# Subjective Idealism

## NC [2:40]

#### [1] Use epistemic confidence in the debate i.e evaluate all offense under the winning framework 2 warrants [A] You use confidence to choose to use modesty which cedes the validity of confidence and [B] Modesty is incoherent, you can’t be 60% sure of Deont and 40% sure of Util, you can’t split ethical theories. [C] Modesty invites judge intervention- judges become calculators for determining how much you are winning the framework debate by and how strong your offense links to the framework. [D] Modesty encourages debaters to read extinction scenarios to outweigh under modesty which kills clash on the fw debate which kills phil ed.

#### [2]Permissibility negates- Lack of obligation proves the resolution false- the res specifically says you have to prove an obligation, you cannot be obligated and lack an obligation simultaneously.

#### Presume Neg- [A] We assume statements to be false until proven true. That is why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. [B] Statements are more often false than true. If I say this pen is red, I can only prove it true one way where I can prove it false in an infinite amount of ways.

The standard is consistency with Metaphysics. Metaphysics is the foundation of philosophy and action – the correct theory ensures consistency with reality. **Landauer et al,** Landauer, Jeff, and Joseph Rowlands. *Reason Is Absolute*, [www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Metaphysics\_Main.html](http://www.importanceofphilosophy.com/Metaphysics_Main.html). **Metaphysics is** the branch of philosophy responsible for the study of existence. It is **the foundation of a worldview**. It answers the question "What is?" **It encompasses everything that exists, as well as the nature of existence** itself. It says whether the world is real, or merely an illusion. It is a fundamental view of the world around us. **Metaphysics is the foundation of philosophy. Without an explanation** or an interpretation **of the world around us, we would be helpless to deal with reality**. We could not **feed ourselves, or act** to preserve our lives. **The degree to which our metaphysical worldview is correct is the degree to which we are able to comprehend the world, and act accordingly. Without this firm foundation, all knowledge becomes suspect**. Any flaw in our view of reality will

#### Metaphysics is a prerequisite to any other moral theory. And, Epistemology outweighs and comes before the framework debate since it determines how we know what is true

#### The empirical world does not exist, but rather is constituted in thought. When I think I see a mountain I am not perceiving something that exists, but instead constructing an idea of it in my mind

Addison Ellis 1, Thousand Word Philosophy, 2014, [https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley///GHAS[Bracketed](https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley///GHAS%5BBracketed) for clarity]

Berkeley challenged this traditional picture in the following way.1 First, when we take a representation to accurately represent an object in the world, we do so on the assum[e]ption that the representation resembles the object in some way. But, Berkeley argues, we are in no position to say that our ideas resemble anything other than other ideas. According to Berkeley, we cannot compare ideas with material objects since to have knowledge of a material object would require that we know it via some idea. Thus, all we ever encounter are ideas themselves, and never anything material.

#### Matter is impossible, it only exists an idea

Addison Ellis 2, Thousand Word Philosophy, 2014, https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/07/07/berkeley///GHAS

If Berkeley is right, then we never have knowledge of anything material whatsoever; we only ever know our own ideas. This is part of a larger attack in which Berkeley argues that we are not entitled to believe that matter exists, in which case the only things that do exist include minds and ideas. Berkeley is putting forth a view that is sometimes called subjective idealism: subjective, because he claims that the only things that can be said to exist are ideas when they are perceived. Thus, my black dog exists only when I am currently in possession of the idea of my black dog. If I leave my dog behind when I walk to the store, she no longer exists, and so her existence is purely dependent upon a subject’s perception of her.

In addition to the resemblance argument above, and to strengthen his attack on realism and materialism, Berkeley also argues that matter is impossible.

