# DA – Elections

## 1NC Shells

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#### **Biden wins now, but it’s close**

Cohn 10/12 Nate Cohn, [Nate Cohn is a domestic correspondent for The Upshot at The New York Times. He covers elections, polling and demographics.], “Trump Defectors Help Biden Build Leads in Wisconsin and Michigan”, 10/12/20, NY Times, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/12/upshot/polls-wisconsin-michigan-election.html> AG

Joseph R. Biden Jr. holds a significant lead in the pivotal states of Michigan and Wisconsin, with President Trump so far failing to retain the overwhelming advantage he enjoyed among white voters there in 2016, according to surveys from The New York Times and Siena College on Monday.

Over all, Mr. Biden led Mr. Trump by eight percentage points in Michigan, 48 percent to 40 percent, among likely voters. His lead in Wisconsin was slightly larger, 51 percent to 41 percent.

The new results, along with recent Times/Siena surveys from elsewhere in the Northern battlegrounds, suggest that the president has not yet managed to reassemble his winning coalition across the region. He faces modest but significant defections among white and independent voters, while facing a groundswell of opposition from those who voted for a minor-party candidate or didn’t vote at all in 2016.

The president’s path to re-election is narrow if he doesn’t win either Wisconsin or Michigan. If Mr. Biden puts those two states in his column, along with the states carried by Hillary Clinton in 2016, he will hold 258 electoral votes, putting him on the doorstep of the 270 needed to win.

Nonetheless, the Trump campaign appears to recognize that the two states no longer represent his likeliest path to re-election. Over the last month, the campaign has reduced its television ad spending in the two states in favor of an apparent push to sweep Arizona, Florida and Pennsylvania, where Times/Siena surveys conducted since the first debate show the president trailing by somewhat narrower but still significant five-to-eight-point margins.

Four years ago, Mr. Trump’s strength among white voters without a college degree helped him breach the so-called blue wall of traditionally Democratic Northern battleground states, including Michigan and Wisconsin. The new surveys show him well short of matching 2016 levels of support among white voters, leaving the president with a daunting deficit with just three weeks until the election.

#### Nonvoters decisively hand Trump the election—polling, age demographics, approval ratings, meta-analysis break swing states for Trump – AND mail-in voting doesn’t skew left.

Panetta 3-20 (Grace Panetta, staff writer. 3/30/2020. “Trump baselessly claimed that expanding voting access would lead to a Republican never being elected in America again” <https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-falsely-claims-expanding-voting-access-would-hurt-republicans-2020-3>) DLuo

In a Monday morning interview on "Fox & Friends," President Donald Trump explicitly said that congressional Republicans opposed expanding voting access in the coronavirus stimulus package because it would hurt them politically. The stimulus package presented by the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives included several provisions that would require states to expand options for voters to safely cast ballots. The bill [would have mandated](https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/32320) that states offer 15 days of early voting prior to every election, allow voters to request an absentee ballot without an excuse, and send a mail-in ballot to every voter in an emergency situation where holding in-person elections would be logistically unfeasible or dangerous. But Republicans in Congress accused Democrats of using the crisis specifically to pass their own pet projects through Congress. Some, like GOP Congressman Thomas Massie, [even argued the expanded voting access measures would be](https://twitter.com/RepThomasMassie/status/1242573156776378371) "the end of our Republic as we know it." On "Fox & Friends," Trump went several steps further by directly suggesting that Republicans shot down those measures specifically because they would increase voter turnout and make it harder for the GOP to win elections. "I will tell you this, when you look at the before and after, the things they had in there were crazy," Trump said. "They had levels of voting, that if you ever agreed to it you'd never have a Republican elected in this country again, they had things in there about election days, and what you do...and it was totally crazy." Trump's expressed belief that making it easier for Americans to vote hurts Republicans is inaccurate and baseless for several reasons. In the status quo, [38 states have some form of early voting](https://ballotpedia.org/Early_voting#Early_voting_by_state), 35 [allow voters to request an absentee ballot without a documented excuse](https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2020/3/16/1927986/-These-17-states-must-change-their-laws-to-let-voters-cast-absentee-mail-ballots-without-an-excuse), and five states (Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Utah, and Hawaii), All those states, however, including the ones that exclusively vote by mail, still elect Republicans in nearly every level of government. Utah especially has long been a Republican stronghold despite relying on vote by mail. Over the past decade, Republican-controlled state legislatures have invoked [several different policies to make it more difficult for people to vote](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voter-suppression), including burdensome voter identification laws, closing down polling places, and enacting laws [that specifically target college students](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/us/voting-college-suppression.html) and add hurdles to their voter participation. But so far, the available evidence about non-voters doesn't support Trump's assertion that higher voter turnout would automatically benefit Democrats. A 2019 [New York Times meta-analysis](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/upshot/2020-election-turnout-analysis.html) of voter file, census, and polling data from registered voters in swing districts found that the prevalent assumptions that non-voters would back Democrats if they turned out to vote may not hold in 2020, partly because of college-educated voters swinging to Democrats and white, non-college educated voters overwhelmingly backing Trump. [The Times said](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/15/upshot/2020-election-turnout-analysis.html) that while Democrats saw the upper limits of how an increase in voter turnout could benefit them in the 2018 midterms, white, working-class voters who did not vote in 2018 are "likeliest to return to the electorate in 2020, and it could set back Democrats in crucial battleground states." As The Times noted, non-voters and especially Americans who aren't registered to vote at all are chronically under-represented in public opinion surveys, making it difficult to gauge how they would. But The Times' polling of voters in 2018 battleground districts and estimates based on voter file data found that Trump's approval ratings were nearly the same among voters and non-voters, suggesting that non-voters aren't necessarily more anti-Trump than those who did cast ballots. A February 2020 survey on [12,000 non-voters conducted by the Knight Foundation](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/increased-voter-turnout-could-benefit-republicans-or-democrats-in-2020/) further found that while non-voters narrowly lean Democratic as a group and in swing states like Michigan and Wisconsin by one and two percentage points respectively, they favor Trump by greater margins in other battleground states. Non-voters indicated that if they did vote in 2020, they would back Trump by a margin of eight percentage points in Pennsylvania and five percentage points in Florida, two states Trump carried in 2020. And in the context of the coronavirus crisis, expanding early voting and vote-by-mail would greatly benefit older voters over the age of 65, who the CDC say are most vulnerable to contracting COVID-19, lean more Republican than younger generations, [and backed Trump 53% to 45% the 2016 election.](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education/)

#### Trump re-election guarantees existential climate change, global proliferation, and arms racing – Dem victory averts extinction

Starr 19 [Paul Starr, professor of sociology and public affairs at Princeton and a winner of the Pulitzer Prize for General Nonfiction, May 2019. “Trump’s Second Term.” https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/05/trump-2020-second-term/585994/]

Of all the questions that will be answered by the 2020 election, one matters above the others: Is Trumpism a temporary aberration or a long-term phenomenon? Put another way: Will the changes brought about by Donald Trump and today’s Republican Party fade away, or will they become entrenched? Trump’s reelection seems implausible to many people, as implausible as his election did before November 2016. But despite the scandals and chaos of his presidency, and despite his party’s midterm losses, he approaches 2020 with two factors in his favor. One is incumbency: Since 1980, voters have only once denied an incumbent a second term. The other is a relatively strong economy (at least as of now). Alan Abramowitz, a political scientist at Emory University who weights both of those factors heavily in his election-forecasting model, gives Trump close to an even chance of reelection, based on a projected 2 percent GDP growth rate for the first half of 2020. So far, much of the concern about the long-term effects of Trump’s presidency has centered on his antidemocratic tendencies. But even if we take those off the table—even if we assume that Trump continues to be hemmed in by other parts of the government and by outside institutions, and that he governs no more effectively than he has until now—the impact of a second term would be more lasting than that of the first. In normal politics, the policies adopted by a president and Congress may zig one way, and those of the next president and Congress may zag the other. The contending parties take our system’s rules as a given, and fight over what they understand to be reversible policies and power arrangements. But some situations are not like that; a zig one way makes it hard to zag back. This is one of those moments. After four years as president, Trump will have made at least two Supreme Court appointments, signed into law tax cuts, and rolled back federal regulation of the environment and the economy. Whatever you think of these actions, many of them can probably be offset or entirely undone in the future. The effects of a full eight years of Trump will be much more difficult, if not impossible, to undo. Three areas—climate change, the risk of a renewed global arms race, and control of the Supreme Court—illustrate the historic significance of the 2020 election. The first two problems will become much harder to address as time goes on. The third one stands to remake our constitutional democracy and undermine the capacity for future change. In short, the biggest difference between electing Trump in 2016 and reelecting Trump in 2020 would be irreversibility. Climate policy is now the most obvious example. For a long time, even many of the people who acknowledged the reality of climate change thought of it as a slow process that did not demand immediate action. But today, amid extreme weather events and worsening scientific forecasts, the costs of our delay are clearly mounting, as are the associated dangers. To have a chance at [keeping global warming below 1.5 degrees Celsius](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2018/07/SR15_SPM_version_stand_alone_LR.pdf)—the objective of the Paris climate agreement—the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change says that by 2030, CO2 emissions must drop some 45 percent from 2010 levels. Instead of declining, however, they are rising. In his first term, Trump has announced plans to cancel existing climate reforms, such as higher fuel-efficiency standards and limits on emissions from new coal-fired power plants, and he has pledged to pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement. His reelection would put off a national commitment to decarbonization until at least the second half of the 2020s, while encouraging other countries to do nothing as well. And change that is delayed becomes more economically and politically difficult. According to the Global Carbon Project, if decarbonization had begun globally in 2000, an emissions reduction of about 2 percent a year would have been sufficient to stay below 2 degrees Celsius of warming. Now it will need to be approximately 5 percent a year. If we wait another decade, it will be about 9 percent. In the United States, the economic disruption and popular resistance sure to arise from such an abrupt transition may be more than our political system can bear. No one knows, moreover, when the world might hit irreversible tipping points such as the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which would likely doom us to a catastrophic sea-level rise. The 2020 election will also determine whether the U.S. continues on a course that all but guarantees another kind of runaway global change—a stepped-up arms race, and with it a heightened risk of nuclear accidents and nuclear war. Trump’s “America first” doctrine, attacks on America’s alliances, and unilateral withdrawal from arms-control treaties have made the world far more dangerous. After pulling the United States out of the Iran nuclear agreement (in so doing, badly damaging America’s reputation as both an ally and a negotiating partner), Trump [failed to secure from North Korea](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/02/donald-trump-summit-kim-jong-un-failure/583810/) anything approaching the Iran deal’s terms, leaving Kim Jong Un not only unchecked but with increased international standing. Many world leaders are hoping that Trump’s presidency is a blip—that he will lose in 2020, and that his successor will renew America’s commitments to its allies and to the principles of multilateralism and nonproliferation. If he is reelected, however, several countries may opt to pursue nuclear weapons, especially those in regions that have relied on American security guarantees, such as the Middle East and Northeast Asia. At stake is the global nonproliferation regime that the United States and other countries have maintained over the past several decades to persuade nonnuclear powers to stay that way. That this regime has largely succeeded is a tribute to a combination of tactics, including U.S. bilateral and alliance-based defense commitments to nonnuclear countries, punishments and incentives, and pledges by the U.S. and Russia—as the world’s leading nuclear powers—to make dramatic cuts to their own arsenals. In his first term, Trump has begun to undermine the nonproliferation regime and dismantle the remaining arms-control treaties between Washington and Moscow. In October, [he announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/trump-withdraw-inf-treaty-why/573715/) signed in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev. While the Russian violations of the treaty that Trump cited are inexcusable, he has made no effort to hold Russia to its obligations—to the contrary, by destroying the treaty, he has let Russia off the hook. What’s more, he has displayed no interest in extending New START, which since 2011 has limited the strategic nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States. If the treaty is allowed to expire, 2021 will mark the first year since 1972 without a legally binding agreement in place to control and reduce the deadliest arsenals ever created. The prospect of a new nuclear arms race is suddenly very real. With the end of verifiable limits on American and Russian nuclear weapons, both countries will lose the right to inspect each other’s arsenal, and will face greater uncertainty about each other’s capabilities and intentions. Already, rhetoric has taken an ominous turn: After Trump suspended U.S. participation in the INF Treaty on February 2, Vladimir Putin quickly followed suit and promised a “symmetrical response” to new American weapons. Trump replied a few days later in his State of the Union address, threatening to “outspend and out-innovate all others by far” in weapons development. The treaties signed by the United States and Russia beginning in the 1980s have resulted in the elimination of [nearly 90 percent of their nuclear weapons](https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia/); the end of the Cold War seemed to confirm that those weapons had limited military utility. Now—as the U.S. and Russia abandon their commitment to arms control, and Trump’s “America first” approach causes countries such as [Japan](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/28/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-japan-south-korea.html) and [Saudi Arabia](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-nuclear.html) to question the durability of U.S. security guarantees—the stage is being set for more states to go nuclear and for the U.S. and Russia to ramp up weapons development. This breathtaking historical reversal would, like global warming, likely feed on itself, becoming more and more difficult to undo. Finally, a second term for Trump would entrench changes at home, perhaps the most durable of which involves the Supreme Court. With a full eight years, he would probably have the opportunity to replace two more justices: Ruth Bader Ginsburg will be 87 at the beginning of the next presidential term, and Stephen Breyer will be 82. Whether you regard the prospect of four Trump-appointed justices as a good or a bad thing will depend on your politics and preferences—but there is no denying that the impact on the nation’s highest court would be momentous. Not since Richard Nixon has a president named four new Supreme Court justices, and not since Franklin D. Roosevelt has one had the opportunity to alter the Court’s ideological balance so decisively. In Nixon’s time, conservatives did not approach court vacancies with a clear conception of their judicial objectives or with carefully vetted candidates; both Nixon and Gerald Ford appointed justices who ended up on the Court’s liberal wing. Since then, however, the conservative movement has built a [formidable legal network](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/us/politics/supreme-court-conservatives-trump.html) designed to ensure that future judicial vacancies would not be squandered. The justices nominated by recent Republican presidents reflect this shift. But because the Court’s conservative majorities have remained slim, a series of Republican appointees—Sandra Day O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and most recently John Roberts—have, by occasionally breaking ranks, held the Court back from a full-scale reversal of liberal principles and precedents. With a 7–2 rather than a 5–4 majority, however, the Court’s conservatives could no longer be checked by a lone swing vote. Much of the public discussion about the Court’s future focuses on Roe v. Wade and other decisions expanding rights, protecting free speech, or mandating separation of Church and state. Much less public attention has been paid to conservative activists’ interest in reversing precedents that since the New Deal era have enabled the federal government to regulate labor and the economy. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, conservative justices regularly struck down laws and regulations such as limits on work hours. Only in 1937, after ruling major New Deal programs unconstitutional, did the Court uphold a state minimum-wage law. In the decades that followed, the Court invoked the Constitution’s commerce clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce, as the basis for upholding laws regulating virtually any activity affecting the economy. A great deal of federal law, from labor standards to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to health and environmental regulation, rests on that foundation. But the Court’s conservative majority has recently been chipping away at the expansive interpretation of the commerce clause, and some jurists on the right want to return to the pre-1937 era, thereby sharply limiting the government’s regulatory powers. In 2012, the Court’s five conservative justices held that the Affordable Care Act’s penalty for failing to obtain insurance—the so-called individual mandate—was not justified by the commerce clause. In a sweeping dissent from the majority’s opinion, four of those justices voted to strike down the entire ACA for that reason. The law survived only because the fifth conservative, Chief Justice Roberts, held that the mandate was a constitutional exercise of the government’s taxing power. If the Court had included seven conservative justices in 2012, it would almost certainly have declared the ACA null and void. This is the fate awaiting much existing social and economic legislation and regulation if Trump is reelected. And that’s to say nothing of future legislation such as measures to limit climate change, which might well be struck down by a Court adhering to an originalist interpretation of our 18th-century Constitution. Democracy is always a gamble, but ordinarily the stakes involve short-term wins and losses. Much more hangs in the balance next year. With a second term, Trump’s presidency would go from an aberration to a turning point in American history. But it would not usher in an era marked by stability. The effects of climate change and the risks associated with another nuclear arms race are bound to be convulsive. And Trump’s reelection would leave the country contending with both dangers under the worst possible conditions, deeply alienated from friends abroad and deeply divided at home. The Supreme Court, furthermore, would be far out of line with public opinion and at the center of political conflict, much as the Court was in the 1930s before it relented on the key policies of the New Deal. The choice Americans face in 2020 is one we will not get to make again. What remains to be seen is whether voters will grasp the stakes before them. In 2016, Hillary Clinton’s emails absorbed more media and public attention than any other issue. In 2018, Trump tried to focus attention on a ragtag caravan of a few thousand Central Americans approaching the southern border. That effort failed, but the master of distraction will be back at it next year. If we cannot focus on what matters, we may sleepwalk into a truly perilous future.

### 1nc – ! – populism

#### U.S. sets the tone for global populism—more Trump swings the pendulum..

Fukuyama 18 [Francis Fukuyama is chairman of the editorial board of The American Interest and senior fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University. 2/9. The American Interest. Volume 13, Issue 4. "The Populist Surge." https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/02/09/the-populist-surge/]

**The Future of Populism at Home and Abroad What is the likelihood that the** populist nationalist parties **threatening to** undermine the liberal order **will succeed?** For better or worse, **a lot** depends **on** what will happen **in the** U**nited** S**tates**. American power **was critical in establishing both the** economic **and** political pillars **of the** liberal order, and if the United States retreats **from that leadership role, the** pendulum will swing quickly **in favor of the nationalists**. So **we need to understand how populism is likely to unfold in the worlds** leading liberal democracy**.** The American Constitution’s system of checks and balances was designed to deal with the problem of “Caesarism,” that is, a populist demagogue who would accumulate power and misuse it. It is for this reason that vetocracy exists, and so far into the Trump Administration, it appears to be working. Trump’s attacks on various independent institutions—the intelligence community, the mainstream media, the courts, and his own Republican Party—have only had modest success. In particular, he has not been able to get a significant part of his legislative agenda, like Obamacare repeal or the border wall, passed. So at the moment he looks like a weak and ineffective President.

#### U.S. populism prevents effective liberal internationalism – that makes the entire system more prone to erupt and escalates every major hotspot

Lavin 17 [Frank Lavin is the Chairman of Export Now. He served in the White House, National Security Council, State Department, and Commerce Department during the Reagan, Bush (41) and Bush (43) Administrations. Things Fall Apart: Populism and Foreign Policy. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. October 20, 2017. https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2017/10/20/things-fall-apart-populism-and-foreign-policy]

Trump does indeed have guiding principles, but they are process principles and not the substantive principles that we are used to seeing in a president. What shapes his foreign policy is that which shaped his singular triumph in public life: his campaign. Indeed, Trump abjured several of the policies that have guided Republican campaigns of the modern era: entitlement reform, trade agreements, and international leadership. A long-time supporter of both Bill and Hillary Clinton, President Trump’s political success was drawn not from conservatism nor an intellectual architecture—though he has some conservative impulses—but from political populism. His worldview in many ways is an extension of that belief. What is Populism? This populism has four characteristics. First, it is grievance-based. It focuses on problems rather than solutions. This has the extraordinary advantage of giving the message potency because negative statements can motivate more effectively than positive ones, but it makes it difficult to form a governing coalition, since constituencies that have a problem with a particular policy might have even greater differences among its alternatives. Indeed, as a candidate, Trump avoided articulating a positive vision regarding even central pillars of his campaign such as health care. Notably, Trump’s main foreign policy pronouncements in the campaign were grievance-based: terrorism, trade and immigration. Equally noteworthy, they were all essentially domestic issues with a foreign genesis. The traditional foreign policy questions were largely absent from his discussions: What is America’s role in the world? What is the value of an alliance? To what extent should we promote democracy and human rights, or should the U.S. focus on national interest calculations? Second, the populist must establish emotional connectivity with the audience. Trump tends to evaluate people largely based on how they connect with him. The rally format suits him well; he loves the audience and the audience loves him. There are no questions and answers, nor any discussion, nor does there have to be new information, but there is plenty of emotional connectivity. Importantly, this emotional connectivity has little to do with economic class, a point that can befuddle Trump’s domestic political opponents, who underestimate his working-class appeal on the basis that he personally has little in common with them or that his policies supposedly would not help them. To a populist, the first point is broadly irrelevant and the second point is highly debatable. Might many a construction worker welcome a construction boom, and many a restaurant worker welcome an expansion of the business, if it meant job security and a larger paycheck, even if it would create disproportionate returns to the construction company and restaurant owner? For many working men and women, a growth in inequality is not inherently troubling. Thomas Piketty might be right, but it might not matter to most Americans if returns to capital outpace returns to labor. In addition, when establishment elites mock Trump, from his grammar to his boorishness, a portion of non-elites see this as condescension. Third, populism is exculpatory: Every problem the United States faces was caused by others and the target audience is blameless. So if a company wanted to relocate some activity to Mexico, it must have been to exploit wage differences. No discussion as to whether wage increases at the U.S. facility have outpaced productivity increases. No discussion as to whether union rules impede flexibility and productivity. No discussion of the fact that Mexico might be a better production platform because it has more free trade agreements. Management is to blame, with Mexico in connivance. This is frequently expressed in themes of anti-establishment or alienation, which can have a corrosive effect when anchored in grievances. Fourth, policy choices are cost-free and without trade-offs. Cost-benefit analysis, transition costs, the challenges in administering a government agency, underperforming programs, secondary effects and unintended consequences – these are all incidental to the victory of the policy choice itself. As such, populists might as well berate NATO leadership into burden-sharing, ignoring the downside to publicly hectoring leaders of sovereign nations. They, too, might as well call for a physical wall on the U.S. border with Mexico since it will be, by self-declaration, cost free. To be fair, others in public life exhibit some of these elements. President Obama’s healthcare plan was historically grandiose in scope, cost and complexity, yet it was ballyhooed to save money. Similarly, Obama’s eight-year effort to reduce U.S. commitments to NATO was to have no costs in terms of force projection, alliance cohesion, or deterrence. And, Obama was the only President in the modern era to have run against trade as a candidate, an approach Trump followed. What Went Wrong? How could the bipartisan consensus on U.S. international leadership fade so quickly, particularly at a moment when the combination of market economics and alliances of democracies had resulted in perhaps the most prosperous and most liberal moment in human history? There are four contributors to the rise of populism: societal transformation, grievance economics, international leadership, and elite limitations. First, societal transformation – meaning both globalization and automation— has two profound socio-political effects. It produces an extraordinary degree of prosperity; and it carries with it a distribution effect. The bell curve of income distribution does not shift as much as it elongates. Few people are worse off, but many people are not better off. There is not necessarily the creation of a large number of winners and losers, but there is certainly the perception people getting left behind. Trump understands the message: The globalization club is having a party, and you are not invited. Silicon Valley is drinking champagne and your role is to pick the grapes. These trends also feed into the narrative of alienation because it decreases people’s control over their lives even as their overall prosperity increases. Globalization and automation have created economic anxiety in electorates around the world, and not just among steelworkers and coal miners. Realtors, bank tellers, school teachers, and cab drivers are all seeing competitive pressure and the prospect of job elimination. To many Americans, comparative advantage and creative destruction create a more prosperous society, but accompanying it is job insecurity. David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter might be right, but so what? Second, over several decades we have seen a shift from growth economics to grievance economics. This represents a break with the recovery policies that guided the leading economies through the 1950s and 1960s (and that economic rationalists such as Macron tilt toward today). In the current view, the primary purpose of economic policy is not to foment prosperity, but to redress grievances. Indeed, regardless of absolute improvements in well-being, reducing economic inequality is deemed to be a basis for policy. The premise of growth economics is that a system is fundamentally fair, so the main challenge is how fast we can go. The premise of grievance economics is that the system is fundamentally unfair, so going faster merely exacerbates the unfairness. This cult of inequality incentivizes interest-group politics and rent-seeking, leading to slower growth. If you focus on growth policies, you get growth. If you focus on grievance policies, you get grievances. A third cause is the shift in the U.S. international posture. We have seen a growing fatigue in the United States over the cost of international leadership. The U.S. entered the post-Cold War era with the institutions and the cohesion of the Cold War era largely intact, even though the end of the Soviet Union removed what political scientists term a “negative integrator.” Now we are deep into the post-post-Cold War era, with faded cohesion and institutions. For the first time since Harding and Coolidge we have two presidents in a row who have no international military or policy pedigree. Beyond the direct costs of international leadership in defense budgets and personnel, Americans seem more sensitive to the indirect costs of public opinion and anti-Americanism. Relationships can be expensive. Friendships can be complicated. If there is no immediate threat, and if no one likes us anyhow, then what is the point of foreign policy? To sum up this point, imagine international Presidential leadership as a decision between whether to be a minute early or a minute late. Do you deter or do you react? Being a minute early requires leadership, because it carries with it the possibility of error and the cost of action without a consensus. “Left of Boom,” the British call it. Being a minute late and waiting until the problem has metastasized has the considerable benefit of allowing public consensus to build, and it is the less politically expensive approach. President Obama’s instinct is that foreign policy is better managed by being a minute late, such as responding after-the-fact to the Chinese build-out in the South China Sea, not confronting Russia on its intervention in U.S. elections, and perhaps in the cases of Aleppo or ISIS, Obama was more than a minute late. President Bush’s instinct was to be a minute early, foolishly so to his critics. Presidents have spent some 75 years since Pearl Harbor trying to be a minute early, with all the costs and mistakes that entailed, yet now we have two presidents in a row who believe we are better off being a minute late. Finally, the appeal of populism has been driven by their perception of the limitations of the U.S. leadership class: insular, rigid, and sometimes simply mediocre. Additionally, over-engineered solutions and the appearance of being self-serving, if not corrupt, help the appeal of populism. Sometimes it comes from the declining marginal effectiveness of government programs as society becomes more affluent and complicated. Indeed, the Obama administration seemed to regularly play into the hands of populists, sometimes passively so, as with the refusal to challenge even the more exotic of the sanctuary city movement. Sometimes, it was by design as with the painstaking construction not to label Islamic terrorism as such. If responsible leaders appear to be playing favorites or not accurately describing a phenomenon, they abandon the issue to their opponents — a phenomenon Trump witnessed through his hesitation in characterizing the Charlottesville protests. If populists rely too heavily on emotional connectivity, which establishment politicians have any emotional connectivity? Does there exist an aspirant for President, other than Donald Trump, who can have a friendly discussion with a Walmart cashier? How many of the possible 2020 presidential candidates have worked in the “real” economy, working for an institution that needed to turn a profit? Sam Rayburn’s wish to Lyndon Johnson, after LBJ had related how bright was his brain trust, was that he wished one of them had run for county sheriff. Can we today wish that one of the 2020 presidential candidates will have run a diner, which would have required them to hire teenagers, train high school dropouts, deal with single parents, lay-off workers from failed projects and negotiate wages, all while paying taxes and dealing with various government agencies? Maybe this is why a restaurant worker might respect an owner, or even a New York real estate developer, but not a career politician. If the elites cannot maintain that connectivity, they give an opening to populists. Attaining political maturity contemporaneous with the Bush 43 invasion of Iraq, Obama was wary of American over-reach and committed to a foreign policy pullback. He embedded that withdrawal in a denial of American exceptionalism, a pillar of U.S foreign policy since Pearl Harbor. If you stop believing in yourself, it is difficult to ask others to believe in you. The rejection of America’s special role in the world helped set the stage for “Make America Great Again.” Was Barack Obama the ultimate Donald Trump enabler? There other contributing factors beyond the above four. The rise of identity politics probably played into Trump’s hands, as did the digital communications revolution. News clutter rewards pugnacity and sensationalism and allows for cocoons and even tribalism. It is also worth noting that Trump is a man of unusual presentation strengths, and he can effectively project personality. Simply put, Trump was an exemplary grievance candidate in a grievance year. Trump articulated a vision; Hillary Clinton did not. We are in a communications era. For Secretary Clinton, communications is a means to an end. For Trump it is an end. She believes in her in-box; He, in his out-box. Hillary campaigned as the functionary; Donald as the visionary. Is internationalism doomed? America is now in the middle of a twelve and possibly sixteen year reign of two presidents who challenge the Cold War view that America is better off with a leading international presence, with being a minute early. It is too expensive, argued President Obama, and it leads us into unwinnable conflicts, draining our reputation and our purse. It is too expensive, echoes President Trump, and foreigners abuse and cheat us. Obama argues for minimalism because the United States is a problem for the world, and Trump argues for minimalism because the world is a problem for the United States. Even as President, Trump is easy to underestimate. Appealingly so. Many critics derive amusement, even a sense of superiority, from his foibles. His factual errors and even spelling mistakes provide an opportunity for mockery, but the lazy epiphany of error-spotting is a poor substitute for a substantive rebuttal. And a significant portion of the criticism is either ad hominem or an over-reach, either of which helps Trump. Those who are serious about policy should look at the direction in which he is taking the country, rather than fixate on these errors. To be even-handed, if President Trump’s distinctive success in the public space was his astonishing 2016 victory, in 2008 the distinctive success of Senator Obama was his astonishing election. Obama wisely chose not to run on his government record but marshaled his formidable stage skills and personal charisma to direct criticism toward Hillary Clinton and John McCain. So if Trump’s foreign policy approach stems from his success as “Ranter-in-Chief,” does Obama’s approach stem from his success as “Charmer-in-Chief?” Radically different styles, but with policy similarities. The deterioration in U.S. foreign policy will likely continue for the near term. On any given day, the Obama/Trump approach may make sense. We should be a minute late. It makes sense to skimp, to cut defense expenditures, to reduce international good-will and connectivity, to save money all around. Relationships can be expensive and even harmful – this is the seduction of the minimalist school. But there is a countervailing argument. The main argument against this minimalist approach will be events themselves. The minimalist approach might work in a static environment, but that stasis in itself incentivizes a destabilizer. At some point, history presents the bill. Only then will we be reminded, perhaps cruelly, that although on any given day it might be less expensive to be a minute late, as a matter of national policy we need to be a minute early. If we are not willing to pay the price to be left of boom, then we must pay the price for the boom itself. Worse than the expense and bother of having friends would be the expense and bother of not having friends.

#### That causes extinction from allied prolif, nuclear terrorism, power wars, and climate change – only U.S. leadership solves

Yulis 17 [Max Yulis, Penn Political Review. In Defense of Liberal Internationalism. April 8, 2017. pennpoliticalreview.org/2017/04/in-defense-of-liberal-internationalism/]

Over the past decade, international headlines have been bombarded with stories about the unraveling of the post-Cold War world order, the creation of revolutionary smart devices and military technologies, the rise of militant jihadist organizations, and nuclear proliferation. Indeed, times are paradoxically promising and alarming. In relation to treating the world’s ills, fortunately, there is a capable hegemon– one that has the ability to revive the world order and traditionally hallmarked human rights, peace, and democracy. The United States, with all of its shortcomings, had crafted an international agenda that significantly impacted the post-WWII landscape. Countries invested their ambitions into security communities, international institutions, and international law in an effort to mitigate the chances of a nuclear catastrophe or another World War. The horrors and atrocities of the two Great Wars had traumatized the global community, which spurred calls for peace and the creation of a universalist agenda. Today, the world’s fickle and declining hegemon still has the ability, but not the will, to uphold the world order that it had so carefully and eagerly helped construct. Now, the stakes are too high, and there must be a mighty and willing global leader to lead the effort of diffusing democratic ideals and reinforcing stability through both military and diplomatic means. To do this, the United States must abandon its insurgent wave of isolationism and protectionism, and come to grips with the newly transnational nature of problems ranging from climate change to international terrorism. First, the increase in intra-state conflict should warrant concern as many countries, namely in Africa and the Middle East, are seeing the total collapse of civil society and government. These power vacuums are being filled with increasingly ideological and dangerous tribal and non-state actors, such as Boko Haram, ISIS, and Al-Shabaab. Other bloody civil wars in Rwanda, Sudan, and the Congo have contributed to the deaths of millions in the past two decades. As the West has seen, however, military intervention has not been all that successful in building and empowering democratic institutions in the Far East. A civil crusade, along with the strengthening of international institutions, may in fact be the answer to undoing tribal, religious, and sectarian divisions, thereby mitigating the prospects of civil conflict. During the Wilsonian era, missionaries did their part to internationalize the concept of higher education, which has contributed to the growth of universities in formerly underdeveloped countries such as China and South Korea.[1] In addition, the teachings of missionaries emphasized the universality of humanity and the oneness of man, which was antithetical to the justifications for imperialism and the rampant sectarianism that plagued much of the Middle East and Africa.[2] Seeing that an increase in the magnitude of human casualty is becoming more of a reality due to advancements in military technology and the increasing outbreaks of civil war, international cooperation and the diffusion of norms that highlight the importance of stable governance, democracy, and human rights is the only recourse to address the rise in sectarian divides and civil conflicts. So long as the trend of the West’s desire to look inward continues, it is likely that nation states mired in conflict will devolve into ethnic or tribal enclaves bent on relying on war to maintain their legitimacy and power. Aside from growing sectarianism and the increasing prevalence of failed states, an even more daunting threat come from weapons that transcend the costs of conventional warfare. The problem of nuclear proliferation has been around for decades, and on the eve of President Trump’s inauguration, it appeared that Obama’s lofty goal of advocating for nonproliferation would no longer be a priority of American foreign policy.[3] In addition, now that the American president is threatening to undo much of the United States’ extensive network of alliances, formerly non-nuclear states may be forced to rearm themselves. Disarmament is central to liberal internationalism, as was apparent by the Washington Naval Treaty advocated by Wilson, and by the modern CTBT treaty. The reverse is, however, being seen in the modern era, with cries coming from Japan and South Korea to remobilize and begin their own nuclear weapon programs.[4] A world with more nuclear actors is a formula for chaos, especially if nuclear weapons become mass-produced. Non-state actors will increasingly eye these nuclear sites as was the case near a Belgian nuclear power plant just over a year ago.[5] If any government commits a serious misstep, access to nuclear weapons on the behalf of terrorist and insurgent groups will become a reality, especially if a civil war occurs. States with nuclear weapons require domestic stability and strong security, which is why states such as Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan could be in serious trouble in the event of a domestic uprising or military coup. The disarmament of all states is essential for human survival, and if it is not achieved, then a world full of nuclear weapons and an international system guided by realpolitik could give rise to nuclear warfare. In today’s world, nuclear weapons leave all states virtually defenseless. But, for nuclear deproliferation to become a cornerstone of the global agenda, a pacifying and democratic power must rise to the limelight to advocate the virtues of peace, stability, and human rights.

