# FF- Antinatalism NC

## Notes

#### Pretty much everything in the NC can be substituted out since its just a hot mess of cards, so it can be whatever you want really.

## NC

### Framework General

#### I negate and defend the status qou.

#### There is no such thing as innate knowledge created through self reflection. Instead knowledge is derived from experiences. Prefer Empiricism:

#### [1] Disagreement: If Apriori truth existed independently of the empirical world then it would be shared by all societies. However, given that this is not the case rationalism is false.

#### [2] Rationalism collapses since we create ideas through empirical interactions with the external world. For example know what a triangle is from seeing one, and know that blue and red are two different concepts from having eyes.

#### [3] Doublebind: Either A) All moral facts have some presence in the empirical world, which entails that they are accessible through it or B) Moral facts are completely divorced from the empirical world which defeats the entire purpose of ethics since its impossible to apply them to anything or know them since brains are physical objects.

#### And the Metaethic is hedonism: Our senses tell us that pleasure is good and pain is bad. Only pleasure has value for its own sake which means that all other moral systems collapse to mine.

Ole Martin Moen, Post-Doctoral Fellow in Philosophy at Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, 12 September 2015, <http://www.olemartinmoen.com/wp-content/uploads/AnArgumentForHedonism.pdf> ///AHS PB

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. ‘‘Pleasure’’ and ‘‘pain’’ are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: ‘‘What for?’’ This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: ‘‘To buy soda.’’ This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: ‘‘What is buying the soda good for?’’ This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: ‘‘Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.’’ If I then proceed by asking ‘‘But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?’’ the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: ‘‘We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.’’4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says ‘‘This is painful!’’ we never respond by asking: ‘‘And why is that a problem?’’ We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**He Continues**

Many philosophers would accept the conclusion from the previous section, that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. Most of them would add, however, that this is probably not the complete story of what is intrinsically valuable and disvaluable. They would suggest that there are intrinsic values besides pleasure and intrinsic disvalues besides pain, and thus endorse some form of pluralism rather than hedonism. Pluralism has many defenders. W. D. Ross, for example, suggests that pleasure is indeed intrinsically valuable, but adds that so are knowledge and artistic activity.19 Noah Lemos adds consciousness, morally good actions, beauty, and flourishing to the list of intrinsic values.20 Martha Nussbaum suggests life, health, bodily integrity, emotional attachment, practical reason, affiliation, play, and more.21 William Frankena has provided what is arguably the most extensive list of intrinsic values: life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic experience; morally good dispositions or virtues; mutual affection, love, friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and proportion in one’s own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-expression; freedom; peace, security; adventure and novelty; and good reputation, honor, esteem.22 Prima facie, these all seem to be reasonable suggestions for things worth having, not just for the sake of other things, but for their own sake. So is it clear, as G. E. Moore asks, that a hedonist can show ‘‘that all other things but pleasure, whether conduct or virtue of knowledge, whether life or nature or beauty, are only good as a means to pleasure or for the sake of pleasure, never for their own sakes or as ends in themselves’’?23 I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as ‘‘pleasures and satisfactions.’’ The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and ‘‘proportion in objects contemplated,’’ and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: ‘‘Hedonists,’’ he writes ‘‘do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.’’24 Ross writes that ‘‘[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.’’25 Roger Crisp observes that ‘‘those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.’’26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonicintrinsic values are potentially explainable by appealtojust pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality ofintrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27

#### Nonexistence is always a net better state of affairs under hedonism since it maximizes pleasure and minimizes pain.

David Benatar, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, pub Oxford University Press, USA, Year: 2006, ISBN: 0199296421 ///AHS PB

As a matter of fact, bad things happen to all of us. No life is without hardship. It is easy to think of the millions who live a life of poverty or of those who live much of their lives with some disability. Some of us are lucky enough to be spared these fates, but most of us who are, nonetheless suffer ill-health at some stage during our lives. Often the suffering is excruciating, even if it is in our final days. Some are condemned by nature to years of frailty. We all face death.²⁰ We infrequently contemplate the harms that await any new-born child—pain, disappointment, anxiety, grief, and death. For any given child we cannot predict what form these harms will take or how severe they will be, but we can be sure that at least some of them will occur.²¹ None of this befalls the nonexistent. Only existers suffer harm. Optimists will be quick to note that I have not told the whole story. Not only bad things but also good things happen only to those who exist. Pleasure, joy, and satisfaction can only be had by existers. Thus, the cheerful will say, we must weigh up the pleasures of life against the evils. As long as the former outweigh the latter, the life is worth living. Coming into being with such a life is, on this view, a benefit. The asymmetry of pleasure and pain However, this conclusion does not follow. This is because there is a crucial difference between harms (such as pains) and benefits (such as pleasures) which entails that existence has no advantage over, but does have disadvantages relative to, non-existence.²² Consider pains and pleasures as exemplars of harms and benefits. It is uncontroversial to say that () the presence of pain is bad, and that () the presence of pleasure is good. However, such a symmetrical evaluation does not seem to apply to the absence of pain and pleasure, for it strikes me as true that () the absence of pain is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone, whereas () the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation.

