# United States Aff

# Core Advantages

### 1AC—Plan

#### Plan: In the United States of America, voting ought to be compulsory.

### 1AC—Advantage: Partisanship

#### Political parties in the United States have grown farther apart, locking in partisanship and political gridlock.

Jones 19 [Brad Jones, A research associate at Pew Research Center, involved in all stages of the research process at the center, doctorate in political science from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, “Republicans and Democrats have grown further apart on what the nation’s top priorities should be, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/05/republicans-and-democrats-have-grown-further-apart-on-what-the-nations-top-priorities-should-be/>**]** JJ

Republicans and Democrats have long held differing views about policy solutions, but throughout most of the recent past there was rough partisan agreement about the set of issues that were the top priorities for the nation.

However, that is less and less the case. Republicans and Democrats have been moving further apart not just in their [political values](https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/) and approaches to addressing the issues facing the country, but also on the issues they identify as top priorities for the president and Congress to address.

For more than two decades, Pew Research Center has tracked the public’s priorities, including in [our most recent survey](https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2019/01/24/publics-2019-priorities-economy-health-care-education-and-security-all-near-top-of-list/).

While many issues are considered high priorities by majorities in both parties today, there is virtually no common ground in the priorities that rise to the *top* of the lists for Democrats and Republicans.

Among Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, health care costs, education, the environment, Medicare and assistance for poor and needy people top the list of priorities (all are named as top priorities by seven-in-ten or more Democrats). None of these is among the five leading top priorities for Republicans and Republican-leaning independents (Medicare and health care costs rank sixth and seventh, respectively). Conversely, the two priorities named by more than seven-in-ten Republicans – terrorism and the economy – are cited by far smaller shares of Democrats.

The partisan gap is particularly wide for a handful of issues. For instance, two-thirds of Democrats and Democratic leaners identify global climate change as a top priority, while just 21% of Republicans and Republican leaners say the same. Similarly, although only 31% of Democrats say that strengthening the military should be a top priority, 65% of Republicans hold this view.

Republicans were much more aligned than they are today. In[1999](https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/1999/01/18/senate-trial-little-viewership-little-impact/#priorities), improving the educational system topped the list of priorities for both Republicans and Democrats, and four of the top five issues for Republicans were listed among the Democrats’ top five issues as well. [Ten years later](https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2009/01/22/economy-jobs-trump-all-other-policy-priorities-in-2009/), in the wake of the financial crisis, three issues (economy, jobs and terrorism) topped the list among both Republicans and Democrats (although they ranked them slightly differently). Five years ago, the economy, the job situation and Social Security all ranked among the top five issues in both parties.

#### Partisanship is destroying strong international commitments and clear foreign policy objectives, unraveling the American century.

Trubowitz 19 [Peter Trubowitz, Professor of international relations at the London Schol of economics and political science, [https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century#](https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century), “Will Dysfunctional Politics Finally end the American Century? ]

America is suffering from a shortage of functional or ‘usable power.’ While relative power as measured by its military arsenal vis-à-vis those of its rivals has held steady, the domestic political ability of US presidents to turn the country’s tremendous power and wealth into international influence is declining. This has been the case for some time now. America’s deficit of usable power did not begin with Donald Trump, but it has grown measurably on his watch as president.

Presidents’ usable power depends on their ability to win the support of a broad cross-section of the voting public for their foreign policy agenda. Historically, presidents have relied on three tools to gain public buy-in: bipartisanship on Capitol Hill, the leader’s ability to set the terms of debate and the design of economically inclusive policies. Each contributed mightily to the public consensus underpinning US foreign policy for decades after the Second World War. Today, all three are in short supply.

Bipartisanship was the norm in foreign policymaking during the Cold War. Democratic presidents could count on the support of moderate eastern Republicans in Congress; Republican presidents relied on the support of conservative southern Democrats. Domestic voters, who worried about presidents’ partisan motives, found such bipartisan support reassuring.

So did America’s allies and friends overseas. They worried that in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments taken by one president would be reversed or soft-pedaled when the party out of power gained control of the White House.

This is exactly what has happened since the end of the Cold War. Foreign policymaking has become increasingly partisan and erratic. Incoming presidents now look for opportunities to undo their predecessors’ legacies, something that rarely happened during the Cold War.

George W Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and opposed the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. Barack Obama ended US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pulled out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and renounced the Iran nuclear deal. US relative power may not have changed much since the 1990s, but these examples show decline in America’s willingness to engage and commit internationally as well as in how credible others view its international pronouncements.

