# CS- Kant NC

### Framework

#### Permissibility and Presumption flow neg: A) If I know nothing about P, under a world where presumption flowed aff, I would presume both P and not P true without positive justification causing a contradiction B) Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### First is the skeptical question: In order to be normative ethics must not only identify what is good, but produce a binding obligation to act towards it. The only way to resolve this is for rules to be constitutive to the very being of agents so they cannot be denied. Prefer on regress, we can always infinitely question whether we have to follow external rules, making them nonbinding

#### And Rational Agency is the only constitutively binding enterprise: A) To ask why do I reason, is to use reason to question reason, implicitly conceding its authority B) Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise takes place outside of it, requiring a higher order system of Agency C) Agency is a precondition to acting because it requires that people recognize themselves as the cause of their actions.

#### And Agents must will Universizable maxims:

#### A) To say it is possible for a maxim to not be universizable is inherently a Universal statement, conceding the frameworks authority.

#### B) Non Universizability eradicates the ability for agents to be the causes of their actions:

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The second step is to see that particularistic willing makes it impossible for you to distinguish yourself, your principle of choice, from the various incentives on which you act. According to Kant, you must always act on some incentive or other, for every action, even action from duty, involves a decision on a proposal: something must suggest the action to you. And in order to will particularistically, you must in each case wholly identify with the incentive of your action. That incentive would be, for the moment, your law, the law that deﬁnes your agency or your will. It’s important to see that if you had a particularistic will you would not identify with the incentive as representative of any sort of type, since if you took it as a representative of a type you would be taking it as universal. For instance, you couldn’t say that you decided to act on the inclination of the moment, because you were so inclined. Someone who takes ‘‘I shall do the things I am inclined to do, whatever they might be ’’as his maxim has adopted a universal principle, not a particular one: he has the principle of treating his inclinations as such as reasons. A truly particularistic will must embrace the incentive in its full particularity: it, in no way that is further describable, is the law of such a will. So someone who engages in particularistic willing does not even have a democratic soul. There is only the tyranny of the moment: the complete domination of the agent by something inside him. Particularistic willing [this] eradicates the distinction between a person and the incentives on which he acts. But then there is nothing left here that is the person, the agent, that is his will as distinct from the play of incentives within him. He is not one person, but a series, a mere conglomeration, of unrelated impulses. There is no difference between someone who has a particularistic will and someone who has no will at all. Particularistic willing lacks a subject, a person who is the cause of these actions. So particularistic willing isn’t willing at all. If a particularistic will is impossible, then when you will a maxim you must take it to be universal. If you do not, you are not operating as a self-conscious cause, and then you are not willing. To put the point in familiar Kantian terms, we can only attach the ‘‘I will’’ to our choices if we will our maxims as universal laws.¹⁸The categorical imperative is an internal standard for actions, because conformity to it is constitutive of an exercise of the will, of an action of a person as opposed to an action of something within him.

#### C) it’s a tautological contradiction any non-universal norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends, which also means universalizability acts as a side constraint on ends-based frameworks.

**Siyar 99** Jamsheed Aiam Siyar: Kant’s Conception of Practical Reason. Tufts University, 1999**:**

Now, **when I represent my end as to be done, I represent it as binding me to certain courses of action**, precluding other actions, etc. **Thus, my ends function as constraints for me in that they determine what I can** or must **do** (at least if I am to be consistent). I may of course give up an end such as that of eating ice cream at a future point; yet while I have the end, I must see myself as bound to do what is necessary to realize it.35 Thus, I must represent my ends as constraints that I have adopted, constraints that structure the possible space of choice and action for me. Further, given that my end is rationally determined, I take it to be generally recognizable that my end functions as a rationally determined constraint. That is, I take it that other subjects can also recognize my end as an objective constraint, for I take it that they as well as myself can cognize its determining grounds—the source of its objective worth—through the exercise of reason. Indeed, **in representing an end, I** in effect **demand recognition for it from other subjects: since the end functions as an objective though self-imposed constraint for me**, I must demand that this constraint be recognized as such. The thought here is simply that **if I am committed to some end,** e.g. my ice cream eating policy, I must act in certain ways to realize it. In this context, **I cannot be indifferent to the** attitudes and **actions of others, for these may either help or hinder my pursuit of my end. Hence, if I am** in fact **committed to realizing my end,** i.e. if I represent an end at all, **I must demand that the worth of my end**, its status as to be done, **be recognized by others.**

#### Thus the Standard is Consistency with Universizability:

#### Evaluate Intent first: [A] Consequences are infinitely regressive because they always produce more consequences [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events

### Offense

#### Vote neg – the aff is a conceptual contradiction. Truthfulness is necessary to meeting the universalizability test, and reporters privilege prevents it.

**Duffy and Freeman 11** [Duffy, M. J., & Freeman, C. P. (2011). Anonymous sources: A utilitarian exploration of their justification and guidelines for limited use. Journal of Mass Media Ethics, 26(4), 297-315] brackets in original

British philosopher W.D. Ross (1946) contends that **the act of communication requires the obligation to be truthful. He supports this contention by pointing to a Kantian categorical imperative―without a commitment to truth-telling,** societies fail to function (Ross, 1946). Without confidence that other parties are telling the truth—a confidence backed by consistent actions that, over time, create a positive reputation and engender trust—**people may lose their ability to transfer information**, to act effectively as moral agents, or to even co-exist with others. Ross’ adherence to truthtelling applies especially to journalists. **Journalists cannot do their jobs without telling the truth. If their reports are untruthful, or have an appearance of obfuscation or of a lack of truth, then readers will not trust them**. Those readers, therefore, will turn elsewhere to obtain the information they seek. Boeyink (1990) stresses the importance of sourcing as a method of fostering trust: **“[A]ttribution serves as an important truth-telling check on a reporter’s accuracy. If the source of the information is provided, that information can be independently verified** by others. Errors can then be more easily discovered and corrected” (1990, p. 235). **Offering full attribution provides an implicit promise to the reader: This information is true** and you can go ask to the source to verify our work.

#### [2] There is no a priori distinction between agents, but a reporter’s privilege prioritizes a certain class of agents based on empirical conditions. That negates because universalizability requires that all obligations apply to everyone equally to generate reciprocal obligations.

#### [3] The aff allows a particularistic will to make decisions on the part of the other, which prioritizes maxims based on arbitrary choices instead of universal law.

#### [4] The aff is a contradiction is conception: Justifying that people can keep their identity anonymous universalizes a world where nobody knows who anyone is which A) means nobody can be a reporter or a source and B) destroys the concept of what it means to protect an identity.