#### This creates a moral obligation to not bring people into existence since every life always contains more pain then pleasure. This means the procreation always brings more pain into the world. Thus, the standard is consistency with antinatalism, or the view that having children is bad. Prefer the standard:

#### [] Heavily err neg in the framework, since almost all counterarguments are caused by psychological bias.

David Benatar, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, pub Oxford University Press, USA, Year: 2006, ISBN: 0199296421 ///AHS PB

Most people deny that their lives, all things considered, are bad (and they certainly deny that their lives are so bad as to make never existing preferable). Indeed, most people think that their lives go quite well. Such widespread blithe self-assessments of well-being, it is often thought, constitute a refutation of the view that life is bad. How, it is asked, can life be bad if most of those who live it deny that it is? How can it be a harm to come into existence if most of those who have come into existence are pleased that they did? In fact, however, there is very good reason to doubt that these self-assessments are a reliable indicator of a life’s quality. There are a number of well-known features of human psychology that can account for the favourable assessment people usually make of their own life’s quality. It is these psychological phenomena rather than the actual quality of a life that explain (the extent of) the positive assessment. The first, most general and most influential of these psychological phenomena is what some have called the Pollyanna Principle,⁷ a tendency towards optimism.⁸ This manifests in many ways. First, there is an inclination to recall positive rather than negative experiences. For example, when asked to recall events from throughout their lives, subjects in a number of studies listed a much greater number of positive than negative experiences.⁹ This selective recall distorts our judgement of how well our lives have gone so far. It is not only assessments of our past that are biased, but also our projections or expectations about the future. We tend to have an exaggerated view of how good things will be.¹⁰ The Pollyannaism typical of recall and projection is also characteristic of subjective judgements about current and overall well-being. Many studies have consistently shown that self-assessments of well-being are markedly skewed toward the positive end of the spectrum.¹¹ For instance, very few people describe themselves as ‘not too happy’. Instead, the overwhelming majority claims to be either ‘pretty happy’ or ‘very happy’.¹² Indeed, most people believe that they are better off than most others or than the average person.¹³ Most of the factors that plausibly improve the quality of a person’s life do not commensurately influence self-assessments of that quality (where they influence them at all). For example, although there is a correlation between people’s own rankings of their health and their subjective assessments of well-being, objective assessments of people’s health, judging by physical symptoms, are not as good a predictor of peoples’ subjective evaluations of their well-being.¹⁴ Even among those whose dissatisfaction with their health does lead to lower self-reported well-being, most report levels of satisfaction toward the positive end of the spectrum.¹⁵ Within any given country,¹⁶ the poor are nearly (but not quite) as happy as the rich are. Nor do education and occupation make much (even though they do make some) difference.¹⁷ Although there is some disagreement about how much each of the above and other factors affect subjective assessments of well-being, it is clear that even the sorts of events that one would have thought would make people ‘very unhappy’ have this effect on only a very small proportion of people.¹⁸

#### [] Winning that antinatalism is good in academic debates a pre fiat reason to vote neg

David Benatar, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Anti-Natalism, Published in Debating Procreation: Is it Wrong to Reproduce?, 2015 ///AHS PB

The sad truth is that the human species is not voluntarily going to cease reproducing, and any attempt by a minority to prevent the rest from procreating is unlikely to work. That does not mean that individual humans will not desist from procreation. Some of them will desist as a result of considering arguments for anti-natalism. Every decision not to procreate is a decision to spare a potential person from serious harm and is thus to be welcomed.

#### [] Anti-Natalism is ethically safer than allowing procreation:

#### A] The aff doesn’t provide a moral obligation to reproduce, their framework just prove that reproduction is a neutral action and ethically permissible. Since the neg provides a reason why reproduction is an harm and prohibition, any uncertainty means we shouldn’t procreate since there is no benefit.

#### B] Even if living a life with more pleasure than pain is possible, not having a child causes no harm or pain, while having a child has the possibility of causing harm and pain due to them living a bad life, which leads to preventable suffering.

### Offense

#### Now negate:

#### [1] Fossil fuels cause infertility. [to include]

#### [2] Climate change is inevitable

**Thorsten Mauritsen, Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, Robert Pincus, UC Boulder, Nature, 2017** [“Committed warming inferred from observations” accessed 08-11-2019 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3357>] mre

