I affirm.

First, presume aff since affirming’s harder so a tie means I’m the better debater. Out of more than 12000 rounds during the course of the last year affs won over 7% fewer rounds[[1]](#footnote-1) and almost 10% fewer rounds at Glenbrooks this topic. Prefer stats since they determine whether analytics actually apply in the real world. Also means all neg theory must be weighed against side bias because otherwise aff abuse just rightfully rectifies the side bias.

Second, to affirm is “**to say that something is true.**”[[2]](#footnote-2) To negate is **“to deny the truth of”** which impliesfor any paradigm of debate to be jurisdictional it must be based on the resolution’s truth or falsity since when you sign the ballot you are saying the better debating was done by the aff.

I value morality since ought implies an obligation.Actions are expressions of an agent’s will and derive from their practical reason. If I cross the street to get bread, the only reason we call that crossing the street is because my intention to get bread unifies all the different steps involved into one action. Any action can be divided up into an infinite number of smaller end states; but the intentionality that we carry through the multiple steps unifies them. So, we can only evaluate intentions. Thus, look to practical reason, which gives us the ability to will something in accordance with our principles, i.e. to intend something. We are defined by our constitutive ability to reflect on our obligations and act on principles, **Korsgaard** elaborates:

Rationality and intelligence are often confused. But at least as Kant understands **rationality**, they are not the same thing. Kant believed that human beings have developed [**is] a** specific **form of self-consciousness,** namely, **the ability to perceive**, and therefore to think about, **the grounds of our** beliefs and **actions as grounds.** Here’s what I mean: an animal who acts from instinct is conscious of the object of its fear or desire, and conscious of it as fearful or desirable, and so as to-be-avoided or to-be-sought. That is the ground of its action. But a rational animal is, in addition, conscious that she fears or desires the object, and that she is inclined to act in a certain way as a result. That’s what I mean by being conscious of the ground as a ground. So **as rational beings we are conscious of the principles on which we are inclined to act.** Because of this, we have the ability to ask ourselves whether we should act in the way that we are instinctively inclined to. We can say to ourselves: “I am inclined to do act-A for the sake of end-E. But should I?” **We [can]** have the ability to **question** whether the responses our incentives present to us as appropriate really are so, and therefore **whether we have reason for acting in the ways that they suggest.**

And even if they win the NC framework, if I win that intentionality unifies action, then all their offense must still be conceptualized through intents. Also, unintended harms can be solved for by extra-topical action since they’re not inherent to the maxim of the resolution, thus they’re irrelevant. Prefer a starting point of practical reason:

1. Physical facts and empirical realities, like desires and consequences, cannot be the basis of morality because we’re not responsible for descriptive characteristics of the world. Only a priori practical reason solves, **Furrow:**[[3]](#footnote-3)

“This is because the source of human dignity is our capacity for freedom. We are distinguished from all other beings by our capacity to rationally choose our actions. If God, nature or other persons imposed moral[s] requirements on us, against our will, our freedom would be fatally compromised. What is more, if our moral decisions were not free but imposed on us, we would not be morally responsible for them, thus undermining the system of praise and blame that is central to our moral framework. Thus, according to Kant, the basic condition for moral agency is moral autonomy – the capacity that each of us has to impose moral constraints on ourselves. Thus far, Kant’s thrilling praise of moral freedom seems compatible with ethical egoism. If moral decisions are up to me then it would seem that I am free to choose in accordance with my self-interest. However, Kant goes on to argue that **I cannot achieve moral autonomy if desires, emotions and inclinations govern my moral judgements.** Kant was convinced that **nature is a mechanical system governed by deterministic, physical laws** – causal relationships determine the behaviour of plants, animals and inanimate objects. They have no capacity to choose. But human desires, emotions and inclinations are also part of that deterministic universe, since they are a function of our bodily nature. When we act in accordance with desires, emotions and inclinations, we are simply responding to physical urges much as an animal does. How can human beings escape this deterministic physical world? **The only way we can exercise our freedom** and autonomy **is to rationally assess our actions independently of our desires**. Moral reasoning will set us free – free from desires **and** emotions that chain us to nature. In contexts where moral judgement is required, by reasoning independently of desires, I am imposing **[impose] moral principles on [ourselves]** myself**.** My actions are self-directed rather than caused by external forces. Kant is not arguing that we should never act on our desires or inclinations. In fact, most of the time we act on what he calls hypothetical imperatives, which involve desires. ‘If you want to earn money, go to work.’ ‘If you are afraid of tigers, then stay out of the jungle.’ These are perfectly acceptable as a basis for action. Actions based on these hypothetical imperatives have instrumental value – they get us something we want. But such actions have no moral value. **When our actions reflect only our desires** and inclinations, **and not** our capacity for moral **reason, they are not free and thus** they **have no moral worth, since morality requires freedom.**

