If the affirmative wins offense to a counter-interpretation or an “I meet” on T or theory, vote affirmative as the aff gets spread out in the 1AR; theory in particular requires huge time commitments because it is a game over issue. The only fair thing is to let the affirmative collapse to theory in the 1AR, forcing the negative to defend their interpretation. Next, the resolution posits that deadly force is permissible under morality, but does not assert anything about the significance of morality itself. The topic asks whether morality, itself good or not, would deem deadly force a permissible option; arguments claiming that people have no reason to act morally are irrelevant.

Next, the aff defends cases of intimate terrorism, **LaRoche[[1]](#footnote-1):**

**Intimate terrorism** (IT)27 **denotes the will** or compulsion **of the perpetrator to exert general control** over the partner (Johnson, 2006a: 559; Johnson & Leone, 2005: 323; Johnson & Ferraro, 2000: 949; Johnson, 1999: [3]; Johnson, 1995: 284-285, 287), and physical violence is only one element embedded in a general pattern of controlling behaviours (Johnson & Ferraro, 2000: 949; Johnson, 1999: [4])**.** In other words, **the distinguishing feature** of intimate terrorism **is the** existence of a **pattern of both violent and non-violent behaviours rooted in the attempt to dominate the partner** (Johnson, 2006a: 559-560; Johnson & Leone, 2005: 323; Johnson & Ferraro, 2000: 949).

Prefer this interpretation since: A) All ground and topic lit is in the context of victims expecting *future* severe violence, since they are subject to a pattern of abuse. If violence were part of minimal discrete incidents, it would obviously be unreasonable to kill someone. B) Context - intimate terrorism is equivalent to the entire phrase “repeated domestic violence.” When we say repeat as part of a phrase, we’re generally trying to indicate a pattern, not just discrete incidents. Defining the words separately leads to multiple different interpretations in a vacuum, whereas there is one meaningful interpretation in a specific context, making it more predictable and equitable.

Next, because it asks what is morally permissible FOR a victim to do, the resolution questions the behavior of an individual, not an act alone. This makes excusability and accountability irrelevant, since saying someone’s behavior was not wrong, is the same thing as saying their behavior was permissible. When we excuse someone for committing a wrong act, we are saying that their behavior was the morally correct behavior.

I advocate for the meta-ethic of consistency with practical identity. A practical identity is the “you” from which you take actions– it’s the identity you view yourself as having. Practical identities are the source of moral prohibitions, Korsgaard[[2]](#footnote-2):

*The Solution:* Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a *conception* of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is *like* to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is *for you* when you deliberate. **When you deliberate, it is as if there were something** over and **above all of your desires,** something **that is *you,* and that *chooses* which desire to act on. This means that the principle** or law by **which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of *yourself.*** To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. **The conception of one’s identity in question here is** not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as **a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this** a conception of **your practical identity.** Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on.And **all** of these **identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.**

Practical identity is a pre-requisite to ethics as it is the perspective we make decisions from – I can only make decisions as me. But, in order for there to be moral prohibitions springing from our identity, we first have to have an identity that we place value on. Without a self-valued identity, there would be no reason not to simply change one’s identity in order to avoid moral wrong. Next, practical identity is valuable due to consistency: Velleman[[3]](#footnote-3)

**The value of being a person** in the present context **is** precisely **that of attaining a perspective that transcends** that of **your current, momentary self.** **Right now, you would rather sleep than swim, but you also know that if you** roll over and **sleep, you will wake up wishing that you had swum instead**. Your impulse to decide on the basis of reasons is, at bottom, an impulse to transcend these momentary points-of-view, by attaining a single, constant perspective that can subsume both of them**. It’s** like **the impulse to attain a higher vantage point that overlooks the restricted standpoints** on the ground **below. This higher vantage point is neither your current perspective of wanting to sleep, nor your later perspective of wishing you had swum, but a timeless perspective from which you can reflect on now-wanting-this and later-wishing-that**, a perspective from which you can attach constant practical implications to these considerations and come to a stable, all-things-considered-judgement.