Due to the lifetime of CO2, the thermal inertia of the oceans1,2 , and the temporary impacts of short-lived aerosols3–5 and reactive greenhouse gases6 , the Earth’s climate is not equilibrated with anthropogenic forcing. As a result, even if fossil-fuel emissions were to suddenly cease, some level of committed warming is expected due to past emissions as studied previously using climate models6–11. Here, we provide an observational-based quantification of this committed warming using the instrument record of global-mean warming12, recently improved estimates of Earth’s energy imbalance13, and estimates of radiative forcing from the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change14. Compared with pre-industrial levels, we find a committed warming of 1.5 K (0.9–3.6, 5th–95th percentile) at equilibrium, and of 1.3 K (0.9–2.3) within this century. However, when assuming that ocean carbon uptake cancels remnant greenhouse gas-induced warming on centennial timescales, committed warming is reduced to 1.1 K (0.7–1.8). In the latter case there is a 13% risk that committed warming already exceeds the 1.5 K target set in Paris15. Regular updates of these observationally constrained committed warming estimates, although simplistic, can provide transparent guidance as uncertainty regarding transient climate sensitivity inevitably narrows16 and the understanding of the limitations of the framework11,17–21 is advanced. Burning of fossil fuels elevates atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2), alters atmospheric chemistry, and produces aerosol particles. Over the past century, warming by CO2 and other greenhouse gases has exceeded cooling by aerosols and Earth’s surface temperature has gradually increased. If fossil-fuel emissions were to cease instantaneously, anthropogenic aerosols would be washed out of the atmosphere in a matter of weeks but anthropogenic CO2 would persist, equilibrating only across centuries to millennia. The long life of CO2 and the large thermal inertia of the oceans imply that some amount of future warming is inevitable even in the unreasonably optimistic scenario of an abrupt halt to fossil-fuel emissions. Here we apply observational constraints within a simple linear energetic framework to estimate the magnitude of this committed warming due to past emissions. We first estimate Earth’s equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) and transient climate response (TCR) (Fig. 1 and Methods) from estimates of effective radiative forcing and observations of present-day energy imbalance and global-mean surface temperature, using an energy-balance model and treating uncertainty in each term using probability distributions22. Both sensitivities are defined according to the forcing by atmospheric CO2 concentrations doubled from pre-industrial values; ECS is the warming that occurs when the deep oceans have equilibrated while TCR is the warming at the time of doubling, assuming forcing increasing linearly at a rate consistent with a 1% per year increase in CO2 concentration. Our estimates of TCR are commensurate with previous estimates23,24 and, despite reductions in the uncertainty of the Earth’s energy imbalance13, the uncertainty in inferred values of ECS remains large. Best estimates of TCR and ECS inferred from historical observations and an energy-balance framework are at the lower end of the assessed ranges (1.0–2.5 and 1.5–4.5 K, respectively) that consider a wider variety of evidence25. We return to this idea and its implications below. These estimates of climate sensitivities can be used to infer the committed future warming on centennial (transient) and at multi-millennial (equilibrium) timescales by scaling the radiation imbalance and changes in forcing by the relevant climate sensitivity. The simplest estimate of equilibrium committed warming Ta is obtained by holding effective radiative forcing at present-day values and assuming that the warming balancing present-day energy imbalance (Q) will be consistent with joint distributions of past response to forcing. The resulting increment is added linearly to the mean warming (T) in the present-day (here 2005–2015) relative to a pre-industrial period (1850–1899): Ta ≈T + [Q+δF] ECS F2× (1) where F2× is the radiative forcing from a doubling of CO2 . Here δF ≈0.2 W m−2 accounts for forcing by emissions from 2010 (the centre of the present-day period) to 2016, estimated from ref. 14 for the period 2000–2011 as about 0.033 W m−2 yr−1 to yield an upto-date estimate of commitment. The result is case a in Fig. 2. In the absence of fossil-fuel emissions, however, present-day aerosol forcing (Faero ≈ −0.9 W m−2 (−1.9 to −0.1)) will quickly vanish as anthropogenic aerosols are removed by precipitation and other processes (case b): Tb ≈T + [Q+δF −Faero] ECS F2× (2) where it is assumed that non-fossil-fuel anthropogenic aerosols, such as biomass burning, yield near-zero forcing26. Values of committed warming exceeding 2 K are far more likely under this assumption even though aerosol forcing does not dominate total forcing (Supplementary Table 1). The high values of equilibrium committed warming arise because, in the energy-balance model, the strict constraint on observed warming means that strong aerosol cooling is possible only if climate sensitivity is high. These estimates are nonetheless smaller than earlier estimates5 of 2.4 K (1.4–4.3) applying equivalent assumptions but basing their ECS on climate models. Although carbon dioxide is long-lived, other chemical species emitted by fossil-fuel burning, including methane (CH4), nitrogen oxides (NOx ) and carbon monoxide (CO), impact the Earth’s radiation balance6 both directly and through chemical reactions affecting the concentrations of ozone, stratospheric water vapour, and each other. We estimate that short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs) taken together introduce a forcing of 0.36 W m−2 (0.17–0.56) (see Methods). The loss of this net warming effect parallels the impact of reduced aerosol cooling: Tc ≈T + [Q+δF −Faero −FSLCF] ECS F2× (3) The result is a slight reduction in equilibrium committed warming (Fig. 2 case c). Estimating the amount of warming to be realized in the current century requires accounting for the multiple timescales of equilibration in the climate system. These timescales—in an idealized view, a yearly to decadal timescale associated with equilibration of the atmosphere, upper soil and ocean mixed layer, and a centennial to millennial timescale associated with the overturning of the deep oceans—imply that the temporal response of surface temperature is sensitive to the history of the applied forcing. An abruptly applied positive forcing, such as that arising from the cessation of anthropogenic aerosol emissions (−Faero), is associated primarily with a fast warming near the surface, followed by slow warming, while equilibration with remnant planetary energy imbalance due to past forcing (Q) involves mainly a slow warming of the deep oceans. The fraction of equilibrium warming on centennial timescales may be estimated using ocean models of varying complexity27 but these are poorly constrained by observations. Instead, we assume that the centennial response to present-day forcing will be consistent with the response to historical forcing, and so approximate centennial commitment using the observationally determined TCR Td ≈T + [Q+δF −Faero −FSLCF] TCR F2× (4) 1850 1900 1950 2000 2016 0 1 2 3 4 Temperature change relative to 1850−1899 (K) 0.8 0.03 a b c d e Equilibrium with constant forcing (a): 1.25 [0.97−1.96] ...and removed aerosol cooling (b): 1.67 [1.03−4.05] ...and removed SLCFs (c): 1.49 [0.92−3.61] Centennial committed warming (d): 1.31 [0.88−2.30] ...with carbon uptake (e): 1.06 [0.71−1.85] Figure 2 | Estimates of committed warming under five dierent sets of assumptions. Cases a (black) and b (red) are the equilibria with and without aerosol cooling, whereas case c (purple) includes the eect of removing short-lived climate forcers. Cases d (blue) and e (orange) are scaled with the transient climate