, such as poverty, poor access to education, weak institutions and governance, inadequate infrastructure, low access to technology and information, poor access to health services, problems with income generation and armed conflicts. These structural problems come on top of the threats that originate from the overexploitation of available natural resources, a quickly increasing population, desertification and land degradation. These stress factors make developing countries, especially the least developed countries, more vulnerable for climate change and make adaptation more difficult. The Belgian development cooperation is active in many sectors where the impact of climate change must be taken into account, such as agriculture and rural development, water, energy, infrastructure and health care. Through its bilateral cooperation, by supporting non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the northern and southern hemispheres and by supporting scientific institutions, Belgium is contributing to several programs and projects that all tackle adaptation to climate change in one way or another. In the framework of multilateral cooperation20, Belgium supports amongst others international agricultural research (mainly the centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the European Research for Agriculture/Agricultural Research for Development (ERA/ARD). In 2009 Belgium contributed to the Least Developed Countries Fund to support implementation of the National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs) of these least developed countries. Belgium is planning to increase this support significantly as part of its contribution to the fast start funding package, negotiated in Copenhagen.

#### Belgium key

Ypersele 8 [Jean-Pascal van YPERSELE (Professor of Climatology and Environmental Sciences at the Université catholique de Louvain), "Climate change and the Belgian development cooperation policy: Challenges and opportunities," September 2008] AZ

Examined from the point of view of the fight against climate change, we will see below that Belgian development cooperation has tendencies similar to those observed at an international level: underestimation of the challenge, distortion in favour of mitigation and at the expense of adaptation, and methodological difficulty in conceiving integration within existing policies and procedures. The 2006-2007 report of the DGDC (DGDC 2007) tackles the question of climate change through the protection of the tropical rainforest in DR Congo, noting that this is “essential because of its climate regulation effect”, in particular. Discussing the importance of the concept of the nondestructive use of the forest (REDD), which was at the heart of the Brussels Conference on the sustainable management of the Congo basin (26-27/ 2/2007), the report states as follows: “While it is natural for the forests to be exploited, it is no longer acceptable for them to be reduced purely and simply to the financial value of the wood. The forests make essential contributions to the environment which should be taken equally into consideration, such as reducing the effects of climate change”. We find here a certain confusion between adaptation and mitigation of the effects of climate change, since the text continues by stating, more correctly, that “At the international climate summit in Bali, it was decided that the concept of ‘prevention of deforestation’ would form part of the Kyoto II Agreement as of 2012, and that this would give the protection of the forests its proper place in the global fight against CO2 emissions” (p. 32). Climate change is brought up again, more briefly and in a general manner, elsewhere in the report. With reference to the global partnership for development, and more precisely the EU report on the coherence of European development policies and their interaction with other domains of political action, we read that twelve of these domains have been identified, namely “trade, environment, climate change, security, agriculture, fishing, etc.” (p. 34). However, the report itself does not give any concrete form to this desire for complementarity. Thus, the direct or indirect significant interactions between climate change and the campaign against extreme poverty and hunger, primary education for all, equal opportunities for women, structural support for public health (e.g. in the fight against malaria) and the sustainable management of water resources are not mentioned. In fact, in focusing on the carbon sinks of the Congo forest, the report seems to express a preponderant interest in mitigation. Adaptation is not taken into account. The same distortion is found, albeit in a less pronounced manner, in the first report of the DGDC on the Millennium Development Goals (DGDC 2005). On page 23 of this document, we read that “The challenge of climate change, for example, must be taken up not only by Belgium or Europe, but also through partnerships with the developing countries, aimed at creating a favourable environment for measures to mitigate climate change (e.g. the promotion of renewable energies) and adapt to its effects (for example by rethinking the planning of land-use).” The statement seems to express a priority preoccupation with mitigating climate change through the exporting of lowcarbon technologies. The concept of adaptation is certainly mentioned, but it is illustrated by the question of land-use, which relates partly to adaptation and partly to mitigation (carbon sinks). This interpretation is reinforced by an inset on the Kyoto Protocol, in which we read that “within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, Belgium enters into partnerships with developing countries with a view to making a contribution to targets for the reduction or absorption of CO2, through the Clean Development Mechanism, while ensuring the transfer of ecological technologies”. In the context of a DGDC report on the achievement of the MDG, we may deplore the absence of any reference to the Marrakech Agreements which, except for the Least Developed Countries, strictly limit the involvement of development cooperation to Belgian cooperation and climate change - 41 the reinforcement of capacities in the implementation of flexible mechanisms. In general, this report on the achievement of the MDG does not testify to any significant recognition of the interactions between climate change, its effects and the development agenda, particularly the fight against poverty and hunger. The documents of the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) give the same impression. The document presenting the Cooperation’s activities in DR Congo devotes significant space to the protection of the Congo forest, its sustainable management, the Brussels Conference and the creation of the Joint Multi-Donor Forestry Governance Fund, but without explaining the important link between this policy and the fight against climate change (BTC 2007a). It emerges from the text that the recently-adopted Indicative Cooperation Programme (ICP), which concerns the period 2008- 2010, does not cover the question of climate change. Adaptation is nevertheless a significant aspect of the Belgian aid sectors in this country: basic healthcare, education and training, agriculture and food supply safety, basic infrastructures (water and drainage, energy, road and rail systems). Similarly, the document presenting the achievements of the Belgian Cooperation in Ecuador does not reveal any great consideration of climate change (BTC 2007b). The activities of the Cooperation are, however, concentrated in climatically sensitive domains such as basic healthcare and rural development in underprivileged regions. Here, the Belgian Cooperation offers its assistance to small producers of dairy, meat and coffee products, and finances projects concerned with the supply of drinking water, in particular. Climate change plays a clear role in all these areas of development, particularly with regard to water, which is of particular concern in the Andean countries (notably in Peru) owing to the meltback of the glaciers. Between 1994 and 1999, the proportion of World Bank projects vulnerable to climate change rose from 20% to 30% in Ecuador, while the proportion of projects requiring adaptation to the effects of climate change rose from 23% to 42%, according to GIGLI & AGRAWALA (GIGLI & AGRAWALA 2007). In March 2008, the Ecuadorian Environment Ministry and the reinforcement of capacities in the implementation of flexible mechanisms. In general, this report on the achievement of the MDG does not testify to any significant recognition of the interactions between climate change, its effects and the development agenda, particularly the fight against poverty and hunger. The documents of the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC) give the same impression. 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### A2 Phase-Out Solves

#### nuclear power is necessary for Belgium to meet energy needs

WNN 16 ["IEA advises rethink on Belgian phase-out policy," World Nuclear News, 5/20/2016] AZ

