# K – Weheliye

## 1NC JANFEB

## 1NC NOVDEC (2:30)

#### The idea that the public has the right to access information begs the question of who can access these rights in the first place - no subject can be articulated as universal, because its very existence causes the exclusion of those who cannot access full humanity. These subjects form a racialized assemblage defined in opposition to this concept of the liberal subject.

Weheliye 14 [Alexander G. Weheliye, (Alexander G. Weheliye is Professor of African American Studies and English at Northwestern University.) "Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, And Black Feminist Theories Of The Human" Duke University Press., 8-1-2014, https://www.dukeupress.edu/habeas-viscus] */* MM \*brackets in original text

**Wynter**’s large-scale intellectual **project**, which she has been pursuing in one form or another for the last thirty years, **disentangles Man from the human in order to use the space of subjects placed beyond the grasp of this domain as a vital point from which to invent hitherto unavailable genres of the human.**27 According to this scheme in western modernity the religious conception of the self gave way to two modes of secularized being: first, the Cartesian “Rational Man,” or homo politicus, and then beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, “**Man as a selected being and natural organism . . . as the universal human, ‘man as man.**’”28 The move from a supernatural conception of world and the self ’s place within this cosmos, however, does not signal the supersession of a primitive axiomatic with an enlightened and rarefied type of the human. Rather, one genre of the human (Judeo-Christian, religious) yields to another, just as provincial, version of the human, and, although both claim universality, neither genre fully represents the multiplicity of human life forms. In the context of the secular human, **black subjects, along with indigenous populations, the colonized, the insane, the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as limit cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human.**29 Thus, **race**, rather than representing accessory, **comes to define the very essence of the modern human as “the code through which one not simply knows what human being is, but experiences being.”**30 Accordingly, race makes its mark in the dominion of the ideological and physiological, or rather race scripts the elision of the former with the latter in the flesh. Blackness 25 In her latest writings, Wynter identifies homo politicus’s successor in the long road from “theodicy” to “biodicy” as the liberal “bio-economic man.”31 The idea of “bio-economic man” marks the assumed naturalness that positions economic inequities, white supremacy, genocide, economic exploitation, gendered subjugation, colonialism, “natural selection,” and concepts such as the free market not in the realm of divine design, as in previous religious orders of things, but beyond the reach of human intervention all the same. In both cases, this ensures that a particular humanly devised model of humanity remains isomorphic with the Homo sapiens species. Wynter’s approach differs markedly from arguments that seek to include the oppressed within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism or, conversely, abolish humanism because of its racio-colonial baggage; instead **Wynter views black studies and minority discourse as liminal spaces, simultaneously** ensconced in and **outside the world of Man, from which to construct new objects of knowledge and launch the reinvention of the human at the juncture of the culture and biology feedback loop.** Even though the genre of the human we currently inhabit in the west is intimately tied to the somatic order of things, for Wynter, **the human cannot be understood in purely biological terms**, whether this applies to the history of an individual organism (ontogenesis) or the development at the level of a species (phylogeny). This is where Fanon’s important concept of sociogeny comes into play, offering Wynter an approach of thinking of the human—the “science in the social text,” to echo Spillers’s phrase—where culture and biology are not only not opposed to each other but in which their chemistry discharges mutually beneficial insights.32 In this scenario, **a symbolic register, consisting of discourse, language, culture, and so on (sociogeny) always already accompanies the genetic dimension of human action** (ontogeny), and it is only in the imbrication of these two registers that we can understand the full scope of our being-in-the-world. Fanon’s concept of sociogeny, arising from the inadequacy of traditional psychoanalytic models in the analysis of racialized colonialism, builds on Freud’s appropriation of recapitulation theory.33 Thus, according to Fanon, Freud breaks with the strict codes of Darwinism and social Darwinism (phylogenetic theory) in order to analyze the psyche of the modern individualized subject from an ontogenetic vantage point. While the ontogenetic technique yields, depending on your general sympathy for the now very antiquated protocols of Freudian psychoanalysis, abundant results when evaluating 26 Chapter One white subjects ensconced in the liberal nuclear family, it encounters a roadblock when transplanted to the colonial settlement, which is why “the alienation of the black man is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is also sociogeny. . . . Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being.”34 Why does the colonial situation specifically necessitate a reformulation of Freud’s and Darwinism’s procedural frame of reference? Since colonial policies and discourse are frequently grounded in racial distinctions, the colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human, or, as Fanon writes, “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.”35 The colonial encounter determines not just the black colonial subject’s familial structure or social and physical mobility and such, but colors his or her very being as he-or-she-which-isnot-quite-human, as always already tardy in the rigged match of the survival of the fittest. Conversely, in this ontological face-off, the white colonial subject encounters herself or himself as the “fullness and genericity of being human.” However, he or she only does so in relation to the deficiency of the black subject and indigenous (Wynter, 40). To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans. Yet because race is thought to rest in biology, it necessitates different analytic protocols than bare life and biopolitics, namely ones that draw on both ontogeny and sociogeny. Whereas Fanon’s mobilization of ontogeny remains rooted in the Freudian paradigm as pertaining to the individual subject, Wynter summons the explanatory apparatus of neurobiology to elucidate how racialization, despite its origins in sociogeny, is converted to the stuff of ontogenesis; this is what Wynter refers to as “sociogenetic.”36 Although human life has a biochemical core defined by a species-specific adaptive reward and punishment mechanism (poison = bad and food = good) that “determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify, and categorize the world,” it is “only through the mediation of the organism’s experience of what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby of what it feels like to be that organism” that a repertoire of behaviors, which ensure the continued existence of the species, develops (Wynter, 50). For the human species, because it is defined by both organic and symbolic registers, **this Blackness is complicated by the way culturally specific sociogenic principles** such as what is good or bad work to **trigger** neurochemical reward and punishment **processes, in the process “instituting the human subject as a culturespecific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being** and sense of self. One, therefore, whose phenomenology . . . is as objectively, constructed as its physiology” (Wynter, 54).37 Phenomenological perception must consequently don the extravagant drag of physiology in order to “turn theory into flesh, . . . [into] codings in the nervous system,” so as to signal the extrahuman instantiation of humanity. 38

#### The very idea of a “good democracy” fuels the Western Man – which bodies are able to access it and which bodies are pushed to the margins of humanity?

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The differently signified flesh is habeas viscus, for in the world of Man, the hieroglyphics of the flesh are translated to the jargons of negativity, lack, the subhuman, and so on. Given the systematic use of torture as a political tool of “democratic” governments—now legalized in the united states of exception—and the simultaneous sexualization of its medial images in our contemporary moment, how might we go about viewing and thinking these depictions not as deviations from the normal order, since that would only affirm the putative externality of pornotroping from the center stage of culture and politics? A potential for pornotroping, however, is far from abnormal given that it shadows so many aspects of modern politics, culture, and sexuality. What the pornotrope contributes to the theorization of modern sociopolitical subjectivity is its freeing and setting in motion of the viscous deviances—the detours, digressions, and shortcuts that authorize violence as a vital layer in the attires of modern sovereignty—that lay dormant in bare life and social death, whether these are found in current practices of torture in U.S. domestic and foreign prisons, or the hauntological histories of the Holocaust, slavery, and colonialism. Because liberal democracy abandons the enfleshed silhouette of political violence, it returns in the form of deviance rather than as habeas viscus. Put simply, pornotroping is the historical Stoff of modern sexuality—its fleshy ether—and to experience the flesh, then, might just allow us to relate to the world differently. But, as I discuss shortly, cravings, just like leaves, humans, numbers, ghosts, species, and stars can manifest in radically different guises; we just have to recognize them as such, even if they dwell among us in the physiological and metaphysical hunger exhibited by C. L. R. James, Harriet Jacobs, and former Muselmänner

#### Their form of reform is intrinsically violent—even so-called successful movements broaden the scope of Western Man by necessitating a new group to join its oppressive regime. Progress is not possible—the very structure of jurisprudence prevents incremental change by constantly finding new groups to exclude. Thus, the role of the ballot is to deconstruct the Western Man.

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**We** are in dire **need** of **alternatives to the legal conception of personhood** that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what remains outside the law**, what the law cannot capture**, what it cannot magically transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identitybased activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on **inclusion, recognition, and equality based on** a **narrow legal framework** (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) **not only hinders the eradication of violence** against trans people and other vulnerable populations **but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”**22 **If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a** delimited **notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively o**n only one form of **subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing** for the continued existence of **hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist,** civil **rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the** still **and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations** (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the 82 Chapter Five law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. **Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia** Oparah suggests counteract**ing the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment”** within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abolition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) **to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird antiprison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law**.24 Relatedly, **Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,”** which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service providers, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the existence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the incompatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered. The idea of bare life as espoused by Giorgio Agamben and his followers discursively duplicates the very violence it describes without offering any compelling theoretical or political alternatives to our current order. Paradoxically, by insisting on a limited notion of the law at the cost of neglecting so many other facets that flow into the creation of bare life, Agamben preempts a rigorous and imaginative thinking of the political imaginary that rests in the tradition of the oppressed. Agamben’s impoverished conception of the political comes into view most clearly in the lack of current or past alternatives it offers to our current order and when we consult the fleshly testimonies of and about subjects that inhabit the sphere of mere life (the enslaved, political prisoners, concentration camp detainees, for instance). Still, these voices should not be construed as fountains of suffering authenticity but as instantiations of a radically different political imaginary, which refuses to only see, feel, hear, smell, and taste bare life in the subjectivity of the oppressed.

#### We affirm Habeas Viscus. Instead of relying on narrow, rights based legal solutions, the alternative plays with the law by exploring the power of liminal spaces. We are new freedom, a fresh start, an understanding of the state as something that isn’t necessary and defining. The state will never release itself from Western Man, so why do we stay reliant on it?

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Because black cultures have frequently not had access to Man’s language, world, future, or humanity, **black studies has developed a set of assemblages through which to perceive and understand a world in which subjection is but one path to humanity**, neither its exception nor its idealized sole feature. Yet black studies, if it is to remain critical and oppositional, cannot fall prey to juridical humanity and its concomitant pitfalls, since this only affects change in the domain of the map but not the territory. In order to do so, the hieroglyphics of the flesh should not be conceptualized as just exceptional or radically particular, since this habitually leads to **the comparative tabulation of different systems of oppression that then serve as the basis for defining personhood as possession.** As Frantz Fanon states: “All forms of exploitation are identical, since they apply to the same ‘object’: man.”28 Accordingly, humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species for the benefit of other humans, which at the same time yields a surplus version of the human: Man. **Man represents the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the** heteromasculine, white, propertied, and **liberal subject that renders all those who do not conform** to these characteristics **as exploitable nonhumans, literal legal no-bodies.** If we are to affect significant systemic changes, then we must locate at least some of the struggles for justice in the region of humanity as a relational ontological totality (an object of knowledge) that cannot be reduced to either the universal or particular. According to Wynter, **this process requires us to recognize the “emancipation** from **the psychic dictates of our present** . . . **genre of being human and therefore from ‘the unbearable wrongness of being,’ of desetre, which it imposes upon . . . all non-white peoples**, as an imperative function of its enactment as such a mode of being[;] this emancipation had been effected at the level of the map rather than at the level of the territory.”29 The level of the map encompasses the nominal inclusion of nonwhite subjects in the false universality of western humanity in the wake of radical movements 136 Chapter Eight of the 1960s, while the territory Wynter invokes in this context, and in all of her work, is the figure of Man as a racializing assemblage. Wielding this very particular and historically malleable classification is not an uncritical reiteration of the humanist episteme or an insistence on the exceptional particularity of black humanity. Rather, Afro-diasporic cultures provide singular, mutable, and contingent figurations of the human, and thus do not represent mere bids for inclusion in or critiques of the shortcomings of western liberal humanism. The problematic of humanity, however, needs to be highlighted as one of the prime objects of knowledge of black studies, since not doing so will sustain the structures, discourses, and institutions that detain black life and thought within the strictures of particularity so as to facilitate the violent conflation of Man and the human. Otherwise, the general theory of how humanity has been lived, conceptualized, shrieked, hungered into being, and imagined by those subjects violently barred from this domain and touched by the hieroglyphics of the flesh will sink back into the deafening ocean of prelinguistic particularity. This, in turn, will also render apparent that black studies, especially as it is imagined by thinkers such as Spillers and Wynter, is engaged in engendering forms of the human vital to understanding not only black cultures but past, present, and future humanities. As a demonic island, black studies lifts the fog that shrouds the laws of comparison, particularity, and exception to reveal an aquatic outlook “far away from the continent of man.”30 The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson’s apt phrasing, “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and I would add also to reimagine] the collective being, the ontological totality.”31 Though **the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man**. Rather,habeas viscus **points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law** given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it **becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the** Freedom 137 oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, **habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envision habeas viscus** as a forceful assemblage of humanity **entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties.** As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 **Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human.** As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man. German r&b group Glashaus’s track “Bald (und wir sind frei) [Soon (and We Are Free)]” performs this overdetermined idea of freedom as disarticulated from Man both graphically and sonically. Paying tribute to both the nineteenth-century spiritual “We’ll Soon Be Free,” written on the eve of the American Civil War, and Donny Hathaway’s 1973 recording, “Someday We’ll All Be Free,” Glashaus’s title “Bald (und wir sind frei)” enacts the disrupted yet intertwined notions of freedom, temporality, and sociality that I am gesturing to here.33 In contrast to its predecessors, which are resolutely located in the future via the use of soon/someday and the future tense, Glashaus’s version renders freedom in the present tense, albeit 138 Chapter Eight qualified by the imminent future of “bald [soon]” and by the typographical parenthetical enclosure of “(und wir sind frei) [and we are free].” The flow of the parentheses intimates both distance and nearness, ragging the homogeneous, empty future of “soon” with a potential present of a “responsible freedom” (Spillers) and/as sociality. The and and the parentheses are the conduits for bringing-into-relation freedom’s nowtime and its constitutive potential futurity without resolving their tension. The lyrics of “Bald (und wir sind frei)” once again exemplify this complementary strain in that the words in the verses are resolutely future oriented, ending with the invocation of “bald” just before the chorus, which, held in the potential abyss of the present, repeats, “und wir sind frei.” Likewise, in the verses, Glashaus’s singer Cassandra Steen, accompanied only by a grand piano, just about whispers, whereas she opens up to a more mellifluous style of singing in the chorus; as a result, the verses (bald/future) sound constricted and restrictive but only when heard in relation to the expansive spatiality of the chorus (present). What initially looks like a bracketed afterthought on the page punctures the putatively central point in the sonic realm. It is not a vacant, uniform, or universal future that sets in motion liberty but rather the future as it is seen, felt, and heard from the enfleshed parenthetical present of the oppressed, since this group’s now is always already bracketed (held captive and set aside indefinitely) in, if not antithetical to, the world of Man. **The domain of habeas viscus represents one significant mechanism by which the world of Man constrains subjects to the parenthetical, while at the same time disavowing this tendency via recourse to the abnormal and/ or inhuman. Heard, seen, tasted, felt, and lived in the** ethereal **shadows of Man’s world**, however, a **habeas viscus unearths the freedom that exists within the** hieroglyphics of the **flesh**. For the oppressed the future will have been now, since Man tucks away this group’s present in brackets. Consequently, the future anterior transmutes the simple (parenthetical) present of the dysselected into the nowtime of humanity during which the fleshy hieroglyphics of the oppressed will have actualized the honeyed prophecy of another kind of freedom (which can be imagined but not [yet] described) in the revolutionary apocatastasis of human genres.

## 1NC SEPOCT (2:30)

#### The 1AC is built on the idea of rights-based reform, this necessitates the exclusion of those who couldn’t access these rights in the first place. The subjects very existence causes the exclusion of those who do not live up to the perfect idealism of the Western Man. These excluded bodies form a racialized assemblage defined in opposition to this concept of the liberal subject.