response representative of warming within this century. Case d is otherwise equivalent to case c. In case e, it is assumed that carbon uptake on the centennial timescale cancels the remnant warming due to imbalance with past forcing. Displayed numbers are the median and 5th–95th percentiles of the respective distribution. Also shown in grey is the instrumental temperature record12 for 1850–2016, and black horizontal lines indicate the reference periods used to estimate TCR and ECS (Fig. 1). The dashed horizontal lines indicate 1.5 and 2.0 K. All temperatures are relative to the 1850–1899 mean, which is here taken to be the pre-industrial reference temperature (Methods). resulting in lower commitments than at equilibrium (Fig. 2). Large values of centennial-scale committed warming are unlikely because the high ECS values leading to large Tc are also associated with smaller ratios of TCR/ECS (Fig. 1b), such that the equilibrium commitment takes more time to be realized if sensitivity is high28 . The approximate scaling of centennial warming by TCR is consistent with an elaborated energy-balance model with a two-layer ocean (see Methods). When tuned to be consistent with inferred ECS, TCR and Q, and driven by the time history of forcing until 2010, followed by forcing evolution consistent with case d until 2100 (Supplementary Fig. 1), this model produces committed centennial warming in agreement with the estimates using equation (4). To this point we have assumed that atmospheric CO2 concentrations are constant after fossil-fuel emissions cease. This is unlikely to hold because the oceans absorb carbon as well as heat from the atmosphere. Although the magnitude of ocean carbon uptake on centennial timescales is uncertain it must act to lower committed warming relative to fixed CO2 concentrations (cases a–d). An estimate of this effect is obtained by idealizing the finding that in Earth system models temperatures stay approximately constant for one or more centuries after carbon emissions cease7–11 , suggesting that remnant warming is approximately cancelled by declining forcing due to oceanic carbon uptake. The approximation is consistent with the mixing process timescale for carbon into the deep ocean being the same as for heat and carbon uptake being approximately linear in CO2 concentration. A crude representation of this cancellation is to neglect further warming from energy imbalance Q: Te ≈T + [δF −Faero −FSLCF] TCR F2× (5) which yields a reduction in estimated median committed warming of 0.2–0.3 degrees (Fig. 2, case e). This scenario was examined in an Earth system model by the authors of ref. 6 who found a fast decadal warming to +0.4 K followed by a slow decline in temperature to around +0.2 K over that at the time when emissions were stopped, in close agreement with the median estimate of +0.26 K found here. Perfect cancellation of radiative imbalance by ocean carbon uptake is unlikely to occur: uptake mechanisms of carbon and heat are distinctly different in Earth system models29,30, while the warming of the upper ocean due to removed aerosol cooling, typically neglected in idealized modelling studies7–9,11, can lead to outgassing of CO2 temporarily counteracting some deep-ocean carbon uptake. For these reasons, we consider perfect cancellation to be an idealization awaiting efforts to understand the fate of carbon in the Earth system. Even including all mediating factors, there is some risk that committed warming on centennial timescales already exceeds societal aspirations to limit global warming to 1.5 to 2 degrees above pre-industrial15. There is 32% and 13% risk (cases d and e) that committed warming as of year 2016 already exceeds the 1.5 K warming threshold; for the 2 degree target, the risks are lower at 10% and 3%, respectively. If anthropogenic forcing keeps rising at the current rate of about 0.033 W m−2 yr−1 then the median value of committed warming exceeds 1.5 K in the years 2032 and 2053, for cases d and e, corresponding to additional forcing of about 0.5 and 1.2 W m−2 . These are the estimated years by which one needs to stop all emissions to have a 50% chance of staying below 1.5 K on centennial timescales. Our estimates of committed warming are sensitive to the relatively large uncertainty in aerosol forcing which leads to a long tail of high climate sensitivity values (Fig. 1). In the energy-balance framework, warming on centennial timescales is closely connected to TCR (Fig. 3): commitment median probability exceeds 1.5 K for TCR of 1.5 and 1.9 K for cases d and e, respectively, and exceeds 2.0 K for TCR of 2.1 and 2.6 K. This means that, if TCR of the Earth turns out to be in the upper range, then the 1.5 degree target could already be unachievable. But high values of TCR are almost exclusively associated with strong aerosol cooling (Faero < −1.0 W m−2 , Fig. 3 red shading). Such strong aerosol cooling may be inconsistent with mid-century warming being forced17 although the lower bound on aerosol is the subject of current debate. On the other hand, our estimates of TCR and ECS, based as they are on the observed relationships between forcing, imbalance and temperature change, are likely to be lower than the Earth’s true sensitivity for several reasons. First, observations of global-mean air surface temperature miss some of the amplified warming at high latitudes and do not carefully distinguish between surface air and water temperatures, which comprehensive models suggest may lead to slight underestimates of warming18. Second, forcing agents are unlikely to be equally effective in driving global temperature change. Aerosol cooling in particular may have masked more warming per unit forcing than greenhouse gas warming causes (efficacy > 1), which would act to damp estimates of sensitivity19. Finally, feedbacks in comprehensive models often vary with timescale or climate state, especially the pattern of surface warming20. In such models, the actual ECS is uniformly similar to or higher than that inferred from estimates of forcing, warming and imbalance21. This last issue does not seem particularly relevant: we explored the impact of time-dependent feedback (Methods and Supplementary Fig. 1) and find that, even if we choose parameters corresponding to the strongest effect found among Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) models, the increase in commitment in case d is modest (around 0.12 K). Using the model ensemble mean time dependence, the impact is only 0.04 K by the year 2100. This implies that the possible time dependence of feedbacks will have a strong impact on committed warming only if the dependencies of Earth are stronger than in any CMIP5 model. Beyond the uncertainties introduced by relying on observations and the simple energy-balance framework the abrupt cessation of all anthropogenic emissions is such a highly idealized scenario that one might question the practical value of estimating committed warming. The reasons for doing so are partly pedagogical: committed warming defies the naive expectation that global warming stops when emissions cease and, indeed, introduces the further complications of rapid additional warming with decreasing emissions as reduced aerosol cooling unleashes masked greenhouse gas warming3,6 . It further distinguishes future warming originating in the past from future anthropogenic emissions, which is useful for estimating the remaining headroom to exceeding target temperature thresholds. Observations-based estimates provide a conceptually transparent framework for estimating commitment that relies on a few assumptions and observables. As the Earth warms in coming decades, uncertainty in some observables will decrease, and so uncertainty in TCR will be roughly halved by year 203016 leading to narrowed probability for committed warming. Likewise, an improved ability to constrain aerosol forcing17, or a deepened understanding of timeor state-dependent feedbacks can be readily implemented to narrow quantitative uncertainty on the remaining headroom to exceeding the set 1.5 and 2 degree target temperatures15 .

