### Freedom NC

Negate if I win a counter interp to 1AR theory-key to deter frivolous theory and 1AR layering strategies designed to blitz out short shells and then collapse for 3 minutes-that’s bad for the neg A. they get the last word plus an extra speech to impact the shell and do comparative weighing-I don’t get to respond to it since there’s no 3NR B. they get a 7-6 time advantage on theory-specifically true of this round since I didn’t read theory.

Something qualifies as an action and not a mere event only if it is constituted by practical reasoning.

Rodl Sebastian. Self-Consciousness, Harvard University Press, 2000

**Calculation from desire does not yield a premise for instrumental reasoning because its conclusion represents a changeable state**, while an instrumental reasoning proceeds from a thought that represents something with the temporality of a movement. But the instrumental syllogism is a necessary form of practical reasoning, for practical reasoning arrives at a thought on which a movement may rest. And **if a movement rests on thought, then the unity of its phases**, which constitutes it as a movement, **must rest on thought.** So it does **if I reason [that]** from the same thought now, **“I want to do B. So let me do [X]”**, and then, “I want to do B. So let me do [Y]”, and so on. As “I want to do B” expresses the same thought all the while that I am doing B and until I have done it, **the unity of the phases of my doing B consists in the fact that they all hang on that thought. By contrast, if “I want to do B” represented a changeable state** I would not reason from the same thought, now to doing A1, and then to doing A2. In consequence, my doing A1 and my doing A2 would bear no unity. **These would not be phases of a movement, and I would not**, in doing A1 and A2, **be doing B.**

Outweighs aff framework. A. probability-we definitely can’t evaluate what a *good* action is if we don’t have a basic definition of what an action is B. strength of link-ethics is by definition a guide to action but only reason unifies that action-otherwise action would be infinite and it couldn’t be guided. C. Probability-denying reason is impossible, we can always question why our desires matter, but asking whether we have a reason to act for reasons would be self-defeating because the question itself concedes the authority of reasons.

And, reason requires that maxims be universalizable-the facts are common knowledge for all of us since we use a perspective that is shared between persons to make our judgments-reason is impartial like mathematics-nobody adding 2 and 2 wouldn’t get 4 if they follow the rules. And, maxims that assault freedom are contradictory since by violating freedom you are extending your own freedom at the cost of someone else’s-when universalized you are extending and limiting your own and others freedom.

Thus, the standard is respecting freedom.

Agents are self-legislating and can never be commanded by others.

Wolff Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, University of California Press 1970 JW 2/6/15

Since the concept of taking and forfeiting responsibility is central to the discussion which follows, it is worth devoting a bit more space to clarifying it. Taking responsibility for one's actions means making the final decisions about what one should do. For the autonomous [person] man, there is no such thing, strictly speaking, as a command. If someone in my environment is issuing what are intended as commands, and if he or others expect those commands to be obeyed, that fact will be taken account of in my deliberations. I may decide that I ought to do what that person is commanding me to do, and it may even be that his issuing the command is the factor in the situation which makes it desirable for me to do so. For example, if I am on a sinking ship and the captain is giving orders for manning the lifeboats, and if everyone else is obeying the captain because he is the captain, I may decide that under the circumstances I had better do what he says, since the confusion caused by disobeying him would be generally harmful. But insofar as I make such a decision, I am not obeying his command; that is, I am not acknowledging him as having authority over me. I would make the same decision, for exactly the same reasons, if one of the passengers had started to issue "orders" and had, in the confusion, come to be obeyed.

Thus, just governments ought not do anything that coerces anybody to do anything. Living wage bites in since it forces employers to pay a certain amount of money to people. Even if the net effect of a living wage law is more freedom the means by which you have achieved said freedom is state action which is inherently coercive. This means the highest layer of the contention debate is the question of jurisdiction-is the state in the position to even take a coercive action in the first place. To clarify, I defend a world in which the government may not coerce anybody ever.

### Framework Interaction

Foreseen harms are inaccessible to us.

