# Egypt DA

### \*\*Terror\*\*

### UQ CP – ME Counterterror

#### CP Text: the United States federal government should refocus all military aid in the Middle East on counterterrorism efforts.

Ash and Grossman 16 [Modernizing US Security and Development Assistance in the Middle East Nazanin Ash and Allison Grossman, 2016, The White House and the World 2016 [https://www.cgdev.org/publication/ft/modernizing-us-security-and-development-assistance-middle-east]//LC](https://www.cgdev.org/publication/ft/modernizing-us-security-and-development-assistance-middle-east%5D//LC).TG

First, US security assistance requires a structural overhaul premised on mutual interest undergirded by mutual responsibility, with the United States providing assistance and countries shouldering reforms. In the aftermath of a nuclear deal with Iran, the United States is poised to increase security assistance and cooperation with many regional allies. In doing so, it must avoid the pitfalls of the past. To do so, the United States should: • Focus assistance on US security priorities and external threats to allies, including counterterrorism, border security, maritime security, and effective internal policing. The United States should reduce funding for weapons systems and capabilities irrelevant to US security priorities and current challenges. Budgets should be driven not by multiyear commitments and de facto budget support to military institutions, but by regular assessments of the threat environment and the capabilities required to respond. The US Departments of State and Defense should conduct these assessments in concert with country partners. • Make institutional reform a priority by providing US security assistance and military sales within mutually agreed compacts that include commitments from partners for the appropriate use of security aid. Compacts should include clear use agreements and objectives based on the assessments noted above, with measures to evaluate outcomes. They should also include institutional reform plans—and the assistance and training to support them—to ensure that the assets and security institutions that deploy them align more closely with international norms. Finally, they should include clear and enforceable actions to halt security assistance if partners fail to comply with compact terms. The United States should eliminate practices such as cash flow financing,22 as such arrangements limit US flexibility to exert its leverage or execute changes in security assistance in accordance with changing priorities or regime relationships.

### UQ CP – Egypt Terror

#### CP text: The United States federal government should build international support towards providing military aid to Egypt.

#### Encourages Egypt to accept military aid and bolsters the fight against terror.

**Soliman 4/27** Mohamed Soliman [Mohamed Soliman is a Huffington Fellow at the Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, where he focuses on US strategy in the Middle East. He appears frequently on television interviews to provide expert commentary on unfolding current events in the Middle East. Soliman has published in several media outlets, including Foreign Affairs, ​Open Democracy and La Stampa, as well as analysis for the Middle East Institute.], 4-27-2018, "How America Can Help Egypt in its War On Terror," The Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/how-america-can-help-egypt-in-its-war-on-terror> OHS-AT.TG

To be sure, the United States finds it challenging to convince the Egyptian government to accept counter-terrorism training and its integration into its military doctrine. Nevertheless, the U.S. should reorient its military relations with Egypt and build more international support to counter the growing Islamist insurgency in Sinai. The U.S. should also persuade the European counterparts to conduct counter-insurgency training for the Egyptian ground and air forces. Egyptian-European military exercises are still limited to naval operations, which have historically played a role in Egypt’s patrol of the southern Mediterranean Sea and the prevention of illegal immigration to Europe. In light of IS expansion into Northern Sinai, such naval cooperation is insufficient and broader cooperation is needed immediately.

The Egyptian army has been skeptical of any pressure from the U.S. regarding Egypt’s military operations. Egypt has always perceived U.S. military aid in its current form as compensation for the peace treaty with Israel, and would perceive any revision of U.S. military aid as an unfriendly act. But the current landscape offers the most opportune moment to restructure the Egyptian army for fighting the IS insurgency in Sinai, due to the Sisi regime’s need for a quick win to reinvigorate its legitimacy among Egyptians. The U.S. can still pressure the Egyptian leadership to change its arm deals priorities to include the needed counter-terrorism tools.(Instead, to cite but two examples, Egypt has recently bought German submarines and two French amphibious helicopter landing vehicles last year, from national funds.) Finally, on the non-military side, the Egyptian priorities towards Sinai should include a development plan providing basic infrastructure and creating job opportunities for the local Sinai Bedouin, who were marginalized for decades.

### DA – Egypt Terror

#### Terrorist main operations have relocated into Egypt

**Raghavan 3/14** Sudarsan Raghavan, 3-14-2018, "Militant threat emerges in Egyptian desert, opening new front in terrorism fight," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/militant-threat-emerges-in-egyptian-desert-opening-new-front-in-terrorism-fight/2018/03/13/1b24e776-1653-11e8-930c-45838ad0d77a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0b660f3deef7> OHS-AT.TG

EL WAHAT EL BAHARIYA, Egypt — The desolate terrain of Egypt’s Western Desert is emerging as a new frontier in the global fight against terrorism.

Militant groups linked to the Islamic State and al-Qaeda are using the desert as both a haven and a crossing point for smuggling fighters, weapons and illicit goods from Libya, where lawlessness rules.

Along a highway stretching toward the Libyan border, the winds blow across a vast no man’s land of sand dunes, rocky scrubs and barren hills. There are no villages, no signs of life save for the cars and trucks that speed past. But this peaceful landscape, just an hour’s drive from Cairo, is the staging ground for an ambitious insurgency.