### 1nc – ! – nato scenario

#### Trump re-election tanks NATO – guarantees erosion of allied confidence and Russian aggression

Griffith 19 [Stephanie Griffith, senior editor at ThinkProgress, July 6, 2019. “The existential threat Trump poses to the world political order is a 2020 campaign issue.” https://archive.thinkprogress.org/can-nato-be-saved-not-if-trump-is-re-elected-in-2020-says-biden-6c3cc001561e/]

NATO, the once rock-solid defense pact of the richest and most powerful nations on both sides of the Atlantic, for months has been shaken to its very core. The mighty military alliance has not been unsettled by the latest bellicose maneuvers by Russia, however, or nuclear development by North Korea. It is becoming undone because of the existential threat posed by U.S. President Donald Trump. Within months of Trump’s assuming the office of president, Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel was already sounding the alarm that America could no longer be seen as a reliable partner and ally. Europe, [she warned](https://archive.thinkprogress.org/europe-can-no-longer-completely-depend-on-america-merkel-says-67d9ce131298/) back in May 2017, would have to take its “fate into our own hands.” Two-and-a-half years into Trump’s presidency, as America’s customary role as the linchpin of the postwar transatlantic alliance continues to erode, the nation’s shaky role at the helm of alliance has become a campaign talking point. It became a topic of discussion again this weekend, when former Vice President Joe Biden warned that NATO will die if Trump is reelected. “Let me put it this way, if he wins re-election, I promise you there will be no NATO in four years or five years,” Biden told CNN in an interview that aired on Friday. Biden said the weakening of ties with America’s closest allies is a grave mistake. “Look, the idea that we can go it alone with no alliances for the next 20 or 30 years is a disaster,” Biden told CNN. “I come out of a generation where we were trying to be the policemen of the world. We can’t go in every place. We need allies,” Biden said, adding that rather than drawer nearer to America’s friends Trump is “stiff-arming” them. “He is absolutely dissing them.” Biden, a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is not alone among the 2020 presidential candidates in expressing fear for the fate of the 29-nation alliance of North American and European countries. The erosion of America’s standing in the world — and especially with its closest allies, as Trump cozies up to autocrats in Russia, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere — has become a full-blown campaign issue. Rep. Seth Moulton (MA) [said in February](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/21/rep-seth-moulton-on-geopolitical-threats-defense-spending-lessons-learned-and-more/) shortly before announcing his presidential candidacy that Trump’s handling of NATO shows that the time has come “to rethink its strategic role and purpose. Now is the opportunity…to renovate and strengthen it for a new world,” and even floated “whether it makes sense to establish a Pacific NATO to counter China.” Rep. Eric Swalwell (CA) said during last month’s presidential debate that he sees Russia as the biggest geopolitical threat facing the United States, and pledged that if elected he would “break up with Russia and make up with NATO.” Sen. Michael Bennet (CO) during the debates promised to “restore the relationships that he’s destroyed with our allies.” Many of the other 2020 contenders expressed similar views, including Washington state governor Jay Inslee who name Trump as the biggest geopolitical threat faced by the United States. Trump, since long before he was elected president has taken issue with America’s membership in military alliances and economic trade unions, saying he prefers bilateral ties and negotiations. He has also complained about the cost of U.S. participation in NATO, usually citing a far higher price tag than what Washington actually pays. And Trump has bristled at the notion of America being obligated by a treaty to come to the aid of another NATO member if it is attacked, even though in the 70-year-long history of alliance, that provision has been invoked just once — following the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, when other NATO nations rallied to America’s side. Biden had other complaints about Trump’s foreign policy worldview, mostly having to do with the way that he has upended the global order. “He’s embracing thugs. He’s embracing Kim Jong Un, who is a thug. He’s embracing Putin, who is a flat dictator,” an exasperated sounding Biden told CNN. “Look at what’s happening with Putin. While Putin is trying to undo our elections, he is undoing elections in Europe. Look at what’s happened in Hungary. Look at what’s happened in Poland. Look what’s happened in Moldova,” he said. “Look at what’s happening. You think that would happen on my watch, on (Barack Obama’s) watch?” he added. ” “You can’t answer that, but I promise you it wouldn’t have. And it didn’t.”

#### Extinction.

Fisher 15 (Max, Foreign affairs columnist at VOX, "How World War III became possible," 6/29, http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war)

That is why, analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more similarity to the period before World War I: an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force the other party into conflict. Today's Russia, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than its collective enemies, calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the world." Now, as then, a rising power, propelled by nationalism, is seeking to revise the European order. Now, as then, it believes that through superior cunning, and perhaps even by proving its might, it can force a larger role for itself. Now, as then, the drift toward war is gradual and easy to miss — which is exactly what makes it so dangerous. But there is one way in which today's dangers are less like those before World War I, and more similar to those of the Cold War: the apocalyptic logic of nuclear weapons. Mutual suspicion, fear of an existential threat, armies parked across borders from one another, and hair-trigger nuclear weapons all make any small skirmish a potential armageddon. In some ways, that logic has grown even more dangerous. Russia, hoping to compensate for its conventional military forces' relative weakness, has dramatically relaxed its rules for using nuclear weapons. Whereas Soviet leaders saw their nuclear weapons as pure deterrents, something that existed precisely so they would never be used, Putin's view appears to be radically different. Russia's official nuclear doctrine calls on the country to launch a battlefield nuclear strike in case of a conventional war that could pose an existential threat. These are more than just words: Moscow has repeatedly signaled its willingness and preparations to use nuclear weapons even in a more limited war. This is a terrifyingly low bar for nuclear weapons use, particularly given that any war would likely occur along Russia's borders and thus not far from Moscow. And it suggests Putin has adopted an idea that Cold War leaders considered unthinkable: that a "limited" nuclear war, of small warheads dropped on the battlefield, could be not only survivable but winnable. "It’s not just a difference in rhetoric. It’s a whole different world," Bruce G. Blair, a nuclear weapons scholar at Princeton, told the Wall Street Journal. He called Putin's decisions more dangerous than those of any Soviet leader since 1962. "There’s a low nuclear threshold now that didn’t exist during the Cold War." Nuclear theory is complex and disputable; maybe Putin is right. But many theorists would say he is wrong, that the logic of nuclear warfare means a "limited" nuclear strike is in fact likely to trigger a larger nuclear war — a doomsday scenario in which major American, Russian, and European cities would be targets for attacks many times more powerful than the bombs that leveled Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even if a nuclear war did somehow remain limited and contained, recent studies suggest that environmental and atmospheric damage would cause a "decade of winter" and mass crop die-outs that could kill up to 1 billion people in a global famine.

### 1nc – ! – heg­

#### Trump re-election permanently collapses US leadership—leads to global instability and great power nuclear war

Wright 20 – PhD @ Georgetown, Senior Fellow @ Brookings, previously executive director of studies at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a lecturer at the University of Chicago's Harris School for Public Policy (Thomas, “The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can't Withdraw From the World,” *Foreign Affairs*, 99.2)//BB

For seven decades, U.S. grand strategy was characterized by a bipartisan consensus on the United States' global role. Although successive administrations had major disagreements over the details, Democrats and Republicans alike backed a system of alliances, the forward positioning of forces, a relatively open international economy, and, albeit imperfectly, the principles of freedom, human rights, and democracy. Today, that consensus has broken down. President Donald Trump has questioned the utility of the United States' alliances and its forward military presence in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He has displayed little regard for a shared community of free societies and is drawn to authoritarian leaders. So far, Trump's views are not shared by the vast majority of leading Republicans. Almost all leading Democrats, for their part, are committed to the United States' traditional role in Europe and Asia, if not in the Middle East. Trump has struggled to convert his worldview into policy, and in many respects, his administration has increased U.S. military commitments. But if Trump wins reelection, that could change quickly, as he would feel more empowered and Washington would need to adjust to the reality that Americans had reconfirmed their support for a more inward-looking approach to world affairs. At a private speech in November, according to press reports, John Bolton, Trump's former national security adviser, even predicted that Trump could pull out of NATO in a second term. The receptiveness of the American people to Trump's "America first" rhetoric has revealed that there is a market for a foreign policy in which the United States plays a smaller role in the world. Amid the shifting political winds, a growing chorus of voices in the policy community, from the left and the right, is calling for a strategy of global retrenchment, whereby the United States would withdraw its forces from around the world and reduce its security commitments. Leading scholars and policy experts, such as Barry Posen and Ian Bremmer, have called on the United States to significantly reduce its role in Europe and Asia, including withdrawing from nato. In 2019, a new think tank, the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, set up shop, with funding from the conservative Charles Koch Foundation and the liberal philanthropist George Soros. Its mission, in its own words, is to advocate "a new foreign policy centered on diplomatic engagement and military restraint." Global retrenchment is fast emerging as the most coherent and readymade alternative to the United States' postwar strategy. Yet pursuing it would be a grave mistake. By dissolving U.S. alliances and ending the forward presence of U.S. forces, this strategy would destabilize the regional security orders in Europe and Asia. It would also increase the risk of nuclear proliferation, empower right-wing nationalists in Europe, and aggravate the threat of major-power conflict. This is not to say that U.S. strategy should never change. The United States has regularly increased and decreased its presence around the world as threats have risen and ebbed. Even though Washington followed a strategy of containment throughout the Cold War, that took various forms, which meant the difference between war and peace in Vietnam, between an arms race and arms control, and between détente and an all-out attempt to defeat the Soviets. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States changed course again, expanding its alliances to include many countries that had previously been part of the Warsaw Pact. Likewise, the United States will now have to do less in some areas and more in others as it shifts its focus from counterterrorism and reform in the Middle East toward great-power competition with China and Russia. But advocates of global retrenchment are not so much proposing changes within a strategy as they are calling for the wholesale replacement of one that has been in place since World War II. What the United States needs now is a careful pruning of its overseas commitments-not the indiscriminate abandonment of a strategy that has served it well for decades. RETRENCHMENT REDUX Support for retrenchment stems from the view that the United States has overextended itself in countries that have little bearing on its national interest. According to this perspective, which is closely associated with the realist school of international relations, the United States is fundamentally secure thanks to its geography, nuclear arsenal, and military advantage. Yet the country has nonetheless chosen to pursue a strategy of "liberal hegemony," using force in an unwise attempt to perpetuate a liberal international order (one that, as evidenced by U.S. support for authoritarian regimes, is not so liberal, after all). Washington, the argument goes, has distracted itself with costly overseas commitments and interventions that breed resentment and encourage free-riding abroad. Critics of the status quo argue that the United States must take two steps to change its ways. The first is retrenchment itself: the action of withdrawing from many of the United States' existing commitments, such as the ongoing military interventions in the Middle East and one-sided alliances in Europe and Asia. The second is restraint: the strategy of defining U.S. interests narrowly, refusing to launch wars unless vital interests are directly threatened and Congress authorizes such action, compelling other nations to take care of their own security, and relying more on diplomatic, economic, and political tools. In practice, this approach means ending U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, withdrawing U.S. forces from the Middle East, relying on an over-the-horizon force that can uphold U.S. national interests, and no longer taking on responsibility for the security of other states. As for alliances, Posen has argued that the United States should abandon the mutual-defense provision of nato, replace the organization "with a new, more limited security cooperation agreement," and reduce U.S. commitments to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. On the question of China, realists have split in recent years. Some, such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, contend that even as the United States retrenches elsewhere, in Asia, it must contain the threat of China, whereas others, such as Posen, argue that nations in the region are perfectly capable of doing the job themselves. Since Trump's election, some progressive foreign policy thinkers have joined the retrenchment camp. They diverge from other progressives, who advocate maintaining the United States' current role. Like the realists, progressive retrenchers hold the view that the United States is safe because of its geography and the size of its military. Where these progressives break from the realists, however, is on the question of what will happen if the United States pulls back. While the realists favoring retrenchment have few illusions about the sort of regional competition that will break out in the absence of U.S. dominance, the progressives expect that the world will become more peaceful and cooperative, because Washington can still manage tensions through diplomatic, economic, and political tools. The immediate focus of the progressives is the so-called forever wars-U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the broader war on terrorism-as well as the defense budget and overseas bases. Although the progressives have a less developed vision of how to implement retrenchment than the realists, they do provide some guideposts. Stephen Wertheim, a co-founder of the Quincy Institute, has called for bringing home many of the U.S. soldiers serving abroad, "leaving small forces to protect commercial sea lanes," as part of an effort to "deprive presidents of the temptation to answer every problem with a violent solution." He argues that U.S. allies may believe that the United States has been inflating regional threats and thus conclude that they do not need to increase their conventional or nuclear forces. Another progressive thinker, Peter Beinart, has argued that the United States should accept Chinese and Russian spheres of influence, a strategy that would include abandoning Taiwan. IS LESS REALLY MORE? The realists and the progressives arguing for retrenchment differ in their assumptions, logic, and intentions. The realists tend to be more pessimistic about the prospects for peace and frame their arguments in hardheaded terms, whereas the progressives downplay the consequences of American withdrawal and make a moral case against the current grand strategy. But they share a common claim: that the United States would be better off if it dramatically reduced its global military footprint and security commitments. This is a false promise, for a number of reasons. First, retrenchment would worsen regional security competition in Europe and Asia. The realists recognize that the U.S. military presence in Europe and Asia does dampen security competition, but they claim that it does so at too high a price-and one that, at any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in the regions themselves. Although pulling back would invite regional security competition, realist retrenchers admit, the United States could be safer in a more dangerous world because regional rivals would check one another. This is a perilous gambit, however, because regional conflicts often end up implicating U.S. interests. They might thus end up drawing the United States back in after it has left-resulting in a much more dangerous venture than heading off the conflict in the first place by staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a hubris that the United States can control consequences and prevent crises from erupting into war. The progressives' view of regional security is similarly flawed. These retrenchers reject the idea that regional security competition will intensify if the United States leaves. In fact, they argue, U.S. alliances often promote competition, as in the Middle East, where U.S. support for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has emboldened those countries in their cold war with Iran. But this logic does not apply to Europe or Asia, where U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A U.S. pullback from those places is more likely to embolden the regional powers. Since 2008, Russia has invaded two of its neighbors that are not members of nato, and if the Baltic states were no longer protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it is conceivable that Russia would test the boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force Japan to increase its defense capabilities and change its constitution to enable it to compete with China on its own, straining relations with South Korea. The second problem with retrenchment involves nuclear proliferation. If the United States pulled out of NATO or ended its alliance with Japan, as many realist advocates of retrenchment recommend, some of its allies, no longer protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, would be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Unlike the progressives for retrenchment, the realists are comfortable with that result, since they see deterrence as a stabilizing force. Most Americans are not so sanguine, and rightly so. There are good reasons to worry about nuclear proliferation: nuclear materials could end up in the hands of terrorists, states with less experience might be more prone to nuclear accidents, and nuclear powers in close proximity have shorter response times and thus conflicts among them have a greater chance of spiraling into escalation. Third, retrenchment would heighten nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, a U.S. withdrawal would send the message that every country must fend for itself. It would therefore empower the far-right groups already making this claim-such as the Alternative for Germany, the League in Italy, and the National Front in France-while undermining the centrist democratic leaders there who told their populations that they could rely on the United States and nato. As a result, Washington would lose leverage over the domestic politics of individual allies, particularly younger and more fragile democracies such as Poland. And since these nationalist populist groups are almost always protectionist, retrenchment would damage U.S. economic interests, as well. Even more alarming, many of the right-wing nationalists that retrenchment would empower have called for greater accommodation of China and Russia. A fourth problem concerns regional stability after global retrenchment. The most likely end state is a spheres-ofinfluence system, whereby China and Russia dominate their neighbors, but such an order is inherently unstable. The lines of demarcation for such spheres tend to be unclear, and there is no guarantee that China and Russia will not seek to move them outward over time. Moreover, the United States cannot simply grant other major powers a sphere of influence-the countries that would fall into those realms have agency, too. If the United States ceded Taiwan to China, for example, the Taiwanese people could say no. The current U.S. policy toward the country is working and may be sustainable. Withdrawing support from Taiwan against its will would plunge cross-strait relations into chaos. The entire idea of letting regional powers have their own spheres of influence has an imperial air that is at odds with modern principles of sovereignty and international law. A fifth problem with retrenchment is that it lacks domestic support. The American people may favor greater burden sharing, but there is no evidence that they are onboard with a withdrawal from Europe and Asia. As a survey conducted in 2019 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found, seven out of ten Americans believe that maintaining military superiority makes the United States safer, and almost three-quarters think that alliances contribute to U.S. security. A 2019 Eurasia Group Foundation poll found that over 60 percent of Americans want to maintain or increase defense spending. As it became apparent that China and Russia would benefit from this shift toward retrenchment, and as the United States' democratic allies objected to its withdrawal, the domestic political backlash would grow. One result could be a prolonged foreign policy debate that would cause the United States to oscillate between retrenchment and reengagement, creating uncertainty about its commitments and thus raising the risk of miscalculation by Washington, its allies, or its rivals. Realist and progressive retrenchers like to argue that the architects of the United States' postwar foreign policy naively sought to remake the world in its image. But the real revisionists are those who argue for retrenchment, a geopolitical experiment of unprecedented scale in modern history. If this camp were to have its way, Europe and Asia-two stable, peaceful, and prosperous regions that form the two main pillars of the U.S.-led order-would be plunged into an era of uncertainty.

### 1nc – ! – warming

#### Trump re-election leads to catastrophic warming

---and US is key

Levitan 19 – MA @ NYU, author of the book Not a Scientist: How Politicians Mistake, Misrepresent, and Utterly Mangle Science., science and politics journalist (Dave, “Would Trump’s Reelection Doom the Planet?,” *The New Republic*, <https://newrepublic.com/article/154539/trumps-reelection-doom-planet>)//BB

The urgency of climate change is finally dawning on the public. Two-thirds of Democrats now say they view global warming as a “critical threat,” and most call it the most important issue to discuss in presidential debates. The Democratic presidential candidates are paying attention, too. Many have released detailed climate plans; most have promised to refuse campaign contributions from fossil fuel industry executives; and nearly all support having a climate-only debate. This sudden interest is understandable. The climate crisis is playing out before our eyes in ways it never has before, with unprecedented heat waves, flooding, and storms around the globe. Scientists’ warnings have also become more dire in recent years, their worst-case scenarios reading more like dystopian fiction than reality. But the most potent reason for voters to be concerned about climate change this year is that we’re running out of time to prevent some of its worst effects. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has determined that the world could hit 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming—the point at which irreversible damage begins—as soon as 2030. This time crunch has led some to say the 2020 election represents humanity’s last hope. “This is a climate crisis. An emergency,” Washington Governor Jay Inslee said last month during the first Democratic debate. “And it is our last chance in an administration—the next one—to do something about it.” But how important is this election, really? Scientists and policy experts agree that 2020 isn’t literally the last chance to save humanity, but four more years of Trump undoubtedly shrinks our chances to ensure a future safe from catastrophe. U.S. emissions likely wouldn’t reduce at the necessary pace, and the lack of leadership on the international stage could cause countries to decelerate their own energy transitions. The planet wouldn’t be doomed quite yet, but it would be closer to doom than ever before. Climate change is a global problem that must be addressed on a global scale, but the United States has an outsized role in whether that global effort succeeds or fails. Historically, the U.S. has emitted more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than any other country, making it the leading contributor to global warming. Today, it’s the second-largest emitter, after China. In order to maintain a stable climate, according to the IPCC, net global emissions must reach zero by 2050. To achieve that, emissions must start rapidly declining in or around 2020. If Trump is reelected, that “would probably mean a stalling of U.S. emissions,” said Corrine Le Quéré, a climate scientist at the University of East Anglia. That’s already happening under Trump. While most developed countries—including the U.S.—have averaged between 1 and 2 percent emissions reductions per year over the last decade, emissions in the U.S. rose by 3.4 percent in 2018, in part due to Trump’s campaign to dismantle climate regulations. “At this stage, to limit climate change anywhere below two degrees [of] warming, the decreases in emissions in developed countries should be accelerating,” Le Quéré said. Necessary carbon reductions in the U.S. are unlikely to happen if Trump is reelected—and not just because of his deregulatory campaign on behalf of polluters. “I’d say one of the worst things about another four years would be that it would allow the Trump Administration to continue packing the courts with conservative judges,” said Drew Shindell, a professor of earth science at Duke University. Many of the administration’s attempts at regulatory rollbacks—of which there are 83 related to the environment, at last count—end up in the courts. So far, judges have delayed or stopped many of those policy moves, from vehicle emissions standards to efforts at promoting fossil fuel extraction on public lands. But four more years of Trump means four more years of lifetime judicial appointments for conservative judges who might be more inclined to allow the rollbacks. Each individual policy may leave a small mark on the country’s overall emissions picture, but the sum of them would doom reductions in the near term. A Trump win in 2020 could discourage other countries from rapidly reducing their emissions, too. Historically, American political leadership has been hugely influential in international climate negotiations, said Andrew Light, a senior fellow at the World Resources Institute who helped negotiate the Paris Agreement during the Obama administration. “The United States was absolutely instrumental in getting the strong agreement out of Paris,” he said. The Paris agreement, as currently drafted, is not enough to stave off the worst of global warming, but it was intended to be strengthened periodically—and since Trump announced his intention to pull the U.S. out of the agreement in June 2017, the leadership that was so crucial to the initial negotiations has been absent. The next deadline for more aggressive climate targets arrives at the end of 2020. Thus, Light said, “2020 has got to be an inflection point for the world.” Michael Mann, a distinguished professor of atmospheric science at Penn State, feels likewise. “Another four years of Trump would probably render futile any efforts to limit planetary warming to 1.5 [degrees Celsius], which is necessary to avert ever-more catastrophic climate-change impacts,” he said in an email. Others think the effort to limit warming to 1.5 degrees is futile no matter the outcome of the election. “[It’s] hard to say four more years of Trump makes impossible something that seems unlikely either way,” Shindell said. Experts like Le Quéré, however, hope that the target could still be met even if Trump wins, because U.S. emissions are not tethered irrevocably to the occupant of the White House. “The U.S. president alone would probably not completely remove the chance that the [1.5-degree] target is met, but cities and states in the U.S. would need to redouble their actions and other countries would need to work harder,” she said. That means efforts like the U.S. Climate Alliance—a group of governors representing half the states and more than half the population, committed to reaching Paris agreement goals with or without federal government help—would have to ramp up significantly during Trump’s second term. “Those particular four years are extremely important to keep the 1.5-degree limit in sight,” Le Quéré said. No one disputes that. Waiting another four years to take aggressive action on climate change will have real consequences, which may include whether the world, led by the U.S., can keep warming below that limit. But even if warming exceeds that target, each additional fraction of a degree represents more destruction, more death. So in that sense, it will never be too late—not in 2024, not even in 2028—to prevent an even greater toll.

#### Extinction

Sprat and Dunlop 19 (David Spratt and Ian Dunlop, \*Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration and co-author of *Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action*; \*\*member of the Club of Rome AND formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading, "Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach," Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0\_90dc2a2637f348edae45943a88da04d4.pdf)//BB

2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant. While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation and rising sea levels contributes to 21 perhaps a billion people being displaced. Water availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about two billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. According to the Global Challenges Foundation’s Global Catastrophic Risks 2018 report, even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated due to sea-level rise, and In high-end scenarios “the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end”. 22

## 2NR – Uniqueness

### 2nr – trump loses link wall

#### Trump loses:

#### (a) Economy and Covid

Rana 20 (Abbas Rana, staff writer for The Hill Times. “U.S. academic who saw Trump victory in 2016 says president’s re-election bid in serious trouble.” May 28, 2020. https://www.hilltimes.com/2020/05/28/u-s-academic-who-saw-trump-victory-in-2016-says-presidents-re-election-bid-in-serious-trouble/250257 Accessed: 5/30/20)

**A U.S. academic, who has correctly predicted all presidential elections going back to 1984, says that U.S. President Donald Trump’s re-election bid appears to be in trouble due to his administration’s handling of the pandemic and the economic fallout that has left more than 38 million Americans unemployed. “Obviously, things are looking worse for Trump now than they were four or five months ago**,” said Prof. Allan Lichtman, a distinguished professor of history at the American University in Washington, D.C., in a phone interview with The Hill Times. **He said the economic downturn and the administration’s response to the pandemic, are two key reasons Mr. Trump’s chance at winning a second term is in jeopardy**. **The 2016 election was the ninth consecutive time, starting in 1984, when Prof. Lichtman correctly predicted the outcome of the U.S. presidential election**. He gained further prominence internationally after the last election, as almost all high-profile pundits and commentators were unanimous in predicting that Hillary Clinton would win the White House. Prof. Lichtman has written a book, Predicting the Next President: The Keys to the White House, to explain his analytical model, outlining how he makes his predictions. He came up with his model by studying and analyzing past elections between 1860 and 1980. The theory behind his model is that the presidential elections are often a referendum on the incumbent party’s performance and whether or not the party holding the White House deserves four more years in power. This model is based on 13 true or false statements about the incumbent president. If six or more of the statements are false, the sitting president loses, and if fewer than six are false, the incumbent wins. The statements include the most recent mid-term election results; whether the president is facing a nomination challenge from his or her own party; any significant third-party candidate; the state of the short-term and long-term economy; whether the incumbent administration has faced any major scandal; any major national policy achievements; the state of social cohesion in the country; foreign and military successes; foreign and military failures; the quality of the incumbent candidate; and the quality of the opposing party candidate. The system ignores the polling numbers, advertising, debates, the opinions of political pundits, or how candidates run their campaigns. For the current campaign, Prof. Lichtman told The Hill Times that, based on his model, Mr**. Trump appears to be in trouble chiefly because of his handling of COVID-19 and the economic devastation**.“Not just because there’s a pandemic, but because the Trump administration has handled it about as badly as one possibly could,” said Prof. Lichtman. **“You couldn’t draw up a scenario, hardly, which would take a worse response than we’ve seen from Trump.”**

#### (b) Polls & Impeachment

Rana 20 (Abbas Rana, staff writer for The Hill Times. “U.S. academic who saw Trump victory in 2016 says president’s re-election bid in serious trouble.” May 28, 2020. https://www.hilltimes.com/2020/05/28/u-s-academic-who-saw-trump-victory-in-2016-says-presidents-re-election-bid-in-serious-trouble/250257 Accessed: 5/30/20)

RealClearPolitics’ composite of national polls suggested that presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, Joe **Biden, has a 5.5-percentage point lead over** Mr. **Trump**. Prof. Lichtman said he would make his final prediction about the outcome of the presidential election in July, when the second quarter economic numbers about the state of the economy are available. **So far,** he said, **there are four “keys” against Mr. Trump, including the Republicans’ loss in the mid-terms, which saw the Democrats take control of Congress, and his impeachment, which made him the third president in U.S. history to be impeached. The other indicators include the lack of a significant foreign policy achievement and his narrow appeal to voters**. “What’s still up in the air are two economic keys. And it takes six keys to count out. [The] president right now he has four, which is why I’m looking to see what’s gonna happen with the economic keys,” he said. **Prof. Lichtman said that it remains to be seen how the presidential campaign, which is playing out amid social-distancing measures, will affect the electoral outcome. However, he said, that, right now, it’s a negative for Trump who relishes rallying in front of huge crowds of supporters.**

#### \*(c) Mass Protests

Curtis 20 (Mark Curtis, Ed.D., is Chief Political Reporter for the five Nexstar Media TV stations serving West Virginia, its five neighboring states and most of the Washington, DC media market. He's a National Contributing Political Writer for The White House Patch at Patch.com. “Will Trump's Tweets cost him the election?” May 30, 2020. https://patch.com/us/white-house/will-trump-s-tweets-cost-him-election Accessed: 5/30/20)

CHARLESTON, W. Va. – **There has been a lot of emotion and passion this past week over the death of George Floyd while in the custody of Minneapolis police. Even more emotion was added to the mix when President Trump tweeted about the ensuing violence**. My job as a political analyst is to try to look beyond the emotion in assessing an event's impact. I look at a lot of polling data and trends to draw my conclusions about whether someone might win an election, and why? Let's "brunch" on that this week: "What He Said?" – After nights of violence and looting in Minneapolis, President Trump took to his favorite platform, Twitter, and said, in part, "...when the looting starts, the shooting starts." He also referred to the perpetrators of the violence as "thugs," a word that some interpret as having derogatory racial connotations. I make no judgement here. My readers are fully capable of drawing their own conclusions. What I do want to analyze and discuss is **what the political fallout may be**. "**The African American Vote**" – African Americans comprise roughly 13 percent of the U.S. population, or 43 million people. Historically, they have voted in droves for members of the Democratic Party, especially in presidential races. For example, in 2016, Hillary Clinton received 91 percent of the black vote, with Donald Trump getting 6 percent, and the balance of 3 percent going to minor candidates. No other demographic of our population is this lopsided. The Hispanic vote, for example, was 66 percent for Clinton, 28 percent for Trump. "Trump Makes Historic Inroads" – **Trump promised to be inclusive and extend an olive branch to African Americans, even though few voted for him**. When Trump laid out his economic plan, he was quick to brag that the people it would help the most were minority group members. Historically, Blacks and Hispanics had unemployment rates double the rest of the population, and minority youth employment was often above 20 percent. After tax cuts, economic growth and market investment, the economy grew tremendously. Unemployment in 2019 dropped to a 50-year low. Even many of his critics begrudgingly gave Trump at least partial credit. A 2019 poll conducted by the Public Religion Research Institute showed that 23 percent of Black men and 14 percent of Black women gave Trump a favorable approval rating. "The Democrats Roadmap to a 2020 Victory" – I've written extensively since the 2016 election, on how Democrats could retake the White House in 2020. Democrats would have to win back the historically blue states of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, plus win all the other states they carried in 2016. Remember, they must win all three of those states; just two won't put them in the White House. "Why Turnout Matters" – As I pointed out, Hillary Clinton won African American voters by a huge landslide. While that may sound amazing, there is another aspect of that vote that is significant. Let's look at Michigan. In 2012 in Detroit, a city that is 79 percent black, Barack Obama received 281,743 votes. In 2016, Hillary Clinton received 234,871 votes in Detroit, a drop of nearly 47,000 votes. Donald Trump won Michigan by a narrow 10,704 votes. **It's not that all** those **votes went to Trump (they didn't). Instead, it reflected how many African American voters simply stayed home**. It isn't so much that Trump won Michigan in 2016, it's more a reflection of how Hillary Clinton lost the state. It's fair to say that Joe Biden, who is wildly popular among African Americans, will have a different strategy. If he can mobilize nearly 11,000 more black voters to back him, he wins Michigan. "The Other States" – Politico reported that Black voter turnout in Wisconsin and Michigan was down 12 percent between 2012 and 2016. In Pennsylvania, it dropped a mere 2.1 percent. It was also down in other key battle ground states including Ohio, down 7.5 percent, and Florida, down 4.2 percent. Joe Biden has already promised to name a female running mate, but will she also be Black? He's getting a lot of pressure to make that very choice. Stay tuned. "It's the Economy, Stupid!" – The famous James Carville line from 1992 still rings true. The number one factor in most presidential elections is the state of the economy. Yes, things were booming in Trump's first three years, and just about everyone was working, with unemployment at 3.6 percent. In particular, minorities had their lowest unemployment rates, I believe, since those records were kept. But then, Covid-19 hit, and the economy tanked. The national unemployment rate is at 14.7 percent. The rate of positive tests and deaths from Covid-19 in minority groups is double the rate for the rest of the population. I'm not saying its Trump's fault because it isn't. But it's a reflection that in politics when things are going well you get the credit, and when things go bad, you get the blame. Its not fair, but it is how politics works. "Presidents Don't Control the Economy" – The important point from the above economic analysis, is that presidents don't control the economy. If they did, they'd all be reelected and remembered fondly! Presidential policies on tax and spending can certainly affect economic growth and consumer confidence. And, other bodies such and Congress and the Federal Reserve have influence, too. But no one can control the unexpected. The last three presidents who were voted out after one term – Ford, Carter, and Bush I – all lost due to a suffering economy. "**Words Matter**" – We look to leaders to inspire and aspire. We look for guidance and comfort when things go bad. We look for words of congratulations and joy when things go well. But **sometimes the wrong words or tone can inflame a delicate or volatile situation. President Trump can be like a bull** in a China shop. He knows it, and it suits him fine. **It's one of the main reasons he got elected. But harsh words (or tweets) can also cause a backlash, and that could also have implications for November.**

### 2nr – biden wins

#### Biden wins

#### (a) Black vote in swing states

Paton 20 (Calum Paton. Deputy Managing Director at The Speaker, former research at the London Think Tank (IARS) International Institute. BA from University of Warwick. “Will Trump Win The 2020 Election? - Trump Vs Biden.” May 29, 2020. https://speakerpolitics.co.uk/us/2121-biden-vs-trump-who-wins-the-2020-election Accessed: 5/29/20)

With **Biden far more popular amongst African American voters in 2016 than Hillary Clinton, he will likely mobilise the support to win states such as North Carolina, that Clinton could not carry in 2016**. **He is decidedly more favourable amongst Hispanic voters too, potentially seeing him carry states such as Arizona and making inroads in Texas - the second largest state by delegates.** Trump won the 2016 election by securing the plurality of voters who liked neither candidate but still voted for a major party. Current evidence suggests that in 2020, they will break for Biden. This makes it highly likely that he will win many of those states where he has a polling lead, without the same fall off as was seen with Clinton in the final days of the campaign, with **North Carolina, Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida and Pennsylvania all flipping to Biden**. **Biden will win**, with an Electoral College margin of 334-204, and a popular vote margin of 3-4 million. **Although** **it can be impossible to tell this far out, with myriad potential events and scandals yet to unfold, the current projection appears as though Biden will comfortably win back the White House for the Democratic party - Trump is in a uniquely weak position for an incumbent president**.

#### (b) **Polls – but surge is possible**

Milligan 9/2 Susan Milligan,[ Susan Milligan is senior political writer at U.S. News & World Report. She has covered domestic and foreign politics for 35 years] , 9-2-2020, "Biden’s Shrinking Lead Is a Jolting Reminder for Democrats – Trump Could Win," US News & World Report, <https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/2020-09-02/joe-bidens-shrinking-lead-is-a-reminder-for-democrats-trump-could-win> AG

With two months to go before Election Day, Democratic nominee Joe Biden's lead over President Donald Trump has narrowed, both nationally and in critical battleground states. Two new polls out Wednesday, one by Selzer & Co., and one by Suffolk University, show Biden ahead nationally by 8 and 7 percentage points, respectively, while a Monmouth University survey shows a dramatic shrinkage in Biden's advantage in his birth state of Pennsylvania. Monmouth – which had Biden ahead by a startling 13 percentage points in mid-July – found the former vice president leading by 4 percentage points among all registered voters now.

The numbers are both predictable and unnerving for the Biden campaign. It's typical for the race to tighten around Labor Day, as voters settle into their choices and "come home" to their party's nominee. And political analysts have been skeptical that the double-digit leads Biden had over Trump in polling earlier in the summer would hold.