#### Causes extinction

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In the Online Journal of Space Communication , Dr. Feng Hsu, a NASA scientist at Goddard Space Flight Center, a research center in the forefront of science of space and Earth, writes, “The evidence of global warming is alarming,” noting the potential for a catastrophic planetary climate change is real and troubling (Hsu 2010) . Hsu and his NASA [was] colleagues were engaged in monitoring and analyzing climate changes on a global scale, through which they received first-hand scientific information and data relating to global warming issues, including the dynamics of polar ice cap melting. After discussing this research with colleagues who were world experts on the subject, he wrote: I now have no doubt global temperatures are rising, and that global warming is a serious problem confronting all of humanity. No matter whether these trends are due to human interference or to the cosmic cycling of our solar system, there are two basic facts that are crystal clear: (a) there is overwhelming scientific evidence showing positive correlations between the level of CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere with respect to the historical fluctuations of global temperature changes; and (b) the overwhelming majority of the world’s scientific community is in agreement about the risks of a potential catastrophic global climate change. That is, if we humans continue to ignore this problem and do nothing, if we continue dumping huge quantities of greenhouse gases into Earth’s biosphere, humanity will be at dire risk (Hsu 2010 ) . As a technology risk assessment expert, Hsu says he can show with some confidence that the planet will face more risk doing nothing to curb its fossil-based energy addictions than it will in making a fundamental shift in its energy supply. “This,” he writes, “is because the risks of a catastrophic anthropogenic climate change can be potentially the extinction of human species, a risk that is simply too high for us to take any chances” (Hsu 2010).

#### That negates since either 1) Climate change is going to kill everyone anyway in which case the aff just causes false hope which leads to more people being brought into existence or 2) Climate change isn’t going to kill us, so the aff solves extinction and leads to more future humans which is bad.

### Vs Kant Framework

#### We create our beliefs about the world through empirical experiences not apriori knowledge.

### Kant Hijacks

#### Kant justifies antinatalism:

#### [1] Procreation uses people as a means to an end, by bringing them into existence to make others happy without their consent.