In its report - titled Energy Policies of IEA Countries: Belgium 2016 Review - the IEA said Belgium should develop a "long-term comprehensive energy policy" that enables "market players to balance energy security, climate change goals and affordability in line with Belgium's EU and international commitments, taking into account the policy approaches of neighbouring countries". The policy should also ensure "a stable investment climate for all energy supply options". However, the IEA notes that Belgium's current policy to phase out the use of nuclear energy by 2025 "does not help Belgium meet any of its energy policy goals". "It is of the utmost importance that Belgium's policy on nuclear power is consistent with its objectives regarding electricity security and climate change mitigation." Fatih Birol, IEA executive director Closure of Belgium's seven operating reactors is "expected to occur in a very short time frame", between 2022 and 2025. According to the IEA, "A rapid phase-out of the nuclear units, which currently represent around half the electricity generation, would be extremely challenging and would have a significant impact on energy supply, on the level of electricity prices and on the country's ability to meet its long-term GHG emission targets." The report added, "It could also have an adverse impact on the financing of regulatory bodies, which is currently ensured by a levy on nuclear installations. It would also have an effect on the funding of the provisions for waste management and decommissioning." The IEA suggests, "To help ensure security of electricity supply and to limit the costs of the phase-out, the government should reconsider the current phase-out policy and opt for a more gradual approach. A better option would be to allow nuclear power plants to run as long as the regulator considers them safe. The IEA recommends the government to simply avoid a phase-out as it is currently envisaged." The Belgian government should thoroughly assess whether the current phase-out schedule is "feasible and reasonable". Should this assessment show that it is not, the phase-out policy should be "quickly" amended by "clarifying the role of nuclear energy and [providing] a stable and long-term framework to allow for adequate planning and an overall reasonable return for the necessary investments in long-term operation". Launching the report in Brussels yesterday, IEA executive director Fatih Birol said: "Our review rings alarm bells due to the lack of private-sector investment in the electricity sector. Government efforts to mobilize investment should include an electricity market design that ensures a viable business model for power generation. And to avoid a lack of generation capacity in the medium term, Belgium could consider operating their nuclear power plants as long as they are certified to be safe by the regulator." He added, "It is of the utmost importance that Belgium's policy on nuclear power is consistent with its objectives regarding electricity security and climate change mitigation."

#### The plan crushes energy production

IEA 16 [International Energy Association, "Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 2016 Review Belgium," 2016] AZ

Such a rapid phase-out of the source of almost half all electricity generated in the country will be extremely challenging from both financial and technical viewpoints and will have a significant impact on energy supply. It will raise the costs of generating electricity and weaken the country’s ability to meet its long-term GHG mitigation targets. It can also have an adverse impact on the financing of regulatory bodies, which is currently ensured by a levy on nuclear installations. The current tight phase-out schedule is partly the result of addressing imminent electricity supply concerns in Belgium by extending the operation of the three oldest units by 10 years from 2015 to 2025. To avoid electricity security challenges in 2022-25, investments in power supply options are needed soon. The planned increases in interconnections will help, but are not a full substitute for the baseload power the NPPs generate. At the same time, wholesale electricity prices in Belgium and the broader Central Western European region are expected to remain too low to attract major new investments in electricity generation without subsidies. To help ensure security of electricity supply and to limit the costs of the phase-out, the government should reconsider the current phase-out policy and opt for a more gradual approach. A better option would be to allow NPPs to run as long as the regulator considers them safe. The IEA recommends the government to simply avoid a phase-out as it is currently envisaged. A recent OECD study has shown that extending the long-term operation of nuclear plants is the lowest-cost option available for power generation. Several utilities in OECD member countries have already obtained the licence to operate their nuclear plants beyond 40 years or are in the process of submitting an application to the safety authorities. Permitting an increase of the LTO for the four relatively recent NPP units (commissioned in 1982-85) would allow for a more gradual phase-out from nuclear energy, would reduce the costs for electricity generation in the mid-term and would help meet long-term GHG reduction targets.

### Provinces

#### The three regions of Belgium should prohibit the production of nuclear power. The Federal Government of Belgium should devolve authority over nuclear power to the regions.

#### In the context of environmental regulation, provinces should regulate nuclear power

Gayard 13 [Gregoire Gayard (Centre Thucydide – Analyse et recherche en relations internationales Université Panthéon-Assas), "How Regions Contribute to Belgium's International Climate Policy: A Comparison of Belgian and Canadian Multi-Level Climate Politics," 2013] AZ

In practice, Belgium's climate policy coordination mechanisms give a large place to the regions. Even though the federal government is responsible for organizing the coordination mechanisms, regions have a leading role in the CCIEP. This is due to the fact that the environmental competencies are mostly regional. Therefore, the pilots very often come from the regional level. 29 Another important feature of the coordination mechanism is the tendency of the minister's cabinets to play an important role in the position formation process. Interviews with experts and members of ministers' cabinets at both the federal and regional level showed that representatives of the ministers' cabinets have an input at every level of the coordination. Even at the administrative level of the GECG, experts from the various governments are in constant contact with their minister's cabinet. Members from these cabinets also have informal relations with the pilots. These contacts increase when an issue is politically sensitive. Also, as soon as a disagreement occurs, the issue is usually discussed in informal inter-cabinet meetings between the various governments. These findings are confirmed by the observations made by various authors who conducted the same type of interviews30 . To summarize, we can identify three main characteristics of the system we have just described. First, the coordination mechanisms allowing regions to be deeply involved in the international climate policy of Belgium are highly institutionalized. The coordination architecture includes many committees, working groups, and conferences, whose relations to each other are defined by written mechanisms. The role, the composition, and the decision mechanisms of each cog in the coordination machinery are defined by cooperation agreements, and even individual committees such as the CCIEP have their own set of rules and regulations. The complexity of this architecture is described by the participants as a necessary evil. Many interviewees declared they were aware that the coordination process often delays the definition of an international policy, but that this was the necessary price to pay to make sure that the Belgian position would be coherent and adhered to by all parties. Second, the architecture allows every concerned level of government to have an input in the policies that are defended by Belgium. The fact that the whole process is based on a consensus decisionmaking system ensures that each participant has the power to veto a position or a decision. This does increase the risk of policy failure, in the sense that if an agreement is ultimately impossible to find between the various components of Belgium, the country will not be in a position to express itself on the international stage. Finally, the mechanisms ensure that the large involvement of the regions will not weaken the coherence of the country's positions on the international stage. The system is remarkably efficient in this regard, in the sense that while it allows for a large input from the regions, it still permits the formulation of a coherent policy which is expressed through a single voice. This is confirmed when we examine the strategies favored by the regions to defend their positions on the international stage. Rather than expressing themselves directly on the international stage to defend their individual interests, the regions have mostly opted to channel their voices through the Belgian positions. Van Den Brande, Happaerts and Bruyninckx have shown that Flanders most extensively used “intrastate routes” to get involved in the global sustainable development debate, because of the opportunities offered by the intra-Belgian arrangements31 .

### Federalism DA

#### Regions have energy policy authority

Belgian Federal Government 16 ["The powers of the Regions," Official Belgium government website, 2016] AZ

Regions have powers in fields that are connected with their region or territory in the widest meaning of the term. So the Flemish Region, the Brussels-Capital Region and the Walloon Region have powers relating to the economy, employment, agriculture, water policy, housing, public works, energy, transport (except Belgian Railways), the environment, town and country planning, nature conservation, credit, foreign trade, supervision of the provinces, communes and intercommunal utility companies. They also have powers relating to scientific research and international relations in those fields.