“It’s geographically a crucial place for the terrorists and extremists,” said Khaled Okasha, an Egyptian security expert and member of a government council to counter terrorism and extremism. “The presence of caves and hills makes it easier for them to attack and hide. And the capital is close. They can carry out attacks in a lot of nearby places.”

The ranks of the insurgents are being filled, in part, by fighters returning from Syria and Iraq, where the Islamic State’s caliphate has been dismantled, according to security officials and analysts.

Ominously, a new group linked to al-Qaeda has also emerged in the desert, announcing its presence with an attack in October that killed at least 16 security forces. This group, Ansar al-Islam, is now competing directly with the Islamic State, which had already been active in the Western Desert, introducing a rivalry that could fuel a further uptick in violence.

In recent months, the militants have been solidifying their presence along the Libyan border, moving freely across it with the help of sympathetic tribes. It is a reminder of the extent to which the instability that emerged in Libya after the Arab Spring revolts continues to spill across national borders.

Egypt is using American equipment and military vehicles to surveil and patrol its 700 mile-long border with Libya. At the same time, the Sissi government is aligning with Russia in backing Libyan strongman Khalifa Hifter, who controls much of eastern Libya in the hopes that he will stabilize the border areas.

Yet, despite billions of dollars in military assistance from the United States and other western nations, Egypt’s security forces have struggled to control the flow of militants into the Western Desert.

“There are areas of the border that remain completely unsecured 100 percent,” said Mohannad Sabry, an Egyptian journalist and the author of a book on the Islamist insurgency in Sinai. “The attacks in the past few months tell a lot about how much the terrorists are able to mobilize across the border.”

The militant activity in the Western Desert has largely been overshadowed by the violence emanating from the northern Sinai. ISIS suicide bombers have blasted churches. Hundreds of minority Christians have been killed or injured in militant attacks.

Sufi Muslims, viewed as heretics by the Sunni extremists, have also been targeted. In November, militants who authorities said were affiliated with ISIS overran the Sufi al-Rawda mosque in the northern Sinai, killing more than 300 worshipers gathered for Friday prayers. It was the deadliest terrorist attack in Egypt’s history.

Meanwhile, attacks on security forces in urban areas by smaller Islamic extremist groups, with names like Hasm and Liwaa el-Thawra, that seek political change have risen in the past year, also catching the public’s attention. Hasm is the Arabic acronym for the Forearms of Egypt Movement.

The extent of the threat in the Western Desert became clearer in October. About 80 miles southwest of Cairo, not far off the highway, militants attacked a security convoy patrolling near an oasis, killing at least 16 soldiers and police. Military officials said more than 50 died, but the government disputed that figure, even attacking foreign media for reporting the higher number.

For security officials and analysts, the attack revealed that the situation in the Western Desert was more serious than the government had admitted. The attack was claimed by a little-known al-Qaeda-linked group, Ansar al-Islam, which declared a holy war against the Egyptian state, suggesting another lethal dimension to Egypt’s spreading Islamist militant landscape. Linked to Libyan extremists, the group has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the network’s North and West Africa branch.

“The location of the ambush suggests that a new theatre of operations linked to Libya may be emerging,” wrote the International Crisis Group, a nonpartisan U.S. think tank, in a Jan. 31 report.

#### Revitalized military assistance towards Egypt sufficiently wipes out ISIS presence

**Soliman 4/27** Mohamed Soliman [Mohamed Soliman is a Huffington Fellow at the Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, where he focuses on US strategy in the Middle East. He appears frequently on television interviews to provide expert commentary on unfolding current events in the Middle East. Soliman has published in several media outlets, including Foreign Affairs, ​Open Democracy and La Stampa, as well as analysis for the Middle East Institute.], 4-27-2018, "How America Can Help Egypt in its War On Terror," The Washington Institute, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/how-america-can-help-egypt-in-its-war-on-terror> OHS-AT.TG

Faced with a stubborn common terrorist enemy, the United States should expand its military support for the Egyptian army’s capabilities, focusing more on training and equipping it to counter the Islamic State (IS) in Sinai. Without increased U.S. military aid, Egypt will be ill-equipped to counter the threat of the Islamic State, which will gain a crucial foothold that can expand into other parts of the Middle East. For its part, Egypt must integrate modern counter-terrorism techniques into its military doctrine.

In the past year, IS has lost most of its territories in Iraq and Syria. But having established a powerful base in Egypt since 2013, IS shifted its attention from Iraq and Syria to Egypt. There has been a continuous Islamist insurgency in Northern Sinai led by more than 1,000 IS fighters. The Sinai insurgency has had drastic consequences: the take-down of a Russian passenger plane in 2015 that killed all 224 people on board; the attacks on the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO), including American personnel Task Force of Sinai; the killing of more than 250 people in the al-Rawda mosque bombing of November 2017, and the targeting of Egypt’s Minister of Defense and Minister of Interior during their visit to al-Arish airport in December 2017.

In February 2018, Egypt’s military started Operation Sinai, involving land, naval and air forces, plus police and border guards, to target terrorist organizations in northern and southern Sinai. After two weeks of military operations, Mohamed Farid, chief of staff of the armed forces, asked President Sisi to extend the campaign by at least three months. Farid justified his request by noting the terrorist organizations’ extensive possession of explosives and the hardships that Egypt’s forces face in residential areas. In fact, the Egyptian Army has been incapable of countering IS expansion because it lacks advanced relevant training for its aircrews and enhanced ground forces training in urban combat.

