# Israel Aff

## Notes for C.D.

Hi! Not too in the mood to edit this around but I’m sorry for profanity, I get hangry when I cut cards – if in this doc it says smth like “this card is [bad]” it was probably aadit 😊

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## 1AC – Israel V1

### 1AC – Advantage

#### The Advantage is Israel – Palestine war

#### Israel is developing and deploying LAWs now.

TRT World 21 2-26-2021 "Israel's autonomous 'robo-snipers' and suicide drones raise ethical dilemma" <https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/israel-s-autonomous-robo-snipers-and-suicide-drones-raise-ethical-dilemma-44557> (TRT World is a Turkish state-owned news channel which broadcasts in English 24 hours a day. The channel is operated by the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation and is based in Istanbul. It provides worldwide news and current affairs focusing on Turkey, Europe, Western and Southern Asia.)//Elmer

With its considerable line-up of ‘robo-snipers’, ‘suicide drones’ and ‘robattle’ battlefield robots, Israel’s defence industry is pushing the envelop of autonomous machines with only token human involvement. In recent years, the use of autonomous weapons has seen a dramatic increase on modern battlefields - and the proliferation has increased international concern over the ethics governing their use. Israel has established itself **as a pioneer** of autonomous weapons, specifically with the Harop ‘Suicide Drone’, Robattle wheeled battlefield robot, and Sentry-Tech automated border control machine gun. The increasing demand for automated weapons comes amid a global revolution in military affairs (RMA), as nations seek to exploit the advantages of offensive firepower manned by tireless machines without the loss of human life. Suicide drones, or ‘loitering munitiions as they are technically known, are a hybrid between drones and guided missiles. They are defined by being able to ‘loiter’ in the air for a long period of time, before striking a target entering a pre-defined zone or waiting for human guidance. Euphemistically described as a ‘fire-and-forget’ weapon, the Israeli Aerospace Industries’ Harop autonomously attacks any target meeting previously identified criteria, but includes a ‘man-in-the-loop’ feature that allows a human to technically prevent an attack from taking place. Given the cutting-edge nature of autonomous weapon platforms, there is little in the way of international law regulating their production or sale. Demand for autonomous ‘suicide drones’ is at an all-time high after the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict of 2020, which established a benchmark for the effective use of kamikaze drones against conventional military forces. Throughout the conflict, Azerbaijan made prodigious use of Israeli ‘loitering munitions’ and manned Turkish drones. With demand, comes opportunity. On February 11, more than Israelis including several former defence officials came under investigation for illegaIly designing, producing and selling ‘suicide drones’ to an unnamed Asian nation. “The Israelis are suspected of national security offenses, breaching arms exports laws, money laundering and other financial offenses,” the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported. But for Israeli authorities, the crime wasn’t due to a lack of regulation. Instead, it was for making personal profit from s technology owned by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). In the same week, Israel made three official sales to anonymous Asian nations. Is the concern real? Researchers from the Institute for Strategic, Political, Economic and Security Consultancy argue that development on automation is moving so fast its outpacing the laws that could even hope to regulate it. To this end, they describe a slippery slope where the role of human beings in decision loops **is quickly fading away**, with the lack of a clearly defined line over what is acceptable and what is immoral. Take the Israeli Border Control Sentry-Tech turret currently deployed along Gaza’s border. They were designed to prevent Palestinians from leaving the Gaza strip and entering Israeli territory. Automated ‘Robo-Snipers’ set up along the Gaza border, **designed to create “automated kill-zones”** at least 1.5 km deep. But they aren’t merely robotic guns. The turrets feature heavy duty 7.62 calibre machine guns tied into a network **spanning the entire border. If any turret detects human movement, the entire chain of guns can train their sights** and concentrate firepower on the interloper. Some turrets are also able to fire explosive rockets. With such overlapping fields of fire, even heavily armored vehicles would be quickly eliminated. The effect on a human body would be overwhelming, disproportionately violent, and would leave little in the way of human remains. To increase its effectiveness, its automation consumes information provided by a larger network of drones and ground sensors spanning a 60 kilometer border. Rafael, Sentry-Tech’s manufacturer emphasises that a human operator in a hardened bunker still has to make the ultimate decision. Barbara Opall-Rome, former Defence News bureau chief, reports that the turret was designed as **an automated closed-loop system**, without the need for human input, speaking to Wired Magazine. She notes, “until the top brass is completely satisfied with the fidelity of their overlapping sensor network – and until the 19- and 20-year-old soldiers deployed behind computer screens are thoroughly trained in operating the system — approval by a commanding officer will be required before pushing the kill button.” The chilling testimony suggests a move towards a slow decrease in oversight over lethal autonomous weapons, made possible by a lack of state-enforced regulation, and international norms that have yet to adapt to the risks and possibilities of modern technology.

#### Gaza ceasefire now means war is limited but Israeli military restraint is necessary.

Byman 19 Daniel L. Byman 5-10-2019 "Why Gaza hasn’t erupted into all-out war" <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/05/10/why-gaza-hasnt-erupted-into-all-out-war/> (Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy)//Elmer

A **ceasefire** on Monday **ended** one of the worst rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas since 2014. Four Israelis and more than 20 Palestinians died in two days of conflict, which followed a violent demonstration along the border fence that separates Israel and the Gaza Strip and the shooting of two Israeli soldiers. Palestinian militant groups fired almost 700 missiles into Israel, most of which landed harmlessly—but several struck homes or other targets in Israel. Israel bombed hundreds of targets in Gaza, striking Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad facilities and killing a military commander it claimed had links to Iran, resuming a practice of targeted killings it had put on pause. As always, responsibility for civilian dead is hotly disputed, but the Palestinians count two pregnant women and two infants among the dead. The latest round of fighting between Israel and Hamas illustrates not only the constant potential for conflict in Gaza but also—perhaps more counterintuitively—why the combustible situation there has not exploded into outright war. Some Israeli citizens this week called on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to escalate the fight, and some militants welcome a broader clash. But both sides have reasons for restraint. Hamas leaders recognize their own military, political and diplomatic weakness; a longer war would achieve little and leave Gaza in even worse shape. And Israel, for its part, recognizes that a weak extremist regime in Gaza is better than the collapse of order in the strip or the rise of an even more radical group there. As Israeli security analyst Gabi Siboni pointed out, “If Israel collapses the Hamas regime, what comes after? Every alternative is awful.” So Israel uses enough force to keep Hamas weak and to send a message that shootings and rocket attacks will be severely punished. But **it restrains itself to avoid a full conflagration.** On both sides, however, **domestic politics and misconceptions could spur decisions that could cause the violence to spiral out of control**. The latest fighting was intense but should come as no surprise. Israel and Hamas clashed in 2008-2009, 2012 and 2014, resulting in the deaths of almost 100 Israeli soldiers and civilians and that of more than 3,000 Palestinians. Between 2014 and 2018, Israel regularly bombed Gaza to stop rocket attacks and punish Hamas—operations the Israeli military calls the “campaign between the wars.” Hamas has long used or tolerated rocket attacks as a way to draw international attention to Gaza—and to Israel’s alleged failure to honor past agreements that would enable more economic activity and development on the strip. In addition, this time the group may believe that the timing was especially opportune, because Israel’s Memorial Day and Independence Day are coming up (on Wednesday and Thursday) and because in a week, Tel Aviv hosts the Eurovision song contest; Israel may have been more sensitive to disruption. More broadly, Hamas may seek to send the world, including the Trump administration, the message that no peace deal can happen without Hamas’s tacit approval. Hamas governs Gaza ineffectively, which hampers its ability to gain leadership of the Palestinian cause. Israel and Egypt both maintain tight control over Gaza’s borders, and Hamas’s archrival in the West Bank—the Palestinian Authority—uses its ties to Israel and the international community to control money going into Gaza (and undermine Hamas). The resulting misery and stagnation in Gaza are one reason Hamas is willing to risk conflict: to show militants that it is standing up to Israel and let frustrated Gazans know that it will not meekly accept a grim status quo. Yet the lack of an all-out conflict comparable to 2014 suggests that both sides are reluctant to escalate. Hamas’s rockets spread terror and some death, but they aren’t a winning military strategy, and the group was quick to press for a ceasefire. Israel’s tough but calibrated military response ended the barrage without upending the government in Gaza, and it provoked little international criticism (this time, at least). In addition to its poor military options, Hamas is diplomatically isolated. Egypt’s leader Abdel Fatah al-Sissi, who has support from both Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates, has proved a bitter enemy, closing the Rafah border crossing and cracking down on the movement of arms and militants between Sinai and Gaza. The wars in Syria and Yemen (where Hamas and Iran back opposite sides) have frayed relations with Tehran, and although the two have reached a modus vivendi, Hamas has learned to expect little from Iran during a shooting war with Israel. **Restraint is hardly guaranteed**, of course. Israel often conducts the “campaign between the wars” to send a message to its other regional enemies. Any weakness in the face of Hamas attacks, Israeli leaders fear, will embolden Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran in Syria. Israel, however, must be wary of pushing Hamas too close to the brink. Ironically, Hamas and Israel both have the same answer to Gaza’s troubles: the Palestinian Authority. From Israel’s point of view, if the Palestinian Authority took control of Gaza, the group could serve as a peaceful alternative to Hamas and an acceptable channel for international aid. Hamas, for its part, is eager to pass the hot mess that is Gaza off to the Palestinian Authority. However, Hamas will not surrender its weapons, as Israel and the United States demand, for fear of losing its “resistance” credentials and because it suspects that the Palestinian Authority would arrest and torture Hamas members (as it has in the past). The Palestinian Authority does not want Hamas to get back on its feet, and it recognizes that trying to bring prosperity to Gaza is a losing proposition. Domestic politics on both sides are wild cards. Former Israeli chief of staff Benny Gantz, who almost unseated Netanyahu in the latest election, claimed the ceasefire was “another surrender to the blackmail of Hamas and terrorist organizations.” Hamas’s politics are less transparent, but hard-liners are likely to press for a more confrontational approach if the group continues to flounder. In addition, Hamas leaders face competition from even more militant organizations such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as Islamic State-type radicals who reject all compromise. The greatest source of Hamas’s strength is the political weakness of the Palestinian Authority, which grows ever more discredited as peace talks become a pipe dream. Serious proposals on settlements and a move toward a broader peace agreement would serve Israel well in the long term. But this won’t happen without prompting from Washington or a change in heart among the Israeli population and their leaders, neither of which seems likely. For now, limited, sporadic conflict may be the best outcome we can hope for.

#### Multiple Internal Links:

#### First is spoofing –

#### Palestinian militant groups are looking for methods to instigate retaliatory fire with Israel, empirics

Leys 20 [“Autonomous Weapons Systems, International Crises, and Anticipatory Self Defense” by Nathan Leys, 2020 P 387-388 <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1709&context=yjil> //gord0]

A second problem created or exacerbated by introducing AWS into crises is that of spoofing or behavioral hacking. These terms describe an adversary’s efforts to trigger an undesirable reaction from an artificially intelligent system.53This is similar to the Canadian Geese problem, except the false positive is fed to the AWS by an adversary or third party. In the context of anticipatory strikes by AWS, this could involve an adversary or third party feeding an autonomous weapon information designed to cause the AWS to fire first. Recall the Harpy, Israel’s anti-radar “kamikaze drone.” The IDF’s perennial adversaries, Palestinian militant groups like Hamas, “have been using human shields, hospitals, schools, UN facilities, mosques, hotels and private homes to hide and protect personnel and equipment since the late 1960s.”54 In the 2014 Gaza conflict, Hamas fired rockets from these locations “to provoke retaliatory fire.”55 It is entirely conceivable that rather than firing rockets from a school, which may strengthen the legitimacy of a self-defense claim by Israel, Hamas could instead place a targeting radar on top of the same school and “spoof” a Harpy into firing the first shot. C.The “Flash Crash” Fear: Competing Algorithms and Catastrophic InteractionThe interaction of two adversarial Autonomous Weapon Systems in a tense but non-violent situation poses the risk of unintentional escalation at dizzying speeds, otherwise known as a “flash crash”.Although such a scenario is not known to have occurred at the time of writing, other examples of negative interactions between competitive, algorithm-based systems do not provide much reason for comfort. For instance, “automated stock trading algorithms offer an example of the risks of autonomous systems interacting in complex, competitive environments and at speeds exceeding human reaction times.”56In 2010,competing algorithms set off a “flash crash” that wiped out around 10 percent of the Dow Jones Industrial Average in a matter of minutes.57Outside the stock market context, two competing buy-sell algorithms on Amazon bid the price of an obscure textbook on flies up to $23.7 million dollars (plus $3.99 shipping).58The fear is that two militaries’ AWS will interact in a way that creates a rapid feedback loop with destructive consequence.59

#### Causes catalytic Nuclear War

Johnson 21, James. "‘Catalytic nuclear war’ in the age of artificial intelligence & autonomy: Emerging military technology and escalation risk between nuclear-armed states." Journal of Strategic Studies (2021): 1-41. (School of Law and Government – Dublin City University)//Elmer

In the contemporary digitized landscape, the theft of nuclear grade materials, the detonation of atomic weapons, and ‘dirty bombs’ by non-state actors are not the only threats that states must worry about. Emerging technologies – most notably cyber, AI technology, and drones – are rapidly creating new (and exacerbating old) low-cost and relatively easy **means for non-state actors** to fulfill their nefarious goals; without the need for actual physical contact with or manufacture of nuclear weapons to have the ‘power to hurt’ – or the power to get others to hurt each other. 27 One of the critical potential ‘threat vectors’ (i.e., a mechanism or means by which an actor can gain access to a network in order to deliver a malicious payload) is the severe consequences that would result from a non-state actors’ deliberate **actions to penetrate or manipulate nuclear command**, control, and communication (NC3) **systems with AI-enhanced conventional capabilities**. Above all, cyber operations targeting early-warning satellites and radars are central to this article’s central focus. 28 The presumption of immunity or overconfidence in the robustness of NC3 networks to external (or insider) threats may increase the chances that states underestimate nuclear weapon systems’ vulnerabilities to a multitude of possible attack mechanisms, inter alia, **data manipulation, malware** cyber-attacks, ‘**false-flag cyber operations**,’ 29 social media flooding, or **spoofing** decision-makers **with disinformation** and misinformation. Minuteman missile silos are, for example, considered to be particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks. 30 Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) once believed to be air-gapped – not connected to the internet and considered ‘hack-proof’ – are, however, connected via various electromagnetic signals that create potential vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. A committed non-state or third-party actor may, for example, disrupt (digital jamming), deny (denial of service attacks), and distort or destroy information (spoofing or malware attacks) used by SSBN’s command and control networks to sow miscalculation and misperceptions, fan the waves of a crisis, or trigger an accidental nuclear launch. 31 In extremis, third-party hackers (or ‘cyber terrorists’) during a crisis might use AI-augmented false flag cyber operation to mislead submarine commanders (or political decision-makers) that an SSBN was – or expected to be in the case of a ‘launch on warning’ policy – under-attack. 32 Echoing these concerns, a 2009 study commissioned by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) warned that non-state actors might penetrate command and control (C2) systems – and even launch an unauthorized nuclear attack – an easier and more plausible ‘alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves.’ 33 Recent developments in AI-enabling technology have **exacerbated** these **vulnerabilities** **and introduced additional threat vectors** non-state actors might leverage, **which may precipitate a catalytic nuclear war** that manipulates the information landscape in which decisions about atomic weapons occur. In particular, social media manipulation and the spreading of misinformation, false memes, and fake news. For example, in 2016, a false news story appeared on the AWD News site that claimed that Israel had threatened to attack Pakistan with nuclear weapons if Islamabad interfered in Syria. The report consequently caused a tit-for-tat incendiary rhetorical exchange on Twitter – the Pakistani defense minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif warned that Israel should remember that Pakistan is also a nuclear-armed state debunked as fictitious by the Israeli Defense Ministry. 34 This incident puts a modern spin on the Cold War concept of catalytic nuclear war – in which third party actions provoke a nuclear war between the two nuclear-armed powers – and demonstrates the potentially severe damage caused by the misinformation and manipulation of information by non-state actors. During a crisis involving a competitive strategic dyad – such as the conflict-prone South Asia or Northeast Asia – when communication is compromised, nuclear arsenals are on high-alert, decision-making timeframes are compressed, or launch authority is pre-delegated (e.g., to nuclear-armed submarine commanders), **the consequences could be catastrophic**. 35 Moreover, in a high pressured crisis environment with confusion and paranoia running high the risk of misperceptions of an adversary’s intentions and behavior (e.g., putting nuclear arsenals on high-alert status) non-routine troop movement), the temptations for pre-emptive action increases. 36 That is, the catalyzing non-state actor produces the effect of an imminent attack on one or both of two nuclear-armed states, for which pre-emption is considered the most advantageous strategy. 37 What factors might aggravate these escalation pathways during a crisis?

