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### Framework

#### The standard is mitigating structural violence.

#### 1] Structural violence is based in moral exclusion, which is fundamentally flawed because exclusion is not based on dessert but rather on arbitrarily perceived differences.

Winter and Leighton 99 |Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|[Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and justice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice] “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” Pg 4-5 ghs//VA

Finally, to recognize the operation of structural violence forces us to ask questions about how and why we tolerate it, questions which often have painful answers for the privileged elite who unconsciously support it. A final question of this section is how and why we allow ourselves to be so oblivious to structural violence. Susan Opotow offers an intriguing set of answers, in her article Social Injustice. She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects. Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social justice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

#### 2] Debate should deal with questions of real-world consequences—ideal theories ignore the concrete nature of the world and legitimize oppression.

Dr. Tommy J. Curry 14, “The Cost of a Thing: A Kingian Reformulation of a Living Wage Argument in the 21st Century”, Victory Briefs, 2014, BE

**Despite the pronouncement of debate as an activity and intellectual exercise pointing to the real world consequences of dialogue**, thinking, and (personal) politics when addressing issues of racism, sexism, economic disparity, global conflicts, and death, many of the discussions concerning these ongoing challenges to humanity are fixed to a paradigm which sees the adjudication of material disparities and sociological realities as the conquest of one ideal theory over the other. In “Ideal Theory as Ideology,” Charles Mills outlines the problem contemporary theoretical-performance styles in policy debate and value-weighing in Lincoln-Douglass are confronted with in their attempts to get at the concrete problems in our societies. At the outset, Mills concedes that “ideal theory applies to moral theory as a whole (at least to normative ethics as against metaethics); [s]ince ethics deals by definition with normative/prescriptive/evaluative issues, [it is set] against factual/descriptive issues.” At the most general level, the conceptual chasm between what emerges as actual problems in the world (e.g.: racism, sexism, poverty, disease, etc.) and how we frame such problems theoretically—the assumptions and shared ideologies we depend upon for our problems to be heard and accepted as a worthy “problem” by an audience—is the most obvious call for an anti-ethical paradigm, since such a paradigm insists on the actual as the basis of what can be considered normatively. Mills, however, describes this chasm as a problem of an ideal-as-descriptive model which argues that for any actual-empirical-observable social phenomenon (P), an ideal of (P) is necessarily a representation of that phenomenon. In the idealization of a social phenomenon (P), one “necessarily has to abstract away from certain features” of (P) that is observed before abstraction occurs. ¶ This gap between what is actual (in the world), and what is represented by theories and politics of debaters proposed in rounds threatens any real discussions about the concrete nature of oppression and the racist economic structures which necessitate tangible policies and reorienting changes in our value orientations. As Mills states: “What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual,” so what we are seeking to resolve on the basis of “thought” is in fact incomplete, incorrect, or ultimately irrelevant to the actual problems which our “theories” seek to address. Our attempts to situate social disparity cannot simply appeal to the ontologization of social phenomenon—meaning we cannot suggest that the various complexities of social problems (which are constantly emerging and undisclosed beyond the effects we observe) are totalizable by any one set of theories within an ideological frame be it our most cherished notions of Afro-pessimism, feminism, Marxism, or the like. At best, theoretical endorsements make us aware of sets of actions to address ever developing problems in our empirical world, but even this awareness does not command us to only do X, but rather do X and the other ideas which compliment the material conditions addressed by the action X. As a whole, debate (policy and LD) neglects the need to do X in order to remedy our cast-away-ness among our ideological tendencies and politics. How then do we pull ourselves from this seeming ir-recoverability of thought in general and in our endorsement of socially actualizable values like that of the living wage? It is my position that Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s thinking about the need for a living wage was a unique, and remains an underappreciated, resource in our attempts to impose value reorientation (be it through critique or normative gestures) upon the actual world. In other words, King aims to reformulate the values which deny the legitimacy of the living wage, and those values predicated on the flawed views of the worker, Blacks, and the colonized (dignity, justice, fairness, rights, etc.) used to currently justify the living wages in under our contemporary moral parameters.

#### 3] Morality is based on response to problems in the world, which justifies focus on resolving material conditions of violence.

Gregory Fernando Pappas 16 [Texas A&M University] “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, BE