#### Any back down emboldens them

Wall Street Journal 11/7/15. “A Terror Warning in Sinai; The ISIS threat will become global unless it is defeated soon,” Wall Street Journal (Online). New York, N.Y.

It may be some time before investigators in Egypt can confirm claims by Islamic State (ISIS) that it is responsible for the "downing" last weekend of a Russian passenger jet over the Sinai peninsula, ostensibly in retaliation for Vladimir Putin's intervention in Syria. Russian commercial carriers have a notorious safety record, and it's too soon to rule out that a structural or mechanical failure caused the plane to break apart in the sky, killing 224 passengers and crew. Yet by Thursday the weight of evidence was sufficient to persuade David Cameron that it was "more likely than not" that the plane was brought down by "a terrorist bomb," with President Obama adding that "it is certainly possible that there was a bomb on board." The British Prime Minister suspended U.K. flights to the resort town of Sharm el Sheikh, stranding thousands of British tourists, and Mr. Putin suspended Russian flights to Egypt on Friday. So much, then, for Mr. Obama's conceit that the world can somehow diminish the strength and reach of ISIS by not paying it too much heed. In February the President was asked by the Vox website whether "the media sometimes overstates the level of alarm people should have about terrorism." "Absolutely," he replied, adding that level of attention given to terrorism is "all about ratings." Mr. Obama's claim might be an easy sell with the readers of left-wing blogs. It must seem detached from reality to U.S. allies, including Egypt, who find that the outspreading chaos of Syria has now reached them. The Egyptian economy has recovered modestly over the last year thanks largely to a jump in tourism, which accounts for 5% of GDP and more than a million jobs. "The magnitude of the effort needed to secure the needs of 90 million people is huge and beyond any one man's effort," Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi told us in March. Now it's become that much bigger. The Egyptian military has been fighting a terrorist insurgency in Sinai for years, turning much of the peninsula into a no-man's land. In 2014 terrorists shot down an Egyptian military helicopter with a surface-to-air missile. In July they hit an Egyptian patrol ship using a guided missile. In September four U.S. troops serving with a multinational peacekeeping mission in Sinai were injured when two improvised explosive devices hit their convoy. Nearly 300 Egyptian soldiers and several hundred civilians have been killed in the fighting. Islamic State considers Sinai a "province" from which its fighters--mostly local Bedouins who swore allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi last year--can stage attacks against the rest of Egypt, Israel and nearby Saudi Arabia. That's no small risk, especially considering that Egypt must also contend with Islamic State offshoots on its border with Libya. But the larger danger is ISIS's growing ability to win the allegiance of geographically distant groups or individuals beyond Syria or Iraq. It is doing so partly through its sophisticated propaganda channels, but mainly by the power of its example. As long as ISIS is in the fight and undefeated by the U.S. or other "apostate regimes," it becomes a natural pole of radical attraction--the proverbial "strong horse" in the race for ideological sympathy among young Muslims around the world. That's what makes the Obama Administration's lackadaisical approach to fighting ISIS so dangerous. Local battlefield reverses such as ISIS's conquest of Ramadi in May don't stay local. They amplify a growing Mideast and world perception that the U.S. has no stomach for a real fight and is prepared to tolerate the existence of Islamic State over the long term. The longer ISIS holds large chunks of Iraq and Syria, the stronger its offshoots in Sinai, Afghanistan, North Africa and elsewhere will grow. The greatest folly of the Administration's Mideast policy has been to imagine that an arms-length approach to the region's troubles would keep its problems away from us. But as with the refugee crisis in Europe, or ISIS-inspired jihadist attacks in the U.S., the tragedy in Sinai is another reminder that trying to downplay the threat of terrorism only brings its risks closer to home.

#### ISIS has the capability for nuclear terror --- massive income and theft --- extinction

Farhad Rezaei Fall 16. Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute at Sakarya University and PhD in international relations and national security studies. “Shopping for Armageddon: Islamist Groups and Nuclear Terror,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 23, Iss. 3, Fall, p. 112-132, Emory Libraries