David Benatar, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Anti-Natalism, Published in Debating Procreation: Is it Wrong to Reproduce?, 2015 ///AHS PB

Procreators inflict these harms on their progeny obviously without the latter’s consent. Nor can they inflict those harms for the sake of the children they create. None of the reasons for procreating have anything do with the interests of the beings that are brought into existence. Procreation serves the interests of others—the parents, grandparents, already existing siblings, the nation or state, or the broader human community into which the child is born. Inflicting serious harm—or even the risk of it—on one person, without his or her consent, in order to benefit others, is presumptively wrong. The misanthropic argument for anti-natalism deepens the presumption against procreation. None of the reasons for procreating are sufficiently strong to defeat this presumption.

#### [2] Even if Benatar is wrong, and existence is on net good. Its still not justified under Kant to violate freedom by causing a tiny amount of pain to produce large amounts of pleasure.

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Her argument does not assume that coming into existence has no benefits. She is willing to assume, at least for the sake of argument, that it can benefit the person brought into existence. However, she points to a (deontic) asymmetry between harms and benefits: It is permissible and perhaps even obligatory (in the absence of a person’s wishes to the contrary) to inflict a lesser harm on somebody in order to save that person from a greater harm, but it is not permissible to inflict a harm on somebody in order to bestow a greater (pure) benefit on that person. This, she says, is why it would be permissible to break somebody’s arm if that were necessary to save his life, but it would not be permissible to break somebody’s arm in order to bestow some benefit such as “supernormal memory, a useful store of encyclopedic knowledge, 20 IQ points worth of extra intellectual ability, or the ability to consume immoderate amounts of alcohol or fat without side effects.”53 Creating somebody always causes that person harm— the harms of existence—and we cannot justify the infliction of those harms because of the purportedly greater benefits of existence.

## 2NR

### Overview

### A2 Induction Fails

### A2 No pleasure for nonexist arg

#### The argument that we cant experience the absence of pain if we don’t exist, might seem intuitively persuasive. But it actually makes no sense whatsoever.

#### [1] Our argument is that life is always suffering. Insofar as every moment we spend existing is actively bad under util, not feeling it is still good

#### [2] Our theory solves, it’s a question of counterfactual analysis

David Benatar, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, pub Oxford University Press, USA, Year: 2006, ISBN: 0199296421 ///AHS PB

Now it might be asked how the absence of pain could be good if that good is not enjoyed by anybody. Absent pain, it might be said, cannot be good for anybody, if nobody exists for whom it can be good. This, however, is to dismiss () too quickly. The judgement made in () is made with reference to the (potential) interests of a person who either does or does not exist. To this it might be objected that because () is part of the scenario under which this person never exists, () cannot say anything about an existing person. This objection would be mistaken because () can say something about a counterfactual case in which a person who does actually exist never did exist. Of the pain of an existing person, () says that the absence of this pain would have been good even if this could only have been achieved by the absence of the person who now suffers it. In other words, judged in terms of the interests of a person who now exists, the absence of the pain would have been good even though this person would then not have existed. Consider next what () says of the absent pain of one who never exists—of pain, the absence of which is ensured by not making a potential person actual. Claim () says that this absence is good when judged in terms of the interests of the person who would otherwise have existed. We may not know who that person would have been, but we can still say that whoever that person would have been, the avoidance of his or her pains is good when judged in terms of his or her potential interests. If there is any (obviously loose) sense in which the absent pain is good for the person who could have existed but does not exist, this is it. Clearly () does not entail the absurd literal claim that there is some actual person for whom the absent pain is good.²³ In support of the asymmetry between () and (), it can be shown that it has considerable explanatory power. It explains at least four other asymmetries that are quite plausible. Sceptics, when they see where this leads, may begin to question the plausibility of these other asymmetries and may want to know what support (beyond the asymmetry above) can be provided for them. Were I to provide such support, the sceptics would then ask for a defence of these further supporting considerations. Every argument must have some justificatory end. I cannot hope to convince those who take the rejection of my conclusion as axiomatic. All I can show is that those who accept some quite plausible views are led to my conclusion. These plausible views include four other asymmetries, which I shall now outline.

### A2 Kant no rights for the non existence

David Benatar, Professor of Phil at University of Cape Town, Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming into Existence, pub Oxford University Press, USA, Year: 2006, ISBN: 0199296421 ///AHS PB

One common basis for denying that procreation violates the rights of the person created is that prior to procreation that person does not exist and thus there can be no bearer of the right not to be created. But this may be an unduly narrow view of rights ascription—one that ignores the special features of procreation. If, as I argued in the opening section of this chapter, one can be harmed by being brought into existence, one could argue that the right that protects against this kind of harm is a special kind of right—a right that has a bearer only in the breach. Put another way, we might say that one violates a right by performing some action if, as a result of performing this action, there exists some person who is wrongfully harmed. I acknowledge that this is an unusual kind of right, but coming into existence is an unusual case. If one could make sense of such a right, it would then not be an objection to an argument that a person is wrongfully harmed that there was no right not to be.⁴⁶

### A2 Kant violating the right to decide if life is good

[1] Contradcitions come first

[2] Doesn’t deny that the Rights violations is structuraly bad. That’s like saying we should allow slavery because soemoen might choose to enjoy being a slave. It doesn’t matter if it still violates freedom.