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#### **Freedom of speech reinforces linguistic structures that naturalize the Western Man – The paradigm of incorporation excludes the language of the flesh whose “cries and groans” are inaudible and fuel the voice of the Western Man.**

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In this closing chapter I would like to continue taking up Hortense Spillers's challenge and ask what it might mean to claim the monstrosity of the flesh as a site for freedom beyond the world of Man in order to heed Baby Suggs's words in Toni Morrison's Beloved about loving the flesh: “In this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not love your flesh. They despise it.” 1 In order to improperly inhabit and understand the politics and poetics of habeas viscus, we must return to some of the voices from the previous two chapters. Revisit them we should, however, not to authenticate them as acoustic mirrors of the oppressed or to grant them juridical humanity but in order to listen more closely to prophetic traces of the hieroglyphics of the flesh in these echoes of the future anterior tense. Many critics assume that political violence is somehow outside the grasp of linguistic structures. In her now classic account of the body in pain, Scarry argues that pain in general and torture in particular causes a regression to the “pre-language of cries and groans,” which becomes indicative of the annihilation of the tortured's world. 2 In making this argument, Scarry assumes that world and language preexist and are unmade by the act of torture, which imagines political violence as exterior to the normal order rather than as an instrument in the creation of the world and language of Man. Agamben's point about language and witnessing vis-à-vis Auschwitz, although not quite in the same register, skirts fairly close to making a similar argument: “It is thus necessary that the impossibility of bearing witness, the ‘lacuna,’ that constitutes human **language, collapses, giving way to a different impossibility of bearing witness— that which does not have language**” (Remnants, 39). Perhaps **it might be more useful to construe “cries and groans,” “heart-rending shrieks,” “the mechanical murmurs without content” as language that do**es **not rely on linguistic structures**, at least not primarily, to convey meaning, sense, or expression. 3 For language, especially in the space-ways of the flesh, comes in many varieties, and functions not only—or even primarily—to create words in the service of conforming to linguistic structures transparent in the world of Man. 4 This approach also cannot imagine that for many of those held captive by Man it is always already “after the end of the world…. Don't you know that yet?” long before the actual acts of torture have begun. Roman Grzyb, a former concentration camp prisoner, for instance, gives the following account of the Muselmann's idiolect: “The Muselmann used his very own jargon by constantly repeating what came to his completely confused mind. The sentences were often incomplete and were illogical, stopping abruptly at random points.” 5 **As** **can be gleaned from the testimonies of Muselmänner, slaves, or Ellis Island detainees, what is at stake is** not so much the lack of language per se, since we have known for a while now that the subaltern cannot speak, but **the kinds of dialects available to the subjected** and how these are seen and heard by those who bear witness to their plight. Nevertheless, the suffering voices exemplified by James and the Muselmänner should not be understood as fountains of authenticity but rather as instantiations of a radically different political imaginary that steers clear of reducing the subjectivity of the oppressed to bare life. In R. Radhakrishnan's thinking, **this political domain produces “critical knowledge, which in turn empowers the voice of suffering to make its own** cognitive epistemological **intervention** by envisioning its own utopia, rather than accepting an assigned position within the ameliotary schemes proposed by the dominant discourse.” 6 Thus, suffering appears as utopian erudition—or is expressed through hieroglyphics of the flesh to echo Spillers and Zora Neale Hurston—and not as an end unto itself or as a precritical sphere of truth, as the liberal humanist Weltanschauung would have it; rather, **“liberalism is tolerant of abundant speech as long as it does not have to take into account voices it does not understand**.” 7 Where dominant discourse seeks to develop upgrades of the current notions of humanity as Man, improvements are not the aim or product of the imaginaries borne of racializing assemblages and political violence; instead they summon forms of human emancipation that can be imagined but not (yet) described. While this form of communication does not necessarily conform to the standard definition of linguistic utterance, to hear Aunt Hester's howls or the Muselmann's repetition merely as pre- or nonlanguage absolves the world of Man from any and all responsibility for bearing witness to the flesh. Hardly anterior to language and therefore the human, these rumblings vocalize the humming relay of the world that makes linguistic structures possible, directly corresponding to how the not-quite- and nonhuman give rise to the universe of Man. That is to say, the flesh engulfs not only Man's visually marked others via instruments of torture and the intergenerational transmission of hieroglyphics but emanates rays of potential enfleshment throughout the far-flung corners of Being in the world of Man. According to Aristotle, even though “higher life (bios) is emphatically the end proposed, yet life itself (zoe) is also an object for which [citizens] unite and maintain the corporate political association; for it is probable that some degree of the higher life is necessarily implied in merely living…. Certain it is that the majority of men endure much suffering without ceasing to cling to life—a proof that a certain happiness or natural sweetness resides in it.” 8 When the hieroglyphics of the flesh are construed not merely as banishments but as transit visas to universes betwixt and between the jurisdictions of Man, they prompt the following question: how is it possible to politicize the “natural sweetness” of the flesh without the limits imposed by the concepts of bare life and biopolitics?

#### Their reform is uniquely violent—even so-called successful movements broaden the scope of Western Man by necessitating a new group to join its oppressive regime. Rights-based progress is not possible—the very structure of western jurisprudence prevents incremental change by constantly finding new voices to exclude and otherizes those voices by saying they “need” more rights. Thus, the role of the ballot is to deconstruct the Western Man.

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**We** are in dire **need** of **alternatives to the legal conception of personhood** that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what remains outside the law**, what the law cannot capture**, what it cannot magically transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identitybased activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on **inclusion, recognition, and equality based on** a **narrow legal framework** (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) **not only hinders the eradication of violence** against trans people and other vulnerable populations **but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”**22 **If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a** delimited **notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively o**n only one form of **subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing** for the continued existence of **hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist,** civil **rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the** still **and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations** (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the 82 Chapter Five law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. **Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia** Oparah suggests counteract**ing the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment”** within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abolition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) **to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird antiprison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law**.24 Relatedly, **Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,”** which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service providers, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the existence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the incompatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered. The idea of bare life as espoused by Giorgio Agamben and his followers discursively duplicates the very violence it describes without offering any compelling theoretical or political alternatives to our current order. Paradoxically, by insisting on a limited notion of the law at the cost of neglecting so many other facets that flow into the creation of bare life, Agamben preempts a rigorous and imaginative thinking of the political imaginary that rests in the tradition of the oppressed. Agamben’s impoverished conception of the political comes into view most clearly in the lack of current or past alternatives it offers to our current order and when we consult the fleshly testimonies of and about subjects that inhabit the sphere of mere life (the enslaved, political prisoners, concentration camp detainees, for instance). Still, these voices should not be construed as fountains of suffering authenticity but as instantiations of a radically different political imaginary, which refuses to only see, feel, hear, smell, and taste bare life in the subjectivity of the oppressed.

#### We affirm Habeas Viscus. Instead of relying on narrow, rights based legal solutions, the alternative plays with the law by exploring the power of liminal spaces. We are new freedom, a fresh start, an understanding of the state as something that isn’t necessary and defining. The state will never release itself from Western Man, so why do we stay reliant on it?

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Because black cultures have frequently not had access to Man’s language, world, future, or humanity, **black studies has developed a set of assemblages through which to perceive and understand a world in which subjection is but one path to humanity**, neither its exception nor its idealized sole feature. Yet black studies, if it is to remain critical and oppositional, cannot fall prey to juridical humanity and its concomitant pitfalls, since this only affects change in the domain of the map but not the territory. In order to do so, the hieroglyphics of the flesh should not be conceptualized as just exceptional or radically particular, since this habitually leads to **the comparative tabulation of different systems of oppression that then serve as the basis for defining personhood as possession.** As Frantz Fanon states: “All forms of exploitation are identical, since they apply to the same ‘object’: man.”28 Accordingly, humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species for the benefit of other humans, which at the same time yields a surplus version of the human: Man. **Man represents the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the** heteromasculine, white, propertied, and **liberal subject that renders all those who do not conform** to these characteristics **as exploitable nonhumans, literal legal no-bodies.** If we are to affect significant systemic changes, then we must locate at least some of the struggles for justice in the region of humanity as a relational ontological totality (an object of knowledge) that cannot be reduced to either the universal or particular. According to Wynter, **this process requires us to recognize the “emancipation** from **the psychic dictates of our present** . . . **genre of being human and therefore from ‘the unbearable wrongness of being,’ of desetre, which it imposes upon . . . all non-white peoples**, as an imperative function of its enactment as such a mode of being[;] this emancipation had been effected at the level of the map rather than at the level of the territory.”29 The level of the map encompasses the nominal inclusion of nonwhite subjects in the false universality of western humanity in the wake of radical movements 136 Chapter Eight of the 1960s, while the territory Wynter invokes in this context, and in all of her work, is the figure of Man as a racializing assemblage. Wielding this very particular and historically malleable classification is not an uncritical reiteration of the humanist episteme or an insistence on the exceptional particularity of black humanity. Rather, Afro-diasporic cultures provide singular, mutable, and contingent figurations of the human, and thus do not represent mere bids for inclusion in or critiques of the shortcomings of western liberal humanism. The problematic of humanity, however, needs to be highlighted as one of the prime objects of knowledge of black studies, since not doing so will sustain the structures, discourses, and institutions that detain black life and thought within the strictures of particularity so as to facilitate the violent conflation of Man and the human. Otherwise, the general theory of how humanity has been lived, conceptualized, shrieked, hungered into being, and imagined by those subjects violently barred from this domain and touched by the hieroglyphics of the flesh will sink back into the deafening ocean of prelinguistic particularity. This, in turn, will also render apparent that black studies, especially as it is imagined by thinkers such as Spillers and Wynter, is engaged in engendering forms of the human vital to understanding not only black cultures but past, present, and future humanities. As a demonic island, black studies lifts the fog that shrouds the laws of comparison, particularity, and exception to reveal an aquatic outlook “far away from the continent of man.”30 The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson’s apt phrasing, “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and I would add also to reimagine] the collective being, the ontological totality.”31 Though **the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man**. Rather,habeas viscus **points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law** given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it **becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the** Freedom 137 oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, **habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envision habeas viscus** as a forceful assemblage of humanity **entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties.** As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 **Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human.** As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man. German r&b group Glashaus’s track “Bald (und wir sind frei) [Soon (and We Are Free)]” performs this overdetermined idea of freedom as disarticulated from Man both graphically and sonically. Paying tribute to both the nineteenth-century spiritual “We’ll Soon Be Free,” written on the eve of the American Civil War, and Donny Hathaway’s 1973 recording, “Someday We’ll All Be Free,” Glashaus’s title “Bald (und wir sind frei)” enacts the disrupted yet intertwined notions of freedom, temporality, and sociality that I am gesturing to here.33 In contrast to its predecessors, which are resolutely located in the future via the use of soon/someday and the future tense, Glashaus’s version renders freedom in the present tense, albeit 138 Chapter Eight qualified by the imminent future of “bald [soon]” and by the typographical parenthetical enclosure of “(und wir sind frei) [and we are free].” The flow of the parentheses intimates both distance and nearness, ragging the homogeneous, empty future of “soon” with a potential present of a “responsible freedom” (Spillers) and/as sociality. The and and the parentheses are the conduits for bringing-into-relation freedom’s nowtime and its constitutive potential futurity without resolving their tension. The lyrics of “Bald (und wir sind frei)” once again exemplify this complementary strain in that the words in the verses are resolutely future oriented, ending with the invocation of “bald” just before the chorus, which, held in the potential abyss of the present, repeats, “und wir sind frei.” Likewise, in the verses, Glashaus’s singer Cassandra Steen, accompanied only by a grand piano, just about whispers, whereas she opens up to a more mellifluous style of singing in the chorus; as a result, the verses (bald/future) sound constricted and restrictive but only when heard in relation to the expansive spatiality of the chorus (present). What initially looks like a bracketed afterthought on the page punctures the putatively central point in the sonic realm. It is not a vacant, uniform, or universal future that sets in motion liberty but rather the future as it is seen, felt, and heard from the enfleshed parenthetical present of the oppressed, since this group’s now is always already bracketed (held captive and set aside indefinitely) in, if not antithetical to, the world of Man. **The domain of habeas viscus represents one significant mechanism by which the world of Man constrains subjects to the parenthetical, while at the same time disavowing this tendency via recourse to the abnormal and/ or inhuman. Heard, seen, tasted, felt, and lived in the** ethereal **shadows of Man’s world**, however, a **habeas viscus unearths the freedom that exists within the** hieroglyphics of the **flesh**. For the oppressed the future will have been now, since Man tucks away this group’s present in brackets. Consequently, the future anterior transmutes the simple (parenthetical) present of the dysselected into the nowtime of humanity during which the fleshy hieroglyphics of the oppressed will have actualized the honeyed prophecy of another kind of freedom (which can be imagined but not [yet] described) in the revolutionary apocatastasis of human genres.

## 1NC v SV

#### The 1AC is built on the idea of legal personhood, this necessitates the exclusion of those deemed not quite human. The subject cannot be articulated as universal, because it’s very existence causes the exclusion of those who do not live up to the perfect idealism of the Western Man. These bodies form a racialized assemblage defined in opposition to this concept of the liberal subject.

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**Wynter**’s large-scale intellectual **project**, which she has been pursuing in one form or another for the last thirty years, **disentangles Man from the human in order to use the space of subjects placed beyond the grasp of this domain as a vital point from which to invent hitherto unavailable genres of the human.**27 According to this scheme in western modernity the religious conception of the self gave way to two modes of secularized being: first, the Cartesian “Rational Man,” or homo politicus, and then beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, “**Man as a selected being and natural organism . . . as the universal human, ‘man as man.**’”28 The move from a supernatural conception of world and the self ’s place within this cosmos, however, does not signal the supersession of a primitive axiomatic with an enlightened and rarefied type of the human. Rather, one genre of the human (Judeo-Christian, religious) yields to another, just as provincial, version of the human, and, although both claim universality, neither genre fully represents the multiplicity of human life forms. In the context of the secular human, **black subjects, along with indigenous populations, the colonized, the insane, the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as limit cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human.**29 Thus, **race**, rather than representing accessory, **comes to define the very essence of the modern human as “the code through which one not simply knows what human being is, but experiences being.”**30 Accordingly, race makes its mark in the dominion of the ideological and physiological, or rather race scripts the elision of the former with the latter in the flesh. Blackness 25 In her latest writings, Wynter identifies homo politicus’s successor in the long road from “theodicy” to “biodicy” as the liberal “bio-economic man.”31 The idea of “bio-economic man” marks the assumed naturalness that positions economic inequities, white supremacy, genocide, economic exploitation, gendered subjugation, colonialism, “natural selection,” and concepts such as the free market not in the realm of divine design, as in previous religious orders of things, but beyond the reach of human intervention all the same. In both cases, this ensures that a particular humanly devised model of humanity remains isomorphic with the Homo sapiens species. Wynter’s approach differs markedly from arguments that seek to include the oppressed within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism or, conversely, abolish humanism because of its racio-colonial baggage; instead **Wynter views black studies and minority discourse as liminal spaces, simultaneously** ensconced in and **outside the world of Man, from which to construct new objects of knowledge and launch the reinvention of the human at the juncture of the culture and biology feedback loop.** Even though the genre of the human we currently inhabit in the west is intimately tied to the somatic order of things, for Wynter, **the human cannot be understood in purely biological terms**, whether this applies to the history of an individual organism (ontogenesis) or the development at the level of a species (phylogeny). This is where Fanon’s important concept of sociogeny comes into play, offering Wynter an approach of thinking of the human—the “science in the social text,” to echo Spillers’s phrase—where culture and biology are not only not opposed to each other but in which their chemistry discharges mutually beneficial insights.32 In this scenario, **a symbolic register, consisting of discourse, language, culture, and so on (sociogeny) always already accompanies the genetic dimension of human action** (ontogeny), and it is only in the imbrication of these two registers that we can understand the full scope of our being-in-the-world. Fanon’s concept of sociogeny, arising from the inadequacy of traditional psychoanalytic models in the analysis of racialized colonialism, builds on Freud’s appropriation of recapitulation theory.33 Thus, according to Fanon, Freud breaks with the strict codes of Darwinism and social Darwinism (phylogenetic theory) in order to analyze the psyche of the modern individualized subject from an ontogenetic vantage point. While the ontogenetic technique yields, depending on your general sympathy for the now very antiquated protocols of Freudian psychoanalysis, abundant results when evaluating 26 Chapter One white subjects ensconced in the liberal nuclear family, it encounters a roadblock when transplanted to the colonial settlement, which is why “the alienation of the black man is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is also sociogeny. . . . Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being.”34 Why does the colonial situation specifically necessitate a reformulation of Freud’s and Darwinism’s procedural frame of reference? Since colonial policies and discourse are frequently grounded in racial distinctions, the colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human, or, as Fanon writes, “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.”35 The colonial encounter determines not just the black colonial subject’s familial structure or social and physical mobility and such, but colors his or her very being as he-or-she-which-isnot-quite-human, as always already tardy in the rigged match of the survival of the fittest. Conversely, in this ontological face-off, the white colonial subject encounters herself or himself as the “fullness and genericity of being human.” However, he or she only does so in relation to the deficiency of the black subject and indigenous (Wynter, 40). To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans. Yet because race is thought to rest in biology, it necessitates different analytic protocols than bare life and biopolitics, namely ones that draw on both ontogeny and sociogeny. Whereas Fanon’s mobilization of ontogeny remains rooted in the Freudian paradigm as pertaining to the individual subject, Wynter summons the explanatory apparatus of neurobiology to elucidate how racialization, despite its origins in sociogeny, is converted to the stuff of ontogenesis; this is what Wynter refers to as “sociogenetic.”36 Although human life has a biochemical core defined by a species-specific adaptive reward and punishment mechanism (poison = bad and food = good) that “determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify, and categorize the world,” it is “only through the mediation of the organism’s experience of what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby of what it feels like to be that organism” that a repertoire of behaviors, which ensure the continued existence of the species, develops (Wynter, 50). For the human species, because it is defined by both organic and symbolic registers, **this Blackness is complicated by the way culturally specific sociogenic principles** such as what is good or bad work to **trigger** neurochemical reward and punishment **processes, in the process “instituting the human subject as a culturespecific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being** and sense of self. One, therefore, whose phenomenology . . . is as objectively, constructed as its physiology” (Wynter, 54).37 Phenomenological perception must consequently don the extravagant drag of physiology in order to “turn theory into flesh, . . . [into] codings in the nervous system,” so as to signal the extrahuman instantiation of humanity. 38

#### Legal reform is intrinsically violent—even so-called successful movements broaden the scope of Western Man by necessitating a new group to join its oppressive regime. Progress is not possible—the very structure of western jurisprudence prevents incremental change by constantly finding new groups to exclude. Thus, the role of the ballot is to deconstruct the Western Man.