A consistent personhood is a pre-requisite to moral wrongness because without a temporally consistent personhood, people have no way of judging whether their current desires constitute reasons for action, making them morally blameless. Also, reasons to act necessarily stem from practical identity, Velleman 2

As I mentioned earlier, I identify the self of self-governance with the faculty of causal reasoning, by which a person understands the deter minants of his behavior. **When the person’s causal reasoning helps to determine** his **behavior, his understanding of its determinants becomes inescapably reflexive, so that his behavior turns out to be determined by something inescapably conceived as self.** The way in which a person’s **causal reasoning helps to determine** his **behavior**, in my view, is **by inclining him toward** behavior of which he has an incipient causal understanding — **behavior that he is already pre pared to understand as motivated by his desires, expressive of his beliefs, guided by his intentions, and so on. That he has those desires, beliefs, and intentions is reason for him to** **do the things that he could understand as partly determined by them, because reasons for doing something are considerations in light of which doing it would make sense.**

Next, practical reason can’t provide a practical identity. Acting in accordance to the categorical imperative is equivalent to acting in accordance with individual, disconnected choices. Nagel[[4]](#footnote-4):

But why is the second sentence of this argument true? **If the will is self-determining, why can’t it determine itself in individual, disconnected choices as well as according to some consistent law** or system of reasons**?**  A neo-Humean regularity theory of causation seems an inappropriate model for free self-determination. If the idea makes sense at all, **the free choice of actions which conform to a law is no more nor less a form of *causality* than the free choice of actions which do not.**  (And the same could be said of the free adoption of beliefs.) So far as I can see, **choosing freely in a law-like pattern is merely a way of mimicking causality; if I always put on my left sock before my right, that does nothing to establish the causality of my will, so why does the categorical imperative do any better?** There has to be something more compelling about the demand for universality than this.

Practical reason might generate consistent norms – i.e. that you always would refrain from treating someone as a means – but it doesn’t generate a consistent perspective which is “you”. Next, reflection is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for having a reason. Silverstein[[5]](#footnote-5):

Despite this misunderstanding, though, Parfit’s objection still stands. Even if Korsgaard’s notion of normative force is not reducible to motivating force, it remains unsatisfyingly subjective. Consider her claim that the term reason refers to a sort of “reflective success.” Reflective success may be required for us to act for a reason, but—Parfit argues—**we can have a reason to act without successfully reflecting (or even reflecting at all). If my friend is in pain, then I have a reason to run to his aid, even if his need never enters my mind.** For Parfit, **a good reason has normative force whether we confront that force during deliberation or not. Moreover, we can successfully reflect on a set of considerations and then act accordingly without having a good reason to do so. Thus, reflective success seems to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a consideration to count as a reason for action**. According to Parfit, full-blooded normativity or justification involves more than justification from

Thus, showing that deadly force is inconsistent with practical reason doesn’t demonstrate that it’s inconsistent with reasons stemming from practical identity. Next, if there’s a conflict, we ought to value our practical identity over our rational identity. This is true as our rational identity is only derivatively valuable to achieve other ends – if I want chocolate, my rationality tells me that I have to go buy chocolate. But rationality can’t give a reason by itself without pre-existing practical identity.

Thus the criterion is consistency with practical identity based prohibitions. Prefer this criterion as all intentional actions are necessarily the result of practical identity: Velleman[[6]](#footnote-6) 3