Compared to its “sister” organizations, ISIS has been well positioned to implement its apocalyptic plans. After occupying Mosul, ISIS confiscated 40 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) from Mosul University in July 2014. While LEU is not suitable for use in an IND per se, ISIS-allied websites claimed that the Islamic State has used the material to construct a dirty bomb. ISIS jihadists engaged in an online discussion about the destructive power of the alleged bomb and the devastation it would wreak on London. For instance, British explosives expert Hamayun Tariq, going by the name of Muslim-al-Britani, posted the now-deleted Tweet: “O by the way Islamic State does have a dirty bomb. We found some radioactive material from Mosul University. This sort of a bomb would be terribly destructive if went off in LONDON becuz [sic] it would be more of a disruptive than a destructive weapon.”75 Others expressed joy over the prospect of blowing up a large Western city. Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations, Mohamed Ali Alhakim, acknowledged the theft of the uranium. He noted that “terrorist groups have seized control of nuclear material at the sites that came out of the control of the state,” adding that such materials can be used in manufacturing WMD: “These nuclear materials, despite the limited amounts mentioned, can enable terrorist groups, with the availability of the required expertise, to use it separately or in combination with other materials in its terrorist acts.”76 In June 2015, an ISIS force took possession of the large Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex, where Saddam Hussein had manufactured chemical weapons. In a letter distributed to the United Nations on July 8, Iraq stated that remnants of 2,500 chemical rockets filled with the deadly nerve agent sarin were kept in the facility along with other chemical warfare agents. On June 12, the site's surveillance system showed that some equipment had been looted. Though ISIS used some of the chemicals in an attack against the Kurds in July 2014 and in August 2015, as noted, neither chemical nor biological weapons have been considered adequate for a spectacular terror event.77 Al-Meshedani suggested getting hold of Iran's nuclear secrets or purchasing nuclear weapons from Russia in exchange for control of the oil fields in Iraq.78 Perhaps most ominously, on December 7, 2015, Yukia Amano, the IAEA chief, warned that violent extremists may get hold of nuclear or radiological material in order to fabricate dirty bombs.79 Pakistan, a top destination in the network of nuclear smuggling, has received a great deal of attention from the organization. The Pakistani media reported that a group of 10 commanders from ISIS visited Baluchistan to seek an alliance with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Baloch freedom movement. The commanders arrived a few weeks after Maulana Fazlullah, chief of a group of TTP, voiced support for the Islamic State and swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi.80 Syrian and Turkish suppliers who work for ISIS have mentioned urgent requests for the so-called “red mercury” that allegedly possesses nuclear powers. Something of an urban myth, that substance does not exist in reality but has been pushed by fraudsters in the smuggler community.81 Whatever strategy ISIS would use to obtain its doomsday weapon, “The Perfect Storm” article and other sources indicate that the organization has amassed more than a billion dollars. Oil smuggling from Iraq and Syria has been a major source of income, as have royalties (private-sector taxes), zakat (a tax levied to help the poor), external donors, and ransom from kidnappings of foreign citizens and journalists among others. Taxing and extorting money from local businesses and taking control of 62 government and private banks in Mosul, Tikrit, Fallujah and other cities have added to the cash flow. Looting of the region's rare and valuable antiquities along with sales of other looted goods has been very profitable. According to Cantlie, ISIS has more than enough resources to purchase nuclear weapons and fissile or radiological materials from traffickers or corrupt officials in Pakistan or elsewhere.”82 Even after a new round of intensive Western attacks on the self-proclaimed caliphate, spurred by the November 14, 2015, terror attack in Paris, ISIS is still considered a highly serious terror player. Both French intelligence sources and a secret British intelligence report noted an unspecified ISIS threat of a dirty bomb, in addition to chemical and possibly biological attacks.83 For instance, Jamie Shea, deputy assistant secretary-general for emerging security threats at NATO, has warned that there is a “justified concern” that jihadists are trying to obtain chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and to develop new methods of evading security measures such as implanting in human bodies and hacking driverless cars to launch attacks in Europe. According to the official, the group may be splitting in two, with one part trying to protect the caliphate, and the other concentrating on setting up terror cells in Europe. It may call upon one of its European cells to fabricate a “dirty bomb” to launch an attack. Evidence demonstrates that the group can operationalize a nuclear attack if left unchecked.84

### \*\*Stability\*\*

### UQ CP – Egyptian Stability

#### CP text: The United States federal government should increase technical support for US equipment used in Sinai and engage in further bilateral military exchanges with Egypt

**Clingan 7/31** Bruce Clingan, 7-31-2018, "Commentary: The U.S. is right to restore aid to Egypt," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-us-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE> OHS-AT.TG

U.S. assistance should also include greater technical support for U.S. equipment that Egypt uses in the Sinai and more bilateral military exchanges, including sharing U.S. lessons-learned from counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria.

These policy changes can bolster Washington’s influence in Cairo, helping to disrupt Russia’s shaping of a Middle East security environment reminiscent of the Cold War. They can also capitalize on a fleeting opportunity to defeat the scourge of IS by advancing an important relationship and promoting economic development and democracy in a vital Middle East partner.

### DA – Egyptian Stability

#### Continued US military aid is necessary to stabilize Egypt – spills over to the entire Middle East and preserves counterterrorist operations

**Clingan 7/31** Bruce Clingan, 7-31-2018, "Commentary: The U.S. is right to restore aid to Egypt," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-us-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE> OHS-AT.TG

Last week the United States restored the $195 million in military aid that it had withheld from Egypt because of the country’s human rights record and its ties to North Korea. This was the right move.

Egypt has long been one of the world’s largest recipients of U.S. aid, accepting $71.6 billion in bilateral military and economic aid between 1948 and 2011 – the largest amount of any country in that time period, other than Israel. The United States has given Egypt about $1.3 billion per year in military aid since 1987. Last August, the United States decided to deny Egypt $95.7 million in aid and to delay an additional $195 million because of concerns about human rights under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

Sisi was elected president after he led the army in ousting Mohammad Mursi. His government then enacted a law restricting the activities of nongovernmental organizations – part of a wider crackdown on dissent. Under Sisi scores of websites have been taken down and journalists and opponents have been arrested. In a 2017 State Department memo to Congress, U.S. officials wrote that the “overall human rights climate in Egypt continues to deteriorate, with the government enacting legislation that conflicts with its human rights obligations, including the right of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and due process guarantees.” In March voters elected Sisi to a second term, in an election that saw all major opposition candidates cut short their campaigns, citing intimidation.