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**We** are in dire **need** of **alternatives to the legal conception of personhood** that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what remains outside the law**, what the law cannot capture**, what it cannot magically transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identitybased activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on **inclusion, recognition, and equality based on** a **narrow legal framework** (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) **not only hinders the eradication of violence** against trans people and other vulnerable populations **but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”**22 **If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a** delimited **notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively o**n only one form of **subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing** for the continued existence of **hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist,** civil **rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the** still **and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations** (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the 82 Chapter Five law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. **Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia** Oparah suggests counteract**ing the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment”** within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abolition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) **to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird antiprison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law**.24 Relatedly, **Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,”** which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service providers, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the existence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the incompatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered. The idea of bare life as espoused by Giorgio Agamben and his followers discursively duplicates the very violence it describes without offering any compelling theoretical or political alternatives to our current order. Paradoxically, by insisting on a limited notion of the law at the cost of neglecting so many other facets that flow into the creation of bare life, Agamben preempts a rigorous and imaginative thinking of the political imaginary that rests in the tradition of the oppressed. Agamben’s impoverished conception of the political comes into view most clearly in the lack of current or past alternatives it offers to our current order and when we consult the fleshly testimonies of and about subjects that inhabit the sphere of mere life (the enslaved, political prisoners, concentration camp detainees, for instance). Still, these voices should not be construed as fountains of suffering authenticity but as instantiations of a radically different political imaginary, which refuses to only see, feel, hear, smell, and taste bare life in the subjectivity of the oppressed.

#### We affirm Habeas Viscus. Instead of relying on legal personhood, the alternative plays with the law by exploring the power of liminal spaces through lines of flight which interrupt racialized assemblages. We are new freedom, a fresh start, an understanding of the state as something that isn’t necessary and defining. The state will never release itself from Western Man, so why do we stay reliant on it?

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Because black cultures have frequently not had access to Man’s language, world, future, or humanity, **black studies has developed a set of assemblages through which to perceive and understand a world in which subjection is but one path to humanity**, neither its exception nor its idealized sole feature. Yet black studies, if it is to remain critical and oppositional, cannot fall prey to juridical humanity and its concomitant pitfalls, since this only affects change in the domain of the map but not the territory. In order to do so, the hieroglyphics of the flesh should not be conceptualized as just exceptional or radically particular, since this habitually leads to **the comparative tabulation of different systems of oppression that then serve as the basis for defining personhood as possession.** As Frantz Fanon states: “All forms of exploitation are identical, since they apply to the same ‘object’: man.”28 Accordingly, humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species for the benefit of other humans, which at the same time yields a surplus version of the human: Man. **Man represents the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the heteromasculine, white, propertied, and liberal subject that renders all those who do not conform** to these characteristics **as exploitable nonhumans, literal legal no-bodies.** If we are to affect significant systemic changes, then we must locate at least some of the struggles for justice in the region of humanity as a relational ontological totality (an object of knowledge) that cannot be reduced to either the universal or particular. According to Wynter, **this process requires us to recognize the “emancipation** from **the psychic dictates of our present** . . . **genre of being human and therefore from ‘the unbearable wrongness of being,’ of desetre, which it imposes upon . . . all non-white peoples**, as an imperative function of its enactment as such a mode of being[;] this emancipation had been effected at the level of the map rather than at the level of the territory.”29 The level of the map encompasses the nominal inclusion of nonwhite subjects in the false universality of western humanity in the wake of radical movements 136 Chapter Eight of the 1960s, while the territory Wynter invokes in this context, and in all of her work, is the figure of Man as a racializing assemblage. Wielding this very particular and historically malleable classification is not an uncritical reiteration of the humanist episteme or an insistence on the exceptional particularity of black humanity. Rather, Afro-diasporic cultures provide singular, mutable, and contingent figurations of the human, and thus do not represent mere bids for inclusion in or critiques of the shortcomings of western liberal humanism. The problematic of humanity, however, needs to be highlighted as one of the prime objects of knowledge of black studies, since not doing so will sustain the structures, discourses, and institutions that detain black life and thought within the strictures of particularity so as to facilitate the violent conflation of Man and the human. Otherwise, the general theory of how humanity has been lived, conceptualized, shrieked, hungered into being, and imagined by those subjects violently barred from this domain and touched by the hieroglyphics of the flesh will sink back into the deafening ocean of prelinguistic particularity. This, in turn, will also render apparent that black studies, especially as it is imagined by thinkers such as Spillers and Wynter, is engaged in engendering forms of the human vital to understanding not only black cultures but past, present, and future humanities. As a demonic island, black studies lifts the fog that shrouds the laws of comparison, particularity, and exception to reveal an aquatic outlook “far away from the continent of man.”30 The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson’s apt phrasing, “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and I would add also to reimagine] the collective being, the ontological totality.”31 Though **the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man**. Rather,habeas viscus **points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law** given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it **becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the** Freedom 137 oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, **habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envision habeas viscus** as a forceful assemblage of humanity **entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties.** As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 **Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human.** As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man. German r&b group Glashaus’s track “Bald (und wir sind frei) [Soon (and We Are Free)]” performs this overdetermined idea of freedom as disarticulated from Man both graphically and sonically. Paying tribute to both the nineteenth-century spiritual “We’ll Soon Be Free,” written on the eve of the American Civil War, and Donny Hathaway’s 1973 recording, “Someday We’ll All Be Free,” Glashaus’s title “Bald (und wir sind frei)” enacts the disrupted yet intertwined notions of freedom, temporality, and sociality that I am gesturing to here.33 In contrast to its predecessors, which are resolutely located in the future via the use of soon/someday and the future tense, Glashaus’s version renders freedom in the present tense, albeit 138 Chapter Eight qualified by the imminent future of “bald [soon]” and by the typographical parenthetical enclosure of “(und wir sind frei) [and we are free].” The flow of the parentheses intimates both distance and nearness, ragging the homogeneous, empty future of “soon” with a potential present of a “responsible freedom” (Spillers) and/as sociality. The and and the parentheses are the conduits for bringing-into-relation freedom’s nowtime and its constitutive potential futurity without resolving their tension. The lyrics of “Bald (und wir sind frei)” once again exemplify this complementary strain in that the words in the verses are resolutely future oriented, ending with the invocation of “bald” just before the chorus, which, held in the potential abyss of the present, repeats, “und wir sind frei.” Likewise, in the verses, Glashaus’s singer Cassandra Steen, accompanied only by a grand piano, just about whispers, whereas she opens up to a more mellifluous style of singing in the chorus; as a result, the verses (bald/future) sound constricted and restrictive but only when heard in relation to the expansive spatiality of the chorus (present). What initially looks like a bracketed afterthought on the page punctures the putatively central point in the sonic realm. It is not a vacant, uniform, or universal future that sets in motion liberty but rather the future as it is seen, felt, and heard from the enfleshed parenthetical present of the oppressed, since this group’s now is always already bracketed (held captive and set aside indefinitely) in, if not antithetical to, the world of Man. **The domain of habeas viscus represents one significant mechanism by which the world of Man constrains subjects to the parenthetical, while at the same time disavowing this tendency via recourse to the abnormal and/ or inhuman. Heard, seen, tasted, felt, and lived in the** ethereal **shadows of Man’s world**, however, a **habeas viscus unearths the freedom that exists within the** hieroglyphics of the **flesh. For the oppressed the future will have been now, since Man tucks away this group’s present in brackets.** Consequently, the future anterior transmutes the simple (parenthetical) present of the dysselected into the nowtime of humanity during which the fleshy hieroglyphics of the oppressed will have actualized the honeyed prophecy of another kind of freedom (which can be imagined but not [yet] described) in the revolutionary apocatastasis of human genres.

## 1NC Identity PTX

#### Power operates not by exclusion but by incorporation and capture – this is a machine known as faciality: a mode of coding which includes all bodies into spheres of recognition but in wholly differential ways – the 1AC conceives of power as a scale between inclusion and non-inclusion – you should instead understand it as a circle with an idealized face at the center and deviant faces along its circumference. Subjecthood cannot account for the infinite proliferation of identities within this machine which guarantees domination

Saldanha 07Arun Saldanha, Associate Professor of Geography, Environment, and Society at University of Minnesota, Senior Lecturer of Social Sustainability at Lancaster University, 2007, “Psychedelic White: Goa Trance and the Viscosity of Race,” / MM

My disagreement is not with Fanon’sand Martín Alcoff’sinsistence on embodiment and emotion, but with their reliance on a Hegelian notion of recognition to explain encounter.Because of this they tend to treat white and nonwhite not only as a dyad, but as almost naturally opposed entities. There is, then, little attention paid to the complicated processes whereby some racial formations become dominant,that is, how racial formations emerge from material conditions and collective interactions, which greatly exceed the spatiality of self versus other. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality is not based on an intersubjective dialectics enlarged to world-historical scope. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari stronglydistance themselves from phenomenology and psychoanalysis**.** First of all, for them**,** it isn’t consciousness but an abstract machine of faciality that arranges bodies into relations of power. And second, faciality constantly invents new faces to capture deviant bodies, multiplying possible positions far beyond any binaries such as black/white (though binarization can be an important effect**).** That is precisely its strength. There are thousands of encounters, thousands of trains. Deleuze and Guattari believe faciality’s imperialism arose with institutional Christianity. Being imposed in lands populated by different phenotypes, faciality became a matter of imperialist racialization. That faciality originated in Renaissance humanism and depictions of Jesus seems a plausible if one-sided interpretation. It is less relevant than Deleuze and Guattari’s unusual theory of contemporary racism**:** If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the [white] wall [of signification], distributed by the [black] hole [of subjectivity]. They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized. European racism as the white man’s claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other: it is instead in primitive societies that the stranger is grasped as an “other.” Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating thematgiven places under given conditions, in a given ghetto, sometimes erasing them from the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.5 For Anjuna’s psy-trance parties, there were “no people on the outside.” Locals, domestic tourists, charter tourists, and beggars would join the white Goa freaks on the dance floor, sometimes even in Nine Bar. In fact, as with the United Colors of Benetton, it will be remembered that the rhetoric of PLUR demonstrated faciality’s inclusiveness—the parties were supposed to be open to all. But immediately, the faciality machine would place all bodies in relation to the Goa freak standard, both spatiotemporally and subjectively, measuring their acceptability through increasingly meticulous signs: sociochemical monitoring, scene savviness, chillum circles, sexual attractiveness. Many nonfreaks felt uneasy being pigeonholed like this—especially domestic tourists, who would retreat to the darker corners. The result was viscosity, bodies temporarily becoming impenetrable—more or less. It would seem to me that to understand the intricate hierarchies of racism, a framework that allows for gradual and multidimensional deviances is preferable to a dialectical model. Faciality also explains why after colonialism, with television and tourism, there is scarcely place left for any “dark others.” Everyone is included; everyone is facialized. At the same time, Euro-American ways of life continue to spread, and White Man (Elvis Presley, Sylvester Stallone, David Beckham) remains the global standard against which all other faces are forced to compete. What this account of racism has in common with the Fanonian is that whiteness is the norm, even in our “post”-colonial era. Where it differs, however, is that deviance is based not on lack of recognition or negation or annihilation of the other, but on subtle machinic differentiations and territorializations. The virtual structures behind racial formations don’t look like formal logic (a/not-a; they continually differentiate as actual bodies interact and aggregate. Racism, then, can’t be countered with a Hegelian sublation into the universal.

#### This sets up the idea of personhood as property which creates binaries and necessitates the exclusion of those deemed not quite human. The subject cannot be articulated as universal, because it’s very existence causes the exclusion of those who do not live up to the perfect idealism of the Western Man. These bodies form a racialized assemblage defined in opposition to this concept of the liberal subject.

Weheliye 14 [Alexander G. Weheliye, (Alexander G. Weheliye is Professor of African American Studies and English at Northwestern University.) "Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, And Black Feminist Theories Of The Human" Duke University Press., 8-1-2014, https://www.dukeupress.edu/habeas-viscus] */* MM \*brackets in original text

**Wynter**’s large-scale intellectual **project**, which she has been pursuing in one form or another for the last thirty years, **disentangles Man from the human in order to use the space of subjects placed beyond the grasp of this domain as a vital point from which to invent hitherto unavailable genres of the human.**27 According to this scheme in western modernity the religious conception of the self gave way to two modes of secularized being: first, the Cartesian “Rational Man,” or homo politicus, and then beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, “**Man as a selected being and natural organism . . . as the universal human, ‘man as man.**’”28 The move from a supernatural conception of world and the self ’s place within this cosmos, however, does not signal the supersession of a primitive axiomatic with an enlightened and rarefied type of the human. Rather, one genre of the human (Judeo-Christian, religious) yields to another, just as provincial, version of the human, and, although both claim universality, neither genre fully represents the multiplicity of human life forms. In the context of the secular human, **black subjects, along with indigenous populations, the colonized, the insane, the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as limit cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human.**29 Thus, **race**, rather than representing accessory, **comes to define the very essence of the modern human as “the code through which one not simply knows what human being is, but experiences being.”**30 Accordingly, race makes its mark in the dominion of the ideological and physiological, or rather race scripts the elision of the former with the latter in the flesh. Blackness 25 In her latest writings, Wynter identifies homo politicus’s successor in the long road from “theodicy” to “biodicy” as the liberal “bio-economic man.”31 The idea of “bio-economic man” marks the assumed naturalness that positions economic inequities, white supremacy, genocide, economic exploitation, gendered subjugation, colonialism, “natural selection,” and concepts such as the free market not in the realm of divine design, as in previous religious orders of things, but beyond the reach of human intervention all the same. In both cases, this ensures that a particular humanly devised model of humanity remains isomorphic with the Homo sapiens species. Wynter’s approach differs markedly from arguments that seek to include the oppressed within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism or, conversely, abolish humanism because of its racio-colonial baggage; instead **Wynter views black studies and minority discourse as liminal spaces, simultaneously** ensconced in and **outside the world of Man, from which to construct new objects of knowledge and launch the reinvention of the human at the juncture of the culture and biology feedback loop.** Even though the genre of the human we currently inhabit in the west is intimately tied to the somatic order of things, for Wynter, **the human cannot be understood in purely biological terms**, whether this applies to the history of an individual organism (ontogenesis) or the development at the level of a species (phylogeny). This is where Fanon’s important concept of sociogeny comes into play, offering Wynter an approach of thinking of the human—the “science in the social text,” to echo Spillers’s phrase—where culture and biology are not only not opposed to each other but in which their chemistry discharges mutually beneficial insights.32 In this scenario, **a symbolic register, consisting of discourse, language, culture, and so on (sociogeny) always already accompanies the genetic dimension of human action** (ontogeny), and it is only in the imbrication of these two registers that we can understand the full scope of our being-in-the-world. Fanon’s concept of sociogeny, arising from the inadequacy of traditional psychoanalytic models in the analysis of racialized colonialism, builds on Freud’s appropriation of recapitulation theory.33 Thus, according to Fanon, Freud breaks with the strict codes of Darwinism and social Darwinism (phylogenetic theory) in order to analyze the psyche of the modern individualized subject from an ontogenetic vantage point. While the ontogenetic technique yields, depending on your general sympathy for the now very antiquated protocols of Freudian psychoanalysis, abundant results when evaluating 26 Chapter One white subjects ensconced in the liberal nuclear family, it encounters a roadblock when transplanted to the colonial settlement, which is why “the alienation of the black man is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is also sociogeny. . . . Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being.”34 Why does the colonial situation specifically necessitate a reformulation of Freud’s and Darwinism’s procedural frame of reference? Since colonial policies and discourse are frequently grounded in racial distinctions, the colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human, or, as Fanon writes, “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.”35 The colonial encounter determines not just the black colonial subject’s familial structure or social and physical mobility and such, but colors his or her very being as he-or-she-which-isnot-quite-human, as always already tardy in the rigged match of the survival of the fittest. Conversely, in this ontological face-off, the white colonial subject encounters herself or himself as the “fullness and genericity of being human.” However, he or she only does so in relation to the deficiency of the black subject and indigenous (Wynter, 40). To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans. Yet because race is thought to rest in biology, it necessitates different analytic protocols than bare life and biopolitics, namely ones that draw on both ontogeny and sociogeny. Whereas Fanon’s mobilization of ontogeny remains rooted in the Freudian paradigm as pertaining to the individual subject, Wynter summons the explanatory apparatus of neurobiology to elucidate how racialization, despite its origins in sociogeny, is converted to the stuff of ontogenesis; this is what Wynter refers to as “sociogenetic.”36 Although human life has a biochemical core defined by a species-specific adaptive reward and punishment mechanism (poison = bad and food = good) that “determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify, and categorize the world,” it is “only through the mediation of the organism’s experience of what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby of what it feels like to be that organism” that a repertoire of behaviors, which ensure the continued existence of the species, develops (Wynter, 50). For the human species, because it is defined by both organic and symbolic registers, **this Blackness is complicated by the way culturally specific sociogenic principles** such as what is good or bad work to **trigger** neurochemical reward and punishment **processes, in the process “instituting the human subject as a culturespecific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being** and sense of self. One, therefore, whose phenomenology . . . is as objectively, constructed as its physiology” (Wynter, 54).37 Phenomenological perception must consequently don the extravagant drag of physiology in order to “turn theory into flesh, . . . [into] codings in the nervous system,” so as to signal the extrahuman instantiation of humanity. 38

#### Reform is intrinsically violent and based off of legal change—even so-called successful movements broaden the scope of Western Man by necessitating a new group to join its oppressive regime. Progress is not possible—the very structure of power prevents incremental change by constantly finding new groups to exclude. Thus, the role of the ballot is to deconstruct the Western Man.