2. We can question any moral principle, we can ask “why should I look to this desire?” or “why should I follow this rule?” which means ethical statements are infinitely regressive because we can always keep questioning. Only reason escapes this regress because if I ask “why should I look to reason?” I’m asking for a reason to obey reason which concedes its own authority.

3. Any rule **must be known by all actors the rule governs, two warrants. A.** Just as you wouldn’t blame for not getting you a present if I didn’t know it was your birthday, we wouldn’t hold someone responsible for failing to meet a standard that they didn’t know. **B.** Rules guide action but they can never guide action if we don’t know what to use to guide our actions. Takes out descriptive standards because some people won’t know the literal fact or document that morality is based upon and thus won’t know the moral rule. Only practical reason solves because all agents possess rationality and can act upon the conclusions of reason.

4. A priori practical reason is necessary to ground all moral judgments, **Kant:**[[4]](#footnote-4)

We have therefore wanted to say that **all our intuition is nothing but** the **representation** of appearance; that **the things** that **we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be**, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that **if we remove** our own subject or even only **the subjective constitution of** the **senses** in general, **then all constitution**, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves **would disappear**, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. **We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them**, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure **it pertains to every human being**. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can **cognize[d]** only the former **a priori**, i.e., prior to all actual perception, **and** they are **therefore** called **pure** intuition.

Means external description can never be relevant since our knowledge of the physical world is necessarily filtered. And, such externalist theories can’t evaluate moral properties, **Korsgaard 2:**

There is another reason why the idea of a constitutive standard is important—or rather, this is the same reason, described a different way, coming from a different direction. It is that we *need* the concept of the *defective*, in the sense described above. Say we have two objects, call them A and B, and they are in some respect different from each other. They have some different non-accidental properties. Now we need to distinguish two ways that A and B can be different from each other in this way: A can be a different *kind* of thing from B, or A can be a *defective instance* of the same kind of thing as B. Suppose A is a defective instance of the same kind of thing as B. Then say we have two objects Y and Z, which differ in regard to the same property, but which areof different kinds. Should we treat these two cases, the case of A and B and the case of Y and Z, any differently? Does it matter what *kinds of things* things are? Why shouldn't all that matters be the properties themselves? If properties are all that matter, then we need not—and cannot—distinguish the different from the defective: different collections of properties will just be different•

Theories reliant on external description can’t reconcile defective and different actions, so under such a framework, moral imperfection is impossible. My framework is the only way to guarantee culpability of actions.

Next, agents can act by and will universal rules that are valid for everybody, or non-universal rules. Rational agents must view themselves as the cause of their actions, which means they must identify with principles and cannot act on non-universal rules, **Korsgaard 3:**

“The first step is this: [t]o conceive yourself as the cause of your actions is to identify with the principle of choice on which you act. **A rational will is** a self-conscious causality, and a self-conscious causality is **aware of itself as a cause.** To be aware of yourself as a cause is to identify yourself with something in the scenario that gives rise to the action, and this must be the princxiple of choice. For instance, **suppose** you experience a conflict of desire: **you** have a **desire** to do both **A and B,** and they are incompatible. **You have some principle which favors A** over B, **so you** exercise this principle, and you **choose** to do **A.** In this kind of case,you do not regard yourself as a mere passive spectator to the battle between A and B. **You regard the choice as yours,** as the product of your own activity, **because you regard the principle of choice as expressive**, or representative, **of yourself.** You must do so, for **the only alternative** to identifying with the principle of choice **is regarding the principle of choice as some third thing in you,** another force on a par with the incentives to do A and to do B, which happened to throw in its weight in favor of A, in a battle at which you were, after all, a mere passive spectator. **But then you are not the cause of the action.”**