In Experience and Nature, Dewey names the empirical way of doing philosophy the “denotative method” (LW 1:371).18 What Dewey means by “denotation” is simply the phase of an empirical inquiry where we are con- cerned with designating, as free from theoretical presuppositions as possible, the concrete problem (subject matter) for which we can provide different and even competing descriptions and theories. Thus an empirical inquiry about an injustice must begin with a rough and tentative designation of where the injustices from within the broader context of our everyday life and activities are. Once we designate the subject matter, we then engage in the inquiry itself, including diagnosis, possibly even constructing theories and developing concepts. Of course, that is not the end of the inquiry. We must then take the results of that inquiry “as a path pointing and leading back to something in primary experience” (LW 1:17). This looping back is essential, and it neverends as long as there are new experiences of injustice that may require a revi- sion of our theories.¶ Injustices are events suffered by concrete people at a particular time and in a situation. We need to start by pointing out and describing these prob- lematic experiences instead of starting with a theoretical account or diagnosis of them. Dewey is concerned with the consequences of not following the methodological advice to distinguish designation from diagnosis. Definitions, theoretical criteria, and diagnosis can be useful; they have their proper place and function once inquiry is on its way, but if stressed too much at the start of inquiry, they can blind us to aspects of concrete problems that escape our theoretical lenses. We must attempt to pretheoretically designate the subject matter, that is, to “point” in a certain direction, even with a vague or crude description of the problem. But, for philosophers, this task is not easy because, for instance, we are often too prone to interpret the particular problem in a way that verifies our most cherished theories of injustice. One must be careful to designate the subject matter in such a way as not to slant the question in favor of one’s theory or theoretical preconceptions. A philosopher must make an honest effort to designate the injustices based on what is experienced as such because a concrete social problem (e.g., injustice) is independent and neutral with respect to the different possible competing diagnoses or theories about its causes. Otherwise, there is no way to test or adjudicate between competing accounts.¶ That designation precedes diagnosis is true of any inquiry that claims to be empirical. To start with the diagnosis is to not start with the problem. The problem is pretheoretical or preinquiry, not in any mysterious sense but in that it is first suffered by someone in a particular context. Otherwise, the diagnosis about the causes of the problem has nothing to be about, and the inquiry cannot even be initiated. In his Logic, Dewey lays out the pattern of all empirical inquiries (LW 12). All inquiries start with what he calls an “indeterminate situation,” prior even to a “problematic situation.” Here is a sketch of the process:¶ Indeterminate situation → problematic situation → diagnosis: What is the problem? What is the solution? (operations of analysis, ideas, observations, clarification, formulating and testing hypothesis, reasoning, etc.) → final judgment (resolution: determinate situation)¶ To make more clear or vivid the difference of the starting point between Anderson and Dewey, we can use the example (or analogy) of medical prac- tice, one that they both use to make their points.19 The doctor’s startingpoint is the experience of a particular illness of a particular patient, that is, the concrete and unique embodied patient experiencing a disruption or prob- lematic change in his life. “The patient having something the matter with him is antecedent; but being ill (having the experience of illness) is not the same as being an object of knowledge.”20 The problem becomes an object of knowledge once the doctor engages in a certain interaction with the patient, analysis, and testing that leads to a diagnosis. For Dewey, “diagnosis” occurs when the doctor is already engaged in operations of experimental observation in which he is already narrowing the field of relevant evidence, concerned with the correlation between the nature of the problem and possible solu- tions. Dewey explains the process: “A physician . . . is called by a patient. His original material of experience is thereby provided. This experienced object sets the problem of inquiry. . . . He calls upon his store of knowledge to sug- gest ideas that may aid him in reaching a judgment as to the nature of the trouble and its proper treatment.”21¶ Just as with the doctor, empirical inquirers about injustice must return to the concrete problem for testing, and should never forget that their con- ceptual abstractions and general knowledge are just means to ameliorate what is particular, context-bound, and unique. In reaching a diagnosis, the doc- tor, of course, relies on all of his background knowledge about diseases and evidence, but a good doctor never forgets the individuality of the particular problem (patient and illness).¶ The physician in diagnosing a case of disease deals with something in- dividualized. He draws upon a store of general principles of physiology, etc., already at his command. Without this store of conceptual material he is helpless. But he does not attempt to reduce the case to an exact specimen of certain laws of physiology and pathology, or do away with its unique individuality. Rather he uses general statements as aids to direct his observation of the particular case, so as to discover what it is like. They function as intellectual tools or instrumentalities. (LW 4:166)¶ Dewey uses the example of the doctor to emphasize the radical contex- tualism and particularism of his view. The good doctor never forgets that this patient and “this ill is just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else.”22 Similarly, the empirical philosopher in her in- quiry about an injustice brings forth general knowledge or expertise to an inquiry into the causes of an injustice. She relies on sociology and history as well as knowledge of different forms of injustice, but it is all in the service of inquiry about the singularity of each injustice suffered in a situation.¶ The correction or refinement that I am making to Anderson’s character- ization of the pragmatists’ approach is not a minor terminological or scholarly point; it has methodological and practical consequences in how we approach an injustice. The distinction between the diagnosis and the problem (the ill- ness, the injustice) is an important functional distinction that must be kept in inquiry because it keeps us alert to the provisional and hypothetical aspect of any diagnosis. To rectify or improve any diagnosis, we must return to the concrete problem; as with the patient, this may require attending as much as possible to the uniqueness of the problem. This is in the same spirit as Anderson’s preference for an empirical inquiry that tries to “capture all of the expressive harms” in situations of injustice. But this requires that we begin with and return to concrete experiences of injustice and not by starting with a diagnosis of the causes of injustice provided by studies in the social sciences, as in (5) above. For instance, a diagnosis of causes that are due to systematic, structural features of society or the world disregards aspects of the concrete experiences of injustice that are not systematic and structural.¶ Making problematic situations of injustice our explicit methodological commitment as a starting point rather than a diagnosis of the problem is an important and useful imperative for nonideal theories. It functions as a directive to inquirers toward the problem, to locate it, and designate it before venturing into descriptions, diagnosis, analysis, clarifications, hypotheses, and reasoning about the problem. These operations are instrumental to its ame- lioration and must ultimately return (be tested) by the problem that sparked the inquiry. The directive can make inquirers more attentive to the complex ways in which such differences as race, culture, class, or gender intersect in a problem of injustice. Sensitivity to complexity and difference in matters of injustice is not easy; it is a very demanding methodological prescription because it means that no matter how confident we may feel about applying solutions designed to ameliorate systematic evil, our cures should try to address as much as possible the unique circumstances of each injustice. The analogy with medical inquiry and practice is useful in making this point, since the hope is that someday we will improve our tools of inquiry to prac- tice a much more personalized medicine than we do today, that is, provide a diagnosis and a solution specific to each patient.

### Advantage

#### Status quo loopholes in gun laws are vague as to who is excluded, which allows alcoholics access to guns.

Daniel W. Webster et al. 12 and Jon S. Vernick and Katherine Vittes and Emma McGinty and Stephen Teret and Shannon Frattaroli [all MPH except McGinty. Vernick and Teret have JD’s, Vittes and Frattaroli have PhDs. Tl;dr these people are all very qualified]“The Case for Gun Policy Reforms in America”, John Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research, October 2012, BE

Several studies suggest that firearm owners may be at increased risk for abusing alcohol (Diener and Kerber 1979; Miller, Hemenway, and Wechsler 1999, 2002; Nelson et al. 1996; Wintemute 2011). This is especially concerning, given that alcohol has been shown to hamper shooting accuracy and impair judgment about when it might be appropriate to use a gun (Carr et al. 2009). A recent study that analyzed population-based survey data from eight U.S. states found that respondents who owned firearms were more likely than those who did not live in a home with a firearm to engage in binge drinking, drive under the influence of alcohol, and have at least 60 drinks per month. Heavy drinking was also more common among firearm owners who carried a gun for protection and stored a gun loaded and unlocked (Wintemute 2011). College students who own firearms are more likely than their unarmed coun- terparts to binge drink (Miller, Hemenway, and Wechsler 1999, 2002), to drive after binge drinking (Miller et al. 1999, 2002), to be arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (Miller et al. 1999), and to damage property after drink- ing alcohol (Miller et al. 1999).¶ State laws vary with regard to firearm purchase and possession prohibi- tions for alcohol users or problem drinkers (Carr et al. 2010; Webster and Vernick 2009). Unfortunately, the state laws that do exist may be ineffective because they fail to provide precise definitions of who is disqualified, making them impossible to enforce (Webster and Vernick 2009). Pennsylvania is an exception in that it prohibits firearm purchase by persons who have been convicted of three or more drunk driving offenses within a five-year period. Webster and Vernick (2009) point out that Pennsylvania’s law is particularly useful because it provides a definition of alcohol abuser that is sufficiently spe- cific to allow for the identification of prohibited persons. It is also highly justi- fiable given the abundant evidence that repeat drunk driving offenders are a high-risk group. Not only have they demonstrated reckless behavior, people who drive under the influence are also more likely to abuse illicit drugs or al- cohol and to have concurrent psychiatric disorders (Freeman, Maxwell, and Davey 2011; Lapham et al. 2001, 2006; Laplante et al. 2008), have lower self- control (Keane, Maxim, and Teevan 1993), and have higher rates of repeated arrests (Lucker et al. 1991)

#### Plan: The state governments of the United States ought to ban private ownership of handguns by people convicted but not exonerated for multiple alcohol-related offenses.