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**We** are in dire **need** of **alternatives to the legal conception of personhood** that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what remains outside the law**, what the law cannot capture**, what it cannot magically transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identitybased activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on **inclusion, recognition, and equality based on** a **narrow legal framework** (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) **not only hinders the eradication of violence** against trans people and other vulnerable populations **but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.”**22 **If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a** delimited **notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively o**n only one form of **subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing** for the continued existence of **hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist,** civil **rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the** still **and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations** (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.).23 To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the 82 Chapter Five law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. **Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia** Oparah suggests counteract**ing the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment”** within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abolition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) **to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird antiprison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law**.24 Relatedly, **Spade calls for a radical politics articulated from the “‘impossible’ worldview of trans political existence,”** which redefines “the insistence of government agencies, social service providers, media, and many nontrans activists and nonprofiteers that the existence of trans people is impossible.”25 A relational maroon abolitionism beholden to the practices of black radicalism and that arises from the incompatibility of black trans existence with the world of Man serves as one example of how putatively abject modes of being need not be redeployed within hegemonic frameworks but can be operationalized as variable liminal territories or articulated assemblages in movements to abolish the grounds upon which all forms of subjugation are administered. The idea of bare life as espoused by Giorgio Agamben and his followers discursively duplicates the very violence it describes without offering any compelling theoretical or political alternatives to our current order. Paradoxically, by insisting on a limited notion of the law at the cost of neglecting so many other facets that flow into the creation of bare life, Agamben preempts a rigorous and imaginative thinking of the political imaginary that rests in the tradition of the oppressed. Agamben’s impoverished conception of the political comes into view most clearly in the lack of current or past alternatives it offers to our current order and when we consult the fleshly testimonies of and about subjects that inhabit the sphere of mere life (the enslaved, political prisoners, concentration camp detainees, for instance). Still, these voices should not be construed as fountains of suffering authenticity but as instantiations of a radically different political imaginary, which refuses to only see, feel, hear, smell, and taste bare life in the subjectivity of the oppressed.

#### We affirm Habeas Viscus. Instead of relying on personhood, the alternative plays with the signifiers by exploring the power of liminal spaces through lines of flight which interrupt racialized assemblages. We are new freedom, a fresh start, an understanding of power as something that isn’t necessary and defining. Any of the 1AC’s movement will never release itself from the deadly grip of the law.

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In order to do so, **the hieroglyphics of the flesh should not be conceptualized as just exceptional** or radically particular, **since this habitually leads to the comparative tabulation of different systems of oppression that then serve as the basis for defining personhood as possession.** As Frantz Fanon states: “All forms of exploitation are identical, since they apply to the same ‘object’: man.”28 Accordingly, humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species for the benefit of other humans, which at the same time yields a surplus version of the human: Man. **Man represents the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the heteromasculine, white, propertied, and liberal subject that renders all those who do not conform** to these characteristics **as exploitable nonhumans, literal legal no-bodies.** If we are to affect significant systemic changes, then we must locate at least some of the struggles for justice in the region of humanity as a relational ontological totality (an object of knowledge) that cannot be reduced to either the universal or particular. 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To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties.** As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 **Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human.** As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man. German r&b group Glashaus’s track “Bald (und wir sind frei) [Soon (and We Are Free)]” performs this overdetermined idea of freedom as disarticulated from Man both graphically and sonically. Paying tribute to both the nineteenth-century spiritual “We’ll Soon Be Free,” written on the eve of the American Civil War, and Donny Hathaway’s 1973 recording, “Someday We’ll All Be Free,” Glashaus’s title “Bald (und wir sind frei)” enacts the disrupted yet intertwined notions of freedom, temporality, and sociality that I am gesturing to here.33 In contrast to its predecessors, which are resolutely located in the future via the use of soon/someday and the future tense, Glashaus’s version renders freedom in the present tense, albeit 138 Chapter Eight qualified by the imminent future of “bald [soon]” and by the typographical parenthetical enclosure of “(und wir sind frei) [and we are free].” The flow of the parentheses intimates both distance and nearness, ragging the homogeneous, empty future of “soon” with a potential present of a “responsible freedom” (Spillers) and/as sociality. The and and the parentheses are the conduits for bringing-into-relation freedom’s nowtime and its constitutive potential futurity without resolving their tension. The lyrics of “Bald (und wir sind frei)” once again exemplify this complementary strain in that the words in the verses are resolutely future oriented, ending with the invocation of “bald” just before the chorus, which, held in the potential abyss of the present, repeats, “und wir sind frei.” Likewise, in the verses, Glashaus’s singer Cassandra Steen, accompanied only by a grand piano, just about whispers, whereas she opens up to a more mellifluous style of singing in the chorus; as a result, the verses (bald/future) sound constricted and restrictive but only when heard in relation to the expansive spatiality of the chorus (present). What initially looks like a bracketed afterthought on the page punctures the putatively central point in the sonic realm. It is not a vacant, uniform, or universal future that sets in motion liberty but rather the future as it is seen, felt, and heard from the enfleshed parenthetical present of the oppressed, since this group’s now is always already bracketed (held captive and set aside indefinitely) in, if not antithetical to, the world of Man. **The domain of habeas viscus represents one significant mechanism by which the world of Man constrains subjects to the parenthetical, while at the same time disavowing this tendency via recourse to the abnormal and/ or inhuman. Heard, seen, tasted, felt, and lived in the** ethereal **shadows of Man’s world**, however, a **habeas viscus unearths the freedom that exists within the hieroglyphics of the flesh. For the oppressed the future will have been now, since Man tucks away this group’s present in brackets.** Consequently, the future anterior transmutes the simple (parenthetical) present of the dysselected into the nowtime of humanity during which the fleshy hieroglyphics of the oppressed will have actualized the honeyed prophecy of another kind of freedom (which can be imagined but not [yet] described) in the revolutionary apocatastasis of human genres.

# Links

## Democracy

#### The very idea of a “good democracy” fuels the Western Man – which bodies are able to access it and which bodies are pushed further out of humanity?

Weheliye 14[Alexander G. Weheliye, (Alexander G. Weheliye is Professor of African American Studies and English at Northwestern University.) "Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, And Black Feminist Theories Of The Human" Duke University Press., 8-1-2014, <https://www.dukeupress.edu/habeas-viscus>] / MM \*brackets in original text

The differently signified flesh is habeas viscus, for in the world of Man, the hieroglyphics of the flesh are translated to the jargons of negativity, lack, the subhuman, and so on. Given the systematic use of torture as a political tool of “democratic” governments—now legalized in the united states of exception—and the simultaneous sexualization of its medial images in our contemporary moment, how might we go about viewing and thinking these depictions not as deviations from the normal order, since that would only affirm the putative externality of pornotroping from the center stage of culture and politics? A potential for pornotroping, however, is far from abnormal given that it shadows so many aspects of modern politics, culture, and sexuality. What the pornotrope contributes to the theorization of modern sociopolitical subjectivity is its freeing and setting in motion of the viscous deviances—the detours, digressions, and shortcuts that authorize violence as a vital layer in the attires of modern sovereignty—that lay dormant in bare life and social death, whether these are found in current practices of torture in U.S. domestic and foreign prisons, or the hauntological histories of the Holocaust, slavery, and colonialism. Because liberal democracy abandons the enfleshed silhouette of political violence, it returns in the form of deviance rather than as habeas viscus. Put simply, pornotroping is the historical Stoff of modern sexuality—its fleshy ether—and to experience the flesh, then, might just allow us to relate to the world differently. But, as I discuss shortly, cravings, just like leaves, humans, numbers, ghosts, species, and stars can manifest in radically different guises; we just have to recognize them as such, even if they dwell among us in the physiological and metaphysical hunger exhibited by C. L. R. James, Harriet Jacobs, and former Muselmänner

## Freedom of Speech

#### **Freedom of speech reinforces linguistic structures that naturalize the Western Man – The paradigm of incorporation excludes the language of the flesh whose “cries and groans” are inaudible and fuel the voice of the Western Man.**

Weheliye 2[Alexander G. Weheliye, (Alexander G. Weheliye is Professor of African American Studies and English at Northwestern University.) "Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, And Black Feminist Theories Of The Human" Duke University Press., 8-1-2014, <https://www.dukeupress.edu/habeas-viscus>] / MM \*brackets in original text

In this closing chapter I would like to continue taking up Hortense Spillers's challenge and ask what it might mean to claim the monstrosity of the flesh as a site for freedom beyond the world of Man in order to heed Baby Suggs's words in Toni Morrison's Beloved about loving the flesh: “In this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in grass. Love it. Love it hard. Yonder they do not love your flesh. They despise it.” 1 In order to improperly inhabit and understand the politics and poetics of habeas viscus, we must return to some of the voices from the previous two chapters. Revisit them we should, however, not to authenticate them as acoustic mirrors of the oppressed or to grant them juridical humanity but in order to listen more closely to prophetic traces of the hieroglyphics of the flesh in these echoes of the future anterior tense. Many critics assume that political violence is somehow outside the grasp of linguistic structures. In her now classic account of the body in pain, Scarry argues that pain in general and torture in particular causes a regression to the “pre-language of cries and groans,” which becomes indicative of the annihilation of the tortured's world. 2 In making this argument, Scarry assumes that world and language preexist and are unmade by the act of torture, which imagines political violence as exterior to the normal order rather than as an instrument in the creation of the world and language of Man. Agamben's point about language and witnessing vis-à-vis Auschwitz, although not quite in the same register, skirts fairly close to making a similar argument: “It is thus necessary that the impossibility of bearing witness, the ‘lacuna,’ that constitutes human **language, collapses, giving way to a different impossibility of bearing witness— that which does not have language**” (Remnants, 39). Perhaps **it might be more useful to construe “cries and groans,” “heart-rending shrieks,” “the mechanical murmurs without content” as language that do**es **not rely on linguistic structures**, at least not primarily, to convey meaning, sense, or expression. 3 For language, especially in the space-ways of the flesh, comes in many varieties, and functions not only—or even primarily—to create words in the service of conforming to linguistic structures transparent in the world of Man. 4 This approach also cannot imagine that for many of those held captive by Man it is always already “after the end of the world…. Don't you know that yet?” long before the actual acts of torture have begun. Roman Grzyb, a former concentration camp prisoner, for instance, gives the following account of the Muselmann's idiolect: “The Muselmann used his very own jargon by constantly repeating what came to his completely confused mind. The sentences were often incomplete and were illogical, stopping abruptly at random points.” 5 **As** **can be gleaned from the testimonies of Muselmänner, slaves, or Ellis Island detainees, what is at stake is** not so much the lack of language per se, since we have known for a while now that the subaltern cannot speak, but **the kinds of dialects available to the subjected** and how these are seen and heard by those who bear witness to their plight. Nevertheless, the suffering voices exemplified by James and the Muselmänner should not be understood as fountains of authenticity but rather as instantiations of a radically different political imaginary that steers clear of reducing the subjectivity of the oppressed to bare life. In R. Radhakrishnan's thinking, **this political domain produces “critical knowledge, which in turn empowers the voice of suffering to make its own** cognitive epistemological **intervention** by envisioning its own utopia, rather than accepting an assigned position within the ameliotary schemes proposed by the dominant discourse.” 6 Thus, suffering appears as utopian erudition—or is expressed through hieroglyphics of the flesh to echo Spillers and Zora Neale Hurston—and not as an end unto itself or as a precritical sphere of truth, as the liberal humanist Weltanschauung would have it; rather, **“liberalism is tolerant of abundant speech as long as it does not have to take into account voices it does not understand**.” 7 Where dominant discourse seeks to develop upgrades of the current notions of humanity as Man, improvements are not the aim or product of the imaginaries borne of racializing assemblages and political violence; instead they summon forms of human emancipation that can be imagined but not (yet) described. While this form of communication does not necessarily conform to the standard definition of linguistic utterance, to hear Aunt Hester's howls or the Muselmann's repetition merely as pre- or nonlanguage absolves the world of Man from any and all responsibility for bearing witness to the flesh. Hardly anterior to language and therefore the human, these rumblings vocalize the humming relay of the world that makes linguistic structures possible, directly corresponding to how the not-quite- and nonhuman give rise to the universe of Man. That is to say, the flesh engulfs not only Man's visually marked others via instruments of torture and the intergenerational transmission of hieroglyphics but emanates rays of potential enfleshment throughout the far-flung corners of Being in the world of Man. According to Aristotle, even though “higher life (bios) is emphatically the end proposed, yet life itself (zoe) is also an object for which [citizens] unite and maintain the corporate political association; for it is probable that some degree of the higher life is necessarily implied in merely living…. Certain it is that the majority of men endure much suffering without ceasing to cling to life—a proof that a certain happiness or natural sweetness resides in it.” 8 When the hieroglyphics of the flesh are construed not merely as banishments but as transit visas to universes betwixt and between the jurisdictions of Man, they prompt the following question: how is it possible to politicize the “natural sweetness” of the flesh without the limits imposed by the concepts of bare life and biopolitics?

## Rationality

#### Rationality necessitates a view from nowhere which prevent embodied experience and can’t resolve oppression. This is a form of rationality as a construct created in Western philosophy that divides rational whiteness and irrational ‘savagery’ of non-white people.

**Kinchello 99** {Joe L; Research chair at Faculty of Education at McGill University; “The Struggle to Define and Reinvent Whiteness: A Pedagogical Analysis”; College Literature 26 (Fall 1999): 162-; 1999; [http://www.virginia.edu/woodson/courses/aas102%20(spring%2001)/articles/kincheloe.html](http://www.virginia.edu/woodson/courses/aas102%20%28spring%2001%29/articles/kincheloe.html) ]