The basic idea goes like this: Matter is defined as physical stuff which can exist independently of our minds. We ordinarily take matter to be the stuff that makes up reality, and this stuff is supposed to go on existing whether we are perceiving it or not. That is, we think of matter as stuff that can exist unconceived. But we can never conceive of matter except through some idea. If so, then we cannot conceive of matter as something unconceived. In fact, it would be absurd to say so, since necessarily in conceiving of matter, we are conceiving of an idea, and surely we cannot conceive of an idea that is unconceived. If all of this is true, then, Berkeley argues, matter as it is defined is impossible.2 If matter is impossible, then no material objects exist,

#### Prefer on linguistics: The fact that talking about rocks isn’t the communication of literal, physical, rocks means that all experiences can be regressed into idea. Additionally, flow this as a warrant for performativity, criticizing my framework uses and presupposes that language is possible

#### Subjective Idealism, the view described above, is the only coherent account of metaphysics.

#### Prefer:

#### [1] Objects cannot exist independent of thought: Even when we imagine a tree sitting alone in the forest unseen by humans we are creating a representation of it in our mind, because its impossible to think or know of something that constitutively can’t be thought.

#### [2] In the same way sensory experiences like pleasure and pain are relative to agents, and therefore cannot be reliably observed or compared, it’s impossible know if or how others experience ideas. Even if their does exist a correct account of an object, a plurality of un comparable viewpoints make it impossible to know which one is true.

#### [3] Only my framework avoids skep: There is no way to confirm the truth of anything in the outside world making knowledge impossible.

Bishop George Berkeley of Cloyne, Irish Philosopher, Bishop, and namesake of the city Berkeley California, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710, ///AHS PB

From the principles I have laid down, it follows that human knowledge can naturally be classiﬁed under two headings—knowledge of ideas, and of spirits. I shall take these separately. First, as to ideas or unthinking things, our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confused, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a two-fold existence of the objects of sense, •one intelligible, or in the mind, •the other real and outside the mind. The latter has been thought to give unthinking things a natural existence of their own, distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which I think I have shown to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of scepticism: as long as men thought that real things existed outside the mind, and that their knowledge was real only to the extent that it conformed to real things, it followed that they couldn’t be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things that are perceived conform to those that aren’t perceived, i.e. that exist outside the mind? 87. Colour, shape, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, because there is nothing in them that isn’t perceived. But if they are looked on as signs or images that are meant to copy things existing outside the mind, then we are all involved in scepticism ·through a line of thought that goes like this·: We see only the[ir] appearances of things, not their real qualities. We can’t possibly know what a thing’s size, shape or motion is, really and absolutely, in itself; all we can know is how its size etc. relate to our senses. Our ideas can vary while things remain the same, and which of our ideas—whether indeed any of them— represent the true quality really existing in the thing is something we have no way to discover. For all we know, everything that we see, hear, and feel may be only phantom and empty chimera, and not at all agree with the real things existing in the real world. All this scepticism follows from supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the former exist outside the mind, or unperceived. It would be easy to expand on this topic and show how the arguments advanced by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects.

#### That outweighs: Moral judgement and truth require absolute certainty

Unger, Peter (1975): Ignorance (Oxford: Oxford University Press). ///AHS PB[Bracketed for gendered language]

The very particular idea that knowing entails its being all right to be certain is suggested, further, by the fact that knowing entails, at least, that one is certain. As we saw in section 9 of the preceding chapter, that this is a fact is made quite plain by the inconsistency expressed by sentences like '[They] really knew that it was raining, but he wasn't absolutely certain it was.' Such a sentence can express no truth: if [they] weren’t certain, then they didn't know.

#### Prefer on bindingness, if someone has reason to doubt a moral imperative, they can arbitrarily excuse themselves from any obligation to do it, thus certainty is required for any normative ought.

#### There is a 100% chance we know ideas to exist, but a less than a 100% chance we know the material world exists, so you independently negate on Unger.

#### [4] Induction fallacy – every empirical observation presupposes certain facts about the empirical world leading to infinite regress, like gravity existed 1 sec ago because it existed a second before that and so on.

### Offense

#### And that justifies voting neg:

#### [A] States and nuclear arsenals are all empirical properties, but if they don’t exist the res is incoherent.

#### [B] Ought implies an external obligation, but that makes no sense if there is no empirical outside to force us to do something.

#### [C] Negates on probability, triggers presumption, we know ideas to exist but we can’t prove the material true.

# 2NR Moves Baby

### Presumption/Permissibility

#### First the presumption/permissibility debate- presume neg because we assume statements to be false until proven true, that’s why we don’t believe in alternate realities or conspiracy theories. That means intuitively you would presume neg. Next is this probability warrant- If I say this timer is white there is only one way to prove it true, while there are an infinite number of weights to prove it false. This probability argument outweighs and if you are unsure which was presumption flows just choose neg because of probability.