Berkowitz draws a similar distinction between impulsive and purpo sive aggression. In collaboration with Turner (1974), he manipulated the degree of anger that subjects attributed to themselves toward a particu lar person, thereby modifying the intensity of the “punishment” that they inflicted on that person, though not their aggression toward a third party. Berkowitz emphasizes that the attribution-governed aggression observed. in this experiment was purposive rather than impulsive. “[I] mpulsive acts,” he says, “are automatic, stimulus-elicited responses to the external si tu atio n governed primarily by associative fac tors and relatively u naf fected by cognitive processes.”48 By contrast, purposive aggression is sub ject to cognitive governance:49 The present results generally support [my] cognitive analysis of purposive aggres sion. Emotionally aroused people seek to attack a particular target when (a) they interpret their internal sensations as “anger,” and (b) they believe this specific target had been the cause of their feelings. As indicated in this study, the inten sity of the subjects’ desire to hurt a particular person, reflected in the intensity of the punishment given him, arose from their perceptions of the strength of their anger and their belief that this person had been the one who had provoked the rn. Berkowitz goes on to explain this mechanism in terms of a cognitive motive toward self-consistency:5°Looked at from a larger perspective, the findings also provide yet another demon stration of the search for cognitive consistency. **We want our actions to** be in **accord with our emotions,** as we understand them, **and** apparently we **are also disturbed if** these **feelings do not seem to be warranted** by the causal incident. **The emotion as well as the behavior must be consistent with our other cognitions.** The idea that **behavior becomes purposive or intentional when it is regulated for self-consistency** can be traced back to the early clays of self-consistency theory. Six years after the publication of Lecky’s treatise, Carl Rogers published “A Theory of Personality and Behavior” offering a similar postulate:5’ Most of the ways of behaving which are adopted by the organism are those which are consistent with the concept of self. . . **As the organism strives to meet its needs** in the world as it is experienced, **the form which the striving takes must be** a form **consistent with the** concept of **self**. . . . **The person who regards himself as having no aggressive feelings cannot satisfy a need for aggression** in any direct fashion. **The** only **channels by which needs may be satisfied are those** which are **consistent with the** organizedconcept of **self.** To this Leckian postulate, Rogers added the following piece of action theory: Behavior may, in some instances, be brought about by olganic experiences and needs which have not been symbolized. Such behavior may be inconsistent with the structure of the self but in such instances tite behavior is not “owned” by the individual. . . . In such instances the individual feels “I didn’t know what I was doing,” “I really wasn’t responsible for what I was doing.” The conscious self feels no degree of government over the actions which took place. According to Rogers, then, **only behavior that is regulated for self-consistency is experienced as intentional action, for which the subject takes responsibility**. Hence the difference between mere behavior and intentional action — the difference, as Wittgenstein put it, between my arm ‘s rising and my raising it — may be due to the intervention of a self consistency motive.

Thus, only action based on practical identity is attributable to us as an agent, and thus only practical identity is capable of generating moral obligations for us as an agent. Moreover, since all actions necessarily stem from practical identity, if victims have no control over their immediate practical identity then they are blameless for their actions. The unique case of domestic violence victims is that changes in practical identity are being forced on them. Thus, if I show their practical identity can’t prohibit deadly force, then they are acting in a morally blameless manner.

I contend that victims’ practical identity places no constraints on deadly force. All people have a breaking point. At some point, people can’t take it anymore and they respond with violence - Dutton[[7]](#footnote-7)

Battered women are often “helped” along in tolerating abuse by health and mental health professionals, law enforcement personnel, and legal professionals who suggest that battered women change themselves or live with their situation instead of attempting to develop safe ways to leave. It has been suggested that **women sometimes increase their tolerance over time as the violence increases** in severity or frequency, **but** that **the abuse may eventually** reach a point where it **become**s **intolerable**. **Regardless of the “reasons” a battered woman might previously have remained**, or of her attempts to “live with” the violence**, there often comes a point where she no longer** chooses or **is able to do** **so**. It is at this point that a battered woman **[She] may react to a** particular violent episode or **threat as intolerable. This may occur even** in cases **where serious violence may have gone unchallenged in the past.** Battered women’s **level of tolerance** (or intolerance) **may fluctuate at any** given point in **time** and should be carefully evaluated in order to inform an understanding of the basis of her behavior. In sum, understanding these and other cognitions of a particular battered woman requires a careful analysis of the information and experience—especially regarding violence and abuse—available to her which may have shaped that learning.

The reaction is a result of a buildup of experiences - Dutton 2

Identification of current psychological reactions to trauma, or even a clinical diagnosis of PTSD, while consistent with a history of violence and abuse, does not prove that domestic violence actually occurred, that it occurred at the hands of the particular perpetrator in question, or that the psychological effects are, in fact, sequelae to domestic vio1ence.” Ultimately, that determination rests with the factfinder, although the testimony of expert witnesses may assist the factfinder in reaching that determination. The testimony of expert wit nesses can provide the factfinder with the formulation, based on the scientific literature, that best accounts for the phenomena experienced by the victim. Recognizing post-traumatic reactions of psychological distress or dysfunction may be helpful in explaining a battered woman’s actions while responding to a subsequent episode of violence. **The situation at issue may trigger certain intrusive images, affective responses** such as fear or anger**, or memories that may influence** the course of the battered woman’s **behavior.** For example, when a batterer begins to act out his threat to beat, rape, or kill the battered woman**, she may experience rage and fear based** on her (conscious or unconscious) **memory of prior episodes** when the barterer beat her severely, actually raped her, or attempted to kill her**. Her actions** in that immediate situation **may be influenced by both the actual events** occurring in the immediate situation **and** the **triggered responses** related to prior abusive experiences.