While no one knows exactly what constitutes whiteness, we can historicize the concept and offer some general statements about the dynamics it signifies. Even this process is difficult, as **whiteness** as a socio-historical construct **is constantly shifting in light of new circumstances and changing interactions with various manifestations of power**. With these qualifications in mind we believe that a dominant impulse of **whiteness took shape around the European** Enlightenment’s **notion of rationality with its privileged construction of a transcendental white, male, rational subject who operated at the recesses of power while concurrently giving every indication that he escaped the confines of time and space.** In this context **whiteness was naturalized** asa universal entity that operated as more than a mere ethnic positionality emerging from a particular time, the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and a particular space, Western Europe. Reason in this historical configuration is whitened and human nature itself is grounded upon this reasoning capacity. Lost in the defining process is the socially constructed nature of reason itself, not to mention its emergence as a signifier of whiteness. Thus, in its rationalistic womb whiteness begins to establish itself as a norm that represents an authoritative, delimited, and hierarchical mode of thought. In the emerging colonial contexts in which Whites would increasingly find themselves in the decades and centuries following the Enlightenment, **the encounter with non-Whiteness would be framed in rationalistic terms - whiteness representing orderliness, rationality, and self-control and non-whiteness as chaos, irrationality, violence, and the breakdown of self-regulation**. **Rationality emerged as the conceptual base around which civilization and savagery could be delineated** (Giroux 1992; Alcoff 1995; Keating 1995). This rationalistic modernist whiteness is shaped and confirmed by its close association with science. As a scientific construct whiteness privileges mind over body, intellectual over experiential ways of knowing, mental abstractions over passion, bodily sensations, and tactile understanding (Semali and Kincheloe 1999; Kincheloe, Steinberg, and Hinchey 1999). In the study of multicultural education such epistemological tendencies take on dramatic importance. In educators’ efforts to understand the forces that drive the curriculum and the purposes of Western education, modernist whiteness is a central player. The insight it provides into the social construction of schooling, intelligence, and the disciplines of psychology and educational psychology in general opens a gateway into white consciousness and its reactions to the world around it. Objectivity and dominant articulations of masculinity as signs of stability and the highest expression of white achievement still work to construct everyday life and social relations at the end of the twentieth century. Because such dynamics have been naturalized and universalized, **whiteness assumes an invisible power unlike previous forms of domination in human history. Such an invisible power can be deployed by those individuals and groups who are able to identify themselves within the boundaries of reason** and to project irrationality, sensuality, and spontaneity on to the other. Thus, European ethnic groups such as the Irish in nineteenth-century industrializing America were able to differentiate themselves from passionate ethnic groups who were supposedly unable to regulate their own emotional predispositions and gain a rational and objective view of the world. Such peoples - who were being colonized, exploited, enslaved, and eliminated by Europeans during their Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment eras - were viewed as irrational and, thus, inferior in their status as human beings. As inferior beings, they had no claim to the same rights as Europeans - hence, white racism and colonialism were morally justified around the conflation of whiteness and reason. In order for whiteness to place itself in the privileged seat of rationality and superiority, it would have to construct pervasive portraits of non-Whites, Africans in particular, as irrational, disorderly, and prone to uncivilized behavior (Nakayama and Krizek 1995; Stowe 1996; Alcoff 1995; Haymes 1996). As rock of rationality in a sea of chaos and disorder, whiteness presented itself as a non-colored, non-blemished pure category. Even a mere drop of non-white blood was enough historically to relegate a person to the category of "colored." Being white, thus, meant possessing the privilege of being uncontaminated by any other bloodline. A mixed race child in this context has often been rejected by the white side of his or her heritage - the rhetorical construct of race purity demands that the mixed race individual be identified by allusion to the non-white group, for example, she’s half Latina or half Chinese. Individuals are rarely half-white. As Michel Foucault often argued, reason is a form of disciplinary power. Around Foucault’s axiom, critical multiculturalists contend that reason can never be separated from power. Those without reason defined in the Western scientific way are excluded from power and are relegated to the position of unreasonable other. Whites in their racial purity understood the dictates of the "White Man’s Burden" and became the beneficent teachers of the barbarians. To Western eyes the **contrast between white and non-white culture was stark: reason as opposed to ignorance; scientific knowledge instead of indigenous knowledge; philosophies of mind versus folk psychologies; religious truth in lieu of primitive superstition; and professional history as opposed to oral mythologies**. Thus, **rationality was inscribed in a variety of hierarchical relations between European colonizers and their colonies** early on, and between Western multinationals and their "underdeveloped" markets in later days. Such **power relations** **were erased by the white claim of** cultural **neutrality** around the transhistorical norm of reason -in this construction rationality was not assumed to be the intellectual commodity of any specific culture. Indeed, colonial hierarchies immersed in exploitation were justified around the interplay of pure whiteness, impure non-whiteness, and neutral reason. Traditional **colonialism was grounded on colonialized people’s deviation from the norm of rationality**, thus making colonization a rational response to **inequality**. In the twentieth century thiswhite norm of rationality was extended to the economic sphere where the philosophy of the free market and exchange values were universalized into signifiers of civilization. Once all the nations on earth are drawn into the white reason of the market economy, then all land can be subdivided into real estate, all human beings’ worth can be monetarily calculated, values of abstract individualism and financial success can be embraced by every community in every country, and education can be reformulated around the cultivation of human capital.When these dynamics come to pass, the white millennium will have commenced - white power will have been consolidated around land and money. The Western ability to regulate diverse peoples through their inclusion in data banks filled with information about their credit histories, institutional affiliations, psychological "health," academic credentials, work experiences, and family backgrounds will reach unprecedented levels. The accomplishment of this ultimate global colonial task will mark the end of white history in the familiar end-of-history parlance. This does not mean that white supremacy ends, but that it has produced a hegemony so seamless that the need for further structural or ideological change becomes unnecessary. The science, reason, and technology of white culture will have achieved their inevitable triumph (MacCannell 1992; Nakayama and Krizek 1995; Alcoff 1995; Giroux 1992). Whatever the complexity of the concept, whiteness, at least one feature is discernible - whiteness cannot escape the materiality of its history, its effects on the everyday lives of those who fall outside its conceptual net as well as on white people themselves. Critical scholarship on whiteness should focus attention on the documentation of such effects.Whiteness study in a critical multiculturalist context should delineate the various ways such material effects shape cultural and institutional pedagogies and position individuals in relation to the power of white reason. Understanding these dynamics is central to the curriculums of black studies, Chicano studies, postcolonialism, indigenous studies, not to mention educational reform movements in elementary, secondary, and higher education. The history of the world’s diverse peoples in general as well as minority groups in Western societies in particular has often been told from a white historiographical perspective. Such accounts erased the values, epistemologies, and belief systems that grounded the cultural practices of diverse peoples. Without such cultural grounding students have often been unable to appreciate the manifestations of brilliance displayed by non-white cultural groups. Caught in the white interpretive filter they were unable to make sense of diverse historical and contemporary cultural productions as anything other than proof of white historical success. The fact that one of the most important themes of the last half of the twentieth century - the revolt of the "irrationals" against white historical domination - has not been presented as a salient part of the white (or non-white) story is revealing, a testimony to the continuing power of whiteness and its concurrent fragility (Banfield 1991; Frankenberg 1993; Stowe 1996; Vattimo 1992).

## Surveillance

The affirmative’s over focus on technological surveillance ignores the assemblage that is the surveillance state – this essentialism turns all of their arguments about gridding as they can only ever understand identity and power through the lens of biometrics –

Puar 07 Jasbir Puar, Associate Professor of Women's & Gender Studies at Rutgers University, “Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times” Duke University Press, November 2007,

Sunaina Maira writes of Muslim communities in the greater Boston area, ‘‘There is **. . .** a heightened sense of fear and vulnerability **. . .** particularly among working-class immigrants who cannot as easily afford legal counsel if they are harassed or detained. . . . It would not be too dramatic to say that many in these communities feel under siege.’’ She argues that **another byproduct of the** NSEERS **program entails the manufacture of** a population living in the shadows, a ‘‘subliminal and precarious world of individuals **who cannot** fully **admit they exist.’’** The ephemera of control simulates homologous affects and intensities as detention: fear, anxiety, discomfort, disorientation, uncertainty, despair, anger, vertigo, nausea. (We can ponder the bountiful palimpsest: policing activist events and activists themselves, patrolling educational sectors and academic freedom of speech, the surge of video surveillance in public arenas.) As Judith Butler wonders, ‘‘What kind of public culture is being created when a certain **‘indefinite containment’** takes place outside the prison walls, **on the subway, in the airports, on the street, in the workplace?**’’ ∞≠Ω **But the metaphor of containment is not quite right, for there is mass distribution of these ‘‘technologies of suspicion’’**; hence the sliding between indefinite and infinite detention**.** Silence, then, **the silence of a discordant American citizenry, or the silence** (relative to the historical and the geographical) **of U.S. antiwar protests, or the silence of the academy, or the silence of people of** color **and immigrants, undocumented or not: these silences not only point to political apathy, defeatism, denial, or detachment, but also to** the workings of control that surpass the walls of detention. Another symptom of societal control is that **those who are not silent**— global **protests**, alternative media, **resistant strands of politics**— **are rarely heard, seen, or responded to by the state,** in part because the apparatuses of control diffuse the state as the regulatory center of control. The vacating of entire predominantly Muslim neighborhoods in Brooklyn, Queens, Detroit, Boston, and other cities suggests that the means of control bleed far beyond the disciplinary apparatus of the prison. That is, the affects of detention are mimicked in public spheres. Indeed, **detention sites themselves have become sites of activism and protest, along with antiwar protests, and thus of expanded surveillance, while the administrative control tool of the ‘‘list’’ is an accomplice to forcible detention and deportation; i**n actuality, the list brings much better results than direct policing. The NSEERS program aggregates national, religious, ethnic, and racial identities from subjects to populations; that is, **the ‘‘Muslim population’’** or the ‘‘terrorist look-alike’’ population is collected as a target **(**the targeting happening through the collecting) of these regulations as are those who fall outside these parameters or could perform as if outside these parameters. Data Bodies The security of biopolitics is precisely this challenge of managing a network of bodies, data, and their interlinkages— travel advisories, global health alerts, emergency-response protocols, selective quarantines, high-tech diagnostics, and the medical and economic assertion of newer and better prescription drugs. The problem of security for biopolitics is the problem of creating boundaries that are selectively permeable.—Eugene Thacker, The Global Genome intimate control, infinite detention Dismayingly, the TIA [the Defense Department’s Total Information Awareness] panel reverentially quotes Michel Foucault, one of the biggest academic frauds of the late twentieth century, for the proposition that ‘‘ ‘modern society increasingly functions like a super Panopticon [prison watchtower] in which government constrains individual behavior by the threat of surveillance.’’ One should hope that this is the first and last time that a Defense Department advisory board has invoked Foucault, since this French poseur, who presented Western culture as one big plot to suppress dissent, difference, and minority rights, has less than nothing to contribute to the national defense. Like Foucault, who never troubled himself with evidence, the Washington wise men offer no backup for their claim that government increasingly ‘‘constrains individual behavior by the threat of surveillance.’’—Heather MacDonald ‘‘What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us’’ **The ‘‘technological sublime’’** refers to the totalizing, overarching, and inflated power falsely accorded to surveillance, **hyperbole that** conveniently forgets that interactions between user and interface are often consensual, that security and information systems often fail in their objectives, and that control does not always espouse or shape value systems.I turn now to a preliminary sketch of surveillance technologies to construct a perfunctory understanding of intimacy and security within control societies. I am not interested in appraising the relative intrusiveness or privacy-hindering effects of surveillance. More significant is that the perception of an all-encompassing, impenetrable, and infallible surveillance structure affectively breeds fear, terror, and insecurity. **The** **private within rights discourses** is overwhelmingly a ‘‘flat discourse. It largely ignores the vertical dimension **and tends to look across rather than to cut through the landscape**.’’ Eyal Weizman, through what he terms ‘‘the politics of verticality,’’ details the spatial reconceptualization of the shift from two-dimensional space— an expanse of horizontal and vertical coordinates, latitudinal and longitudinal positions, over here and over there, inside and out— to a three-dimensional space of volume, depth, and verticality.∞∞≥ Addressing the flatness of mapping and its inaccuracy or inadequacy, the politics of verticality oscillates from representational space to informational space, from epistemological comprehensions of space to ontological presences and experiences**.** The variances between ‘‘looking across’’ and ‘‘cutting through’’ drive transformations in corporeal phenomena of space, territory, and occupation. Weizman’s point is that the penetrative force of surveillance is also vertical rather than only lateral, unaligned and punctuated by ‘‘kissing points’**’** (a pleasant misnomer, lending a sweetness to it all)and other momentary contacts rather than invasion or gentrification**.** The politics of **verticality transgresses a notion of panoptic surveillance enabled through the expanse of looking from above and beyond, able to witness the visibly aberrant body in question within the prescribed sites of devianc**e (for queers, especially gay men, this has conventionally meant cruising zones and gay neighborhoods) to thinking about networks of contact and control, of circuits that cut through. ∞∞∂ **Networks of surveillance in this three-dimensional, vertical setup are not removed, abstract, or cohered,** but viciously intimate**: unlike the apartheid of separation, these ‘‘new and intricate frontiers’’ invented for domination demand intimacy, not just penetration but interpenetration, matrices of scalar layers that are discontinuous yet transversal.** They are **discontinuous in that intimate proximities are orchestrated to produce the ephemera of nonconnection, of not-touching**— not through a vacuum of distance or of severing or separation, but in **the proactive, provocative swerve away from contact, the refusal of tactile knowing; the discontinuity is a deliberate rupturing**, not simply a missing or a missed connection, but an intimate, brutal, almost-but-no kind of taunting. **Intimacy in biopolitical terms is not bound to protection in the private or exposure in public. It mediates relations between transparency and opacity, waves of proximity, observation and invisibility, gazes, traces and profiles, electric and erotic charges, passing by and bypassing, tightness, looseness, comfort, orderliness and chaos, order and disarray, rubbing and brushing against. Control networks are systems of unleashed circuitry, exuberant, fertile, that** taunt the boundaries of inside and outside and, more important, beginning and end. Legislation after September 11, 2001, exacerbated an already occurring blurring of the dissimilarities between law enforcement and intelligence. The former is a reactive activity, the purpose of which is ‘‘to capture and prosecute criminals.’’Intelligence, on the other hand, is proactive, ‘‘collected for the prevention of, and warning about, national security threats,’’ allowing for the ‘‘government mining of third-party private transactional data,’’ easing barriers in obtaining ‘‘warrants for electronic surveillance,’’ and permitting the ‘‘FBI to collect public information . . . and conduct surveillance in public places absent to a link to suspected criminal activity.’’ ∞∞∏ **What we** also **see** **is a profound sway in the tenor of temporality: the realignment from reactive to preemptive is a conversion from past tense subject formation to** future-tense subject anticipation**, from the rehabilitative subject whose violated rights can be redressed through social representation and legal recognition, to regenerative populations** who are culled through anticipation. Felix Stalder observes**, ‘‘Our bodies are being shadowed by an increasingly comprehensive** ‘data body.’ However, this shadow body does more than follow us. It does also precede us,’’ lurking as an ‘‘informational doppelganger.’’Systems such as the Department of Defense’s Total Information Awareness enable mining ‘‘transactional data’’ to locate ‘‘patterns of terrorist activity.’’Creating ratings of mobility risk naturally favors ‘‘ ‘low risk’ frequent travelers’’ through ‘‘smart border’’ agreements. Such pacts include the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection system (at the U.S.-Mexico border south of San Diego); the Free and Secure Trade program (easing truck congestion at border points for human as well as nonhuman entities); Nexus (at the U.S.-Canada border, as well as, in the future, the Ottawa and Montreal international airports); and the Immigration and Naturalization Service Passenger Accelerated Service System (in six U.S. airports, including Los Angeles International). A ‘‘trusted travelers’’ database allows selected individuals to bypass regular security lines. ∞∞Ω The Transportation Security Agency’s Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II project is designed to ‘‘profile prospective airline passengers using commercial databases.’’ ∞≤≠ Identity recognition technologies involve biometric facial and iris recognition; hand geometry recognition; ‘‘electronic body scanner[s] that sees through clothing’’; and the Human Identification at a Distance system that ‘‘identifies an individual’s unique walking style and gestures.’’ ∞≤∞ A ‘‘virtual borders’’ program commissioned by the government and developed by Accenture aims to standardize the use of biometric data not only at U.S. ports of entry but prior to departure, at the point of origination.Visa applicants will be screened through fingerprinting and again upon departure from the origin country to the United States, the goal being to make ‘‘technology and information systems the first line of defense, and allow U.S. border inspectors to become the last line of defense.’’ A description of the program is as follows: ‘‘Virtual borders of the United States would extend to the point of origination for visitors. The bulk of the security checks will be performed at the time of application for a visa to visit the United States.’’ ∞≤≤ These ‘‘surveillant assemblages,’’ invested in witnessing the mobility of human and nonhuman actors, as well as affectively undulating movement itself, create the sameness of population through democratization of monitoring at the same time they enable and solidify hierarchies— in other words, the circuit amid profiling and racial profiling. ∞≤≥ Despite reports that terrorist circles are recruiting non-Arabs and non– South Asians who can pass and thus carry out attacks, racial profiling continues to be an important security measure. ∞≤∂ Yet unlike an older ‘‘masculinism as protection’’ model of surveillance, whereby ‘‘patriarchal logic . . . gives to protective services a right to rule over those who count on their expertise at keeping watch and apprehending,’’ in the move from the containment and normativization of the subject to the control of populations (here we must perpetually drag ourselves from the subject as an object of inquiry, if only for a moment), self**-regulation becomes less an internalization of norms and more about** constant monitoring of oneself and others**, watching, waiting, listening, ordering, positioning, calculating. One sees emerging through these practices** not necessarily the crafting of the individual subject cohered through acquiescence to or internalization of norms but assemblages of ‘‘militarized bodies.’’ As John Armitage explains, **these comprise ‘‘an assortment of practices consisting of the conversion of civilian bodies to military use and the inculcation into such bodies of military principals.’’** ∞≤∏ **Militarized bodies arise from both conventional nationstate militaries and their supraand subnational counterparts** (militias, paramilitary groups) **and also through technologies that produce zones where ‘‘the ‘redundant’ population . . . rubs shoulders with the ‘useful’ and ‘legitimate’ rest**.’’ ∞≤**π In the context of civilians who have no direct links with conventionally defined military spaces, the force of mobilization takes on a different role**.Going beyond meaning or interpretations of bodies in the military, **militarization is produced through flows of information and series of activities,** the everyday activities **of civilians that participate in and contribute to the military complex. These vectors of militarization that permeate the everyday** once again **produce public spheres where many affects of detention cells are mimicked**. Thus, **militarization is not only heightened and intensified, not only expanded in expanse or range**; in constellation fashion, it is disseminated precisely and insidiously, from bodies to entertainment to consumption. **Militarized bodies are crafted through the dissemination and diffusion of control, rather than within concentrated and isolated patches of discipline or via overt methods of force**.These networks of control are distributed and interactive, intent on mobilizing the populace: participation is therefore a patriotic mandate.