#### Second is Unsafe Development and conflict escalation –

#### Gaza is the testing site for development of Israel’s LAWs – continual development pushes reactive outcomes and urban warfare

Musleh 18 (Musleh, A. H. Ali H. Musleh is a PhD student at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. He teaches Political Design and Futuristics in the Department of Political Science at UHM. His research is focused on the automation of settler colonialism in Palestine. amusleh@hawaii.edu (2018). Designing in Real-Time: An Introduction to Weapons Design in the Settler-Colonial Present of Palestine. Design and Culture, 10(1), 33–54. doi:10.1080/17547075.2018.1430992)-NA recut gord0

After Israel completed its withdrawal from Gaza in September 2005, it turned the Strip into a hermetically sealed “high-tech enclosure” (Tawil-Souri 2012) serving as a laboratory for a military-industrial complex “moving into the robotic era” (Levinson 2010). In the years since, Israel has deployed a series of drone and robotic unmanned weapons against Gaza in regular, day-to-day operations and in large-scale assaults, which are described as “tests” that are part of an iterative design process. In an interview for Der Spiegel, Avner Benzaken, head of the technology and logistics division in the Israeli army – a unit which is “mostly comprised of academics who serve as officers” – explained this process as follows: If I develop a product and want to test it in the field, I only have to go five or 10 kilometers from my base and I can look and see what is happening with the equipment … I get feedback, so it makes the development process faster and much more efficient. (Becker 2014) Gaza is the site for “testing” formations of unmanned war, what many in Palestine refer to as “remote-control occupation” (Gordon 2009; Hanafi 2012; Salamanca 2011; Weizman 2007). According to Israel, the purpose is to explore and optimize integrations of “operational concepts” and weapons development – a process Israeli military planners refer to as “technological force design” (Hania 2016, 73). This “design process,” which operates in “real-time,” is pursued under the heading of the “Future Battlefield” and is managed by MAFAT, the defense ministry’s R&D directorate. The “Future Battlefield” is a scenario-based construct through which design problems are captured and articulated for the weapons manufacturers, universities, and SMEs to organize the design and development of solutions for future “operational requirements.” Remote-control occupation in Palestine is located at the evolutionary end of what Grégoire Chamayou (2011b, 4) calls cynegetic wars: wars that bear “an ideal of non-confrontation with death, and of domination without real combat.” This aligns with the basic strategy behind the drone as explained by the commander of the Israeli Air Force’s UAV training center: drone operators can “make life and death decisions” while they “sit in a safe room and their personal level of danger is the same as of someone on the beach in Tel Aviv” (IDF 2014). Looking to multiply this power, Israel’s official plan is to increase the population of these “soldiers” and diversify them to eventually unman two-thirds of the Israeli air force (Berger 2015) and a third of Israel’s ground machinery (Levinson 2010) in the next five to ten years. According to Israeli ground forces technology division, the induction of these machines into the army will create a future where “autonomous soldiers could carry the weight in the war” (IDF 2015).7 To realize their plan, Israel has carried out the following tests among many others. During “Operation Cast Lead” of 2008–9, the Israeli military tested the extensive use of 60 ton remote-controlled bulldozers designed for “urban warfare” by the IAI (Katz 2009). A total of 11,000 civilian homes were destroyed or damaged during this three-week assault, 12 percent of them by bulldozer (Al-Haq 2009). In an operation conducted in 2012, the military shifted its focus from ground drones to test the “massive” use of aerial drones for “surgical warfare” over Gaza. Called “Pillar of Cloud,” that operation was deemed a “milestone in the history of aerial combat” (Dobbing and Cole 2010). Two years later during “Operation Protective Edge” in 2014, the army tested the integration of hand-launched Skylark aerial drones into ground battalions; the Hermes 900 autonomous drone in collaboration with Elbit systems, one of the suppliers of drones to the Israeli military (Khalek 2017); and the use of subterranean robots designed by an Israeli start-up called Roboteam (Orpaz 2015). A figure of 872 drone strikes were conducted during the operation (Amnesty and Forensic Architecture 2014). Over 2,219 Palestinians were killed (Al Mezan 2015) including 547 children, 30 percent of them by drone strikes, according to Defense for Children Palestine (DCIP 2015). Amnesty International also reported that 18,000 homes were destroyed or rendered uninhabitable (Amnesty 2014). After the fifty-one days of “Protective Edge,” the United Nations reported that Gaza’s life supporting systems could completely collapse in less than five years rendering the Strip uninhabitable (UNCTAD 2015). A few months after the 2014 operation, the Israeli army started testing new urban warfare concepts that integrated ground robotic capabilities (Opall-Rome 2015). These horrific events took place in “cycles” of violence that occurred every two to three years. Israelis give these cycles the “operative metaphor” of “‘cutting the grass’ [or ‘mowing the lawn’], meaning a task that must be performed regularly and has no end” (Bronner 2012). In each assault the death ratio was one to three Israelis killed to every 100 Palestinians killed (BBC 2014).8 The tests took place during periods of high visibility that turned Gaza into a showcase, not only of Israeli designs but also of Israeli “in real-time” designing capabilities. In 2014, Udi Adam, the chair of the state-owned Israel Military Industries who today serves as Director-General of the Israel Ministry of Defense, made clear that the “defense industry is in a perpetual learning mode together with the IDF and the Defense Ministry” to analyze and evaluate newly introduced weapons and other systems in operation (Sadeh 2014). This “perpetual learning mode” is portrayed as a national capability unparalleled elsewhere in the world. Quoting Ran Galli, corporate vice-president of major campaigns for Elbit Systems (one of Israel’s biggest private weapons manufactures), Neve Gordon (2011, 161) had written that “no other country has Israel’s extensive hands-on experience in fighting terror, including the development of new systems, testing them in real-time and adapting and fine-tuning following feedback from performance in the field.” Adding to this “design experience” an element of speed, Nissim Hania (2016, 46) writes: “the operational friction that the IDF ‘provides’ for the weapons systems developed by the industry allows it to shorten the systems’ development and maturation cycles.” Because Israeli military operations accelerate Israeli weapons design cycles, operations are also seen as the “opportunity to cut red tape” (Sadeh 2014). Amir Rapport says, “new products were introduced for the army’s use … [and] weapons systems that have long been under development suddenly became operational during the course of the fighting” (Sadeh 2014). Overall, the acceleration of the design cycle is boasted as a national capability that allows weapons to “receive the ‘stamp of approval’ of operational experience at a far higher rate than others in the market” (Hania 2016, 46), thus turning the occupation into a kind of high-volume production site for Israel’s export-oriented industry. The state aggressively markets its “field-tested” weapons as the “Israeli advantage” and the “brand promise” in the global defense and security markets. Each test can produce one or more of these outcomes: validate a new weapons system with a “stamp of approval”; move the weapons development process forward towards further refinement; modulate the speed of the development process; and “[generate] new requirements in order to supply for the next battle,” in the words of the chief scientist of Elbit Systems (Denes 2011, 181). All these outcomes reactivate the process and generate more design incursions into Palestinian bodies. Indeed, while reports of war crimes were being crafted by local and international investigative bodies after “Protective Edge,” MAFAT was putting together a design brief for the “new requirements” needed after “lessons learned” from the operation. The result is an armored fighting vehicle for “urban warfare” in “the future battlefield” designed to fight in the “narrow streets and alleys” of Gaza and equipped with 360-degree viewing, a remote-controlled machine gun, and a missile launcher (Ahronheim 2017) (Figure 1).

#### Rapid proliferation causes a race to the bottom for safety due to competitively-fueled risks.

Horowitz and Scharre 21 Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre 1-12-2021 "AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures" <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures#fnmarker5> (Michael C. Horowitz is Richard Perry Professor and the Director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania. He is also an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Paul Scharre is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.)//Elmer

Alternatively, militaries could adopt an immature **technology too quickly**, betting heavily and incorrectly on new and untested propositions about how a technology may change warfare. Given the natural incentive militaries have in ensuring their capabilities work on the battlefield, it may be reasonable to assume that militaries would manage these risks reasonably well, although not without some mishaps. But when balancing the risk of accidents versus falling behind adversaries in technological innovation, militaries arguably **place safety as a secondary consideration**.18 Militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents in the pursuit of technological advantage, since accidents are a routine element of military operations, even in training.19 Nevertheless, there are strong bureaucratic interests in ultimately ensuring that fielded capabilities are robust and secure, and existing institutional processes may be able to manage AI safety and security risks with some adaptation. For militaries, balancing between the risks of going too slow versus going too fast with AI adoption is complicated by the fact that AI, and deep learning in particular, is a relatively immature technology with significant vulnerabilities and reliability concerns.20 These concerns are heightened in situations where there may not be ample data on which to train machine learning systems. Machine learning systems generally rely on very large data sets, which may not exist in some military settings, particularly when it comes to early warning of rare events (such as a nuclear attack) or tracking adversary behavior in a multidimensional battlefield. When trained with **inadequate data sets** or employed outside the narrow context of their design, AI systems are often unreliable and brittle. AI systems can often **seem deceptively capable,** performing well (sometimes better than humans) in some laboratory settings, then failing dramatically under changing environmental conditions in the real world. Self-driving cars, for example, may be safer than human drivers in some settings, then inexplicably turn deadly in situations where a human operator would not have trouble. Additionally, deep learning methods may, at present, be insufficiently reliable for safety-critical applications even when operating within the bounds of their design specifications.21 For example, concerns about limits to the reliability of algorithms across demographic groups have hindered the deployment of facial recognition technology in the United States, particularly in high-consequence applications such as law enforcement. Militaries, too, should be concerned about technical limitations and vulnerabilities in their AI systems. Militaries want technologies that work, especially on the battlefield. Accordingly, the AI strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) calls for AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”22 This is undoubtedly the correct approach but a challenge, at least in the near term, given the reliability issues facing many uses of algorithms today and the highly dynamic conditions of battlefield use. An additional challenge stems from security dilemma dynamics. Competitive pressures could lead nations to shortcut test and evaluation (T&E) in a desire to field new AI capabilities ahead of adversaries. Similar competitive pressures to beat others to market appear to have played an exacerbating role in accident risk relating to AI systems in self-driving cars and commercial airplane autopilots.23 Militaries evaluating an AI system of uncertain reliability could, not unjustifiably, feel pressure to hasten deployment if they believe others are taking similar measures. Historically, these pressures are highest immediately before and during wars, where the risk/reward equation surrounding new technologies can shift due to the very real lives on the line. For example, competitive pressures may have spurred the faster introduction of poison gas in World War I.24 Similarly, in World War II, Germany diverted funds from proven technologies into jet engines, ballistic missiles, and helicopters, even though none of the technologies proved mature until after the war.25 This dynamic risk might spark **a self-fulfilling prophecy** in which countries accelerate deployment of insufficiently tested AI systems out of the fear that others will deploy first.26 The net effect is not an arms race but **a “race to the bottom” on safety**, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems and heightening the **risk of accidents and instability**.

#### Third is relations –

#### Israel is in a state of perpetual conflict – LAWS are the breaking point for Palestine

Roth-Rowland 15 [“How the IDF’s hi-tech revolution cheapens Palestinian lives” by Natasha Roth-Rowland June 3, 2015 [How the IDF's hi-tech revolution cheapens Palestinian lives - +972 Magazine](https://www.972mag.com/how-the-idfs-hi-tech-revolution-cheapens-palestinian-lives/) //gord0]

The Israeli army is optimistic that there will be no need for soldiers to be stationed on Israel’s borders in the future. Not because there will be peace, and not because there will be no need to maintain militarized borders. Rather it is because they are working towards [unmanned, weaponized patrol vehicles](https://www.idfblog.com/blog/2015/05/28/will-robots-soldiers-future/) that will do the job instead. A blog post on the topic published on the IDF’s English-language website, which was was shared on the IDF’s official Facebook page, was accompanied by the comment: “In 10 years there won’t be any soldiers guarding Israel’s borders. And here’s why.” Bottom of Form