**And,** prefer this view because if rationality serves as the basis for normative claims, anything that is asserted to be a maxim must be universalizable because it’s arbitrary to reject a maxim for one person or circumstance while making it sufficient to guide other actions. Thus, the standard is **consistency with the universalizability of moral maxims.**

#### I defend that jury nullification ought to be used in the face of perceived injustice. I’ll defend the resolution as a general principle but I’ll grant further specifications that don’t abandon the AC’s maxim. The neg must ask about interps in CX to prevent misunderstandings so I meet an interp unless the neg asks me to comply and I refuse – prevents the neg from reading unfair binary interps that moot my AC, skewing time, and destroys substantive education. Now, offense –

#### First is complicity, perceiving a situation as unjust requires rejecting the injustice; nullification prevents unwarranted punishment, Huemer:[[5]](#footnote-5)

A jury that votes to convict a defendant can predict that this will result in judicial punishment of the defendant, even more surely than you could predict the violence your friend would suffer at the hands of the hoodlums in the above example. Therefore, the jury should not vote to convict. Just as you should tell the hoodlums your friend is not gay, the jury should tell the state that the defendant is not guilty. Whether the “not guilty” verdict should b

e construed as a lie is immaterial, since the imperative of avoiding serious unjust harms is of far greater import than the **relatively** trivial imperative to avoid making inaccurate statements**.7 In short, there is a simple and obvious argument for jury nullification:** It is prima facie wrong to cause unjust harm to others. To convict a defendant for a morally blameless violation of law is to cause unjust harm to that defendant, for: a. To convict a defendant is to cause the defendant to be punished. One does not deserve punishment for a morally blameless act. Undeserved punishment is an unjust harm. **Therefore, it is prima facie w**rong to convict a defendant for a morally blameless violation of law. This argument establishes not only an entitlement but a duty of jury nullification in cases of blameless law-violations. This is no trivial or easily overridden duty, for it derives directly from the duty to avoid causing unjust harms. The more serious an unjust harm is, the stronger is the moral duty to avoid bringing it about. Since judicial punishments are typically very serious harms, the duty of jury nullification, when it comes into play, is typically a very weighty duty.

We have a perfect duty to not cause undue limitations of freedom to others becausedoing so wills a maxim that hindering another’s freedom is permissible, which contradicts the standard since you non-universally extend your own freedom while limiting another’s. When convicting would unjustly cause harm for a blameless act, it needlessly throws a person into prison and is thus in violation of the standard.

**Second**, practical identities universally ground the unconditional value of human action, **Korsgaard 4:**

Korsgaard, Christine M. The Sources of Normativity. THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University. November 16 and 17, 1992. Pg. 81-85

Those who think that **the** human **mind** is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self- consciousness” because it **forces us to have a conception of ourselves.** As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that **the principle** or law **by which you determine** your **actions is one that** you regard as being **[is] expressive** of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself. **[How] an agent** might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she **thinks of herself will determine** whether it is **the law** of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of **one’s identity** in question here **is not** a **theoretical** one, a view about what **as** a matter of inescapable **scientific fact** you are. It is better understood as **[but] a description under which you value yourself**, a description under which you find your life to be worth living **and your actions** to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of **these identities give rise to** reasons and **obligations.** Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

Few implications – **A.** My argument precludes turns regarding taking on some form of other identity like juror or citizen since those identities are contingent and can be ignored.

**B.** Your identity as a reasoner means you must be the source of value, legalism defers our rational, universal judgments, and imposes external, descriptive criteria on what obligations are, **Carroll:**

"Nullification as Law"JENNY E. CARROLL\* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. © 2014, Jenny E. Carroll. Thanks to Adam Steinman, Larry Solum, Paul Butler, Daryl Brown, Charles A. Sullivan, L. SongRichardson, Brian Sheppard, Alice Ristroph, Rachel Godsil, D. Michael Risinger, John Copacino,Wally Mylenic, and Michael Cahill for their helpful suggestions. This Article has also benefited greatly from comments received during presentations at Seton Hall University School of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Brooklyn Law School, University of Alabama School of Law, Southwestern Law School, Wayne State Law School and the University of Idaho School of Law. Finally, I would like to especially thank members of Larry Solum’s Advanced Constitutional Law Seminar for their critiques as well as the careful editing of The Georgetown Law Journal staff