## Afropess

The aff is a structuralist political ontology which situates blackness as a static position forced from the outside – this is a concession to systems of domination which reinforces a sad affect and eradicates the truly dangerous power of blackness: becoming

Koerner 12**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

In “The Case of Blackness” Moten (2008b: 187) perceptively remarks, “What is inadequate to blackness is already given ontologies.” What if we were to think of blackness as a name for an ontology of becoming? How might such a thinking transform our understanding of the relation of blackness to history and its specific capacity to “think [its] way out of the exclusionary constructions” of historyand the thinking of history (Moten 2008a: 1744)? Existing ontologies tend to reduce blackness to a historical condition,a “lived experience,” and in doing so effectively eradicate its unruly character as a transformative force.Deleuze and Guattari, I think, offer a compelling way to think of this unruliness when they write, “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self- positing as concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). To bring this relation between blackness and becomingfurtherinto the open — toward an affirmation of the unexpected insinuation of blackness signaled by the use of Jackson’s line as an “event in its becoming” — a few more words need be said about Deleuze’s method. The use of Jackson’s writing is just one instance of a procedure that we find repeated throughout Capitalism and Schizophrenia, where we constantly encounter unexpected injections ofquotations, names, and ideas lifted from other texts, lines that appear all of sudden as though propelled by their own force. One might say they are deployed rather than explained or interpreted; as such, they produce textual events that readers may choose to ignore or pick up and run with. Many names are proposed for this method — “schizoanalysis**,** micropolitics**,** pragmatics, diagrammatism, rhizomatics, cartography” (Deleuze and Parnet [1977] 2006: 94) — but the crucial issue is to affirm an experimental practice that opposes itself to the interpretation of texts, proposing instead that we think of a book as “a little machine” and ask “what it functions with, in connection with what other things does it or does it not transmit intensities?” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987: 4).8 Studying how Soledad Brother functions in Deleuze’s books, connecting Jackson’s line to questions and historical issues that are not always explicitly addressed in those books, involves one in this action. And further, it opens new lines where the intensities transmitted in Jackson’s book make a claim on our own practice. This method can be seen as an effort to disrupt the hierarchical opposition between theory and practice and to challenge some of the major assumptions of Western Marxism. In an interview with Antonio Negri in the 1990s, Deleuze (1997: 171) clarifies that he and Guattari have “remained Marxists” in their concern to analyze the ways capitalism has developed but that their political philosophy makes three crucial distinctions with respect to more traditional theoretical approaches: first, a thinking of “war machines” as opposed to state theory; second, a “consideration of minorities rather than classes”; and finally, the study of social “lines of flight” rather than the interpretation and critique of social contradictions**.** Each of these distinctions, as we will see, resonates with Jackson’s political philosophy, but as the passage from Anti-Oedipus demonstrates, the concept of the “line of flight” emerges directly in connection to Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Soledad Brother**.** The concept affirms those social constructions that would neither be determined by preexisting structures nor caught in a dialectical contradiction. It names a force that is radically autonomous from existing ontologies, structures, and historical accounts. It is above all for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari insist that society be thought of not as a “structure” but as a “machine,” because such a concept enables the thinking of the movements, energies, and intensities (i.e., the lines of flight) that such machines transmit. The thinking of machines forces us not only to consider the social and historical labor involved in producing society but also the ongoing potentials of constructing new types of assemblages (agencement). One of the key adversaries of this machinic approach is “interpretation” and more specifically structuralist interpretations of society in terms of contradictions**.** According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987: 293), structuralism persisted in the “submission of the line to the point” and as a result produced a theory of subjectivity, and also an account of language and the unconscious, that could not think in terms of movement and construction. Defining lines only in relation to finite points (the subject, the signifier) produces a calculable grid, a structure that then appears as the hidden intelligibility of the system and of society generally. Louis Althusser’s account of the “ideological State apparatus” as the determining structure of subjectivityisperhaps the extreme expression of this gridlocked position (an example we will come back to in a later section). Opposed to this theoretical approach, diagrammatism (to invoke one of the terms given for this method) maps vectors that generate an open space and the potentialsfor giving consistency to the latter.9 In other words, rather than tracing the hidden structures of an intolerable system, Deleuze and Guattari’s method aims to map the ways out of it.

The relationship of negativity resurrects the most violent forms of humanism by defining blackness in opposition to civil society and serves only to banish the positive beauty of blackness that the affirmative attempts to reclaim

Larue 11**[[2]](#footnote-2)**

By trying to uncover a human ontology, humanism underscores the necessity and value of “knowing” origins. Origins, to date, have been used as principles by which things, objects, and people can be grouped and segregated. Questions such as “where are your people from?” or “where are you from?” seek origins so that the speaker can be lumped into a group, which is usually pre-established as either “acceptable” (Western European) or “unacceptable” (all others). While this is a gross oversimplification of categories, it does serve to show how determining ontological roots affects human society. Not only did Descartes‟ cogito renew a desire to find the origins of human existence, but it set the origins of the human within the confines of its own mind—in the human‟s ability (or lack thereof) to reason. This practice both set the stage for understanding existence through a reliance on reason and provided a “reasonable” justification for an exclusion of all those beings who, according to the Enlightenment model of the human, could not demonstrate reason. Since colonized individuals did not effectively demonstrate “Enlightenment” reason, they were effectively considered outside of European humanity. Apart from this, setting up this “foundation” for human existence proves troubling because the very concept of a foundation—structurally speaking—seeks to dislocate bodies from the rest of the world. Foundations set apart, and isolate, all that is built on their perimeter. It limits what can and cannot be established, killing off all roots--or histories--and establishing itself as the origin of the order. Ironically, as they convey a desire to unite multiple elements into one single structure (just as the foundation of a house attempts to bring together all of the parts of the house, from the wood used to construct spaces, to the spaces themselves), foundations are based on a system of “is/is not.” Because they are finite regions, they always exclude. Seeking a “foundational” humanity, then, sets up an understanding of the human that requires exclusions and boundaries. So far, this desire for a foundational humanity is what has limited much expansion of the concept of what it means to be “human.” In order for humanity to progress beyond the point of a binarized logic of either/or this concept of a “foundation” of human existence must be eradicated. Since its inception, the Cartesian division (of mind and body, or reason and form) has become the cornerstone for definitions of humanity. However, if, as Bart Simon argues, “the revolutionary Enlightenment narratives” of the human reestablished the foundations of the human and “challenged an oppressive feudal order and reenvisioned [sic] „man‟ as rational, autonomous, unique, and free” (4), it only did so for a small sector of humanity. As focusing on the “feudal order” left many other sectors of humanity untouched and without vision, it served to both turn the human into a product of politics and economics by expanding the population of humanity based on ownership rights. And, as Susan Bordo argues, the Cartesian model presents problems for humanity because it “is nothing if not a passion for separation, purification, and demarcation,” where the body is separated from the mind (17). Acting as the scalpel, Descartes‟ reliance--or, perhaps more appropriately, his insistence—on reason further complicates the question of “what is human” since, in an attempt to form “a unified system of absolute knowledge” (4), the model further divided human existence within the world, and placed humanity further at odds with the rest of the world (4). Instead of uniting humanity, the Cartesian “Man” was now limited to white males who could reason and who could, with this reason, properly make use of the environment; or, in other words, at this point, another classification of the human was established based on “his” ability to subjugate “his” environment and all that existed (without Enlightenment approved reason) within it.6 Origins became tied to European reason, and, in doing this, denied all non-Europeans access to ontology. It is from this point—from an attempt to enter the “body” of humanity—that Fanon’s humanism seems to stem Fanon’s cries for seeing the “equality of all men in the world” **(**Black Skin 110) based on their ability to rationalize it (123) show him continually trying to climb onto, and establish residency on this “revolutionary” foundation of humanity**.** By clinging to the already troubled concept of a “foundational” humanness, Fanon seems to ignore the fact that this “all-inclusive” humanity is established on principles of exclusion and can never be entered as long as the system remains intact. Fanon troubles a potentially fruitful argument on postcolonial existence because he, as many of his predecessors, attempts to focus on the origins of postcolonial individuals—looking to the ideologies of the colonizer as the point of this origin—and, all the while further grounding a postcolonial future within the colonial situation. If postcoloniality is forever a “descendent” of colonization, it can never move beyond exclusion because it is always defined as exclusion. For postcolonialism alone, this is an arduous—and perhaps impossible—task. However, by “reading” postcoloniality as part of whatGiles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call a rhizome (6), it is possible to break Fanon‟s postcolonial search for reclaiming an origin, and allow for an understanding of “self” that does not predicate itself upon the rationalization of existence, but on the understanding and appreciation of interconnections of existence. In order to move beyond the effects of colonization, postcoloniality can no longer afford to be seen as a “product of” colonization—or white European actions. It must be understood on different terms.¶ While it must be noted that posthumanism— much like postcolonialism—is an academic endeavor, the field’s importance comes in its insistence that, as Myra Seaman phrases it, “there has never been one unified, cohesive ‘human’” (246-47). The “human” derived from European humanism have been nothing more than, to quote N. Katherine Hayles, a labels knighted upon a “fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice” (286). It is in this attempt to rethink human relationships not only with the environment but with other human bodies, and ultimately redefine what it means to be human from a more “global” perspective that possible strategies for rethinking postcoloniality arise. Because it emphasizes “deterritorializations” and “reterritorializations” **(**Deleuze and Guattari 10) the rhizome offers a break from an understanding of the human as a “point” to be entered. As “there are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root” (8) the idea that the human has a point of origin, and that, in postcoloniality, European culture is the postcolonial‟s point of origin can be discarded. What, instead, the rhizome makes available are a multiplicity of lines (8) which can be understood as continuous forms. This is important because, “reading” postcoloniality as part a rhizome means understanding that there was existence before, through, and after the events of colonization, therefore separating the origins of postcolonial individuals from those of the colonizer. A separation in this way restores “validity” to the existence of the postcolonial, removes the concept of victimhood—or victimization—and sets the understanding that not all contact is—although there may at times be horrific incidents, or periods**—**negative.¶ In addition to this, since rhizomes are multiplicities (of lines, no less) and seek—unlike Fanon—to do away with the concept of “unity,” since unity “always operates in an empty dimension supplementary to that of the system considered (overcoding)” (8), there no longer exists a need for postcolonial individuals to desire to ascend the hierarchy established by colonization**.** Postcoloniality, as a rhizome, no longer needs to enter into the humanity of the colonizer because, as a rhizome, it is allowed—no, it is necessary—to be apart from the other. As a rhizome they remain connected. Moreover, redefining the human in terms of a posthuman-postcoloniality allows for the possibility of opening all sectors of humanity so that the human is understood as a nexus rather than a solid form. Still, much work is needed in order to more fully understand postcoloniality as rhizomatic. As established, postcoloniality includes not only the physical, political, economic, and social modes of postcolonized individuals, but at the heart of these modes rests a linguistic model that establishes the “presence” of individuals. This presence works in two parts: first it establishes a vacuum in which it can place its subject, and it then institutes them as European-style individuals.

## Biopower

#### **States of exception aren’t created equal – the 1AC’s insists that power operates through the collapse of legal caesuras, which normalizes the production of extra-legal racializing assemblages and ignores that the hieroglyphics of the flesh need no legal qualifications to function**

Weheliye 14Alexander Weheliye, Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University, 2014, “Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human,”

Because the dossier is so limited in scope and in order to bring Benjamin into the Schmittian fold, Agamben takes it upon himself to revise the text of Origin as it appears in the German edition of Benjamin’s collected works: “An unfortunate emendation in the text of the Gesammelte Schriften has prevented all the implications of this shift from being assessed. Where Benjamin’s text read, Es gibt eine barocke Eschatologie , ‘there is a baroque eschatology,’ the editors, with a singular disregard for all philological care, have corrected it to read**:** Es gibt keine . . . ‘there is no baroque eschatology’” (State of Exception , 56). According to Rolf Tiedemann, the editor of Benjamin’s Gesammelte Schriften , this particular amendment is based on contextual conjecture, as are other editorial changes, since Benjamin states at several other points in the text that the German baroque was characterized by an absence of eschatology, for instance: “the baroque knows no eschatology” and “the rejection of the eschatology of the religious dramas is characteristic of the new drama throughout Europe.” 37 The problem lies not so much in Agamben’s linking of Schmitt’s and Benjamin’s ideas, but rather in the alacrity with which he postulates direct historical connections between these two thinkers. These philological canards become indicative of Agamben’s overall appropriation of Benjamin, which has at its goal the annexing— by any means necessary— of Benjamin into the mainstream at the cost of disregarding Benjamin’s liminal status in Germany during his lifetime; it also downplays both the Marxist elements, as fractured as they may have been, and those aspects regarding the revolutionary potentiality of the oppressed in Benjamin’s philosophy. As a result, the homo sacer’s social death appears as the only feature of his or her subjectivity. Taking in other instantiations of mere life such as colonialism, racial slavery, or indigenous genocide opens up a sociopolitical sphere in which different modalities of life and death, power and oppression, pain and pleasure, inclusion and exclusion form a continuum that embody the hidden and not-so-veiled matrices of contemporary sovereignty. Agamben’s dogmatic insistence on a stringently juridical instantiation of the state of exception reinstitutes the Holocaust as the most severe and paradigmatic manifestation of bare life(here bolstered by a legal rather than moral frame of reference), and this argument also neglects forms of bare life that take place within the jurisdiction of the normal legal order. This reliance on a dogmatic conception of not only the state of exception but law in general materializes in Agamben’s discussion of incarceration. Contra Foucault, Agamben excludes the prison from the state of exception, and thus the production of bare life, because it forms a part of penal law and not martial law(the state of exception) and is therefore legally within “the normal order.” The camp, on the other hand, represents the absolute space of exception, which is “topologically different from a simple space of confinement” ( Homo Sacer , 20). 38 But as Angela Davis and Colin Dayan, among others, have shown, the violent practices in U.S. prisons neither deviate significantly from Agamben’s description of bare life vis-à-vis the suspension of law nor are mere spaces of detention. 39 Dayan explicitly addresses the continuities between slavery, imprisonment, and the torture in the Abu Ghraib prison through an excavation of the various interpretations of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, especially the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment,” which has been evacuated of its meaning by locating its significance solely in relation to the intent of the perpetrator. 40 In Angela Davis’s observation, torture suffuses everyday life in the United States and abroad: “The military detention center as a site of torture and repression does not, therefore, displace domestic supermaximum security prison. . . . My point is that the normalization of torture, the everydayness of torture that is characteristic of the supermax may have a longer staying power than the outlaw military prison.” 41 Slavery, imprisonment, and torture, in U.S. prisons and abroad, are legal in the strict sense and very much part of the “normal order.” Still they display many of the same features Agamben ascribes to the camp as the definitive site for the production of bare life**.** If we take into account the racial dimensions of the U.S. penal system, imprisonment, and torture in their full juridical and cultural normalness, it would seem that racial violence is always already beyond the law under a constant state of siege. In other words, the normal order is differentially and hierarchically structured and does not necessitate a legal state of exception in order to fabricate the mere life of those subjects already marked for violent exclusion; in fact, we might even say that this is its end goal. In the contemporary United States, the prison-industrial complex functions as a racializing assemblage that dysselects black and Latinx subjects, branding them with the hieroglyphics of the flesh. In this way, blackness and racism figure as major zones of indistinction: blackness as a vital (nonlegal) state of exception in the domain of modern humanity. Which is to say, the judicial machine is instantiated differentially according to various hierarchical structures and frequently abandons numerous subjects, making them susceptible to premature death within the scope of the normal order, which, in turn, aids in the creation and maintenance of caesura among humans. Instead of being seduced by the supposed omniscience of the law, we should ask, as Dayan does, “what does the law mask?” to underscore what remains “rotten at the core of the law” (Benjamin) or its “bare-faced two-facedness” (Spillers), especially for the oppressed. Agamben goes to great lengths to show that the political tools of subjection developed during the Holocaust were not simply blunders in the progressive march of western modernity. The Holocaust provides such an apt formation for Agamben’s theorization of modern politics precisely because the Third Reich as a whole took place in a legal state of exception after the suspension of regular German law in 1933. 42 After Hitler had been appointed chancellor on January 30, 1933, the Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat and the Ermächtigungsgesetz (Enabling Act) were issued in February and March 1933 respectively, withdrawing most civil liberties from German citizens while granting the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei ( nsdap) leadership almost unlimited powers in legislative, judicial, and executive matters. Since these edicts were not repealed until 1945, they established martial law (the state of exception) in effect for the duration of the Third Reich. Carl Schmitt has famously defined the sovereign as “he who decides on the state of exception,” which Agamben takes as his starting point for thinking about the field of politics. 43 Even though he claims that the state of exception cannot be conceptualized solely in legal terms, since it represents the juridical suspension of the law, Agamben insists, “a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law” ( State of Exception , 1). Nevertheless, as several critics have noted, the state of exception does not apply equally to all, since the exclusion of and violence perpetrated against some groups is anchored in the law. In a salient piece about planetary violence and the emergence of disposable populations, Ronald Judy states, “They [cannot] be explained in terms of exception, because the conditions of their existence know no temporal limits nor result from crises of sovereignty. . . . The occurrence of violence associated with disposable populations is symptomatic of the irrelevance of the entire discourse of sovereignty to the current arrangements of power, except when it operates as a means of ‘effecting control over mortality’ and as ‘a way of exercising the right to kill.’” 44 As opposed to the temporally bound state of exception espoused by Agamben and Schmitt that revokes the legal entitlements of all citizens, here different populations— often racialized— are suspended in a perpetual state of emergency in which legal rituals stain dysselected individuals and groups with the hieroglyphics of the flesh. And, as evidenced in the prison-industrial complex, the pretense of juridical equality rarely abolishes selective legal insouciance or genocidal acts against those who have been touched by racializing assemblages of the flesh.