Garen J. Wintemute 13 [renowned expert on the public health crisis of gun violence and a pioneer in the field of injury epidemiology and prevention of firearm violence, which results in approximately 30,000 deaths a year and approximately 75,000 nonfatal injuries seen in hospital emergency departments, md, mph], “REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis”, Center for Gun Policy and Research Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2013, BE

Federal and state governments should also deny the purchase and possession of firearms to persons who abuse alcohol. Multiple definitions of alcohol abuse are in use, and it might be reasonable to consider the second instance of any alcohol-related offense (DUI, drunk and disorderly, etc.) as the criterion for denial. This can be explored further and refined as needed. We do not have specific evidence that denial is effective in such cases, but there is good evidence that alcohol abuse is a risk factor for crime, that its prevalence is increased among firearm owners, and that it and other behaviors that in- crease risk for violence co-occur among firearm owners.

#### Alcohol is associated with increases in violent crime and suicide.

Garen J. Wintemute 14 [renowned expert on the public health crisis of gun violence and a pioneer in the field of injury epidemiology and prevention of firearm violence, which results in approximately 30,000 deaths a year and approximately 75,000 nonfatal injuries seen in hospital emergency departments, md, mph], “UPDATED EVIDENCE and POLICY DEVELOPMENTS on REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA”, Center for Gun Policy and Research Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2014, BE

A history of alcohol abuse has repeatedly been proposed as grounds for a firearm prohibition. Under federal law, alcohol is specifically excluded from the definition of controlled substances; neither addiction to nor unlawful use of alcohol prohibits firearm ownership. A 2013 review by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence identified three states (Indiana, Maryland, and Penn- sylvania) with firearm prohibitions related to multiple convictions for driving under the influence or related offenses.4 Other states used less well defined criteria to identify a population of alcohol abusers to whom a firearm prohibi- tion might apply. No data on enforcement or effectiveness were available.¶ There is conclusive evidence, however, linking current and prior alcohol abuse or dependence to risk for committing violence against others or oneself. For example, approximately 37% of persons incarcerated for violent crimes are intoxicated when those crimes are committed, by their own report.5,6 About one third of homicide and suicide victims test positive for alcohol, and at least 60% of those meet legal criteria for intoxication.7 Multiple large-scale surveys have shown substantial increases in risk for future violence related to a prior history of alcohol abuse or dependence.8,9 Studies of DUI offenders have found a very high prevalence of alcohol dependence and increased rates of criminal activity.10,11¶ In January 2013, the Summit on Reducing Gun Violence in America work- ing group convened by Johns Hopkins University recommended a 10-year firearms prohibition for persons convicted of DUI or similar offenses on two or more occasions within three years.12 Such legislation was passed by the California legislature but vetoed by the governor. In his veto message, the governor stated that he was “not persuaded that it is necessary to prohibit gun ownership on the basis of crimes that are non-felonies, non-violent and do not involve misuse of a firearm.”13 Research now in development will assess the risk for future criminal activity associated with a prior history of alcohol abuse or dependence among firearm owners.¶ The Consortium for Risk-Based Firearm Policy—a group of experts in gun policy, mental health, psychiatry, epidemiology, law, and law enforcement— recently endorsed five-year prohibitions against firearm possession for vio- lent misdemeanants and persons with multiple convictions related to alcohol or controlled substance abuse.14 A new survey of federally licensed firearm retailers (gun dealers and pawnbrokers) in 43 states found strong support for such polices. Majorities favoring prohibitions based on convictions for specific crimes were as follows: 84.8% for publicly displaying a firearm in a threaten- ing manner, 80.7% for possession of equipment for illegal drug use, 70.7% for multiple DUI convictions, 67.4% for assault and battery not involving a lethal weapon or serious injury, and 53.1% for resisting arrest.15 Nine of 10 retailers (90.1%) supported a firearms prohibition for persons with “alcohol abuse and repeated cases of alcohol-related violence.”

#### Status quo is ineffective and alcoholism massively increases violence.

Susan Baker 15 (University of CA Davis health system, May 29th, UC Davis medical studies, Susan Baker and Garen Wintermute professors of public health/ medicine at UC Davis, “Restricting firearms access for people who misuse alcohol may prevent violence”, https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/05/150529101110.htm--ghs//sk)

The analysis, published online April 30 in the peer-reviewed journal Preventive Medicine, summarizes studies on binge drinking and other forms of alcohol misuse in association with firearm access and use, including firearm violence. It also describes the shortcomings of existing policies designed to restrict access to firearms among those who are at high risk for violence due to alcohol misuse -- particularly people with multiple prior convictions for alcohol-related offenses such as driving while under the influence (DUI).¶ "Both acute alcohol intoxication and chronic alcohol misuse are strongly associated with risk for committing firearm violence, whether that violence is directed at others or at oneself," said Garen J. Wintemute, professor of emergency medicine, founding director of the UC Davis Violence Prevention Research Program and expert on gun violence as a public health problem.¶ "In any given month, an estimated 8.9 million to 11.7 million firearm owners binge drink. Both binge drinking and heavy chronic drinking are more common among firearm owners than in the general population. For men, there are as many alcohol-associated deaths from firearm violence as from motor vehicle crashes," he said.¶ The article cites numerous studies that link aggressive firearm behaviors and alcohol misuse. These include a nationally-representative study in which people who reported threatening others with a firearm were more likely than others to meet Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th Edition (DSM-IV) criteria for alcohol abuse or dependence, and another that found people who misused alcohol were substantially more likely than others to exhibit a combination of angry behavior and either carry firearms outside the home or have firearms at home.¶ Similarly, many studies have linked suicide by firearm and alcohol intoxication, including a 2011 study that found the excessive consumption of alcohol was associated with an 86-fold increase (an increase of 8,600 percent) in the risk of firearm suicide or near-suicide.¶ Federal and state policies are largely ineffective in restricting firearm access for people who misuse alcohol, Wintemute writes. Federal statute prohibits individuals who are unlawful users of or addicted to any controlled substance from the purchase or possession of firearms, but the statute specifically excludes alcohol from its definition of a "controlled substance" and leaves alcohol-related restrictions for individual states to consider.¶ "While 37 states with jurisdiction over 65 percent of the U.S. population have some restrictions on acquiring, possessing or using firearms by those who are intoxicated or have a history of alcohol misuse, many of these policies are unenforceable because they rely on vague, inherently subjective definitions of intoxication or misuse, such as 'habitual drunkard,' 'habitually in an intoxicated condition,' 'chronic alcoholic' and 'addicted to alcohol,'" Wintemute said.¶ Wintemute noted that in the few locations that more specifically define alcohol misuse by number of convictions for DUI or other alcohol-related offenses over time (Maryland, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and the District of Columbia), the data on enforcement are unavailable or suggest that enforcement is lacking.¶ "Policies that restrict firearm access by persons with other risk factors for violence have been shown to be effective," said Wintemute, who also is the first Susan P. Baker-Stephen P. Teret Chair in Violence Prevention at UC Davis Health System.