**Nullification** is a **challenge[s]** to **the notion that law**—constructed, enforced, and interpreted by the formal bodies of government—**requires wholesale deference.** It is a rejection of the premise that the citizen owes a duty of unquestioning obedience to the State and its construction of law above other competing allegiances. It pushes against an external construct of the law, in which the State defines the terms of the community it governs and then demands obedience to those terms as the cost of continued membership in the community. It recognizes instead that there are times when rejection of the law is a good thing—when the lives of the citizens are diminished by wholesale deference and improved by disobedience. Although obedience to the law may create stability within a community, such obedience can also produce harm. Laws, left static, may fail to acknowledge the world as it actually exists, and may instead imagine circumstances as they might—but do not—exist. Likewise, laws, even from the moment of their creation, may never have adequately accounted for or accommodated the lives of the citizens they govern. In these moments, it may be that the citizen, and not the government, is better able to access the value of the law and suggest counter-meanings or interpretations. Indeed, citizens’ continued allegiance to the law as constructed by formal bodies may alienate citizens from their own values, their government, and their personal autonomy. In part, this is a recognition that in the process of compromise, settlement, and interpretation that informs the formal construction of the law the citizen’s sovereignty may be lost. In these moments, whatever virtue is gained from this stable and unifying conception of law may simply come at too high a price for those left to live in the shadow of the formal law. But it is also a recognition that **if** the **government seeks** to force an **unquestioning deference** to the law **based on its status** as “law” **alone, without any effort to ground the legitimacy** or justification **of the law in the citizen’s own value system, the relationship between the citizen and government shifts.** The government claims power for itself as the source of the law and the source of the value system that is bestowed on the citizenry through the creation, application, and interpretation of the law. **Nullification promotes** the opposite reality: **that the power of governance**—law creation, application, and interpretation—**must flow from the citizen to the government.** Members of the formal bodies that have created, codified, enforced, and interpreted the law have done so as an act of delegation—by virtue of the citizens’ willingness to cede the power of governance to representatives. The fact of this delegation alone cannot displace the power of the citizens’ own normative judgments about the value of the law, measured by its ability to account for their own lives and values. Indeed, juries have nullified and continue to nullify, even without formal permission. Nullification, even in the small space it occupies, is thus a safety valve in a world that might otherwise reduce self-governance to a series of deferred loyalties and wholesale obedience. It is a constant reminder that the value of the law flows from the people, and that **the formal decision makers are agents**—repositories of our delegated power—and not the source of power itself. The law is not an external body but an internal one that is as fluid as our own shifting values, norms, and expectations.

#### C. Even if jurors are constrained by the institutions of the state, they must act as if they are wholly free, mandating nullification in the face of injustice. Korsgaard 5:[[6]](#footnote-6)

Kant argues that when you make a choice you must act “under the idea of freedom” (G 448). He explains that “we cannot conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside with respect to its judgments” (G 448). **You may** of course **choose to act on a desire, but insofar as you take the act to be yours, you** think you **have made it your maxim** to act on this desire. If you feel that the desire impelled you into the act, you do not regard the act as a product of your will, but as involuntary. The point is not that you must believe that you are free, but that you must choose as if you were free. It is important to see that this is quite consistent with believing yourself to be fully determined. To make it vivid, **[I]magine** that you are participating in a scientific experiment, and **you know** that today your **every move is programmed by an electronic device** implanted in your brain. The device is not going to bypass your thought processes, however, and make you move mechanically, but rather to work through them: it **[which] will determine what you think.**. Perhaps you get up and decide to spend the morning working. You no sooner make the decision than it occurs to you that it must have been programmed. We may imagine that in a spirit of rebellion you then decide to skip work and go shopping. And then **[I]t occurs to you that that must have been programmed**. The important point here is that efforts to second guess the device cannot help you decide what to do. They can only prevent you from making any decision. **In order to do anything, you must simply ignore that fact that you are programmed, and decide what to do – just as if you were free**. You will believe that your decision is a sham, but it makes no difference. Kant’s point, then, is not about a theoretical assumption necessary to decision, but about a fundamental feature of the standpoint from which decisions are made. It follows from this feature that we must regard our decisions as springing ultimately from principles that we have chosen, and justifiable by those principles. We must regard ourselves as having free will.