That this is being used as a point of reassurance speaks volumes about the mentality of the Israeli military. The tone reads as: “Don’t worry, [the occupation will still be going on in a decade’s time](https://www.972mag.com/netanyahu-clarifies-the-occupation-will-last-forever/93372/). But we’ll be using robots to maintain it instead.” The introduction to the article takes this thrust further, describing how “the induction of these vehicles and robots into the battlefield will dramatically change the future of urban warfare, leading modern-day combat into new and unexpected directions.” It sounds as if this state of perpetual conflict is desirable — something the Israeli army is actively pursuing. The eventual idea is to have unmanned vehicles and robots on the front lines “making autonomous decisions based on the information they are provided with.” This is in effect proposing that the decision as to whether someone in a combat zone lives or dies will be made by an algorithm. This level of technology is already in play in Russia, where [mobile, weaponized robots](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-05-25/violence-algorithms) have been deployed to guard ballistic missile installations. Later on in the piece, Col. Yaron Sagiv of the IDF’s Technology Division states that “[w]e are definitely going in a direction where autonomous soldiers could carry the weight in the war. The intention is to increase the quantity of robots.” This intention reflects a trend that is increasing around the world. When it comes to patrolling borders, the United States has been using [unmanned drones over the Arizona border](http://edition.cnn.com/2010/US/03/12/border.drones/) for several years, which it uses to collect data and send video feeds back to a command center. ([The drones are Israeli exports](http://mondoweiss.net/2015/03/witnessing-american-borderlands) — Elbit Systems’ Hermes-450 model.) At one time, the Department of Homeland Security was [considering weaponizing these drones](http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130703feds-planned-arm-drones.html), although the idea has apparently been shelved for the time being. Nonetheless, drone warfare constitutes one of the [building blocks of the U.S.’s Afghanistan-Pakistan policy](http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare). In terms of conflict situations, more and more armies are developing and testing technology that would hand over decision-making in combat areas to autonomous machines. The momentum has increased to the point that Human Rights Watch recently[released a report](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/panther.htm) calling for such innovations to be banned along with cluster bombs and land mines. The UN’s second multi-lateral meeting on [“Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6CE049BE22EC75A2C1257C8D00513E26?OpenDocument) (LAWS) took place last month, during which the [Israeli representative stressed the need](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1B879A0827FBA307C1257E29004778B8/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_Israel_GS+bis.pdf) to “maintain an open mind” regarding such weaponry. In the spirit of such an open mind, let us consider a major point that is raised by these developments. If, indeed, the IDF is looking to drastically cut down on (or even do away with altogether) the need to have human beings in the battlefield, it removes a critical restraint on Israel’s preparedness to engage in conflict. The sight of soldiers being returned home to be buried is one of the key elements that causes a society to [question its government’s participation in a war](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/25/usa.politics), and [Israelis are particularly sensitive](http://www.wsj.com/articles/missing-soldier-provokes-anguish-in-israel-1406932202) to the fate of IDF soldiers. With this risk alleviated, there will be far less to stay the government’s hand. Such technology also further “sterilizes” the experience of soldiers participating in conflict. Already in last summer’s Gaza war, [testimonies from IDF soldiers](https://www.972mag.com/israeli-soldiers-testify-on-gaza-war-redefining-who-is-a-civilian/106311/) repeatedly described their lack of contact with other living beings, save for fellow soldiers; the words “like a video game” crop up again and again. This is partly due to the fact that [entire neighborhoods were shelled to ruins](https://www.972mag.com/gunning-for-destruction-in-gaza-you-want-to-see-people-in-pieces/106293/) before ground troops moved in, but also because so much of the IDF’s activity was based on long-range, indiscriminate fire. With the advent of technology — [tanks](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/panther.htm), [cooperative automated attack robots](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/cougar.htm) and a [host of other unmanned units](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/ugv.htm) — that keep most soldiers away from the front line, few will ever actually come face-to-face with the consequences of their actions. This is true for armies around the world, not just the IDF, and it raises grave concerns about the [future of ethics in warfare](https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/08/killer-robots-accountability-gap), already a near-oxymoronic concept. When your target is nothing more than pixels on a screen, it is far easier to press the button. According to the IDF, however, this is supposedly cause for celebration. The apparent guilelessness that accompanies the descriptions of the latest weapons technology is so cynical it is almost difficult to read. In one example, an IDF Spokesperson blog entry from a few years ago breathlessly lists the dimensions and merits of the “[Tzefa Shirion](https://idfspokesperson.wordpress.com/2011/12/26/8-incredible-technologies-used-by-the-idf/),” a mine-clearing device that contains nearly a ton of C4 explosives and produces a 720-960 meter-squared blast radius. “Sounds impressive? Wait till you see it in action,” the blog continues, under which one can watch a video of the weapon detonating in an open field. Gazans have been able to see it in action when it was used to [blow up residential streets](https://gazahealthattack.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/gazareport_eng.pdf) in Operations Cast Lead and Protective Edge. No mention of the human cost on the IDF’s blog, though — just applause for a good, clean, life-saving explosion. Ultimately, the overarching message that permeates most of the IDF’s social media forays on the topic goes as follows: the targets of these weapons (i.e. Palestinians, occasionally Lebanese) are a faceless, nameless, threatening and homogenous entity that obligates the IDF to [continuously innovate](https://www.972mag.com/wars-on-gaza-have-become-part-of-israels-system-of-governance-an-interview-with-filmmaker-yotam-feldman/71957/) in “exciting” and “maverick” ways. The subtext suggests a population that is simply there to justify the development and/or purchase of the [army’s latest toys](https://www.972mag.com/playing-with-fire-idf-to-use-new-weapon-on-west-bank-protests/106981/), with the attendant [endless bankrolling](http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.657634) this requires (not to mention the fortune that private companies make [exporting this technology](https://www.972mag.com/watch-israeli-companies-export-occupation-technology/91866/)). In this reckoning, there is only one set of lives at stake in this land, and it is not those in the crosshairs of the IDF’s expensive, cutting-edge arsenal. Yes, Israel is indeed a hi-tech nation, and its relentless marketing as such has spilled over into the military domain; it sounds for all the world as if the army is marketing the next level of home entertainment technology and not highly-destructive weapons that are intended to be instrumental in subjugating an occupied population. So next time you read about Israel as a “start-up miracle,” think about the impact that technology can and does have in this country, and about [how it is used](https://www.972mag.com/how-an-alleged-war-crime-goes-away-and-resurfaces-a-year-later/107357/). Think about how much money is invested in “the art of war” here, and how such expenditures have rendered so many lives so cheap.

#### Stable relations are an impact filter for the entire Middle Eastern region

Fraihat, 16 (Ibrahim Fraihat was a senior fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, and an affiliate scholar at Georgetown University. He is the author of the book "Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring" (Yale University Press, 2016). His research focuses on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction in the Arab world, with a particular emphasis on conflict management and mediation, transitions, national reconciliation, national dialogue, and institutional reform. January 28, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/palestine-still-key-to-stability-in-the-middle-east/kmr)

The United States has long treated Palestine as irrelevant to its “war against terrorism”, a premise that remains in place as the superpower leads a campaign to degrade and defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Last month, however, comments made by key figures on opposing sides of that campaign once again reaffirmed that Palestine remains central to any serious effort to counter extremism in the region. When Rob Malley, the Obama administration’s chief adviser on countering ISIL, was asked whether the group had any relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he replied: “There are many reasons to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict … one of the reasons is that it would help diffuse an issue that is fuelling extremism.” While admitting that resolving the conflict would not be “the magic wand that would put an end to all of the problems that have been plaguing the Middle East”, Malley reiterated that “the absence of a resolution is fuelling extremism”. Released two weeks after Malley’s comments, a statement from ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi seemed to confirm Malley’s point: “The Jews thought we forgot Palestine and that they had distracted us from it. Not at all, Jews. We did not forget Palestine for a moment. With the help of Allah, we will not forget it … The pioneers of the jihadist fighters will surround you on a day that you think is distant and we know is close. We are getting closer every day.” A continuous pattern Baghdadi’s threatening message adds him to a long list of Middle Eastern political figures who invoked the Palestinian issue – whether sincerely or not – as a political tool. Historically, Arab rulers used the Palestinian cause to build legitimacy for their rule. In 1977, for example, Muammar Gaddafi was central to the establishment of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in protest of Egypt’s negotiations with Israel. The Front included, among others, Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein. Ultimately, however, instead of doing something for Palestine, the members leveraged its plight to legitimize and sustain their iron-fisted rule over their own peoples. Nearly 40 years later, the pattern continues as Palestine is still at the center of the Middle East’s political discourse. A former Iranian diplomat recently told me that the war in Syria is all about preserving Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah’s “Axis of Resistance” that opposes Israel and the United States while supporting the Palestinian cause. From this perspective, the issue is not Bashar al-Assad remaining in power but ensuring that Syria remains a committed member of the Axis. Arab Politics Beyond the Uprisings EIn a recent speech during Friday prayers in Tehran, the deputy commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Hossein Salami said, “[…] we tell the Americans that we will further expedite enhancement of our missile capabilities as long as they massacre the Palestinian children, as long as they bury Yemen’s oppressed children in their houses, as long as they displace the Muslim nation of Syria …” In Yemen, the Houthis’ slogan is “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory to Islam”. Even as they advanced on Yemen’s capital in 2014, they did not lose sight of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, adopting a secondary slogan of “we fight in Sanaa while our eyes are on Jerusalem”. Wrong methods to fight extremism The US will never be able to build a credible coalition in the Middle East against ISIL, al-Qaeda or others as long as it continues its open and unconditional support for Israel. What the US touts as a 60-country coalition against ISIL is, at least in the Middle East, a coalition with governments that largely lack legitimacy with their own people. Thus, public support for the fight against ISIL will be difficult to obtain. Governments cannot contain and defeat extremism by themselves. If they could, NATO could have eliminated al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and the US drones could have finished off al-Qaeda in Yemen. Instead, they have failed. Iraq’s governmental forces, for their part, collapsed astonishingly quickly when attacked by ISIL. It is the people who represent the main recruitment pool for extremist groups who are able to neutralise extremism, and this happens only when their hearts and minds are opposed to it. It is the people, not the governments, who can make any campaign against extremism legitimate. In the case of the Arab world, the people are against the US and its complete bias in favour of Israel. It is very difficult to trust the US while it pours excessive support to Israel and prevents Palestinians from achieving their national aspiration of a state of their own. During a recent visit to Jordan, I repeatedly heard a sentiment of being opposed to ISIL but also being totally against partnering with the US government, which is viewed as the guarantor of a Zionist project in Palestine. This image of the US, along with its history of interventions in the region, foments distrust among Arabs and hampers the formation of a partnership to counter extremism. The great unifier The rise of ISIL has understandably shaken the region, captured the world’s attention, and elicited an urgent response. Since 1948, many crises and incidents have done just that, including Anwar Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem, Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War, and more recently the Arab Spring. Yet, as these crises rise and recede, the issue of Palestine continues to cast its shadow over the region. As severely as these and other crises have divided the region along a variety of lines, Palestine remains the great unifier. Sooner or later, the war in Syria will end, but the people of the Middle East, whether Arab or Persian, Sunni or Shia Muslim, secular or Islamist, will still desire justice for Palestine. ISIL may be degraded or defeated, but the extremism that has destabilised the Middle East will continue to feed on the issue of Palestine. Washington must understand that every time it vetoes a UN Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements or Palestinian statehood, it is sabotaging its own efforts to counter extremism. It looks like Baghdadi, currently the world’s most famous extremist, has recognised the value of using Palestine to appeal to the hearts and minds of the region. Let us hope that Malley can convince his boss of the value of Palestine not only for countering extremism but also for the stability of the region in its entirety.

#### Israel-Palestine conflict goes Nuclear.

Nawash 9 Kamal Nawash 1-10-2009 “Israel/Palestine Conflict May Lead to Nuclear War” <http://www.arabisto.com/article/Blogs/Kamal_Nawash/IsraelPalestine_Conflict_May_Lead_to_Nuclear_War/28363> (director of the legal department at the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and attorney at the Nawash Law Office in Washington, D.C.)//Elmer

Before HAMAS was created, Israel fought five major wars and numerous other battles. Moreover, before HAMAS there were the PLO, Fatah, PFLP, PFLP-GC, 15 May Organization, Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades, Al-'Asifah, Arab Liberation Front, Force 17, Black Hand , Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command, Popular Resistance Committees, Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Black September, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Doghmush, Omar Ben al-Khatib Warriors, Palestinian Liberation Army, Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, Palestinian fedayeen, Swords of Truth, Rejectionist Front, among other organizations. Today most of the above organizations have been destroyed or just vanished. However, the conflict has not ended as the above organizations have been replaced by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Holy Jihad Brigades, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Army of Islam, As-Sa'iqa, Tanzim, Al-Quds Brigades, among others. The point here is that even if Israel destroys HAMAS, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would not be solved and it would only be a matter of time before a new group forms to replace HAMAS. Israelis and Palestinians must realize that what they have done for the last 70 years will never bring peace to either Palestine or Israel under the best of circumstances. Under the worst of circumstances this conflict may lead to an all out nuclear war where millions will die and this is no longer an exaggeration. To summarize, Israel and its neighbors have fought numerous wars and no side has given up on their fundamental claims. For the last 20 years, both sides have tried to separate by creating two separate countries but this approach has failed because all sides have attachments to Israel and Palestine. The only solution that has a record of success is integration as demonstrated by the Palestinians who are citizens of Israel. **If peace is not found** then the day may soon come when the governments of **the Middle East maybe overthrown** by people who want to directly intervene on behalf of the Palestinians. If an uprising erupts throughout the Middle East then nuclear war may soon follow. Therefore, the choices are between total annihilation or equality for Palestinians and security for Israel. There are no other choices.

#### Nuke war causes extinction

* Checked

PND 16. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf> //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about **20 percent** for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

### 1AC – Plan

#### Plan – The State of Israel and The State of Palestine ought to ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons.

#### Shift to “on-the-loop” is goldilocks – maintains AI decision-making speed while preserving human control over escalation

* Checked (sid)

Barnett 20 Jackson Barnett 2-14-2020 "AI needs humans ‘on the loop’ not ‘in the loop’ for nuke detection, general says" <https://www.fedscoop.com/ai-should-have-human-on-the-loop-not-in-the-loop-when-it-comes-to-nuke-detection-general-says/> (Politics Journalist)//Elmer

The general who oversees U.S. defense against incoming missiles and air-based attacks wants to automate detection systems and move humans further out in the decision-making loop to meet the challenge **of faster, more powerful weapons**, he said Thursday. “What we have to get away from is … ‘human in the loop,’ or sometimes ‘the human is the loop,’” Gen. Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, commander of the United States Northern Command and of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. Having a human in the loop means a person still has complete control over starting or stopping any action performed by an intelligent system after receiving a cue. Instead, O’Shaughnessy wants to move the military toward a “human **on the loop**” standard, pushing human control farther from the center of the automated decision-making. **It would still give humans oversight** of an automated system, but the artificial intelligence would jump right into action, **not needing human pre-approval** as it would with a “human in the loop” design. Pentagon officials have previously stressed the need to keep a human “in the loop” as a standard for automated systems, but O’Shaughnessy said that the military needs to move “at the speed of relevance” to react to incoming threats. O’Shaughnessy added the need to move faster with machines because of the aggressive pursuit of AI by the Chinese and the Russian, and the speed at which they can move. Hypersonic missiles are a particular concern, as they can travel 15 times the speed of sound and be fully maneuverable to avoid detection from legacy U.S. homeland security surveillance systems. Automating those systems and integrating sensor data could help speed up reaction time to meet the challenge of hypersonic weapons. But AI is still a long way from being used to alert the military of incoming threats, the general said. “Stovepiped transmission of data from non-compatible sensors presents a significant impediment to our ability to defend against advanced threats,” O’Shaughnessy said in his opening statement. “By leveraging a cloud architecture, big data analytics, edge computing, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, **this network should sense a threat** from one node and engage it precisely and expeditiously from another across vast distances and across all domains.” The Pentagon has been talking a lot about a potential Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system-of-systems that would integrate data across services and all domains of warfare. The potential of missing an incoming nuclear attack is one of the most striking arguments in support of such a framework. “[The U.S.] needs to make sure we take advantage of emerging technology,” O’Shaughnessy said.

#### Software is dual-use – causes rogue and non-state replication – Israel Ban stops reproduction

Freedberg 19 [Sydney J. Freedberg, MA, deputy editor for Breaking Defense. During his 13 years at National Journal magazine, he wrote his first story about what became known as “homeland security” in 1998, his first story about “military transformation” in 1999, and his first story on “asymmetrical warfare” in 2000. Since 2004 he has conducted in-depth interviews with more than 200 veterans about their experiences, writing stories that won awards from the association of Military Reporters & Editors in 2008 and 2009. Sydney graduated summa cum laude from Harvard and holds masters’ degrees from Cambridge and Georgetown; “Genocide Swarms & Assassin Drones: The Case For Banning Lethal AI,” Breaking Defense; 3-8-2019; https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/genocide-swarms-assassin-drones-the-case-for-banning-lethal-ai/] Justin.