####  (c) Voter dissatisfaction and overall narrative spin

Bitecofer 20 (Dr. Rachel Bitecofer. Pro-democracy researcher at the Niskanen Center, doctorate in political science from UGA, Go Dawgs. “A Post-Democratic Primary Update to the Bitecofer Model.” March 24, 2020. https://www.niskanencenter.org/bitecofer-post-primary-update/ Accessed: 5/22/20)

In states like Indiana and Missouri in 2020, some Republicans would have to break from Trump. These two states are becoming more like Kentucky or West Virginia in this regard. And until, and unless, that 90/10 breakdown among Republicans starts to crack, nationally and in states like Indiana, Donald Trump remains theoretically competitive for reelection, with a tight popular vote window (floor to ceiling). I’ll be watching Republican political behavior in the coming weeks closely for signs of breakage, but I will be surprised to see it. But **even without a big assist from the looming recession, by avoiding a Sanders nomination, and with it, total party meltdown, Democrats are well-positioned for the fall general election. The changes to my original ratings from July 2019 reflect this reality and are universally positive for Democrats**. When the original forecast was released, I said that **the party’s nominee did not matter at all unless the nominee ended up being Bernie Sanders**, and the reason that a Sanders nomination mattered was that it would be “disruptive.” To illustrate what I mean by that, under a Sanders nomination, it is my belief that the traditionally nonhierarchical and, shall we say, strategically challenged Democratic Party would easily have been pushed both by their well-meaning consultant class and naturally moderate and well-read candidates and by a shrewd, calculating GOP into turning the 2020 cycle into a referendum on socialism instead of what it needs to be for the negative partisanship model to function at capacity: a referendum on Trump. With Sanders as the nominee, most, if not all, of the Democratic Party’s “frontline” candidates would have ended up with a muddled message- liable to spend as much time contrasting themselves with Sanders (and socialism) as their GOP opponents and Trump. As GOP strategist Rick Wilson aptly points out in his latest book, and former RNC Chairman Michael Steele and I painfully poke fun at in his podcast, Democrats already seem to struggle with the concept of referendum effects and, specifically, the power of tapping into or exploiting them. Due to their deep-rooted (seemingly unshakable) belief in the “median voter theory,” Democratic candidates/consultants/strategists would have fractured into chaos over a Sanders nomination. It would have been an unmitigated disaster the GOP was already positioning themselves to capitalize on. And although the many progressives reading this see Biden’s nomination as an unmitigated disaster, citing his bland moderation, this or that policy from 30 years ago, or general lack of what might be called “stump agility,” I can assure you, **Biden fills the role of “generic Democrat” perfectly fine, and that is all that is really required from Democrats to win this election**. Because as Sanders supporters are just now coming to learn, **while 2016 was about revolution, 2020 is about one thing and one thing only: making the scary, bad man go away.** Dissatisfaction with the party’s nomination process is largely powered by people’s (and the media’s) unrealistic expectations of what these nomination contests can produce, precisely because it is reliant on the voting public. It’s a common mistake — we tend to see the world from our own perspective, and in your perspective, you watched a dozen debates, assessed more than 20 Democratic hopefuls, and tried to select the one you felt best suited to the job vis a vis your own ideological biases. From this perspective, candidates like Kamala Harris, Cory Booker, Beto O’Rourke, Julian Castro, even late-stagers like Amy Klobuchar and Pete Buttigieg were closely examined by the electorate and found wanting. But the truth is, only five candidates ever received any real scrutiny through the year-long primary process, and of those, only two were particularly well known by average voters, which you, dear reader, are not one of. It’s not an accident that in presidential nominations, the person or persons leading the Invisible Primary are the same people that come out at the end, cycle after cycle. There are occasional exceptions — a Bill Clinton here and Barack Obama there. And these trend-buckers are the reasons we see 20 candidates throw their hats int do the ring. **Biden, though unexciting to many millennials and Gen Z voters, is perceived by party mainstreamers as highly electable**. **These perceptions carry important implications for the behaviors of donors, volunteers, candidates, and tertiary actors such as the punditocracy, who hold important narrative-setting power in the electoral ecosystem**. Biden will likely be pushed towards selecting fellow primary contender Amy Klobuchar as his running mate, and in the two-person debate last Sunday, the candidate shrewdly dominated the news cycle by announcing that he will select a female running mate.

#### (d) He leads in swing states, but its tenuous.

BBC 9/3 Visual and Data Journalism Team, 9-3-2020, "How is Donald Trump doing in the polls?," BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-53657174 AG

With that caveat aside, Joe Biden has been ahead of Donald Trump in national polls for most of the year. He has hovered around 50% in recent months and has had a 10-point lead on occasions At the moment, polls in the battleground states look good for Joe Biden, but there's a long way to go and things can change very quickly, especially when Donald Trump's involved. The polls suggest Mr Biden is ahead in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin - three industrial states his Republican rival won by margins of less than 1% to clinch victory in 2016. But it's the battleground states where Mr Trump won big in 2016 that his campaign team will be most worried about. His winning margin in Iowa, Ohio and Texas was between 8-10% back then but it's looking much closer in all three at the moment. But political analysts are less convinced about his chances of re-election. FiveThirtyEight, a political analysis website, says Mr Biden is "slightly favoured" to win the election, while The Economist says he is "very likely" to beat Mr Trump.

### 2nr – convention bounces

#### Biden wins now, but Trump is gaining on him.

New York Times 9/3 New York Times, “Trump Encourages People in North Carolina to Vote Twice, Which Is Illegal”, 9/3/20, <https://www.nytimes.com/live/2020/09/02/us/trump-vs-biden> AG

Coming out of the party conventions, former Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. still leads President Trump nationally and in several crucial battleground states — but in a number of new polls released Wednesday, his advantage has been whittled down. A USA Today/Suffolk University poll found Mr. Biden leading Mr. Trump by seven points among registered voters nationwide, down from a 12-point advantage in June. A Quinnipiac University poll put Mr. Biden’s lead among likely voters at 10 points; in July, when Quinnipiac used a sample of registered voters, it found a 15-point margin Mr. Biden had an eight-point edge among likely voters in a Grinnell College/Selzer survey — results echoed in a CNN poll of registered voters that also gave the former vice president an eight-point lead. Regardless of the national numbers, the race will be won and lost in just a few key swing states: Even if Mr. Biden ekes out a narrow win in the popular vote, he could still lose the Electoral College, as Hillary Clinton did in 2016. A Monmouth University survey of Pennsylvania released Wednesday found Mr. Biden’s lead among registered voters there shrinking to just four percentage points, down from 13 points in July. But a series of Fox News polls from Arizona, North Carolina and Wisconsin had more reassuring news for Mr. Biden. They all showed him essentially maintaining or even expanding his advantages in those states. He led by eight points among likely voters in Wisconsin, and by nine points in Arizona. In North Carolina, where previous Fox News polls had shown the candidates basically neck-and-neck, Mr. Biden led Mr. Trump by four points (technically within the poll’s margin of error). In Arizona and Wisconsin, voters said they preferred Mr. Biden over Mr. Trump to handle the issues of policing and criminal justice by a five-point margin; in North Carolina, voters were basically split down the middle on that. In all four national polls, more voters held a negative opinion of Mr. Trump than a positive one, by double-digit margins. But Mr. Biden was not sitting pretty, either: While voters were more evenly split in their opinions of him, he managed a net-positive favorability rating in only one of those polls, from CNN. That is largely because of his difficulties among independents. Although his popularity among Democrats appears to have climbed in the wake of the conventions — now roughly matching Mr. Trump’s overwhelmingly positive ratings among Republican voters — 53 percent of likely independent voters expressed a negative view of Mr. Biden, according to the Quinnipiac survey. Just 39 percent saw him in a positive light. The USA Today/Suffolk poll found that the party conventions had at best a mild impact on voter choice. Independents were slightly more likely to say the events had diminished their willingness to support Mr. Trump. Thirty-eight percent said that, compared to 29 percent who said the conventions had nudged them toward supporting him. Still, in that poll, Mr. Trump had consolidated his support among certain other key demographic groups — including likely voters 65 and over, who now swing in his favor by 11 points, and men, who now favor him by 12 points. The Quinnipiac and Grinnell/Selzer polls showed the race to be slightly more competitive among those groups.

### 2nr – swing states

#### Biden wins now, but small perturbations flip the election.

Cohn 6-25---[Nate Cohn, Domestic correspondent for The Upshot at The New York Times who covers elections, polling and demographics, "In Poll, Trump Falls Far Behind Biden in Six Key Battleground States", No Publication, 6-25-2020, [https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/upshot/poll-2020-biden-battlegrounds.html]//Mango](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/25/upshot/poll-2020-biden-battlegrounds.html%5D//Mango)

President Trump has lost significant ground in the six battleground states that clinched his Electoral College victory in 2016, according to New York Times/Siena College surveys, with Joseph R. Biden Jr. opening double-digit leads in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. Mr. Trump’s once-commanding advantage among white voters has nearly vanished, a development that would all but preclude the president’s re-election if it persisted. **Mr. Biden now has a** 21-point lead **among white college graduates, and the president is losing among white voters in the three Northern battleground states — not by much**, but he won them by nearly 10 points in 2016. Four years ago, Mr. **Trump’s strength in the disproportionately white working-class battleground states allowed him to win the Electoral College while losing the popular vote**. The surveys indicate that the president continues to fare better in these relatively white battleground states than he does nationwide. **A separate Times/Siena survey released on Wednesday found Mr. Biden leading by** 14 points nationwide, 50 percent to 36 percent. Mr. Biden would win the presidency with at least 333 electoral votes, far more than the 270 needed, if he won all six of the states surveyed and held those won by Hillary Clinton four years ago. **Most combinations of any three of the six states** — which also include Florida, Arizona and North Carolina — **would suffice.** With a little more than four months to go until the election, there is still time **for the president’s political standing to recover, just as it did on so many occasions four years ago. He maintains a substantial advantage on the** economy, which could become an even more central issue in what has already been a volatile election cycle. And many of the undecided voters in these states lean Republican, and may end up returning to their party’s nominee. But for now, the **findings confirm that the president’s political standing has deteriorated sharply since October, when Times/Siena polls found Mr. Biden ahead by just two percentage points** across the same six states (the average gap is now nine points). Since then, the nation has faced a series of crises that would pose a grave political challenge to any president seeking re-election. The polls suggest that battleground-state voters believe the president has struggled to meet the moment. Over all, **42 percent of voters in the battleground states approve of how Mr. Trump is handling his job as president, while 54 percent disapprove. These six​ states — with their mix of major cities, old industrial hubs, growing suburbs, and even farmland** — together deliver a grim judgment of Mr. Trump on recent issues that have shaken American life. His handling of the pandemic and the protests after the death of George Floyd help explain his erosion across both old and new battlegrounds. President Trump has the most support among voters in dealing with the economy, the least on issues connected to race.

#### His lead is tiny but structural – polls

Pramuk 6/17 Jacob Pramuk Staff Reporter CNBC PUBLISHED WED, JUN 17 202010:37 AM EDTUPDATED WED, JUN 17 20205:03 PM EDT “Biden leads Trump in six 2020 swing states, CNBC/Change Research poll finds” <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/17/biden-leads-trump-in-2020-election-swing-states-cnbcchange-research-poll.html> //AWhite

Former Vice President Joe Biden has expanded his edge over President Donald Trump in six 2020 election swing states, according to a new CNBC/Change Research poll.

The survey found the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee leads the incumbent by a 48% to 45% margin across Arizona, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, which will determine who wins the White House in November. Biden’s edge grew from 1 percentage point in the last swing-state poll released two weeks ago. Trump led in all previous versions of the survey dating back to March.

The poll released Wednesday found Biden leading Trump in all six states for the first time (though only narrowly in some):

Arizona: Biden 45%, Trump 44%

Florida: Biden 50%, Trump 43%

Michigan: Biden 47%, Trump 45%

North Carolina: Biden 47%, Trump 45%

Pennsylvania: Biden 49%, Trump 46%

Wisconsin: Biden 48%, Trump 44%

The CNBC/Change Research poll surveyed 2,408 likely voters across the six states from June 12-14 and has a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percentage points.

The result adds to a series of warning signs for Trump less than five months away from the election. Biden’s lead in averages of both national and swing state polls has widened in recent weeks as the Trump administration struggles to contain the coronavirus pandemic and meet nationwide calls to address police brutality and systemic racism.

### ---florida

#### He wins Florida now—but it requires active work

Nilsen 20 (Ella Nilsen; reporter @ Vox; 5-26-2020; "The voters Joe Biden needs to win the election, explained"; Vox; https://www.vox.com/2020/5/26/21264719/joe-biden-election-coalition; Accessed: 6-24-2020 //GBS Rudolph)

The RealClearPolitics average of head-to-head state polls shows Biden up 6.5 percent in Pennsylvania, 5.5 percent in Michigan, and a smaller 2.7 percent lead in Wisconsin. (In the rapidly diversifying Sun Belt states, Biden has a 4 percent lead in Arizona, a 3.3 percent lead in Florida, and Trump has a 1 percent lead in North Carolina.) Biden winning the three Rust Belt states will take a combination of strong African American turnout in cities like Philadelphia and Detroit, suburban voters, and working-class white voters where Democrats can get them. While Biden is strong with African Americans overall, Trump’s campaign is doing outreach that could cut into that lead. “We should take the Trump efforts with black men and younger black men seriously,” said Addisu Demissie, former campaign manager for Sen. Cory Booker’s presidential run. “When you’re talking about margins in the tens of thousands in some of these states like Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Florida, that could be the difference. On the margins, any constituency matters.” Polls so far show Trump still has a pretty strong hold on working-class white men nationwide, which he won by nearly 50 points in 2017. This is the core of Trump’s base, and they have largely remained loyal. Still, there is the potential for some movement among white non-college-educated women, who Trump carried by 27 points in 2016. “There seems to be a bit more movement, you can peel a few more of them off,” said Monmouth University Polling Director Patrick Murray, adding that Biden is “certainly going to lose men in that group by a huge margin.” Winning back working-class areas with Democratic roots and a heavy union presence in 2020 “isn’t rocket science,” said Rep. Conor Lamb, the Pennsylvania Democrat whose long-shot win in a 2018 House special election in western Pennsylvania was a sign of life for the party there. “You can win a lot of votes in these areas, but you’ve got to fight for them.”

### ---midwest

#### Biden win’s here, and it’s *key* to his victory.

Oprysko 6/24 By CAITLIN OPRYSKO 06/24/2020 Caitlin is a breaking news reporter for POLITICO. “Polls show Biden climbing past Trump in Wisconsin, Ohio. Both surveys underscore that Biden's ascendance in Midwest states will be key to either candidate’s victory in November.” <https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/24/joe-biden-wisconsin-ohio-polls-338296> //AWhite

\*\*Edit in brackets\*\*

Former Vice President Joe Biden has widened his lead over President Donald Trump in Wisconsin and narrowly leads the president in Ohio, according to a pair of polls out Wednesday from two key swing states in the Midwest. In Wisconsin, where Trump eked out a victory in 2016 to flip the state from blue to red, Marquette University Law School poll found the former vice president up 8 percentage points, with 49 percent support to Trump’s 41 percent. In Ohio, a state Trump carried by 8 points in 2016 and which has voted for the eventual presidential winner for half a century, a new poll from Quinnipiac University found 46[%] of respondents favor Biden, compared with 45 percent who favor the president. Both surveys underscore that Biden's ascendance in Midwest states will be key to either candidate’s victory in November. Both Wisconsin and Ohio were won by President Barack Obama in 2012 before flipping to Trump in 2016. The two polls build on a raft of national polling in recent weeks showing Biden with a growing lead over Trump as the president grapples with responding to the coronavirus pandemic, the economic recession and mass protests for racial justice. One such poll released Wednesday morning showed the former vice president with a 14-point lead over Trump nationwide. The RealClearPolitics average of polls gives Biden a 10-point national lead.

### ---pennsylvania

#### Models indicate close Biden win—mail-in-voting is key.

Corasaniti 20 (Nick Corasaniti; domestic correspondent covering national politics for The New York Times; 6-2-2020; "What Pennsylvania’s ‘Dry Run’ Election Could Reveal About November"; No Publication; https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/politics/pennsylvania-primary-election.html; Accessed: 6-25-2020 //GBS Rudolph)

In Philadelphia, the election offices have been closed because of the virus. The phone line to the county elections office leads to a recording, with no general voice mail or ability to reach a human with an election problem. Officials are also bracing for longer voting lines. Every municipality outside Philadelphia and Pittsburgh has only one open polling location, and the locations in the two major cities have been condensed. In Bucks County, a swing suburban county near Philadelphia that Hillary Clinton carried by less than 3,000 votes in 2016, the county Democrats transitioned their effort to knock on 300,000 doors into a blitz of phone calls and text messages. They now have a big absentee ballot advantage: As of Monday, 72,061 Democrats had applied for the mail-in ballots, compared with 29,475 Republicans, according to the secretary of state. “I can only remember the last two cycles where the Democrats actually turned in more absentees than the Republicans, and it was not by much,” said John Cordisco, the Democratic Party chair in Bucks County. He added that virtual organizing had helped the county party conserve resources for November. “We’re literally saving $400,000 to $500,000 by not having to do the volunteers’ door knocking.” A central part of the Democratic effort has been what’s known as a “ballot chase” program. Using the state party’s voter file, volunteers from around the country are able to login and call or text voters in Pennsylvania asking if they’ve requested a ballot. An app with a call script provides volunteers with responses based on how far along a voter is in the absentee process. For the past week and a half, the state Democratic effort has focused on contacting voters who had already requested a mail-in ballot but had not yet returned it and letting them know their remaining options for returning the ballots. The overall Democratic effort on vote-by-mail in Pennsylvania has led to a significant advantage for the party. Of the 1.8 million absentee ballots requested, 70 percent were from Democrats, according to the secretary of state’s office. While Pennsylvania turnout in the general election in 2016 topped six million, the huge ballot advantage is buoying the hopes of Democrats in a state that Mr. Trump won by less than 45,000 votes.

### 2nr – at: too early

#### Polls have increasing predictive power at this stage even if they’re not perfect --- and they show that 2020 is close

Skelley 20 – elections analyst at FiveThirtyEight Geoffrey, 4/27. “You Can Pay Attention To Those Trump vs. Biden Polls. But Be Cautious.” https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/you-can-pay-attention-to-those-trump-vs-biden-polls-but-be-cautious/

We at FiveThirtyEight have cautioned you not to take early general election polls too seriously, but the answer for when you should tune in isn’t exactly straightforward either. There’s actually a pretty big debate over just how meaningful early general election polls are. MIT researcher Alexander Agadjanian and The Economist data journalist G. Elliott Morris argue that early polls in recent cycles have been closer to the final outcome than polls from previous cycles and should therefore be taken seriously. But political scientists Robert Erikson and Christopher Wlezien maintain that while early general election polls might be more accurate now, they’re still not as accurate as those conducted closer to Election Day, and that distinction matters as even small shifts in the polls can matter a great deal to the final outcome in our era of highly competitive elections. So to better understand just how meaningful early general election polling is we did our own analysis, collecting all the national surveys we could find from 1980 to 2016, spanning from 200 days before the presidential election to the day before. We then created a rolling, seven-day polling average of the margin between the Democratic and Republican nominees2 as that allowed us to calculate just how far off the polls were from the final Election Day vote share margin on any given day.3 And what we found is, well … each side in this debate has a point. A satisfying answer, we know. On the one hand, the margin in early general elections polls has been closer to the final national popular vote margin in recent cycles since at least 2004 — you can see this quite clearly in the chart below. There just isn’t as much movement in the polling margin in recent elections. But even when early polls have been closer to the final outcome, the error has still often been large enough to swing an election from one party to the other. What’s more, the direction of the polling error has been inconsistent — sometimes polls tend to be Republican-leaning; at other times, Democratic-leaning. This error is substantial enough that it makes it hard to predict the final election result, even if the early polls aren’t that far off. Take the last three presidential elections. In 2016, the polls about six months from the general election were about 2 points more Democratic than the final national popular vote margin (2.1 points), on average, so while they weren’t far off, the size of the error was about the same as the final margin in what was a very close race. But in 2008 and 2012, the early polls missed in a Republican direction: In 2008, Barack Obama won by 7.3 points, but then the average six months out was about 6 points more Republican than the final outcome. Similarly, in 2012, Obama won by 3.9 points, but the early polls were, on average, 2 points more Republican compared to the final margin. The difference at the margins, in other words, can still be very meaningful. Consider the 2016 election. Trump lost the popular vote by 2 points but still won the presidency because our elections are determined by the Electoral College, not the national popular vote. It’s harder to imagine this being the case, though, had Trump lost the popular vote by 4 points, which was Clinton’s average lead between 150 and 200 days out. Why did Clinton’s edge change from 4 points in the early surveys to 2 points in the final result? Well, for a variety of reasons. Polls are snapshots in time, while campaigns are dynamic events. And although some moments are somewhat predictable in their impact — such as the convention bounce — many others aren’t. This seems particularly important right now because we don’t know how the coronavirus pandemic will affect the standing of the two major-party nominees. And unexpected events can’t be discounted: Clinton may have lost in 2016 in part because of the Comey Letter, which came out less than two weeks before the election. All of this is to say it’s difficult to know how 2020 will shape up. Some pollsters have adjusted their methodologies after 2016 — such as weighting samples by educational attainment — and the 2020 race will happen under a different set of circumstances, so it’s not a given that polls will lean Democratic as they did four years ago. But what the polls can tell us right now is that the 2020 race should be pretty competitive. As the campaign develops over the next few months, the electorate’s preferences could shift in small but meaningful ways that could ultimately be consequential. So look at the early polls — you know you’re going to anyway — but know that they are subject to change.

#### \*We are *more* than close enough

The Economist 19 (G.E.M. The Economist. “When to pay attention to 2020 forecasts.” July 26, 2019. https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2019/07/26/when-to-pay-attention-to-2020-forecasts Accessed: 5/30/20)

PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP is going to lose his re-election bid next year—or so recent surveys appear to suggest. A poll conducted between July 21st and 23rd on behalf of The Economist by YouGov, a pollster, found that Mr Trump would lose the national popular vote to a Democratic opponent by seven percentage points. A margin that large would be more than enough for a Democratic candidate such as Joe Biden, the former vice-president, or Elizabeth Warren, a senator from Massachusetts, to coast to a landslide victory in the Electoral College. However, it is currently more than 15 months before the election, and numbers released this early cannot accurately predict how candidates will perform. **According to number-crunching from Christopher Wlezien and Robert Erikson, political scientists at the University of Texas and Columbia University,** **pre-election polls make for poor predictors until the close of summer in an election year, by which point both parties have held their nominating conventions. In their book “The 2012 Campaign and the Timeline of Presidential Elections”, they explain that candidates’ standing in the polls fails to account for even half of the variance in their eventual vote margins until the spring before the election**. At 330 days before the contest—roughly December of the year before the election—polls show virtually no correlation to final election outcomes.

### 2nr – at: polls bad

#### They are good and have great predictive power.

Agadjanian 17 – research associate at the M.I.T. Election Lab Alexander, with George Elliott Morris, 1/3. “A Primer on Polling Error in 2016 — A Historical and Comparative Perspective.” https://www.thecrosstab.com/2017/01/03/history-polling-error-us-uk/

Hillary Clinton bested Donald Trump in the 2016 election popular vote by a margin of 2.1 percentage points. By our best estimates, public opinion polls overestimated Clinton’s win margin by a mere single percentage point — not an unimpressive performance by pre-election polls at the national level. Historically, pre-election polls are relatively good indicators of election outcomes. Our research shows that they have an average error of around 2.5 percentage points dating back to 1980. Using the error between polled and actual win/loss margins of Democratic candidates, national polling in 2016 will go down in history as the fourth most accurate in the last 10 US presidential elections. For an industry that is said to be getting worse and worse at reading the American electorate, these findings are revealing and significant. That being said, there remain areas of serious concern. Yet this simple comparison of final polling accuracy is not substantial evidence that US polls are are any good at all. Could it be that polls in other western democracies are of higher quality than those in the US? Do voters in the UK, for example, have a better sense of the course of their elections months in advance? In that vein of thought, we incorporate analysis of public opinion polling in the United Kingdom as a point of comparison. Our analysis of polls in the United States and United Kingdom finds that polls in the United States are more accurate on election day than those in the UK. In addition, they seem to have greater variance around observed campaign inflection points such as the primary season, party conventions, and presidential debates. This suggests that US polls are better at reading the dynamics of the electorate. Alternatively, the greater volatility in US polling—as documented by others —could signify more erratic polling measurements and not so much meaningful movement. This question, however, is not central to our inquiry. Our findings that US polls are more accurate in the last week of the election holds true for almost every day of the 2016 campaign cycle. Only during the heat of the 2016 primary elections and the presidential debates did the level of polling error in 2016 come close to rivaling that of the average across all US and UK elections. More specifically, the last week’s worth of polling in 2016 had an average error of 1.07 percent, which is roughly a point and a half lower than the average of all final week polling in US elections since 1980 and was much better than the 2015 UK election, which had roughly seven percentage points of raw polling error. Overall, polling has gotten much more accurate over the years. We also have more accurate poll results earlier in the cycle. In 2000, for example, polls taken 300 days out had error upwards of 20 percentage points. In 2016, error 300 days out was a comparatively miniscule four points off. As if that weren’t enough, we find that the 2016 election continues the trend of increasing polling accuracy relative to the UK. United States Historical Polling Accuracy Beginning in 1980, there was huge error in pre-election public opinion polls. Even worse, volatile spikes in error created far more noise than there was signal. At one point, you would have been right to expect Jimmy Carter to beat Ronald Reagan by an enormous forty percentage points! Only beginning once July came around did pollsters pick up on Reagan’s huge support among the silent majority — and even then, he was not favored by nine points. 1992 also saw larger than average error, but what is the average and what does it tell us? According to our analysis measuring the error in each day’s poll of the Democratic candidate’s win margin, the average polling error in the last week of United States election campaigns is 2.49 percentage points. Empirically, this error has still allowed for accurate predictions of elections — but error before an election can be pretty high, as seen in Figure 2a, which displays the error one year out from Election Day for every cycle since 1980. Take 1980, for example. Error of the final week’s polls was 7.6 percent. However, error 300 days before the election (in early February) reached upwards of 40 points. This is mostly due to a few polls that had Democrat Jimmy Carter beating Ronald Reagan by 30-35 points — shockingly inaccurate, as Reagan beat the Georgia peanut farmer by nine percentage points. This early error has greatly decreased in recent years. The maximum error in the entire 2016 election cycle was just 15 percentage points. The only other time the error reached as large that in the first few months of the 1980 cycle was in 1992. One year before the 1992 election, polls had George H.W. Bush beating Bill Clinton by more than 30 points, though Clinton emerged with a six point victory on election night. These two cases of extreme error–the early periods in 1980 and 1992–distort the progression of error observed in the small multiple graphs for other years. In order to get a closer look at the polling error in some of these other more recent years, Figure 2b below looks only at error in elections starting in 1996 through the present day. Over these last 20 years, error in the Democrat’s margin has a decreasing trend in only three of six elections over the course of the campaign. This is a bit surprising, as we would suspect that error generally decreases closer to Election Day across most cases. In 1996, the error slightly increases as Election Day neared, though the error dropped in the final two months or so. The final error ends up at 3.2 points. Notably, in 2012 and 2016, the error stays fairly stable across the campaign season. At only one small period (in 2016) does the error ever extend beyond five percentage points. However, the final error in national level polls was 1.1 in 2016–lower than the three point error in 2012, despite more controversy over polling in 2016.

#### Throwing our hands in the air and saying “fuck variance” is fatalistic and wrong—our numbers quantify uncertainty—the r-squared even 18 months before is 80% and improving as we get closer.

Enten 17 Harry Enten 6/5/2017. Wiz kid. Senior political writer and analyst for FiveThirtyEight. “Here’s The Best Tool We Have for Understanding How the Midterms Are Shaping Up,” FiveThirtyEight. https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/heres-the-best-tool-we-have-for-understanding-how-the-midterms-are-shaping-up/

If you’re interested in how the 2018 midterm elections will go, you may want to keep an eye on the generic congressional ballot, one of the best tools for predicting how many U.S. House seats each party will win. The FiveThirtyEight generic ballot tracker, which we launched today, can help you do that. The generic ballot question, posed by pollsters for decades, is simple: It asks which party voters would support in a congressional election1; there’s usually no mention of specific candidate names — that’s what makes it “generic.” We hope you’ll check it out every day between now and November 2018. (Occasionally is fine too.) So what does the generic ballot show right now? That Democrats are in a historically strong position, with a 44 percent to 37 percent lead over Republicans. That is an incredible gain from the eve of the 2016 election, when our generic ballot estimate put Democrats up by only a single point, 45 percent to 44 percent.2 Indeed, at no point during the summer or fall leading up to the 2016 election did Democrats have as large an advantage on the generic ballot as they do now, and the generic ballot was essentially tied by November. In other words, the political environment seems to have become a lot worse for Republicans since last year’s presidential election. As I’ve written previously, the generic ballot, even this early in a midterm cycle, can be quite predictive of the outcome of the following year’s House elections. Once you control for which party is in the White House, the generic ballot about 18 months before a midterm election is strongly correlated (+.78) with the eventual House result — i.e., the share of votes cast for the president’s party versus the share of votes cast for the opposition party. Here’s all the generic ballot polling we have going back to 1942:3 Generally, in the runup to the midterms, the party that doesn’t control the White House (now, the Democrats) generally sees its position on the generic ballot improve — or remain stable. Given the Democrats’ current 7-point advantage, they’d be expected to win the 2018 national House vote by about 9 percentage points (assuming, of course, that past trends hold and the forecast is perfect, which is very unlikely). But sometimes the political environment changes and the party in the White House makes gains on the generic ballot. Ahead of the 2002 midterms, for example, when George W. Bush was the president, the Democrats held a small lead at this point in the cycle, but Republicans took back the advantage after the Sept. 11 terror attacks. As we approach the 2018 midterms, expect the generic ballot to become even more predictive. For the 18 midterm elections that have taken place since 1946, I compared the final generic-ballot polling of the cycle by Gallup or the final polling average from RealClearPolitics4 with the results of the national House vote and found that the final polling missed by an average of only 2 percentage points. That’s about as accurate as the final national presidential polls before a presidential election.

### ---at: 2016 bad

#### The 2016 polls were actually *quite good*

Silver 17 (Nate, Fiver Thirty Eight, “Trump Is Tempting Fate On Health Care”, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-is-tempting-fate-on-health-care/)

But can we trust these polls in the first place? Oh, this argument again? It’s certainly possible to overestimate the precision of polling. If your fate depended on whether Trump’s approval rating was really 40 percent or 43 percent or 46 percent, for instance, you’d want to take out a life insurance policy. And there are inevitably lots of ways to misinterpret the polling. During last year’s election, a lot of national media outlets mistakenly concluded that the Electoral College would help Clinton. That finding wasn’t supported by the polling, which instead suggested the Electoral College would benefit Trump. But overall, the polls were about as accurate as they’d been historically, with Trump beating his national polls by only 1 to 2 percentage points and his swing state polls by 2 to 3 percentage points, on average.

#### National average was correct—state-swings were small, and models have updated.

Goldberg 18 – editor at large of National Review Online and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute

(Jonah, 12/14. “Commentary: Maybe Trump can't win in 2020, but Democrats can lose.” <https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-goldberg-trump-win-2020-democrats-lose-1216-20181214-story.html>)

Trump’s boosters are often quick to dismiss the polls, claiming they were wrong in 2016, when everyone said he had no chance of winning. The problem with this defense is that the national polls were actually pretty accurate in 2016. If you average out the 13 final national polls of 2016, they showed Hillary Clinton ahead by 3.1 percentage points. She won the popular vote — the only thing national polls measure — by 2.1 percentage points.

Trump carried the Electoral College because he won Pennsylvania and Wisconsin by 0.7 points each and Michigan by 0.2 points. A mere 78,000 votes carried the day.

### 2nr – at: covid thumper

#### Biden’s not getting brownie points either

Russonello 20 – journalist and music critic who covers jazz and improvised music as well as electoral politics for The New York Times Giovanni, 5/15. “Trump’s Ratings on the Virus Are Sagging. Why Isn’t Biden Surging?” New York Times, Proquest.

In the five weeks since Biden became the lone remaining Democratic presidential candidate, all but sealing his nomination, Americans’ faith in Trump’s handling of the coronavirus has steadily sunk. In this week’s CNN poll, Americans disapproved of his pandemic response by a 13-point margin. But Biden has largely stayed outside the spotlight in recent weeks — at the very moment when he might otherwise be expected to grab headlines with attacks on Trump’s leadership and examples of how he would confront the pandemic. In the CNN poll, voters were just 6 points more likely to say Biden would do a better job than Trump at responding to the virus outbreak. A month ago, the difference was 9 points in Biden’s favor.

#### Trump spins covid in his favor.

Jacobs 5/31/20Anna Jacobs is Senior Research Assistant at Brookings Doha Centre. “A Warning to Joe Biden: Trump Is Winning the Covid-19 Spin Game”, <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2020/05/31/warning-joe-biden-trump-winning-covid-19-spin-game>

Currently, the US is facing an unprecedented public health crisis as the country with the highest number of confirmed cases and deaths from COVID-19. The death toll surpassed 100,000 this week and infections have reached nearly 1.8 million. The US is also confronting an economic crisis, with 15 percent unemployment. Economists predict this will rise to between 25 to 30 percent. It has not seen unemployment rates this high since the Great Depression. The Trump administration's handling of the global pandemic has been an unmitigated disaster - he brushed off the seriousness of the virus, moved too slowly on mass testing and turned the virus response into a partisan game for his own political gain. Healthcare costs went up and economic bailouts helped corporations more than they helped American workers. Trump's grossly incompetent leadership was on full display, every day, during White House briefings about the virus, which he essentially turned into daily campaign rallies. He attacked reporters, in his usual bullying style, for asking questions about his slow response to the pandemic. As criticism of the administration's response grew and the death toll rose, Trump and his team did what they do best: changed the conversation.This is how Trump has survived these battles. He turns legal battles into political ones and positions them in the court of media and public opinion, which is where he has transformed the art of political spin. His propaganda has normalised (or, rather, elevated) blatant lying, under the banner of "alternative facts". Through Fox and Friends, and Trump pals like Sean Hannity, right-wing conspiracy theories have become commonplace in the media and American political discourse. After all, Fox News is still the most-watched cable news channel in America and has been for the past 18 years. Just when you think Trump is confronting a crisis that he cannot escape, the White House creates a scandal for the media to focus their attention on. They overwhelm us with a story (often with an accompanying buzzword) that creates a host of accusations and legal questions that confuse and overwhelm the public as we scramble to try to understand the basic elements of the controversy. Cue, Trump's now infamous Mother’s Day tweeting rampage. The #OBAMAGATE! tweet was followed by accusations of wrongdoing by dozens of individuals from the Obama administration, the FBI, the Justice Department and others. Trump demanded that Obama be subpoenaed to testify to the Senate over "Obamagate," a demand which Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell and South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsay Graham both rejected. This says a lot about how ridiculous this story is given that McConnell and Graham are two of Trump's staunchest defenders. Furthermore, when a Washington Post reporter asked Trump to explain the specific crimes behind "Obamagate," he retorted in his classic style: "You know what the crime is. The crime is very obvious to everybody ... All you have to do is read the newspapers, except yours." This is Trump doing what Trump does best. He is spinning a story that he hopes will undermine the entire Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the election. He thinks that if they exonerate the likes of Roger Stone and Michael Flynn, it will completely exonerate the Trump team and shift attention towards Obama (and Obama's vice president and the presumptive Democratic nominee, Joe Biden). This is also likely a pre-emptive attack to help the Trump administration battle accusations of pro-Trump Russian interference in the upcoming 2020 election. Intelligence officials briefed members of Congress on the matter in February, arguing that Russia was already actively working to help re-elect Trump. Biden rightly pointed out in an interview with ABC that: "This is all about diversion. This is a game this guy plays all the time." The question is, will it work? Given Trump's track record, it could. Trump has the bully pulpit and he is using it. Plus, the media is falling for it. His wild accusations and conspiracy theories increase ratings and clickbait. Perhaps less cynically, it is also the job of reporters to follow and investigate claims that the president makes. I am guilty of this myself. In the last couple of weeks, I have spent hours trying to understand all the individuals and accusations surrounding the alleged "Obamagate". Trump is attempting to squirm his way out of a serious conversation about his failed leadership, yet again. Even the impeachment did not seem to make much of a difference and opinions about the charges (abuse of power and obstruction of Congress) fell along partisan lines. And that seems like it was a lifetime ago, given the onslaught of news and scandals coming from the White House (and Trump's tweets) every day. Somehow, Trump's approval ratings are holding relatively steady. They even got a bump. As of May 13, according to a Gallup poll, his job approval rating reached 49 percent, a tie for the highest of his presidency. This is low, but not that much lower than previous presidents. Obama began his second term in 2012 with a job approval rating of 46 percent. Furthermore, even amid the greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression, a recent CNN poll shows that respondents gave Trump a strong advantage over Biden in terms of his handling of the economy.Trump's strategy of blaming the Chinese for the coronavirus also seems to be working with the American public. A recent survey by Navigator Research showed that 43 percent of Americans think "China bears more responsibility than the federal government for the way coronavirus has spread in the US".