Hegel George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel The Philosophy of Right 1820

**The will has** before it **an outer reality**, upon which it operates. But to be able **to do this, it must have a representation of** this **reality**. True **responsibility** **is** **mine only** in **so far as the outer reality** **was within my consciousness**. The will, because this external matter is supplied to it, is finite; or rather because it is finite, the matter is supplied. When I think and will rationally, I am not at this standpoint of finitude, nor is the object I act upon something opposed to me. The finite always has limit and boundary. There stands opposed to me that which is other than I, something accidental and externally necessary; it may or may not fall into agreement with me. But I am only what relates to my freedom; and the act is the purport of my will only in so far as I am aware of it. Œdipus, who unwittingly slew his father, is not to be arraigned as a patricide. In the ancient laws, however, less value was attached to the subjective side of the act than is done to-day. Hence arose amongst the ancients asylums, where the fugitive from revenge might be received and protected. 118. **An act**, when it has become an external reality, and is connected with a varied outer necessity, has manifold consequences. These consequences, being the visible shape, whose soul is the end of action, belong to the act. But at the same time the inner act, **when realized** as an end **in the external world**, **is handed** over **to external forces, which attach** to it **something** quite **different from what it is in itself**, **and thus carry** it away into **strange** and **distant consequences. It is the right of the will to adopt only the first consequences, since they alone lie in the purpose.**

Freedom is necessary to hold people responsible for actions-this is the foundation of moral philosophy.

Wolff Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, University of California Press 1970 JW 2/6/15

The fundamental assumption of moral philosophy is that [people] men are responsible for their actions. From this assumption it follows necessarily, as Kant pointed out, that [people] men are metaphysically free, which is to say that in some sense they are capable of choosing how they shall act. Being able to choose how he acts makes a man responsible, but merely choosing is not in itself enough to constitute taking responsibility for one's actions. Taking responsibility involves attempting to determine what one ought to do, and that, as philosophers since Aristotle have recognized, lays upon one the additional burdens of gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes, criticizing principles, and so forth.

Governments are not in the epistemic position to make laws.

Jones Harold B. Jones, Jr., Mercer University, "Immanuel Kant, Free Market Capitalist," Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, 2004.

While Kant was not an evangelical Christian, his thinking on the subject of morality was in perfect accord with Scriptural revelation. The golden rule, after all, is only the Law and the prophets (Matt 7:12). In saying that **moral choices are necessarily individual choices**, Kant was admittedly opening the door to decisions that would not square even with the Ten Commandments, let alone the Sermon on the Mount. Kant understood that **an individual's free choices may lead to vice as well as virtue**. This also accords with the teachings of Christianity. As C.S. Lewis observed, "Some people think they can imagine a creature who is free but had no possibility of going wrong. I cannot. If a thing is free to be good it is also free to be bad" (1952: 48). The tendency analyzed in Romans 7, whether described in terms of pathological affects or as a deaf ear to the voice of the impartial spectator, will lead to immoral choices. On balance, though, it is probably that these will be fewer if each individual decides for himself than if the decision is left to someone else. **No one is as well informed with regard to the challenges a person faces, or as highly motivated to make the best of them, as that particular person.** Smith's thinking applies this moral truth to the economy. In saying that **each individual is in a better position than anyone else to make a wise decision about the use of his personal capital**, Smith did not imply that all economic decisions would prove to be correct (1937: 423). He was saying only that they would be better than those by **some third party,** who **would be less perfectly informed about the individual's resources, less concerned about that individual's goals, and less highly motivated to reach those goals**. Just as Kant believed that no rational being could ever deliberately choose to be punished (1996b: 108), Smith believed that no economic decision-maker would deliberately choose to ruin himself. Mistakes are inevitable, but on balance they will be fewer and less destructive if made by those most thoroughly acquainted with the facts of each particular situation. Individual freedom works in the economy because it is an application of an eternal truth. The same principle that entrusts persons with the right to make decisions affecting their fate in Eternity indicates they should be entrusted with decisions affecting their fate in time. The ultimate meaning of moral freedom is not yet clear to us: we see in a glass darkly. There is, however, no uncertainty about the use of individual choice in organizing an economy: it is the worst possible arrangement, as Winston Churchill once said of democracy, except for all the others.

### Boltzmann

Overwhelming mathematical probability that nothing has ever happened. Ever.