Remember, once you’ve written the software, you can make infinite copies; lone cranks can make explosives; and mini-drones are getting cheaper by the day. Remember also that the Chinese government has personal information on some [22.1 million](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/chinese-national-arrested-for-using-malware-linked-to-opm-hack/2017/08/24/746cbdc2-8931-11e7-a50f-e0d4e6ec070a_story.html?utm_term=.1021f907ff58) federal employees, contractors, and their family members from the [Office of Personnel Management breach](https://breakingdefense.com/tag/opm-hack/) two years ago. Now imagine one out of every thousand shipping containers imported from China is actually full of mini-drones programmed to go to those addresses and explode in the face of the first person to leave the house. Imagine they do this the day before [China invades Taiwan](https://breakingdefense.com/2018/11/beyond-inf-countering-russia-countering-china-analysis/). How effectively would the US government react? A rogue **state or terrorist group could go further**. How about programming your mini-drones to kill everyone who looks white, or black or Asian? (One Google facial recognition algorithm classified African-Americans as “[gorillas](https://www.wired.com/story/when-it-comes-to-gorillas-google-photos-remains-blind/),” not humans, so racist AI is a mature technology). It would be genocide by swarm. Such a tactic might only work once, much like hijacking airliners with box cutters on 9/11. “Small drones are vulnerable to jamming, to high-powered microwaves, to other drones that might intercept them, to nets,” said [Paul Scharre](https://www.cnas.org/people/paul-scharre), an Army Ranger turned thinktank analyst. “Bullets work pretty well… I have a buddy who shot a drone out of the sky back in Iraq in 2005.” (Unfortunately, the drone was American). At least some object-recognition algorithms can be [tricked by carefully applied reflective tape](https://breakingdefense.com/2019/02/attacking-artificial-intelligence-how-to-trick-the-enemy/). “People are working on countermeasures today,” Scharre told me, “and the bigger the threat becomes, the more people have an incentive to invest in countermeasures.” But how do you stop tiny drones from becoming a big threat in the first place? While technology to build a “working prototype” already exists, Russell told me, the barrier is mass production. No national spy agency or international monitoring regime can find and stop everyone trying to make small numbers of drones. But, Russell argues fervently, a treaty banning “lethal autonomous weapons systems” would prevent countries and companies from openly producing swarms of them, and a robust inspection mechanism — perhaps modeled on the [Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons](https://www.opcw.org/about-us) — could detect covert attempts at mass production. Without a ban, Russell said, legal mass production could make lethal swarms as easy to obtain as, say, assault rifles — except, of course, one person can’t aim and fire thousands of rifles at once. Thousands of drones? Sure.

# Israel – 1AR – T/B

## Case

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### 1AR – AT: T Nebel

#### “States” is existential and pragmatics outweigh

Cohen et al 02 Ariel Cohen [Ph.D., Computational Linguistics, Carnegie Mellon University] Nomi Erteschik-Shir [PhD, Ben Gurion University of the Negev] “Topic, Focus, and the Interpretation of Bare Plurals” Natural Language Semantics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 125-165 RE

\*for reference the sentence it is referring is “Boys are present.”\*

Sentence (46b) contains the predicate present, which is S-level. This predicate introduces a spatiotemporal variable, which may be a stage topic. In this case the subject may be a topic as before, but does not have to be. When the subject is a topic, it is interpreted generically; when it is in focus, it is interpreted existentially (we will return to existential interpretations in section 7 below). Hence, the sentence is ambiguous and both generic and existential readings are available (cf. Jäger 1999). In fact, it is hard to get the generic reading, and the existential reading is much preferred. The reason is that generics cannot express predication of a temporary property (Cohen 1999). If the property present is perceived to be such a temporary property, with a boy being present at some times and absent at others, the generic will be unacceptable. If, on the other hand, being present is perceived to be a property that is expected to hold well into the future, a generic reading is possible, as in (4)

#### Specific instances prove generics - I meet

Cimpian et al 10 (PhDs – Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or “Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and are likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1. Generics’ truth conditions Some of the first experimental evidence for the idea that the truth of a generic statement does not depend on the underlying statistics was provided by Gilson and Abelson (1965; Abelson & Kanouse, 1966) in their studies of “the psychology of audience reaction” to “persuasive communication” in the form of generic assertions (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966, p. 171). Participants were presented with novel items such as the following: Altogether there are three kinds of tribes—Southern, Northern, Central. Southern tribes have sports magazines. Northern tribes do not have sports magazines. Central tribes do not have sports magazines. Do tribes have sports magazines? All items had the same critical feature: only one third of the target category possessed the relevant property. Despite the low prevalence, participants answered “yes” approximately 70% of the time to “Do tribes have sports magazines?” and other generic questions similar to it. Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977) writes that “there are many cases where […] less than half of the individuals under consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50% of books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic form

### 1AR – AT: T Pre-emptive Bans

#### 1] C/I – Bans can be preventive – it can apply to future scenarios

Vocabulary.com <https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/ban#:~:text=The%20verb%20to%20ban%20means,be%20used%20as%20a%20noun.&text=Something%20with%20a%20ban%20on,certain%20stories%20in%20the%20newspaper>. //gord0

Ban: The verb to **ban means to forbid something from being or happening**. The word can also be used as a noun.

#### 2] All LAW bans in the topic lit presume pre-emptive bans

* Yo so don’t come at me w/ ev ethics – this is from the footnotes of a table – tables are not paragraphs so the footnotes are separate

Horowitz 19, Michael C. "When speed kills: Lethal autonomous weapon systems, deterrence and stability." Journal of Strategic Studies 42.6 (2019): 764-788. (professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania)//Elmer

Source: CRS consolidation of data from multiple sources. Notes: CCW discussions on LAWS exclude existing weapons systems. Therefore, **States Parties consider any potential LAWS ban to be preemptive**. a. State is not party to the CCW. b. States that oppose a preemptive LAWS ban do not necessarily share the same alternative approach to managing LAWS. c. See section below on China.

#### 3] Topic precedence dictates pre-emptive bans are LAW bans – blinding lasers prove

Kessel 19 Jonah M. Kessel 12-13-2019 "Killer Robots Aren’t Regulated. Yet." <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/technology/autonomous-weapons-video.html> (Jonah M. Kessel is a visual journalist at The New York Times, based in New York. From 2011 to 2016, he covered Asia for the video desk, working out of the Beijing and Hong Kong bureaus.)//Elmer

If A.G.I. is inevitable, as Dr. Russell says, should we regulate autonomous weapons before they exist? That’s what the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is trying to achieve at the United Nations. The campaign is made up of nonprofits, civil society organizations and activists. They are calling for a ban on fully autonomous weapons. So far, 30 countries have joined them in supporting such a ban, as well as 100 nongovernmental organizations, the European Parliament, 21 Nobel laureates and more than 4,500 A.I. scientists. For many in the coalition, it is a moral issue. “When human beings decide to allow machines to target and kill, they have crossed some moral and ethical Rubicon,” the Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams said to a packed and polarized room of diplomats, experts and military personnel at the United Nations. But countries like the United States, Britain, Russia, China and Israel argue that we **can’t regulate something that** **does not exist yet**, effectively blocking any kind of regulation by the United Nations that requires consensus among member states to create a treaty. Is it actually **possible to ban a weapon before it exists**? Yes, **there is precedent for a pre-emptive ban**. In 1995, the **Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons** was passed, prohibiting militaries from using lasers to blind their opponents. In the clip below, Dr. Russell explains how and why this unfolded. Though his account on the origin of the ban is disputed — the International Committee of the Red Cross’s “Blinding Laser Weapons: Questions and Answers” gives a variety of other explanations — a **pre-emptive ban** is nonetheless possible.

#### 4] Prefer:

#### a] Debatability – there’s a debate on if LAWs actually exist – means their interp collapses to zero topic since the Neg can always just argue the Aff has no inherency every debates – at best, results in stale debates which turns education, at worst, results in 100% Neg win rate which turns Fairness

Kessel 19 Jonah M. Kessel 12-13-2019 "Killer Robots Aren’t Regulated. Yet." <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/technology/autonomous-weapons-video.html> (Jonah M. Kessel is a visual journalist at The New York Times, based in New York. From 2011 to 2016, he covered Asia for the video desk, working out of the Beijing and Hong Kong bureaus.)//Elmer

I don’t get it. The video seems to say lethal autonomous weapons systems both exist and don’t exist. Which is it? While we are largely **talking about weapons systems of the future**, **this is a matter of semantics**. It mostly depends on how you define them. And because governments can’t agree on a definition, potential regulation has slowed to a crawl. As Mr. Scharre put it in his book: “When the U.K. government **uses the term ‘autonomous systems**,’ they are describing systems with humans-level intelligence that are more analogous to the ‘general A.I.’ described by the U.S. deputy defense secretary [Bob] Work. The effect of this definition is to shift the debate on autonomous weapons to **far-off future systems** and **away from potential near-term weapon systems** that may search for, select, and engage targets on their own — what others might call ‘autonomous weapons.’” Whether or not fully autonomous weapons exist today, the countries that most vocally oppose regulation are the ones most heavily invested in such technologies — the United States among them.

## DA

### 1AR – AT: Deterrence Disadvantage (Strake)

#### 1] Non-Unique - Nuclear Deterrence is stable – empirics – and shift to conventional “winter-safe” deterrence fails

- Checked

Wirtz 18, James J. "How Does Nuclear Deterrence Differ from Conventional Deterrence?." Strategic Studies Quarterly 12.4 (2018): 58-75. (James J. Wirtz joined NPS in 1990 as a professor for the department of National Security Affairs. He has taught courses on nuclear strategy, international relations theory, and intelligence while at NPS. He served as Chair of the National Security Affairs from January 2000 and January 2005. He currently serves as Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies. Professor Wirtz is also a renowned author, and is presently working on a monograph entitled Theory of Surprise. He is also editor of the Palgrave Macmillan series, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies. Professor Wirtz is a past president of the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association and the former section chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association)//Elmer

History is replete with incidents in which those subjected to conventional deterrent, or for that matter compellent, threats posed by even a vastly superior power **adopted a “come and get it” attitude**.6 When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, for example, he told April Glaspie, the US ambassador to Iraq, that he did not fear a US response because Americans did not have the will to suffer 10,000 casualties a day in battle.7 When Japanese officials decided to attack Pearl Harbor, they believed that Washington would not respond vigorously to the setback and would instead reach some sort of negotiated settlement with Tokyo. Indeed, as the leading work on the subject suggests, **conventional deterrent threats remain viable only as long as the target fails to develop what appears to be a cost-effective workaround**, so to speak.8 Once Adolph Hitler was sold on the notion that blitzkrieg would produce a rapid collapse of French and British forces, for instance, the “Phony War” ended with a Nazi armored thrust that knocked France out of the war in about six weeks. Because combat itself is the ultimate arbiter of their effectiveness, conventional capabilities that appear on paper to be quite impressive might, for a host of reasons, not appear particularly significant to the target of conventional deterrent threats. For instance, the combat effectiveness of large conventional forces **could be undermined by mediocre leadership, poor morale, faulty command and control, flawed doctrine, logistical handicaps, lack of domestic political support, or misguided strategy**. **Contestability is the Achilles’ heel of conventional deterrence**. By contrast, deterrent threats based on nuclear capabilities enjoy a degree of certainty that can never be achieved by conventional weapons because the costs of nuclear war, especially engagements involving more than a few nuclear weapons, are largely uncontestable. The effects of nuclear war also are easily **calculated with a high degree of certainty**, something that cannot be said about conventional weapons. For example, 50 percent of the people living within five-miles of a 1-megaton nuclear air burst will die promptly from blast effects; there is virtually nothing an opponent can do to mitigate the impact of that weapon once it detonates.9 Active defenses or an effective preemptive attack could reduce the number of weapons hitting the target, but it only takes one “leaker” to render those defenses superfluous. Nevertheless, as the number of nuclear weapons involved in an attack increase—in excess of approximately 100—the certainty about the levels of death and destruction inflicted also increases. During the Cold War, policy makers also **went to great lengths to eliminate any guesswork** when it came to the impact of nuclear retaliation (i.e., execution of a deterrent threat). During the tenure of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for instance, “assured destruction” of the Soviet Union was pegged at the elimination of 70 percent of Soviet industry and 30 percent of the Soviet population, which would occur if 440 equivalent megatons of nuclear yield hit its targets.10 To achieve these levels of destruction in a worst-case scenario after suffering a Soviet nuclear attack, each leg of the triad was designed to deliver 440 equivalent megatons of firepower, giving the United States triple redundancy under a worst case (second-strike) scenario when it came to achieving its criteria for assured destruction. If the Soviets struck first, they could not prevent that destruction; if they did nothing at all, as critics often pointed out, most US nuclear weapons would simply end up making the rubble bounce. Because today no defense exists against a nuclear attack involving more than a few nuclear weapons, a peculiar opportunity emerges whereby it is possible to inflict significant death and destruction outside the dialectic of war. Thomas Schelling aptly named this opportunity “the diplomacy of violence.”11 In the past, noted Schelling, it was necessary to first defeat an opponent’s military forces before striking at countervalue targets, such as population, industry, leadership, and mechanisms of state control. Nuclear weapons, by contrast, allow deterrent or compellent threats to be executed against countervalue targets regardless of the state of the opponent’s defenses, the conventional military balance or even the outcome of a clash of conventional arms. Schelling posited a situation in which an opponent’s conventional forces were fully combat ready and effective, while the country they were intended to defend lay in ruins, obliterated by nuclear strikes that could not be stopped. “Nuclear weapons,” according to Schelling, “make it possible to do monstrous violence to the enemy without first achieving victory.”12 Deterrent policies based on nuclear weapons can disregard the normal rules associated with conventional war and move directly to killing opponents and destroying industry and infrastructure on a scale that some have suggested is impossible even to imagine before Armageddon.13

### 1AR – AT: Disarmament Disadvantage

#### 1] Non-Unique – Proliferation is stabilizing – only our ev does a statistical, controlled study

- Checked

Suzuki 15, Akisato. "Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by random forests." Research & Politics 2.2 (2015): 2053168015589625. (Researcher at the Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University)//Elmer

Given these conflict-reducing/provoking effects of nuclear proliferation, what overall effect would nuclear proliferation have on a systemic propensity for conflict? This is difficult to answer, not only due to the controversy over whether nuclear states are more or less prone to conflict, but also because the existing theories do not explain whether those conflict-reducing/provoking effects are large enough to influence a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, given the ratio of nuclear states to non-nuclear states in the system. This challenge motivates the empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. Empirical investigation by Random Forests The interstate–systemic year data are used here to investigate the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. The dependent variable is the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets (Palmer et al., 2015; version 4.01 is used) per systemic-year, standardized as the ratio to the number of states in the interstate system (Correlates of War Project, 2011) – hereafter, the ‘dispute–state ratio’. Observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to make sure that causal effects precede a variation in the dispute–state ratio.2 Two regressors are used to examine the effect of nuclear proliferation: the number of nuclear states in the interstate system; and a count of the years since the number of nuclear states changes (hereafter ‘nuclear year counter’), measuring the effect of new nuclear states (Horowitz, 2009). The data about nuclear states are from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009); additionally, the current paper codes North Korea as a nuclear state since 2009 (Table 1).3 The model also includes the number of democratic states (Polity2 score ⩾ 6 in Marshall, 2013) in the interstate system, the gross world product (Earth Policy Institute, 2012), and the binary variable of unipolarity (coded zero until 1989 and one from 1990; see Monteiro, 2011/2012); these three variables control for democratic peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), and polarity (Monteiro, 2011/2012) respectively. The number of nuclear states and these control variables suffer from multicollinearity (see Table A-9 in the online appendix), and this paer later explains how to resolve this problem. A lagged dependent variable is also included to address the temporal dependence of time-series data. The temporal scope is 1950–2009 (i.e. N=59) due to the data availability and the use of the dependent variable at t+1. The descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 2.4. As mentioned in the introduction, this paper uses the machine learning, non-parametric method Random Forests for the empirical investigation.5 Although it is unfamiliar to most political science and international relations analysts, Random Forests has been widely used in numerous scientific studies (Strobl et al., 2009: 324; Strobl et al., 2008). The popularity of the method is also apparent from the fact that Breiman’s (2001) original paper has been cited 12,721 times in the literature.6 Random Forests generates two useful analytics: first, ‘conditional variable importance’ measures how ‘important’ each regressor is, conditional on the remaining regressors (Hothorn et al., 2006; Strobl et al., 2007, 2008). This is analogous to statistical significance in conventional regression models. The significance threshold proposed by Strobl et al. (2009: 343) is whether the importance score of a regressor is negative, zero, or lower than the absolute value of the lowest negative score. If none applies, the regressor is considered as important; and the second relevant analytic is a partial dependence plot (Friedman, 2001). This estimates the marginal effect of each regressor on the dependent variable while taking the remaining regressors into consideration. Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are therefore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute–state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and concluding remarks The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