#### \*It’s backfiring against Biden

Siders 20 – senior national political reporter for POLITICO and co-author of the California Playbook David, 3/18/20. “Why some Democrats worry the coronavirus could help Trump win reelection.” https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/18/coronavirus-campaign-primary-135107

Yet because of the coronavirus, the presidential campaign is suspended in time. Rallies are off. Campaign workers, like many other people, are sheltering in place. On Tuesday, Maryland became the fifth state to postpone its election, and more states are expected to follow. The postponements have left an unexpected opening for Sanders to soldier on, even as his prospects fade. The pandemic, which first sapped the primary of life, is now extending it. “It’s frozen the campaign,” said Mark Longabaugh, a senior adviser to Sanders during his 2016 campaign. “I don’t know what major campaign event you are going to have … Put 50 press people in the room and let [the candidates] address the camera with their wives, maybe? He said, “Past that, and I don’t see how you cut through this life-or-death coverage that we’ve got. … It just kind of closes it down.” For many Democrats, the prospect of a stalled but protracted nominating contest is unsettling. Moderates are laboring to unify the party’s ranks behind Biden, and the politics of the coronavirus crisis is heightening their anxiety. The conventional wisdom for weeks has been that President Donald Trump's uneven, and at times chaotic, handling of this crisis is deeply problematic for his reelection chances. But it may not be that simple. So far, Trump has taken a beating over his handling of the pandemic. The economy is tanking, and just 46 percent of Americans believe the federal government is doing enough to confront the coronavirus, down from 61 percent last month, according to an NPR/PBS NewsHour/Marist poll. Few people trust what Trump is saying about the pandemic, according to the same poll. But Trump has time on his side, with the coronavirus spreading early in the election cycle. This week, the Republican president adopted a more somber tone, and some Democrats are beginning to worry that he could mold the narrative to his benefit. A massive stimulus, including direct payments to Americans, could help him in November. “The initial mishandling of the coronavirus by the government doesn’t mean voters will penalize Trump in November,” said Michael Ceraso, who worked for Sanders in 2016 and was Pete Buttigieg’s New Hampshire director before leaving his campaign last year. “We know we have two candidates who can pivot this generation’s largest health crisis to their policy strengths. But history tells us that an incumbent who steers us through a challenging time, a la Bush and 9/11 and Obama and the Great Recession, are rewarded with a second term.”

### 2nr – at: russia hacks

#### Net zero impact.

Tobin 18 (Jonathan; 2/14/2018; National Review, “it seems exceedingly unlikely,” http://www.nationalreview.com/article/456412/2018-elections-russian-meddling-unlikely-make-difference)

On Tuesday morning, the heads of America’s intelligence agencies publicly warned that the Russians are seeking to meddle in this year’s midterm elections. Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the Russians aim to use “propaganda, social media, false-flag personas, sympathetic spokespeople and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States.” The United States was, Coats said, “under attack.” Since the Russians considered their 2016 meddling to be a “success,” the 2018 assault was likely to be as brazen as their past behavior. The warning, echoed by the other intelligence chiefs, was in stark contrast to President Trump’s dismissal of both the evidence about Russian activity in 2016 and the possibility of a repeat performance. Though CIA director Mike Pompeo said his agency was prepared to respond to attempted Russian mischief with local law-enforcement officials and even to launch a counter-attack on Moscow, the disconnect between the president’s ongoing indifference to the issue and alarms being sounded in Congress is disquieting. But lost in all this hand-wringing was the most pertinent question of all: Could Russia’s interference even make any difference? Judging by what we know about 2016, the answer is: not much. As the New York Times noted in an Upshot column published the same day as the hearings, there is no reason to believe Russia’s dirty work altered many opinions during the 2016 election, let alone swung the presidency to Trump. Infuriating as the Kremlin’s propaganda operations were, studies showed that only two American voters out of every 10,000 were exposed to them during the course of the campaign, and the odds that even those few voters were the least bit affected by said exposure seem very small indeed. The Upshot post, citing a meta-analysis of various forms of campaign persuasion, indicated that the net effect on voters of what the Russians did was “zero.”

#### It didn’t change vtoes

Cillizza 20 (Chris Cillizza is a CNN Politics Reporter and Editor-at-Large, covering national politics. “Donald Trump just made Vladimir Putin very happy.” May 8, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/08/politics/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-russia/index.html Accessed: 5/30/20)

The President's inability to grasp that nuance means that he continues to reject the findings of the intelligence community, Robert Mueller's special counsel investigation and the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee -- all of which concluded that, **yes, Russia ran a broad and deep campaign to interfere in the 2016 election** and, yes, it was aimed at helping Trump, who they believed was better for their interests than Clinton. (**To be clear: None of those investigations produced definitive proof that a single vote had been changed by Russia's effort.)** And unfortunately, this is not the first time that Trump has dismissed the findings of those various investigations while Putin was present. In July 2018, at a summit in Helsinki, Finland, Trump and Putin emerged from a nearly two-hour private meeting and took questions from the press. Asked directly whether he blamed Russia for election interference, Trump responded: "I hold both countries responsible. I think that the United States has been foolish. I think we've all been foolish. ... And I think we're all to blame." Later, when pressed on the fact that the intelligence community had concluded Russia meddled to help him and hurt Clinton, Trump said: "So **I have great confidence in my intelligence people**, but I will tell you that President **Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial** today."

### ---1nc – uq counterplan

#### \*read this plank if they go for hacking a lot or your judge likes infinite condo

The United States federal government should substantially increase its funding and investments in election security measures and infrastructure for the 2020 US General Election.

### ---2nr – uq cp solvency

#### But, state coordination solves residual risk.

Berry 8-21/18 – Washington correspondent for USA TODAY, focusing on the Deep South and voting rights and civil rights (Deborah Barfield, “Cybersecurity: States ramp up election protections ahead of midterms with $380 million in federal funds.” https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/08/21/midterms-states-beef-up-cybersecurity-ahead-pivotal-vote/1047759002/)

With just three months until the midterms, states are spending an infusion of federal money to hire experts, add layers of security and adopt paper trails to thwart cyberthreats to their election systems. “There is no going back to the way things were," said Rhode Island Secretary of State Nellie Gorbea, co-chair of the Elections Committee at the National Association of Secretaries of States. "We have to constantly be wary and face the facts that our elections are under threat at an international level. We have to safeguard our democracy." The federal Election Assistance Commission will release a report Tuesday highlighting what states and territories plan to do with the $380 million Congress approved this year to help them protect against cyberthreats. USA TODAY received an advance copy of the report. Nearly all the states and territories have received their share of the federal money, ranging from $6 million for Alabama to $19 million for Florida. States plan to use nearly 37 percent of the money to improve cybersecurity and 28 percent to buy new voting equipment, according to the report. “By and large you see very robust, very earnest plans around security and infrastructure improvement across the board," said Mark Abbott, director of grants at the election commission. Here are what some battleground states plan to do: • Florida, which recently hired five cybersecurity experts, plans to use some of its $19 million to train local election officials on cybersecurity. • Pennsylvania plans to use a chunk of its $13 million to upgrade its aging voting machines and add a paper record. • Indiana wants to use some of its $7.5 million to test its voting equipment, including poll books, for vulnerabilities. Abbott noted that Indiana proposed nine steps to harden its security, including voter registration security scans, email encryption and digital signatures. “They already had some robust stuff going on around cyber, but with this plan and with input from their stakeholders they really amped it up,'' he said. "I think it’s a good example of how serious states are taking the security posture of their systems." With the midterms looming, many states are using the money to make changes quickly, including training staff, hiring cybersecurity experts and adding verification steps. They also plan to pay for post-election audits. Several states are upgrading or replacing voter registration systems.

### 2nr – at: trump postpones

#### Legality & Empirics means this won’t happen.

Schive 20 (Miriam Schive, Community Lead, Regional Strategies – North America, World Economic Forum “Voting in a pandemic: How COVID-19 will change the US elections.” April 29, 2020. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/us-presidential-election-primary-voting-covid19-coronavirus-pandemic-ballot-polling/> Accessed: 5/19/2020 )

**A second wave of the coronavirus could hit the United States close to the presidential election on 3 November**. State and local governments must consider options like voting by mail and expanding in-person polling stations, but these are costly and have challenges. **The US election is unlikely to be postponed**. On 3 November 2020, the people of the United States are scheduled to cast their ballots in the 59th presidential election. The choices are now clear: re-elect the incumbent President Donald Trump, or vote in former Vice President Joe Biden. What is far less clear is how, exactly, voters will be able to exercise their right in a way that is free, fair, accessible, secure and safe in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the primary method of preventing the spread of the coronavirus is creating social distance, the normal interactive and assembly-driven process of primaries, campaigns and party conventions has been severely interrupted. Experts are already warning of a potentially worse second wave of the coronavirus later this year, making the threat of continued disruption far from hypothetical. Because elections are highly decentralized in the US, thousands of state and local systems must make their own calls on how to move forward with administering the elections. Wisconsin’s primary election on 7 April demonstrated the ensuing complications. After Democratic Governor Tony Evers’ executive order to postpone the primaries until June was challenged by the Republican-controlled legislature, Wisconsin’s Supreme Court voted along ideological lines to proceed with the 7 April vote as planned. Voters were left with a difficult choice: adhere to federal guidelines and a mandated stay-at-home order, or face the possible health risk and exercise their right to vote in person. While close to 70% of voters chose to mail-in their ballots, others waited for hours in long lines, six feet apart, to cast their ballots at the few operating polling stations. Several voters seem to have contracted COVID-19 as a result. Absentee Voting Rate Spikes Wisconsin 2020 Wisconsin saw a huge spike in absentee and mail-in voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sixteen states have decided to postpone their primary contests to dates later in the summer, but there is no guarantee that stay-at-home orders and social-distancing guidelines will be lifted by then. A few states have moved to voting entirely by mail, but the decision isn’t as easy as it sounds. Why not just vote by mail? While five US states already conduct elections (nearly) entirely by mail, voting by mail is a costly and time-consuming process with its fair share of complications. The process is expensive, requiring printing mail-in ballots, which are different from in-person voting ballots; mailing the ballots, including pre-paid return postage to ensure poorer communities are not marginalized by the process; and ultimately, processing the filled-out ballots, which requires the acquisition of specialized machines and training of poll workers to use them. This also presupposes that states have addresses for all eligible voters, but that is not always the case. Some states make it easy to register as a voter or update an address online, but many do not – and the issue of expanding or tightening voter registration laws has been the subject of deep partisan divides. Changing to a vote-by-mail system also requires extensive public information campaigns to ensure voters are aware of the changes and their voting options. Which states have the strongest support for vote by mail **In the midst of a pandemic, Americans support voting by mail.** But even under the best circumstances, some voters will either not receive or be able to mail their ballot, and this requires contingency planning for at least limited in-person voting. Ohio’s vote, which was postponed from 17 March and changed to postal voting by 28 April, will be the first US test case. Why not just increase in-person voting options? States have a set of options to improve the possibilities for in-person voting to be compliant with the social distancing guidelines. In order to avoid overcrowding at polling stations, states might expand the number of polling stations available in their district. However, this will also be costly as it requires hiring and training additional volunteers and election officials, providing protective equipment and buying additional voting machines. States could also expand options for early voting to spread out the crowds over several days, but this would similarly require more staff. Can we postpone the election? **Postponement of the US election – while technically possible – is not a likely scenario. The President cannot unilaterally postpone Election Day. The US Congress could enact legislation to postpone Election Day, but this would need to be signed by the President and would be subject to legal challenge. There is also little flexibility in how long the election could be postponed, because the US Constitution mandates that the new terms of the Congress and President begin on 3 January and 20 January, respectively. Additionally, there is no precedent in US history of moving the federal elections – including during the US Civil War, World War I, World War II, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and even during the Spanish Flu.** What is the World Economic Forum doing about the coronavirus outbreak? So, what’s the solution? **Congressional representatives are working (mostly from home) to pass legislation to help states prepare for holding elections in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic**. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act passed with bipartisan support and allocated $400 million in grants to help states “prevent, prepare for, and respond to coronavirus.” But many representatives are pushing for additional legislation to guide states through this crisis. The non-partisan Brennan Center for Justice released a detailed plan to protect the 2020 vote during the pandemic. It estimates it will need $2 billion of funding to implement the plan. Congress may agree to allocate additional funds, but most of this funding will have to come from state budgets, which are already overstretched from dealing with the health crisis. Ensuring a free and fair election this November will not be simple or cheap. But **as the recent elections in South Korea demonstrated, with careful planning and adequate investments, it is possible to pull off elections in the middle of a pandemic**. If there is an opportunity in every crisis, perhaps this pandemic provides an opportunity for the US to invest in improvements to make the election process more accessible and inclusive – and ensure they’re resilient in the face of future disruptions.

#### \*Vote-by-Mail thumps and addresses safety concerns

Wicker 20 (Jewel. Columnist for Billboard, Atlanta Magazine, Pitchfork, VICE, Teen Vogue, and The Hollywood Reporter. “The Coronavirus Could Dramatically Alter Voting in the 2020 Election.” April 30, 2020. <https://www.teenvogue.com/story/coronavirus-alter-voting-2020-election>)

As the country continues to grapple with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 presidential election is drawing nearer. A new poll conducted by the Pew Research Center said two-thirds of Americans believe it is “very or somewhat likely that the coronavirus outbreak will significantly disrupt people’s ability to vote in the presidential election.” In many ways, as primaries have continued or been delayed in some states, it already has. Expert opinions vary on when the current pandemic will end, and, as previously noted, this makes it difficult for policymakers and citizens to make decisions about the future as Election Day on November 3 approaches. With that uncertainty in mind, here is a look at some of the different ways voting could play out. Voting in person The primaries that have occurred during this uncertain time give us a look at some of the issues that could arise. Several primary elections have been postponed as a result of COVID-19. Earlier this week, the New York State Board of Elections officially canceled its primary. But some primaries have occurred as scheduled, despite the pandemic and stay-at-home orders. CNN reported that many voters in Wisconsin wore face masks as they waited in long lines to vote earlier this month. In Teen Vogue op-eds, voters wrote about being forced to choose between risking their health and exercising their right to vote, a decision that was exacerbated for Black residents. As of last week, NPR reported that Milwaukee health officials have identified seven cases of COVID-19, the infectious disease caused by the coronavirus, tied to the election. If the current pandemic persists through the fall, or we experience a second major wave of infection, which the director of the CDC has warned us about, in-person voting could be risky, depending on the size of the outbreak in a given location. Moreover, the virus has apparently prompted a lot of poll workers to avoid returning to potential high-risk infection zones, which could complicate in-person logistics. Voting by mail President Trump has spoken out against expanding voting by mail, **but a new poll from the Pew Research Center shows that “there is broad support among the public for both making voting by mail widely available and automatic voter registration” as a result of the current pandemic**. The Atlantic notes that while congressional Democrats are pushing for national rules that would require all states to allow absentee voting without an excuse or to mail a ballot to every eligible voter in the event of an Election Day national health emergency, this effort isn’t likely to get past the Republican-controlled Senate or receive a signature from Trump. Alarmingly, there is an apparent partisan divide forming over vote by mail. Some on the right have raised concerns that expanded mail-in voting measures could be exploited for voter fraud (which others say is a myth). Meanwhile, some on the left worry that not expanding vote by mail is tantamount to voter suppression. Currently, The Atlantic reports, five states mail all eligible voters a ballot to their homes. Another 28 states offer “no excuse” mail ballots, although they must be requested. Meanwhile, 17 states require a cause (including age, illness, or disability) to receive a ballot by mail. But COVID-19 could spark more changes; as reported by New York magazine, New Hampshire policymakers think the pandemic could be justification for voters to request absentee ballots through existing voting laws. **Postponement of election** **This is considered the most unlikely outcome, according to experts. Through the Civil War, two world wars, and the 1918 flu pandemic, presidential elections still occurred as scheduled.** (Although, as FiveThirtyEight points out, calamities have made voting more difficult and more expensive to conduct.)

### 2nr – at: biden win inevitable

#### Trump capitalizes on the unexpected to secure victory

Enten 7-5-2020, election analyst @ CNN (Harry, “Trump faces a now historical disadvantage,” *CNN*, [https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/05/politics/polls-july-analysis/index.html)//BB](https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/05/politics/polls-july-analysis/index.html%29//BB)

A new Monmouth University poll finds former Vice President Joe Biden with a 53% to 41% lead over President Donald Trump. The average live interview poll conducted over the last month has Biden ahead by a similar 11-point margin. What's the point: Usually, this is the point where someone like myself says we have four months to go until the election and polls are a snapshot in time. Both of those statements are true, but they obscure an important fact. Polls taken around Independence Day in an election year are actually pretty highly correlated with the November results in incumbent contests. That means Trump is in a lot of trouble. Take a look at the 13 incumbent elections dating all the way back to 1940. Usually going all the way back in time will lead you to find a lot of volatile campaigns, as more modern ones tend to be more steady. Yet, since 1940, the final result differs from the polls at this point by an average of just 7 points. The median difference is only about 4.5 points. View Trump and Biden head-to-head polling These should be quite worrisome for Trump given he's already down double-digits, and there's no guarantee any polling miss would benefit him. Indeed, we can translate past polling to give us odds about the current election. At least 8-in-10 to 9-in-10 times based solely on the horserace polling, Biden would be expected to take more votes in the fall. More troublesome for Trump: no one in an incumbent presidential election has been polling above 50% at this point like Biden and gone on to lose. In other words, Trump already needs something quite unusual to occur in order to come back in this race. Many of the previously hopeful examples for Trump are no longer ones that should make Trump happy. Republican Wendell Willkie significantly cut an over 20-point deficit in early 1940 to be within about 10 points of Democrat Franklin Roosevelt in July 1940. Willkie would lose by 10 points. Democrat Jimmy Carter had jumped out to a mid-single digit advantage over non-elected incumbent Republican Gerald Ford in early July 1976, after being down in the winter. Carter would win by 2 points in the fall. Republican Ronald Reagan blew past Carter to an 11-point lead by early July in 1980 despite trailing by double-digits a few months earlier. Reagan emerged victorious by 10 points in the fall. Even Republican George H.W. Bush's lead over Democrat Bill Clinton had turned into basically a tie by this point, after Clinton was down nearly 40 points in some of the earliest polling of the race. By July 10, Clinton was ahead in some polling before going on to win by a little less than 6 points in the fall. View 2020 presidential election polling There have been only two races since 1940 in which the difference between the polls now and the eventual result was greater than the margin by which Trump is down now. Democrat Lyndon Johnson's 56-point blowout edge over Republican Barry Goldwater translated into a 23-point blowout in the fall. Johnson's advantage, however, defied the bounds of political gravity, as he still was likely benefiting from a polling bump after succeeding the assassinated John Kennedy. The only really good example for Trump is Democrat Harry Truman in 1948. He was down by a little over 10 points to Republican Thomas Dewey. Truman would win by a little less than 5 points. Unlike Biden, however, Dewey was under 50%. Now, the past isn't necessarily prologue. There is time for volatility. The polls will probably bounce around during the convention period. (Part of the reason the first 10 days of July are a good snapshot is that it is usually after the primary season but before the conventions.) Trump could close the gap and could very well win.

#### Inevitability wrong—Dukakis, bush, *clinton*

Skelley 6-25-2020 (Geoffrey, “Biden Has A Historically Large Lead Over Trump, But It Could Disappear

Just ask Michael Dukakis or George W. Bush.,” https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/biden-has-a-historically-large-lead-over-trump-but-it-could-disappear/?cid=taboola\_rcc\_r)//BB Of course, there are still four months to go until Election Day, but the fact that Biden has such a sizable lead — already bigger than Hillary Clinton’s largest lead over Trump, which peaked at 7.5 points in 2016 — is notable. Heck, even Barack Obama never led by more than 8 points in our 2008 national average, and that wound up being a blowout. [Related: Our 2020 National Polling Averages] It’s not just Biden’s margin that stands out, either; he’s also only one of three candidates to crack the 50 percent mark at this point in the cycle. (The other two were Richard Nixon in 1972 and Ronald Reagan in 1984, both of whom were incumbents who went on to win landslide victories by 23 and 18 points, respectively.) It’s unlikely that Biden wins by that sort of margin, given our increasingly polarized politics, but it is a sign that there are fewer undecided or third-party voters for Trump to pick up to help improve his position. It also doesn’t bode well for Trump that he is in the worst position of any incumbent since Jimmy Carter in 1980. But before you declare Biden the winner, remember his lead is not insurmountable. Polls closer to November could very well show a race that is tightening. At this point in the 1988 cycle, Michael Dukakis led nationally by almost 5 points, and in 2000, George W. Bush was up by nearly 8 points. But Dukakis ended up losing by nearly 8 points in November while Bush narrowly lost the popular vote. (He still won the Electoral College, thanks to Florida.) So Trump still has plenty of time to recover enough ground to win in the Electoral College even if he loses the national popular vote — after all, he did it in 2016. That said, if Biden’s current national lead holds steady, it would almost certainly neutralize Trump’s potential edge in the Electoral College. But as Dukakis and Bush show us, a lot can change between now and November.

#### \*2016.

Garrison 7-5-2020 (Joey, “‘Grim resolve’: Biden is up big and the Senate is in sight, but Democrats still haunted by fear of letdown,” USA Today, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/05/joe-biden-up-big-and-senate-grasps-dems-haunted-fear-letdown/3284392001/>)//BB

Democrats have heard this story before. Their standard-bearer builds a sizable lead in the race for president against Donald Trump. Everything seems pointed in their direction. Pundits talk about a Democratic victory like it’s inevitable. Then it doesn’t happen. Still licking their wounds four years after Hillary Clinton’s stinging loss, Democrats are grappling with heightened expectations that didn’t seem possible at the start of the year. Presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden cruised to a double-digit lead nationally weeks ago and has stayed there as President Trump takes a pounding over his handling of the coronavirus crisis, high unemployment and the fallout from nationwide protests over police brutality. Not only does Biden lead polls in every battleground state – a wider command than Clinton ever had – the former vice president is either ahead or competitive in states that the GOP must carry, including Texas, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio and Missouri. Democrats also have a path to take control of the Senate. More:Trump trails Biden in Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Florida, North Carolina and Arizona, poll finds Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden leads in polling in battleground states. On one hand, Democrats are gushing about their prospects: a chance for a sweeping victory, not just eking out a win, to deliver a clear repudiation of the Trump era and unseat Mitch McConnell as Senate majority leader. But they’re not able to shake off their painful memories of 2016, when many Democrats falsely assumed that the Republican Party’s nomination of a reality TV show host with no elected office experience would ensure a Clinton victory in November. "That memory can't be erased," said Luis Heredia, executive director of the Arizona Education Association, the state's teachers union, and a Democratic National Committee member. He recalled watching swing states Pennsylvania and Michigan quickly collapse for Democrats on election night. “That memory is still very fresh, especially for me.” "You remind people that a poll is just a poll," Heredia said. "It's a moment in time on Tuesday morning when somebody answered a call. Let's not get carried away. We should be winning by 20 points, given the circumstances. Winning by 6 points is still too close for us to say that we're ahead of the game." Different dynamics in 2020 than 2016 In interviews with DNC members from six battleground states, including party leaders, each came back to an old campaign cliche: “Take nothing for granted.” Democratic anxiety is assuaged a bit by the different circumstances this time around: Trump is an incumbent, unable to run as a businessman outsider fighting to “drain the swamp.” Multiple crises – including a pandemic that’s resulted in more than 129,000 American deaths – are part of his record. He just wrapped up arguably the most difficult month in his presidency, capped by a controversy over reports that Russia offered bounties to the Taliban to kill U.S. soldiers. Perhaps most significantly, Biden lacks the low favorability and trustworthiness marks that doomed Clinton, whose polarization gave Trump an opening many Democrats did not see. There is a major warning sign for Democrats: Despite Biden’s sizable lead, his supporters are significantly less enthusiastic about him than Trump’s loyalists are of the president, polling shows. “Democrats across Wisconsin have two reactions to this moment,” said Ben Wikler, chairman of the Wisconsin Democratic Party. “The first is that Trump is an unmitigated disaster, and polls demonstrate that everyone knows he’s bad. The second reaction is that we have learned our lesson from 2016.” President Donald Trump enjoys an advantage in the enthusiasm of his supporters. He said Democrats “can’t take their foot off the gas even for a second” by buying too much into the polls, noting that Clinton led Trump by as many as 15 percentage points in Wisconsin after the Democratic National Convention in August 2016. Trump ended up winning Wisconsin by less than 1 percentage point. “I would encapsulate it as ‘grim resolve,’ ” Wikler said of the mood among Democrats. It’s “mystifying that Trump even has the scraps of support he has,” given his troubles. He said Democrats fear Trump is “willing to cheat his way back into power” by limiting voter access and refusing to accept results. There are four months left before the election, enough time for the race to upend again.

## 2NR – Link

### Low-Information

#### Mandatory voting increases uninformed voting, which breaks decisively for Trump—he “loves the uneducated”

Brennan 16 (Jason Brennan, Robert J. and Elizabeth Flanagan associate professor of strategy, economics, ethics, and public policy @ Georgetown. 11/10/2016. “Trump Won Because Voters Are Ignorant, Literally” <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/10/the-dance-of-the-dunces-trump-clinton-election-republican-democrat/>) DLuo

OK, so that just happened. Donald Trump always enjoyed massive support from uneducated, low-information white people. As Bloomberg Politics [reported](http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-08-12/education-level-sharply-divides-clinton-trump-race) back in August, Hillary Clinton was enjoying a giant 25 percentage-point lead among college-educated voters going into the election. (Whether that trend held up remains to be seen.) In contrast, in the 2012 election, college-educated voters just barely favored Barack Obama over Mitt Romney. Last night we saw something historic: the dance of the dunces. Never have educated voters so uniformly rejected a candidate. But never before have the lesser-educated so uniformly supported a candidate. Trump supporters might retort: “That’s because Trump supports the little guy and Clinton helps the already privileged college grads.” But that’s false: Trump supporters in the primaries had an [average income](http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-mythology-of-trumps-working-class-support/) of about $72,000 per year. They aren’t rich, but make more than the national average and more than Clinton supporters. Trump owes his victory to the uninformed. But it’s not just Trump. Political scientists [have been studying](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=26809) what voters know and how they think for well over 65 years. The results are frightening. Voters generally know who the president is but not much else. They don’t know which party controls Congress, what Congress has done recently, whether the economy is getting better or worse (or by how much). In the 2000 U.S. presidential election, most voters knew Al Gore was more liberal than George W. Bush, but significantly less than half knew that Gore was more supportive of abortion rights, more supportive of welfare-state programs, favored a higher degree of aid to blacks, or was more supportive of environmental regulation. Just why voters know so little is well-understood. It’s not that people are stupid. Rather, it’s that democracy creates bad incentives. Consider: If you go to buy a car, you do your research. After all, if you make a smart choice, you reap the rewards; if you make a bad choice, you suffer the consequences. Over time, most people learn to become better consumers. Not so with politics. How all of us vote, collectively, matters a great deal. But how any one of us votes does not. Imagine a college professor told her class of 210 million students, “Three months from now, we’ll have a final exam. You won’t get your own personal grade. Instead, I’ll average all of your grades together, and everyone will receive the same grade.” No one would bother to study, and the average grade would be an F. That, in a nutshell, is how democracy works. Most voters are ignorant or misinformed because the costs to them of acquiring political information greatly exceed the potential benefits. Most voters are ignorant or misinformed because the costs to them of acquiring political information greatly exceed the potential benefits. They can afford to indulge silly, false, delusional beliefs — precisely because such beliefs cost them nothing. After all, the chances that any individual vote will decide the election is vanishingly small. As a result, individual voters tend to vote expressively, to show their commitment to their worldview and team. Voting is more like doing the wave at a sports game than it is like choosing policy. The great political scientist Philip Converse once [said](http://users.clas.ufl.edu/billrad/Behave_Fall_2006/Converse%20assessing%20capacity.pdf): “The two simplest truths I know about the distribution of political information in moderate electorates are that the mean is low and variance is high.” In other words, most people know nothing, some know less than nothing (that is, they are systematically mistaken rather than just ignorant), and some know a great deal. In general, college-educated people are better-informed than those with a high school diploma, who are in turn better informed than those who did not finish high school. When people hear such depressing statistics, they are quick to wag their fingers at America’s broken education system. “This just shows we need better teachers!” they cry. It’s a plausible argument, but wrong. In fact, average Americans have completed [more schooling](https://www.amazon.com/Democracy-Political-Ignorance-Smaller-Government/dp/0804786615) now than 60 years ago, but they’ve remained equally ignorant about politics even as their education levels rose. More fundamentally, to blame the schools is to misunderstand why citizens know so little. The schools teach them most of what they need to know to vote well. But they forget it because the information is not useful. And the reason it is not useful is because their individual votes make no difference. Others say the problem could be fixed by encouraging citizens to deliberate together. They believe getting random groups of Americans together to talk about politics will cause them to resolve their differences, become informed, and reach agreement. However, political scientists have been conducting large number of experiments testing how deliberation works. Even though the researchers in question almost always want deliberation to “fix” democracy, in general, they [tend to find](http://www.princeton.edu/~talim/mendelberg%20-%20deliberative%20citizen.pdf) that it makes things worse, not better. None of this would matter if political information had no effect on how citizens vote. But, in fact, it does. Every other year, the [American National Election Studies](http://www.electionstudies.org/) survey 1) what voters know, 2) what policies they support, and 3) who they are (e.g., white or black, poor or rich, employed or not). With these three sets of data, it is then possible to determine how information, by itself, changes what voters want, because we can control for whatever effect race, gender, and income have. Trump supporters might be upset to learn that this method reveals that high-information voters (regardless of their income, race, employment status, gender, or where they live) tend to favor free trade and are pro-immigration. It’s not just that Trump’s anti-trade and anti-immigrant agenda flies against the consensus of economists on the left, right, and center, but it’s precisely the platform informed voters reject — regardless of their backgrounds. That’s not to say that high-information voters tend to favor the Democrats’ politics. That’s not to say that high-information voters tend to favor the Democrats’ politics. In fact, high-information voters tend to have policy preferences that cut across party lines. For instance, high-information voters are [pro-free trade](https://www.amazon.com/Collective-Preferences-Democratic-Politics-Opinion/dp/0521527872/ref%3Dsr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1478791615&sr=1-1&keywords=Collective+Preferences+in+Democratic+Politics), pro-immigration, in favor of criminal justice reform, wish to raise taxes to offset the deficit, anti-war, pro-gay rights, and [skeptical](https://www.amazon.com/Myth-Rational-Voter-Democracies-Policies/dp/0691138737) that the welfare state can solve all our problems. The real worry, though, is that when we look at the policy platforms of the two major parties, we see that both the Republicans and Democrats push agendas that tend to appeal to the uniformed and disinterested. We can’t quite blame them for that. After all, politicians need to win elections, and to do so, they have to appeal to voters. In a modern democracy, the uninformed will always greatly outnumber the informed. The quality of our candidates reflects the quality of our electorate. But democracy encourages our electorate to be bad quality. There is no real solution to the problem of political ignorance, unless we are willing to break with democratic politics. Some economists, such as [Robin Hanson](http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/futarchy.pdf), favor using specialized betting markets to choose policies. Law professor [Ilya Somin](http://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=22955) favors radically decentralized federal systems that encourage citizens to vote with their feet. In my recent book [Against Democracy](https://www.amazon.com/Against-Democracy-Jason-Brennan/dp/0691162603), I discuss how we might experiment with epistocracy — where political power is widespread, as in a democracy, but votes are in some way weighted according to basic political knowledge. Most of these proposals set off alarm bells (usually among people who have not bothered to think carefully about how these systems work). But each proposal at least takes seriously that universal suffrage and voter ignorance go hand in hand. Trump’s victory is the victory of the uninformed. But, to be fair, Clinton’s victory would also have been. Democracy is the rule of the people, but the people are in many ways unfit to rule.

### Messaging

#### Nonvoters care less about the pandemic—they view Trump more favorably as a result—and he will get brownie points for democracy.

Russonello 20 (Giovanni Russonello, Staff Writer. 4/10/2020. “Trust in Trump’s Virus Response Is Falling. What Does It Mean for November” <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/us/politics/trump-polls-coronavirus.html>) DLuo

Americans are rapidly losing faith in President Trump’s handling of the coronavirus outbreak, according to national polls released over the past week. What’s more, some of that drop-off is occurring among groups that Mr. Trump will need to retain as he looks ahead to a difficult re-election battle in the fall. Older voters broke for Mr. Trump in 2016, and they are seen as crucial to a potential victory for him in November. But their approval of his job performance [has](https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2448) [been](https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=2627) [middling](https://poll.qu.edu/national/release-detail?ReleaseID=3658) throughout his presidency — and with the oldest Americans now particularly endangered by the virus, they may be watching his response to the pandemic closely. Just 43 percent of people 65 and older said they thought Mr. Trump was doing all he could to confront the outbreak, according to a [CNN poll](https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2020/images/04/08/rel4a.-.coronavirus.pdf) released this week. Fifty-five percent said he could be doing more. By comparison, Americans aged 50 to 64 — who tend to see Mr. Trump more favorably over all — were more likely to say he was doing what he could. And while it is typical for registered voters to skew slightly more conservative than the overall population, that trend disappears when it comes to views of the coronavirus response. Registered voters were considerably more likely than nonvoters to give the federal government’s handling of the crisis a bad review, according to the CNN poll. Fifty-seven percent of voters rated it poor, while 39 percent gave it positive marks. “I think what recent polling has suggested is that while he’s kept his base satisfied, he has turned off a lot of people, especially elderly voters, who are frankly a little bit scared by what they’re hearing at the podium every night,” Jim Manley, a veteran Democratic strategist, said, referring to [the president’s freewheeling daily news conferences](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/09/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-press-briefing.html). In any election, different types of voters are likely to be swayed by different factors. Liberals, for instance, often express more concern about health care, whereas conservatives generally pay more attention to foreign affairs. Among ambivalent swing voters, it is often candidates’ personalities — whether they are perceived as relatable, trustworthy, evenhanded and so on — that make a difference. But this year’s presidential race may be an anomaly. With the response to the pandemic taking center stage, issues like health care, the economy and voting rights are likely to be viewed through the lens of the virus. So how the president handles the response — and how his presumptive opponent, former Vice President [Joseph R. Biden Jr.](https://www.nytimes.com/topic/person/joe-biden), proposes to confront the outbreak — could become a kind of omni-issue. At his daily news conferences, and in frequent tweets about the virus, Mr. Trump has sought to project authority as the nation weathers the storm. But he has hardly let up on his habit of lashing out at political opponents, and he has refused to take responsibility for things like shortages of test kits and medical supplies, which many governors say they need. Most Americans are not convinced of the president’s position. Roughly seven in 10 said the federal government should be doing more to address shortages in personal protective equipment and medical devices, the CNN poll found. And by a 14-percentage-point margin, most respondents to that survey said the federal government had done a bad job of preventing the virus’s spread. (That is a significant change since last month, when back-to-back CNN polls found the public more split on the question.) As the pandemic has worsened nationwide, Americans have expressed widespread approval of their own governors (72 percent, according to a [Monmouth University poll](https://www.monmouth.edu/polling-institute/documents/monmouthpoll_us_040820.pdf/) released this week) and of federal health agencies (66 percent, per the Monmouth poll). This bucks the trend in recent years of waning faith in American institutions. But Mr. Trump has never shed his public persona as an anti-establishment firebrand. Throughout the crisis he has criticized everyone from nonpartisan inspectors general to popular state governors. So the president will need to contend with Americans’ belief in core institutions — which Mr. Biden has consistently echoed — alongside their wavering confidence in Mr. Trump himself. “He likes to say, ‘Well, the governors messed up,’ and ‘China lied to me,’ and all this other stuff,” Bob Shrum, the director of the Center for the Political Future at the University of Southern California, said in an interview. “I think it’s a little like Herbert Hoover saying, ‘The Great Depression, you know, that’s really a world problem.’ People’s reaction was: ‘Well, wait. You’re the president of the United States. Fix it.’” In a [Pew Research Center survey](https://www.people-press.org/2020/04/09/public-holds-broadly-favorable-views-of-many-federal-agencies-including-cdc-and-hhs/?utm_source=AdaptiveMailer&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20-04-09%20Agency%20Favorabilities%20_GEN%20DISTRO&org=982&lvl=100&ite=5918&lea=1316089&ctr=0&par=1&trk=) out Thursday, public health agencies like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Health and Human Services were not the only arms of the federal government to receive broadly positive marks. Even the Internal Revenue Service, a relatively unpopular agency, was seen favorably by 65 percent of respondents. That’s a record, according to Pew data.