#### Belgian federalism is key to EU cohesion – Flemish and Wallonian tensions are high and any additional violation of federalism triggers the impact

Sotirovic 14 [Vladislav B. Sotirović (Associate professor, Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Faculty of Politics and Management, Institute of Political Sciences), "Belgium’s Multicultural Society: “Federalism Laboratory” of European Integration," Global Research, 11/22/2014] AZ

Belgium not so often attracts outside attention. Yet the country is more than fine chocolates, delicious beers or Tintin. Usually, the others celebrate Belgium as a federal, post-nationalist country, which combines cultural pragmatism with a rather solid social consensus. The historians present the country without a critical vision of the origins of the Belgian independence in 1830 as a part of a game between the great European powers. Belgium as well as illustrates how the deep-seated tradition of local autonomy and suspicion towards state authority go hand in hand with a strong sense of individual tolerance and solidarity, with a rejection of violent confrontation and a continuous search for consensus between the Flemish and the Walloon parts of the country. Belgian history from the very beginning in 1830 up to the present is a history of linguistic diversity, cultural plurality and a search for a kind of a “Belgian” common identity of its all citizens who are constantly living between state’s integration and its territorial disintegration. Belgium is an example of the ambivalent relation between history, national myths, and the “lasagne” identity of most Belgians for whom the King, as a political institution, is de facto the only factor of the national unity. The Belgian case of multicultural federalism can be at the same time and a model but also and a warning for the rest of Europe. Its history addresses questions of identity and security, of a sense of cohesion and common purpose – or the lack thereof. Like for the rest of Europe as well. Any history of the Belgians from 1830 onwards has to describe the traditions and transitions that have developed on the territory of the present-day Belgium in a sense of shared identity, common government, and a centralized nation-state – and then over a few recent decades paved the way for Flemish-Walloon schism that now threatens to break up Belgium. However, it has to respond to the crucial question: Why does a government, unified for more than 150 years, no longer seem capable of holding together a linguistically divided country? If Belgium, as a symbol of the west European successful policy of multiculturalism and multilingual cohabitation, can not function anymore as a united political system and a country based on it, what other parts of Europe with the same structure and problems as Belgium can expect in the post-Cold War future of Europe which basically already started in 2014 in the multilingual and multicultural Ukraine?

#### Turns the case – disintegration of the EU crushes US relations – ensuing chaos prevents coherent agreements and diplomatic visits

#### EU collapse causes global depression

Strahan 10/13/11

http://www.davidstrahan.com/blog/?p=1300

 David Strahan is an award-winning investigative journalist and documentary film-maker who specializes business and energy. For a decade he reported and produced extensively for the BBC’s Money Programme and Horizon strands. He is also the author of The Last Oil Shock: A Survival Guide to the Imminent Extinction of Petroleum Man, published by John Murray, and continues to write, broadcast and consult on energy. He is a trustee of the Oil Depletion Analysis Centre, fellow of the RSA, and an honorary researcher at the Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre.

 The climate always takes a back seat when economies turn sour, but **the impact of a euro breakup would be profound** and long-lasting. Any country leaving the euro would also breach the treaties of Mastricht, Lisbon and Rome, and therefore be forced to leave the single market and the European Union. So a euro breakup is likely to shatter the EU, and with it the hard won architecture of climate policy. For a start, **the Emissions Trading System would be unlikely to survive** the collapse of the currency in which it is denominated. True, the EU ETS has been widely criticized for being ineffectual – with certificates currently languishing at less than €11 per tonne of CO2 – and many argue a carbon tax would be cheaper and more effective. But **the system** is what we have, and **crucially imposes an international framework which,** however weak at present, **could be strengthened** and expanded in future. That would all be swept away by the collapse of the EU, along with any obligation for countries to deliver their 2020 targets on emissions reduction, renewables capacity and energy efficiency. But so what? Given the scale of the likely economic collapse, emissions would plunge too. In the 2009 recession, Europe’s GDP shrank 4% while total emissions in the EU27 dropped a little over 7%, according to the European Environment Agency. If the cost to countries leaving the euro is between 25% and 50% of GDP, as UBS suggests, in a euro breakup European emissions would fall far below any existing targets. And emissions could stay low for many years: Stephen King, the chief economist of HSBC, has said the destruction of the single currency would threaten “another Great Depression”. On that basis, the collapse of the EU, so long in the vanguard of climate policy, could ironically be seen as the best outcome for global warming. But nothing could be further from the truth. Because **while emissions would fall dramatically, so would our ability to do anything about the remainder.**  The IPCC’s most recent assessment says holding global temperature increase to 2C means cutting emissions by up to 85% by 2050. But that assessment does not include the impacts of so-called ‘slow feedback loops’ such as the melting ice sheets. More recent work led by James Hansen, director of the Goddard Institute at NASA, suggests we need to be carbon neutral by around the middle of the century and carbon negative thereafter. Both assessments clearly require emissions to fall far more than would be delivered by Europe’s economic ruination. Yet achieving those kinds of reductions requires massive investment. The International Energy Agency calculates that holding temperatures to +2C means the world needs to invest $18 trillion by 2035, across transport, power generation, buildings and industry. The investment needed would presumably be lower if emissions themselves had already slumped, but even so it is hard to imagine governments could mobilize anything like enough money in the midst of a grinding depression. Not only would the wealth have been destroyed, but also the political will. Which leader, for example, would dare to raise energy prices to pay for carbon capture and storage? **There is much more riding on the outcome** of the Greek crisis than the future of Europe or even the world economy. The danger is that **a euro collapse could destroy the** capital and European institutions needed to combat climate change for a generation. **A spiralling financial crisis would then spawn an environmental catastrophe**. It is bitterly ironic that the meltdown of a minor economy that has little to sell but sunshine could condemn the planet to uncontrollable global warming.

**economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that triggers hotspots around the globe – co-opts all other causes of war**

**Harris and Burrows 9** [Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf> Increased Potential for Global Conflict]

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever.** While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised **that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would** almost certainly **be the Middle East**. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed **Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.** It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict and terrorism** taking place **under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** **combined with underdeveloped surveillance** capabilities **and** mobile **dual-capable** Iranian **missile systems** also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

### 2NR – A2 Coop Federalism

#### No cooperation – each region should have their own realm

Swenden 3 [Wilfried Swenden (Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research (Flanders/Belgium) University of Leuven (KULeuven), Belgium and Visiting Scholar, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, USA), "Belgian Federalism Basic Institutional Features and Potential as a Model for the European Union," Minda de Gunzberg Centre for European Studies, 2003] AZ

The extensive legislative autonomy of the Regions and Communities is paralleled by autonomous Regional and Community administrations. Belgium does not adopt the system of ‘administrative federalism’ so characteristic of the German federal model (Jeffery 1999; Börzel 2002). In Belgium, federal laws are implemented by federal departments or agencies and Regional or Community laws are implemented by regional departments or agencies. A second feature which sets Belgian federalism apart from the German variant relates to its characterization as a dual federation: unlike in Germany, there is scarce evidence of concurrent federal legislation, joint action programmes or framework legislation. Consequently, with one minor exception, i.e. the power of the Regions to raise income taxes, Belgian federal and regional law stand on equal footing; both are subordinate only to the constitution.