The aff’s Foucaultian conception of power only naturalizes the power of racializing assemblages by presuming a Foucault’s biopower re-entrenches humanism - Eurocentric demarcation between the west and the rest and disavowing the sociogenetic character of racialization

Weheliye 14Alexander Weheliye, Associate Professor of African American Studies at Northwestern University, 2014, “Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human,”

In the Society lectures Foucault defines biopolitics as the power of the European state to “make live and let die,” which begins to shatter the hitherto unitary body politic of European nations at the end of the eighteenth century and comes to fully engulf these societies that must be defended throughout the nineteenth century. 12 This is the moment in which politics takes hold of the biological and the biological health of the national population defines the exercise of state power; and, according to Foucault, it produces a “racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements, and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification , and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalization” ( Society, 60). Careful to establish that racism preexists this moment, even though both its quality and primary function shift, Foucault shows how racism “had already been in existence for a very long time. But I think it functioned elsewhere [ Je ne veux pas dire du tout que le racisme a été inventé à cette époque. Il existait depuis bien longtemps. Mais je crois qu’il fonctionnait ailleurs ]” ( Society , 254/214). Racism, which up to this point had led a peaceful conceptual and historical life in an unspecified terra incognita, thus journeys from the uncharted periphery into the heart of the modern European nation-state. Yet despite locating the naissance of modern racism in “colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide” ( Society , 257), for Foucault, in a reversal of colonial modernity’s teleology that locates the temporal origin of all things in the west, racism only attains relevance once it penetrates the borders of fortress Europe. Even though the originating leap of racism can be found in the colonized “rest,” only its biopolitical rearticulation in the west imbues it with the magical aura of conceptual value. Because Foucault does not describe this *ailleurs* or even mention it again in the text, it materializes as a primitive topography, operating as a constitutive outside for his theory of biopolitics throughout these lectures. In logic, primitive terms or notions, also referred to as axioms or postulates, name instantly understandable terms that are used without elucidating their signification. The meanings of all other concepts in a logical system are determined by these primitive terms and by previously established expressions. Over the course of his argument about the genesis of biopolitics in the lectures, Foucault will continue to distinguish European state racism and biopolitics from those primeval forms of racism that linger in the aforementioned philosophical, geographical, and political quicksands of an unspecified elsewhere; at least, this is what we are asked to infer as a consequence of Foucault’s taciturnity about the reach and afterlife of those other modalities of racialization. In another context, Foucault defends the recurrent dearth of geographical specification in his oeuvre thus: “I don’t specify the space of reference more narrowly than that since it would be as warranted to say ‘I am speaking only of France’ as to say ‘I am talking about all of Europe.’ There is indeed a task to be done of making the space in question precise, saying where a certain process stops, what are the limits beyond which one could say ‘something different happens’—though this would have to be a collective undertaking.” 13 Alas, this collective undertaking has yet to be realized and it continues to be reproduced in contemporary biopolitics and bare life discourse. In several of the 1975– 76 lectures Foucault also employs the term colonization figuratively in order to ask whether there “isn’t a danger that they [our genealogical fragments] will be recoded, recolonized by these unitary discourses” ( Society , 11), to explain how madness and sexuality were “colonized and supported by global mechanisms and, finally, by the entire system of the State” (33), to demonstrate how “normalizing procedures are increasingly colonizing the procedures of the law” (38– 39), to argue that the Hegelian dialectic “be understood as philosophy and right’s colonization and authoritarian colonization of a historico-political discourse that was both a statement of fact, a proclamation, and a practice of social warfare” (58), and to show how the discourse of war was “restricted, colonized, settled, scattered, civilized if you like, and up to a point pacified” (215) within historical discourse at the close of the eighteenth century. The slippage between colonialism as a historical phenomenon and colonization as a synonym for hegemonic appropriation or annexation underscores the primitiveness of this concept in Foucault’s system of thought, in much the same way as the idea of ethnic racism, which I discuss shortly. That is, despite the fact that the histories of colonialism and racism secure Foucault’s definition of biopolitics, for Foucault the meaning of colonization and ethnic racism are immediately understandable, and as such they are exploited without the peripheral benefits of explication. More generally, Foucault positions biopolitics against rather simplified definitions of, on the one hand, an “ordinary racism . . . that takes the traditional form of mutual contempt or hatred between races” and, on the other, racism as an “ideological operation that allows States, or a class, to displace the hostility that is directed toward them . . . onto a mythical adversary” ( Society , 258). In its place, modern European racism provides a deeper domain, because it supplies the conditions of possibility for biopolitics, and although Foucault sees modern racism as originating in colonialism, he ultimately uses the Third Reich to illustrate the full reach of biopower when he writes, “of course, no state could have more disciplinary power than the Nazi regime. Nor was there any other State in which the biological was so tightly, so insistently, regulated” ( Society , 259). 14 We should remain vigilant about not acquiescing to these monumentalizing protocols (and Agamben’s) because, more often than not, they achieve their aggrandizing effect by not taking into account the historical relationality and conceptual contiguity between Nazi racism and the other forms of biopolitics I discussed earlier, those perfected in colonialism, indigenous genocide, racialized indentured servitude, and racial slavery, for instance. 15 They also discount discussions of those racializing assemblages that Foucault and Agamben consign to a theoretico-geographical no-Man’s-land. Moreover, given Foucault’s principal point about the overall pervasiness of biopolitics in Europe, why must its most severe incarnation bear the heavy burden of paradigmatic exemplariness, just as it does in Agamben? Why not simply examine the biopolitics of Nazi racism qua Nazi racism? Why must this form of racism necessarily figure as the apex in the telos of modern racializing assemblages? Even when considering modes of biopolitical racialization in the socialist state, Foucault’s interpretation hinges on setting it apart from a narrow definition of racism: “Quite naturally, we find that racism— not a truly ethnic racism [ le racisme proprement ethnique ] but racism of the evolutionist kind, biological racism— is fully operational in the way socialist States (of the Soviet Union type) deal with the mentally ill, criminals, political adversaries, and so on” ( Society , 261– 62/222). Initially, the caesura Foucault places between ethnic and biological racism seems to productively counteract some of his foregoing remarks about this question; at closer look, however, the distinction exposes the shortcomings of Foucault’s approach to race and racism**.** Because Foucault fails to probe the decidedly undemonic ground of his argument, he uncritically embraces an ontological differentiation between ethnic and biopolitical racism, leaving the door open for the naturalization of racial categories and the existence of a biological sphere that is not always already subject to ethnic racism. However, all modern racism is biological, first, because it maintains the believed natural— often evolutionary— inferiority of the targeted subjects and, second, because racialization is instituted, as elucidated by Wynter, in the realm of human physiology as the sociogenic selection of one specific group in the name of embodying all humanity. So rather than dysselecting phenotypically nonwhite or Jewish subjects, socialist biopower racializes sets of humans (criminals, dissidents, etc.) that are not distinctive in Man’s racial epidermal schema but are nevertheless classified as deviating from full (socialist) humans according to a preestablished pecking order that is deemed beyond the authority of human culture or politics. 16 Put bluntly, there exists no significant difference between ethnic and biological racism in the way Foucault imagines, since both rely on the same tools of trade: racializing assemblages. Nevertheless, it appears as if Foucault can only authenticate the uniqueness and novelty of European biopolitical racism by conjuring the antithetical spirits of racisms always already situated in a primitive elsewhere. Foucault concedes that the idea of race has no stable anchor in the biological; rather it names “a certain historico-political divide” in which “two races exist whenever one writes the history of two groups which do not, at least to begin with, have the same language or, in many cases, the same religion” ( Society , 77). If divergences in language and religion between different humans serve as the markers for racial difference within the confines of Europe, this passage cannot explain how theoperations of race differ constitutively from those of nationalism, to name one obvious example. Foucault, then, moves quite swiftly to explain that races “exist when there are two groups which, although they coexist, have not become mixed because of the differences, dissymmetries, and barriers created by privileges, customs and rights, the distribution of wealth, or the way in which power is exercised” ( Society , 77). Here, Foucault supplies so broad a definition of racism that it could be applied to any number of categories that have been brandished to create caesuras among different humans: economic and social class, nationality, gender, for instance**.** We are confronted with these resulting questions: How does this definition of race diverge from ethnic racism? Are the racialized classes in ethnic racism not segregated as a result of the distribution of wealth or the deployment of power? Moreover, Foucault does not explain how these groups come to exist as different. How are we to understand the distinction between coexistence and mixing, or what their particular mixing might entail, and so on? Hence, in a fashion similar to Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault positions hybridity as a panacea for racial difference without querying the foundation upon which the idea of racial differences among humans is built. Ultimately, Foucault, despite stressing the importance of racism to the machinations of biopolitics, restrains its full conceptual reverberations, because he relies on a commonsensical notion of racism as his primitive straw man, and because he remains confined to a version of nineteenth-century Europe oddly unscathed by colonialism and ethnic racism. Of course colonial configurations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries would at least partially derive from the intramural tensions within and between European nations given that these tensions were exported to the colonies elsewhere around the globe. As a result, colonization unavoidably reflects the racializing assemblages interior to Europe, while techniques that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans developed in the colonies inflect those at home, and which Foucault, following Hannah Arendt, terms the boomerang-effect of colonialism. 17 The fundamental problem, then, is not that Foucault largely omits colonialism and the non-western world from the province of his discussion of racism, but, to be more precise, that he and some of his followers assume there to be substantial inconsistency between a “confrontation of two alien races” and the “bifurcation within Europe’s social fabric,” which demarcates the inadequate and limiting theoretical parameters of Foucault’s conception of racism. 18 Though Foucault does not deploy the term alien races , his insistence on the spatiotemporal disjuncture between the race from “here” and the race that came from “another place” as well as the reemergence of the race from the past within it cannot but echo colonialist tropes and “recapitulation theory”: “The other race is basically not the race that came from elsewhere . . . but . . . it is a race that is permanently, ceaselessly infiltrating the social body. . . . What we see . . . as a binary rift within society is not a clash between two distinct races. It is the splitting of a single race into a superrace and a subrace. To put it a different way, it is the reappearance, within a single race, of the past of that race” ( Society , 61). Within this context, alien races— Ann Stoler’s very unfortunate rephrasing of Foucault’s ethnic racism, to be sure— dodge the brush of discourse, dwelling in a speculative state of organic truth. This line of reasoning rests on the presumptions that such a thing as alien races exist, that the confrontation between them (ethnic racism) need not be explained, and that Europe— remember it is immaterial whether this signifies France or Europe as a whole— was internally cohesive, because racism dwelled elsewhere prior to the ascent of biopolitics in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Therefore, in Foucault’s schema race and racism, insofar as they have yet to achieve proper biopolitical credentials, take on the shape of an inevitable clash between unacquainted civilizations. There lies a vast gulf between an argument that explores the particular techniques of racialization which appeared in Europe over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and one that attests to some form of cultural, social, or ontological anteriority of alien races. Put simply, Foucault never interrogates the bare existence of racial difference and those hierarchies fabricated upon this primordial notion and, as a result, reinscribes racial difference as natural. Because ethnic racism is based on preestablished variances among different ethnicities, it evidently demands no further elaboration in Foucault’s genealogical deduction of modern racializing assemblages, and thus emerges as a fixed category rather than as the biopolitical apparatus it actually is**.** Conversely**,** the fission that appears within Europe’s autochthonous population in this period assumes the fragmentation of a formerly cohesive body politic: the proliferation of biopower produces the hierarchical differentiation of internal groups as races, whereas the caesuras between European and alien races exist outside the vicissitudes of biopolitics**.** In Foucault’s model,race and ethnicity remain always already beyond the administrative, ideological, and conceptual precincts of Europe; they function as and in an unnamed elsewhere. 19 The elision and active disavowal of racism , colonization , and ethnic racism in these lectures and beyond become even more pronounced if we bear in mind the unacknowledged influence of the Black Panther Party (BPP) , especially the thinking of George Jackson and Angela Davis, on Foucault’s work in this period. According to Brady Heiner and Joy James, Foucault was familiar with Davis’s and Jackson’s thinking through his affiliation with Groupe d’Infor­ mation sur les Prisons, an antiprison group Foucault helped found, and which translated Davis’s and Jackson’s writings and published a pamphlet about the assassination of George Jackson in France. In addition to tracing historical lines between Foucault and the bpp , persuasively showing just how much Foucault’s ideas about incarceration, state racism, and disciplinary power owe to Davis and Jackson, Heiner asks, “Given the formative role that black power plays in Foucault’s elaboration of the concepts of power-knowledge, genealogy and biopower, why is it that the enunciative force of black power is met with social, civil and biological death while that of power-knowledge is subject to canonization in a host of academic disciplines?” 20 The short answer to this important question would insist on the many different ways white supremacy and coloniality still form the glue for the institutional and intellectual disciplinarity of western critical thought. Since the ideas of the BPP are limited to concerns with ethnic racism elsewhere, they do not register as thought qua thought, and can thus be exploited by and elevated to universality only in the hands of European thinkers such as Foucault, albeit without receiving any credit. [Dear reader, if this reminds you of the colonial expropriation of natural resources, you would be neither wrong nor alone in making such an assumption. In the words of Kanye West: that shit cray.] In a trenchant and timely essay, Achille Mbembe offers an extensive contextualization for the many reasons that the history of colonialism and postcolonial studies have made so little impact on French thought since the 1960s. This lacuna represents a marked departure from Sartre’s conversation with Negritude or the relays between surrealism and anticolonialism, to name only a few of the most obvious instances of earlier white French intellectual discussions of these thematics. 21 Though Mbembe writes specifically about France, most western European nations exhibit the same sort of popular cultural and intellectual amnesia regarding (post)coloniality; whither, for instance, coloniality in Jürgen Habermas’s or Antonio Negri’s thinking? Not only does the systematic neglect of race and coloniality as analytic topoi in much of western European critical thought since the 1960s accent the poverty of theory in the European context, it also enables the disavowal of these questions in the U.S. variant of critical theory. Ironically, despite— and most likely because of— the provinciality of post-­1960s French and western European thought with regard to questions of coloniality and race, it continues to enjoy great success in the Anglo-American academy, which, in turn, authorizes the ongoing acts of active disremembering such as Foucault’s**.** Thus, while French president François Hollande may now acknowledge the presence of “Niggas in Paris,**”** Mbembé offers a more somber and radical diagnosis of this dilemma: “For such a critical thought to have a future at all, we must first turn our backs on that form of anachronism we have come to know as Parisianism.” 22 Perhaps, then, the time has come to bid adieu to Foucault’s metropolitan territoire d’outre-mer . 23

## Temporality

Linear temporality is a fantasy – Time can’t function on a normative plane because of the functions of white supremacist violence that renders black existence impossible

**Dillon 13** Stephen; University of Minnesota; Fugitive Life: Race, Gender, and the Rise of the Neoliberal-Carceral State; University of Minnesota Conservancy; accessed 8/23/15

In this chapter, I continue to consider time in relation to how radical and revolutionary activists theorized the formation of the neoliberal-carceral state in the 1970s United States. In chapter one, I argued that the neoliberal-carceral state is possessed by the racialized, gendered, and financial logics of chattel-slavery. More specifically, I focused on **neoliberalism** to argue **that the market is a system of dispersed biopolitical control symbiotically enmeshed with the prison and animated by the antiblackness of chattel-slavery.** This chapter builds on the concerns of the first by asking, if time does not pass, but accumulates, then what did the future of the prison and **neoliberalism** look like **from** the 1970s when both **formations** were **rising to a new level of dominance**? In particular, I explore what I call the “temporality of violence.” As I document, **racialized** and gendered forms of **violence undo homogenous conceptions of time.** **Possession is one temporality of violence where the past takes hold of the present.** **Yet, possession also has profound implications for the future.** When one centers **racialized** and gendered forms of **violence** in a theory of history, **time does not flow evenly,** **progressing into a better** or unknown **future**. Instead, **violence can slow time, reverse it, loop it, make it stop or rush by in a moment of terror**; **it can also make it disappear forever**. This chapter explores different conceptions of the relationship between time, race, gender, and violence. It examines two contrasting visions of how neoliberalism and the prison were connected to time and the future: I analyze the rhetoric of late 1960s law and order politicians and the epistemologies of 1970s underground revolutionaries.162 Specifically, I examine how a **discourse about time and** the **future was used by** proponents of **law** and order **to suture the freedom of the market** to the incapacitation of the prison. In addition, I explore how underground revolutionary activists named this process through a non-normative engagement with temporality. While the last chapter considered how the past is theorized in the writings of imprisoned (and at one time underground) revolutionary black women, this chapter analyzes the writings of 1970s imprisoned radicals and underground revolutionaries, most of whom identified as women, in order to examine how they theorized the prison and the market in relation to time and the future. It contrasts these revolutionary visions to the dreams of people like Nixon who understood the prison and the market as foundational to the security and order of the nation and its future. Indeed, for Nixon and others, the very possibility of a future depended on the immobilization of those rendered surplus or resistant to new economic regimes structured around privatization, deindustrialization, deregulation, and financialization. In other words, embedded in the emergent discourses of the neoliberal-carceral state was a vision of the future—one where the freedom of individuality and the market required the mass immobilization of the prison. By contrasting statist and underground forms of knowledge about the prison and market, I argue that underground activists produced a theory of time and history that understood law and order as a way for the prison and market to colonize the future.

## Anthro

Anthropocentric studies personify all humans as the Western Man and presumes equal access to western humanity—yet ignores the alternative versions of humanity that exist and are excluded by the Animal vs. Man categorization as per the 1AC.