[3] Turn: you assume that the child wants to exist. My argument outweighs since you violate actual consent, while the neg is just an omission.

### A2 Kant Willing to not have kids is a contradiction in conception

#### This argument is a terrible misunderstanding of Kant

#### [1] Kant bbelieves there is an distinction between acting and not acting. Simply refraining from having a child isn’t something we are morally culpable for.

#### [2] If your framework doesn’t care about consequences, the fact that nobody having children ENTAILS there is no humans is a consequence.

### A2 Violates Womens rights

#### [1] Alt Worse: bc women are forced to have children since iit’s a positive ob to procreate

#### [2] No life is better, bc no rights violations now under util

#### [3] Not what the neg defends specifically, just kletting climate change hapoen is enough

#### [4] We don’t defend gov actually forcing eople not to create just A) individual moral obligations and B) Gov should incentivize it

### Random card

This recognition is important for warding off another potential objection to my argument. One of the implications of my argument is that a life filled with good and containing only the most minute quantity of bad—a life of utter bliss adulterated only by the pain of a single pin-prick—is worse than no life at all. The objection is that this is implausible. Understanding the distinction between (a) coming into existence being a harm and (b) how great a harm it is, enables one to see why this implication is not so implausible. It is true of the person enjoying this charmed life marred only by a single brief sharp pain, that as pleasant as his life is, it has no advantages over never existing. Yet coming into existence has the disadvantage of the single pain. We can acknowledge that the harm of coming into existence is minuscule without denying that it is harm. Setting aside the matter of whether coming into existence is a harm, who would deny that a brief sharp pain is a harm, even if only a minor one? And if one acknowledges that it is a harm—one that would have been avoided had that life not begun—why should one deny that a life begun at that cost is a harm, even if only a minor one? Think again of the analogy of S and H. If S gets sick only once, and then only has a headache that quickly subsides, it is still better to be H (even though not that much better). If all lives were as free of suffering as that of the imagined person who suffers only a pin-prick, the harms of coming into existence would easily be outweighed by the benefits to others (including the potential parents) of that person coming into existence. In the real world, however, there are no lives even nearly this charmed.³⁷

#### Risk

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Second, let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is true that the chances of something very bad happening to the average person—or even the average person in more privileged societies—are small. There may still be good reason to be risk averse in this context. The basic axiological asymmetry discussed in chapter 2 is one reason. When considering the interests of the prospective child, there is nothing to be lost by desisting from bringing it into existence. There is however a potentially very serious cost if the created person suffers in one of the ways I have mentioned. A second reason to be risk averse arises from the empirical asymmetries between harms and benefits that I enumerated earlier in this chapter. For example, the worst things in life are worse than the best things are good and the bad things tend to last longer than the good things. There is therefore more reason to avoid the bad things even if we grant that this comes at the cost of not attaining the good things. As it happens, however, the chance of very bad things happening to any person one creates is actually far from remote. Indeed, the chance is actually alarmingly high. Just how high it is does depend, of course, on where one sets the threshold for what counts as “very bad.” However, one does not have to set that bar impossibly low to reach a pessimistic conclusion. Cancer, for example, is a plausible candidate for something that is “very bad.” In the United States, it has been estimated that one in two men and one in three women will develop cancer, and one in four men and one in five women will die from it.46 It has recently been suggested that estimates of lifetime risk of developing cancer may be exaggerated by the fact that some people develop cancer more than once. However, even if we opt for the more conservative estimate of lifetime risk of first primary, we find that forty percent of men and thirty-seven percent of women in the United Kingdom will develop cancer.47 Those who do not get cancer are still at risk of hundreds of other possible causes of suffering. Thus (even) in privileged countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom any prospective parents who propose to bring a child into existence are subjecting that child to an extraordinarily high risk of suffering some very bad condition.