If hyper-partisanship has made US commitments worth less internationally, the absence of a shared vision of America’s international purpose has made bipartisanship harder to produce domestically.  To build lasting bipartisan coalitions, presidents must structure the national conversation in ways that convince voters that their administration’s preferred international policies will strengthen national security and increase economic opportunity while making it hard for their political opponents to mount an effective challenge.

During the Cold War, presidents enjoyed considerable success in structuring debate over America’s role in the world. The existence of a ‘clear and present danger’ to national security helped by making it possible for to frame the case for creating and sustaining an expansive (and expensive) American-led international order in terms of national security and anti-communism.

This formulation contributed to some forms of extremism (such as McCarthyism) and overreach (the Vietnam War). At the same time, it put internationalism on firm bipartisan footing and gave presidents considerable latitude to advance internationalist causes.

Since the end of the Cold War, presidents have struggled to secure domestic support for their foreign policies. In absence of a Soviet-style threat, Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama all found their efforts to breathe new life into internationalism buffeted by partisan division and public pressure to ‘do less internationally’. Mounting public disillusionment with globalization compounded matters. This disillusionment is related to the problem of (non)inclusive growth.

#### Compulsory voting forces center-focused politics ensuring common ground and bipartisanship.

Alcorn 19 [Gay Alcorn “How Australia’s compulsory voting saved it from Trumpism, Melbourne Edtir at the Guardian Australia, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/mar/08/how-australias-compulsory-voting-saved-it-from-trumpism>] JJ

Compulsory voting keeps politics focused on the centre rather than the fringe of politics. To win elections, political parties have to appeal not just to their base but to the majority of people. Australia is also one of only a few countries with preferential voting, which means a voter ranks candidates in order of preference, compared with most countries where the candidate with the most votes wins. It ensures that those elected have the support of the majority of voters.

“It keeps the emotional temper of the conflict down,” says Brett. “That’s become more evident recently with the way politics has gone in the United States, where you’ve had issues around sexuality and race being used to motivate voters. If you need to get out the vote, you need to have things that people are going to feel passionate about, and that’s not necessarily such a good thing.”

Brett gives the example of the fringe right within the Liberal party that has fiercely rejected action on climate change – the issue that cost former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull his job. Yet most Australians want serious action on climate change and the party has “got themselves right out of whack, and you can see prime minister Scott Morrison trying to pull them back desperately now”.

#### Empirics prove compulsory voting decreases partisanship by compelling more moderate, non-voters.

Badger 17 [Emily Badger, New York time Journalist and Urban policy writer, “Mandatory Voting as a Cure for Extreme Partisanship?” <https://psmag.com/news/mandatory-voting-as-a-cure-for-extreme-partisanship-18582>] JJ

Political scientists will inevitably get more evidence this fall for a pattern particularly true of midterm elections: People who don't follow politics — and don't have rabid views on the most polarizing topics of the day — tend not to vote. They leave alone at the polls motivated voters with extreme views likely to elect equally extreme politicians who are, as a result, unable to work with each other.

"You have a kind of reinforcement where politicians appeal to more ideologically inspired voters, who then reinforce politicians who respond to them," said [William Galston](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/galstonw.aspx), a senior fellow at the [Brookings Institution](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/galstonw.aspx). "I've spent a lot of time thinking and doing research on this problem. It's not easy to interrupt a vicious cycle. It's one of the hardest things to do in life — and certainly in politics."

Galston's solution is a fairly radical intervention: [Make everyone vote](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0601_innovation_galston.aspx). If the people who turn up voluntarily at the polls reinforce our worst political instincts toward conflict and obstruction, we could dilute their influence by roping absolutely everyone into the process.

Research, after all, has shown that the American population eligible to vote is considerably more moderate than the subset of people who actually do vote

"Non-voters look like the classic bell curve," Galston said, if we rate them on an ideological spectrum from left to right (see Emory political scientist [Alan Abramowitz](http://www.polisci.emory.edu/faculty%20pages/abramowitz.htm)'s new book [The Disappearing Center](http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300141627)). "That's not what the electorate looks like," he added.

Galston's proposal is, at this stage, more an intriguing thought experiment than anything else. He knows — "America being the kind of viscerally libertarian place that it is" — that the idea would be greeted by many as a gross government invasion of individual liberties. (It's an equally fun thought experiment to ponder how Tea Party patriots would react to a government mandate requiring them to fulfill what is an arguably patriotic duty.)

Galston, though, is convinced the evidence is on his side. Congress has become measurably [more polarized](http://www.psmag.com/politics/there-is-no-common-ground-anymore-3412/) over the years, a crisis that consumes countless think-thank hours in Washington. And a significant increase in voter participation would statistically bump up the percentage of self-described moderates in the electorate. "There's just no question there," Galston said.