Yet despite Sisi’s record on human rights, it is still in the United States’ interests to support Egypt. Doing so will help hold the line against IS and prevent Egypt from turning to a country like Russia for security and economic cooperation. Washington should adopt a two-track approach with Egypt, as it has historically done with Turkey, advancing security issues at the same time it pushes for improvements in human rights and democracy.

Egypt has long been a critical U.S. security partner because of its control of the Suez Canal and its border with Israel. When U.S. forces are engaged in the region, Egypt provides expedited access for U.S. naval vessels transiting the Suez Canal and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft, both of which are crucial for the United States’ ability to project power across the Middle East. Its role as a linchpin of regional stability has grown with multiple forces roiling the Middle East in recent years. Amid Iranian and Russian entrenchment in the Levant, and the recent rise in IS and Hamas operations, Egypt has remained squarely in the camp of secular and reformist Middle Eastern countries trying to stop the spread of Islamist extremism.

Cairo is working with Israel to contain IS in the Sinai and Hamas in Gaza, and the countries’ navies coordinate regularly on Mediterranean security issues. I met with Sisi in May, when I visited Egypt as part of a delegation sponsored by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, and he was keen to emphasize the common security interests Cairo shares with Washington and Jerusalem, and his desire to advance both partnerships.

Egypt’s internal security is threatened by a relentless IS-affiliated insurgency in Sinai. In November the group attacked a Sinai mosque, killing more than 300 people. Egypt also faces the ever-present challenge of preventing the conflict in Libya from spilling over its western border. (While Cairo and Washington both want a stable Libya, the Sisi government is backing Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a military strongman who was once a CIA asset; the United States is supporting his rival and UN-backed Libyan government.)

Further instability in Egypt would be disastrous for its nearly 100 million citizens, the region and the United States. Regardless of which might come first – the collapse of Egypt’s economy or the spread of Islamist insurgency – the other would surely follow.

The result would be new extremist safe havens, millions of desperate Egyptians seeking to flee to Europe, an existential threat to Israel, the disruption of the Suez Canal upon which global economic stability depends and the potential for the United States to get involved in yet another Middle East quagmire.

Recent American support for Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts in Sinai and the resumption of Bright Star joint military exercises are both steps in the right direction. So is the United States’ recent decision to provide Egypt with its fully-authorized $1.3 billion in foreign military financing.

Egypt needs this assistance to replenish military capabilities expended combatting IS in Sinai, and to respond effectively to any IS resurgence. It will also help improve bilateral military interoperability and promote Egypt’s continued phaseout of Soviet-era weaponry.

#### Extinction – deterrence doesn’t check

Russell 09 James A. Russell [Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School], “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” Proliferation Papers, No. 26, Spring 2009 OHS-AT.TG

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants.

These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### DA – Arabian Maritime Stability

#### Egypt aid key to maintaining Arabian and maritime stability

Clingan 7/31 [(Adm. ret. Bruce Clingan is former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa. ) "Commentary: The U.S. is right to restore aid to Egypt," U.S., 7-31-2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE] whs-ee

Yet despite Sisi’s record on human rights, it is still in the United States’ interests to support Egypt. Doing so will help [hold the line](https://store.tcgplayer.com/magic/product/show?ProductName=Hold%20the%20Line&partner=AUTOANY&affiliate_id=autocard&utm_campaign=affiliate&utm_source=autocard&utm_medium=card) against IS and prevent Egypt from turning to a country like [Russia](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/30/saudi-arabias-hostile-relationship-with-russia-is-leaving-egypt-stuck-in-the-middle/?utm_term=.4fd476306a2b) for security and economic cooperation. Washington should adopt a two-track approach with Egypt, as it has historically done with Turkey, advancing security issues at the same time it pushes for improvements in human rights and democracy.

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Cairo is [working with Israel](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/world/middleeast/israel-airstrikes-sinai-egypt.html) to contain IS in the Sinai and Hamas in [Gaza](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians/israel-says-hamas-curbed-gaza-protests-after-egyptian-warning-idUSKCN1IH1B9), and the countries’ navies coordinate regularly on Mediterranean security issues. I met with Sisi in May, when I visited Egypt as part of a delegation sponsored by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, and he was keen to emphasize the common security interests Cairo shares with Washington and Jerusalem, and his desire to advance both partnerships.

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Further instability in Egypt would be disastrous for its nearly 100 million citizens, the region and the United States. Regardless of which might come first – the collapse of Egypt’s economy or the spread of Islamist insurgency – the other would surely follow.

The result would be new extremist [Safe Haven](https://store.tcgplayer.com/magic/product/show?ProductName=Safe%20Haven&partner=AUTOANY&affiliate_id=autocard&utm_campaign=affiliate&utm_source=autocard&utm_medium=card)s, millions of desperate Egyptians seeking to flee to Europe, an existential threat to Israel, the disruption of the Suez Canal upon which global economic stability depends and the potential for the United States to get involved in yet another Middle East quagmire.

Recent American support for Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts in Sinai and the resumption of Bright Star [joint military exercises](http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/1308877/us-egypt-kick-off-exercise-bright-star-2017/) are both steps in the right direction. So is the United States’ recent decision to provide Egypt with its fully-authorized $1.3 billion in foreign military financing.

Egypt needs this assistance to replenish military capabilities expended combatting IS in Sinai, and to respond effectively to any IS resurgence. It will also help improve bilateral military interoperability and promote Egypt’s continued phaseout of Soviet-era weaponry.