#### Cooperative federalism fails

Richard A. Epstein 14, the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law (emeritus) at the University of Chicago; and Mario Loyola, senior fellow at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, Summer 2014, “Saving Federalism,” National Affairs, Issue #20, http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/saving-federalism

There was only one problem: Like New York, Printz left the door wide open for the cooperative-federalism programs that are almost as effective in establishing federal control of the states as direct rule would be. Cooperative federalism uses either fiscal or regulatory inducements to rope states into implementing federal policy. Examples include state Medicaid programs and state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act (such as the EPA's new state-based carbon rule), both of which require states to seek federal approval to gain benefits and avoid penalties. The Rehnquist Court held fast to the fiction that such programs are voluntary for the states and constitute mere "encouragement" on the part of federal authorities, which is permissible unless and until it rises to the level of coercion. As the Court explained in New York, "Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people." But what is the conceptual difference between encouragement and coercion? Both involve free will but both involve the imposition of onerous penalties if states refuse to comply with federal policy. Federal funds, which now account for 32% of state budgets on average, often come with so many conditions attached that any state variations to a program can be only marginal. If states refuse to comply, they lose funds under programs that their citizens have already been taxed for. Likewise, through what scholars call "conditional preemption," the federal government, exercising its commerce power, grants states permission to implement federal regulations in areas such as health care, the environment, education, and transportation — but only if the states comply with a host of conditions. The conditions are normally so extensive that if states comply they are reduced to mere field offices of the federal government. But if they don't comply, the federal government preempts them and imposes its own implementation program, often with little consideration for local constituents. Indeed, sometimes the federal agency comes to "crucify" local constituents, as former EPA regional administrator Al Armendariz boasted at a closed-door meeting in the first months of the Obama administration. One troubling example of such "crucifixion" arose when Texas refused to implement the EPA's first greenhouse-gas regulations: EPA preempted the field and then massively delayed the implementation of the regulation, leaving key industries with no access to necessary operating permits. Texas was forced to back down. Unlike the Supreme Court, the National Federalists have no trouble praising cooperative-federalism programs that increase federal control of state governments. Federal conditions shape most state policies, chiefly because they are almost impossible for state officials to resist as a matter of political reality. The blandishment of hard tax dollars, which if rejected will go to other states even if raised from the citizens of the refusing state, plus the specter of unfriendly federal regulators stepping in if state regulators refuse to comply, are usually more than enough to force the hands of state officials.’

#### Cooperative federalism’s counterproductive for overall effective state-federal balance

Richard A. Epstein 14, the Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law (emeritus) at the University of Chicago; and Mario Loyola, senior fellow at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, Summer 2014, “Saving Federalism,” National Affairs, Issue #20, http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/saving-federalism

It is particularly vital to disentangle the operations of state and federal governments. It is one thing for the federal government to locate a research institute at a state university or manage multiple federal, state, and local agencies in response to a disaster. It is quite another to systematically integrate the finances of governments with separate taxing authorities. As Michael Greve convincingly argues in his 2012 book, The Upside Down Constitution, the intermingling of state and federal finances has led to a disastrous and unsustainable fiscal dysfunction across the whole government. The money Washington sends to the states is not "assistance"; it is rent for the use of state agencies as field offices of the federal government, in transactions that contain a strong element of coercion. Much the same is true for cooperative regulatory programs under "conditional preemption." The separation of state and federal government is every bit as vital as the separation of powers within government, and given the much greater disparities in bargaining power, judicial policing of that troubled boundary is as indispensable for long-term national prosperity as for federalism itself.

### Taxes DA

#### Rapid shutdown of nuclear plants requires huge resources – trades off with funding for waste management –

IEA 16 [International Energy Association, "Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 2016 Review Belgium," 2016] AZ

According to the current schedule of nuclear phase-out provided in Table 10.1, the shutdown of all Belgian NPPs is expected to occur in a very short time frame, between 2022 and 2025. A rapid phase-out of the nuclear units, which currently represent around half the electricity generation, would be extremely challenging and would have a significant impact on energy supply, on the level of electricity prices and on the country’s ability to meet its long-term GHG emission targets. It could also have an adverse impact on the financing of regulatory bodies, which is currently ensured by a levy on nuclear installations. It would also have an effect on the funding of the provisions for waste management and decommissioning. A recent OECD study has shown that the LTO of nuclear plants is the lowest-cost option available for power generation (OECD, 2012). Several utilities in OECD member countries have already obtained the licence to operate their nuclear plants beyond 40 years or are in the process of submitting applications to the safety authorities. The nuclear operator has estimated that investments of EUR 600 million are needed for the LTO of Tihange 1, and EUR 700 million for the long-term operation (LTO) of both units 1 and 2 at Doel.

#### Nuclear power key to revenue generation – taxes

IEA 16 [International Energy Association, "Energy Policies of IEA Countries: 2016 Review Belgium," 2016] AZ

In 2008, the government introduced a substantial levy on nuclear power generation. The contribution level has been revised several times; on average, the contribution volume has been more than EUR 200 million per year. Nuclear power generation is subject to several kinds of taxes and levies in more countries, probably because it is a relatively easy source of revenue: the plant operator cannot just shut down operations or move to a more favourable jurisdiction. The absolute level of contribution needs to be carefully considered, however. In general, limiting the utilities’ profits reduces their options for investing capacities in the LTO and/or other much-needed low-carbon capacity, and leads to a greater need for governments to encourage such investments, also financially.

### Belgium Key

#### Belgium key to global economy

Daniel Gross 4 [(Daniel Gross, ) Is Belgium the secret heart of the global economy?, Slate Magazine 4-2-2004] AT

Europe is the sick man of the global economy. The continent's regulation-bound economies have been sputtering for years. The European Central Bank's most recent survey of professional forecasters predicts 2004 growth of just 1.8 percent. The stubborn refusal of the economies of Europe to grow more rapidly slows demand for American products and puts more pressure on American consumers to stoke the world's economic engine. Can Europe recover? Economists and CEOs pray for it every day. But where can they look for signs of a rebound? The broadest measure of economic growth—gross domestic product—is backward-looking. It only tells us what happened in the last quarter. Those interested in determining whether the French and German economies will kick into a higher gear must seek out leading indicators. But the best answer may not be found in Paris or Berlin. Instead, the search for the world's best obscure economic indicators leads us to Brussels. AnnaMaria Grimaldi, an economist at Morgan Stanley in London, suggests that Belgian inventory measures can function as a highly useful leading indicator. "Inventories are a very important component of GDP, especially at turning points," Grimaldi said. "The reading can be one of the key starting elements of the turning point in the business cycle." Why? When inventories are insufficient, or low, companies may be more likely to order goods and hence stimulate production. When inventories are excessive, or high, companies will be slower to build up stocks. After a period of sluggish growth, a decline in inventory levels would tend to signal an imminent uptick in activity. Get Slate in your inbox. What makes Belgium, with its population of about 10 million, the best place to detect a potential turn in the European economy? It has nothing to do with chocolate or moules frites. The nation that houses the capital of Europe is a very open economy. About 80 percent of its GDP comes from exports, and a large chunk of that goes to European neighbors. In other words, Belgium is a big hub for intra-European trade. "In a sense, a rise in Belgian orders … would signal that domestic demand in other Euroland countries is rising," said Grimaldi. In fact, Grimaldi and her colleagues have found that Belgian inventory levels tend to lead broader European levels by three months. So what's happening in Belgium in March can give us a sense of which direction European inventories will move in June. So what are Belgian inventories telling us? In September 2003, Belgian inventory levels shifted significantly lower, indicating insufficient inventories in Belgium—good news for future growth. And while the Belgian figures have edged up in recent months, they have nonetheless remained low, suggesting growth ahead. The low readings coming out of Brussels should be good news for Europe. If the historical relationship holds, European inventory levels should fall in the coming months—a phenomenon that will ultimately stimulate economic activity. If Belgian inventories stay in their slump, Europe might even get out of its sickbed one of these days.