Weheliye 14 [Alexander G. Weheliye, (Alexander G. Weheliye is Professor of African American Studies and English at Northwestern University.) "Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, And Black Feminist Theories Of The Human" Duke University Press., 8-1-2014, https://www.dukeupress.edu/habeas-viscus] */* MM \*brackets in original text

We also find this in current studies of posthumanism associated with theories of technological virtuality, as well as in the embryonic field of animal studies. In these modes of inquiry, **Man interfaces with a plethora of informational technologies, or in the case of animal studies sheds its superiority complex vis-à-vis nonhuman animals, and enters into the space and time of the posthuman.** Moreover, many **invocations of posthumanism**, whether in antihumanist post-structuralist theorizing or in current considerations of technology and animality, **reinscribe the humanist subject (Man) as the personification of the human by insisting that this is the category to be overcome, rarely considering cultural and political formations outside the world of Man that might offer alternative versions of humanity.** 18 Moreover, posthumanism and **animal studies isomorphically yoke humanity to the limited possessive individualism of Man, because these discourses also presume that we have now entered a stage in human development where all subjects have been granted equal access to western humanity and that this is**, indeed, **what we all want to overcome. It is remarkable, for instance, how the** (not so) dreaded **comparison between human and animal slavery is brandished about in the field of animal studies** and how black liberation struggles serve as both the positive and negative foil for making a case for the sentience and therefore emancipation of nonhuman beings.19 **This sleight of hand comes easy to those critics attempting to achieve animal rights and is frequently articulated comparatively vis-à-vis black subjects’ enslavement in the Americas**—“the moral and intellectual jujitsu that yielded the catachresis, person-as-property.”20

## Identity

# Add On

## Alt

### Surveillance

#### Our alternative allows us to engage in an underground, illegible form of politics outside of the knowledge and control of state surveillance

Dillon 13 Fugitive Life: Race, Gender, and the Rise of the Neoliberal-Carceral State, Stephen Dillon is an assistant professor of Queer Studies, holds a B.A. from the University of Iowa and a Ph.D. in American Studies with a minor in Critical Feminist and Sexuality Studies from the University of Minnesota. https://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/handle/11299/153053/Dillon\_umn\_0130E\_13833.pdf?sequence=1

**As law and order**, **especially** in the form of the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program (**COINTELPRO**), **systematically dismantled the radical and revolutionary left** in the United States (through disinformation, murder, sabotage, incarceration, and exile), **a massive network of underground groups emerged** in the early 1970s in the place of the 1960s aboveground student, civil rights, and anti-war organizations.233 In **order to evade state repression and engage illegal tactics, thousands of activists disappeared into a vast network of safe houses, under-the-table jobs, and transportation channels that kept them hidden in plain sight**. One of the main arguments of this dissertation is that these groups contested the emergence of the neoliberal-carceral state. Some of the better-known groups like the Black Liberation Army splintered off from the Black Panthers and other black power groups, while the Weather Underground departed from the student and antiwar movements of the New Left. Still other groups, like the Seattle-based George Jackson Brigade—a group of multi-racial, queer, working class ex-convicts—emerged out of the culture and politics of the era’s anti-prison activism.234 Other underground groups of the period about which much less is known include: Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional, the Chicano Liberation Front, Red Guerilla Family, Emiliano Zapata Unit, Iranian Liberation Army, United Freedom Front (or the “Ohio 7”), Sam Melville-Jonathan Jackson Unit, Nat Turner/John Brown Brigade, and the New World Liberation Front. **Many of these groups remain historically obscure because invisibility was their condition of possibility**. **Underground organizations survived by incessantly erasing the subtle traces every life leaves behind: the detritus of bodies—fingerprints, hair, and skin—but also memories, stories, and documents that could lead to recognition and capture. In this way, a major aspect of their history is what will never be known: what they did, who they were, where and how they lived**. In fact, for three years beginning in 1974, **the New World Liberation Front committed over 50 bombings in the San Francisco area** (including banks, power stations, corporate offices, the San Francisco stock brokerage, and the South African embassy) **without injuring one person and without a single member ever being identified or apprehended**.235 **The underground was a space structured by a politics of unknowing. Indeed, a controlled lack of knowledge— “an endorsement of willful forgetting**”—you will know what you need to know when you need to know it, was the condition of possibility for the continuation of the underground.236 **This invisibility and illegibility contrasted with the regimes of hypersurveillance**, regulation, **and policing** central to the law and order state As the next chapter explores more fully**, the underground is not a place, but rather, is an alternative time-space paradigm, a “parallel universe,” a shadow world that exists within, but negates the normative time of the nation, state, and capital**. **The underground is a non-place** where one hides in the “expectations of others,” fashioning survival along different dimensions that mobilized “timing and synchronization, the thoughtful use of light and shadow, rhythm and pulse.”237 **The fugitive became a ghost by disappearing into the openness of the world. New lives and identities were constructed by piecing together fragments collected while on the run**: new styles, clothing, voices, histories, andnames. David Gilbert, a member of the Weather Underground and later a group associated with the Black Liberation Army, recounts that fugitives had to even learn to walk differently: gait and carriage sometimes were more recognizable than hair or clothing.238 However, “the most essential tool for staying underground was ID.”239 Bill Ayers, a founding member of the Weather Underground, recounts how political fugitives often scoured rural cemeteries for the graves of dead children: born between 1940 and 1950 and who died five to ten years later. With a name and birth date, they would acquire a birth certificate from the local courthouse and then apply for a social security card that had never been issued.240 They could then get jobs, buy cars, and get bank accounts. **The newly disappeared resurfaced as the dead resurrected**.241

## Cards for Case

#### Only critical theory prompts social movements – modern politics is dead

Burch 01 [ASSISTANT PF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY Kerry, “The Significance of Critical Pedagogy for Cultural Studies” Theory & Event, 5:3, pg. Projectmuse ] / MM

Giroux shows how some new Left theorists, while recognizing the importance of class, also "made visible…interconnected forms of oppression organized against women, racial minorities, gay men and lesbians, the aged, the disabled, and others" (25). On this basis, Giroux argues that insurgent political movements in the United States during the 1960s and after were positively affected by theoretical work which initially emerged from the cultural realm but which evolved into a more classic political instantiation. According to Giroux, since Rorty and Gitlin privilege class at the exclusion of other sites of identity construction, they overlook the vital pedagogical relation which can potentially transform sites of cultural interpretation into a heightened political awareness, the obvious precondition for heightened political action. To support this position, Giroux points to the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACTUP) and to feminist theorists, both of whom broadened the scope of the political first through a cultural aegis. Giroux is persuasive in showing how Rorty and Gitlin's prescriptions, taken to their logical conclusion, would result in a deculturalization of politics. The danger in adopting such a constricted view of the political within the academy is that it tacitly erects a protective, curricular shield around the corporate narratives which increasingly govern the production of youth identity and desire. This discourse is troubling because it separates culture from politics and leaves little room for capturing the contradictions within dominant institutions that open up political and social possibilities for contesting domination, doing critical work within the schools and other public spheres, of furthering the capacity of students and others to question oppressive forms of authority and the operations of power (31, emphasis added).

#### Our stance is the only effective strategy. The political has already been ceded to the right—broadening the scope of politics is key to effective engagement

Grondin 04 [David – Masters Political Science, Ph.D Canidate University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies] PDF

A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world politics that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a broader meaning, especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). Poststructuralism thus gives primacy to the political, since it acts on us,

#### Don’t drop Antonio!

**Antonio 95** (Nietzsche’s antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History”; American Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor,) / MM

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that **persons** (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They **are so** thoroughly **absorbed in simulating** effective **role players that they have trouble being anything but actors**-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." **Integrity, decisiveness**, spontaneity, and pleasure **are undone by paralyzing** **over concern about possible** causes, meanings, and **consequences** of acts **and** unending *internal dialogue* about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor?  A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new **simulated versions**. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly **combination** of **desperate conforming** and overreaching **and** untrammeled **ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant** (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-

#### **We should produce an educational space that is critical of everything**

Schlag 3 (Pierre, Distinguished Prof. @ U. of Colorado and Byron R. White Professor @ Colorado Law School, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 1029) / MM

The presumption is that the words of the judge (if they are well crafted) will effectively produce a social reality that corresponds roughly with the words uttered. But what reason is there to believe this? False Empowerment (No. 2) The endlessly repeated question in first year, "What should the court do?" leads law students to believe that courts respond to the force of the better argument. This would be tolerable if one added two provisos:1. The better argument often means little more than the one the courts are predisposed to believe; and 2. In the phrase "force of better argument" it's important to attend not just to the "better" part, but to the other term as well. False Empowerment (No. 3) Law students first learn of many complex social and economic realities through the medium of case law. What they learn is thus the law's vision of these economic and social realities. Not surprisingly, there is an almost magical correspondence between legal categories and social or economic practices. This magical fit leads law students (later to become law professors) to have an extremely confident view of the efficacy of law. Many law students are cured of this belief-structure by a stay in the legal clinic or by law practice. n4 There is one group of people, however, who are generally not cured of this belief-structure at all, but whose faith is actually intensified. These are the people who hold prestigious judicial clerkships where an emotional proximity to and identification with their judge ("my judge") leads to an even greater confidence in the efficacy of law. These people are frequently chosen to teach in law schools. False empowerment can be disempowering. It can also lead to pessimism and despair. Many people react to a loss of faith in law or legal studies with despair or pessimism. But this is the despair and pessimism that comes from giving up a naieve or a romantic vision of law and/or legal studies. The onslaught of this despair and pessimism is a good thing. It is like the thirty-something who realizes that he is mortal and that life is brief. Generally, this is not welcome news. At the same time, it may help prevent a life spent in Heideggerian dread, tanning salons, or the interstices of footnote 357.When the academic loses faith in law or legal studies, typically that person is most troubled because they have lost the framework that makes their academic project possible. But so what? Isn't the demand that law conform to an academic project arguably a selfish one? The Con, The Joke, and The Ironic Truth The Con: In the courtroom, the appellate judge is typically seated behind an elevated bench. On the classroom blackboard the appellate judge is chalked in above the plaintiff and the defendant. This is both a reflection and a reinforcement of the belief that the appellate judge is an intellectually and politically privileged legal actor. The Joke: In actuality, the appellate judge is a person who operates in conditions of severe information deficits and whose outlook is thoroughly manipulated by professional rhetoricians. Very often he has little or no understanding of the configurations of the social field to which his rulings will apply. What's more, this is a person who is prohibited from talking about the social field, except with a highly restricted number of people. The Ironic Truth: On the other hand, because we believe the appellate judge is a particularly privileged intellectual and political actor, we contribute to making him so. Legal intellectuals like to believe that law is an intelligent enterprise. They like to believe that the law offers an interesting vocabulary, grammar, and rhetoric through which to think about the world and law itself. This is naive. The political demand that law be efficacious means that law must track, must indeed incorporate popular beliefs about social and economic identities, causation, linguistic meaning, and so forth. (Those beliefs are often intellectually bereft.)The Argument Room The argument room is a place where academic advocates go to argue passionately about law and politics. (Apologies to Monty Python.) Within the room, arguments are won and lost; triumphs and defeats are had. But generally, no one outside the room pays much attention to what goes on inside the room. Sometimes there is seepage and fragments of the conversations are heard outside the room. Participants most often spend their time arguing about what should happen outside the room. This they call “knowledge” or "understanding" or "jurisprudence" or “scholarship” or “politics.” The one thing that generally cannot be talked about inside the room is the construction of the room itself. Politics (No. 1) For progressive legal thinkers, politics is a "theoretical unmentionable": The concept "politics" does a great deal of theoretical work and yet its identity remains generally immune from scrutiny. The categories (right, left) and the fundamental grammar of politics (progress, reaction, and so forth) generally go unquestioned. Oddly, while everything else seems to be contingent, conditional, contextual, and so on, the categories of politics seem to be oddly stable, nearly transcendent.

#### The 1AC asks the wrong question - we don’t need rights from the system, we need resistance

Jordan 14Taryn D. Jordan December 2014 College of Arts and Sciences Georgia State University "THE POLITICS OF IMPOSSIBILITY: CECE MCDONALD AND TRAYVON MARTIN— THE BURSTING OF BLACK RAGE" / MM

My thinking of the politics of impossibility does not come out of a vacuum; at least two other scholars who are active in queer and transgender activist politics have been thinking closely about what it means to become comfortable with the possibilities of impossible demands. Stephen Dillon notes in his article “The Only Freedom I Can See” that freedom in terms of **rights-based** campaigns and **policy** platforms **do not provide a pathway to** a queer imaginable world, a **world free from police and prisons** (Dillon 182). He comes to this conclusion by exchanging letters between two different gender queer prisoners who are serving life in prison. Prisoner R notes that she finds her freedom after living in a solitary confinement cell through her physical death in a prison cell, “The only freedom I can see/Is Death in a prison cell” (Prisoner R 181). The impossibility of queer and transgender subjects in prison is based on the shift towards neoliberal politics by the **LGBT movement**, which is no longer interested in members of the community who are most affected by poverty, transphobia, and white supremacy. Instead LGBT politics became **concern**ed **with neoliberal economies** of gay respectability, economic affluence and whiteness (Dillon 181). Thus, it ultimately **left** those **queer** and transgender **bodies behind in the chase for marriage and military**, two institutions steeped in neoliberalism. Gay marriage creates a hetronormative family that is legible to the state and capable of being self-sufficient, leaving out the need for state of federal social welfare. Militarism broadens the project of American imperialism by incorporating gay and lesbian bodies, once seen as abject, into the fold of the American dream. The focus on marriage and military has the effect of splitting the LGBT political base into those who are legible and those who are not. Dean Spade is also an activist and legal scholar who is interested in thinking though the potential of a politics based on impossibility. He, along with Morgan Bassichis and Alexander Lee in their article “Building an Abolitionist Trans and Queer Movement with Everything We’ve Got,” charts a variety of problems affecting poor and people of color (POC) gender queer and transgender people. I see their activist-focused manifesto as a way to think through the possibilities of impossibility, what they are demanding of us as activists and **scholars** is to **think outside of the marriage and military fights** put forward by mainstream LGBT movements (Bassichis, Lee, Spade 36). **Instead they are interested in a politic that links to other struggles**, seeks change that is **focused on** mass **societal change** verse policy-only strategies, that desires social transformation, and that attacks systems that affect queer POC and trans subjectivities the most. Taken together, these strategies urge us to become comfortable with politics that leaves no one behind, and think through how such a politic could be **effective to** all **impossible bodies** (Bassichis, Lee, and Spade 37). Both Dillon and Bassichis, et al situate their work as rooted in critiquing LGBT politics writ large. While this is a worthy fight, I aim to take their critique further and think through what an impossible politic might mean for all bodies that are marked by various dominations emerging from race, gender, class, sexuality, and ability.

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# Overviews

## vs. Ethical Framwork O/V

### Top Level O/V

### Framing O/V

## NOVDEC O/V

### Top Level O/V

### Framing O/V

## SEPOCT O/V

### Top Level O/V

### ROTB O/V

# AT Theory

## Condo

# AT Objections

## AT: All Rights Bad

## AT: Weheliye Inconsistent

## AT: Accessibility

## AT: Anti-Humanism Bad

# AT Policymaking

## O/V Macro Structures

## AT Framework

## AT Methodological Pluralism

## AT Zanotti - Heurisitc

#### Only critical theory prompts social movements – modern politics is dead

Burch 01 [ASSISTANT PF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY Kerry, “The Significance of Critical Pedagogy for Cultural Studies” Theory & Event, 5:3, pg. Projectmuse ] / MM

Giroux shows how some new Left theorists, while recognizing the importance of class, also "made visible…interconnected forms of oppression organized against women, racial minorities, gay men and lesbians, the aged, the disabled, and others" (25). On this basis, Giroux argues that insurgent political movements in the United States during the 1960s and after were positively affected by theoretical work which initially emerged from the cultural realm but which evolved into a more classic political instantiation. According to Giroux, since Rorty and Gitlin privilege class at the exclusion of other sites of identity construction, they overlook the vital pedagogical relation which can potentially transform sites of cultural interpretation into a heightened political awareness, the obvious precondition for heightened political action. To support this position, Giroux points to the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACTUP) and to feminist theorists, both of whom broadened the scope of the political first through a cultural aegis. Giroux is persuasive in showing how Rorty and Gitlin's prescriptions, taken to their logical conclusion, would result in a deculturalization of politics. The danger in adopting such a constricted view of the political within the academy is that it tacitly erects a protective, curricular shield around the corporate narratives which increasingly govern the production of youth identity and desire. This discourse is troubling because it separates culture from politics and leaves little room for capturing the contradictions within dominant institutions that open up political and social possibilities for contesting domination, doing critical work within the schools and other public spheres, of furthering the capacity of students and others to question oppressive forms of authority and the operations of power (31, emphasis added).

#### Our stance is the only effective strategy. The political has already been ceded to the right—broadening the scope of politics is key to effective engagement

Grondin 04 [David – Masters Political Science, Ph.D Canidate University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies] PDF

A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the repoliticization of practices of world politics that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a broader meaning, especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). Poststructuralism thus gives primacy to the political, since it acts on us,

## AT Pappas – Particularism

## AT Coverstone

## AT Lester - Humanism

## AT Materialism

# AT Perms

## Generic Perms Bad

## Perm Double Bind

1. Michelle Koerner, Professor of Comparative Literature at UC-Berkeley, 2012, “Line of Escape: Gilles Deleuze’s Encounter with George Jackson” *Genre*, Volume 44, Number [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Robert Larue, M.A. in English from the University of Texas at Arlington, “MOVING BEYOND THIS MOMENT: EMPLOYING DELEUZE AND GUATARRI‟S RHIZOME IN POSTCOLONIALISM,” August 2011, https://dspace.uta.edu/handle/10106/6148‎ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)