#### Hate crimes are associated with alcohol abuse.

Wu 8, Glen Kercher and Claire Nolasco and Ling Wu, “Hate Crimes”, Crime Victims’ Institute • Criminal Justice Center • Sam Houston State University, August 2008, BE

Investigation, prosecution, and handling of hate crime cases also present major issues for the victim or surviving family members of the incidents. Studies show that hate crime [survivors] victims are prone to isolation, loss of faith and identity, self-blaming, ignorance, police mistrust, deciding whether to report, frustration, and post-victimization coping behaviors. Studies also suggest that hate crimes are more likely than any other kind of crime to be seriously injurious or lethal, and have many psychological and social repercussions that are extremely destructive to the victim, the victim’s family, and the victim’s community (Garcia, & McDevitt, 1999). The harm is mainly generated from three resources, the severe underreporting of victimization, additional negative psychological impact on the victim, and community disorganization through victim coping behavior and incident publicity. According to a recent NIBRS data analysis on hate crime on the state level, the researcher found that compared with non-bias crime, hate crimes are more likely to be associated with drug and alcohol abuse (Messner, McHugh, & Felson, 2004). In other words, hate crime offenders fit the versatility model instead of the professional model. Motivated by prejudice, perpetrators might use a broad range of tools to attack victims, from mere words to deadly weapons.

#### Alcoholism increases risk of IPH.

Phyllis Sharps 3 [Phyllis Sharps, Ph.D., R.N., is director of the masters program and an associate professor of com- munity health nursing at the Johns Hopkins University School of Nursing. Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Ph.D., R.N., F.A.A.N., is the associate dean for faculty affairs at the Johns Hopkins University School of Nursing. Doris Campbell, Ph.D., R.N., F.A.A.N., is professor emeritus at the University of South Florida. Faye Gary, Ed.D., R.N., F.A.A.N., is the Medical Mutual of Ohio Professor in Nursing for Vulnerable and At-Risk Persons at Frances Payne Bolton School of Nursing at Case Western Reserve University. Daniel Webster, Sc.D., M.P.H., is an associate professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health and co-director of the Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Policy and Research], “Risky Mix: Drinking, Drug Use, and Homicide”, NIJ Journal, November 2003, BE

This study examines the connection between alcohol and drug use and inti- mate partner violence, both during the incident and in the year leading up to it. The researchers found that higher levels of substance use by the offenders (and to a lesser extent, by the victims) tracked closely with more severe violence. Notably, although both partners may have regularly used alcohol before the homicide, attempted homicide, or the most severe violent incident of abuse, more male partners than female victims were problem drinkers. Also, during these violent incidents, more male partners than their female victims used alcohol.¶ As other articles in this issue state, inti- mate partner violence, the most common form of violence against women, is a key prelude to the murder of women by their partners. Alcohol and drugs are involved in more than half of these homicides,1 and men who batter their partners also frequently abuse alcohol.2 In this study, strikingly high rates of alcohol and drug use were reported for males who murdered or attempted to murder their female partners. These findings reinforce the already documented com- plex relationship between substance use by men and violence against women.

#### Ownership of handguns in conjunction with alcoholism empirically increases risk of arrest.

Garen J. Wintemute 13 [renowned expert on the public health crisis of gun violence and a pioneer in the field of injury epidemiology and prevention of firearm violence, which results in approximately 30,000 deaths a year and approximately 75,000 nonfatal injuries seen in hospital emergency departments, md, mph], “REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis”, Center for Gun Policy and Research Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2013, BE

Alcohol abuse is a major risk factor for firearm-related violence of all types (Kellermann et al. 1992, Kellermann et al. 1993, Rivara et al. 1997, Conner et al. 2001, Karch, Dahlberg, and Patel 2010). Moreover, several studies have identified an association between personal firearm ownership and heavy or abusive alcohol consumption (Diener and Kerber 1979, Schwaner et al. 1999, Miller, Hemenway, and Wechsler 1999, 2002, Nelson et al. 1996, Smith 2001, Casiano et al. 2008).¶ A recent study of data from the 1996 and 1997 Behavioral Risk Factor Sur- veillance System surveys examined this association more closely (Wintemute 2011). After adjustment for demographics and state of residence, firearm owners were more likely than persons who had no firearms at home to have five or more drinks on one occasion (odds ratio 1.3), to drink and drive (odds ratio 1.8), and to have 60 or more drinks per month (odds ratio 1.5) (Table 6.3).¶ Of particular interest—and perhaps not surprisingly—firearm owners who engaged in risk behaviors with firearms were also more likely than other firearm owners to drink excessively. For example, as compared with persons who had no firearms at home, firearm owners who also drove or rode in a vehicle with a loaded firearm were at greatest risk for drinking and driving (odds ratio 4.3). Firearm owners who did not travel in a vehicle with a loaded firearm available, were still at increased risk for drinking and driving (odds ratio 2.1), but less so.¶ The limited data available suggest that firearm ownership itself is associated with an increased risk of arrest (Cook and Ludwig 1996, Diener and Kerber 1979) or, among college students, “trouble with the police” (Miller, Hemenway, and Wechsler 2002). Carrying a firearm in public has also been linked to arrest for a non-traffic offense (Cook and Ludwig 1996, Smith 2001) and aggressive or hostile driving behavior (Miller et al. 2002, Hemenway, Vriniotis, and Miller 2006). Given the findings just presented, it is plausible that alcohol abuse among firearm owners is partly responsible for the association between fire- arm ownership and involvement with the criminal justice system.