### Ag Impact

#### Independently, the agriculture industry is uniquely sensitive to electricity costs

WALLACE 2—CSU Chico Research Foundation Staff [Henry Wallace, Agricultural Electricity Rates in California, Consultant Report, http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2002-05-13\_400-01-020.PDF]

Today, agricultural commodity prices have been driven down by worldwide competition, greatly reducing the net returns to all California agricultural operations. Growers and food processors are now more vulnerable to increased costs, such as higher electricity rates, that cannot be passed along in higher prices. Significant reductions in profitability could lead to bankruptcies, and concomitant reductions in agricultural output. The recent spate of cooperative failures (e.g., Tri Valley and Farmers’ Rice) and processing plant closures are examples of the current weakness in the agricultural economy.

#### Causes global wars & instability

Femia 12 (Francesco and Caitlin Werrell, Write for The Center For Climate and Security, When National Climate Disasters Go Global: On Drought, Food, And Global Insecurity, July, Accessed Online at Think Progress)

The security implications of food price spikes

What we’ve also seen is that spikes in world food prices have increased the likelihood of instability and riots. In some instances, crop failure in one part of the world associated with instability halfway around the globe, can contribute to serious diplomatic crises between the U.S. and its allies, as occurred with Egypt, and could conceivably result in U.S. military involvement.

This is part of a larger phenomenon Dr. Troy Sternberg calls “the globalization of hazards,” where natural hazards in one region can have a significant impact on regions halfway across the globe. This is not to say that the current U.S. drought will necessarily lead to unrest. However, it is not unprecedented for droughts, and other climatic events that damage crop production, to do so.

Collective impact of crop failure across the globe

It is also important to consider that the drought and crop failures in the U.S. are not happening in isolation. In recent years, extreme hot and dry weather has forced Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to reduce their harvest forecasts (and two studies explicitly link the devastating Russian heat wave of 2010 to climate change). European Union wheat yields this year will be smaller, in part, because Spain is suffering from the second worst drought in fifty years. North and South Korea are facing the worst drought in a century. Shifts in glacial melt and rainfall are threatening crops in Pakistan. The proliferation of locusts throughout West Africa is threatening household food security. Recent floods in Japan, India and Bangladesh are threatening rice crops. Argentina’s soy crops were severely depleted because of a shortage of rain. And in Mali, drought combined with other factors led to a major humanitarian disaster in the region. The list goes on.

Many of these conditions are record-setting, or the worst of their kind in decades and sometimes centuries. And climate projections threaten to make matters worse. What this means is that it is possible that the global food market is about to witness an unusual amount of stress. It is not entirely clear if the market is prepared for it, or even if nations have the capacity to adequately respond.

Impact on U.S. assistance and diplomacy

Food, for better or worse, is also used as a form of diplomacy. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Food for Peace program has sent 106 million metric tons to the hungry of the world, feeding billions of people and saving countless lives. The program depends on the unparalleled productivity of American farmers and the American agricultural system. Without this vast system there would be no Food for Peace program, or any of the other food assistance programs either run by the U.S. government, or heavily supported by the U.S. such as the UN’s World Food Program.

On average, American food aid provides 60 percent of the world’s food aid, feeding millions of desperately hungry people every year. This means that in addition to facing an increasing risk from lower crop and animal stock yields and global food market shocks, the U.S. may also be limiting its ability to respond rapidly to global disasters, including global food crises. This is bad news for the global poor, and for U.S. diplomacy.

### Turns Terror

#### Turns case – increases likelihood of dirty bomb

Rubin & Schreuer 16 [ALISSA J. RUBIN and MILAN SCHREUER, Belgium Fears Nuclear Plants Are Vulnerable," NY Times, 3/25/2016] AZ

Asked on Thursday at a London think tank whether there was a danger of the Islamic State’s obtaining a nuclear weapon, the British defense secretary, Michael Fallon, said that “was a new and emerging threat.”

While the prospect that terrorists can obtain enough highly enriched uranium and then turn it into a nuclear fission bomb seems far-fetched to many experts, they say the fabrication of some kind of dirty bomb from radioactive waste or byproducts is more conceivable. There are a variety of other risks involving Belgium’s facilities, including that terrorists somehow shut down the privately operated plants, which provide nearly half of Belgium’s power.

### Turns Renewables

#### Revenues are used to fund renewables – no wind or solar without government subsidies

WNA 16 [World Nuclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Belgium," March 2016] AZ

In May 2010, CREG estimated the cost of producing electricity from Belgian nuclear power plants as 1.7-2.1 € cents/kWh, including fuel cycle, operating, depreciation, and provisions for decommissioning and waste management. This compared with the forward market price of 6 ¢/kWh and the market price for green energy certificates at 8.8-10.7 ¢/kWh.In June 2013 Electrabel filed an appeal to Belgium's Constitutional Court against the €550 million ($734 million) annual federal tax on nuclear power generation. In 2012 the government passed laws doubling the size of the tax. As the dominant power generator and supplier, Electrabel bears the brunt of the tax – €479 million – while EDF-Luminus, Belgium's second-largest generator, has nuclear offtake rights and pays the remainder. GDF Suez said that raising the tax bill goes against the protocol signed by the company and the federal government in 2009, which set out a special tax of €215-245 million for 2010-14. Since 2010 the tax has doubled and market conditions for utilities have deteriorated.In April 2014 the Court of First Instance in Brussels rejected Electrabel's claim it was entitled to an exceptional tax refund of about one billion euros over profits from its Belgian nuclear plants, which it has been paying 2008 to 2012 as a tax increment. The company appealed, saying the €479 million for 2012 corresponded to its entire nuclear profits, but that appeal was rejected in July 2014, with the court saying that the appeal was “unfounded”. Electrabel’s contribution of €422 million for 2013 was higher than its entire operational activities in Belgium. "This confiscatory fiscal pressure on Electrabel at a time when the company's economic situation has deteriorated resulted in losses for Electrabel in 2013 for the second year in succession." The company lodged an appeal against the 2013 contribution, but in September 2015 the Constitutional Court rejected this and said the tax was "legitimate". In April 2015 CREG updated its 2010 calculations and said that the profit from all of Belgium's nuclear operators – Electrabel, EDF Luminus and EDF Belgium – totalled some €435 million in 2014. CREG reported that "the profits derived from nuclear activities are the difference between revenues and costs. The 'nuclear rent' can then be calculated by subtracting a fair remuneration of the invested capital." Electrabel noted that the nuclear contribution amounted to €479 million in 2014 – some €44 million more than CREG’s calculation of profits. "The nuclear operators are thus paying to the state more than they earn from this nuclear activity," and CREG's latest calculation clearly shows that the 'nuclear contribution' imposed by the government on nuclear operators since 2008 is confiscatory, it said.In July 2015 Electrabel agreed to pay €130 million in 2016 as the federal nuclear power ‘contribution’ or tax, substantially less than previously intended (and less than €479 million in 2014). This is alongside a fee for life extension of Doel 1&2 – see section below. From 2017 a formula will apply, with a minimum of €150 million per year to 2019. In mid-2013 the government approved an energy plan which would subsidise gas-fired generation and offshore wind capacity with taxes from nuclear power. Investors had been deterred from investing in planned 800 MWe of gas-fired plant by the relatively low cost of nuclear power and the grid priority of renewables input.