The reaction of victims of domestic abuse is part of conditioned behavior LaViolette and Barnett

**Cues associated with an assault become conditioned** (discriminative) **stimuli that bring about terror** when encountered again (Wirtz & Harrell, 1987). **Learned fear has a way of** mushrooming and **spreading into new areas** (generalization). **Because stimulus generalization occurs, events that are similar to the punished situations** **may** come to **trigger a negative anticipation**. **As a result, cues** that seem totally nonthreatening to most people **may come to elicit self-defensive responses in battered women**. When safety depends on reading significant cues accurately, people become speed readers.

Deadly force is an expression of the fear and aggression that are ingrained by domestic violence. LaViolette and Barnett[[8]](#footnote-8) 2

In animal research, punishment leads to increased aggression, a phenomenon termed elicited aggression. A punished monkey will attack objects, other organisms not involved in the punishment, or even itself (Ulrich, Wolff, & Azrin, 1964). **Humans** also **will become aggressive** toward noninvolved individuals when shocked (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967). **This** finding **helps explain battered women’s self-defensive aggression,** and it predicts outbursts of aggression toward others. Surprisingly, an extrapolation of the phenomenon of elicited aggression suggests that battered women’s agression toward their children may occur as one outcome of being battered themselves. Anothcr possibility is Freud ian displacement of aggression—the trickle-down theory—or that women them selves are violent. **Anger and fear emerge as the two predominant reactions to assault** (Gore Felton et al., 1999). **Anger** can be, and **often is, a buffer against fear**. In one En glish study, 62% of crime victims reported feeling angry because of their victimization (Shepherd, 199Œ, Stuckless, 1998). **Similarly, battered women** and those in shelters **are significantly angrier than** are comparison groups of **nonbattered women** (see also Edleson & Brygger, 1986; Feindler, 1988; Russell et al., 1989). Several **experts have recognized this combination of anger and fear** in victims (Blackman., 1988; Walker, 1984). Very likely, **the motives of self-defense** (fear motivated) **and retaliation** (anger-motivated) **become blended together for some battered women** (Saunders, 1986). Legally, self-defense pleas **in homicide cases** do not become nullified when extreme terror becomes mixed with extreme rage, because **it** **is reasonable to combine anger and fear** when attacked (Schneider & Jordan. 1978).

Also, victims suffer from severe forms of PSTD Kotler et al.[[9]](#footnote-9)

The occurrence of PTSD and symptoms of PTSD in women who are the victims of domestic violence has been investigated. This PTSD framework has been found to be useful in helping organize the symptoms commonly seen in victims of domestic violence. Studies assessing PTSD prevalence rates among battered women have yielded figures of 45% to 84% in community samples of battered women (Astin, Lawrence, & Foy, 1993; Astin, Ogland-Hand, Coleman, & Foy, 1995; Houskamp & Foy, 1991). **Symptom patterns indicative of PTSD and commonly found in battered women include intrusive symptoms**, such as nightmares, flashbacks, or reexperiencing the abuse (Saunders, 1994); **avoidance symptoms**, such as constricted affect or affective numbing (Houskamp & Foy, 1991; Saunders, 1994); **and autonomic hyperarousal symptoms**, such as sleep disturbance, hypervigilance, intense anxiety, difficulty concentrating, and startle response (Kemp et al., 1991; Saunders, 1994). Herman (1992) has claimed that **domestic violence is similar to circumstances of captivity**. Domestic violence of women and children is often overlooked because it is difficult to understand this parallel (i.e., that home may be a prison). Women **[Victims] are rendered captive by economic, social, psychological, and legal subordination as well as by physical force.** Herman found that **people subjected to prolonged, chronic, repeated trauma develop an insidious, progressive form of PTSD that invades and erodes the personality. The symptom** **picture appears to be more complex, diffuse, and tenacious than in simple PTSD.** **Characteristic personality changes may** also **develop, including deformations of relatedness and identity**. There is also vulnerability to repeated harm, both self-inflicted and at the hands of others