### 1AR – AT: R&D DA

#### 2] More recent ev – they’re AI incentives stem from military arms racing and competition

CTech 1/6 [CalcalisTech Jan 6, 2021 “In the global AI arms race, a thriving local ecosystem gives Israel the lead” <https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3886022,00.html> //gord0]

The field of artificial intelligence has long ago broken out of the niche category and over the past decade has become a sort of basic infrastructure, similar to electricity, roads, or the internet. Multinational tech giants describe themselves as AI-focused companies and invest enormous resources in developing AI applications for all of their activities. Every piece of data they gather is saved, stored, added to billions of other data points, and goes through sophisticated analysis that is either developed by the companies themselves, or purchased from others. The AI arms race involves large forces, lots of money, giant multinational corporations, governments, and militaries, and their motives are similar to those that drive every war: power, influence, control, and money. At its core, it is a competition over control of information, of data. Those with access to the largest amount of high quality data, will take the lead and dominate over the people and the money. In light of that, the last five years have seen an aggressive armament race play out, only instead of weapons, the path to victory rests on AI technology and all of its derivatives. Israel has the opportunity to become one of the leaders in the race, since with nearly 1,500 active startups in the field, it comes third to only the U.S. and China. From a national perspective, the government of Israel, through the Israel Innovation Authority, presented at the end of 2020 a plan to invest NIS 5 billion ($1.5 billion) over the next five years in the AI sector. The plan includes investment in research and development for various fields, such as the establishment of a supercomputer infrastructure, advancement of generic R&D with an emphasis on natural language processing (NLP) and the advancement of the training of personnel and acquisition of advances equipment for the academia, in partnership with the leading players in the industry, defense, and governance sectors alongside leading researchers and experts around the world. A 2020 study conducted by research firm Tortoise examining the AI capabilities of 54 countries by measuring seven characteristics: talent, infrastructure, operating environment, research, development, government strategy and commercial — ranked Israel in fifth place overall. Israel ranked #5 in talent, #27 in infrastructure, #38 in operating environment, #7 in R&D, #51 in government strategy, and #3 in commercial. Israel’s overall ranking improved from the previous year, but when it comes to infrastructure, operating environment, and government strategy, Israel remains far behind. It was also ranked slightly lower than past years in the innovation related category of R&D.

#### 3] Bans reverse the trend and boost Civilian AI

Chengeta 20 Thompson Chengeta 2-18-2020 “Curb your banphobia: It’s critical to ban killer robots now!” <https://together1st.org/proposals/297/pdf> (Dr. Thompson Chengeta studied law at Harvard Law School, University of Pretoria (UP) and Midlands State University (MSU). He is a Fellow at the South African Research Chair in International Law, University of Johannesburg (UJ), Adjunct Senior Lecturer at MSU and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Institute of International and Comparative Law in Africa, UP.)//Elmer

Reducing inclusivity and accountability in national and global governance A legally binding instrument prohibiting the development and use of killer robots will, in fact, reduce chances of algorithmic bias in the use of force. It will also that humans remain accountable for the use of force both domestically and at the international level. Killer robots create an accountability gap. Because they are unpredictable, it would be difficult or impossible to establish legal responsibility of humans in cases where killer robots commit crimes. In such cases, killer robots undermine accountability, a very important component of global governance. Further, in 2019, UN Group of Governmental Experts on Killer Robots and the UN Working Group on the Rights of Peoples of African Descent, noted that the development and potential use of killer robots may worsen racial and gender discrimination which can be perpetuated through algorithmic bias. As such, this proposal is in the interest of inclusive society that holds criminals to account. Conversing effect in increasing poverty and inequality One of the questions that is asked is whether a legally binding instrument banning killer robots will negatively affect other AI technologies meant for civilian use like those that can be useful in development and poverty alleviation. On several occasions and in this proposal, it is made categorically clear that **a ban on killer robots will not negatively impact on the civilian uses of AI technology**. If anything, with a ban on killer robots, States and other stakeholders will focus and invest more on the research and development of AI technology that is meant for the good of humanity instead of death and distraction. Just as the current theme of the African Union states “Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa’s Development”, a ban on killer robots will create a conducive environment within which AI applications **meant for development and poverty alleviation are given a priority**. Reducing conflict and political violence As already indicated above, there is already an AI arms race between major powers that threaten global security. In January 2020, the United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, identified killer robots as one of the four main threats to global security. There are scholars who have identified killer robots as one of the likely causes of World War III. Killer robots will make it too easy for states to go to war and will reduce the threshold at which force is used in law enforcement situations. Just as armed drones were once thought to be the only game in the fight against terrorism, they ended up marking unprecedented deaths of civilians, among them, women and children. Furthermore, killer robots may be used for politically motivated violence, in particular, political assassinations. Targeted killings on the basis of facial recognition will become more prevalent. In contexts of demonstrations, for example in contested elections in Africa, it may make it too easy for dictators to crush any opposition. Therefore, a legally binding instrument banning or prohibiting killer robots will go a long way in avoiding future conflicts and political violence. Of course, there are some scholars who have argued or suggested that the use of killer robots will reduce or do away with the brutalities that are currently being committed by human soldiers. The main basis of this suggestion is that killer robots will not act out of prejudice or ill-will. Yet, this suggestion has already been disproved by the existence of algorithmic bias and prejudice against people of colour.

### 1AR – AT: Terrorism Disadvantage (Harker)

#### Circumvention Link at the top:

#### 1] Small Violations don’t disprove a Ban – no large-scale development ensures Status Quo defense solve

Russell 15 Stuart Russell 7-8-2015 “Ban Lethal Autonomous Weapons” <https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/09/07/ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons/2yI2wF0wWRjHLmNQkPiCpI/story.html> (Stuart Russell is professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley, and co-author of the On pen Letter on Autonomous Weapons.)//Elmer

Of course, treaties are not foolproof. Violations may occur, and some argue that a treaty that prevents “us” (usually the United States) from developing a full-scale lethal autonomous weapons capability will expose “us” to the risk of defeat by those who violate the treaty. All countries need to protect their national security, but this is an argument for a treaty. Yes, there will be nonstate actors who modify pizza-delivery drones to drop bombs. The concern that a military superpower such as the United States could be defeated by small numbers of homemade, weaponized civilian **drones is absurd**. But some advanced future military technology, **produced in huge numbers, might present a threat**; preventing such developments **is the purpose of a treaty**. In late July, more than 2,800 scientists and engineers from the artificial intelligence and robotics community signed an open letter calling for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. Without it, we fear there will be an arms race in autonomous weaponry whose outcome can only be catastrophic. Where, exactly, will this arms race lead us? Current and future developments in robotics and artificial intelligence will be more than adequate to support superior tactical and strategic capabilities for autonomous weapons. They will be constrained only by the laws of physics. For instance, as flying robots become smaller, they become cheaper, more maneuverable, and much harder to shoot down, but their range and endurance also decrease, and they cannot carry heavy missiles. How can a tiny flying robot, perhaps the size of an insect, kill or incapacitate a human being? Human ingenuity will play a role. The two most obvious solutions — injecting with neurotoxin and blinding with a laser beam — are banned under existing treaties. It is legal, however, to deliver a one-gram shaped charge that suffices to puncture the human cranium and project a hypersonic stream of molten metal through the brain. Alternatively, the robot can easily shoot tiny projectiles through the eyeballs of a human from 30 meters. Larger vehicles can deliver microrobots to the combat zone by the million, providing lethality comparable to that of **nuclear weapons.** Terrorists will be able to inflict catastrophic damage on civilian populations while dictators can maintain a constant and visible threat of immediate death. In short, humans will be utterly defenseless. This is not a desirable future.

#### Counter-Terror:

#### 2] Non unique – Israel counterterror efforts are increasing with framework development

Bureau of Counterterrorism 19 [“Country Reports on Terrorism 2019” Country Reports on Terrorism 2019 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of theUnited States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide to Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2019-2.pdf> //gord0]

#### Israel was a committed counterterrorism partner in 2019, closely coordinating with the United States on a range of counterterrorism initiatives. Israel and the United States held numerous interagency counterterrorism dialogues to discuss the broad rangeof threats in the Middle East and to determine areas of collaboration to address these challenges. This included the annual meeting of the U.S.-Israel Joint Counterterrorism Group, which was launched in the early 1990s and is our longest-standing strategic counterterrorism dialogue. Israel faced threats from the north from Hizballah and along the northeastern frontier from Hizballah and other Iran-backed groups, including about 150,000 rockets aimed at Israel. Israeli officials expressed concern thatIran was supplying Hizballah with advanced weapons systems and technologies, as well as assisting the group in creating infrastructure that would permit it to indigenously produce rockets, missiles, and drones to threaten Israel from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,or Yemen. To the south, Israel faced threats from terrorist organizations including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and ISIS-Sinai. Rocket attacks originating from Gaza resulted in four deaths and dozens of injuries in 2019. 2019 Terrorist Incidents:Israel experienced numerous terrorist attacks in 2019 involving weapons ranging from rockets and mortars to small arms and knives. The following is a partial list of terrorist incidents that occurred in 2019: On February 7, an assailant violently assaulted and stabbed to death 19-year-old Ori Ansbacher in the EinYael forest near Jerusalem. Police arrested Arafat Irfiya, a 29-year-old Palestinian man from Hebron and reported he admitted the attack was “nationalistically motivated.” Hamas and other terrorist groups including PIJ launched more than 1,000 rockets and mortar shells from Gaza toward Israel during the year, some of which landed in civilian areas. For details, see “West Bank and Gaza” section below.Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Israel has a robust legal framework to combat terrorism and promote international legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorists. In December, the defense minister signed the first executive order placing economic restrictions on assets of an individual connected to terrorism: Mohammad Jamil, a Hamas activist living in the United Kingdom.

#### 3] Link Turn –– LAW prolif to rogue actors circumvents those – makes Terrorist Attacks more likely

Ware 19 Jacob Ware 9-24-2019 "TERRORIST GROUPS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AND KILLER DRONES" <https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/terrorist-groups-artificial-intelligence-and-killer-drones/> (Davis Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, where Jacob Ware is a research associate.)//Elmer

Terrorists Will Be Interested in Acquiring Lethal Autonomous Weapons Terrorist groups will be interested in artificial intelligence and lethal autonomous weapons for three reasons — cost, traceability, and effectiveness. Firstly, killer robots are likely to be **extremely cheap**, **while still maintaining lethality**. Experts agree that lethal autonomous weapons, once fully developed, will provide a cost-effective alternative to terrorist groups looking to maximize damage, with Tegmark arguing that “small AI-powered killer drones are likely to cost little more than a smartphone.” Additionally, killer robots will minimize the human investment required for terrorist attacks, with scholars arguing that “greater degrees of autonomy enable a greater amount of damage to be done by a single person.” Artificial intelligence could make terrorist activity **cheaper financially** and in terms of human capital, lowering the organizational costs required to commit attacks. Secondly, using autonomous weapons will **reduce the trace** left by terrorists. A large number of munitions could be launched — and a large amount of damage done — by a small number of people operating at considerable distance from the target, reducing the signature left behind. In Tegmark’s words, for “a terrorist wanting to assassinate a politician … all they need to do is upload their target’s photo and address into the killer robot: it can then fly to the destination, identify and eliminate the person, and self-destruct to ensure nobody knows who was responsible.” With autonomous weapons technology, terrorist groups will be able to launch increasingly complex attacks, and, when they want to, **escape without detection**. Finally, killer robots could reduce, if not eliminate, the **physical costs and dangers of terrorism**, rendering the operative “essentially invulnerable.” Raising the possibility of “fly and forget” missions, lethal autonomous weapons might simply be deployed toward a target, and engage that target without further human intervention. As P. W. Singer noted in 2012, “one [will] not have to be suicidal to carry out attacks that previously might have required one to be so. This **allows new players into the game**, making al-Qaeda 2.0 and the next-generation version of the Unabomber or Timothy McVeigh far more lethal.” Additionally, lethal autonomous weapons could potentially **reduce human aversion to killing**, making terrorism even more palatable as a tactic for political groups. According to the aforementioned February 2018 report, “AI systems can allow the actors who would otherwise be performing the tasks to retain their anonymity and experience a greater degree of psychological distance from the people they impact”; this would not only improve a terrorist’s chances of escape, as mentioned, but reduce or even eliminate the moral or psychological barriers to murder.

## CP

### 1AR – AT: Boko Haram PIC

#### 2] No U/Q or Scenario for LAW usage in Nigeria – it’s a recommendation not about the Status Quo

Abiodun and Taofeek 3: Abiodun, Temitope (Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies Faculty of Multidisciplinary Studies University of Ibadan, Nigeria) and Raheem Taofeek (Captain, Navigation and Direction, Nigerian Navy). UNENDING WAR ON BOKO HARAM TERROR IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA AND THE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY ROBOTS OR AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS TO COMPLEMENT MILITARY OPERATIONS. International Journal of Advanced Academic Research, Vol International Journal of Advanced Academic Research International Journal of Advanced Academic Research 6, issue 6 (June 2020). <https://www.ijaar.org/articles/v6n6/sms/ijaar-sms-v6n6-jun20-p2.pdf> (SGK)

The developments of the past few years have changed the modus operandi of the use of the armed forces. These robotic systems would therefore need to continue to be deployed in military operations in northeast Nigeria for effective outcomes. What is more important is that the combat role of robotic powers would easily make the decisions over life and death of the Boko Haram terrorists by the press of just a button, or substituting the trained soldiers whose health would never be at risk and families not have to worry again. Benefits of military robots find their ways into strategic industries as: they would produce an accurate and more precise result. Military robots or autonomous weapons systems remain flexible and can easily perform multiple roles of annihilating all the dangerous terrorists’ camps and hideouts in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa respectively. As military robotics are comparatively cheaper compared to hiring human labour (armed forces) to confront the hardened terrorists in the region; they are noiseless or unnoticeable; and these would definitely boost the military operations speedily. Military robots **would help** to carry out an investigation, gather intelligence, surveillance, provide support in the war front, and perform patrol tasks for the troops. However, these robots **can potentially** minimize the loss of life being recorded on daily basis on the part of the Nigerian Armed Forces respectively. Lastly, autonomous weapons system or military robotics would definitely make it easier for soldiers to securely spy locations or breach enemy targets. It is therefore, **recommended** that military robots or autonomous weapons systems be **deployed to complement the Nigerian military operations** in the face of an unending Boko Haram terror in the Northeastern Nigeria.