**Third**, a state is just an omnilateral will to preserve a system of right – if it doesn’t do so it doesn’t even meet its condition, **Korsgaard 6:**

Why is it permissible for others to force or coerce you to conform to the duties of justice? The Universal Principle of Justice in effect says that **the only restriction on freedom is consistency with the freedom of everyone else**. Anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just, and you therefore have a right to do it. If someone tries to interfere with that right, he is interfering with your freedom and so violating the Universal Principle of Justice. Violations of the Universal Principle of Justice may be opposed by coercion for the simple reason that anything that hinders a hindrance to freedom is consistent with freedom, and anything that is consistent with universal freedom is just. It follows that **rights are coercively enforceable.** Indeed, coercive enforceability is not something attached to rights; it is constitutive of their very nature (MPJ 6:232). To have **a right** just **is** to have **the executive authority to enforce a** certain **claim. This** in turn **is the foundation of the** executive or coercive **authority of the political state.** (p. 238 ) Kant's political philosophy is a social contract theory, in obvious ways in the tradition of Locke. But the differences are important. In Locke's view, individuals have rights in the state of nature, and may enforce those rights. But when each person determines and enforces his own rights the result is social disorder. Since this disorder is contrary to our interests, **people join together** into a political state, **transferring** our **executive authority to a government.**

Injustice means the state does not even advance from the state of nature, **Banham:**

Banham, Gary, “Ripstein, Barbarism and Revolution,” <http://kantinternational.blogspot.com/2010/09/ripstein-barbarism-and-revolution.html> -- I am an independent philosopher, author and editor. I am the managing editor of \*Kant Studies Online\* and general editor of the Palgrave Macmillan series \*Renewing Philosophy\*. I have published widely, mainly on Kant's philosophy.

Bertram also makes another [error](http://kantinternational.blogspot.com/2010/09/ripstein-barbarism-and-revolution.html#78017257) in his response to Ripstein when he insists on a set of responses that will transcend the "example" (if they can be termed that!) of the Nazis, insisting that, if the notion of "barbarism" is of any use it should also be able to guide our political responses to Franco's Spain and Israel. To suggest that the distinction, just as such, is sufficient to deal with such complex empirical situations is no more helpful than the view that Rousseau's accounts of where a republic exists and where it does not should so easily be applied. The other case given, however, that of the US when it had slavery is rather simpler since, as Ripstein states explicitly: **"A condition in which some are not allowed to have anything as their own, or in which they are enslaved** or murdered by others, **is not a difficult case"** (342). In such cases there is not a state of right since **the state of right explicitly requires equal rights to freedom. So if there not such rights then, for everyone in such a condition, there is not an advance on the state of nature.** This is precisely the point of Ripstein's invocation of the notion of "barbarism".

## T/theory underview

1. No 2NR theory or metatheory – **A.**  It skews my time because I only have 3 minutes to respond to 6 minutes so they’re always advantaged and **B.** no judge will vote on a 2ar rvi so it’s a no risk issue that can eat up the little amount of time I have. If we each spend a minute on theory the skew will be 5-2 which is worse than 6-3. **And,** no 2NR RVIs – they could always collapse to theory in the 2N with long scripts I couldn’t have predicted since the justification wasn’t there when I made my choice, that’s strat skew.

2. The neg must concede to the affirmative’s choice of role of the ballot for this round. Prefer this interp **A.** other interps allow the NC to introduce an entirely new layer that the 1AR cannot establish adequate footing on due to the 13-7 time skew of a 1AR restart, means we can’t engage under their new role of the ballot anyways **B.** only my interpretation permits substantive discussion since when the role of the ballot is contested, every single round becomes a procedural debate about what role of the ballot is preferable and **C.** switch side debate links turns reasons to prefer alternate roles of the ballot – my interp forces debaters to debate under different roles of the ballot increasing clash and depth because superficial responses aren’t made on multiple layers of the flow.