#### Maritime instability hikes premiums on maritime insurance – collapses global trade

\*\*TEU is a cargo capacity

Richardson 4 (senior research fellow at the Institute of South-East Asian Studies) [A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction. http://www.ecop.info/documents/mricfeb04.pdf]

What would happen to insurance rates if terrorists attacked, or worse still blocked, a major port, strait or waterway used for international trade? The bigger the attack up the scale of terrorism, the greater the insurance shock would be. As noted above, there is no insurance for a maritime-related terrorist attack using a crude nuclear weapon. The recovery costs would be unimaginably huge. They would also be very heavy if a radiological bomb were detonated in a mega port-city. Whether private insurance payouts would be available to aid recovery from a dirty bomb attack using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive toxins is doubtful. Even a terrorist attack using a ship or ships to block a busy port, strait or waterway – but not involving nuclear or radiological bombs – would trigger a damaging upward spiral in insurance rates and make many ships avoid the area. The fate of the port of Aden in the wake of the terrorist attack on the Limberg in October 2002 is an example. International shipping business collapsed, brought down by security fears and a hike in insurance premiums to prohibitively high levels. Marine underwriters in the influential Lloyd’s of London market tripled war risk premiums for ships calling at Aden and other ports in Yemen to as high as 0.5% of the value of the vessel’s hull and machinery, compared to about 0.15% before the attack – an increase amounting to hundreds of thousands of US dollars for larger ships. For a ship carrying around 5,600 standard twenty-foot containers (TEUs), this premium came to as much as $US 300,000 per port call. As a result, many vessels diverted to Salalah port in neighboring Oman or stayed away from the area altogether. Container cargo arriving at the port, mainly from elsewere in the region for transhipment to a hub port overseas, plunged from 43,000 TEUs in September 2002, the month before the attack on the Limberg, to 3,000 TEUs just two months later, in November 2002 and then fell further to almost nothing. In the third quarter of 2003, the Yemeni government claimed it had successfully negotiated a substantial reduction in the probibitive war risk premiums. But the damage to the shipping business had already been done. The previously booming two-berth Aden Container Terminal, 60% owned by Singapore’s PSA Corporation, was crippled by the business slump. PSA was forced to virtually write off its stake in 2002, in the form of a 125 million Singapore dollar provision for impairment loss. In October 2003, Yemen’s official news agency, Saba, reported that the PSA had signed an agreement to end its port concession and hand the assets back to the Yemeni government, its 40% partner in the project.

#### Nuclear war

Garten 9 – professor at the Yale School of Management and chairman of Garten Rothkopf, a global advisory firm
(Jeffrey E, The Dangers of Turning Inward, Truth About Trade & Technology, 3-3-09, <http://www.truthabouttrade.org/content/view/13454/54/lang>,en/)

As happened in the 1930s, economic nationalism is also sure to poison geopolitics. Governments under economic pressure have far fewer resources to take care of their citizens and to deal with rising anger and social tensions. Whether or not they are democracies, their tenure can be threatened by popular resentment. The temptation for governments to whip up enthusiasm for something that distracts citizens from their economic woes — a war or a jihad against unpopular minorities, for example — is great. That's not all. As an economically enfeebled South Korea withdraws foreign aid from North Korea, could we see an even more irrational activity from Pyongyang? As the Pakistani economy goes into the tank, will the government be more likely to compromise with terrorists to alleviate at least one source of pressure? As Ukraine strains under the weight of an IMF bailout, is a civil war with Cold War overtones between Europe and Russia be in the cards?

And beyond all that, how will economically embattled and inward-looking governments be able to deal with the critical issues that need global resolution such as control of nuclear weapons, or a treaty to manage climate change, or help to the hundreds of millions of people who are now falling back into poverty?

### Turns Case – Egyptian Stability

#### Crushes Egyptian stability—turns case

Clingan 7/31 [(Adm. ret. Bruce Clingan is former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa) "Commentary: The U.S. is right to restore aid to Egypt," U.S., 7-31-2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE] whs-ee

Egypt’s internal security is threatened by a relentless IS-affiliated insurgency in Sinai. In November the group attacked a [Sinai mosque](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-security/gunmen-in-egypt-mosque-attack-carried-islamic-state-flag-prosecutor-says-idUSKBN1DO1AN), killing more than 300 people. Egypt also faces the ever-present challenge of preventing the conflict in Libya from spilling over its western border. (While Cairo and Washington both want a stable Libya, the Sisi government is [backing](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security/east-libya-commander-haftar-returning-after-treatment-in-paris-idUSKBN1HW2EN) Gen. [Khalifa Haftar](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-security-analysis/is-egypt-bombing-the-right-militants-in-libya-idUSKBN18R2GE), a military strongman who was once a [CIA asset](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/a-former-cia-asset-has-become-a-us-headache-in-libya/2016/08/17/a766e392-54c6-11e6-bbf5-957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.398f156c6caf); the United States is supporting his rival and UN-backed [Libyan government](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-usa/u-s-envoy-endorses-libyas-u-n-backed-government-in-whirlwind-visit-to-tripoli-idUSKBN18J2HR).)