Thus, while there are some common reactions that we expect from victims, those reactions are not part of a common character type. Rather, they are a result of people not knowing how to respond to a loss of their coherent identity. The impact is that victims lose a stable practical identity, especially as they are subject to repeat abuse. A lack of stable identity makes deadly force permissible since without a stable identity, it’s impossible to have a consistent set of prohibitions. Victim’s possible moral reasons come from their current identity, but if their identity is subject to radical shifts, then we can’t say there’s a prohibition. Today they might have reason not to use deadly force, tomorrow they might. Thus, without consistent personhood there cannot be a prohibition on deadly force rendering it morally permissible. Next, victim’s practical identity is warped by the relationship – Dunn and Williams[[10]](#footnote-10)

Yet, **deriving even a portion of one’s identity from a relationship with an abusive man is** a **risky** proposition. **In addition to** **hazards** **that** **are usually** **part** **of a dependent relationship** —**e.g.,** others’ insensitivity, inattentiveness, and the normal **fluctuations a couple experiences** in closeness and affection over time—**in a violent relationship**, the person who knows the woman best and who is in the most intimate contact with her seems to value her so little as to batter her. **It is** **very hard for a victim**—any victim—**not to** internalize the implications of this kind of treatment and **deeply question** her own **worthiness**. In addition, **a battered woman’s difficulty in maintaining a self-image apart** **from the one reflected** **by** the man and his **treatment** of her **is often exacerbated by isolation** from outside activities and people who would provide more objective information, **The man’s moods, definitions, attributions, and opinions dominate** the environment. Even if the woman knows his abuse or accusations are unreasonable and based within some problem of his own, repeated incidents, combined with a victim’s confusion and distress and the vulnerability fostered by injury and depression, make the abuser’s definitions especially hard to resist.

Isolation makes victims of abuse define their identity via another person completely. But domestic violence is characterized by manic shifts in love, hatred, and violence, making someone completely unable to formulate a stable identity with the same impact. Next, domestic violence makes people accustomed to violence - LaViolette and Barnett 2

Alyce D. LaViolette [Alternatives Counseling Association, Co-author of best selling academic books], Ola W. Barnett [Distinguished Professor Emerita of Psychology at Pepperdine University, Malibu, California. She earned her undergraduate and doctoral degrees in Psychology at UCLA, specializing in Learning. Her initial research centered on batterers, and she later studied battered women and dating violence. She has coauthored two best-selling Sage books (with Alyce D. LaViolette) on why battered women stay with abusive partners. Remains active in the field of family violence by reviewing articles for a large number of journals] “It could happen to anyone: why battered women stay” Print. SAGE, 2000. Pg 105.

Over time, she may add depression, silent suffering, her own angry outbursts, and leaving temporarily. Her **[Victims] behavior will** probably **occur along a continuum of increasing intensity over a period of time**. **With gradual, subtle changes in** his **aggression and** her **response, adjustments and adaptations in thinking occur**. (See Appendix C, Section 6 for an explanatory animal study by Sandier et aL, 1966**). Couples in which one partner batters the other stop believing each other.** They begin to accept as facts that [the batterer] he is not going to stop and that [the victim] she is not going to leave. These couples tend to think of the aggression in their relationship as an aberration and the noncrisis period as the norm and true state of their marriage (Douglas, 1991). The gradual build-up of intermittent punishment allows the partners (and children) in a violent family the opportunity to recuperate. With subtle adjustments, **individuals** may **change their standards for judging the violence. What they previously thought of as severe punishment may now seem mild.** The once-severe punishment may become the new baseline.

Underview: skepticism affirms since a) If there are no moral truths, there are no moral prohibitions and thus all actions are rendered morally permissible. Something is permissible if not prohibited –if I live in a failed state, everything is legally permissible and the same applies for morality. B) The resolution is a conditional statement given its assumption of morality. The rules of logic indicate that if antecedents are false, than consequents are trivially held to be true. Thus, logic means the resolution would be true if morality is false. C) If disproving morality doesn’t lead to permissibility or the truth of the resolution, then skepticism would merely demonstrate that the resolution is predicated of something that is non-existent, thus going to presumption. Presume affirmative to overcome structural skews. D) There is no distinction between “mere” permissibility and “moral” permissibility in my framework. My framework indicates that morality stems from the very basis of our identity, meaning every choice is necessarily a moral choice.