#### 4] Turn - LAWs hurt counter-terrorism – alienates population

Bogosian 19 Kyle Bogosian 11-13-2019 "On AI Weapons" <https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/vdqBn65Qaw77MpqXz/on-ai-weapons#Disproportionately_worsening_the_strategic_position_of_the_US_and_allies> (Writer at Effective Altruism)//Elmer

Lyall and Wilson (2009), examining both a comprehensive two-century data set and a close case study of two U.S. Army divisions in Iraq, found that mechanization worsens the prospects for effective counterinsurgency. Putting troops behind wheels and armor **alienates** the **populace** and **increases opposition to the militiary involvement**. And I think this can be a case of perverse incentives rather than just a military error because, as noted above, liberal democracies are loss-averse in protracted counterinsurgencies. It takes a lot of political willpower to suffer an additional twenty American troop deaths even if it means that the campaign will be wrapped up sooner with one hundred fewer Iraqi deaths. I presume that if LAWs are used for counterinsurgency operations then they are very likely to display this same effect. They could be overused to save soldier lives in the short term with **worse results for the locals and for the long term**.

#### 5] Nigerian Security at Bases sucks – Boko Haram steals weapons

Reinl 19 James Reinl 4-19-2019 "How stolen weapons keep groups like Boko Haram in business" <https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-04-19/how-stolen-weapons-keep-groups-boko-haram-business> (James Reinl is a journalist, editor and global affairs analyst. He has reported from some 35 countries and won awards for his work in Sri Lanka, Congo, Somalia, Haiti, the US and Iran. He reports for Al Jazeera, Foreign Policy, Fox News, France 24, CBC, CBS News, dpa, RTÉ, The Times, The National, Monocle and APTN. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English from Sussex University and a postgraduate diploma in journalism.)//Elmer

Last November, when Boko Haram militants raided an army base in Metele, a village in northeastern Nigeria’s Borno state, the deaths of dozens of soldiers sent shockwaves across the country. The nation thought it was winning the war against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa province, its splinter group. In the run-up to national elections, critics blamed incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari — elected on a promise to put an end to Boko Haram — for the attack. He and his government downplayed the carnage and warned against “fake news” being spread by extremists. Politicians rowed over reasons for the attack, citing weak strategy and underpaid, ill-equipped troops. But the debate largely missed an aspect of the raid — one of several that month in Nigeria’s restive northeast — that posed a further threat to security. Terror groups often make off with weapons belonging to peacekeeping missions and militaries, and a new report released this week tries to measure the scope of the problem. Each time Boko Haram and ISWAP overpowered a military base, they seized caches of assault rifles and hundreds or thousands of rounds of **ammunition they could use in later strikes, fuelling their bloody rebellions**.

#### 6] No Bioterror – empirics and medicine solves

Lentzos 14 Filippa Lentzos 14, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, http://thebulletin.org/myths-and-realities-synthetic-bioweapons7626

The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions. The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers. Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.

### 1AR – AT: Ceasefire CP

### 1AR – AT: Consult NATO CP

#### 5] NATO says No – your ev is from one person, ours is about NATO’s policy.

Cebul 18 Daniel Cebul 10-7-2018 "Autonomous systems to play key role in NATO logistics drills" <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2018/10/08/autonomous-systems-to-play-key-role-in-nato-logistics-drills/> (Daniel Cebul is an editorial fellow and general assignments writer for Defense News, C4ISRNET, Fifth Domain and Federal Times.)//Elmer

WASHINGTON — As the U.S. military begins to tackle the challenges posed by great power competition and 21st century combat, expeditionary logistics is an area receiving extra attention to ensure troops are more agile and lethal. That’s why the U.S. Marine Corps and NATO allies will be testing these capabilities in Norway later this month during Exercise Trident Juncture 18. More than 40,000 participants, 130 aircraft, 70 naval vessels and 10,000 vehicles are set to participate in the live-fire and computer-assisted command post exercise. But some of those vehicles will be autonomous weapon systems that are set to demonstrate their ability to reduce the need for dedicated manpower on often dangerous resupply missions. Describing the expeditionary logistics experiment, NATO Allied Command Transformation said the “aim of this experiment is to demonstrate the capabilities of autonomous weapon systems, in force protection, building and delivery of supplies to isolated troops, through hazard zones.” Autonomous systems will also be on display during enhanced logistics base experiments. They are expected to demonstrate the ability of autonomous and automated systems with an aim toward significantly improving military logistics by upgrading services and downgrading manpower.

### 1AR – AT: Future Gens CP (Harker)

#### 7] Doesn’t solve the aff – Israeli’s don’t care about future generations - Israeli people think Palestine is an existential threat anyways so they have no incentive to do it since "future gens" would be considered threatened by Hamas and the MIddle East – view this as a “say no” argument and a solvency def to the cp

### 1AR – AT: ICJ CP

#### 5] ICJ is useless and has no compliance.

Posner 4, Eric A. "The decline of the international court of justice." U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper 233 (2004). (Full Time Teaching Faculty. Eric A. Posner. Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair)//Elmer

II. Decline The decline of the ICJ is best seen from its usage data. Figure 1 shows the history of filings of contentious cases. The bars show the number of filings in a given year; they range from 0 (in various years) to 17 (in 1999); the line shows the five year moving average. One can perhaps discern a gradual trend upward, driven almost entirely by the spike in 1999. What does seem true is that ICJ usage enjoyed a recovery in the 1980s and 1990s from a trough in the 1960s and 1970s. Eyeballing the graph, it’s not clear whether the recovery brings us back to the earlier level or to a higher level. But the raw data in Figure 1 are misleading for several reasons. 1. They do not take account of the large increase in the number of states that can benefit from ICJ dispute resolution. In 1946, there were only 55 UN members; today there are 191.7 Adjusting for the increase in the number of states, the U shape of the curve remains, but the decline is more precipitous, the recovery more gradual, and the initial usage level is never matched. 2. We have counted many cases that never progressed beyond the filing stage and required the ICJ to make a non-ministerial decision. These cases only add noise because the ICJ does not actually perform any function. 3. The final decade of the ICJ’s existence contained one anomalous case. In 1999, Yugoslavia filed proceedings against all the Nato countries for violating international law during the intervention in Kosovo. Thus, we count 10 cases for what is essentially a single case with multiple respondents. When the figures are adjusted, a new pattern emerges. We see a decline in usage of the ICJ with, at best, a very gradual recovery during the 1990s, but not to the levels seen in the 1950s. Figure 2 provides a slightly different perspective, focusing on judgments rather than filings, though a graph of the filings would be quite similar.8 The conclusion that the popularity of the ICJ has declined is bolstered by several factors. First, the ICJ is being abandoned by the major powers. Consider the countries that currently have the ten largest economies: USA, China, Japan, India, Germany, U.K., France, Italy, Brazil, and Russia. Four of these states – China, Japan, Brazil, and Russia (U.S.S.R.) – **have never brought a proceeding, and never been a respondent** beyond the filing stage. Table 2 lists cases involving the other major parties, excepting special agreement cases. In the first twenty year period, a major power was an applicant in 60 percent of the cases, and a respondent in 60 percent of the cases. In the second period, a major power was an applicant a little under 50 percent of the time, and a respondent a little under 50 percent of the time (depending on how one counts India). In the last period, a major power was an applicant **in only 13 percent of the cases**; a major power was a defendant in 100 percent of the cases.9 This trend is suggestive. Increasingly, major powers are not applicants that drag other states into courts; they are respondents being dragged by other, usually weaker, states into court. It thus would not be surprising if major powers have begun to sour on the court. I will discuss the possible reasons for this trend in Part IV. The decline of major power interest in ICJ adjudication is reflected not only in these usage statistics; also recall that with the United States’ withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction in 1985,10 France’s in 1974,11 and China’s in 1972,12 only the U.K., among permanent security council members, is subject to this form of jurisdiction. Among the top thirty states (measured by current GDP), only Japan, the U.K., India, Canada, Mexico, Spain, Australia, the Netherlands, Poland, the Philippines, Pakistan, Belgium, and Egypt have submitted to compulsory jurisdiction; and, among these states, Japan, Poland, the Philippines, and Egypt have never appeared before the ICJ – as respondent or applicant – under any head of jurisdiction. The ICJ has historically been dominated by the U.S., the U.K., and France. In the last twenty years, these states, as a group, brought a case only once. Second, although the number of states that have filed under the optional clause has roughly doubled since 1946, the fraction of states that has filed has declined, and so has its practical value in providing the ICJ with jurisdiction. In 1950, 60 percent of the states were subject to compulsory jurisdiction; today, this fraction has declined to 34 percent. And, of these states, few have been involved in ICJ litigation. Focusing on cases where the applicant successfully invoked compulsory jurisdiction and then prevailed on the merits,13 we count four instances from 1946 to 1965, eleven instances from 1966 to 1985, and three instances from 1986 to 2004. Thus, the doubling of states subject to compulsory jurisdiction has had no impact on its usage.14 This may be due in part to states’ use of reservations to limit their consent to ICJ jurisdiction even when they submit to compulsory jurisdiction.15 Third, states have showed less and less **enthusiasm for treaty-based jurisdiction**.16 From 1946 to 1965, states entered (on an annual basis) 9.7 multilateral or bilateral treaties that contained clauses that granted jurisdiction to the ICJ. This number dropped to 2.8 per year for the period from 1966 to 1985, and to 1.3 per year from 1986 to 2004.17 These numbers are absolute; recall again the number of states tripled during this period. Figure 3 provides the trend; the line shows the number of states. The U.S., which was an enthusiastic user of ICJ treaty clauses in the 1950s and 1960s, apparently has not used this type of clause a single time since the early 1970s.18 Fourth, the only positive trend for the ICJ has involved special agreement cases. The ICJ had only four such cases during the first half of its existence; it has had ten during its second half. But in special agreement cases, the ICJ is just a glorified arbitration panel; indeed, states now routinely exclude most of the ICJ judges from the panel that hears the case. While the ICJ may serve a useful function as an arbitration panel, this was not its purpose. Fifth, during the period of the ICJ’s existence, global interaction has expanded dramatically. There are far more opportunities for (say) aerial incidents today than in the past because there is far more crossborder air traffic, even holding the number of states constant. Thus, in determining relative usage, using the number of states as the denominator probably exaggerates the ICJ’s importance.19 At the same time, it must be acknowledged that there are many more international courts than in the past – the ECJ, for example, may have taken much of the business of the ICJ – but many of these have business that the ICJ has never had (the WTO), and many others have not had much business so far (ITLOS). So although it is probably impossible to measure the ICJ workload correctly adjusted for the expansion of global interaction, it seems likely that it has lagged globalization. A note on compliance. One might ask whether usage of the ICJ has declined because states have failed to comply with its judgments. This question just begs the further question why states would not comply with the ICJ’s judgments, but the data may be interesting nonetheless. Measuring compliance with ICJ judgments is difficult for various reasons: many states comply but only years after the judgment was rendered; other states comply but only partially; and so forth. I largely defer to the work of others. Ginsburg and McAdams provide the most complete data.20 They examined the post-judgment behavior of states, and classified it as either compliance or noncompliance. I depart from their coding in one respect: I drop contentious cases in which the respondent prevailed. The reason is that if the respondent prevails, it is not clear whether the applicant “complies”: it might pursue its claim diplomatically, for example. Indeed, an applicant could do this consistently with international law, for an adverse judgment based on jurisdiction or prudential grounds does not negate a claim under international law. By contrast, it seems reasonably clear that a respondent who loses a case either complies with it by giving the applicant what it sought, or violates it by refusing to change its behavior.21 (I include all special agreement cases, which do not technically have an applicant and respondent.) I divide the cases into twenty year periods, and compute the mean compliance rate. I provide separate figures for all cases and for compulsory jurisdiction and treaty-based cases, as special agreement cases are more like arbitration than like judicial cases. The results are in Table 3. The table shows that the compliance rate – whether including or excluding special agreement cases – **was much higher in the ICJ’s first twenty years than in its last twenty years.** This is consistent with the conjecture that **states have lost confidence in the ICJ** after an initial honeymoon period. There has been a slight recovery in the last few years, however. In any event, there are too few observations to have much confidence in the statistics.

#### 7] No Impact to Multilat

Langenhove 11 Luk Van Langenhove 5-31-2011 “Multilateralism 2.0: The transformation of international relations” <http://unu.edu/publications/articles/multilateralism-2-0-the-transformation-of-international-relations.html> (Director of the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Institute of the United Nations University)//Elmer