#### Prohibition is effective—proven by similar policies with violent misdemeanants.

Garen J. Wintemute 13 [renowned expert on the public health crisis of gun violence and a pioneer in the field of injury epidemiology and prevention of firearm violence, which results in approximately 30,000 deaths a year and approximately 75,000 nonfatal injuries seen in hospital emergency departments, md, mph], “REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis”, Center for Gun Policy and Research Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2013, BE

Most importantly, denial appears to reduce risk for new criminal activity among those persons who are denied. The strongest evidence for this comes from a quasi-experimental evaluation of California’s decision to extend its prohibitions to persons convicted of violent misdemeanors (Wintemute et al. 2001). The prohibition lasts for 10 years following their convictions. Study subjects were aged 21 to 34; all had prior convictions for violent misdemean- ors. The intervention group comprised 927 persons who sought to purchase handguns in 1991 and were denied under the terms of the new policy. The control group included 727 persons who sought to purchase handguns in 1989 or 1990, just before the policy changed, and whose purchases were ap- proved. Subjects were followed for up to three years.¶ Overall, 33.0% of subjects were arrested during follow-up: 21.8% for a firearm- related or violent offense and 22.1% for offenses of other types (Table 6.4). Persons whose purchases were approved were more likely than those who were denied to be arrested for a firearm-related or violent offense (relative hazard 1.2) but not for other offenses (relative hazard 0.9). In both groups, as always, risk of arrest was strongly related to age and the number of prior misde- meanor convictions (Table 6.4).¶ Denial was associated with a significant decrease in risk of arrest, both overall and for subjects stratified by age or number of prior convictions. These findings persisted in multivariate analysis (Table 6.5). Purchasers were more likely than denied persons to be arrested for new firearm-related or violent crimes (relative hazard 1.3), but not for other crimes (relative hazard 1.0). Simi- lar results were seen in subgroups stratified by age, number of prior convictions for any crime, and number of prior convictions for a firearm-related or violent crime. The only exception was for subjects with three or more prior convictions for firearm-related or violent crimes. In this group with an established pattern of such activity, denial of handgun purchase may have no effect.

#### Surveys prove the plan is popular.

Garen J. Wintemute 13 [renowned expert on the public health crisis of gun violence and a pioneer in the field of injury epidemiology and prevention of firearm violence, which results in approximately 30,000 deaths a year and approximately 75,000 nonfatal injuries seen in hospital emergency departments, md, mph], “REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE IN AMERICA Informing Policy with Evidence and Analysis”, Center for Gun Policy and Research Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 2013, BE

Survey research in the late 1990s found high levels of support among the general population and firearm owners for denial criteria that included violent and firearm-related misdemeanors and alcohol abuse (Table 6.6) (Teret et al. 1998). Results for the general population were confirmed in the 2001 General Social Survey (Smith 2007).¶ In a 2012 survey of firearm owners, 75% of members of the National Rifle Association (NRA) felt that persons with a history of misdemeanor violence should not receive concealed weapon permits. Many states provide such per- mits to anyone who is legally eligible to possess firearms. Therefore, a judg- ment that a class of persons should not receive concealed weapon permits sug- gests a judgment that they should not possess firearms (Luntz Global 2012).

#### No substitution effect—especially true for IPV and alcoholics since they aren’t premeditated crimes where criminals actively seek big guns.

Nicholas Dixon 93 [Associate Professor of Philosophy, Alma College, Alma, Michigan], “SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW”, 12 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 243, 1993, BE

One has to doubt the reliability of the statements of prisoners as to what firearms they would carry in certain circumstances. Macho bragging and outright lying are very likely in such situations, and relegate Kleck's projections to the status of unsupported conjecture. In view of the fact that such a small percentage of the actual murders in the United States in 1990 were committed with long guns,' the burden on Kleck to prove his hypothetical speculation is even heavier. As for Kates and Benenson, their projections are based on the unsupported assertion that the 70% of handgun killers who do not turn to long guns would instead use knives, the most lethal weapon other than firearms. It is more probable that at least some potential murderers would turn to less lethal weapons or their bare hands, and that some would be deterred from assaults altogether. Since Kates and Benenson ignore these probable scenarios, and since their substitution predictions are in any case purely speculative, it is safe to conclude that their estimate of the increase in the homicide rate in the event of a handgun-only ban is inflated. The conjectures offered in support of the substitution hypothesis are inadequate and fail to meet the burden of proof encumbent on opponents of my proposal.¶ Another reason to doubt that long guns would be used in great numbers to replace handguns in robberies, assaults, and homi- cides is that long guns are obviously much more difficult to conceal. A potential mugger roaming the streets wielding a long gun will cause everyone in sight to flee, and is likely to be quickly arrested¶ when alarmed people call the police. Similarly, a bank robber car-¶ rying a long gun will be immediately detected by security guards,¶ alarm systems will be triggered, and the chances of a successful¶ robbery greatly diminished. Handguns are obviously much more¶ convenient for the commission of such crimes. Kates and Benenson¶ point out that most homicides occur in the home, where¶ concealability is "irrelevant."95 However, concealability would seem¶ to be an important factor even in the home. Since the victim may¶ well be unaware that the killer is carrying a concealed weapon, the "surprise factor" which is peculiar to handguns can still apply even¶ in the home. In contrast, people can hardly be unaware that the person they are with is carrying a shotgun or rifle. Moreover, in any argument or domestic quarrel, regardless of whether the potential victim knows that the assaulter is carrying a handgun, the ease of pulling out the gun and shooting makes such arguments more likely to spill over into murder. In contrast, by the time the assaulter has gone into another room to retrieve their long gun and loaded it, the potential victim [person] has crucial seconds in which to escape.

### Underview 1

#### Subsets are good—ban just means prohibit

OED, “ban”, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american\_english/ban

Officially or legally prohibit:¶ he was banned from driving for a year

#### All of our evidence uses the phrase “prohibit”, which proves it’s in the topic literature—“ban” doesn’t mean anything specific in topic lit but applies to certain groups.

DeFilippis and Zimring 16, Evan DeFilippis [graduated number one in his class at the University of Oklahoma with degrees in Economics, Political Science, and Psychology. He is a Harry S. Truman Scholar, a David L. Boren Critical Languages Scholar, and currently works as a research analyst at Quest Opportunity Fund. His work on gun violence has been featured in Washington Post, Atlantic, Slate, VICE, Huffington Post, Vox, Media Matters, Boston Review, and many others.], Franklin E. Zimring [Law Professor at University of California, Berkeley School of Law, J.D., University of Chicago, Zimring's major fields of interest are criminal justice and family law, with special emphasis on the use of empirical research to inform legal policy.], “CAL RR FINALS POST-ROUND DISCUSSION [TRANSCRIPT].” Debate Matters, February 2016, BE