Blocks:

AT – PR is how we reflect on our PI.

(\_) Even if we need practical reflection to choose and develop our identities, those identities still give us our reasons. If they give reasons that are contrary to practical reason that just means it was irrational to develop one’s identity in such a way. Thus, a person whose practical identity is conflicted with their practical rationality made the immoral choice when they developed their identity in an immoral way, but at the time of deadly force they were correct.

(\_) The fact that we use PR to develop PI doesn’t mean PR is the ultimate source of reasons. For example, my parents created me, but that doesn’t mean my parents have the right to make all my decisions for me.

(\_) EXTEND V3/ARG UNDER IT. Victims had their PI warped into one that justified doing such things which violate practical reason. It’s not their fault it was developed in such a way so their not acting wrongly.

AT – they have no identity -> not moral agent -> nothing MP

AT - excusability

AT – PR constitutes timeless perspective

AT – Need PR to reflect on identities and shit so most important identity.

AT – their PI includes loving their abuser and not killing them and stuff

EXTEND KORSGAARD AND ANALYTIC BELOW - A true practical identity which creates prohibitions on action requires that you value your identity. If your practical identity wasn’t valuable to you, you would just change it at any time to escape immorality. The neg argument relies on an identity wherein someone DOESN’T value themself, meaning that it’s not a true practical identity. This is aff offense as it shows that victims don’t have a self-valuing practical identity, and thus can do no wrong. [Even if you don’t vote on it, default to risk of aff offense from the possibility that a) there is no stable identity and b) if there is one, that self-valuing identity mandates killing the abuser]

AT – universizability spec.

Blocks below +

Universalizability misunderstands what a reason is, as it holds we have NO reason to do non-universalizable things. For example, if a criminal kills someone to make a profit, then according to Kant they had NO reason to do it. However, the criminal clearly did have a reason – the reason was to make profit.

AT – PR NEG FW

Concede reasons come first

Korsgaard – PR is our source of reasons.

Extend bottom velleman card

Our understanding of causality constitutes the autonomous self

I think that in order to locate the self to whom autonomous actions are attributed, we have to ask which part or aspect of the person is presented to him in reflexive guise when he considers the causes of his behavior. Whatever is presented in reflexive guise to the agent’s causal reasoning will be that to which such reasoning attributes his behavior when attributing it to the self. Clearly what’s presented in reflexive guise to causal reasoning is that which conducts such reasoning — that part or aspect of the person which seeks so understand events in terms of their causes. The self to which autonomous actions are attributed must there fore be the agent’s faculty of causal understanding. Insofar as a person’s behavior is due to his causal understanding. its causes will appear to that understanding in reflexive guise, and the behavior will properly appear as due to the self.

This causal understanding gives rise to reasons for action. Reasons are explanatory of our behavior, with reference to our identity.

Most of my work prior to the essays in this volume was devoted in argu ing that the actions traditionally classified as autonomous by philosophers of action are indeed due to the agent’s causal understanding. Autonomous actions are actions performed for a reason, and reasons for performing an action, I argued, are considerations in light of which the action would be understandable in the causal terms of folk psychology. To act for a reason is to do what would make sense, where the consideration in light of which it would make sense is the reason for acting. Thus, for example, one’s being interested in jail would explain why one might frequent nightclubs, and so one can frequent nightclubs not only out of an interest in jazz but also on the grounds of that interest regarded as explanatory of one’s behavior. When one’s behavior is guided by such considerations, it is guided by one’s capacity for making sense of behavior, which is one’s causal understanding and is therefore presented in reflexive guise to that very understanding as the self that causes one’s behavior.

We don’t need to act on universal laws because reasons exist independently of our will—we don’t need to make reasons. Cohon[[11]](#footnote-11) writes:

In this respect I think Korsgaard cannot really be a voluntarist. **The normativity of my reason**, its status as a reason, **does not stem from my will. My will does not make my reason a reason, because the reason was already there. To say we give ourselves a law is** at best **a figure of speech, like saying we make broccoli for dinner. "What are you doing in the kitchen?" I ask, and you answer, "Making broccoli." But what are you making it out of?** Well, broccoli. **The broccoli is already there. You are doing something with it, but to say you are making it is just a figure of speech.**

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