### Nationalization

\*this is possibly a better link for Senate politics

#### \*Nationalization of elections for *split ticket* voters means mandatory voting exacerbates voter preferences along political lines, especially among underinformed voters

Grossmann 8-10 (Matt Grossmann, director of the Institute for Public Policy & Social Research, professor of political science @ MSU. 8-10-2020. “Why GOP Senators Are Sticking With Trump — Even Though It Might Hurt Them In November” <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-gop-senators-are-sticking-with-trump-even-though-it-might-hurt-them-in-november/>) DLuo

Arizona Sen. Martha McSally handily defeated her primary challenger Tuesday, with the help of an endorsement from President Trump. Her chances of winning the general election are even more closely tied to Trump’s — and she’s embracing that connection. She has attacked the “liberal hack media” for criticizing the president, [predicted](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/02/19/sen_mcsally_to_liberal_hack_media_at_trump_rally_arizona_is_going_to_vote_to_keep_trump_in_white_house.html) he will win Arizona in November and repeatedly appeared with him in his visits to the state, following her advisors’ plan to [stay close](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-senate-arizona/imperiled-arizona-us-senator-mcsallys-hopes-seen-riding-on-trump-train-idUSKCN24S12D) to Trump, even if that means going down with a sinking ship. She may already be getting a sinking feeling. The U.S. Senate race in Arizona is rated as “lean Democrat” by [most](https://cookpolitical.com/ratings/senate-race-ratings) [analysts](http://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/2020-senate/). And a [recent Marist poll](http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/NBC-News_Marist-Poll-AZ-NOS-and-Tables_202007231249.pdf) showed her doing even worse than Trump in the state, trailing Democrat Mark Kelly by 12 percentage points. The same survey showed Trump trailing Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden by 5 points. Now that McSally has made it past a primary challenge, though, she might benefit from shifting gears. Research suggests Republicans running for the House and Senate this year would benefit from distancing themselves from Trump and the national Republican Party. The problem is … that’s a lot harder than it used to be. A little independence goes a long way Even in an age of [nationalized politics](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/all-politics-is-presidential/), it still helps to have an independent identity from your party. Voters tend to [not like](https://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/oslo/canes_wrone_et_al.pdf) [blind loyalty](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1065912915608699), and [prefer representatives](https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/81/2/473/3806103?redirectedFrom=fulltext) who are [willing to compromise](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/compromise-in-an-age-of-party-polarization-9780197510490?cc=us&lang=en&) with the opposition party. In 2018, Republicans who were endorsed by Trump actually did [worse](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/lsq.12284) in their general election races than Republicans the president ignored or disparaged, all else being equal. And Republicans who opposed their party’s major legislative initiative, repealing Obamacare, [did better than those who supported it](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-020-09615-4). One study [even found](https://t.co/xuy8sIQQ5Z?amp=1) that Trump rallies raised more money for Democrats than they did for Republicans. The reason GOP senators could benefit from some independence from the White House is that drawing attention to a candidate’s ties to Trump helps polarize a race along the same lines of presidential job approval. And that is a particularly troubling trend for a president with [poor approval ratings](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-ratings/). For most of his presidency, Trump has had [more disapprovers](https://morningconsult.com/tracking-trump-2/) than approvers in Arizona and other states with competitive Senate races, including Colorado and Maine. Linked to Trump, the Republican senators in those states are now getting the same treatment; McSally, Cory Gardner in Colorado and Susan Collins in Maine all have [negative net approval ratings](https://morningconsult.com/senator-rankings/). As political scientist (and co-author of the study finding negative effects of Trump endorsements) Andrew Ballard told me, “Unpopular presidents probably need to be very strategic and judicious with their usage of their platform to endorse candidates, because in certain situations it can do more harm than good.” Trump failed to follow this advice in 2018 and doesn’t seem to be paying it any more heed this year. And most GOP senators are not effectively keeping their distance from Trump. Senators up for reelection are siding with Trump Trump may not be able to resist intervening in Senate and House races, given his desire for being the center of attention. But Republican legislators have choices about how to present themselves. So far, they are sticking with Trump. McSally supported repealing Obamacare, opposed the president’s impeachment and has rarely publicly criticized the Trump administration. That is a big shift from 2016, when she chose not to endorse Trump and [bashed](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/29/trump-endorses-martha-mcsally-in-arizona-senate-race-against-kyrsten-sinema.html) his behavior. Moreover, McSally has voted with Trump’s position [95 percent](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/) of the time over the last two congressional sessions — far more often than you’d expect based on Arizona’s politics. In fact, in the Senate, McSally has the fourth highest “Trump Plus-Minus” score, which measures how often a member of Congress votes in line with the president’s position relative to what you would expect from that member based on the partisanship of their state or district. ADVERTISING [Ads by Teads](https://hp.teads.com/?utm_source=inread&utm_medium=credits&utm_campaign=invented%20by%20teads) Other Republican senators up for reelection this year have also remained loyal to Trump’s positions. Gardner has voted with Trump [89 percent](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/cory-gardner/) of the time during the 115th and 116th Congresses (he has the second highest “Trump Plus-Minus”), Thom Tillis (North Carolina) with Trump [93 percent of the time](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/thom-tillis/), David Perdue (Georgia) [95 percent](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/david-perdue/), Joni Ernst (Iowa) [91 percent](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/joni-ernst/) and Steve Daines (Montana) [86 percent](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/steve-daines/). The one partial exception is Collins, who has sided with Trump [two-thirds of the time](https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/susan-m-collins/) over the last two Congresses (though that is still far more than expected based on Trump’s losing margin in Maine). Collins has clearly tried to put some distance between herself and Trump as her reelection race draws nearer — but not too much. She did not support Obamacare repeal, though she voted to acquit the president in his Senate trial and voted to confirm his Supreme Court nominees. She went from voting with Trump 77 percent of the time in the 115th Congress (2017-18) to only 46 percent in the 116th (2019-20). It’s been a tough balancing act that may end up pleasing no one. Indeed, Collins has become the poster child for Republicans’ unwillingness to seriously break with Trump. She has been “disappointed” in Trump without taking action to restrain him [so often](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/opinion/susan-collins-maine-trump.html) that “Saturday Night Live” did a [skit](https://youtu.be/3c5neBXQwf8) about it. Still, Collins may still have a chance to retain an independent reputation, something she’s cultivated for years by necessity in blue-ish Maine. The problem is … that’s harder to do these days. Why it’s become more difficult to break with the national party Many members of Congress used to have local reputations independent of their parties, [presenting](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/disliking-congress-as-a-whole-and-as-individuals/) themselves as fighters for local interests and dollars in Washington. Even if most voters hated Congress, they still liked their own representatives and senators. But the long-term trends are nationalization (voters perceive their representatives through the lens of national and presidential politics) and [polarization](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12218) (voters see the parties as distinct and agree more with one side). Voters learn [less](https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/I/bo27596045.html) about their own legislators and more about the president, in part due to decreasing reliance on [local news](https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Local-News-%2C-Information-%2C-and-the-Nationalization-Moskowitz/6fa9f6c6142a964a36fc3f2b13bda8ae70818b97). As a result, [fewer voters split their tickets](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/split-ticket-voting-hit-a-new-low-in-2018-senate-and-governor-races/), voting for one party’s candidate for president and the other’s for Senate or the House. Democrats have faced the same problem in trying to distinguish themselves from their party. Voters recognized the independent streak of West Virginia’s Joe Manchin and Montana’s Jon Tester in the 2018 midterms, but Missouri’s Claire McCaskill, North Dakota’s Heidi Heitkamp and Indiana’s Joe Donnelly weren’t able to overcome the Republican lean of their states. Manchin went so far as to appear in ads [showing him shooting](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNte7Vr-IJg) at policies he disliked and proclaiming “for me, it’s all about West Virginia.” He won a state that Hillary Clinton [lost by more than 42 points](https://www.cnn.com/election/2018/results/west-virginia). Nationalization makes it more difficult for senators to be seen as separated from their party’s president and his priorities. So even if Republican senators do break with Trump, [fewer voters now learn about it](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/all-politics-is-national-because-all-media-is-national/) because they no longer see state-specific news. Since voters tend to assume that partisans vote like their parties, voters are often [unable to perceive moderate senators’ divergent policy positions](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1532673x16630378?casa_token=iXGXZmTnglEAAAAA%3A1woLFANiqKxOKC8B9LYOdV9aIAfxyogBJXNy3BmlxSb8UWqHQ2WB8UpecOxhdijhILZUAqxmFK6J). And legislators who do break with their party now face a risk of a primary challenger. McSally [won her 2018 Republican primary](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/28/us/elections/arizona-primary-elections.html)[1](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-gop-senators-are-sticking-with-trump-even-though-it-might-hurt-them-in-november/#fn-1) facing two candidates closely tied to Trump: Joe Arpaio and Kelli Ward. In this year’s race to defend the seat she was appointed to, McSally this week fended off a primary challenge from Daniel McCarthy, who tried to build support from local pro-Trump groups. “More [congressional] members are running scared in the primaries,” political scientist Sarah Treul told me. “Even if they’re actually not having quality challengers emerging, they’re afraid of it happening. And I think a lot of them are spending time trying to figure out how [they] can ward off one of those challengers from even coming to the table.” That usually means doing little to upset the party’s base by breaking with the president. Can Republicans still jump ship? Now that primary season is coming to an end, will Republicans start separating themselves from Trump? Some probably don’t need to do so to win reelection. Despite his national unpopularity, senators in more Trump-leaning states, such as Ernst in Iowa and Daines in Montana, may be able to survive with a standard partisan vote. But McSally, Collins, Gardner in Colorado and Tillis in North Carolina likely need to earn a substantial number of votes from Biden supporters to survive. It’s just not clear whether they will break with Trump in public ways or whether late breaks would be enough to help them win. That said, they may have one option to rally both the Republican faithful and a few swing voters. It turns out some voters fear giving unified government to the president’s party and desire some [balance](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/lsq.12127?casa_token=E60MtRYFRk0AAAAA%3AVPLP1Q0aKL4WDQ-JcWpjVFueuoz_YhkfOhtZdvwLKUdp05qpY0i6hOsZccPSlTXy_zV5yX561epOhA). If voters expect a Democratic president, they are slightly more likely to support Republicans in Congress, which could perhaps keep the Senate in GOP hands. So terrible Trump polls could be turned into something useful by Republican senators. They might eventually need to argue that, if Trump is going to lose, voters should trust them to serve as a check on the Democratic agenda.

### Turnout

#### Nonvoters in key swing states vote republican – prefer our ev because it is state-specific.

Arrieta-Kenna 20 (Ruairi Arrieta-Kenna, Assistant Editor of Politico Magainze, 2/19/2020, “Could Higher Turnout Actually Help Trump?” <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/02/19/knight-survey-nonvoters-battleground-states-trump-democrats-112135>) DLuo

Conventional wisdom is that those who stayed home in 2016 cost Hillary Clinton the election and if Democrats can just increase turnout in 2020, they’ll defeat President Donald Trump in November. That assumption is likely wrong. [Report](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/registered-voters-who-stayed-home-probably-cost-clinton-the-election/) after [report](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/08/09/new-data-makes-it-clear-nonvoters-handed-trump-the-presidency/) has shown that nonvoters nationwide prefer Democrats over Republicans. But [new data from the Knight Foundation](https://knightfoundation.org/reports/the-100-million-project/) suggests that if every eligible adult voted in 2020, Democrats would likely increase their popular vote lead from the 2016 presidential election—but still lose the Electoral College. In the closest battleground states, more nonvoters say they’re likely to support Trump, if they vote, than support the Democratic Party’s nominee. And that could have serious implications for the two major parties’ traditional approaches to getting people to the polls on Election Day. The United States has [low voter turnout](https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/) by international standards. In 2016, over 40 percent of people who were eligible to vote did not, [including](http://www.electproject.org/2016g) more than 2.5 million people in Michigan, 3.5 million people in Pennsylvania and 1 million people in Wisconsin, the three states where Trump defeated Clinton by a collective [77,774-vote margin](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks-to-80000-people-in-three-states/) to win the presidency. As part of its “100 Million Project,” the Knight Foundation surveyed thousands of nonvoters—defined as those who are eligible but not registered or registered but have cast no more than one ballot in the past six national elections—in 10 of the most competitive states to better understand what could be the most pivotal portion of the electorate, especially as 2020 may be on track to have a [record-shattering](https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/06/2020-election-voter-turnout-could-be-record-breaking/591607/) turnout. Whereas nationally more nonvoters say they would rather vote this November for a generic Democratic nominee than vote for Trump, in Arizona, Florida, Pennsylvania and Virginia, more nonvoters say they would vote for Trump than a Democrat. In Georgia, which Trump won in 2016, more nonvoters say they would support the Democratic nominee than Trump, and in the other battleground states polled, neither Trump nor a generic Democratic nominee had an advantage—or the advantage was below the margin of error. “It is an irony” says Daniel Smith, a professor of political science at the University of Florida who has [researched](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1065912914554039) how Republican lawmakers have attempted to restrict the vote in electorally competitive states, when asked about the results. “But I’m not that surprised,” he added. “I worked as a poll worker in Florida in 2016, and anecdotally, I can tell you that the people who were not on the voter rolls in my precinct … were disproportionately more likely to be Republicans.” Smith says the notion that Republicans are concerned with voter fraud while Democrats care more about democratic principles may be based on recent evidence but should never have been taken as an indication of the parties’ basic values. “Both sides are doing this with respect to strategy as much as some inherent principle of the sanctity of the vote or the accessibility of the vote,” Smith says. Andy Bernstein, executive director of HeadCount, a nonpartisan get-out-the-vote organization, tells POLITICO: “It’s a very sad thing that voting itself has been politicized.” “There’s a perception that any get-out-the-vote effort is somehow a partisan effort,” Bernstein adds. “Voter registration has become perceived as in and of itself a means to a political end.” Any organization like his, which partners with cultural figures and events to register voters, Bernstein says, “is going to be perceived as having left leanings.” On the other hand, it’s not hard to associate voter restrictions with the right. In 2018, the Supreme Court [ruled](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-980_f2q3.pdf) 5-4, with all the Republican-appointed justices in the majority, in favor of the Republican secretary of state of Ohio in a case over a practice that’s colloquially described as “use it or lose it”—when a state strikes inactive voters who don’t respond to a change-of-residence notice from its voter rolls. “Is it a principle that we want to have clean voter rolls?” Smith, who gave expert testimony in the case, asks rhetorically in an interview with POLITICO. “Or is it a strategy of trying to limit the size of the electorate for partisan advantages?” Ironically, the strategy may be misguided for Republicans. At least with regard to Trump. In Pennsylvania, one of several states where the conservative group [Judicial Watch](https://www.judicialwatch.org/press-releases/judicial-watch-finds-millions-of-extra-registrants-on-voting-rolls-warns-california-pennsylvania-north-carolina-colorado-virginia-to-clean-up-voting-rolls-or-face-a-fed/) is pressuring officials to “clean” their voter rolls, the Knight survey shows far more nonvoters say they would vote for Trump than for a Democratic nominee in 2020. These very people could find themselves disenfranchised by the efforts of an organization that the president has [praised and amplified](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/03/judicial-watchs-voter-fraud-fear-mongering-finds-new-opponent-pro-voter-id-iowa-official/). Similarly, in Arizona last year, Republican state lawmakers attempted—but failed—to purge some 200,000 voters from the Permanent Early Voting List for missing two election cycles. Joel Edman, executive director of the Arizona Advocacy Network, told [NBC News](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-election/9-states-where-rules-voting-have-been-changed-or-challenged-n1026886): “Being on the PEVL has proven to be a strong driver of turnout among those least likely to vote. Removing those marginal voters from the PEVL would only further depress their turnout rate.” According to the new data from Knight, Arizona’s nonvoter population is overwhelmingly more likely to support Trump than the Democratic nominee in 2020. Tom Fitton, president of Judicial Watch, denies that the group’s work is motivated by partisan goals. “People mistake ideology for partisanship. In the case of the left, you’ve got this ideology that’s against enforcing the rule of law. Our ideology is for the rule of law,” he tells POLITICO. “Dirty voting rolls can lead to dirty elections. It provides additional opportunities for potential fraud.” A now-disbanded commission by the Trump administration [found no evidence](https://apnews.com/f5f6a73b2af546ee97816bb35e82c18d/Report%3A-Trump-commission-did-not-find-widespread-voter-fraud) to support claims of widespread voter fraud. But an analysis by the liberal-leaning [Brennan Center](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/purges-growing-threat-right-vote) found voter purges are prone to errors and can end up making it more difficult for eligible people to vote. “It’s not just Democrats who don’t turn out to vote and then therefore might be taken off the rolls from these more restrictive states,” Smith says. “I suspect a story like POLITICO’s might have some of these officials start questioning what they’re doing.” Trump’s reelection campaign has already hinted at reconsidering the usual strategy. The Associated Press [reported](https://apnews.com/2c9022a09add4e5fbd501040c0d09d6f) last year that the Trump campaign views nonvoters as “an untapped stash of Republican support that can help him overcome stubbornly low poll numbers and his difficulties in winning over voters in the shrinking political center.” Bill Stepien, a senior political adviser to the Trump campaign, told reporters: “There’s a new math spurred by a new candidate at the top of his ticket. And I think we need to throw out the old way we look at how elections are won and lost.” Furthermore, in November, Justin Clark, a senior political adviser and senior counsel to Trump’s reelection campaign, [reportedly](https://apnews.com/af2f0ede054d8baebbe1bb6ca47b4895) said privately: “Traditionally, it’s always been Republicans suppressing votes in places. Let’s start protecting our voters.” He clarified his remarks to the Associated Press, saying he was referring to false accusations of the GOP engaging in voter suppression. “Neither I nor anyone I know or work with would condone anyone’s vote being threatened or diluted, and our efforts will be focused on preventing just that.” One possible theory for why a generic Democratic nominee might be less popular than Trump to nonvoters in some battleground states is that nonvoters in those states are significantly whiter than nonvoters nationwide. According to the Knight data, in the 10 battleground states, there are 10 percent less black or Latino nonvoters and 10 percent more white nonvoters than there are nationwide. Another theory for why Trump may be more popular than a generic Democratic nominee among nonvoters is that the political parties themselves are very unpopular, and nonvoters are excited by nontraditional candidates, like Trump. The Knight survey results show that the vast majority—about three quarters—of nonvoters are registered to vote. The most common reason to not be registered is lack of interest. The No. 1 reason voters think other people don’t vote is because they think nonvoters don’t believe their vote matters. In reality, the No. 1 reason nonvoters cite for not voting is that they don’t like the candidates. This is especially true in the battleground states. “It makes sense to me the idea that nonvoters or unreliable voters don’t have a strong attachment to either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party but may have an attachment to Donald Trump,” says Meagan Day, a staff writer at the democratic socialist Jacobin magazine. “This population has no love for the two major parties, but it’s possible for a charismatic change-oriented candidate whose campaign has a lot of vigor to break through and win their affections where the sort of generic partisan affiliation wouldn’t necessarily.” In fact, according to the Knight data, nonvoters do view both parties unfavorably, as do voters. But fewer nonvoters view Trump unfavorably than voters do, and more nonvoters have a favorable opinion of the president than have a favorable opinion of the Republican Party itself. Fewer nonvoters consider themselves liberal, moderate or conservative than voters do, with more nonvoters volunteering that they “don’t think in those terms.” Nonvoters are also less likely than voters to identify with either of the major political parties. And that’s even more true in the battleground states, where more nonvoters identify as independent or say they’re unsure. In Day’s estimation, Bernie Sanders, like Trump, is appealing to people who don’t typically vote because he has managed to put some distance between himself and the Democratic Party establishment. “There are a lot of people who like Donald Trump who don’t necessarily love the Republicans,” she notes. “When we look at who doesn’t vote, we’re looking at people who are feeling alienated from the political process because they feel like there’s nothing on offer from them from either party. And they don’t get the sense that anybody wants to fight for them.” Fewer nonvoters than voters, according to the Knight survey, are confident that the results of an election represent the will of the people, and many nonvoters say that’s because they think the system is rigged or corrupt. Voters who are not confident that the results of an election represent the will of the people cite campaign financing or the Electoral College for their lack of confidence more than a rigged or corrupt system. “It’s not left-right,” Day adds. “While Elizabeth Warren has some very progressive policy proposals,” she admits, Sanders’ campaign is the only one she feels is capable of reaching the nonvoting population in a significant way. And she may be right. In a [New York Times survey](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/07/upshot/nonvoters-2020-presidential-election.html) of swing state nonvoters, Sanders was the most popular Democrat, besting Trump by 4 percentage points, while Warren was actually 1 point less popular than Trump among nonvoters. The same survey showed that between Democratic voters and nonvoters who favor Democrats, fewer nonvoters consider themselves “very liberal” or say they want a candidate who “promises to fight for a bold progressive agenda,” but more nonvoters than voting Democrats want a candidate who “will fundamentally change America.” The Times survey also showed that more Democratic-leaning nonvoters than Democratic voters in swing states support single-payer health care. In the Knight survey, far fewer nonvoters than voters both in battleground states and nationwide who say they think they’ll vote in 2020 cite “civic duty” as their top reason for doing so. More nonvoters than voters cite health care policy. Similarly, more nonvoters than voters point to health care as well as jobs and the economy as the most important issues to them; whereas more voters point to issues like immigration, gun control, climate change and racism. Knight asked nonvoters: What, if anything, could motivate you to vote in more elections? A plurality responded with “a candidate I believe in.” “We can’t rely on high turnout alone,” Day says. Democrats could still lose in November, especially if many people who have been nonvoters up to now in key battleground states show up at the polls for Trump. Democrats, she believes, would have the best chance of motivating nonvoters if they nominate Sanders. “The ratio of nonvoters to voters is so high in the United States,” Day emphasized, “that just a small fluctuation in it can have serious consequences for a general election.

### Voter ID

\*argument here is that calls of mandatory voting (and actually do it) still begs the question of what it means to be *mandatory* – Republican legislatures will just pass stringent ID laws and then fine/arrest all the people who “didn’t” vote (didn’t have ID) – you should make a normal means argument here.

#### Increased pushes for voting rights spark voter-ID laws that exacerbate voter suppression—means link alone turns case.

Fritze 19 ([John Fritze](https://www.usatoday.com/staff/2647507001/john-fritze/), Staff Writer. 8/17/2019. “Donald Trump touts voter ID laws as an issue in the 2020 election. Here’s why.” <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/17/donald-trump-voter-id-laws-must-part-election-security-measures/2030487001/>) DLuo

WASHINGTON – As President [Donald Trump ramps up his reelection](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/06/15/donald-trump-campaign-orlando-2020-organization-professionalism/1408369001/) for 2020, he is resurfacing an unsubstantiated gripe from 2016: That voter fraud [cost him support](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/21/election-results-electoral-popular-votes-trump-clinton/94214826/). At rallies and on Twitter, the president has renewed calls for voter ID laws, revisited assertions that a large number of people voted fraudulently and signaled that, until those issues are resolved, [other pending election measures](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/07/25/after-robert-muellers-warning-parties-split-fixing-2020-election-threats/1826186001/) are going nowhere. [Trump hammered the theme during a New Hampshire rally](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/15/donald-trump-new-hampshire-rally/1991443001/) this week, repeating a statement – dismissed by his allies and critics alike – that thousands of people fraudulently voted for Democrat Hillary Clinton there. She won the state by fewer than 3,000 votes. “It’s also time for Democrats to join with us to protect the sacred integrity of our elections by supporting voter ID,” Trump said to robust applause in Manchester. Days earlier, Trump wrote in a tweet that no other election security measures pending in Washington should move forward unless voter ID laws are addressed first. Voter ID laws have drawn sharp opposition from Democrats who say that voter fraud is uncommon and that requiring IDs could disenfranchise some voters. Trump Manchester rally:[Donald Trump supporters at New Hampshire rally not concerned with market slide, recession fears](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/15/donald-trump-new-hampshire-rally/1991443001/) “No debate on Election Security should go forward without first agreeing that Voter ID must play a very strong part in any final agreement,” Trump posted on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1161439036256526336) this week. Popular vote Trump's latest assertions echo those he made in 2017, when he explained his popular vote loss to Clinton by repeatedly suggesting millions of people voted fraudulently for his Democratic opponent. The president never provided evidence for the statement, which drew pushback from Republican and Democratic state election officials. Get the Coronavirus Watch newsletter in your inbox. Stay safe and informed with updates on the spread of the coronavirus Delivery: Varies Your Email He raised a similar argument Thursday as he traveled to New Hampshire. "New Hampshire should have been won last time, except we had a lot of people come in at the last moment, which was a rather strange situation," Trump said before the rally. "Thousands and thousands of people coming in from locations unknown." Neither Trump nor his aides have backed up that assertion. Trump created a commission in 2017 to study the issue of voter fraud but abandoned it months later amid internal disputes and rebukes from state election officials. Maine Secretary of State Matthew Dunlap, a Democrat who served on the disbanded commission, wrote that [the panel's evidence of voter fraud was "glaringly empty."](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/08/04/donald-trumps-widespread-voter-fraud-claim-untrue-election-official/905262002/) Rep. Rashida Tlaib:[Trump criticizes Tlaib for declining Israel's approval to see elderly grandmother](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/16/trump-tlaibs-decision-not-visit-west-bank-a-complete-setup/2035386001/) The president put the issue on a back burner for a while. The reincarnation of his allegations comes as Democrats press Senate Republicans to take up a series of provisions they say will improve voting systems. The Democratic-led House approved legislation in June that would require states to have paper ballot backups. The measure also would require voting systems to be manufactured in the USA. Democrats initiated the effort in response to special counsel Robert Mueller’s report in April. Mueller wrote that the Russian government interfered in the 2016 election in a “sweeping and systematic fashion.” Noting the measure received only one Republican vote on the House, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell dismissed the bill as a partisan effort intended “to rewrite all kinds of the rules of American politics.” Scaramucci on Trump:['Very clear that it’s impossible for him to win'](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/16/anthony-scaramucci-trump-hell-drop-out-2020-race-march/2034325001/) Democrats have long questioned the need for voter ID requirements, saying they hearken to efforts to suppress minority turnout. "Donald Trump can’t win an election based on his ideas, so he has to suppress the vote to win," presidential candidate Sen. Bernie Sanders wrote on Twitter. "What a coward." Voter ID Thirty-five states, [including New Hampshire, have some form of voter ID law](http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx) in place, according to a National Conference of State Legislatures review this year. Those laws are wide-ranging: Some require a photo ID; others allow poll workers to vouch for a voter or let a voter sign an affidavit of identity if he or she doesn't come to the polls with an ID. Many of those laws have faced legal hurdles. [Wisconsin's voter ID law has been mired in court challenges](https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/state-voting-rights-litigation-july-2019) for years, for instance. A lawsuit filed in 2015 over an Alabama voter ID law is pending in a federal appeals court. "Republicans in 2011 did it with the express purpose of driving down voter turnout," said Jay Heck, longtime executive director of Common Cause Wisconsin, where Trump won in 2016 with almost 23,000 votes. Trump at Manchester rally:[Trump insulted a man at his Manchester rally for having a 'weight problem.' He was actually a Trump supporter](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/16/trump-new-hampshire-rally-man-president-insulted-for-weight-was-a-fan/2028273001/) Max Feldman, counsel for the voting rights and election program at the Brennan Center for Justice, said voter ID laws are more harmful than the problem of voter fraud that supporters say they are attempting to fix. Since the disputed 2000 election, government and private investigations have found no substantial voter fraud. "As we get closer and closer to the 2020 election, this issue and the attempt to gin up false concern about in-person voter fraud will have greater and greater salience," Feldman said. "It's critical that people understand that in-person voter fraud has not proven to be a significant problem in ourelections." New Hampshire Gov. Chris Sununu, a Republican ally of Trump's, initially questioned the president's claim of mystery voters after the 2016 election. But Sununu, who attended the Trump rally Thursday, went on to sign laws that tightened voter eligibility in New Hampshire. One requires residents who move there within a month of an election to document that they intend to stay. Andrew Yang:[How Andrew Yang ended up in a viral video dancing the Cupid Shuffle](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2019/08/16/how-andrew-yang-ended-up-viral-video-dancing-cupid-shuffle/2033186001/) Trump and others said Americans are used to pulling out their IDs. Studies on the impact the laws have on disenfranchisement have drawn mixed conclusions. "The idea that requiring an ID is somehow voter suppression is truly one of the strangest falsehoods ever perpetuated by the Democratic Party," Rep. Dan Crenshaw, R-Texas, a Trump ally, posted on [Twitter](https://twitter.com/DanCrenshawTX/status/1161829512876896256) this week. "It defies logic for any normal American who uses their ID. Every. Single. Day." Opponents of the laws acknowledge that for many Americans, that is true, but it's not the case for everybody. Groups such as Common Cause try to ensure that people obtain an ID needed to vote. "There are people who are properly registered in this state who, through no fault of their own, have no ID and may have problems getting one," said Bob Phillips, executive director of Common Cause North Carolina. "It's regrettable that voting has become almost a partisan issue."

## 2NR – Impact – Heg

### 2nr – at: nato not k2 russia

#### Weak NATO credibility sparks Russian adventurism and first-strike

Kofman 16 (Michael Kofman is an Analyst at CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. Previously he served as Program Manager at National Defense University, May 12, 2016. "Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love NATO’s Crushing Defeat by Russia," War on the Rocks, accessed 9-6-2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/)

Why would Russia make a dash for Baltic capitals, as in RAND’s wargame, when the battle is decided by whether or not NATO can successfully reinforce from Poland? Instead of fighting NATO forces in the Baltics, the best way forward is to turn that deterrent into a military hostage. What if, in the time it takes NATO to generate forces sufficient to break through a Russian defensive position across Kaliningrad, the alliance collapses politically, especially given the concern over losing its units behind enemy lines in the Baltics? All analogies are imperfect, but it strikes me that advocates for a robust U.S. military presence want to replay the Battle of Dunkirk in 1940, where U.S. forces get to fill the unenviable shoes of the British Expeditionary Force surrounded by the German Army. Whether you have one brigade or three brigades, you’re still going to lose that fight. U.S. planners would not be the first to think you could hold a pocket against a land power and reinforce it across a gap. The idea that a line of U.S. forces along the Russian border can achieve deterrence by denial in modern times boasts all the ingenuity of the Maginot Line. More forces in place can’t always compensate for a poor strategy and unworkable geography. A Million Ways to Die in the East NATO’s biggest challenge is not the balance of forces, but the fact that its credibility is attached to every square meter of Baltic terrain. A much more likely scenario is one in which Russia deploys a large land force on the borders as part of a snap exercise, as it did opposite Ukraine in early 2014, and then seizes some unknown patch of dirt. Would NATO attack this offending Russian force over a few square meters? It’s one thing to contemplate trading Washington for Vilnius — what about some farm house on the Russian-Estonian border? Let’s take another option wherein Russia simply picks up the border and moves it further into the Baltic states. That’s no fantasy. Moscow has been doing this to Georgia in South Ossetia. On the one hand, NATO cannot let the Russians break its credibility through salami-slicing tactics, but on the other hand, the Baltic states themselves might not be so eager to pick a fight they can’t win over a few feet of real estate. Who is willing to attack a Russian army on Russia’s border? Plenty has been written on what would happen if Russian special forces tried to seize Baltic towns, leveraging the presumed camaraderie of the local ethnic Russian population. This Crimea-like scenario is improbable, especially because Russia had forces in place in Crimea from the very beginning, but it offers an important lesson that should drive NATO’s thinking about the Baltic high-end fight. The challenge is not NATO’s deterrence against a hypothetical conventional war, which is not only unlikely but wholly unnecessary for Russia to challenge NATO. The problem lies in compellence, because there are numerous scenarios in which Russia can set up a challenge to NATO’s credibility as an alliance and compel the West against a response, thereby leading to failure. The reason Russia annexed Crimea without having to overcome resistance is in large part due to conventional compellence. Russia’s military deployment and a directly issued threat compelled Ukraine’s leaders to avoid even attempting resistance. There was no combat in Crimea. Those arguing for forward deployments keep envisioning a scenario where Russian troops or special forces cross the border and shoot first. That is one set of problems that militarily cannot be easily solved as described above, but the more perilous cases are those in which NATO must shoot first when faced with a large Russian conventional deployment. EUCOM’s true challenge is not deterrence — it’s how to handle compellence by an advanced conventional adversary capable of combining special forces and large-scale military operations. As I’ve written elsewhere on War on the Rocks on the establishment’s obsession with hybrid warfare, the problem is also not a hybrid one. Russia has re-forged its military as a useful instrument of national power and rediscovered how to compel others using military power. Even if territorial defense was workable — a dubious prospect at best — deterrence only works if the other side plans to attack you. A smarter approach for Moscow, and one conceptually demonstrated in Crimea, is to create a crisis in which NATO’s credibility is tested on the choice of whether or not to attack Russia first. What’s the Right Force Posture for Nuclear Oblivion? The other problem with the fixation on conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is that just as in the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this battle is fraught with opportunities for nuclear escalation. Most Russian experts I know in the military analysis community, including those in Russia, don’t see much of a chance for conventional battle with NATO to stay conventional. RAND didn’t wargame that out, since theirs was an AirLand Battle exercise, but it makes the debate over how many brigades to stick into the Baltics somewhat moot. On any map, Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad is a central problem in keeping this a conventional fight, because this is a piece of Russian territory that NATO must either bypass or neutralize to reinforce the Baltics. That’s not just a Russian fort, projecting long arcs of anti-access and area denial weaponry between Poland and Lithuania — it’s also liable to be a nuclear landmine. There is a possibility that if Russian forces are sufficiently degraded or defeated in Kaliningrad that Moscow may resort to or threaten nuclear first use. Even if we fill all those hex squares with blue forces, it doesn’t get around the issue that NATO’s prize for its victory is not necessarily the successful rescue of the Baltics, but an inbound tactical nuclear warhead. RAND’s report alludes to the minor problem of escalation (all of us dying in nuclear oblivion), but such thoughts get in the way of gaming out how many heavy armor brigades one needs in on the eastern flank. Nuclear escalation is not assured, but given the impact of such an outcome, perhaps the best strategy is to make decisions that afford the most opportunities for managing escalation dynamics. That means a force posture oriented toward strategic flexibility, not entrenchment.