Carroll Sean Carroll (Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, Moore Center for Theoretical Cosmology and Physics) “The Higgs Boson vs. Boltzmann Brains” August 22nd 2013 Preposterous Universe <http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2013/08/22/the-higgs-boson-vs-boltzmann-brains/> JW 1/22/15

A room full of monkeys, hitting keys randomly on a typewriter, will eventually bang out a perfect copy of Hamlet. Assuming, of course, that their typing is perfectly random, and that it keeps up for a long time. An extremely long time indeed, much longer than the current age of the universe. So this is an amusing thought experiment, not a viable proposal for creating new works of literature (or old ones). There’s an interesting feature of what these thought-experiment monkeys end up producing. Let’s say you find a monkey who has just typed Act I of Hamlet with perfect fidelity. You might think “aha, here’s when it happens,” and expect Act II to come next. But by the conditions of the experiment, the next thing the monkey types should be perfectly random (by which we mean, chosen from a uniform distribution among all allowed typographical characters), and therefore independent of what has come before. The chances that you will actually get Act II next, just because you got Act I, are extraordinarily tiny. For every one time that your monkeys type Hamlet correctly, they will type it incorrectly an enormous number of times — small errors, large errors, all of the words but in random order, the entire text backwards, some scenes but not others, all of the lines but with different characters assigned to them, and so forth. Given that any one passage matches the original text, it is still overwhelmingly likely that the passages before and after are random nonsense. That’s the Boltzmann Brain problem in a nutshell. Replace your typing monkeys with a box of atoms at some temperature, and let the atoms randomly bump into each other for an indefinite period of time. Almost all the time they will be in a disordered, high-entropy, equilibrium state. Eventually, just by chance, they will take the form of a smiley face, or Michelangelo’s David, or absolutely any configuration that is compatible with what’s inside the box. If you wait long enough, and your box is sufficiently large, you will get a person, a planet, a galaxy, the whole universe as we now know it. But given that some of the atoms fall into a familiar-looking arrangement, we still expect the rest of the atoms to be completely random. Just because you find a copy of the Mona Lisa, in other words, doesn’t mean that it was actually painted by Leonardo or anyone else; with overwhelming probability it simply coalesced gradually out of random motions. Just because you see what looks like a photograph, there’s no reason to believe it was preceded by an actual event that the photo purports to represent. If the random motions of the atoms create a person with firm memories of the past, all of those memories are overwhelmingly likely to be false.

This is the only way to account for our low-entropy universe.

Albrecht Andreas Albrecht and Lorenzo Sorbo (Department of Physics, UC Davis) “Can the universe afford inflation?” February 1st 2008 <http://arxiv.org/pdf/hep-th/0405270v2.pdf> JW 1/22/15

A century ago Boltzmann considered a “cosmology” where the observed universe should be regarded as a rare ﬂuctuation out of some equilibrium state. The prediction of this point of view, quite generically, is that we live in a universe which maximizes the total entropy of the system consistent with existing observations. Other universes simply occur as much more rare ﬂuctuations. This means as much as possible of the system should be found in equilibrium as often as possible. From this point of view, it is very surprising that we ﬁnd the universe around us in such a low entropy state. In fact, the logical conclusion of this line of reasoning is utterly solipsistic. The most likely ﬂuctuation consistent with everything you know is simply your brain (complete with “memories” of the Hubble Deep ﬁelds, WMAP data, etc) ﬂuctuating brieﬂy out of chaos and then immediately equilibrating back into chaos again. This is sometimes called the “Boltzmann’s Brain” paradox.

### Mutual Aid

An anarchist society is committed to mutual aid-people consent to organic reciprocal constraints-this is historically verified.

McKay Iain McKay (primary contributor and editor to “An Anarchist FAQ”) “Mutual Aid: An Introduction and Evaluation” pg. 35 <http://anarchism.pageabode.com/sites/anarchism.pageabode.com/files/MAintroduction.pdf> JW 2/6/15

Mutual Aid also provides substantial evidence to support the anarchist theory of social change. Anarchists argue that human societal evolution (including periods of swift evolution called revolution) was based on the conflict between what could be termed the “law of mutual struggle” and the “law of mutual aid.” The book provides empirical evidence that both historically and within current struggles, people have organised themselves to resist the institutions and negative results of mutual struggle (such as the oppression and exploitation resulting from private property, the state and other social hierarchies). These take many forms, including village folkmoots, neighbourhood forums, unions, strikes, guilds, co-operatives, and so on). Thus the mutual aid tendency “continued to live in the villages and among the poorer classes in the towns.” Indeed, “in so far as” new “economical and social institutions” were “a creation of the masses” they “have all originated from the same source” of mutual aid. By these means, the masses “maintained their own social organisation, which was based upon their own conceptions of equity, mutual aid, and mutual support . . . even when they were submitted to the most ferocious theocracy or autocracy.”162