## Case

### Case – O/V

#### The aff's not inherent – two implications

#### Belgium will phase reactors out in 2025 anyway, so they need to win that a terror attack will occur in the next decade

#### Reject the aff – the neg has no disad ground since the aff isn't a prohibition – it just accelerates an existing law

### Meltdowns

#### Apocalyptic predictions about meltdowns are exaggerated to justify extraordinary measures

McCartney 11 – general practitioner, Glasgow (Margaret, 3/22. “Panic about nuclear apocalypse overshadows Japan’s real plight.” http://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d1845?ijkey=xsmHzm92sZxFQz2&keytype=ref)

Yet it is not this human disaster that is the source of ongoing headlines and debate; rather it is anxiety about two of Japan’s 55 nuclear power stations, focusing on the Fukushima plant. Five nuclear reactors lost their cooling ability in the earthquake, and a state of emergency was then declared. The Sun newspaper ran a front page headline superimposed on a yellow and black radiation symbol, “Exodus from Tokyo—1000s flee poison cloud,” and declared, “Japan is teetering on the brink of nuclear catastrophe amid fears a radioactive cloud could envelop Tokyo’s 13 million residents. The Foreign Office warned Brits to avoid the capital as it was feared a SECOND nuclear reactor was heading for meltdown after Friday’s devastating earthquake and tsunami.” The next day the physicist and television presenter Brian Cox wrote a piece for the very same newspaper: “Damage to nuclear reactors sounds very frightening—but the first thing to say is that they just cannot explode like nuclear bombs.” Professor Cox went on, “The only real contamination risk is from small amounts of nuclear material being released into the air in this steam. It sounds scary, but the levels of radiation released in this way are very small—probably about the same as you would expect on a long-distance transatlantic flight” (www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3468502/Its-scarybut-nothing-like-a-nuclear-bomb.html). Nevertheless the same newspaper later reported, with pictures of the damaged reactor, “Revealed: the stricken reactor spewing radiation,” adding that this “terrifying image reveals for the first time the cause of the catastrophic nuclear meltdown” (www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/3475902/Nuke-workers-note-to-wife-Live-well-I-cannot-be-home-for-a-while.html). The theme of a nuclear panic in Japan was taken up by the Daily Mail, which dedicated its front page to a picture of a Japanese woman in a face mask, with the headline “A nation in the grip of nuclear panic—Japan’s nuclear disaster spirals out of control amid warnings that it could end in ‘apocalypse.’” Unnamed experts “warned that they have 48 hours to avoid another Chernobyl,” the paper said. Sky News joined in, saying, “Japan’s chief cabinet secretary Yukio Edano said radiation levels outside the 18-mile exclusion zone were not high enough to cause an immediate health risk. ‘People would not be in immediate danger if they went outside with these levels. I want people to understand this,’ he told a news conference. However, Mr Edano’s comments have failed to provide reassurance as thousands of people have been cleared from their homes, and thousands more have chosen to move away from the region surrounding the Fukushima plant.” The Guardian described “panic buying in Tokyo,” saying that “fears are rising that if the hoarding frenzy continues it will affect the ability to deliver emergency supplies to the disaster zone. ‘The situation is hysterical,’ said Tomonao Matsuo, a spokesman for the instant noodle maker Nissin Foods. ‘People feel safer just by buying Cup Noodles’” (www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/15/japan-nuclear-emergency-panic-buying). Most printed photographs of Japanese people failed to show much panic, however, with sadness, social order, and facemasks prominent. The actual aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami seemed to have been pushed off the front pages while a nuclear “disaster” that hadn’t actually affected any members of the public took centre stage instead. The BBC reported, “Europe’s energy commissioner Guenther Oettinger said Tokyo had almost lost control of the situation at Fukushima. ‘There is talk of an apocalypse and I think the word is particularly well chosen,’ he told the European Parliament” (www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-asia-pacific-12749444). Some scientists gave rather more rational risk assessments. John Beddington, the UK chief scientific officer, gave an interview on the website of the British embassy in Tokyo: “So what I would really re-emphasise is that this is very problematic for the area and the immediate vicinity and one has to have concerns for the people working there. Beyond that 20 or 30 kilometres, it’s really not an issue for health” (http://ukinjapan.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=News&id=566799182). He followed this up on his Twitter account, but it seemed to make little impression on the UK media otherwise. Gerry Thomas, chair in molecular pathology at Imperial College London, had a wider audience when she told Channel 4 News, “Precautions taken so far should be sufficient to protect people near the site. There is no significant release of radiation yet; it’s really only the workers that are at risk. We are not looking at an accident anything like Chernobyl.” She continued, “One thing we should have learnt post-Chernobyl is not to spread panic and make claims that turn out to be wrong. The psychological damage being done now to the Japanese is huge. At Chernobyl we told local people that they would get cancer and die and they are still living with the fact that we gave them false information . . . Tens of thousands of people [in Japan] have lost their lives. Even if the worst case scenario happened and there was an accident 10 times the size of Chernobyl, you wouldn’t have as many deaths as that. We are missing the point here and we are panicking that poor, savaged population about radiation that is not going to harm them” (www.channel4.com/news/japan-nuclear-panic-is-over-reaction-say-scientists).

#### Alternatives are worse

Waldman 15 - Susanne, PhD in Risk Communication at Carleton University (“Why we Need Nuclear Power to Save the Environment” <http://energyforhumanity.org/climate-energy/need-nuclear-power-save-environment/>) RMT

What about safety? The accident at Fukushima after the Japanese tsunami in 2011 has gripped the world. Yet no one has died from radiation released, and the World Health Organization anticipates no uptick in associated deaths will occur.

By contrast, a million people die every year of health problems caused by the pollution from coal. A dam break in China in 1971 killed over a hundred thousand people. Rare earth mining for materials used in solar panel construction, EV batteries and wind turbines is currently poisoning a chunk of inner Mongolia.

There is no absolutely risk-free, pollution free way to generate energy, as James Conca has pointed out in a well-circulated article in Forbes, How Deadly is Your Kilowatt. But over its lifetime, Conca points out, “Nuclear has the lowest deathprint” relative to the amount of energy it produces. Meanwhile, safer meltdown-proof reactors are currently being developed around the world.