Zimring: Okay, in general, the distinction between, and this is the problem with talking about bans. The technical meaning of ban or prohibition is nothing at all. It, it's a wonderful word, but it hasn't been used. The distinction for handgun position regulations is between permissive and restrictive licensing. It is not a question of which group. The question is what's the assumption? ¶ Permissive says everybody except can own, and the exceptions are 90% the immature, then criminal records, and then something in the mental health situation.¶ Restrictive licensing reverses the presumption and says nobody can own unless you have a particular good reason. It then has to, if it does it right, say what the good reasons are and what the evidence for them is right. The problem with that, it's highly restrictive. That's the good news. The bad news is, uh, the richer you are, and the more you contributed to last successful mayor, the more likely it is you're going to get a license. Welcome to politics. So, there are implementation problems.¶ Those are the best conceptual frames.¶ DeFilippis: I was just going to add really quickly that, uh, I mean, at risk of having this turn into like a topicality debate or something, but (audience laughs) ... Uh ...¶ Varad: That's the reason I asked the question.¶ DeFilippis: Uh, there's much of the literature as Professor mentioned, ban is not legally operationalized well in gun control literature, but there are plenty of research articles that use the phrase in the context of you know people with criminal records are banned from using guns, most people with different types of mental health records are banned from using guns. I think that in terms of banning subsets of the population, uh, I think it can be argued that it's a ban.

#### Whole res is terrible—one aff for 4 months *guarantees* redundant debates especially since the only person who advocates a total ban explicitly is Dixon—that outweighs

A] there’s plenty of time to write negs to lots of affs and generics are still a thing.

B] there’s 0 education with their interp since we’ve learned everything about the topic long before it’s over—it would literally be the same 1AC and 1NC every round.

C] breadth is good—most of the learning in debate occurs in research outside of rounds so forcing them to research multiple affs magnifies the amount we learn and coopts all depth arguments—topic education is important—it helps us become more informed citizens who can enact change *and* research skills are valuable—they give us skills to learn about stuff in the future which is a prerequisite to successfully advocating change *and* key to information processing—we need skills to sift through massive amounts of data in a digital age.

David McCandless 10, award-winning writer, designer and author August 2010, David McCandless: The beauty of data visualization, http://www.ted.com/talks/david\_mccandless\_the\_beauty\_of\_data\_visualization.html#

**It feels like we're all suffering from information overload or data glut**. And the good news is **there might be an easy solution to that**, and that's using our eyes more. So, **visualizing information**, **so that we can see the patterns and connections that matter** and then designing that information so it makes more sense, **or it tells a story**, **or allows us to focus only on the information that's important**. Failing that, visualized information can just look really cool.

### Underview 2

#### Government-as-heuristic is not an abstraction, but rather provides a means of understanding the state and breaking it down.

Zanotti 14 Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance.“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World” – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database.

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.’’84

#### Gun control should be a debate that citizens engage in about crafting good policies

Andrew Jay McClurg 92, [Professor of Law, University of Arkansas], "The Rhetoric of Gun Control," The American University Law Review, Vol. 42, 1992.

Fallacies are bad rhetoric because they lead to bad decisionmaking.¶ The essential premise of this Article is that it is better to make¶ decisions based on straight thinking than on crooked thinking. 9¶ While this may seem to state the obvious, an examination of the¶ rhetoric used in virtually any political debate shows that we usually¶ do not abide by this principle in the arena of public decisionmaking.¶ As Jeremy Bentham documented more than one hundred and fifty¶ years ago, fallacies are common in the discussions of important social¶ issues in democratic systems.10 Indeed, there seems to be a positive¶ correlation between the importance of an issue, at least as¶ perceived by the populace, and our readiness to resort to bad rhetoric¶ in debating it.¶ Gun control is a premiere example of such an issue. As demonstrated¶ by the debate over the Brady bill, few issues are capable of¶ generating such intense rhetorical conflict among the American¶ people. As with other controversial issues such as abortion and affirmative¶ action, opinions about gun control are almost always passionately¶ held and in diametric opposition.¶ Regrettably, while there is room for reasonable persons to disagree¶ about gun control,I' we have as a nation chosen to disagree in a most disagreeable manner. Excepting a limited number of scholarly¶ commentaries, 12 discourse on gun control has been plagued by¶ bad rhetoric. The Brady bill debate exemplifies the prevalence of¶ poor rhetoric and defective reasoning in gun control argumentation.¶ At its best, the debate over the Brady bill seldom rose above¶ the level of shrill hyperbole.' 3 At its worst, the discussion sank into¶ the muck of name-calling and non sequitur.14 This Article exposes the fallacies in the rhetoric of gun control.¶ Concentrating on the debate over the Brady bill, the Article guides¶ the reader through the treacherous terrain of gun control argumentation¶ by identifying and analyzing the wide variety of reasoning defects¶ employed by participants in the debate. The Article is process¶ oriented. No attempt is made to address the ultimate question of¶ whether the nation's gun policies should be reformed. Until we first¶ reform the debate, we cannot hope to approach law reform in a rational¶ way.¶ In analyzing the rhetoric of gun control, I have attempted to be¶ fair and balanced, attacking the flaws in reasoning on both sides of¶ the debate. As a proponent of gun control, I initially thought this¶ approach would prove difficult. Gun control advocates like to believe¶ that only those who oppose gun control are guilty of deceptive¶ and fallacious rhetoric, but scrutiny of the Brady bill debate reveals¶ that this assumption is false.' 5 The pro-Brady bill forces contrib- uted more than enough bad rhetoric to the gun control debate to¶ allow for relatively evenhanded treatment of the two sides of the¶ issue.1 6¶ The importance of dissecting gun control rhetoric extends beyond¶ the issue of gun control, or even law reform in general. Understanding¶ rhetoric is a process every student of the law should¶ care about. Rhetoric is the art of persuasion and persuasion is the¶ lawyer's stock in trade. Advocates cannot be completely effective¶ unless they first master the tools of advocacy. Learning to distinguish¶ between good rhetoric and bad rhetoric, that is, learning to¶ recognize and identify flaws in reasoning, is an essential part of¶ every lawyer's education.

#### Particularism is good—root cause claims and focus on overarching structures ignore application to material injustice.