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# 2NR

### \*\*XTS\*\*

### 2NR – XT – Stability

#### US military aid is necessary to stabilize Egypt and there’s no alternative – it prevents violent insurgencies, allows for forces to maintain control over key trade ports, and keeps terrorism at bay. Independently causes more structural violence– cascading instability leads to mass refugee crises. Regional instability spills over – encourages foreign further intervention and emboldens non-state actors to pursue and use nukes. CP supercharges anti-terrorist efforts and gives the US leveraging power to promote democratic reform which solves case.

### \*\*Frontlines\*\*

### AT: PDB

#### Makes no sense – this is a UQ CP – you can’t simultaneously increase and stop aid – it’s severance, VI for aff conditionality

### \*\*UQ\*\*

### \*\*Links\*\*

#### Egypt aid key to maintaining Arabian stability

Clingan 7/31 [(Adm. ret. Bruce Clingan is former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa. ) "Commentary: The U.S. is right to restore aid to Egypt," U.S., 7-31-2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE] whs-ee

Yet despite Sisi’s record on human rights, it is still in the United States’ interests to support Egypt. Doing so will help [hold the line](https://store.tcgplayer.com/magic/product/show?ProductName=Hold%20the%20Line&partner=AUTOANY&affiliate_id=autocard&utm_campaign=affiliate&utm_source=autocard&utm_medium=card) against IS and prevent Egypt from turning to a country like [Russia](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/30/saudi-arabias-hostile-relationship-with-russia-is-leaving-egypt-stuck-in-the-middle/?utm_term=.4fd476306a2b) for security and economic cooperation. Washington should adopt a two-track approach with Egypt, as it has historically done with Turkey, advancing security issues at the same time it pushes for improvements in human rights and democracy.

Egypt has long been a critical U.S. security partner because of its control of the Suez Canal and its border with Israel. When U.S. forces are engaged in the region, Egypt provides expedited access for U.S. naval vessels transiting the Suez Canal and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft, both of which are crucial for the United States’ ability to project power across the Middle East. Its role as a linchpin of regional stability has grown with multiple forces roiling the Middle East in recent years. Amid Iranian and Russian entrenchment in the Levant, and the recent rise in IS and Hamas operations, Egypt has remained squarely in the camp of secular and reformist Middle Eastern countries trying to stop the spread of Islamist extremism.

Cairo is [working with Israel](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/world/middleeast/israel-airstrikes-sinai-egypt.html) to contain IS in the Sinai and Hamas in [Gaza](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-palestinians/israel-says-hamas-curbed-gaza-protests-after-egyptian-warning-idUSKCN1IH1B9), and the countries’ navies coordinate regularly on Mediterranean security issues. I met with Sisi in May, when I visited Egypt as part of a delegation sponsored by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, and he was keen to emphasize the common security interests Cairo shares with Washington and Jerusalem, and his desire to advance both partnerships.

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### \*\*I-Links\*\*

#### Egyptian stability key to regional stability

Simón 16 (Luis Simón is research professor at the Institute for European Studies and director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute.) [Seapower and US Forward Presence in the Middle East: Retrenchment in Perspective. Geopolitics, 2016, 21(1), 115–147. doi:10.1080/14650045.2015.1085382 sci-hub.tw/10.1080/14650045.2015.1085382]

For all their importance, the US is well aware of the need not to over-rely on Saudi Arabia and Turkey when it comes to securing its own regional geopolitical objectives.108 In this regard, cultivating bilateral alliances and partnerships with the smaller countries of the Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia and the Levant remains of great strategic and diplomatic interest for Washington. It is with this aim in mind that one must understand ongoing US efforts to reach out to Egypt, Iraq or Jordan, and strengthen its alliance and basing infrastructure in the southern Persian Gulf.109 Retrenchment notwithstanding, recent US efforts to shore up its regional alliances and relationships, as well as consolidate its basing infrastructure, show that Washington continues to believe that the preservation of a balance of power in the Middle East is directly tied to US forward presence. Its vast population, demographic dynamism and geographical location – straddling the Mediterranean and Red Seas – make Egypt a key referent for US geostrategy in the Middle East. In the words of a US official, an ‘unfriendly or de-stabilized’ Egypt could ‘threaten’ core US interests, such as the ‘security of Israel’ and that of a balance of power in the Levant; free passage between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean; and ‘the stability of US allies and friends like Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries’. 110 Thus, the preservation of strong military, intelligence and diplomatic ties with Egypt is a geostrategic priority for Washington. The military element is central to the US-Egyptian relationship. In the words of General Austin III, the US ‘maintains a historically strong military-to-military relationship with the Egyptian Armed Forces and will continue to work with them’ to ‘advance mutual security interests’. 111 More particularly, the $1.3 billion a year in military aid remains an effective source of US leverage in Egypt. Critically, the Egyptian military remains heavily dependent on US assistance for the maintenance of its equipment, the training of its forces as well as ISR support to fight jihadists in the Sinai and Nile Valley.112

### \*\*Impacts\*\*

### -- Instability -> Middle East Nukes

#### Middle Eastern instability emboldens Iran, triggering nuclear warfare between Israel, Iran, and the US – extinction.