Choosing to build more nuclear power plants is going to require a mental shift for a lot of people. In their letter, conservation scientists called for the environmental community to move beyond “idealistic perceptions of what is ‘green’” and think practically about trade-offs around energy. As the scientists suggest, no solution that’s currently visible can match nuclear’s steady, CO2-free power for keeping our world safe from biodiversity and climate impacts.

#### Accidents are rare, nuclear power is the safest

Walsh 13 – Bryan, Writes for Time (“Nuclear Energy Is Largely Safe. But Can It Be Cheap?” <http://science.time.com/2013/07/08/nuclear-energy-is-largely-safe-but-can-it-be-cheap/>) LADI

Is it safe? That’s what most people — brought up on Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and The Simpsons — want to know about nuclear power. And for the most part, the answer is yes. Accidents are rare, and those that have occurred — including the partial meltdown in Fukushima, Japan, in 2011 — have resulted in few deaths. On a megawatt-per-megawatt basis, nuclear kills fewer people than almost any other source of electricity — especially compared with air pollution from coal, the single biggest supplier of electricity in the U.S., which contributes to the deaths of 14,000 Americans each year. And nuclear energy, unlike every other form of electricity — save hydro and renewables, doesn’t contribute to man-made climate change.

### BioD

#### Biodiversity is resilient and inevitable

Sagoff 8 Mark, Senior Research Scholar @ Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy @ School of Public Policy @ U. Maryland, Environmental Values, “On the Economic Value of Ecosystem Services”, 17:2, 239-257, EBSCO

What about the economic value of biodiversity? Biodiversity represents nature's greatest largess or excess since species appear nearly as numerous as the stars the Drifters admired, except that "scientists have a better understanding of how many stars there are in the galaxy than how many species there arc on Earth."70 Worldwide the variety of biodiversity is effectively infinite; the myriad species of plants and animals, not to mention microbes that arc probably more important, apparently exceed our ability to count or identify them. The "next" or "incremental" thousand species taken at random would not fetch a market price because another thousand are immediately available, and another thousand after that. No one has suggested an economic application, moreover, for any of the thousand species listed as threatened in the United States.77 To defend these species - or the next thousand or the thousand after that - on economic grounds is to trade convincing spiritual, aesthetic, and ethical arguments for bogus, pretextual, and disingenuous economic ones.78 As David Ehrenfeld has written,

We do not know how many [plant] species are needed to keep the planet green and healthy, but it seems very unlikely to be anywhere near the more than quarter of a million we have now. Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut, extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bring¬ing the eastern deciduous forest down with it. And if we turn to the invertebrates, the source of nearly all biological diversity, what biologist is willing to find a value - conventional or ecological - for all 600,000-plus species of beetles?7\*

The disappearance in the wild even of agriculturally useful species appears to have no effect on production. The last wild aurochs, the progenitor of dairy and beef cattle, went extinct in Poland in 1742, yet no one believes the beef industry is threatened. The genetic material of crop species is contained in tens of thousands of landraces and cultivars in use - rice is an example - and does not depend on the persistence of wild ancestral types. Genetic engineering can introduce DNA from virtually any species into virtually any other - which allows for the unlimited creation of biodiversity.

A neighbor of mine has collected about 4,000 different species of insects on his two-acre property in Silver Spring, Maryland. These include 500 kinds of Lepidoptera (mostly moths) - half the number another entomologist found at his residence.80 When you factor in plants and animals, the amount of "backyard biodiversity" in suburbs is astounding and far greater than you can imagine.8' Biodiversity has no value "at the margin" because nature provides far more of it than anyone could possibly administer. If one kind of moth flies off, you can easily attract hundreds of others.

### A2 Nuclear Terror – ISIS

#### No nuclear terror from ISIS – no motive, no expertise, and no foreign partners

Kranish 15 [Shoshana Kranish (intern at CAMERA), "Why ISIS Lacks Nuclear Weapons," Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, 6/22/2015] AZ

The title of a recent article on the Hill says it all: “ISIS Won’t Find Nuclear Weapons in Iraq or Syria, Thanks to Israel.” Back in 1981, Israel carried out Operation Opera, destroying Osiraq, a nuclear reactor in Iraq just outside Baghdad. The Iranians had previously tried to do the same a year prior, but had caused only minor damage that had since been repaired. While Israel said the attack had been in self-defense, and that further development with the reactor could have been critical in Iraqi capabilities within the next month – they came under heavy criticism from the West, specifically the UN.

The Begin Doctrine—named for then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin—was formulated for Operation Opera, stating that the attack was a “precedent for every future government in Israel.” Whether this means that Israel will preemptively attack any nuclear reactors or labs that might threaten them is indeterminate. In 2007, though, the doctrine was used to justify Operation Orchard, the attack on the Syrian nuclear site of Deir ez-Zour. Much like Operation Opera, the attack was swift and successful, with minimal casualties on the enemy side.

Whether or not ISIS hopes to develop and use nuclear weapons in the future is unclear. The research and time that goes into developing nuclear weapons is extensive, and the group is unlikely to want to commit to such a project. Furthermore, who would develop these weapons? The work on the nuclear reactor in Syria was previously done by North Koreans. Yet cooperation between the two seems unlikely. ISIS views every non-Sunni Muslim to be a heretic within their view of the Muslim world, and those beyond the Muslim world—Jews, Christians, etc., are in the same boat as the Shi’is. While there is not much of a relationship between ISIS and North Korea, the likelihood of one developing is low. In North Korea, religion is discouraged. Under the Islamic State, strict adherence to their idea of Sharia law is a necessity in preventing an untimely death.

Without North Korea, who could help ISIS acquire nuclear weapons? Iran is highly unlikely for obvious reasons – the Shi’i country is actively opposed to ISIS, supporting militias who are fighting against the Sunni terror organization. Recent reports state that ISIS could purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan within the next year, but with this information public, the world will keep a watchful eye on India’s unstable neighbor. Furthermore, if Pakistan did go ahead with the sale, their economy would come to a screeching halt, as most countries would likely agree to trade sanctions on the country.

Regardless of their success so far in capturing territory from unstable countries, ISIS is unlikely to wage a nuclear war. Their options for trade partners in such a deal are limited, as any country that would sell them nuclear weapons would come under fire themselves by the rest of the world. It is highly unlikely that ISIS is going to develop a nuclear program of their own. Thanks to Israeli actions in 1981 and 2007, ISIS’s access to nuclear weapons is now non-existent.

While the Israeli attacks were heavily condemned then by the United Nations and much of the world, where is the celebration now? If Israel hadn’t destroyed Osiraq after Iran’s failure to do so, what would the Middle East look like today? If the Israeli Air Force had not eliminated Syria’s nuclear reactor, would there be anything recognizable left of Syria today, or would ISIS have seized the weapons and used them already? Thanks to the Israelis, the world doesn’t need to think like this—but they certainly could start thanking Israel.