Gregory Fernando Pappas 16 [Texas A&M University] “The Pragmatists’ Approach to Injustice”, The Pluralist Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, BE

The pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from nonideal theories whose starting point seems to be the injustices of society at large that have a history and persist through time, where the task of political philosophy is to detect and diagnose the presence of these historical injustices in particular situations of injustice. For example, critical theory today has inherited an approach to social philosophy characteristic of the European tradition that goes back to Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Freud, Marcuse, and others. Accord- ing to Roberto Frega, this tradition takes society to be “intrinsically sick” with a malaise that requires adopting a critical historical stance in order to understand how the systematic sickness affects present social situations. In other words, this approach assumes that¶ a philosophical critique of specific social situations can be accomplished only under the assumption of a broader and full blown critique of soci- ety in its entirety: as a critique of capitalism, of modernity, of western civilization, of rationality itself. The idea of social pathology becomes intelligible only against the background of a philosophy of history or of an anthropology of decline, according to which the distortions of actual social life are but the inevitable consequence of longstanding historical processes. (“Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory” 63)¶ However, this particular approach to injustice is not limited to critical theory. It is present in those Latin American and African American political philosophies that have used and transformed the critical intellectual tools of ¶ critical theory to deal with the problems of injustice in the Americas. For instance, Charles W. Mills claims that the starting point and alternative to the abstractions of ideal theory that masked injustices is to diagnose and rectify a history of an illness—the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.11 The critical task of revealing this illness is achieved by adopting a historical perspective where the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. Similary, radical feminists as well as Third World scholars, as reaction to the hege- monic Eurocentric paradigms that disguise injustices under the assumption of a universal or objective point of view, have stressed how our knowledge is always situated. This may seem congenial with pragmatism except the locus of the knower and of injustices is often described as power structures located in “global hierarchies” and a “world-system” and not situations.12¶ Pragmatism only questions that we live in History or a “World-System” (as a totality or abstract context) but not that we are in history (lowercase): in a present situation continuous with others where the past weighs heavily in our memories, bodies, habits, structures, and communities. It also does not deny the importance of power structures and seeing the connections be- tween injustices through time, but there is a difference between (a) inquiring into present situations of injustice in order to detect, diagnose, and cure an injustice (a social pathology) across history, and (b) inquiring into the his- tory of a systematic injustice in order to facilitate inquiry into the present unique, context-bound injustice. To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices, we must study history but also seek present evidence of the weight of the past on the present injustice.¶ If injustice is an illness, then the pragmatists’ approach takes as its main focus diagnosing and treating the particular present illness, that is, the particular situation-bound injustice and not a global “social pathology” or some single transhistorical source of injustice. The diagnosis of a particular injustice is not always dependent on adopting a broader critical standpoint of society in its entirety, but even when it is, we must be careful to not forget that such standpoints are useful only for understanding the present evil. The concepts and categories “white supremacy” and “colonialism” can be great tools that can be of planetary significance. One could even argue that they pick out much larger areas of people’s lives and injustices than the categories of class and gender, but in spite of their reach and explanatory theoretical value, they are nothing more than tools to make reference to and ameliorate particular injustices experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique re- lationship in a situation. No doubt many, but not all, problems of injustice are a consequence of being a member of a group in history, but even in these cases, we cannot a priori assume that injustices are homogeneously equal for all members of that group. Why is this important? The possible pluralism and therefore complexity of a problem of injustice does not always stop at the level of being a member of a historical group or even a member of many groups, as insisted on by intersectional analysis. There may be unique cir- cumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry. If an empirical inquiry is committed to capturing and ameliorating all of the harms in situations of injustice in their raw pretheoretical complexity, then this requires that we try to begin with and return to the concrete, particular, and unique experiences of injustice.¶ Pragmatism agrees with Sally Haslanger’s concern about Charles Mills’s view. She writes: “The goal is not just a theory that is historical (v. ahistori- cal), but is sensitive to historical particularity, i.e., that resists grand causal narratives purporting to give an account of how domination has come about and is perpetuated everywhere and at all times” (1). For “the forces that cause and sustain domination vary tremendously context by context, and there isn’t necessarily a single causal explanation; a theoretical framework that is useful as a basis for political intervention must be highly sensitive to the details of the particular social context” (1).13¶ Although each situation is unique, there are commonalities among the cases that permit inquiry about common causes. We can “formulate tentative general principles from investigation of similar individual cases, and then . . . check the generalizations by applying them to still further cases” (Dewey, Lectures in China 53). But Dewey insists that the focus should be on the indi- vidual case, and was critical of how so many sociopolitical theories are prone to starting and remaining at the level of “sweeping generalizations.” He states that they “fail to focus on the concrete problems which arise in experience, allowing such problems to be buried under their sweeping generalizations” (Lectures in China 53).¶ The lesson pragmatism provides for nonideal theory today is that it must be careful to not reify any injustice as some single historical force for which particular injustice problems are its manifestation or evidence for its exis- tence. Pragmatism welcomes the wisdom and resources of nonideal theories that are historically grounded on actual injustices, but it issues a warning about how they should be understood and implemented. It is, for example, sympathetic to the critical resources found in critical race theory, but with an important qualification. It understands Derrick Bell’s valuable criticism as context-specific to patterns in the practice of American law. Through his inquiry into particular cases and civil rights policies at a particular time and place, Bell learned and proposed certain general principles such as the one of “interest convergence,” that is, “whites will promote racial advantages for blacks only when they also promote white self-interest.”14 But, for pragma- tism, these principles are nothing more than historically grounded tools to use in present problematic situations that call for our analysis, such as deliberation in establishing public policies or making sense of some concrete injustice. The principles are falsifiable and open to revision as we face situation-specific injustices. In testing their adequacy, we need to consider their function in making us see aspects of injustices we would not otherwise appreciate.15

#### Critique is useless without the 1AC’s concrete nature

Henry A. Giroux 15 [American scholar and cultural critic. One of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public pedagogy], “Beyond Dystopian Visions in the Age of Neoliberal Authoritarianism”, Truthout, 4 Nov 2015, BE

Fifth, another serious challenge facing advocates of a new truly democratic social order is the task of developing a discourse of both critique and possibility or what I have called a discourse of educated hope. Critique is important and is crucial to break the hold of common-sense assumptions that legitimate a wide range of injustices. The language of critique is also crucial for making visible the workings of unequal power and the necessity of holding authority accountable. But critique is not enough and without a discourse of hope, it can lead to a ~~paralyzing~~ despair or, even worse, a ~~crippling~~ cynicism. Hope speaks to imagining a life beyond capitalism, and combines a realistic sense of limits with a lofty vision of demanding the impossible. As Ernst Bloch once insisted, reason, justice and change cannot blossom without hope, because educated hope taps into our deepest experiences and longing for a life of dignity with others, a life in which it becomes possible to imagine a future that does not mimic the present. I am not referring to a romanticized and empty notion of hope, but to a notion of informed hope that faces the concrete obstacles and realities of domination but continues the ongoing task of "holding the present open and thus unfinished." (51)¶ The discourse of possibility not only looks for productive solutions. It also is crucial in defending those public spheres in which civic values, public scholarship and social engagement allow for a more imaginative grasp of a future that takes seriously the demands of justice, equity and civic courage. Democracy should encourage, even require, a way of thinking critically about education, one that connects equity to excellence, learning to ethics, and agency to the imperatives of social responsibility and the public good. Casino capitalism is a toxin that has created a predatory class of unethical zombies who are producing dead zones of the imagination that even Orwell could not have envisioned, while waging a fierce fight against the possibilities of a democratic future. The time has come to develop a political language in which civic values, social responsibility and the institutions that support them become central to invigorating and fortifying a new era of civic imagination, a renewed sense of social agency and an impassioned international social movement with a vision, organization and set of strategies to challenge the neoliberal nightmare engulfing the planet. Educators, artists, youth, intellectuals and others must refuse to succumb to the authoritarian forces that are circling US society, waiting for the resistance to stop and for the lights to go out. History is open, and as James Baldwin once insisted, "Not everything that is faced can be changed; but nothing can be changed until it is faced."