Russell 09 James A. Russell [Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School], “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” Proliferation Papers, No. 26, Spring 2009 OHS-AT.TG

To summarize, systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework induce the prospect of strategic instability in which escalation could unfold in a number of scenarios leading to the use of nuclear weapons by either the United States, Israel, or Iran. For purposes of this paper, escalation means an expansion of the intensity and scope of the conflict.78 The common denominator for the proposed scenarios is that nuclear use occurs in the context of conflict escalation – a conflict that could be initiated by a variety of different parties and in a variety of different circumstances.79 It is extremely unlikely that either the United States or Israel would initiate the use of nuclear weapons as part of a pre-emptive attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.80 However, there are escalation scenarios involving state and non-state actors in the coercive bargaining framework that could conceivably lead to nuclear weapons use by Israel and/or the United States.

Iran’s response to what would initially start as a sustained stand-off bombardment (Desert Fox Heavy) could take a number of different forms that might lead to escalation by the United States and Israel, surrounding states, and non-state actors. Once the strikes commenced, it is difficult to imagine Iran remaining in a Saddam-like quiescent mode and hunkering down to wait out the attacks. Iranian leaders have unequivocally stated that any attack on its nuclear sites will result in a wider war81 – a war that could involve regional states on both sides as well as non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. While a wider regional war need not lead to escalation and nuclear u-se by either Israel or the United States, wartime circumstances and domestic political pressures could combine to shape decision-making in ways that present nuclear use as an option to achieve military and political objectives. For both the United States and Israel, Iranian or proxy use of chemical, biological or radiological weapons represent the most serious potential escalation triggers. For Israel, a sustained conventional bombardment of its urban centers by Hezbollah rockets in Southern Lebanon could also trigger an escalation spiral. Assessing relative probability of these scenarios is very difficult and beyond the scope of this article. Some scenarios for Iranian responses that could lead to escalation by the United States and Israel are:

• Terrorist-type asymmetric attacks on either the U.S. or Israeli homelands by Iran or its proxies using either conventional or unconventional (chemical, biological, or radiological) weapons. Escalation is more likely in response to the use of unconventional weapons in populated urban centers. The potential for use of nuclear retaliation against terrorist type attacks is problematic, unless of course the sponsoring country takes official responsibility for them, which seems highly unlikely.

• Asymmetric attacks by Iran or its proxies using unconventional weapons against U.S. military facilities in Iraq and the Gulf States (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar);

• Long-range missile strikes by Iran attacking Israel and/or U.S. facilities in Iraq and the Gulf States:

• Conventional missile strikes in and around the Israeli reactor at Dimona

• Airbursts of chemical or radiological agents in Israeli urban areas;

• Missile strikes using non-conventional weapons against US Gulf facilities such as Al Udeid in Qatar, Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, and the 5th Fleet Headquarters in Manama, Bahrain. Under all scenarios involving chemical/biological attacks on its forces, the United States has historically retained the right to respond with all means at its disposal even if the attacks come from a non-nuclear weapons state.82

• The involvement of non-state actors as part of ongoing hostilities between Iran, the United States, and Israel in which Hezbollah and/or Hamas became engaged presents an added dimension for conflict escalation. While tactically allied with Iran and each other, these groups have divergent interests and objectives that could affect their involvement (or non-involvement in a wider regional war) – particularly in ways that might prompt escalation by Israel and the United States. Hezbollah is widely believed to have stored thousands of short range Iranian-supplied rockets in southern Lebanon. Attacking Israel in successive fusillades of missiles over time could lead to domestic political demands on the Israeli military to immediately stop these external attacks – a mission that might require a wide area-denial capability provided by nuclear weapons and their associated PSI overpressures, particularly if its conventional ground operations in Gaza prove in the mid- to longterms as indecisive or strategic ambiguous as its 2006 operations in Lebanon.

• Another source of uncertainty is the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – referred to here as “quasi-state” actor. The IRGC manages the regime’s nuclear, chemical and missile programs and is responsible for “extraterritorial” operations outside Iran. The IRGC is considered as instrument of the state and reports directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. So far, the IRGC has apparently refrained from providing unconventional weapons to its surrogates. The IRGC also, however arms and funds various Shiite paramilitary groups in Iraq and Lebanon that have interests and objectives that may or may not directly reflect those of the Iranian supreme leader. Actions of these groups in a wartime environment are another source of strategic uncertainty that could shape crisis decision-making in unhelpful ways.

• The most likely regional state to be drawn into a conflict on Iran’s side in a wider regional war is Syria, which is widely reported to have well developed missile and chemical warfare programs. Direct Syrian military involvement in an Israeli-U.S./Iranian war taking the form of missile strikes or chemical attacks on Israel could serve as another escalation trigger in a nuclear-use scenario, in particular if chemical or bio-chem weapons are used by the Syrians, technically crossing the WMD-chasm and triggering a retaliatory strike using any category of WMD including nuclear weapons.

• The last – and perhaps most disturbing – of these near-term scenarios is the possible use by Iran of nuclear weapons in the event of conventional strikes by the United States and Israel. This scenario is built on the assumption of a U.S. and/or Israeli intelligence failure to detect Iranian possession of a nuclear device that had either been covertly built or acquired from another source. It is possible to foresee an Iranian “demonstration” use of a nuclear weapon in such a scenario in an attempt to stop an Israeli/U.S. conventional bombardment. A darker scenario would be a direct nuclear attack by Iran on Israel, also precipitated by conventional strikes, inducing a “use them or lose them” response. In turn, such a nuclear strike would almost certainly prompt an Israeli and U.S. massive response – a potential “Armageddon” scenario.