Two major developments are currently transforming the multilateral system. The first is the trend towards multi-polarity as expressed by the rising number of states that act as key players. There have been times when only a few or even one player dominated the geopolitical game. But today it seems that several states are becoming dominant players as global or regional actors. The (voting) behavior of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in the UN and their presence in the G20 illustrates this trend. The second development, meanwhile, is that new types of actors are changing the nature of the playing multilateral field. Regions with statehood properties are increasingly present in the area of international relations. Since 1974, the European Union (EU) for instance has been an observer in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). But on 3 May 2011, UNGA upgraded the EU’s status by giving it speaking rights. And that same resolution opens the door for other regional organizations to request the same speaking rights. Undoubtedly, this is what is what will happen in the near future. But as stated by some UN members in discussions on this resolution, this could unbalance the ‘one state, one vote’ rule within the UN. On the other hand, this opening towards regional organizations brings with it new opportunities. Together these two developments illustrate that multilateralism is no longer only a play between states: various regions as well as other actors are present and are profoundly changing the multilateral game. But thinking about multilateralism is still very much based upon the centrality of states: they are regarded as the constitutive elements of the multilateral system and it is their interrelations that determine the form and content of multilateralism. This implies that international politics is regarded as a closed system in at least two ways: firstly, it spans the whole world; and, secondly, there are huge barriers to enter the system. Many authors have pointed to all kinds of dys-functions such as the complexity of the UN system with its decentralized and overlapping array of councils and agencies, or to the divides between developed and developing countries. The emergence of truly global problems such as climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and many others have indeed led to an increasing paradox of governance. As Thakur and Van Langenhove put it in Global Governance (2006, 12:3) “[t]he policy authority for tackling global problems still belong to the states, while the sources of the problems and potential solutions are situated at transnational, regional or global level”. As such the building blocks of multilateralism, the states, seem to be less and less capable of dealing with the challenges of globalization. But because the multilateral world order is so dependent on the input of states, multilateralism itself is not functioning well. From an open to a closed system One way to capture the above-mentioned developments is to use the metaphor of ‘multilateralism 2.0’ in order to stress how the playing field and the players in multilateralism are changing. The essence of the Web 2.0 metaphor is that it stresses the emergence of network thinking and practices in international relations, as well as the transformation of multilateralism from a closed to an open system. In multilateralism 1.0 the principle actors in the inter-state space of international relations are states. National governments are the ‘star players’. Intergovernmental organizations are only dependent agents whose degrees of freedom only go as far as the states allow them to go. The primacy of sovereignty is the ultimate principle of international relations. In contrast, in multilateralism 2.0, there are players other than sovereign states that play a role and some of these players challenge the notion of sovereignty. Regions are one such type of actor. Conceived by states, other players can have statehood properties and as such aim to be actors in the multilateral system. Regional organizations especially are willing and able to play such a role. But sub-national regions as well increasingly have multilateral ambitions as demonstrated by their efforts towards para-diplomacy. As a result ‘international relations’ is becoming much more than just inter-state relations. Regions are claiming their place as well. This has major consequences for how international relations develop and become institutionalized, as well as for how international relations ought to be studied. What was once an exclusive playing ground for states has now become a space that states have to share with others. It is a fascinating phenomenon: both supra- and sub-national governance entities are largely built by states and can therefore be regarded as ‘dependent agencies’ of those states. However, once created, these entities start to have a life of their own and are not always totally controllable by their founding fathers. These new sub- and supra-entities are knocking on the door of the multilateral system because the have a tendency to behave ‘as if’ they were states. This actorness gives them, at least in principle, the possibility to position themselves against other actors, including their founding fathers! All of this has weakened the Westphalian relation between state and sovereignty. ‘One state, one vote’ Organizing multilateralism in a state-centric would only be possible if all states are treated as equal. This means that irrespective of the differences in territorial size, population size, military power or economic strength, all states have the same legal personality. Or in other words, the Westphalian principle of sovereign equality means working with the principle of ‘one state, one vote’, although it is universally acknowledged that this principle does not correspond to the reality. In multilateralism 2.0 this could be balanced through a more flexible system that compares actors in terms of certain dimensions (such as economic power) regardless of the type of actors they are. In other words, one can for instance compare big states with regions or small states with sub-national regions. This allows not only a more flexible form of multilateralism. It could perhaps also lead to a more just system with a more equal balance of power and representation. Within the present multilateral system, the UN occupies a major position. But, in order to adapt to the emerging ‘mode 2.0’ of multilateralism, it needs to open up to regions. This is a problem, as the UN is a global organization with sovereign states as members. Indeed, the way the UN is organized, only sovereign states, the star players, can be full members (see Article four of the UN Charter). Even though the EU was granted speaking rights, it was not granted voting rights. Chapter VIII of the Charter also mentions the possibility of cooperation with regional organizations and right from its conception there have been attempts to go beyond a state-centric approach. However, for many years now, the UN has struggled with the question of what place supra-national regional organizations should and could take in achieving UN goals. On one end of the spectrum is the position that regionalism blocks the necessary global and universal approach needed to solve the problems of today. At the other end there is the position that regionalism can serve the overall goals of the UN. Obviously, the question is not only a philosophical one. Rather, it is also about power of institutions. Are regional organizations weakening the UN or can they be considered as allies of the UN in dealing with supra-national problems? Further recognition required The key issue in relation to any institutional reform aimed at reinforcing multilateralism is how to create a balance of power among UN members and a balance of responsibilities and representation for the people of our planet. Such a complex set of balances cannot be found if reform propositions continue to be based upon states as the sole building blocks of multilateralism. A radical rethinking is needed, which recognizes that, next to states, world regions based upon integration processes between states have to play a role in establishing an effective multilateralism. Today’s reality is that, next to states, world regions are becoming increasingly important tools of global governance. There needs to be, however, a lot of creative and innovative thinking based upon careful analysis of the regional dimensions of ongoing conflicts and of existing cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. The upgrading of the EU’s status in the UN is an important step forward. But it is not enough. Other regional organizations such as the African Union, ASEAN or the League of Arab States should follow. And next to speaking rights, collaboration between the UN and regional organizations needs to be further developed. This is the only way to increase regional ownership of what the UN and its Security Council decide. As a matter of fact, this recently happened with the UNSC resolution 1973 regarding Libya: explicit reference is made to the African Union, the League of Arab States and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Moreover, the League of Arab States’ members are requested to act in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in implementing the resolution. Reviving Chapter VIII seems to be a promising way to combine global concerns with local (regional) legitimacy and capacity to act. The challenge is that in line with the complexity of the emerging new world order, any proposal to rethink multilateralism in such a way that it incorporates regionalism needs to be flexible. A simplistic system of regional representations that replace the national representations will not work. And not only the UN, but also the regional organizations themselves need to adjust to the reality of multilateralism 2.0. In this respect it remains to be seen to what extent the EU Member States will allow the EU to speak with one vision. And above all, in order to become politically feasible, the idea of a multi-regional world order needs to be supported and promoted by civil society. As long as this is not the case, old habits and organizational structures will not change, and the world will not become a more secure place to live in.

#### 8] No ICJ impact

Posner 4, Eric A. "The decline of the international court of justice." U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper 233 (2004). (Full Time Teaching Faculty. Eric A. Posner. Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair)//Elmer

II. Decline The decline of the ICJ is best seen from its usage data. Figure 1 shows the history of filings of contentious cases. The bars show the number of filings in a given year; they range from 0 (in various years) to 17 (in 1999); the line shows the five year moving average. One can perhaps discern a gradual trend upward, driven almost entirely by the spike in 1999. What does seem true is that ICJ usage enjoyed a recovery in the 1980s and 1990s from a trough in the 1960s and 1970s. Eyeballing the graph, it’s not clear whether the recovery brings us back to the earlier level or to a higher level. But the raw data in Figure 1 are misleading for several reasons. 1. They do not take account of the large increase in the number of states that can benefit from ICJ dispute resolution. In 1946, there were only 55 UN members; today there are 191.7 Adjusting for the increase in the number of states, the U shape of the curve remains, but the decline is more precipitous, the recovery more gradual, and the initial usage level is never matched. 2. We have counted many cases that never progressed beyond the filing stage and required the ICJ to make a non-ministerial decision. These cases only add noise because the ICJ does not actually perform any function. 3. The final decade of the ICJ’s existence contained one anomalous case. In 1999, Yugoslavia filed proceedings against all the Nato countries for violating international law during the intervention in Kosovo. Thus, we count 10 cases for what is essentially a single case with multiple respondents. When the figures are adjusted, a new pattern emerges. We see a decline in usage of the ICJ with, at best, a very gradual recovery during the 1990s, but not to the levels seen in the 1950s. Figure 2 provides a slightly different perspective, focusing on judgments rather than filings, though a graph of the filings would be quite similar.8 The conclusion that the popularity of the ICJ has declined is bolstered by several factors. First, the ICJ is being abandoned by the major powers. Consider the countries that currently have the ten largest economies: USA, China, Japan, India, Germany, U.K., France, Italy, Brazil, and Russia. Four of these states – China, Japan, Brazil, and Russia (U.S.S.R.) – **have never brought a proceeding, and never been a respondent** beyond the filing stage. Table 2 lists cases involving the other major parties, excepting special agreement cases. In the first twenty year period, a major power was an applicant in 60 percent of the cases, and a respondent in 60 percent of the cases. In the second period, a major power was an applicant a little under 50 percent of the time, and a respondent a little under 50 percent of the time (depending on how one counts India). In the last period, a major power was an applicant **in only 13 percent of the cases**; a major power was a defendant in 100 percent of the cases.9 This trend is suggestive. Increasingly, major powers are not applicants that drag other states into courts; they are respondents being dragged by other, usually weaker, states into court. It thus would not be surprising if major powers have begun to sour on the court. I will discuss the possible reasons for this trend in Part IV. The decline of major power interest in ICJ adjudication is reflected not only in these usage statistics; also recall that with the United States’ withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction in 1985,10 France’s in 1974,11 and China’s in 1972,12 only the U.K., among permanent security council members, is subject to this form of jurisdiction. Among the top thirty states (measured by current GDP), only Japan, the U.K., India, Canada, Mexico, Spain, Australia, the Netherlands, Poland, the Philippines, Pakistan, Belgium, and Egypt have submitted to compulsory jurisdiction; and, among these states, Japan, Poland, the Philippines, and Egypt have never appeared before the ICJ – as respondent or applicant – under any head of jurisdiction. The ICJ has historically been dominated by the U.S., the U.K., and France. In the last twenty years, these states, as a group, brought a case only once. Second, although the number of states that have filed under the optional clause has roughly doubled since 1946, the fraction of states that has filed has declined, and so has its practical value in providing the ICJ with jurisdiction. In 1950, 60 percent of the states were subject to compulsory jurisdiction; today, this fraction has declined to 34 percent. And, of these states, few have been involved in ICJ litigation. Focusing on cases where the applicant successfully invoked compulsory jurisdiction and then prevailed on the merits,13 we count four instances from 1946 to 1965, eleven instances from 1966 to 1985, and three instances from 1986 to 2004. Thus, the doubling of states subject to compulsory jurisdiction has had no impact on its usage.14 This may be due in part to states’ use of reservations to limit their consent to ICJ jurisdiction even when they submit to compulsory jurisdiction.15 Third, states have showed less and less **enthusiasm for treaty-based jurisdiction**.16 From 1946 to 1965, states entered (on an annual basis) 9.7 multilateral or bilateral treaties that contained clauses that granted jurisdiction to the ICJ. This number dropped to 2.8 per year for the period from 1966 to 1985, and to 1.3 per year from 1986 to 2004.17 These numbers are absolute; recall again the number of states tripled during this period. Figure 3 provides the trend; the line shows the number of states. The U.S., which was an enthusiastic user of ICJ treaty clauses in the 1950s and 1960s, apparently has not used this type of clause a single time since the early 1970s.18 Fourth, the only positive trend for the ICJ has involved special agreement cases. The ICJ had only four such cases during the first half of its existence; it has had ten during its second half. But in special agreement cases, the ICJ is just a glorified arbitration panel; indeed, states now routinely exclude most of the ICJ judges from the panel that hears the case. While the ICJ may serve a useful function as an arbitration panel, this was not its purpose. Fifth, during the period of the ICJ’s existence, global interaction has expanded dramatically. There are far more opportunities for (say) aerial incidents today than in the past because there is far more crossborder air traffic, even holding the number of states constant. Thus, in determining relative usage, using the number of states as the denominator probably exaggerates the ICJ’s importance.19 At the same time, it must be acknowledged that there are many more international courts than in the past – the ECJ, for example, may have taken much of the business of the ICJ – but many of these have business that the ICJ has never had (the WTO), and many others have not had much business so far (ITLOS). So although it is probably impossible to measure the ICJ workload correctly adjusted for the expansion of global interaction, it seems likely that it has lagged globalization. A note on compliance. One might ask whether usage of the ICJ has declined because states have failed to comply with its judgments. This question just begs the further question why states would not comply with the ICJ’s judgments, but the data may be interesting nonetheless. Measuring compliance with ICJ judgments is difficult for various reasons: many states comply but only years after the judgment was rendered; other states comply but only partially; and so forth. I largely defer to the work of others. Ginsburg and McAdams provide the most complete data.20 They examined the post-judgment behavior of states, and classified it as either compliance or noncompliance. I depart from their coding in one respect: I drop contentious cases in which the respondent prevailed. The reason is that if the respondent prevails, it is not clear whether the applicant “complies”: it might pursue its claim diplomatically, for example. Indeed, an applicant could do this consistently with international law, for an adverse judgment based on jurisdiction or prudential grounds does not negate a claim under international law. By contrast, it seems reasonably clear that a respondent who loses a case either complies with it by giving the applicant what it sought, or violates it by refusing to change its behavior.21 (I include all special agreement cases, which do not technically have an applicant and respondent.) I divide the cases into twenty year periods, and compute the mean compliance rate. I provide separate figures for all cases and for compulsory jurisdiction and treaty-based cases, as special agreement cases are more like arbitration than like judicial cases. The results are in Table 3. The table shows that the compliance rate – whether including or excluding special agreement cases – **was much higher in the ICJ’s first twenty years than in its last twenty years.** This is consistent with the conjecture that **states have lost confidence in the ICJ** after an initial honeymoon period. There has been a slight recovery in the last few years, however. In any event, there are too few observations to have much confidence in the statistics.

### 1AR – AT: Iron Dome Pic

#### 1] do the cp

#### A] Iron Dome isn’t autonomous – it’s human on the loop

-checked (sid)

Cook 19, Adam. Taming Killer Robots: Giving Meaning to the" meaningful Human Control" Standard for Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems. Air University Press, Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 2019. (Lieutenant Colonel, USAF)//Elmer

A human **on the loop** weapon system, by contrast, is one which can select and engage targets independently but operates under **the direct supervision of a human operator** **with the ability to intervene** and cancel engagements when necessary. These systems, which utilize preset parameters in combination with inputs from their sensors to identify authorized targets, have to date been used exclusively in defensive systems used to protect installations, ships, or human populations from incoming missiles, mortars, or artillery barrages. Examples include Israel’s **Iron Dome** antimissile system, the US Navy’s Phalanx Aegis-class ship defense system, and the US Army’s Patriot batteries

#### On the Loop is not Autonomous

-checked (sid)

Sayler 19, Kelley M. "Defense Primer: US Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems." Congressional Research Service, March 27 (2019). (former Associate Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where she worked with the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program and the Future of Warfare Initiative.)//Elmer

U.S. Policy Definitions. There is no agreed definition of lethal autonomous weapon systems that is used in international fora. However, Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.09 (the directive), which establishes U.S. policy on autonomy in weapons systems, provides definitions for different categories of autonomous weapon systems for the purposes of the U.S. military. These definitions are principally grounded in the role of the human operator with regard to target selection and engagement decisions, rather than in the technological sophistication of the weapon system. DODD 3000.09 defines LAWS as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and **engage targets without further intervention** by a human operator.” This concept of autonomy is also known as “human out of the loop” or “full autonomy.” The directive **contrasts LAWS with** human supervised, or “human on the loop,” autonomous weapon systems, in which operators have the ability to monitor and halt a weapon’s target engagement. Another category is semi-autonomous, or “human in the loop,” weapon systems that “only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by a human operator.” Semiautonomous weapons include so-called “fire and forget”

#### b] Not Lethal – target isn’t humans

-checked (sid)

FILI Future of Life Institute "LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS" <https://futureoflife.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems/?cn-reloaded=1> (The Future of Life Institute is a non-profit research institute and outreach organization in the Boston area that works to mitigate existential risks facing humanity, particularly existential risk from advanced artificial intelligence.)//Elmer+Aadit

Myth: Mandating human control would outlaw autonomous missile defense systems. Fact: Missile defense systems and other anti-materiel weapons aren’t lethal AWS systems. Their targets are not humans. Lethal AWS systems refer to a narrow subset of autonomous weapons systems where the target of the weapon system is a human. Autonomous weapons systems designed to defend against incoming missiles, or other anti-materiel targets, would not be subject to the mandate.