#### Weak NATO alone ensures escalation of crisis and nuclear war with Russia

Katz 15, (Mark N. Katz, a professor of government and politics at George Mason University, July 2, 2015. "Why Russia Shouldn't Fear NATO", The National Interest, nationalinterest.org/feature/why-russia-shouldnt-fear-nato-13243

President Putin and many other Russians have complained bitterly about the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe and the Baltics after the end of the Cold War. Putin in particular has been determined to stop NATO from expanding into any other former Soviet republics, including those such as Georgia and Ukraine whose leaders have expressed interest in joining. Indeed, many Russians are indignant that NATO was not dissolved like the Warsaw Pact was at the end of the Cold War. Putin in particular sees NATO’s expansion as directed against Russia. With this as his premise, it is clearly in Russia’s interest not only to prevent NATO’s further expansion, but to undermine the Atlantic alliance and even promote its dissolution. It is not in the West’s interests to allow this to happen. What is more, it is not in Russia’s interests either. Indeed, a case can be made (and will be made here) that Russian security interests are better served by NATO’s continuation and expansion than by its weakening or dissolution. This is because Putin and his supporters fundamentally misunderstand NATO’s actual purpose—or more accurately, purposes. Unfortunately, many in the West do too. During the Cold War, one of NATO’s most important—and most obvious—set of goals was to deter a Soviet attack and to respond to it effectively should it occur. As the Soviet Union never launched such an attack, NATO appears to have succeeded at deterring one. Once the Cold War ended, though, Moscow’s former Warsaw Pact allies as well as the three Baltic states all sought NATO membership. One reason why they did so was their fear that Russia might become a threat to them again in the future—or even that it still was a threat. This contrasted with the view of many older NATO members in Western Europe. After the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Europe and then collapsed, many of them did not see post-Soviet Russia as being very much of, or even any, threat to them. They saw Russia instead as a useful source of gas and oil as well as a potential market for their exports. These West European governments did not want East European concerns about Russia to get in the way of their doing business with Moscow. But these West European views were based on the belief that since Russia was not a threat to them, it was not really a threat at all. But the presence or absence of a threat from Moscow was never the only reason for NATO, in the words of Hamlet, “to be or not to be.” NATO’s first secretary-general, Lord Ismay, observed that the purpose of NATO was "to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” In 2010, Admiral Giampaolo di Paola, Chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, described the purpose of NATO as having become “to keep North America in, Europe up, and Russia with.” Both of these formulas now seem outdated: Germany is now one of the principle upholders of the liberal European order, and Russia clearly does not want to be “with” NATO. Lord Imay’s and Admiral di Paola’s formulations, though, underline that NATO has two other purposes besides dealing with Russia. Although di Paola’s formula acknowledges the role of Canada while Lord Ismay’s does not, both clearly see NATO as an important means of keeping the United States committed to maintaining European security. Further, their seemingly contradictory calls to keep “the Germans down” and “Europe up” both point to the need to protect European security not just from external threats, but from strife within NATO as well. The East European and Baltic states that sought NATO membership after the end of the Cold War did not just do so out of fear of Russia. They did so because being accepted into NATO—as well as into the EU—showed that these nations were now a part of the West. Not wanting Russia to be part of the West, Russia’s leaders and much of its public simply cannot understand that this is something that East Europeans, Balts, and, most especially, Ukrainians and Georgians would actually want. Nor can they seem to understand that the more threateningly Russia behaves, the more that those who feel most immediately threatened by it—Poles, Balts, Ukrainians, and Georgians—either want to cling to their NATO membership or acquire it. It is also important to remember that at the end of World War I when the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires all collapsed and several new states as well as new borders emerged, tensions arose between many Eastern and Southeastern European states during the interwar years. At the end of World War II, Stalin redrew Eastern Europe’s borders and the Soviet Union forcibly maintained peace among its East European satellites. There was a danger when Soviet forces withdrew from Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War that conflict would re-emerge in this region—as it actually did in Yugoslavia when the general collapse of European communism resulted in that country breaking up. But the overwhelming desire of the East European and Baltic states to be accepted into NATO, the EU, and the West as a whole resulted in their acceptance of the existing borders (including those drawn by Stalin) and their not pursuing claims to lost territory. Indeed, NATO made resolving territorial disputes with neighboring states a condition of acceptance for new members. One of Putin’s motives for separating Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia in 2008, annexing Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, and supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine since then has been to create the sort of territorial disputes with neighbors that would make Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable as members to the existing ones in Western Europe in particular which have no desire to become embroiled in active conflicts on their behalf. And Putin, it appears, has succeeded in this regard. The corollary of Moscow belief that the expansion of NATO is a threat to Russia is that the retraction, incapacitation, or dissolution of NATO would make Russia safer. Indeed, Putin’s support for anti-NATO and anti–EU political parties throughout Europe indicates that he does indeed aim at undermining these two institutions. Nor does Putin necessarily need to bring about their dissolution in order to undermine them. Since NATO and the EU both tend to operate on the basis of consensus, the fact that the current political leaders of Hungary and Greece are hostile to the existing European order and are quite friendly with Moscow may go a long way toward furthering Putin’s goal of rendering NATO inoperable. And if any more such leaders are elected to power, NATO might indeed become unable to respond effectively to actions taken by Putin to “protect” Russian speakers elsewhere in Ukraine or even in the Baltic states. This clearly would not benefit the West. But it would not benefit Russia either. For the decline of NATO is less likely to lead to the unopposed rise of Russian influence than to the re-emergence of conflicts that common membership in NATO has suppressed or (in the case of Greece and Turkey) kept under control. Putin has had relatively cooperative relations with the often anti-Western Erdogan government in Turkey. He also has good relations with Greece’s new leftist leadership that is at odds with the EU. But if (whether as a result of Putin’s actions or not) NATO becomes inoperable, the Greek-Turkish animosity that NATO helped keep from escalating after Turkey’s 1974 intervention in Cyprus might soon re-emerge. And if it does, it is highly doubtful that Russia will be able to calm it down. Moscow may then be faced with the choice of alienating one party because it sides with the other, or alienating both because it sides with neither or (as Putin has attempted elsewhere) tries to side with both simultaneously. Despite Turkey’s troubled relations with the West recently, Turkey may regard Russian support for Greece against it as an existential threat and thus go all out to support Chechen and other Muslim opponents of Moscow’s rule in the North Caucasus and other Muslim regions of Russia. The decline of NATO might also embolden an increasingly nationalist and pro-Russian Hungary to revive its claim to “lost territories.” Moscow might not mind if Budapest does this with pro-Western Ukraine or Romania (with which Russia also has difficult relations), but would not be pleased if Hungary sought the return of territory that is now part of pro-Russian Serbia or Slovakia (where Moscow has also sought to cultivate illiberal tendencies). Another problem for Moscow is that for every anti-Western government elected to office anywhere in Europe, one or more of its neighbors are likely to feel threatened by it and so turn to America for support. Further, while German public opinion may care little about what Russia is doing in faraway Crimea or Eastern Ukraine, Berlin is likely to take more active measures to thwart Moscow’s efforts to expand Russian influence in countries closer to it. Finally, the more that Western states see Russian actions as directly harming their security, the more incentive they will have to respond by arming Ukraine or others actively resisting Russia. In other words, the decline of the pax Americana in Europe resulting from a weakened NATO is less likely to be replaced by a pax Russica there, but by a chaotic situation in Europe that Russia will be unable to control or prevent from negatively impacting not just Russia’s external ambitions, but its internal security as well. Ironically, Russia could avoid all this if NATO remained strong and intact. Far from threatening Russia, a strong NATO has a much greater incentive to act with self-restraint toward Russia than individual countries (both members and non-members) being undermined by Russian actions. Indeed, offering NATO membership to what remains of Ukraine may be the surest means of inducing Kiev and the West as a whole to acquiesce to (though not formally accept) the loss of Crimea and eastern Ukraine to Russia. In other words, Moscow is better off with a strong NATO that keeps America in, Europe peaceful, and Russia by itself (if that’s what it wants) than a weak NATO (or NATO at all) that keeps America, Europe, and Russia all embroiled in needless conflict and tension.

### 2nr – at: lio resilient

#### Trump re-election causes complete abandonment of US leadership—alliances, institutional support, military power all are ceded

Porter 18 – PhD, Chair in International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham (Patrick, “CRISIS AND CONVICTION: U.S. GRAND STRATEGY IN TRUMP’S SECOND TERM,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/crisis-and-conviction-u-s-grand-strategy-in-trumps-second-term/>)//BB

In the spring of 2014, before Donald Trump’s presidency was even a rumor, I began an article about the sources of U.S. grand strategy. By “grand strategy,” I mean a state’s way of orchestrating means and ends to achieve security over the long haul. I argued that the habitual ideas and pervasive influence of the U.S. foreign policy establishment make the fundamentals of American statecraft hard to change. What former advisor Ben Rhodes called the “Blob” and what former National Security Council official Michael Anton called the “priesthood” defines and dominates the ecosystem in which foreign policy is made. It exerts its influence through its expertise and its advantageous structural position as a “revolving door” between government, academia, think tanks, foundations, and corporations, reinforced by the feedback loop of allies’ demands for American patronage. In turn, the establishment successfully advances the view that the only prudent and legitimate grand strategy for the United States is “primacy,” the pursuit and sustainment of unrivalled dominance. Accordingly, the conservative force of tradition would constrain even revisionist presidents intent on change. Prior choices — over military power, alliances, nuclear proliferation, and the spread of American capitalism — would probably persist. Grand strategic change is possible. But it requires two interacting elements that come together rarely: a major strategic shock and a determined president willing to bear the costs of overhauling American security commitments. Until those forces convene, the United States has a powerful default setting of “leadership,” despite disappointing wars, economic crises, and increasing public fatigue with the burdens of hegemony. Then Trump came to power. Trump provides us with a live experiment that tests the argument, or at least the proposition that short of a major shock and a committed agent of change, the existing strategy will endure. How well does it stack up? Here, I offer two hypotheses. First, despite his aggressive words, his maverick deeds, his authoritarian tendencies, his allies’ doubts, and critics’ lamentations, Trump hasn’t yet altered U.S. grand strategy in its fundamentals. That doesn’t mean he has personally converted to tradition. Trump is still Trump. But so far, he has been constrained. He is not a determined-enough agent of revision to destroy what he inherited. The structure of American power-projection persists. However much he commands center stage, Trump is not America. Even this flame-throwing “outsider” is counter-balanced by the weight of congressional will, the cumulative advice and pressure of Cabinet, the security bureaucracy and the CIA, and the appeals of allies. Violating conventions and slobbering admiringly over international rivals is not the same thing as overhauling a grand strategy at its foundations. That task would take more resilience and more time commitment than the president has shown. Secondly, though, this may change. If Trump is re-elected in 2020 — a distinct possibility — there is a chance that we will see both forces of change come together. If we see a fundamental shock that discredits the status quo and weakens the authority of the establishment, the environment will become more receptive to fundamental change. The Show So Far Among anxious commentators, the defining temptation of the Trumpian moment is to emphasize high drama that eventually leads to a rupture in the Pax Americana. America’s establishment primacists pour obsessively over the president’s tweets and antics. They presume the power of one president’s rhetoric to destroy quickly the post-1945 dispensation, suggesting it must have been fragile to begin with. Old Europe and Putinist Russia form the focus of these lamentations. They point to Trump’s antagonisms with allies such as Angela Merkel’s Germany, his overt coercion of European partners and brute demands that NATO allies pay up for American protection or else, his sinister linkages with Moscow, and his gutting of the State Department. The complaints comport to Twitter word limits. “This is Putin’s dream,” claims Nick Kristof. Wailings from some grandees are ahistorical and shallow. The United States and its diplomacy, though, is not simply the captive of one demagogic commander-in-chief. It moves on two axes. Trump’s heterodox rhetoric and brutally transactional worldview are only one. The second axis is a long built-up assumption that the United States must lead the world. This entrenched idea determines the legitimacy and standing of those who hold office. It is the core concept of what has become an elite “common sense.” It demands that the United States must be the world’s dominant power; that it must have an outsized military power; that it must be preponderant particularly in the three vital power centers of the world, Europe, the Gulf, and East Asia; that it must exercise dominance through allies whom it must contain and subordinate; that it must strive to prevent “rogue” adversaries from acquiring nuclear weapons; and that it must prize open and expand markets for the penetration of American capital. To alter this structure, shred alliances, retrench security commitments, frame the world not as an American domain but as multipolar spheres of influence, would take more than attention-grabbing statements. It would take a sustained, costly, and fiercely fought political struggle, domestically and abroad. Thus far, the bottom line about Trump’s presidency is that before he took office, he threatened to govern as an isolationist, but he has not. Instead of addressing the failures of primacy, he is exacerbating them. When running for office, Trump promised to extricate America from unnecessary wars. He toyed with the idea of tolerating others’ nuclear proliferation. He pronounced NATO to be “obsolete.” He took up the slogan of interwar isolationism, “America First.” This worldview persists. He is no convert to the traditional ethos of the Pax Americana. In his contractual view of international affairs, he would prefer to draw down global military deployments. He would prefer not to be bound by alliance commitments. He would rather accommodate other major powers and let them dominate their back yards. He would be content for regional powers to be security providers. And he has no time for the traditional logic that the hegemon pays more than the lion’s share of the defense bill in order to keep allies subordinate. He has not governed this way. Look beyond the tweets to follow the money and the troops. Trump is aggressively reasserting American primacy, not dismantling it. Rather than bringing the legions home, Trump is reinforcing their central importance, emptying the treasury to strengthen them, and even asking for military parades. Thanks to his deficit-financed military build-up plus his extravagant tax cuts, the annual budget deficit has ballooned by 12 percent since last year, and is projected to rise by an additional $100 billion a year. In the Middle East, Trump has doubled down on America’s bid to remain predominant for the foreseeable future, increasing civilian and military deployments by 33 percent (as of November 2017) along with accelerated arms sales, while strengthening ties with the Saudi bloc and Israel to confront and coerce Iran, America’s main rival in the region. In Asia, Trump has pursued the nuclear disarmament of North Korea while increasingly confronting China about Taiwan, trade, and the South China Sea. We can debate what to call this, but it isn’t isolationism. The disjuncture between Trump’s anti-traditionalism and American deeds, indeed between Trump and the policy thrust of the executive branch, is most apparent in U.S.-Russian relations. Trump’s notorious words are often contradicted by the details of actual policy. Trump stands accused of treasonous collaboration with Vladimir Putin’s regime, due not only to allegations of electoral interference and private one-on-one meetings, but deferential statements about Russia’s security interests, congratulating Putin on re-election, and suggesting that Russia be invited back to the G-7. But amid the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s fascination for the extent of Trump’s collusion with Putin, its almost Trumpian fixation with televisual optics, and its fondness for grandiose tracts about “world order,” it neglects the prosaic details of concrete commitments. Consider the totality of American policy towards Russia since January 2017, which is the product of multiple decision-making centers, and some of which is forged despite Trump. Around the infamous Brussels and Helsinki reports, a significant act went under-reported. Before he went to Brussels, Trump addressed the Three Seas Initiative at Warsaw, where he pitched the United States as an alternative energy supplier to Russia, explicitly to break Russia’s gas monopoly, his Energy Secretary presented the United States as an alternative market provider to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Moscow noticed with displeasure. Whether or not Trump threatened to quit NATO, its members are spending evermore on defense, which is not a happy result for Russia. Despite protestations, European states retain powerful incentives to stick with Washington. There are no signs of their abandoning the alliance to rearm independently or bandwagon with other powers. Consider too other measures. He has appointed hawkish American primacists and Putin critics to Russia-related official posts. He has expanded sanctions, including an expanded Magnitsky list of targets. The Justice Department has forced Russia Today to register as a foreign agent. Trump has expelled Russian diplomats. Trump has armed Ukraine, Romania and Poland. The U.S. has reinforced NATO’s enhanced forward presence in Poland and the Baltic states with increased troop numbers and more exercises, and presided over the expansion of NATO into Montenegro and Macedonia, against Russian efforts to keep its clients in the Balkans and resist E.U.-NATO enlargement, while courting Ukraine and Georgia as future alliance members. The United States also acquires low-yield nuclear weapons with the explicit rationale of competition against Moscow, to remain “top of the pack” among nuclear powers. Trump twice authorized airstrikes against Syria, Russia’s Middle Eastern client state, against Putin’s protests. He also loosened the rules of engagement in Syria, struck Russian troops and mercenaries there and bragged about it. So far, the U.S. refuses to recognize Crimea as part of Russia. Is this Putin’s dream? Some commentators, like Daniel Vajdich and James Carafano, maintain this confrontational stance is Trump’s own. Carafano attributes Trump’s reassertion of American hegemony to a coherent Trumpian vision, a “large dose of peace through strength: showing strong face to his enemies with military and economic pressure,” while offering them a “chance to stop competing.” This is an elegant explanation. But it overstates the president’s command of the policy process. The picture that emerges is more fraught. A surer verdict must await future archives, but from the pattern of what we can know about the process behind these choices, a reluctant Trump is constrained to maintain a hard-line policy mix. This is despite his public braggadocio and despite his instinctive belief that Washington should delegate anti-Putin countermeasures to Europeans. Similarly, he retains a personal preference for pulling troops out of Afghanistan, South Korea, and Syria. Yet advisors pressed him successfully to maintain the traditional U.S. posture so far. “You guys want me to send troops everywhere,” Trump charged Secretary of Defense Mattis, whose response (“You have no choice”) carried the day. As well as being subject to constant advice to maintain a tough stance on Russian adventurism, domestic criticism of any conciliation of Russia and the Mueller investigation that the foreign policy establishment has encouraged have led Trump to complain that he “can’t put on the charm” or “be president.” Trump acknowledges that he is boxed in: “Anything you do, it’s always going to be… ‘He loves Russia.’” “I just want peace,” he complained when aides pushed him (successfully) to supply lethal aid to the Ukraine. The White House initially invited Putin to visit Washington, but subsequently postponed the occasion, citing the “Russia witch hunt.” If Trump had his way, as one former official put it, he would purse a “much more open and friendly policy with Russia.” So far, he hasn’t had his way on most first order questions. The environment is too resistant. The actor is not determined enough and doesn’t have enough political capital to spend. True, in the field of economics, Trump’s stoking of trade wars and large leaps in protectionism are a departure from post-Cold War policies, though he adheres to the impulse of creating markets open for American business and on American terms. On security questions, though, if it is hard politically to arrange a Putin visit to the White House, the constraints against doing what Moscow would like, negotiating a “Yalta-2” grand bargain to recognize a Russian sphere of influence — or withdraw from Europe — are strong. It is thus premature to argue that Trump is “off the chain,” as Hal Brands does. Brands notes that the constraining influence of Secretary Jim Mattis has waned, now that he has fallen out of favor, and that Trump is increasingly being Trump. Yet none of the concrete policies identified above have lapsed. And to focus on palace intrigue over which appointee is in the ascendancy is to miss the larger pattern. While Trump periodically falls out with just about everyone, the policy ecosystem is dominated by primacists and the primacy consensus. Though Tillerson and McMaster fell from grace and departed, the pool of capable talent from which the president selected appointees remains primacist. As Steve Bannon once observed, once you remove anti-Trump neoconservatives and never-Trumpers, the group of viable conservative candidates for official positions is not a “deep bench.” Accordingly, Trump has replaced estranged hawkish primacists with even more hawkish primacists as his new consiglieres: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Advisor John Bolton, alongside U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley who endures as the unapologetic voice of superpower assertion. The Precipice: Trump’s Second Term We would be wise to entertain the possibility of a second term of Trump. Thus far, it has proven futile for Trump’s critics to seek refuge in wishful expectations that he would go away, a wish found wanting every time it is updated. Recall that critics have hoped Trump wouldn’t win the nomination; that he would lose the election; that he would be impeached; that he will not stand again for office. The hope for a post-Trump return to political normality is similarly vain. After Trump there will likely be more Trumps, given the force of populist revolt that he has stirred, and the general dissatisfaction with the alleged liberal world order, whose breakdown and failures made Trumpism possible in the first place. There are good reasons to expect Trump to be a strong contender for re-election. Since World War II, incumbency has been a strong force in U.S. presidential politics. It has been rare for one of the two major parties to hold the presidency for only one term. Consider too Trump’s standing. His disapproval ratings are at historic highs, yet he also strongly mobilizes his base. Donations to Trump’s re-election campaign flood in. Trump enjoys near record approval from Republican voters, with no sign of mass defections. As things stand, he can campaign for a second term with a contentious but powerful story: a booming economy, low unemployment, a rising stock market, strictly enforced borders and tariff walls, and making peace through tough confrontation of North Korea and Iran. Each of these claims can be unpicked. But rebutting them takes explanation. In politics, if you’re explaining, you’re failing. Trump may be fortunate that his re-election timetable coincides with the right side of an economic “boom bust” cycle. Were he to win a second term, and especially if the margin was more decisive, the conditions of his presidency would change. If he won big, he would have more political capital to spend. He would feel vindicated by the authority of a second mandate. Term limits would mean that he would no longer need fear election failure. It is possible that Trump “Mark 2” would be more willing to tolerate the costs of introducing major change in American grand strategy. Consider further the possibility of a major strategic shock, with an impact comparable to the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor in 1941, or the OPEC oil embargo of 1973. By definition, the shape and outline of the shock is unclear. And we can’t know when it would happen. But if the literature on great power decline is sound, it would likely have military and economic dimensions, featuring some fatal interaction of war and debt. The source of the next financial crisis could lie elsewhere, but Trump’s own policies also make more likely what was an implicit tendency, increasing the debt-deficit load and repeating a familiar pattern, whereby a large deficit-financed military build-up, deficit-financed wars (alongside tax cuts) stimulates demand, creates bubbles of irrational exuberance, overheats the economy, and eventually leads to a loss of confidence in markets. This would be followed by a contraction, but this time without the financial reserves that were available to mitigate the last financial crisis. This process could erupt sooner rather than later. It would take the combination of a strategic shock great enough to discredit the status quo and a determined revisionist president. If so, then these forces might come together, to take the president off the chain, and to create a domestic environment more hospitable to major change. Earlier security shocks, such as the 2008 financial crisis, did not lead in this direction because the Bush administration was averse to retrenching commitments. With Trump or a Trumpian figure in the white house, one response that was once taboo would be on the table: a fundamental retrenchment of overseas commitments, along the lines of Trump’s instincts. It isn’t certain what this will involve, but it would be drastic and imply a different assumption about how to pursue security. It could lead the United States to, for example, withdraw from the Gulf and let Saudi Arabia acquire the bomb, or to acknowledge Russia’s view of its sphere of influence while withdrawing from NATO or decisively repudiating Article 5, or to reduce military expenditure just to the level needed for the United States to deter attacks and defend itself. American “greatness” would still be Trump’s signature tune, but it would be redefined around liberating America from foreign entanglements, investing in and walling off the country, and an industrial renaissance. To be sure, the American foreign policy class would fight back furiously. But like in the era of Vietnam and the oil embargo, its power and confidence would be diminished. Already scarred by the last global financial crisis, stagnating wages and general alienation, the populace would be more receptive. An emboldened and more risk-prone president would be willing to hire outsiders as officials, less experienced and capable but ideologically attuned to the narrower security vision of “America First.” All this might be difficult to imagine. But rapid realignments of grand strategy can happen. As I argued, one example is Great Britain’s postwar abandonment of empire. New conditions were inhospitable to the exhausted country maintaining its colonies. These included the cumulative fiscal pressures of World War II, decolonization resistance, the United States’ dismantling of the economic order of imperial preference and the sterling bloc; and the shock of the Suez crisis of 1956, which revealed Britain’s vulnerability to U.S. coercion. Successive British governments were impelled to bow to these pressures once they became overwhelming. They then redefined Britain’s status around alliances and nuclear weapons, presenting retreat from empire as a graceful management of change and casting the emergence of independent countries as “the crowning achievement of British rule.” If we see a different kind of President Trump unleashed by new conditions, less constrained and more emboldened, in a context where major retrenchment becomes thinkable and attractive, only then will he or his heirs probably try to bring down the priesthood’s temple. If so, as Steve Bannon suggested, the next episode of Trump’s prime-time show will be as “wild as shit.”

### 2nr – at: nato resilient

#### Trump 2020 win is the death-knell for NATO

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So how do the various strengths and vulnerabilities of the alliance net out? Is this time really different, or just more of the same? In the near term, it remains unlikely that NATO will experience a fatal or near-fatal rupture, because the underlying logic of the alliance remains compelling, because it has weathered numerous and perhaps even worse crises before, and because some key sources of cohesion persist even amid the current crisis. The most likely scenario for the next two to three years is that the alliance will muddle through as it has muddled through before, with American Atlanticists inside and outside the administration trying to limit the fallout from Trump’s enmity, and Europeans trying to protect their interests and dignity while nonetheless tempering the urge for a showdown that could escalate in counterproductive ways. Here the unprecedented role played by Trump may even provide added resilience. When members of the administration and Trump’s own party signal that they understand the importance of allies even if he does not, they encourage allies to keep their heads down and avoid taking steps that would make matters worse. Better just to wait for the passing of a septuagenarian one-of-a-kind. Yet simply waiting Trump out may be not be possible—and it may not be enough. For one thing, how much wreckage Trump causes will depend on whether he serves one term or two. A renegade president can provoke a lot of crises over the next six years; even the most patient European leaders might find themselves forced to respond more forcefully to ensure their political survival at home. Theresa May and France’s Emmanuel Macron have already discovered that seeking to play the role of “Trump whisperer” comes with a high risk of personal humiliation and domestic political blowback; the course of moderation may be less and less appealing as time passes. More fundamentally, if Trump wins reelection, the allies will no longer be able to cling to the hope that he is the great aberration; they may conclude that they have no choice but to start preparing for a future in which America turns away from Atlanticism. And looking beyond the challenges posed by Trump himself, some of the deeper ills afflicting the alliance could well outlast the 45th president, or they could cause serious disruptions in NATO from the European side. Betting against NATO would require ignoring a lot of history. Yet assuming it will simply come through this crisis requires ignoring a lot of warning signs. If a fundamental rupture occurred, or if NATO were simply hollowed out and devalued by escalating internal tensions, the injury to American interests would be grievous. The stupendous achievements of the postwar era—the great-power peace, unprecedented global prosperity, and flourishing of human rights and democracy—have depended on the historically unprecedented cooperation of the transatlantic community. That community would be divided and its accomplishments jeopardized, and Washington would be deprived of the European partner that has buttressed its power and supported its global agenda. More ominous, the solidarity of the democratic world would be rent just as the authoritarian challenges to the global order are intensifying. European power may not be what it once was, and the major long-term threat to international stability—a rising China—may be located on the other side of the globe. But America and Europe together remain the largest agglomeration of state power in the world, and it is doubtful that the democracies will be able to address the threats posed by the anti-democratic Russia or China if they do not face those challenges together. It is hard to envision how NATO will make much progress toward overcoming its current crises so long as Trump is president. If the worst can be avoided until he departs the scene, salvaging the alliance and all it has accomplished may provide a salutary mission for his successor.

### 2nr – at: nato not k2 lio

#### Strong and credible NATO is key to preserve a stable liberal order

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Far from outdated, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) original purpose of mutual European defense remains as relevant today as it was at NATO’s inception. The United States stands as the sole superpower on the world stage, an integral part of a number of important alliances that maintain global stability, none that is more powerful or relevant than NATO. Paradoxically, a major foreign policy theme for President Donald Trump throughout the run-up to the 2016 elections was the near-universal need to reassess the value of continued involvement in a wide range of these alliances, treaties, and other international pacts.[i] President Trump considered no proverbial “cow” too sacred for this evaluation, with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and many other agreements all on the table for rejection or serious renegotiation. Specifically, President Trump repeatedly questioned the wisdom of America’s continuing membership in NATO. Originally established in 1949, NATO stood throughout the Cold War as a bulwark of democracies against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact of communist vassal states. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 ended the bipolar world order of the Cold War, but not the need for NATO. The United States invoked Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which requires that member states come to the aid of an attacked member, for the very first time in NATO’s history less than 24 hours after the al-Qa’ida attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001.[ii] Since that invocation, NATO forces have readily deployed alongside their American comrades in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world in support of US-led military operations. Comments made by President Trump prior to the January presidential inauguration concerning the obsolescence of NATO left many European leaders startled and uncertain in the face of increasing Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.[iii] Russian activity along Europe’s eastern periphery has taken on an increasingly aggressive tenor in recent years. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and shortly thereafter, the Kremlin backed Eastern Ukrainian “separatists” advised and equipped by soldiers ostensibly on furlough from the Russian military.[iv] The last year has seen widespread accusations of Russian “active measures”, influence operations designed to sway general perceptions and political elections across Europe and even in the United States.[v] Many have criticized NATO members for being slow to respond, but a number of NATO deployments to the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania show that NATO possesses the means and will to provide increased deterrence in the face of Russian aggression. While the alliance has struggled in some cases to adapt to modern threats such as terrorism and hybrid warfare, it remains a critical cooperative defense organization in which continued American membership advances US national objectives. In addition to assisting the United States in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, NATO has also been instrumental in supporting shared interests across Africa, the Balkans, and in the Middle East. NATO provides military training to indigenous forces and other support to U.S. interests in Central Africa, and continues to be instrumental in ongoing counterterrorism operations in Libya. Since assuming office, President Trump has seemingly shifted his views on the alliance, stating during a conference at Tampa-based US Central Command (CENTCOM) in mid-February, “We strongly support NATO. We only ask that all of the NATO members make their full and proper financial contributions to the NATO alliance.”[vi] Admittedly, in 2016 only five of the 28 member states in NATO invested the required 2% of their respective gross domestic product (GDP) into their military forces.[vii] The United States spends far more on defense as a percentage of GDP than any other NATO member, spurring criticism from some, including former President Obama, that NATO’s mutual defense assurances encourage “free riders” who disproportionately rely on the American investments in defense.[viii] However, NATO defense investment was already trending in the right direction before President Trump’s election, with real investment up by 4% in 2016[ix]. Jens Stoltenberg, the current NATO Secretary General, accepted comments by President Trump and US Defense Secretary James Mattis suggesting that US involvement in NATO might be “moderated” without increased defense investment by member states as “firm and fair”.[x] A number of NATO members, notably the Baltic States, have undertaken significant military buildups to face the growing threat posed by Russian aggression.[xi] To some analysts, President Trump’s original “hard line” stand on NATO was a shrewd negotiating ploy to elicit the desired defense investment by other NATO members. To others, his rhetorical shift indicates a recent realization of the importance of the NATO alliance to broader US national interests. For over four decades, membership in NATO served US interests as a powerful counterbalance to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact. In that bipolar world order, NATO’s defense deterrence contained communist designs on Western Europe, who saw global expansion of Marxism as a “sacred” duty. However, the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War did not end the utility of NATO, though it did present challenges and opportunities to which NATO has adapted. In the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO helped the United States advance shared interests in the Balkans, Africa, and the Near East. Throughout the Global War on Terror, NATO served alongside the United States in every single major theater, further honing wartime expeditionary capabilities. Even today, NATO stands ready to face the renewed threat of Russian aggression in Europe’s east, but it would be hard pressed to survive without US membership and support. NATO still matters because its existence is in the best interests of the United States and global stability.