#### Individual ethical orientations aren’t effective – it’s more productive to rearticulate systems from the inside

Chandler 9 (Westminster IR senior lecturer, 2009, David, “Questioning Global Political Activism”, <http://m.friendfeed-media.com/ef12653960910c6594243a9a98293bfa1e1702ff#page=94>)

People often argue that there is nothing passive or conservative about radical political activist protests, such as the 2003 anti-war march, anti-capitalism and anti-globalisation protests, the huge march to Make Poverty History at the end of 2005, involvement in the World Social Forums or the radical jihad of Al-Qaeda. I disagree; these new forms of protest are highly individualised and personal ones – there is no attempt to build a social or collective movement. It appears that theatrical suicide, demonstrating, badge and bracelet wearing are ethical acts in themselves: personal statements of awareness, rather than attempts to engage politically with society. This is illustrated by the ‘celebration of differences’ at marches, protests and social forums. It is as if people are more concerned with the creation of a sense of community through differences than with any political debate, shared agreement or collective purpose. It seems to me that if someone was really concerned with ending war or with ending poverty or with overthrowing capitalism, political views and political differences would be quite important. Is war caused by capitalism, by human nature, or by the existence of guns and other weapons? It would seem important to debate reasons, causes and solutions; it would also seem necessary to give those political differences an organisational expression if there was a serious project of social change. Rather than a political engagement with the world, it seems that radical political activism today is a form of social disengagement – expressed in the anti-war marchers’ slogan of ‘Not in My Name’, or the assumption that wearing a plastic bracelet or setting up an internet blog diary is the same as engaging in political debate. In fact, it seems that political activism is a practice which isolates individuals who think that demonstrating a personal commitment or awareness of problems is preferable to engaging with other people who are often dismissed as uncaring or brainwashed by consumerism. The narcissistic aspects of the practice of this type of global politics are expressed clearly by individuals who are obsessed with reducing their carbon footprint, deriving their idealised sense of social connection from an ever-increasing awareness of themselves and by giving political meaning to every personal action. Global ethics appear to be in demand because they offer us a sense of social connection and meaning, while at the same time giving us the freedom to construct the meaning for ourselves, to pick our causes of concern, and enabling us to be free of responsibilities for acting as part of a collective association, for winning an argument or for success at the ballot-box. While the appeal of global ethical politics is an individualistic one, the lack of success or impact of radical activism is also reflected in its rejection of any form of social movement or organisation. Strange as it may seem, the only people who are keener on global ethics than radical activists are political elites. Since the end of the Cold War, global ethics have formed the core of foreign policy and foreign policy has tended to dominate domestic politics. Global ethics are at the centre of debates and discussion over humanitarian intervention, ‘healing the scar of Africa’, the war on terror and the ‘war against climate insecurity’. Traditional foreign policy, based on strategic geopolitical interests with a clear framework for policy-making, no longer seems so important. The government is downsizing the old Foreign and Commonwealth Office where people were regional experts, spoke the languages and were engaged for the long term, and provides more resources to the Department for International Development where its staff are experts in good causes. This shift was clear in the UK’s attempt to develop an ‘ethical foreign policy’ in the 1990s – an approach which openly claimed to have rejected strategic interests for values and the promotion of Britain’s caring and sharing identity. Clearly, the projection of foreign policy on the basis of demonstrations of values and identity, rather than an understanding of the needs and interests of people on the ground, leads to ill thought-through and short-term policy-making. Governments have been more than happy to put global ethics at the top of the political agenda for the same reasons that radical activists have been eager to shift to the global sphere: namely, the freedom from political responsibility that it affords them. Every government and international institution has shifted from strategic and instrumental policy-making, based on a clear political programme, to the ambitious assertion of global causes – saving the planet, ending poverty, saving Africa, not just ending war but solving the causes of conflict, etc. Of course, the more ambitious the aim the less anyone can be held to account for success and failure. In fact, the more global the problem is, the more responsibility can be shifted to blame the USA or the UN for the failure to translate ethical claims into concrete results. Ethical global questions, where the alleged values of the UN, the UK, the civilised world, NATO or the EU are on the line in wars of choice (from the war on terror to the war on global warming) lack traditional instrumentality because they are driven less by the traditional interests of realpolitik than the narcissistic search for meaning or identity. Governments feel the consequences of their lack of social connection, even more than we do as individuals; it undermines any attempt to represent shared interests or coherent political programmes. As Jean Baudrillard (1983) suggests, without a connection to the represented masses, political leaders are as open to ridicule and exposure as the ‘Emperor with no clothes’. It is this lack of shared social goals which makes instrumental policy-making increasingly problematic. Donald Rumsfeld (2003) said that there are no metrics to help assess whether the war on terror is being won or lost. These wars and campaigns, often alleged to be based on the altruistic claim of the needs and interests of others, are demonstrations and performances, based on ethical claims rather than responsible practices and policies. Max Weber (2004) once counter-posed this type of politics – the ethics of conviction – to the ethics of responsibility in his lecture on ‘Politics as a Vocation’. The desire to act on the international scene without a clear strategy or purpose has led to highly destabilising interventions from the Balkans to Iraq, and to the moralisation of a wide range of issues, from war crimes to EU membership requirements.

### Underview 3

#### 1] Aff gets RVIs on I meets and offense back to counter-interps—you shouldn’t allow the NC conditional positions—the NC can just concede the AC framework and go for turns which means they can kick out of it- if they can kick out of theory that means that they have multiple different kickable positions, making the 1AR, which is already the hardest speech in debate, completely impossible.

#### 2] Prefer reasonable aff interps:

A] There’s only 4 minutes in the 1AR, which makes it almost impossible for me to beat back multiple ridiculous shells—reasonable aff interps allows us to have an actual substantive debate—key to topic education.

B] Strat skew – I have to pick an advocacy in the AC—you can read binary shells against it no matter what, so the only way to ever reach substantive debates is to gut check and avoid dumb theory.