#### 2] Turn – Israeli BMD leads to arms racing – Hamas strategy of saturation and mortar fire, Hezbollah precision missiles, Iran missile development, and momentum for BMD development in IDF prove

Preisler-Swery, 15 (Dana, researcher at the Dado Center, led the political-security branch and studied the Israeli security concept at the Reut Institute and holds an MA in Security Studies from Tel Aviv University, Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, The Dado Center Journal for Operational Art, Vol 4, Defense and Home Front – A Reconsideration, July 2015) Mhs AW

The Influence of the Iron Dome System on the Operational Concepts of Hamas and Hezbollah: Efforts in the Operational Concept and Force Design Domain The experience gained by Hamas in OPD and OPE vis-à-vis the Iron Dome system, led it to draw conclusions and to engage in a two-phase learning process. In the first phase, which took place during the operations themselves, the organization adjusted quickly to Iron Dome. In the second, a parallel learning process took place in both Hamas and Hezbollah which was reflected in changes to their operational concepts and future force design channels. It should be noted that Hezbollah, while it has not yet faced the Iron Dome in direct combat, is learning and drawing conclusions from the successes and failures of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, by virtue of its observation capabilities, and the many resources at its disposal.22 Hamas attempted to cope with Israeli defensive systems primarily through saturation attempts. Saturation of the system was mainly attempted by launching dozens of rockets from multiple locations toward one target, or by launching from one location to several targets. Furthermore, it is possible to identify Hamas attempts to locate gaps in the defensive array, seen in mortar fire at targets near the border. It also seems that some of the fire was meant to achieve psychological warfare goals, especially the salvos launched by Hamas in the evening, during the main news broadcasts, which were even announced in advance. Furthermore, during OPE, Hamas first introduced additional strategic capabilities it had acquired, featuring the extensive use of the underground realm, land and naval commando forces, a concept of launching raids into Israeli territory, and the use of UAVs, thus achieving important propaganda effect. In the force design field, it seems that the most important revolution that the other side is undergoing (particularly Hezbollah at this stage) is the transition to precision fires. Previously, Israel did not face precision missiles that could accurately strike military and civilian targets and the defensive systems themselves. Despite the great challenge posed by precision capabilities, it is likely that the extent of the barrages will decrease due to cost considerations and to the accuracy which obviates the need to fire large salvos.23 As for future force design, it is not clear whether Israel's adversaries, mainly Iran, see the missile defense systems as a real threat. Iranian threat analyses do not focus exclusively on Israel, but also on the American presence in the region and American defensive systems in the Persian Gulf. Facing these threats, Iran continues to research and develop missiles in order to enlarge its missile array and to achieve cruise, homing, stealth and maneuver capabilities, alongside the development of a satellite array and UAVs.24 Arms Race - The Gap and the Opportunity It is important to note that given the emerging capabilities possessed by Israel's adversaries, the Israeli missile defense concept is developing too. Israel has not yet unveiled the Magic Wand system designed to cope with the precision missiles in Hezbollah’s hands, and its introduction in coming years is expected to intensify the presence of missiles and rockets in the region’s skies. As a result, in practice, a ballistic arms race is developing between Israel and its enemies led by Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Each side presents a new and threatening capability, requiring the other to present a counter capability. At the same time, gaps may open between the concept guiding Israel and the emerging capabilities among its adversaries, their concepts and future force design. As noted above, Israel's missile defense concept was designed in light of the political echelon's demand to remove the missile threat to Israel's home front, allowing Israelis to maintain a normal routine.25 However, Israel's enemies have also persisted and built large rockets and missile arrays with precise and deadly capabilities, and have begun to study Israeli defense systems, their advantages and disadvantages, in order to break through them. It is possible that two gaps have opened between the Israeli missile defense concept and the reality of the emerging trends. The first gap comes from the fact that the development of defensive capabilities affects the adversary's behavior, which is developing counter capabilities to bypass the Israeli defense systems. The second gap stems from the success of Israel’s defensive capabilities and its impact on the IDF operational concept, and the relations between its various elements (especially the relationship between defense, decisive defeat and deterrence). In practice, missile defense is gaining momentum within the IDF in parallel to the missile development on the other side, and this reality is leading to an evolving arms race between Israel and its adversaries with implications for force employment, force design and the evolution of the conflict.

### 1AR – AT: Moratorium CP

#### 7] Moratorium Fails

Altmann and Sauer 17, Jürgen, and Frank Sauer. "Autonomous weapon systems and strategic stability." Survival 59.5 (2017): 117-142. (Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo, and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Both authors are members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC).)//Elmer

Three alternatives to a ban, possibly in some combination, are conceivable. One is an internationally agreed moratorium on the development and deployment of AWS. This might buy time for further research and development, and additional consideration of the risks and benefits of AWS. This seems an unlikely and unwise next step, however, **due to the dual-use nature of AWS technology and thus the immense ease with which such an agreement could be spoiled**. A second alternative is a non-binding agreement on best practices or a ‘code of conduct’ with an emphasis on compliance with existing international humanitarian law and more rigorous unilateral weapons reviews in accordance with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.61 This approach attempts to address legal concerns but does nothing to counter the detrimental effects of AWS on strategic stability. Moreover, it would be incomplete, because only a few states conduct Article 36 weapons reviews – without any obligation to share the results, one might add. The third possibility is an agreement between the major powers and states leading in AWS technology that curbs strategic-escalation risks. This could entail limiting or even precluding AWS interactions, especially swarms, as well as excluding specific targets, such as nuclear weapons, from AWS attacks.62 The resulting loss of military capabilities would be so great, however, that it seems unlikely that any AWS-capable state would agree to it. Nor does this solution address concerns related to international humanitarian law. It is also worth mentioning that none of these options would address the fundamental ethical problem posed by AWS – that killing people with an anonymous, unaccountable algorithm arguably amounts to a violation of human dignity. Verifying compliance would also be a problem. Nonbinding agreements would by definition not be subject to verification, but even an international, legally binding moratorium, which would be subject to verification, would present difficulties – just as in the ‘zero solution’ case of a prohibition. However, a ban might promise enough advantages to prompt the international community to actually muster the resources required for addressing the verification problem.

### 1AR – AT: Regulations CP

#### 4] Israel circumvents the cp but not the plan

Altmann and Sauer 17, Jürgen, and Frank Sauer. "Autonomous weapon systems and strategic stability." Survival 59.5 (2017): 117-142. (Jürgen Altmann is a lecturer in experimental physics at Technical University of Dortmund, working on the prospective assessment of new military technologies and the analysis of preventive arms-control measures. Frank Sauer is a senior research fellow and lecturer in international relations at Bundeswehr University in Munich, working on international security and arms control. He is the author of Atomic Anxiety: Deterrence, Taboo, and the Non-Use of U.S. Nuclear Weapons (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Both authors are members of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC).)//Elmer

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### 1AR – AT: Soft Law CP (Debate Drills)

#### b] IHRL fails

Posner 14 Eric Posner 12-4-2014 “The case against human rights” <http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights> (professor of law at the University of Chicago)//Elmer

At a time when human rights violations remain widespread, the discourse of human rights continues to flourish. The use of “human rights” in English-language books has increased 200-fold since 1940, and is used today 100 times more often than terms such as “constitutional rights” and “natural rights”. Although people have always criticised governments, it is only in recent decades that they have begun to do so in the distinctive idiom of human rights. The United States and Europe have recently condemned human rights violations in Syria, Russia, China and Iran. Western countries often make foreign aid conditional on human rights and have even launched military interventions based on human rights violations. Many people argue that the incorporation of the idea of human rights into international law is one of the great moral achievements of human history. Because human rights law gives rights to all people regardless of nationality, it deprives governments of their traditional riposte when foreigners criticise them for abusing their citizens – namely “sovereignty” (which is law-speak for “none of your business”). Thus, international human rights law provides people with invaluable protections against the power of the state. And yet it is hard to avoid the conclusion that governments continue to violate human rights with impunity. Why, for example, do more than 150 countries (out of 193 countries that belong to the UN) engage in torture? Why has the number of authoritarian countries increased in the last several years? Why do women remain a subordinate class in nearly all countries of the world? Why do children continue to work in mines and factories in so many countries? The truth is that human rights law has failed to accomplish its objectives. There is little evidence that human rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the wellbeing of people. The reason is that human rights were never as universal as people hoped, and the belief that they could be forced upon countries as a matter of international law was shot through with misguided assumptions from the very beginning. The human rights movement shares something in common with the hubris of development economics, which in previous decades tried (and failed) to alleviate poverty by imposing top-down solutions on developing countries. But where development economists have reformed their approach, the human rights movement has yet to acknowledge its failures. It is time for a reckoning.

### 1AR – AT: War Torts CP

#### 3] War Torts Fail – multiple warrants

Dickinson 18, Laura. "Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: The Overlooked Importance of Administrative Accountability." Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems: The overlooked importance of administrative accountability, in The Impact of Emerging Technologies on the Law of Armed Conflict (Eric Talbot Jensen & Ronald Alcala eds., Oxford University Press 2018 Forthcoming) (2018). (Oswald Symister Colclough Research Professor of Law and Professor of Law at The George Washington University Law School)//Elmer

While important, **Crootof’s “war torts” framework suffers from some limitations**. To begin with, it is a bit unclear precisely what the “war torts” idea **adds to existing law**. After all, under LOAC/IHL itself, states are already responsible for respecting LOAC/IHL, even when the violations in question would not amount to crimes. Moreover, the substantive law of state responsibility provides a doctrinal framework for assessing the conditions under which states can be held responsible, in general, for violations of international law. Crootof seems to be arguing that, within those substantive legal doctrines, it is important to frame certain violations as “war torts,” but it is unclear whether she is suggesting that concepts from domestic tort law should be imported into the existing analytical framework, and if so, how exactly these concepts would apply to situations involving autonomous weapons **or how they would improve upon existing doctrine**. In addition, other obstacles exist. There are actually relatively **few international venues that exist to adjudicate these types of “war torts,”** even if incidents were framed as such. The leading available international tribunal, the International Court of Justice, is a court of quite limited jurisdiction. Moreover, only states may initiate cases, and they are often **reluctant to do so** for a variety of reasons. With only a small number of entities empowered to initiate cases, few incentives for these entities to do so, and limited available venues, any “war torts” would likely **be significantly under-enforced** in international courts and tribunals. Meanwhile, initiating proceedings for “war torts” in domestic courts poses any number of challenges, including limits on the enforceability of international law within domestic judicial systems and possible contractor and governmental immunity doctrines that might be asserted. In sum, while a tort framework holds some promise, and there is an existing framework of state responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law that do not involve criminal acts, **tort liability for the use of autonomous weapons entails significant challenges and cannot be a full response to concerns about accountability**.

## K

### 1AR – AT: Fem IR Kritik

#### Framework – the ballot decides whether the normative statement of the plan is true or not.

#### A] Fairness – arbitrary frameworks moot the 1AC – there are infinite parts of the 1AC they could problematize which forces 1ar restart. Fairness o/w—debate’s a competitive game and they presuppose fair evaluation of their arguments.

#### B] Clash – Our scholarship is tied to the consequences of the plan – their model lets them get through the 2NR without addressing the aff and do non-specific link debating instead of comparative impact and alt debating

#### AT Epistemology first: No, the aff is 6 minutes of impacts premised on the consequences of the plan, we shouldn’t be forced to weigh something we haven’t justified.

#### AT Subject Formation: a) Debate is not a cite of subject formation – it’s a side effect of the discussions we have, we think our discussions should center around the plan, b) our model is better for subject formation because it creates better debating that leads to info processing, engagement and clash.

#### Ext O/W

#### Realism can be an effective bridge for alternate understanding of geopolitics BUT wholesale rejection only re-creates the same problematic aspects of realism that they’ve identified

Guzzini, Stefano. Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy: the continuing story of a death foretold. Routledge, 2013. (Senior Researcher in Foreign Policy at Danish Institute for Foreign Studies)//Elmer

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history **and start anew**. **This is a non-option.** Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a disappointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which **permeates our daily language** for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, **forgetting realism is also questionable**. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean that they **should lose the capacity to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions**, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

### 1AR – AT: Arms Control Kritik (Harker)

#### Framework – the ballot decides whether the normative statement of the plan is true or not.

#### A] Fairness – arbitrary frameworks moot the 1AC – there are infinite parts of the 1AC they could problematize which forces 1ar restart. Fairness o/w—debate’s a competitive game and they presuppose fair evaluation of their arguments.

#### B] Clash – Our scholarship is tied to the consequences of the plan – their model lets them get through the 2NR without addressing the aff and do non-specific link debating instead of comparative impact and alt debating

#### AT Cooper: If we win an IL it disproves you’re argument which is literally just “the aff is scifi” – we are winning escalation so ur wrong.

#### Extinction o/w

#### Threats are real – focusing on specific situations of urgency is good and discounting things for moves towards sovereignty does nothing

Knudsen 11 (Olav, professor @ Södertörn University College, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization”, <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010601032003007)> //BS 12-17-2017

**In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parliaments before the concept was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this** emphasis on the subjective is a misleading conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat**. Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War,** threats **– in the sense of plausible possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they** refer to ‘real’ phenomena **now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter.** Threats have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening**. The point of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view “security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to the security dilemma in a recent article.** This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to insignificant concerns**. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver aptly calls it. Now, here – in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater.** When real situations of urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy**. But in Wæver’s world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that** instead of ‘abolishing’ threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them**, as Wæver does,** we should continue paying attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states **(such as civil wars, for instance),** not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them**.**

#### No endless war, and local malevolent actors fill in.

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From the presidential candidate debate stage to new think tanks, voices from both left and right are demanding an end to America’s endless wars. Only one problem: We’re not fighting any endless wars. No matter. The endless-war warriors want us to do less on the world stage. Even in this age of great power competition, these “new” isolationists would prefer America step off the playing field and wave from the sidelines. It’s a strategy that would work well for Beijing, Tehran and Moscow – but not for the U.S. No one is denying we’ve seen plenty of wars – and long ones at that. The U.S. has fought more than it ever wanted, including the global war on terrorism and related conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But America’s endless war days have ended – at least for now. That’s not to say we don’t have troops in combat zones around the world. But, by any reasonable definition, America just isn’t at war. We are, for sure, dealing with the aftermath of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. But President Obama’s withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq marked the end of that war, and he transitioned the effort in Afghanistan all-out fighting to an advice-and-assist mission. Today, what America does around the world is pretty much what it has been doing since 1945 – providing forward presence, deterrence, counterterrorism, training, assistance, and freedom of navigation. That’s important work and a heavy lift, but it ain’t war. So what the carpers are really complaining about is not “endless wars” (an admittedly powerful albeit dishonest catch-phrase), but U.S. foreign policy in general. So the question is: what foreign policy do they want instead? The U.S. is a global power with global interests and responsibilities. That’s not a choice; it’s just who we are. No one today is arguing that the U.S. can child-proof the world to make America safe. The overly ambitious efforts of the George W. Bush era clearly created as many problems as they solved. But, walking away from problems doesn’t work well either – as the Obama team more than amply demonstrated. They ended the war in Iraq. And, for that, we got a war with the caliphate. They ended the war in Afghanistan. For that, we got the resurgence of the Taliban. The reset with Russia produced a war in Ukraine. Tried to buy Iran off, and that didn’t work. And they stood by as China moved to make the South China Sea its own and North Korea’s Kim built out his nuclear arsenal. Trump has tried to stake out a middle ground. He isn’t interested in being the world’s babysitter, but he is willing to stand up and demonstrate sufficient resolve to protect America’s interest. He has managed to do that – and finish off the Caliphate – without starting any new wars. So where are the endless wars? Or, more to the point, what’s so bad about this administration’s foreign policy? Look around, and you’ll see Russia stonewalled in Crimea. Iran just failed to close the Straits of Hormuz. The DPRK is negotiating. The Stars and Stripes proudly sail the South China Seas, and there is nothing Beijing can do about. Apparently, that’s not good enough for the end the endless-war warriors. They want us to do even less. But “do less” is a poor prescription for dealing with the world as it is. History supplies overwhelming evidence that weakness and indifference do not deter aggression and exploitation, they invite it. What America needs now are discussions about how to prudently exercise its power in a complex world: what’s the right balance of multilateral action, prodding allies, making compromises, and standing strong. What we don’t need are politicians and pundits who suggest that, if America simply does nothing, our enemies and competitors will behave just as they should and everything will be just fine.

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