#### new safety policy solves

Bunn 16 [Matthew Bunn (Professor, Harvard University; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom), "Belgium Highlights the Nuclear Terrorism Threat and Security Measures to Stop it," Huffington Post, 3/29/2016] AZ

In December 2014, after the August sabotage, Belgium’s Federal Agency for Nuclear Control imposed new regulations substantially strengthening protection against insider threats. Then, after the Brussels airport and subway attacks, Belgium withdrew non-essential personnel from its nuclear facilities. This significantly reduced the number of personnel at these sites, reducing the chance that there might be a malevolent insider among them. They also added new rules on security cameras and use of two-person rule in sensitive areas. Moreover, Belgian authorities reportedly withdrew access passes for at least four workers at nuclear facilities in the days after the attacks.

Following the Paris attacks, the revelation of terrorist rings in Brussels and the monitoring of the Belgian nuclear official, Belgium decided to deploy armed troops to guard its nuclear facilities. (A specialized guard force will be trained and deployed in the coming months.)

Two days after the airport and subway terrorist attacks, with armed guards newly deployed at Belgium’s nuclear facilities, a security guard at one site was murdered. The dead man worked at a radioactive materials facility, not a power reactor. Prosecutors have denied early reports that the guard’s security pass had been stolen, and are playing down any militant link. Still, in a country with one of the world’s lowest murder rates — only about 200 murders occur in Belgium each year — it is a surprising coincidence.

Previously, Belgium had no armed guards at all at its nuclear facilities, relying instead on response forces a few minutes away. U.S. officials had long criticized Belgium on this and other aspects of nuclear security; the Center for Public Integrity reported on an incident in the mid-2000s in which the United States became so concerned that it threatened to cut off further nuclear supply to Belgium.

While there are important unanswered questions about each of these incidents, all told they offer troubling suggestions that ISIS is pursuing nuclear or radiological attacks. Ultimately, the group envisions a total war between the “crusader forces” and itself; winning a total war with a nuclear-armed superpower would presumably require very powerful weapons.

Fortunately, as Belgium has shown, there are clear actions that can drastically reduce the risk. At this week’s summit, the assembled leaders must take action to ensure that all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials worldwide are effectively and sustainably secured against the full spectrum of threats terrorists and criminals might pose.

### ISIS weak

#### ISIS weak – military solutions working

Neidig 8/13/2016 [Harper Neidig (reporter), "ISIS loses crucial Syrian stronghold," The Hill] AZ

U.S.-backed forces captured the Syrian city Manbij from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) this week after two months of fighting and two years of the city’s residents living under the terror group’s reign. According to The Associated Press, Manbij fell late Friday, freeing hundreds of civilians, some of whom reportedly had been used as human shields by ISIS forces. Pentagon spokesman Gordon Trowbridge on Friday praised the coalition known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for its efforts to retake the city. “That … is a major setback for [ISIS] at the hands of our partners the SDF, including thousands of Syrian Arab troops that are fighting to liberate their own homes. It is also the latest significant milestone in the coalition's efforts to cut off and eliminate a hub of [ISIS] activity located outside Syria,” Trowbridge said as reports came in Friday of ISIS forces fleeing the city. The AP reported that the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights put the total number of people killed in the fighting at 1,756. That number includes 438 civilians, 299 coalition troops and 1,019 ISIS fighters.

### Terror Link

#### Threat of nuclear terrorism authorizes a blank check of militarism

Joseph Masco, Prof. of Anthro @ U-Chicago, ‘6 [The Nuclear Borderlands, p. 328-332]

The post-Cold War period ended after September 11, 2001, with the formal conversion of the United States to a counterterrorism state. Americans who once thought the end of the Cold War had fundamentally transformed their relationship to the bomb were, after the terrorist strikes on September 11, once again witness to an escalating discourse of nuclear terror: the air¬waves were filled with stories of vulnerability, of unsecured ports through which a terrorist nuclear device could be smuggled, of unprotected nuclear power plants open to suicide attacks by airplane, of radiological dirty bombs, which might contaminate major U.S. cities, rendering them uninhabitable. A newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) soon launched the first civil defense campaign in more than a generation, seemingly designed more to maintain nuclear fear than reduce it. The Ready.Gov campaign officially advised citizens to stockpile potassium iodide pills to deal with potential radioactive poisoning, while doing their best to avoid contact with an exploding nuclear device (see Figure 8.1). Meanwhile, a new Homeland Security Advisory System kept Americans at a state of "elevated" to "high" risk of terrorist attack, institutionaliz¬ing a new kind of official terror, buttressed by frequent speculations from the DHS and FBI about possibly imminent catastrophic attacks. By the fall of 2004, when asked in their first debate to identify the single greatest threat to the national security of the United States, both presidential candidates agreed it was the atomic bomb: Senator Kerry put it in the context of "nuclear proliferation," while President Bush stated the greatest danger to the United States was nuclear weapons "in the hands of a terrorist enemy."1 In the new century, nuclear insecurity once again formally linked the foreign and the domestic under the sign of apocalyptic nuclear risk, creating a political space in which anything seemed possible. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, for example, made a case for war with Iraq simply by stating that "we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."2 In doing so, she mobilized the threat of an imaginary Iraqi nuclear arsenal to enable the most radical foreign policy decision in modern American history: a "preventative" war, which involved invading another country to eliminate a nuclear threat before it actually existed.3 In a few short years, nuclear fear writ large was politically mobilized into an enormously productive force in the United States, enabling a reconfiguration of U.S. military affairs (embracing covert action on a global scale), a massive bureaucratic reorganization of federal institutions (the Department of Homeland Security), a reconfiguration of civil liberties and domestic policing laws (the U.S.A. Patriot Act), and an entirely new concept of war (preemption. All of these projects were pursued in the name of a "war" on "terror," which was energized by an explicit nuclear discourse after the September 11 attacks on Washington, D.C., and New York. The post-Cold War period (1991-2001), thus', concluded with the official transformation of the United States from a countercommunist to a counterterrorist state, a conversion that would not have been possible in its speed, scale, or lack of debate without a discourse of nuclear terror. Given the scale of this transformation, it is difficult now to remember a time, only a few years ago, when it was difficult to focus American public attention on the bomb. Looking back on when I started researching this book in the mid-1990s, public reactions to nuclear weapons from the early post-Cold War moment now appear quite strange. Outside of New Mexico, a description of this book project, for example, often produced puzzled looks from U.S. citizens, and statements that suggested for many Americans the bomb had already become a thing of the past, of historical interest but not an ongoing political concern. A common response was surprise that Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was "still" involved in nuclear weapons work, and/or "shock" that the United States remained committed to the bomb after the demise of the Soviet Union. This immediate psychological effort to declare the bomb history in the wake of the Cold War is as remarkable as the feverish nuclear discourses following the decidedly non-nuclear September 11 attacks, and is part of the same structural logic: these psychosocial strategies reveal the American cultural tradition of approaching the bombeither as a banal object, not worthy of attention, or as a hysterical threat, requiring a total mobilization of the imagination. This banal/apocalyptic dual structure works to deny the U.S. commitment to the bomb by either cloaking it in a normative everyday space or by displacing attention onto solely external nuclear threats .In both instances, the internal politics and effects of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are erased, even as the core relevance of U.S. nuclear weapons to everyday American life is powerfully revealed by a bomb that is either all too absent or all too present.