#### On Permissibility- ought means to prove a proactive obligation, that means proving a lack of obligation proves the resolution false. You can’t have an obligation and a lack of obligation simultaneously.

### Epistemic Confidence

#### Use epistemic confidence. Evaluate and filter all in round offense under the winning framework. That means if I win the NC framework outweighs or precludes the Framework you vote negative because we have linked offense under the framework.

### Overview

**The standard is consistency with metaphysics. First the weighing. The NC framing comes first because without an accurate view of reality all our epistemology is false. All of our knowledge comes from an assumption of how the world works, that’s launder. That means even if you don’t buy the Truth Testing NC and don’t want to vote under that, you can independently vote on epistemology. Extend the analytic under Launder that says Epistemology outweighs and comes lexically prior to framework because [1] it determines how we know what we know and [2] all claims require epistemology which means we have to evaluate epistemology first before we can evaluate other thesis claims like the AFF. You can’t impact turn epistemology because that concedes the validity of epistemology in the first place. So if we win on the indict of epistemology vote negative even if they win their offense because the underlying epistemology is false. Now on the NC framework.**

#### You’ve vastly under covered the NC, which endorses subjective idealism. The thesis is that the empirical world doesn’t exist, but rather exists in conception and thought. We can only 100% guarantee access to ideas, but we can’t prove the material world true since our connection to this “material world” merely regresses into idea, thus proving we can only guarantee ideas true. Thus, if the material world is false, matter doesn’t exist. That justifies voting negative, because States and nuclear arsenals are empirical properties, but if they don’t exist the res is incoherent. Furthermore, “ought” implies an external obligation but that makes no sense if there is no empirical outside to force us to do something.

#### Now the extensions

### Extensions

#### Extend the Ellis evidence, which says that all we ever counter are ideas and that any comparison to the material world is made via idea, thus everything regresses to encounters with ideas. Couple implications [1] is that it takes out the AC framework insofar as it relies on materialism and [2] proves the NC standard true Further extend the 2nd Ellis evidence that says matter must then be impossible because to conceive of matter is through idea, but we think of matter to exist unconceived but that’s impossible because since necessarily in conceiving of matter, we are conceiving of an idea, and it’s impossible to conceive of something as unconceived that’s llogical, thus matter is impossible.

#### Extend the 1 point that says that objects can’t exist independent of thought, because to think of something independent of thought requires thought, logically your fw regresses to mine because it’s inescapable.

#### Extend the 2 point that says we can’t use ideas to compare how we view “empirical objects”. Even if their does exist an objective account, the plurality of viewpoints means we can never be certain- this independently negates with unger because we need truth propositions to be 100% for us to instill truth value, anything else means the proposition, in this case the resolution, holds no truth, so you negate.

#### Extend the 3 point which says insofar as my fw is true we avoid skep, that’s Berkley. Here is the problem, there is no way to confirm the outside exists. I can’t say that this timer is actually representative of what I see. Because, all my experiences are indexed through ideas and thought. I can’t see the quote on quote material world which means I can never confirm its knowledge true. Means skep is true. The aff is a quest of knowledge but if the aff can’t confirm the outside world then you should not feel comfortable affirming. Doublebind either [A] the NC framing is true in which case you negate because empirical objects don’t exist or [B] the NC framework is false, in which case Skep is true and skep negates on permissibility and presumption.

#### Extend the Unger evidence, prefer the NC. We can 100% guarantee access to ideas are true, but we aren’t 100% certain that the empirical world exists, Unger says that we can’t establish truth values in propositions unless we are 100% certain, prefer the NC on truth and probability. Also pre-fiat impact- if you question yourself while writing the ballot that means you don’t buy the aff 100% in which case the truth value of the Aff is false, that’s an independent prefiat voter.

The descriptive precedes the normative because the normative claim doesn’t matter if its descriptive nature is false, it’s epistemologically useless for us to consider something that’s normatively good if its descriptive value is false- I.e your normative arguments hold 0 weight until they prove why they are descriptively true as well.