### 2nr – xt: lio hotposts

#### Abandoning support for the liberal order causes war in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East that escalates

Chollet 17 (Derek Chollet, Executive Vice President and Senior Advisor for Security and Defense Policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, “Building “Situations of Strength”, *Brookings Report*, February, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/fp_201702_ofc_report_web.pdf>)//BB

We believe that **abandoning traditional U.S. support for the** international order **would be a serious strategic error that would leave the United States weaker and poorer, and the world more dangerous. It** **would encourage revisionist states to destabilize** Europe**,** East Asia**, and the** Middle East. **It would reduce** global economic growth **and leave us vulnerable to a new financial crisis**. **And it would damage efforts to tackle shared challenges like** terrorism**,** nuclear proliferation**, and** climate change that have very real— and potentially very damaging—impacts here at home. **The last time an unraveling of an existing international order occurred was in the 1930s, and the result was depression and** world war. Indeed, **much of the violence and disorder we see in the world today results from the weakening of the current order.** Moreover**, the existing order must be assessed relative to the plausible alternatives**. **The best case outcome in light of an American retreat from the international order is a spheres of influence system whereby China dominates much of East Asia**, **Russia dominates much of Eastern and Central Europe, and the United States is preeminent in its own hemisphere and possibly Western Europe**. **Spheres of influence approaches to international order are inherently unstable, largely because the lines of demarcation are contested.** **It is a**  **configuration prone to** great power conflict. **And the process of** transition **from an open global order where small nations have rights to a more imperial model would be particularly fraught.**

## 2NR – Impact – Start

### 1nc – ! – start

#### Beating Trump saves the US-Russia New START treaty—stops nuke war

Pifer 20 – Senior Fellow @ Brookings, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative (Steven, “Don’t let New START die,” *Brookings*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/06/dont-let-new-start-die/>)//BB

Little suggests grounds for optimism about nuclear arms control as long as Mr. Trump remains president. Change will require that the Democratic candidate win in November. His or her administration would then have to move immediately to extend New START before exploring additional measures that could usefully regulate an ever more complex arms competition with Russia and others. DISINTEREST OR ANTIPATHY: President Trump seems to understand little about nuclear arms or how agreements negotiated to constrain them enhance America’s security. During his January 2017 call with Russian President Vladimir Putin, he reportedly was unfamiliar with New START. In February 2019, the Trump administration gave six months’ notice of its intention to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. That treaty, signed by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, banned all U.S. and Soviet land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. Russia violated the INF Treaty by testing and deploying the 9M729 land-based, intermediate-range cruise missile. While asserting that it wanted to bring Moscow back into compliance, the Trump administration showed little strategy for doing so. It eschewed military and political measures that would have raised the costs to the Kremlin of its violation and might have affected Moscow’s calculation. The demise of the INF Treaty last August leaves New START as the only treaty constraining U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. New START limits each country to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads on no more than 700 deployed strategic missiles and bombers. In contrast to the INF Treaty, Russia has complied with New START’s limits. The compliance concerns expressed to date come from Russian officials, who challenge the adequacy of processes used to convert some U.S. strategic missile launchers and bombers so that they no longer count under New START. New START expires by its terms on February 5, 2021. It can, however, be extended by up to five years by agreement between the countries’ presidents. Mr. Putin has stated that Russia is ready to extend without preconditions. Instead, Mr. Trump wants a negotiation to limit all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons as well as bring China into the equation. Both are desirable—but highly unrealistic—goals. Moscow has long declined to discuss limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons unless the United States discusses issues such as limits on missile defense, but the Trump administration’s 2018 missile defense review stressed no constraints on missile defenses. Absent a readiness to address issues of concern to Moscow, Mr. Trump will not succeed in negotiating limits covering all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms. China has repeatedly made clear that it will not negotiate until the gap between U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons numbers, on the one hand, and Chinese nuclear weapons numbers, on the other, narrows. Currently, the United States and Russia each have well more than ten times as many nuclear weapons as does China. In mid-January, U.S. and Russia officials held strategic security talks covering a range of issues. They agreed to further meetings—which is good news—but nothing suggests progress toward a negotiation that would include all nuclear arms and bring in China. Nine months after Mr. Trump expressed interest in going big on arms control, his administration has offered no concrete ideas as to what limits it wants or how it would persuade Moscow and Beijing to join its desired trilateral negotiation. That could mean internal disagreement within the U.S. government. It fuels suspicion that the proposal seeks to divert attention from the administration’s failure to extend New START. Extending New START to 2026 should be a no-brainer. Doing so would maintain the treaty’s limits on Russian strategic forces when Moscow has hot production lines running (U.S. production of new strategic bombers, submarines and missiles will begin in earnest only in the mid-2020s). Extension would continue the flow of information about Russian forces provided by the treaty’s data exchanges, notifications and inspections, which helps the Pentagon avoid costly worst-case assumptions. It would offer a mechanism for addressing exotic new kinds of Russian strategic weapons. Extending New START would achieve all this without forcing the U.S. military to alter any part of its strategic modernization program, as that program was designed to fit within New START’s limits. Unfortunately, the administration’s attitude toward the INF Treaty and New START give little reason to think anything positive will happen on the arms control agenda under Mr. Trump’s watch. Change will require the Democratic candidate wins in November. LOOKING FORWARD If the Democrats were to win, New START extension would demand urgent attention from the incoming president. He or she would take the oath of office on January 20, 2021—just 15 days before the treaty’s expiration date. The new president should immediately agree to Mr. Putin’s offer on extending the treaty. If extension were decided, U.S. and Russian officials could use the treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission to take a more serious look at Russian concerns about conversion of U.S. strategic systems and the new kinds of strategic arms under development in Russia, such as the Poseidon nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered torpedo. New START extension would provide a solid foundation for discussions with Russian officials on the full range of issues affecting the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship: strategic nuclear weapons, non-strategic nuclear arms, precision-guided long-range conventional strike systems, missile defense, third-country nuclear forces, cyber and space issues, as well as how to maintain strategic stability in a rapidly changing world. During the Cold War period, strategic stability—a situation in which neither Washington nor Moscow had an incentive to strike first with nuclear weapons, even in an intense crisis—required a relatively straightforward calculation. It focused on the strategic nuclear weapons of each side. As long as each had survivable strategic forces capable of devastating the other, even after absorbing a first strike, stability could be maintained. Today’s stability model is far more complex. It is multi-domain, including missile defense, conventional strike, cyber and space operations in addition to nuclear arms. It is multi-player, as third-country actions have to be factored into stability calculations. U.S. and Russian security officials should discuss the challenges posed by this new era. The talks might not spin off specific negotiating agendas, at least not immediately. To get negotiations started, both sides would have to weigh trade-offs. Realistically, if Washington wants Moscow to negotiate non-strategic nuclear weapons, it would have to consider addressing Russia’s concerns on missile defense. However, even absent new negotiations, a structured discussion venue would allow U.S. and Russian experts to exchange views and better understand, and perhaps alleviate, the other side’s concerns. A new administration should seek a parallel set of discussions with China. Seeking negotiated limits on Chinese nuclear forces would pose a wildly impractical goal, at least in the near term. The dialogue might instead usefully begin with an exchange of views on concerns about the other’s force structures and doctrines. It might later seek to move China toward some transparency on its total nuclear weapons number and a unilateral commitment not to increase that number if the United States and Russia continue to limit and reduce their nuclear arms. As for the INF Treaty, the Russian military wants the 9M729, and the Pentagon has four different land-based missiles under development or planned with ranges that the treaty would have prohibited. While the 9M729 reportedly can carry nuclear or conventional warheads, the Russian military appears interested primarily in its conventional capability. All four of the Pentagon’s planned intermediate-range missiles are intended to be conventionally armed. This opens the possibility of a negotiation to ban land-based, intermediate-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads. That would pose verification challenges, but they should not prove insurmountable. The U.S. military has expressed the greatest interest in having land-based intermediate-range missiles in the western Pacific to counter China’s large number of intermediate-range missiles, most of which are conventionally armed. The Pentagon’s development of intermediate-range missiles might open the possibility—admittedly, a long shot—for a separate U.S.-Chinese discussion, or a trilateral U.S.-Chinese-Russian discussion, on prohibiting nuclear-armed, land-based, intermediate-range missiles. Extending New START, strategic discussions with Russia and China, and the possible negotiation of an agreement to ban land-based, intermediate-range missiles armed with nuclear warheads comprise a more modest agenda for nuclear arms control than many would like. These measures nonetheless would provide useful guardrails for the nuclear competition between the United States and its two peer military rivals. They would provide time to consider further steps to reduce nuclear risks and enhance strategic stability in the modern era. Unfortunately, little suggests that Mr. Trump is prepared to take such steps. They will have to await his successor.

### 2nr – at: trump extends start

#### He won’t extend Start – action precedent

Toosi 2-12-2020 (Nahal, “Trump flirts with a new nuclear arms race As advocates and lawmakers warn about the expiration of a key arms-control treaty, the administration appears paralyzed over its approach.,” *Politico*, [https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/12/trump-nuclear-envoy-russia-114655)//BB---ability](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/12/trump-nuclear-envoy-russia-114655%29//BB---ability) edited

Aides to President Donald Trump want to name a high-level negotiator to oversee nuclear talks with Moscow, former U.S. officials say – an effort that may be delaying a Trump decision on whether to extend America’s last major arms control treaty with Russia. The negotiator would act as a special envoy focused on arms control talks. And while Moscow would likely be his or her primary overseas negotiating partner, Trump may insist that the envoy take on the even harder task of convincing China to engage in such discussions. So far, the administration has been unable to find someone willing to take the position, two former U.S. officials told POLITICO. The search has been going on since late last year. Names floated for the role include: former ambassador and nuclear negotiator Richard Burt; Treasury Department official Marshall Billingslea; and former George W. Bush national security adviser Stephen Hadley, according to various sources. Burt declined comment; Hadley and Billingslea did not reply to emails seeking comment. Trump, meanwhile, faces growing pressure to agree to extend the New START Treaty, a landmark Barack Obama administration arms control agreement that took effect in 2011. The treaty limits the United States and Russia each to 1,550 deployed long-range nuclear warheads and 700 long-range delivery vehicles. Advocates for its renewal are arguing in increasingly strident terms that dire consequences could follow if it is allowed to expire next February. U.S. lawmakers from both parties have introduced legislation designed to push Trump to extend the existing accord. The Russian government has said repeatedly it’s happy to extend the treaty for five years without conditions. Former U.S. officials also have added their voices to the effort, insisting that Trump should not waste time. An extension wouldn’t require congressional approval, and could remain in effect while talks on a replacement deal are ongoing. “The treaty’s agreed limits on nuclear arsenals are too important to be put at risk in a game of nuclear chicken,” former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov wrote in a Monday op-ed urging extension. And U.S. allies have likewise expressed their alarm. In a recent speech laying out his nuclear doctrine, French President Emmanuel Macron urged New START’s renewal and warned of “the possibility of a pure and unrestrained military and nuclear competition, the likes of which we haven't seen since the end of the 1960s." But Trump is suspicious of the merits of the treaty. He has complained that the pact is not comprehensive enough, and also said it should include Beijing, given China’s reportedly growing nuclear arsenal. Reuters reported that when Russian leader Vladimir Putin raised the possibility of extending New START with Trump in January 2017, the new U.S. president first paused to ask his aides what it was. He then denounced it to Putin as a bad deal negotiated by Obama. Trump has at times made it clear he isn’t keen on limiting America’s nuclear prowess. Weeks before his inauguration, he tweeted: “The United States must greatly strengthen and expand its nuclear capability until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes.” For now, the president appears inclined to use the possibility of an extension as leverage to push Russia to agree to broader nuclear talks. His newly proposed budget requests billions to modernize America’s nuclear arsenal, another signal to Moscow that the U.S. won’t be cowed. Trump’s hardline approach has its defenders, including hawkish lawmakers such as Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas and Rep. Liz Cheney of Wyoming, who have pushed legislation to withhold funds from an extension unless the treaty covers more of Russia’s arsenal and includes China. This side argues that arms control agreements such as New START are outdated in part because they do not account for non-strategic or “tactical” nuclear weapons – including ones that cover a shorter range. Russia has a significant stockpile of such nukes. Russia also faces a cash crunch, this side argues, so it has an interest in seeing the U.S. extend the limits in New START. “The Russians are seeing that the treaty is the only thing restricting the Americans,” a former senior Defense Department official said. They also note that Trump’s unwillingness to go along with Russia’s call for an extension contradicts the narrative that he’s too eager to please Putin. Tim Morrison, a former senior National Security Council official who worked on arms control issues, is among those urging Trump to use the extension as leverage. In an interview, Morrison urged advocates of an extension to “stop playing into the Russian propaganda” -- arguing that there’s plenty of time. “The treaty doesn’t expire for another year,” he said. “Why all the agonizing when there’s an opportunity for a better deal?” Advocates of a New START extension counter that it’s better to do so now for a number of reasons. For one thing, it will offer the U.S. and Russia a sense of stability to know that treaty will stay in force, and allow them to better plan for future talks and adjustments to their arsenals. For another, it’s tough to predict what the geopolitical situation will be months from now, and the U.S. and Russia already are at loggerheads over many other issues. The Russians might even try to use the ticking clock as leverage over Washington if Trump takes too long, one former senior U.S. official warned. There’s also the possibility that Trump may choose not to extend the treaty at all, believing that a vacuum in the U.S.-Russian arms control space could act as leverage, too. “Part of the concern is that this administration bungles this decision to extend because of ineptitude or simple chaos,” said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. “There is a value in providing the assurance that there will be at least some basic limitations. It assures allies, it assures adversaries, and it allows us to focus our energy and engagement with Russia and potentially with China to talk about what happens next.” Military officials have also warned that the treaty’s expiration would complicate their efforts to keep tabs on Russia’s nuclear arsenal. “When it comes to the New START treaty, from a STRATCOM perspective, we like the idea of arms control agreements, particularly with Russia, that provide us with some level of assurance that at least a portion of their nuclear forces are capped,” Vice Adm. David Kriete, the deputy head of Strategic Command, said in July. “So we kinda know what we have and what we are dealing with, and then we can plan accordingly.” Trump’s handling of the New START issue echoes how he dealt with the Iran nuclear deal, another agreement reached under the Obama administration. Trump insisted the Iran deal, which curbed Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, was too narrow. He abandoned it and imposed new sanctions in hopes of forcing Tehran to negotiate a better deal. But so far, he’s been unable to bring Iran’s leaders to the table. Some nuclear observers say Trump’s reaction to New START is simply par for the course given his instinctive dislike of any policy championed by Obama. There’s even a possibility that Trump won’t decide on an extension until after the November election, avoiding placing his imprimatur on an Obama-era deal ahead of the vote. In any case, according to analysts, Capitol Hill aides and others, there’s a sense of ~~paralysis~~ [inaction] inside the administration now, with no serious plans ready for how to engage Russia or China in any future talks. It hasn’t helped that Trump has cycled through national security advisers; his fourth, Robert O’Brien, took over in September. O’Brien succeeded John Bolton, a skeptic of arms control deals who had said Trump was unlikely to extend New START because it didn’t cover tactical nuclear weapons. O’Brien, who does not have comparable experience working on arms control issues, has offered few clues as to what the White House is now thinking about the treaty negotiations. In remarks Tuesday at the Atlantic Council, he said merely: “We will be negotiating with the Russians on nuclear disarmament issues. And I think that’s something the Russians are interested in and something President Trump is very interested in." One key obstacle to any action, including an extension of New START, is the lack of a point person for the negotiations, the former senior Defense Department official said. “I’m told there’s no work going on until they appoint this senior negotiator,” he said.

### 2nr – at: no arms racing

#### Trump re-election dooms New START

Sigov 2-23-2020 - former Russian journalist in Moscow, a staff writer at The Blade (Mike, “Sigov: Nuclear Arms Race Likely If Trump Stays,” *Toledo Blade*, Proquest)

LESS THAN a year is left before the only remaining U.S.-Russian nuclear arms limitation treaty expires, risking a backslide to an arms race that can end in a nuclear Armageddon. There is little chance, however, that the vital treaty will be extended or replaced before it expires — despite the treaty’s proven effectiveness at warding off nuclear confrontation. The reason is Donald Trump. The dissolution of an equally important Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty initiated by the Trump Administration last year attests to that. So does Mr. Trump’s propensity to undermine vital international accords accomplished by prior administrations — such as the multinational Iran nuclear deal — while trumpeting his own failing efforts — such as the collapsed talks with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, over a nuclear agreement. Russian President Vladimir Putin said in December that he is open to the idea of unconditionally extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. That put the ball in Mr. Trump’s court. “It’s not every day that I find myself in agreement with Russian leaders, but today I argue that the U.S. should accept their offer to extend #NewSTART — the only agreement that limits the size of our nuclear forces. We must avoid a return to brinksmanship,” Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote earlier this month in a tweet linked to a New York Times opinion piece she co-authored with Igor Ivanov, a former Russian foreign minister. Ms. Albright and her Russian counterpart are calling for President Trump to respond positively to Russia’s indicated readiness to extend the treaty before it expires Feb. 5, 2021. That call is both legitimate and urgent. Unfortunately Mr. Trump may have something else in mind, as indicated in Politico’s Feb. 12 article titled “Trump flirts with a new nuclear arms race.” President Donald Trump, the Iranian leadership, and Russian President Vladimir Putin seem interested only in escalating tensions. The nuclear arms race cost America about $5.8 trillion, according to a 1998 Brookings Institution report. Another one would be a huge financial setback, to say nothing of anxiety and other negative psychological effects it would have on us. Former U.S. officials told Politico that “aides to President Donald Trump want to name a high-level negotiator to oversee nuclear talks with Moscow” and that this development “may be delaying a Trump decision on whether to extend America’s last major arms control treaty with Russia,” the media company reported. “The negotiator would act as a special envoy focused on arms control talks. And while Moscow would likely be his or her primary overseas negotiating partner, Trump may insist that the envoy take on the even harder task of convincing China to engage in such discussions,” Politico wrote. That’s bad news. If Mr. Trump’s failed negotiations with Kim are any indication, his Russian endeavor will likely be as unproductive, serving little else than Mr. Trump’s popularity with his base, if that. Most important, any nuclear deal with Russia hinges on verification of Russia’s adherence to it. Without such verification, the deal is useless. But as long as Mr. Trump is President, such verification is effectively impossible. Mr. Trump notoriously holds Mr. Putin in higher regard than his own intelligence experts and diplomats. He has consistently questioned their unanimous conclusion that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election to his advantage. He was also infamously open to Mr. Putin’s suggestion that Michael McFaul — U.S. ambassador in Russia under President Obama — be interrogated by Russian security agents. Consequently, any agreement between Mr. Putin and Mr. Trump would be unverifiable and, thus, useless. Fortunately, there is one thing all of us can do for the sake of our own survival — show up at the November polls in huge numbers in order to overpower any Russian efforts to keep Mr. Trump in power. First things first. Then — once we succeed — it won’t be Mr. Trump dealing with Russia in matters of life and death on our behalf. So help us God.

### 2nr – at: biden ends start

#### Biden supports new START

Schumann 20 - Communications Director @ Council for a Livable World (Anna, “BIPARTISAN BILLS, LEADING DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES SUPPORT EXTENDING NUCLEAR TREATY,” *Council for a Livable World*, https://livableworld.org/bipartisan-bills-leading-democratic-presidential-candidates-support-extending-nuclear-treaty/)//BB

February 5 marks the one-year countdown to the potential end of the last remaining treaty constraining the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) between the United States and Russia can easily be extended into 2026 if both parties agree, but so far, the Trump administration has not committed to extension. Fast facts about New START: New START entered into force on February 5, 2011 and will expire on February 5, 2021. It can be extended for up to five years through a simple agreement. New START required both countries to limit the number of deployed warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs to no more than 1,550 on 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers by February 5, 2018. Both parties met this deadline. Through 18 on-site inspections per year and a comprehensive data exchange, New START gives the United States and Russia a real-time view into each other’s strategic nuclear forces. That level of transparency helps to create stability in unstable times. It is the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia since the collapse of the INF Treaty in August 2019. There are bipartisan bills in Congress supporting New START extension; a bill by Sens. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) and Todd Young (R-IN), and a companion House bill by Reps. Eliot Engel (D-NY) and Michael McCaul (R-TX) urge the Trump administration to extend the treaty through 2026. Separately, Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA) has introduced legislation to preserve New START’s tenets if it is not extended. Former officials who served under Republican and Democratic administrations; military leaders; nuclear policy experts; and the top Democratic candidates for President agree the treaty should be extended immediately. According to NukeVote2020, a Council for a Livable World tracker of presidential candidate positions on nuclear weapons issues, all leading Democratic candidates support extending the treaty. On his NukeVote2020 questionnaire, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) wrote: “It is beyond foolish to allow this treaty to expire, but that is exactly what the Trump administration is doing. As president, I would extend this treaty and work on a new agreement to reduce dramatically US and Russian nuclear arsenals.” On her NukeVote2020 questionnaire, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) wrote: “Russia and the United States control strategic nuclear arsenals that pose a danger to each other and the world — we need to do all we can to reduce the danger of a nuclear miscalculation or exchange.” Former Vice President Joe Biden and former South Bend, Ind., Mayor Pete Buttigieg, also indicated on their questionnaire that they support extending New START, but did not provide comment. Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) recently mentioned the need preserve New START in a presidential debate.

### 2nr – at: congressional veto

#### Extension doesn’t require Congress

Albright 20 (Madeleine, former United States secretary of state, “A Plea to Save the Last Nuclear Arms Treaty,” 10 February 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/opinion/albright-ivanov-nuclear-treaty.html>, DOA: 3-4-2020) //Snowball

Right now, the most important thing to do is extend New START. Russia has indicated, at the highest levels, its willingness to do so. All that President Trump needs to do is agree. Legislative approval is not required. Time is critical. Doing nothing while waiting for a “better” agreement is a recipe for disaster: We could lose New START and fail to replace it. The treaty’s agreed limits on nuclear arsenals are too important to be put at risk in a game of nuclear chicken.

### 2nr – at: Russian veto

#### Russia’s on board for an unconditional extension—it is just up to the US

Reisener 2-3-2020 - chief of staff at the Center for the National Interest (Matthew, “How Donald Trump Can Stop a Nuclear Arms Race,” *National Interest*, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-donald-trump-can-stop-nuclear-arms-race-119756)//BB

On February 5, 2021, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is set to expire a decade after taking effect. New START is a nuclear arms reduction agreement signed by the United States and Russia, the latter of which is eager to see the treaty extended by another five years. Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed in December that his country was, “ready to extend the New START treaty immediately, before the year’s end and without any preconditions.” Unfortunately, it takes two countries to extend a treaty. Russia’s desire to continue with New START has been met with non-committal responses by the United States. Former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Andrea Thompson stated that it was, “too soon to tell,” whether renewing the agreement was in America’s interest, while subsequent administration officials have expressed only a vague desire to, “think more broadly,” than the treaty. Vladimir Yermakov, director of Russia’s Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control at the Foreign Ministry, has reported, “hearing more and more often US officials express their doubts about the need to extend the START Treaty,” while Russian defense minister Sergey Lavrov stated that, “Washington is evading any serious discussion, making public discouraging signals regarding the future of this treaty.” The Trump administration’s lack of urgency and commitment to preserving New START is dangerous and misguided. New START is the cornerstone of the bilateral nuclear arms control framework which has created stability and prevented nuclear arms races since the Cold War. The treaty is broadly popular with members of both political parties, and Congress has been vocal in calling for its extension. The Trump administration must prioritize extending New START in a manner that accounts for America’s changing security needs, lest the United States exposes itself to a dramatically increased risk of a nuclear arms race or nuclear miscalculation.

### 2nr – at: new start ≠ war

#### New START failure causes nuclear war in every hotspot [and their circumvention defense is wrong]

Reisener 2-3-2020 - chief of staff at the Center for the National Interest (Matthew, “How Donald Trump Can Stop a Nuclear Arms Race,” *National Interest*, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-donald-trump-can-stop-nuclear-arms-race-119756>)//BB

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The Trump administration must prioritize extending New START in a manner that accounts for America’s changing security needs, lest the United States exposes itself to a dramatically increased risk of a nuclear arms race or nuclear miscalculation. New START positively impacts nuclear stability in several ways. First, the treaty places hard caps on the number of long-range nuclear warheads (1,500) and long-range nuclear delivery vehicles (700) that each country can deploy, as well as limiting the number of total launchers available to each country to 800. These are the lowest deployment levels of nuclear ICBMs since the early stages of the Cold War, and New START has helped eliminate the nuclear arms races that once cast a specter over American security policy. Furthermore, the treaty provides for on-site inspections which have not only helped verify that both sides are complying with the agreement, but have helped America gain tangible information about the status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which U.S. Strategic Command head General John Hyten has credited with improving American intelligence on this issue. Allowing New START to expire could risk a new nuclear arms race by signaling that the two states with the largest nuclear arsenals are no longer committed to arms control. If Russia and the United States are unrestrained in their capacity to deploy long-range missiles and produce delivery systems, they could rapidly begin installing nuclear warheads onto existing missiles, with each state looking to gain an upper hand over the other. Additionally, the inability to monitor the status, quantity, and positioning of the other side’s nuclear arsenal will further ratchet up distrust between America and Russia and force each side to assume the worst about the others capabilities and intentions. Every potential conflict point between the United States and Russia, such as Ukraine, Syria, and the Baltics, will suddenly carry the risk of rapid escalation and nuclear miscalculation. Furthermore, New START’s expiration could not come at a worse time. Not only are tensions between the United States and Russia high due to the threat of Russian election interference, America’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the ongoing Ukraine dispute, but America has already made plans to replace and upgrade much of its Cold War-era nuclear arsenal during the coming decade. Russia’s ability to verify America’s commitment to arms control will become more important than ever during this period, as the production of new nuclear weapons could easily incentivize Russia to begin creating new weapons systems of their own, sparking an arms race. The Trump administration has posited a number of criticisms of New START to justify its hesitance about extending it. The administration has argued that many of Russia’s new strategic nuclear weapons systems fall outside the purview of the treaty, necessitating efforts to rework the agreement. While Trump likely is not truly motivated by this concern (he was spuriously criticizing the treaty long before President Putin publicly unveiled these missiles in 2018), it remains a valid criticism of New START that is worth addressing. Fortunately, Russia has already conceded that several of these weapons would be subject to New START limitations, and most of the others likely won’t be operational until after the treaty expires in 2026. If the United States has reservations regarding other missiles, they could use treaty negotiations as a way to raise them. As one START expert suggested, Trump could request that Russia’s air-launched Kinzhal missiles not be deployed on Tu-22M3 Backfire medium bombers, a potential combination that violates the spirit of the agreement even if its technical legality is debatable. It makes more sense for America to preserve a treaty that could provide a framework for further negotiations on these developmental weapons than to let it fall by the wayside, especially since the alternative to New START is a world where strategic nuclear missiles can be deployed without restriction.

### 2nr – at: us-russia impact d

#### US-Russia war is existential

Owen Cotton-Barratt et al, 17 - PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

### 2nr – at: start bad

#### Issues don’t affect our impacts—new START drastically decreases the probability of war

Gottemoeller 19 - was the chief United States negotiator for the New START Treaty in 2009 and 2010 (Rose, “Don’t Let the New START Treaty Lapse,” *New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/opinion/dont-let-the-new-start-treaty-lapse.html>)//BB

The New START Treaty, the last and most important nuclear arms limitation agreement still in force between Russia and the United States, expires early in 2021. Perhaps it can be extended. But it has long been criticized by the Trump administration, on two points: The treaty does not limit new nuclear weapons systems that the Russians are threatening to use against us; and it does not include the Chinese, who are busily modernizing their nuclear arsenal. Those concerns are valid and cannot be ignored in any effort to renew the 10-year pact. The new Russian systems will pose a threat to the United States if they are deployed. And although China is far behind the United States and Russia in numbers of warheads, it continues to build them and has not said when it will stop. Nor is China bound now by any arms limitation agreement. The administration’s attention to these issues is welcome, and we should be looking for ways to resolve them. At the same time, we should recognize the benefits the New START Treaty brings to American national security. During the coming decade, the United States will be modernizing its nuclear forces. If the treaty is extended until 2026, it will continue to cap Russian deployed warheads at 1,550 and delivery systems — missiles and bombers — at 700, giving the United States a stable environment in which to modernize. Without the treaty, things could change drastically and quickly. There is no faster way for the Russians to outrun us than to deploy more nuclear warheads on their missiles. This is not a new issue. Starting in the 1970s, the Soviets and now the Russians have built larger and heavier intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs, on which they can load more warheads at will — and they have plenty of them in storage. Ten or more warheads were estimated for the old SS-18 heavy missile, which remains deployed; it will be replaced by a new heavy missile, one of the systems that concern President Trump’s administration. If released from the current 1,550 limit on warheads, the Russians could readily add several hundred more warheads to their ICBMs, forcing the United States into a difficult targeting problem at best, and a strategic crisis at worst. The Russians, whose missiles have grown more capable of a highly accurate first strike, might be tempted to try to knock out the strategic command and control systems of the United States. Stability depends on such temptation never taking shape. As far-fetched as it seems, that very possibility drove both sides in the arms reduction negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s to acknowledge that we must ensure parity in numbers of deployed warheads and delivery vehicles. We cannot afford to lose this parity. The outcome would be too dangerous to our national security. But if New START lapses, that could happen, and fast. So it serves American interests to extend the treaty. At the same time, we need to tackle the problems that the administration has highlighted. The agreement can be extended for five years, or until it is superseded by a new treaty. Success in a new negotiation should be something that we all welcome. How do we treat new Russian weapons? Here, too, the pact can help. Some of the Russian systems, such as the new heavy missile, meet the definition of an ICBM under the treaty; they would therefore fall under it without any additional negotiation. The new boost-glide missile system might also be brought under the treaty, since it is launched on a version of an existing Russian ICBM. The Russians have all but said this system will be accountable under the treaty. But if New START is not extended, Russia would be able to field both the heavy missile and boost-glide system without any constraints. New systems like the Burevestnik, a nuclear-propelled cruise missile, would take more work, since they do not fit the category of missiles defined in the treaty. Here it might be worth a straightforward discussion with the Russians: Do they really need the system? As the radioactive explosion near Arkhangelsk in August showed, the missile will be dangerous to operate and dangerous to deploy — both for the experts handling it and the public living near its bases. The system is not needed. For more than 30 years, since Ronald Reagan’s Star Wars program was announced, the Soviets and Russians have poured money into ensuring that their missiles can penetrate defenses against incoming missiles. Chaff, decoys, maneuvering re-entry vehicles: Russia is best in class in all of these systems to keep ICBMs on course to their targets. The rationale for the new missile is that it would succeed if the ICBMs fail, but that is unlikely. This makes the Burevestnik an elaborate redundancy, and dangerous in the bargain. Straightforward discussion may also be the way to get the Chinese to play. In the 50 years since the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, have been negotiating about bilateral nuclear restraint, the Chinese have never been part of the process. They have expressed restraint through a national no-first-use policy and by keeping their nuclear arsenal small. But with their continuing nuclear modernization, we need to wonder — is China moving beyond assuring a second strike if hit first? Is it striving for parity with the United States and Russia? Seeking some clarity about Chinese intentions should be a first order of business. The Chinese are not allergic to all negotiated measures. They are signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and they have cooperated to prevent proliferation — for example, working with the United States on nuclear security in their port complexes and elsewhere to prevent nuclear terrorism during the Beijing Olympics in 2008. But time and patience will be needed to engage Beijing, alongside mutual goals of predictability and restraint. Early insistence that the Chinese reduce and eliminate their relatively small nuclear arsenal would only drive them away. The Trump administration is on the right track when it draws attention to the new Russian strategic systems and the pace of Chinese nuclear modernization. We can win some progress in both of these arenas, and New START can help: Its extension would make it easier to accomplish both goals. Some of the new systems will be constrained if the treaty survives. Most important, we will maintain stability and bolster America’s national security as we negotiate further. Russia will be locked in on warheads. It will not be able to outrun us.

### ---at: cause china prolif

#### New START failure worsens China prolif

Reisener 2-3-2020 - chief of staff at the Center for the National Interest (Matthew, “How Donald Trump Can Stop a Nuclear Arms Race,” National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-donald-trump-can-stop-nuclear-arms-race-119756)//BB

President Trump also contends that New START is incomplete because China is not bound by it, and that the United States needs to develop a new agreement that includes them. Incorporating China into the international arms control regime is a goal worth pursuing, but not at the expense of New START. China has made it clear that it has no desire to enter into such an agreement given the massive disparity between its nuclear arsenal and those of New START’s signatories (Russia and the United States control more than 90% of all nuclear warheads), and the Trump administration does not appear to have any strategy for persuading them otherwise. Furthermore, the desire to include China in the arms control regime does not justify eliminating the most successful nuclear arms reduction treaty on the planet, especially since the unrestricted deployment of American or Russian long-range nuclear missiles would only incentivize China to develop more nuclear weapons of its own. New START should be used as the foundation to incorporate China into any existing or future arms control treaty, not thrown aside in pursuit of an illusory multilateral agreement which the administration has no real hopes of achieving.

### ---at: hurts alliances

#### It’s the other way around – specifically, it collapses NATO

Manzo 19 (Vincent, nuclear policy analyst, “If New START Dies, These Questions Will Need Answers,” 28 July 2019, <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/07/if-new-start-dies-these-questions-will-need-answers/158744/>, DOA: 3-4-2020) //Snowball

 “What would be the effect on our alliances around the world, especially NATO, of letting the Treaty lapse?” Nuclear arms control with Russia also helps to unite U.S. allies in NATO around a common security strategy. According to Robert Bell, the former U.S. defense advisor to NATO, the United States’ continued commitment to arms control was essential for garnering a consensus within the alliance at the 2016 Warsaw Summit and the 2018 Brussels Summit. While NATO allies ultimately supported U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, they are unlikely to rally around the United States if it allows New START to expire despite Russian compliance with the treaty. What is more, if U.S. allies perceive the United States as failing to put forward a serious nuclear risk-reduction strategy, sustaining NATO solidarity in the future may become more difficult. Some NATO members have domestic constituencies who are skeptical of NATO’s nuclear burden-sharing mission. These policy preferences may gain greater traction in a post-New START world, especially if both the United States and Russia are increasing their deployed nuclear forces and the end of U.S.-Russian arms control increases discord within the already strained Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

## 2NR – Impact – Warming

### 2nr – xt: paris i/l

#### 2020 determines U.S. participation in the Paris agreement---key to avoid extinction from warming

Schlanger 17 - Environment Reporter for Quartz; and Akshat Rathi, Science Journalist with Quartz (Zoë, “It’s Official: Trump is Forcing the US to Turn its Back on the Paris Climate Agreement,” <https://qz.com/996376/trump-has-decided-to-pull-the-us-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/>)

Since Trump reportedly waffled up to the last moment on the Paris agreement decision, we decided to show you what almost could have been. Here’s our story, written both ways. US president Donald Trump announced today (June 1) he’s decided to withdraw the country from the Paris climate agreement. The US emits about one-sixth of the planet’s total greenhouse gas emissions, making it the second-largest emitter in the world. The decision removes the US from its commitments to international efforts to reduce fossil-fuel emissions and thereby avoid levels of global temperature rise that imperil the future viability of human life on Earth. The US joins Nicaragua and Syria as the only countries to reject the Paris agreement. Notably, Nicaragua refused to join because its leadership felt the agreement did not go far enough. Syria, meanwhile, has since 2011 been mired in one of the globe’s most violent civil conflicts. Not leaving means Trump will have to respect the US’s commitments to reduce emissions. Trump will abide by the structure laid out in the agreement, which means it could take the US up to four years to actually leave. So the real question of whether the country stays in the Paris climate agreement may be decided by voters in 2020 the presidential election. Trump, who reportedly was undecided as recently as last evening, ultimately listened to ignored the voices of energy industry giants like ExxonMobil and Shell, coal company Cloud Peak, and Rex Tillerson, his own secretary of state, not to mention some of his most trusted advisors, daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner. He thus ignored instead listened to the climate-denying faction of his inner-circle, including Environmental Protection Agency administrator Scott Pruitt, chief strategist Steve Bannon, and a coterie of 22 Republican senators who sent a letter to the president urging him to back out. (Those senators have collectively received $10 million in campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry since 2012.) The pledge made by the Obama administration to the Paris agreement is was not legally binding, but symbolically important. It offers offered an assurance to other nations that the country would take responsibility for its own share of global emissions. Within weeks of Trump taking office, however, his administration began the process of rolling back key federal emissions standards, making clear that it had no intention of working towards meeting the US’s commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 to about a third of the country’s 2005 emission levels. Without the US, the total number of countries that have formally pledged emissions reductions remains 147 drops to 146, in total accounting for roughly 80% 65% of the planet’s emissions. As the US vacates its seat at the bargaining table, it cedes climate leadership to India, China, and the EU, all of which have publicly pledged to strengthen their commitments to mutually reduce emissions. Still, without US participation during what scientists agree are critical years, the hope of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change slips farther away.