#### [] Moral Uncertainty means having [Decided not to read] I made it analytically

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1733883/pdf/v030p00377.pdf>

The idea of avoiding risks that I have in mind is known in decision theory as the maximin strategy. When we consider what we should do in a given situation, we have typically two or more options. It is also usual that we do not know with any certainty what the outcomes of our action or inaction will be. One action option can produce either good or bad outcomes. Another can be expected to bring about greater or lesser amounts of good. Another can lead to bad outcomes, but we cannot be sure to what extent. Yet others can produce neither good nor bad results. The maximin strategy tells us to choose, under such circumstances, the option that maximises the minimum outcome, and to avoid the options where the worst outcomes can materialise.7 8 The maximin strategy was introduced to moral and political theory by John Rawls, who used it as a cornerstone of his theory of justice. He argued that it is rational, under uncertainty about one’s own place in a future society, to choose political institutions which can be expected to benefit those who turn out to be in the worst position in that society.9 Reasonable precaution dictates that we should not pick out policies, or courses of action, which can realistically have disastrous consequences. THE RISKS OF HAVING CHILDREN The idea of avoiding disasters has recently been used in an argument for the elimination of undesired genetic traits in our offspring.10 It would, according to the argument, be irrational to allow hereditary diseases and disabilities, if these can be avoided by early genetic selection. This is one version of the claim that we should always try to produce the best children we can. The same logic can, however, be extended to defend the view that all human reproduction is irrational. When people consider the possibility of having children, they confront the following choice. They can decide not to have children, in which case nobody will be harmed or benefited. The value of this choice, in terms of potential future individuals and their lives, is zero. Alternatively, they can decide to have children, in which case a new individual can be born. If this happens, the life of the future individual can be good or bad. The eventual value of the decision, depending on the luck of the reproducers, can be positive, zero, or negative. Since it is rational to avoid the possible negative outcome, when the alternative is zero, it is rational to choose not to have children. The conclusion relies on the judgment that human lives can sometimes be bad. Individuals who see their own lives as good, and assert that everybody else’s life must be similarly assessed have frequently challenged this view.11 12 Many actual people believe, however, that they would have been better off had they not been born. This is often the essence of the ‘‘wrongful life’’ charges on which individuals have sued their parents or medical providers for damages.13 14 These legal claims may be controversial, but it cannot be disputed that at least some of the people in question genuinely see their lives as worse than non-existence. THE IMMORALITY OF HAVING CHILDREN I believe it is morally wrong to cause avoidable suffering to other people. This belief gives rise to two different objections to human reproduction. On the one hand, since all human beings suffer at some point in their lives, every parent who could have declined to procreate is to blame. On the other hand, since potential parents cannot guarantee that the lives of their children will be better than non-existence, they can also be rightfully accused of gambling on other people’s lives, whatever the outcome. Because of the uncertainties of human life, anybody’s children can end up arguing that it would have been better for them not to have been born at all. The probability of this outcome does not necessarily matter. It is enough that the possibility is real, which it always is. My moral objections to having children are not necessarily linked with my views on the irrationality of the practice. I do not claim that human reproduction is wrong, because it is irrational. I do believe that it is both morally wrong and irrational, but on slightly separate grounds. Others have argued that rationality and morality are more closely connected in reproductive matters. According to Julian Savulescu, we have a moral obligation to use new technologies, because it is the only rational choice.11 Even he, however, does not insist that the rationality of having children (as he sees it) would always make it immoral not to have them.13 apart from this, others have argued that non-existence can, in a rational analysis, always be preferred to life.15 This shows, if nothing else, that there are so many arguably defensible accounts of rationality that questions of morality, let alone law and social policy, cannot be settled in a widely accepted manner by appeals to just one of them.

# A2

### 1AR Impact Turn

Notwithstanding this overlap, the distinction between the two kinds of extinction (or, if you prefer, the two features of extinction) is helpful. There are clear differences between the two. Most obviously, killing-extinction cuts lives short, whereas dyingextinction does not. Although it may be bad for anyone of us to die, it is still worse to die earlier than we need to. Secondly, there is a moral difference between some cases of killing-extinction and cases of dying-extinction. Were anti-natalists to become pro-mortalists and embark on a ‘speciecide’ programme of killing humans, their actions would be plagued by moral problems that would not be faced by dying-extinction. Humans killing their own species to extinction is troubling for all the reasons that killing is troubling. It is (usually) bad for those who are killed, and unlike dying (from natural causes), it is a bad that could be avoided (until dying occurs). Although we can regret somebody’s death from natural causes at the end of a full life span, we cannot say that any wrong has been done, whereas we can say that a moral agent killing somebody, without proper justification, is wrong. In pointing to both these differences, I assume that death is bad for the one who dies. The view that death is a harm to the one who dies is not an unreasonable view. Indeed it is the common sense view and underlies many important judgements we make. It has been challenged nonetheless. I shall consider this philosophical challenge in the concluding chapter, not in order to defend or reject it, but to show its relevance.

Other

<https://aeon.co/essays/having-children-is-not-life-affirming-its-immoral>

The difference between a life not worth starting and a life not worth continuing partly explains why anti-natalism does not imply either suicide or murder. It can be the case that one’s life was not worth starting *without* it being the case that one’s life is not worth continuing. If the quality of one’s life is still not bad enough to override one’s interest in not dying, then one’s life is still worth continuing, even though the current and future harms are sufficient to make it the case that one’s life was not worth starting. Moreover, because death is bad, even when it ceases to be bad all-things-considered, it is a consideration against procreation – as well as against murder and suicide.

There are further reasons why an anti-natalist should be opposed to murder. One of these is that one person should not force on another competent person a decision whether the latter’s life has ceased to be worth continuing. Because nobody can be certain about these matters, such a decision should, where possible, be made and acted upon by the person who will either live or die as a result.

HE cotinues

This does not imply that we should take a leap further and attempt to eradicate humans through a species-wide ‘final solution’. Although humans are massively destructive, attempting to eradicate the species would cause considerable harm and violate appropriate proscriptions on murder. It might well also be counterproductive, causing more destruction than it seeks to prevent, as so many violent utopians have done.