3**.** Redefine the aff under neg T or theory as **A.** competing mutually exclusive interps make it possible for the neg to always read theory to avoid substance since the aff enters blind and, **B.** T interps are just paradigms for how we debate so winning one isn’t a reason to exclude my offense if it still is applicable. **C.** time skew makes it so that it impossible to win theory and substance in the 1AR. Re-evaluating my offense under their interp solves by bringing the round to one layer. Also means drop the neg on theory since I can’t beat back an abusive NC strat if I need to win theory and substance too.

[A/T juries “promise” to uphold the law]

1. If there’s no temporal specification, then a present tense statement applies atemporally, since a temporal specification is necessary for a present thought to be complete, **Frege[[7]](#footnote-7):**

Thus the contents of a sentence often go beyond the thoughts expressed by it. But the opposite often happens too, that the mere wording, which can be grasped by writing or the gramophone does not suffice for the expression of the thought. **The present tense is used in two ways: first**, in order **to give a date, second**, in order **to eliminate any temporal restriction where timelessness** or eternity **is part of the thought.** Think, for instance, of the laws of mathematics. Which of the two cases occurs is not expressed but must be guessed. **If a time indication is needed** by the present tense **one must know when the sentence was uttered to apprehend the thought** correctly. Therefore the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought. If someone wants to say the same today as he expressed yesterday using the word "today", he must replace this word with "yesterday". Although the thought is the same its verbal expression must be different so that the sense, which would otherwise be affected by the differing times of utterance, is re-adjusted. The case is the same with words like "here" and " there ". In all such cases the mere wording, as it is given in writing, is not the complete expression of the thought, but the knowledge of certain accompanying conditions of utterance, which are used as means of expressing the thought, are needed for its correct apprehension.

And the resolution uses the present tense but we have no way of knowing at what point – that means the intention is the second purpose of the present tense, that is, atemporality. Means your promises arguments don’t apply because we’re considering general obligations, not specific obligations based on the promises you’ve made at a particular point in time.

2. My framework justifies why a priori reason is the basis of moral norms, it always precludes external factors like what is descriptively true which means my offense comes first. Promises and the oath that you cite are just documents or events acted upon, not apriori considerations.

3. Speech acts can never involve wrongdoing, so false promises can’t be prohibited, **Varden:**

[A Kantian Conception of Free Speech Helga Varden In Deidre Golash (ed.), Free Speech in a Diverse World. Springer (2010) philpapers.org/rec/VARAKC-5]

**“Th[e]is distinction between internal and external use of choice and freedom explains why Kant maintains that most ways in which a person uses words in his interactions with others cannot be seen as involv[e]ing wrongdoing**from the point of view **of right:** “such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, **whether** what he says is **true and sincere or untrue and insincere”**do not constitute wrongdoing because “it is entirely up to them [the listeners] whether they want to believe him or not” (6: 238). **The utterance of words in space and time does not have the power to hinder anyone else’s external freedom,** including depriving him of his means.**[s]ince words as such cannot exert physical power over people, it is impossible to use them as a means of coercion against another. For example, if you block my way, you coerce me by hindering my movements: you hinder my [and] external freedom. If, however, you simply tell me not to move, you have done nothing coercive**, nothing to hinder my external freedom,**as I can simply walk passed you.** So, even though by means of your words, you attempt to influence my internal use of choice by providing me with possible reasons for acting, you accomplish nothing coercive. That is, you may wish that I take on your proposal for action, but you do nothing to force me to do so.**Whether or not I choose to act on your suggestion is still entirely up to me.**

**4. [read their ev and find some loopholes that explain why you meet the promise they cite]**

1. http://vbriefly.com/side-bias/ [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Merriam Webster Dictionary, “affirm” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Dwight Furrow. “Moral Agency.” Ethics. 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Critiqueof Pure Reason. Immanuel Kant. 1781. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The Duty to Disregard the Law. M Huemer. 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Creating the Kingdom of Ends. “Morality as freedom.” Christine M. Korsgaard. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Frege, Gottlob. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”. *Mind*, New Series, Vol. 65, No. 259. (Jul., 1956), pp. 289-311. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)