### ---Trump x Paris

#### A new president can reverse the damage from Paris and restore US climate leadership.

Nuccitelli 17 – Dana Nuccitelli, environmental scientist and risk assessor and writes the column Climate consensus, aster's Degree in physics from the University of California at Davis, author of Climatology versus Pseudoscience, 2017 (“On climate and global leadership, it's America Last until 2020,” *The Guardian,* November 13th, Available Online At [https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2017/nov/13/on-climate-and-global-leadership-its-america-last-until-2020)](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2017/nov/13/on-climate-and-global-leadership-its-america-last-until-2020%29//BB)

Five months ago, Trump quickly cemented his legacy as the country’s worst-ever president by inexplicably starting the process to withdraw from the Paris climate accords. With even war-torn Syria now signing the agreement, the leadership of every world country has announced its intent to tackle the existential threat posed by human-caused climate change, except the United States. While this decision may seem puzzling to the rest of the world, the explanation is simple - a study published two years ago found that the Republican Party is the only major political party in the world that rejects the need to tackle climate change, and we know that voters follow elite cues. In 2016, American voters made the terrible mistake of putting that party in charge of the entire federal government, including electing this man president: Donald J. Trump ✔ @realDonaldTrump The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive. However, a year later, Americans are already recognizing this error. Trump’s approval rating is around 38%, and has not touched 40% in over six months. Meanwhile, congressional Democrats enjoy an 8–10% lead over their Republican opponents. Those polling results translated into a landslide Democratic victory in the 2017 elections last week. The clearest result came in Virginia’s gubernatorial election, in which Republican candidate Ed Gillespie ran a Trump-like culture war campaign. He also took the standard Trump administration line on climate change, acknowledging only that humans play some undetermined role while supporting America’s withdrawal from the Paris climate accords and opposing all policies to address the problem. Last week’s election results showed that Trump has strongly mobilized Democrats to vote, even in off-year elections. In Virginia state House of Delegates elections, Democratic candidates similarly beat their Republican opponents by more than 9% in total votes. However, due to gerrymandering and geographical disadvantages (Democrats tend to cluster in cities), unless recounts change the results of close races, Democrats will only hold 49% of the seats in the Virginia House. That structural disadvantage holds across the country. Estimates are that Democrats need to beat Republicans by 7–8% in overall congressional votes in order to win a bare majority of the seats. With a current lead of 8–10% in the generic congressional ballot, they have a chance to take the House in 2018, depending on what happens over the next year. We saw that same structural advantage hand Trump the presidency in 2016. While he lost the popular vote by over 2% (nearly 3 million votes), Trump won the Electoral College, as was the case in 2000 with Bush v. Gore (Gore won the popular vote by a half million votes). America has a bizarrely unbalanced election system in which people who live in sparsely populated areas (predominantly rural Republicans) are disproportionately represented in the government. It will take a landslide election for Democrats to overcome that structural disadvantage, but last week’s results demonstrate that Trump and the Republican Party have become so unpopular, it very well might happen in the 2018 and 2020 elections. That would give Democrats the opportunity to undo Republican gerrymandering after the 2020 census. The Supreme Court is also currently considering a critical gerrymandering case. Regarding the presidency, betting markets currently give Trump approximately a 35–40% chance of winning a second term (which seems overly bullish), and Democrats a 55% chance of retaking the White House in 2020. If that happens, the next president can quickly begin reversing the damage the Trump administration has done to American climate policies and its standing in the world. America’s divide is on display at COP23 At the UN climate talks in Bonn, the ‘We Are Still In’ coalition of US states, cities, tribes, and businesses has been given a US Climate Action Center. Meanwhile, the US government for the first time doesn’t have a pavilion, and the Trump administration perversely plans to promote fossil fuels and nuclear power in a presentation at the meeting. As Senator Brian Schatz (D-HI) noted, If you show up at a climate conference to talk about coal, you’re likely to be ignored. I think the We Are Still In delegation will get more attention than the executive branch. We’ve gone from the indispensable leader to being the only country not engaged in climate change. Many people in Congress are troubled not only from a climate standpoint but a geopolitical standpoint. China is happy to take that leadership from us. Indeed, China is stepping into the global leadership role that the United States has shrunk from under Trump’s “America First” platform. Chinese carbon pollution is approaching a peak 15–20 years ahead of schedule, and its leaders relish the opportunity to take America’s place as a global leader. America Last, for now Americans embrace the notion that their country is the greatest in the world. But what does it say that the United States is the nation that is responsible for the largest fraction of overall carbon pollution and global warming over the past 200 years, and is the only country in the world that refuses to take steps to address the existential threat we created? That lack of responsibility and willingness to protect the well-being of future generation is not the behavior of a great nation. However, that is almost exclusively a Republican Party position, and the party and its president are currently supported by fewer than 40% of Americans. Most of its leaders seem unwilling to reverse the party’s slide toward anti-climate culture wars-based isolationism, but with accelerating climate change and a growing population of non-whites, these are positions that will cost them elections. As we saw last week, the ‘Trump base’ is relatively small, and structural advantages won’t be enough to withstand landslide elections. America’s withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement won’t take effect until the day after the 2020 elections. The next president can quickly reverse that withdrawal, making America the last country to sign on, but resuming its global leadership role. While the Trump administration has exceeded everyone’s fears in its anti-environment, anti-climate actions, the damage is temporary. While the American majority fights to wrest control of its government away from the isolationist climate-denying minority, the rest of the world (literally) is moving forward to tackle this problem.

### 2nr – at: paris not key

#### Paris is the most important mechanism for mitigation---it can limit warming to below 2 degrees

Salawitch 17 (Ross J. Salawitch, Professor, Department of Atmospheric & Oceanic Science and Department of Chemistry and Biochemistry, University of Maryland, with Timothy P. Canty, Austin P. Hope, Walter R. Tribett, Brian F. Bennett, Paris Climate Agreement: Beacon of Hope, pp. 87-93)

[ΔT was changed to “temperature change”]

One clear message that emerges from Figs. 2.15 and 2.16 is that to achieve the goal of the Paris Climate Agreement, emissions of GHGs must fall significantly below those used to drive RCP 8.5. The range of ΔT2100 shown in Fig. 2.16b is 1.6–4.7 °C. Climate catastrophe (rapid rise of sea level, large shifts in patterns of drought and flooding, loss of habitat, etc.) will almost certainly occur by end of this century if the emissions of GHGs, particularly CO2, follow those used to drive RCP 8.5.32 The book Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet (Lynas 2008) provides an accessible discourse of the consequences of global warming, organized into 1 °C increments of future ΔT. In the rest of this chapter, policy relevant projections of ΔT are shown, both from the EM-GC framework and CMIP5 GCMs. Figures 2.17 shows the statistical distribution of ΔT2060 from our EM-GC calculations. The EM-GC based projections are weighted by 1/χ2 (i.e., the better the fit to the climate record, the more heavily a particular projection is weighted). The height of each histogram represents the probability that a particular range of ΔT2060, defined by the width of each line segment, will occur. In other words, the most probable value of ΔT in year 2060, for the EM-GC projection that uses RCP 4.5, is 1.2–1.3 °C above pre-industrial, and there is slightly less than 20 % probability ΔT will actually fall within this range. In contrast, the CMIP5 GCMs project ΔT in 2060 will most probably be 2.0–2.2 °C warmer than pre-industrial, with a ~12 % probability ΔT will actually fall within this range. A finer spacing for ΔT is used for the EM-GC projection, since we are able to conduct many simulations in this model framework. Figure 2.18 is similar to Fig. 2.17, except the projection is for year 2100. The collection of histograms shown for any particular model (i.e., either CMIP5 GCMs or EM-GC) on a specific figure is termed the probability distribution function (PDF) for the projection of the rise in GMST (i.e., ΔT). The PDFs shown in Figs. 2.17 and 2.18 reveal stark differences in projections of ΔT based on the EM-GC framework and the CMIP5 GCMs. In all cases, ΔT [temperature change] from the GCMs far exceed projections using our relatively simple approach that is tightly coupled to observed ΔT, OHC, and various natural factors that influence climate. These differences are quantified in Table 2.1, which summarizes the cumulative probability that a specific Paris goal can be achieved. The cumulative probabilities shown in Table 2.1 are based on summing the height of each histogram that lies to the left of a specific temperature, in Figs. 2.17 and 2.18. Time series of ΔT found using the CMIP5 GCM and EM-GC approaches are illustrated in Figs. 2.19 and 2.20, which show projections based on RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5. The colors represent the probability of a particular future value of ΔT being achieved, for projections computed in the EM-GC framework weighted by 1/ χ2 . Essentially, the red (warm), white (mid-point), and blue (cool) colors represent the visualization of a succession of histograms like those shown in Figs. 2.17 and 2.18. The GCM CMIP5 projections of ΔT (minimum, maximum, and multi-model mean) for RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 are shown by the three grey lines. These lines, identical to those shown in Fig. 2.3a (RCP 4.5) and Fig. 2.3b (RCP 8.5), are based on our analysis of GCM output preserved on the CMIP5 archive. The green trapezoid, which originates from Fig. 11.25b of IPCC (2013), makes a final and rather important appearance on these figures. Also, the Paris target (1.5 °C) and upper limit (2 °C) are marked on the right vertical axis of both figures. There are resounding policy implications inherent in Figs. 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, and 2.20. First, most importantly, and beyond debate of any reasonable quantitative analysis of climate, if GHG emissions follow anything close to RCP 8.5, there is no chance of achieving either the goal or upper limit of the Paris climate agreement (Fig. 2.20). Even though there is a small amount of overlap between the Paris targets and our EM-GC projections for year 2100 in Fig. 2.20, this is a false hope. In the highly unlikely event this realization were to actually happen, it would just be a matter of time before ΔT [temperature change] broke through the 2 °C barrier, with all of the attendant negative consequences (Lynas 2008). Plus, of course, 1.5–2.0 °C warming (i.e., the lead up to breaking the 2 °C barrier) could have rather severe consequences. This outcome is all but guaranteed if GHG abundances follow that of RCP 8.5. The second policy implication is that projections of ΔT found using the EM-GC framework indicate that, if emissions of GHGs can be limited to those of RCP 4.5, then by end-century there is: (a) a 75 % probability the Paris target of 1.5 °C warming above pre-industrial will be achieved (b) a greater than 95 % probability the Paris upper limit of 2 °C warming will be achieved As will be shown in Chap. 3, the cumulative effect of the commitments from nations to restrict future emissions of GHGs, upon which the Paris Climate Agreement is based, have the world on course to achieve GHG emissions that fall just below those of RCP 4.5, provided: (1) both conditional and unconditional commitments are followed; (2) reductions in GHG emissions needed to achieve the Paris agreement, which generally terminate in 2030, are continually improved out to at least 2060. The policy implication articulated above differs considerably from the consensus in the climate modeling community that emission of GHGs must follow RCP 2.6 to achieve even the 2 °C upper limit of Paris (Rogelj et al. 2016). We caution those quick to dismiss the simplicity of our approach to consider the emerging view, discussed in Chap. 11 of IPCC (2013) and quantified in their Figs. 11.25 and TS.14, as well as our Figs. 2.3 and 2.13, that the CMIP5 GCMs warm much quicker than has been observed during the past three decades. In support of our approach, we emphasize that our projections of ΔT [temperature change] are bounded nearly exactly by the green trapezoid of IPCC (2013), which reflects the judgement of at least one group of experts as to how ΔT [temperature change] will evolve over the next two decades. Given our present understanding of Earth’s climate system, we contend the Paris Climate Agreement is a beacon of hope because it places the world on a course of having a reasonable probability of avoiding climate catastrophe.

#### Paris can keep it below 2 degrees

Schellnhuber 16 (Schellnhuber et al., German theoretical physicist and founding director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and chair of the German Advisory Council on Global Change, ‘16 Hans Joachim, Stefan Rahmstorf, and Ricarda Winkelmann, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, “Why the right climate target was agreed in Paris,” Nature Climate Change 6, 649–653)

**Several analysts** have recently **claimed that the 2 °C line is already untenable**16, 17, **but they** failed to underpin their 'impossibility hypothesis' **with concrete calculations**, **so the prime reference point remains the monumental 2014 assessment** provided by Working Group III of the IPCC2. **This assessment concludes that the 2 °C guardrail can be respected at moderate cost under certain** (not entirely unreasonable) **assumptions**, including the realization of 'negative-emissions' schemes. However, **the enormous challenges** associated with massive atmospheric CO2 removal or negative emissions **have been highlighted** by several experts18. **A recent study**19 **nevertheless maintains that anthropogenic global warming could be** confined to 1.5 °C**,** an environmental excursion that would probably allow for the survival of most of the low-lying island states. **The Paris Agreement**1 formally **invites the IPCC to explore** — by 2018, in a Special Report — global **emissions pathways consistent with the** lower end of the temperature target range. The 2014 IPCC analysis has to be applauded for shattering the sweeping infeasibility myth. However, the authors of this Commentary are not convinced that decarbonization will necessarily come in the form of such a planned, smooth, centennial-scale transition. We think that **a better chance to deliver on the Paris promises can be generated by an alternative and more plausible route:** **in order to** avoid the need to recourse to negative emissions as a late-regrets magic bullet (with questionable outcome), **renewable energies and efficiency technologies could be scaled up exponentially**, more rapidly than envisaged in the integrated assessment models behind the IPCC scenarios. We expect that **such a** 'technical explosion' **will be matched by an** 'induced implosion' **of the incumbent industrial metabolism nourished by coal, oil and gas.** Among the driving processes, investment dynamics is crucial, and this dynamic might in fact transgress its own tipping point in response to the narrative transpiring from Paris. This has often been described as the bursting of the 'carbon bubble'20. **Yet what could be** concrete triggers **of such a disruptive change** in asset fluxes? **We can think of at least three causative pathways**, which all have to do with expectation and fear. First, there is the classical hypothesis that **a strong climate agreement paves the way towards** carbon-pricing instruments **that will be adopted by more and more nation states** in the medium term. **As a consequence, investors anticipating the so-induced rise in fossil business** costs should make the rational choice to opt out of that business. Second, **there is a growing risk/chance that morals are going to interfere significantly with economics.** The so-called divestment campaign has become a global social movement that demands leaving most of the fossil fuel resources in the ground21, 22. In public, many business leaders and government officials still try to ridicule or dismiss this sentiment surge within civil society. Yet in private conversations they admit their worries that particularly institutional investors (such as pension funds or big foundations) might be 'infected' by the divestment virus. Third, **there is Schumpeter's 'creative destruction' that might instigate a systemic innovation** **of the existing economic structures**. Let us briefly elaborate on this: when studying industrial history for a better understanding of transformational processes, one encounters certain evidence for a semi-quantitative rule, known as Pareto Principle23, which states **that in heterogeneous community production systems**, **roughly 80% of the total output is typically generated by roughly 20% of the individual units involved**. The Italian economist Vilfredo **Pareto originally formulated this empirical rule in his studies about the distribution of population and wealth and provided a number of supporting observations**. The '80–20 law' was later found to work in numerous other contexts, including prominent examples from manufacturing, quality control, computing science and hazard protection24, 25. With respect to the Paris Agreement, **the Pareto Principle could come into play** in two different ways26: **following the 'law of the vital few',** **it can be argued that the** decarbonization of the worldwill be led by a critical minority of key agents **that advance transformative action**. In fact, **the** i**ntended** n**ationally** d**etermined** c**ontribution**s **submitted by crucial countries in the run-up to COP21** are not sufficient **in terms of medium-term emissions reductions,** yet may initialize an accelerating diversion of development pathways away from fossil trajectories.China has recently announced the closure of a thousand coal mines as its coal use is falling and expected to continue its decline, and India appears very serious about implementing its colossal renewables target announced before Paris**. These are** self-amplifying developments **that have the potential to tip the global market scales. Based on** certain **observations from industrial history** and investment behavior (see, for example, ref. 27) **we submit here also a different Pareto-type hypothesis:** **if a traditional and a novel business paradigm compete with each other,** **the old one tends to** implode **once the new one reaches a market penetration of about 15–20 percent** (according to appropriate metrics). On the one hand, it can be argued that investors will perceive an alternative systems option as too marginal as long as its business share is clearly below 10%. For instance**, in the 1990s solar electricity was expected to never rise to significance**. On the other hand**, asset managers are looking for** emerging opportunities**, where they are** ahead of the pack **and can expect above-average returns.** **Once the alternative systems option exceeds around a quarter of the overall pertinent business volume, it cannot be considered a smart minority choice any more**. **These two arguments combine to delineate a** “basin of venture capital attraction” **centred in the 15–20% domain. The share of new renewables is rapidly increasing**28, especially in the electricity sector, **and might quickly pass through** this critical domain**,** **as several examples on the national level teach us**. A prime country example is provided by Denmark, which increased its wind share in total power demand to a new record in 2015, moving from 17% to 42% within just one decade29. By contrast, **the renewables contribution to the overall global energy consumption only rose from 17% in 2004 to 19% in 2013**28. This does not indicate, however, that the dynamics got stuck in the 15–20% range; **those numbers only mask several dramatic developments:** first, the pertinent lion's share still refers to the 'old' renewables such as traditional biomass and conventional hydroelectricity, which are either resource-restricted or highly capital/planning-intensive. Those problems are much less serious for the 'new' renewables such as solar photovoltaics (solar PV), which has virtually no supply limits and is perfectly scalable. Second, entire energy market sectors **such as transportation are poised for transformational change towards electrification**, **not least by imminent advances in storage technologies and operations.** Therefore, we expect the new renewables to take the lead and to push the total renewables share quickly beyond the 20% line. **A recent study**30 **confirms that the deployment of solar and wind power capacities worldwide has** increased exponentially **while the costs of solar and wind power generation have fallen in a similarly non-linear fashion** (Fig. 3). **In retrospective, these developments may be considered as** transgression of regional and global tipping points.

### 2nr – at: us not key

#### Other countries are acting on climate now but failure to reduce U.S. emissions derails global targets that solve dangerous levels of warming

Rahmstorf 17 – Professor of Ocean Physics at Potsdam University, Head of Earth System Analysis at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Stefan, “The world needs the US in fight against climate change,” *The Hill*, <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/336066-the-world-needs-the-us-in-fight-against-climate-change>)

The incontrovertible physics of the greenhouse effect means that global temperatures are rising. They have risen exactly as was predicted in the 1970s, by 1 degree Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures until now. Incontrovertible physics also means that warming causes sea-levels to rise. They are rising faster now than they have for several millennia, and the rise has accelerated threefold during the 20th century. Global warming also brings us more extreme weather events, like crippling heat waves and droughts already affecting millions of people.¶ The world must work together to stop global warming. It is a threat to all of us, to our children and to our children’s children. It cannot be reversed, only stopped in time.¶ The Paris accord is not perfect, but it is the best we could hope for. The deal’s main fault is that, due to decades of dithering, it came so late. It aspires to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, but that is practically unachievable by now. Some critical tipping points may have already been triggered.¶ The West Antarctic Ice Sheet looks doomed, a fatal instability that will lead to its irreversible decay and raise global sea levels by three meters. Coral reefs are already dying on a massive scale due to heat stress. Even holding global temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius, which should help to prevent even worse tipping points from happening, will require global emissions to fall to zero by 2040 or 2050 at the latest.¶ That is why fighting climate change is a race against the clock now. That is why with any delay, even by a few years, the last chance to halt global warming within manageable bounds is slipping through our fingers.¶ President Trump appears unaware of basic scientific knowledge, preferring to believe a false propaganda narrative from a group of fossil-fuel fans among his advisers. He even reportedly fell for a well-known fake Time magazine cover — supposedly from the 1970s but in reality a modern Photoshop job — warning of an Ice Age. It’s a favorite myth promoted by climate deniers that most climate scientists predicted an Ice Age in the 1970s.¶ And Trump has clearly fallen for the false “Climategate” narrative, referring to “those horrible emails that were sent between the scientists” in a New York Times interview. This kind of doubt over climate science is a “product with an industry behind it.” Someone with a lot of money is trying to fool you with this — and, by the way, with bizarre economic studies that paint a grim picture of the economic consequences of the Paris accord. The organizations that make up the U.S. climate change counter-movement have an annual income of over $900 million.¶ In the scientific community, there has long been an overwhelming consensus about the basic facts of human-caused global warming. Apart from the studies that demonstrate this, I can vouch for this fact from my personal experience of working in climate science for the past thirty years.¶ The United States is currently the second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases after China; in terms of the accumulated historical emissions it is the largest. And, of course, U.S. emissions per person are about twice as large as those of China or of Europe. That means that the U.S. has a large responsibility for the worldwide consequences of these emissions that it cannot just walk away from.¶ Leaving the Paris Agreement and withdrawing from its emissions reduction commitment is a reckless and irresponsible act. The Trump administration will not be able to derail the global effort to halt global warming, since almost every country on the planet by now understands — at least partly — how serious the threat of further global warming is.¶ But the U.S. can delay progress enough to push the Paris goals out of reach. If the U.S. does not reduce its emissions in the coming years along with the rest of the world, we will altogether fail in keeping global warming below a highly dangerous level.

### 2nr – at: warming D

#### Climate change leads to extinction

Klein 17 - former Miliband Fellow, lectured at the London School of Economics on the anti-globalization movement, social activist, and filmmaker known for her political analyses and criticism of corporate globalization and of capitalism (Naomi, “No is not enough: Resisting Trump’s shock politics and winning the world we need,” pg. 68-70)//BB

The stakes in the 2016 election were enormously high for a great many reasons, from the millions who stood to lose their health insurance to those targeted by racist attacks as Trump fanned the flames of rising white nationalism; from the families that stood to be torn apart by cruel immigration policies to the prospect of women losing the right to decide whether or not to become mothers, to the reality of sexual assault being normalized and trivialized at the highest reaches of power. With so many lives on the line, there is nothing to be gained by ranking issues by urgency and playing “my crisis is bigger than your crisis.” If it’s happening to you, if it’s your family being torn apart or you who is being singled out for police harassment, or your grandmother who cannot afford a life-saving treatment, or your drinking water that’s laced with lead—it’s all a five-alarm fire. Climate change isn’t more important than any of these other issues, but it does have a different relationship to time. When the politics of climate change go wrong—and they are very, very wrong right now—we don’t get to try again in four years. Because in four years the earth will have been radically changed by all the gases emitted in the interim, and our chances of averting an irreversible catastrophe will have shrunk. This may sound alarmist, but I have interviewed the leading scientists in the world on this question, and their research shows that it’s simply a neutral description of reality. The window during which there is time to lower emissions sufficiently to avoid truly catastrophic warming is closing rapidly. Lots of social movements have adopted Samuel Beckett’s famous line “Try again. Fail again. Fail better” as a lighthearted motto. I’ve always liked the attitude; we can’t be perfect, we won’t always win, but we should strive to improve. The trouble is, Beckett’s dictum doesn’t work for climate—not at this stage in the game. If we keep failing to lower emissions, if we keep failing to kick-start the transition in earnest away from fossil fuels and to an economy based on renewables, if we keep dodging the question of wasteful consumption and the quest for more and more and bigger and bigger, there won’t be more opportunities to fail better. Nearly everything is moving faster than the climate change modeling projected, including Arctic sea-ice loss, ice-sheet collapse, ocean warming, sea-level rise, and coral bleaching. The next time voters in countries around the world go to the polls, more sea ice will have melted, more coastal land will have been lost, more species will have disappeared for good. The chance for us to keep temperatures below what it would take for island nations such as, say, Tuvalu or the Maldives to be saved from drowning becomes that much slimmer. These are irreversible changes—we don’t get a do-over on a drowned country. The latest peer-reviewed science tells us that if we want a good shot at protecting coastal cities in my son’s lifetime—including metropolises like New York City and Mumbai—then we need to get off fossil fuels with superhuman speed. A paper from Oxford University that came out during the campaign, published in the Applied Energy journal, concluded that for humanity to have a fifty-fifty chance of meeting the temperature targets set in the climate accord negotiated in Paris at the end of 2015, every new power plant would have to be zero-carbon starting in 2018. That’s the second year of the Trump presidency. For most of us—including me—this is very hard information to wrap our heads around, because we are used to narratives that reassure us about the inevitability of eventual progress. Martin Luther King Jr. said, “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” It’s a powerful idea that sadly doesn’t work for the climate crisis. The wealthy governments of the world have procrastinated for so long, and made the problem so much worse in the meantime, that the arc has to bend very, very fast now—or the shot at justice is gone for good. We are almost at midnight on the climate clock. Not Just Another Election Cycle—Epic Bad Timing During the Democratic primaries, I was really struck by the moment when a young woman confronted Hillary Clinton on the campaign trail and asked her if—given the scale of the global warming crisis—she would pledge not to take any more money from the fossil fuel interests that are supercharging it. Up to that point, Clinton’s campaign had received large sums of money from employees and registered lobbyists of fossil fuel companies—about $1.7 million, according to Greenpeace’s research. Clinton looked disgusted and snapped at the young woman, saying she was “so sick” of this issue coming up. A few days later, in an interview, Clinton said young people should “do their own research.” The woman who had asked the question, Eva Resnick-Day, worked as a campaigner for Greenpeace. She had done her research, she insisted, “and that is why we are so terrified for the future…. What happens in the next four or eight years could determine the future of our planet and the human species.” For me, her words cut to the heart of why this was not just another election cycle. Why it was not only legitimate but necessary to question Hillary’s web of corporate entanglements. Resnick-Day’s comments also highlight one of the big reasons why Trump’s presidency is harrowing: the most powerful man in the world is a person who says global warming is a hoax invented by the Chinese, and who is feverishly trashing the (already inadequate) restraints on fossil fuels that his country had put in place, encouraging other governments to do the same. And it’s all happening at the worst possible time in human history. We have so far warmed the planet by just one degree Celsius, and from that, we are already seeing dramatic results: the mass coral die-off, balmy Arctic weather leading to severe ice loss, the breaking apart of Antarctic ice sheets. If we continue on our current pollution trajectory, we are set to warm the planet by four to six degrees Celsius. The climate scientist and emissions expert Kevin Anderson says that four degrees of warming is “incompatible with any reasonable characterization of an organized, equitable and civilized global community.” That is why governments came together in Paris and drew up an agreement to make their best efforts to get off this dangerous course, and try to limit warming to “well below” 2 degrees, pursuing efforts to keep it below 1.5 degrees. The high end of that temperature target represents double the warming we have already experienced, so it’s by no means safe.

#### Scientific consensus you’re wrong.

Schultz 16 – retired Professor and Chair of Computer Information Systems at Woodbury University (Robert, “Modern Technology and Human Extinction,” <http://proceedings.informingscience.org/InSITE2016/InSITE16p131-145Schultz2307.pdf>)

There is consensus that there is a relatively short window to reduce carbon emissions before drastic effects occur. Recent credible projections of the result of lack of rapid drastic action is an average temperature increase of about 10o F by 2050. This change alone will be incredibly disruptive to all life, but will also cause great weather and climate change. For comparison purposes, a 10 degree (Fahrenheit) decrease was enough to cause an ice layer 4000 feet thick over Wisconsin (Co2gether, 2012). Recently relevant information has surfaced about a massive previous extinction. This is the Permian extinction, which happened 252 million years ago, during which 95% of all species on earth, both terrestrial and aquatic, vanished. The ocean temperature after almost all life had disappeared was 15 degrees (Fahrenheit) above current ocean temperatures. Recent information about the Permian extinction indicates it was caused by a rapid increase in land and ocean temperatures, caused by the sudden appearance of stupendous amounts of carbon in the form of greenhouse gases (Kolbert, 2014, pp. 102-144). The origin of the carbon in these enormous quantities is not yet known, but one possibility is the sudden release of methane gases stored in permafrost. This is also a possibility in our current situation. If so, extinction would be a natural side effect of human processes. There is also a real but smaller possibility of what is called “runaway greenhouse,” in which the earth’s temperature becomes like Venus’ surface temperature of 800o The threat of extinction here is not entirely sudden. The threat is, if anything, worse. Changes in the atmosphere--mainly increases in the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere-- can start processes that can’t be reversed but which take long periods of time to manifest. “Runaway greenhouse” may be the worst. Once again, suggestions of technological solutions to this situation should be treated with some skepticism. These proposals are often made by technophiles ignoring all the evidence that technology is very much subject to unanticipated side effects and unanticipated failures. What has happened concerning the depletion of the ozone layer should be a clear warning against the facile uses of technology through geoengineering to alter the makeup of the entire planet and its atmosphere. The complicating factor in assessing extinction likelihood from climate change is corporations, especially American fossil fuel corporations such as Exxon-Mobil and Shell. Through their contributions, they have been able to delay legislation ameliorating global warming and climate change. As mentioned before, recently released papers from Exxon-Mobil show that the corporation did accept the scientific findings about global warming and climate change. But they concluded that maintaining their profits was more important than acting to ameliorate climate change. Since it is not a matter of getting corporations to appreciate scientific facts, the chances of extinction from climate change are good. To ameliorate climate change, it is important to leave a high percentage of fossil fuel reserves in the ground. But this is exactly what a profit-seeking fossil fuel corporation cannot do. One can still hope that because fossil fuel corporations are made up of individuals, increasingly bad consequences of global warming and climate change will change their minds about profits. But because of the lag in effects, this mind change will probably be too late. So I conclude we will probably see something like the effects of the Permian extinction perhaps some time around 2050. (The Permian extinction was 95% extinction of all species.) This assumes the release of methane from the arctic will take place around then.

### 2nr – at: warming inevitable

#### Even if some warming is inevitable, stopping tail-end risk prevents extinction

Roberts 8-7-2018 (David, “This graphic explains why 2 degrees of global warming will be way worse than 1.5,” *Vox*, <https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/energy-and-environment/2018/1/19/16908402/global-warming-2-degrees-climate-change?__twitter_impression=true>)

By delaying the necessary work of decarbonization, we are consigning millions of people in tropical regions to less food and in the Mediterranean to less water — with all the attendant health problems and conflict. We’re allowing more heat waves and higher seas. We’re giving up on the world’s coral reefs, and with them the hundreds of species that rely on them. And even then, the decision will still face us: 2 degrees or 3? Again, it will mean more heat waves, more crop losses, more water shortages, more inundated coastal cities, more disease and conflict, millions more suffering. And even then, the decision: 3 degrees or 4? The longer we wait, the more human suffering and irreversible damage to ecosystems we inscribe into our collective future. But there’s no hiding, no escaping the imperative to decarbonize. It must be done if our species is to have a long-term home on Earth.

### 2nr – at: adaptation

#### We won’t adapt successfully---and it can’t solve any of the systemic risks like oceanic decline, biodiversity loss and oxygen deficiency

McPherson 16 - professor emeritus of natural resources and the environment at the University of Arizona

(Guy, “Climate-Change Summary and Update,” <http://guymcpherson.com/climate-chaos/climate-change-summary-and-update/>)

If you think we’ll adapt, think again, even if you’re the Wall Street Journal claiming on 2 September 2014 that it’s too late for mitigation. **The rate of evolution trails the rate of climate change by a factor of** 10,000, according to a paper in the August 2013 issue of Ecology Lettersfocused on vertebrates. An example comes from the 20 January 2016 online issue of Global Ecology and Biogeography comes research focused on California, which has an extensive collection of herbarium records. **The researchers used 681,609 georeferenced herbarium records to estimate mean shifts in elevational and climatic space of 4426 plant taxa, and found that non-native, invasive species were more likely to be expanding their ranges than native species**. Furthermore, **plants and animals did not move together in synchronized fashion, and thus leading to the suspicion that ecological communities are** breaking down **and** disassembling. Tack on the following title from a 6 June 2015 paper in PLos Biology and it’s easy to understand the importance of habitat for human animals: “Suitable Days for Plant Growth Disappear under Projected Climate Change: Potential Human and Biotic Vulnerability.” **Even once-rich habitats in Antarctica are becoming** biologically impoverished **as icebergs, increasingly breaking free from the surrounding sea ice, scour the shallow-water rocks and boulders on which a diversity of creatures cling to life** (according to research published in the 16 June 2014 issue of Current Biology). A paper in the 22 February 2016 issue of the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences reports that, consistent with research on vertebrates, butterflies cannot keep up with rapid changes in habitat. The bottom line of the abstract: “**These results highlight a potentially common situation in changing environments:** evolutionary changes are not strong enough to fully compensate for the direct adverse effects of environmental change **and thereby rescue populations from extinction**.” \*\* A study published in the 22 June 2016 issue of Earth and Planetary Science Letters reports that parts of the ocean became inhospitable for some organisms as **the Earth’s climate warmed 94 million years ago. As the Earth warmed, several natural elements** — what we think of as **vitamins** — **depleted, causing some organisms to die off or greatly decrease in numbers**. **The decrease of these trace metals also suggests a global expansion of** oxygen deficiency, **which could lead to larger dead zones in bodies of water around the world, meaning little to no life could exist in those areas**.

#### Adaptation is insufficient – warming exponentially aggregates

Harvey 19 – environmental journalist @ The Guardian (Fiona, “Adaptation isn’t enough. We’ve got to throw everything at the climate crisis,” *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/11/adaptaion-climate-disaster-cutting-emissions>)//BB

When we’re faced with threats of inundation, our reaction has traditionally been to build walls. Sea-level rises, storms and floods have been held back with solid barriers, seawalls and dykes. We have used walls to keep out people, too: the fact that this has failed throughout the ages has not stopped its recent revival in the United States. The climate crisis threatens global sea-level rises of well over half a metre if we fail to act, while tidal storm surges will reach many times that height. Fiercer and more frequent hurricanes will batter us, and millions of people who live in areas where crops have failed and wells run dry will be forced to flee their homes. But walls will not work with the climate crisis, even if the temptation to try to keep out the consequences, rather than dealing with the causes, is as strong as ever. The prospect of a “climate apartheid”, in which the rich insulate themselves from the impacts of the climate emergency while the poor and vulnerable are abandoned to their fate, is now real. According to the UN, climate-related disasters are already taking place at the rate of one a week, though only a few of them – such as Hurricane Dorian – get reported. Nowhere on Earth will be untouched, with the number of people facing water shortages set to leap from 3.6 billion today to 5 billion by 2050. At least 100 million people will be plunged into poverty in the next decade, and in the decades following that, rising sea levels will swamp coastal cities from Miami to Shanghai, wiping $1tn a year from the global economy. Agriculture will become increasingly difficult, with more people displaced as a result, searching for liveable conditions elsewhere. The Global Commission on Adaptation, headed by Bill Gates and Ban Ki-moon, warned this week that we have failed to plan adequately for a crisis that is now upon us. At a series of high-level meetings beginning in the next few weeks, and continuing into next year, world leaders and representatives of civil society and businesses will try to devise a better response. Among the questions they face will be how to set new targets, secure new funding and take more effective action to help the world not just prevent further warming, but to adapt to the impacts already being felt. Currently, 20 times more is being spent on reducing emissions than building resilience to the effects of rising temperatures and extreme weather, according to the Commission on Adaptation. That seems patently unbalanced, and neglecting adaptation is putting millions of people and their livelihoods in danger now, as well as storing up problems for the future. What’s more, money invested today will pay dividends in the near future. Spending less than $2tn by 2030 would result in more than $7tn saved in damage avoided and better economic growth. These sums sound huge, but are a fraction of the amount the world will spend on infrastructure in the next decade. And modern adaptation means more than building seawalls. Restoring natural features, such as mangrove swamps and wetlands, can do far more to protect coastal regions, as well as nurturing biodiversity and tourism. New technology will play a key role, as early warnings of extreme weather give people time to take shelter or protect their property. Engineering climate-ready infrastructure encompasses everything from porous pavements to urban trees to provide shade. What’s clear is that we need to adapt and build resilience now, because climate change is no longer a comfortably faraway problem. The predicted ravages have come sooner than expected: heatwaves over much of the northern hemisphere last year, floods and extreme weather in south-east Asia, Arctic ice melting at unprecedented levels this summer, and Hurricane Dorian, one of the strongest ever recorded. Worse still, some of these effects are likely themselves to increase temperatures further, in a series of feedback loops. The fires in the Amazon are destroying a vital “carbon sink”. Shrinking ice reveals darker water that absorbs more heat than highly reflective snow. Melting permafrost releases methane, a greenhouse gas many times more powerful than carbon dioxide. It is tempting, in the face of these events, to suggest that the game is up for trying to prevent climate change. The emissions reductions needed to stop it are so vast, and the changes to our way of life so total, that it may seem like all we can do is adapt to the consequences. The hastening prospect of a “climate apartheid” is morally revolting as well as politically alarming, and could lead to a kind of paralysis. The view that adapting to inevitable climate change should be our priority, over futile and ruinously expensive attempts to cut emissions, has been spread by those who want to continue to emit CO2, come what may. Fossil fuel companies saw adaptation, along with the idea that we could geo-engineer our way out of trouble, as a way to keep selling oil while paying lip service to the climate science. Now it is gaining traction among more respectable thinkers. Jonathan Franzen, the American novelist and nature lover, whipped up a storm when he suggested in the New Yorker that: “In the long run, it probably makes no difference how badly we overshoot 2C … Every billion dollars spent on high-speed trains … is a billion not banked for disaster preparedness, reparations to inundated countries, or future humanitarian relief.” It’s true that spending on adaptation is a good deal. It saves lives, and if used wisely could stave off the climate apartheid that experts foresee. But setting up adaptation versus emissions-cutting as an either-or choice is a grave mistake. Trying to adapt to the consequences of climate change while continuing to burn fossil fuels is like trying to mop up an overflowing sink while the taps are still running. As long as we continue to pump CO2 into the air, we are fuelling rises in temperature. We cannot outrun global heating any more than we can hold back the rising sea with dykes. And the fires blazing through the Amazon show that without action, things could easily get much worse.