He even cites evidence that compulsory voting laws work: [Australia](http://www.aec.gov.au/faqs/voting_australia.htm) passed one in the 1920s after officials grew alarmed by what they considered low turnout rates below 60 percent (America's turnout in the most recent midterm election: [37 percent](http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html)). Today, deterred by a fine the equivalent of a cheap parking ticket, typically 95 percent of Australians show up. Austria, Belgium, Greece and France all have varying versions of compulsory voting, some with enforcement, some without.

#### Sustained usable power key to the structural foundations of the liberal world order that constrains catastrophic transition wars with revisionist Russia and China – multiplicity of factors explains their historical grievances and strategic motivations, but ONLY hard power can check their revisionist rise

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Robert Kagan, “The Twilight of the Liberal World Order,” Brookings Big Ideas for America edited by Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Press (2017): <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.31>

The liberal world order established in the aftermath of World War II may be coming to an end, challenged by forces both without and within. The external challenges come from the ambition of dissatisfied large and medium-size powers to overturn the existing strategic order dominated by the United States and its allies and partners. Their aim is to gain hegemony in their respective regions. China and Russia pose the greatest challenges to the world order because of their relative military, economic, and political power and their evident willingness to use it, which makes them significant players in world politics and, just as important, because the regions where they seek strategic hegemony—Asia and Europe—historically have been critical to global peace and stability. At a lesser but still significant level, Iran seeks regional hegemony in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which if accomplished would have a strategic, economic, and political impact on the international system. North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula, which if accomplished would affect the stability and security of northeast Asia. Finally, at a much lower level of concern, there is the effort by ISIS and other radical Islamist groups to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. If accomplished, that, too, would have effects on the global order.

However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided.

The role of the United States, however, has been critical. Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost insuperable obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism has posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful.

The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined military power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge.

Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions.

The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core order—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.

In recent years, however, the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core. As a result of many related factors—difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism—there has emerged a crisis of confidence in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project tended to elevate universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and fa cilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism; an increasing focus on the “other” in all societies; and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence.

This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable. It may indeed have been cyclical, due to inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy, which periodically have been exposed and have raised doubts about both—as happened, for instance, throughout the West in the 1930s. Now, as then, moreover, this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order. In this case, however, the key variable has not been the United States as the outside power and its willingness, or not, to step in and save or remake an order lost by other powers. Rather it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power.

That willingness has been in doubt for some time. Increasingly in the quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always apparently served and when, indeed, the United States seems to be making sacrifices while others benefit. The reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century have been largely forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing such a role has worn thin. Thus, whereas previous unsuccessful wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as in the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2007–09 have had that effect. President Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but the main thrust of his approach was retrenchment. His actions and statements were a critique of previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests.

With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have sig naled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order.

Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. The weakness of the liberal core and the abdication by the United States of its global responsibilities will encourage more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers, which may in turn exacerbate the sense of weakness and helplessness and the loss of confidence of the liberal world, which will in turn increase the sense on the part of the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests.

History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of global responsibility, to reject strategic involvement to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict.

One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltics, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. The cycle only ends if and when the great powers that make up the existing power structure, in today’s case, the United States, decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.

The new administration seems to be fixated almost entirely on the threat of radical Islam and may not believe its main problem is going to be great power confrontation. In fact, it is going to have to confront both sets of challenges. The first, addressing the threat of terrorism, is comparatively manageable. It is the second, managing great power competition and confrontation, that has historically proved the most difficult and also the most costly when handled badly.

The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear from the outset. That position should be that the United States welcomes competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.

But security competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

If history is any guide, the next four years are the critical inflection point. The rest of the world will take its cue from the early actions of the new administration. If the next president governs as he ran, which is to say if he pursues a course designed to secure only America’s narrow interests; focuses chiefly on international terrorism—the least of the challenges to the present world order; accommodates the ambitions of the great powers; ceases to regard international economic policy in terms of global order but only in terms of America’s bottom line narrowly construed; and generally ceases to place a high priority on reassuring allies and partners in the world’s principal strategic theaters—then the collapse of the world order, with all that entails, may not be far off.

#### Heg decline causes prolif and unstable nuclear alliances -- that leads to war.

Peter Hayes, 6-16-2018, [Peter Hayes is Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia and Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. His main research interests are nuclear weapons, climate change and energy security, particularly in Northeast Asia.]"Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony," Taylor & Francis, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525//CHS> PK

During a post-hegemonic era, long-standing nuclear alliances are likely to be replaced by ad hoc nuclear coalitions, aligning and realigning around different congeries of threat and even actual nuclear wars, with much higher levels of uncertainty and unpredictability than was the case in the nuclear hegemonic system. There are a number of ways that this dynamic could play out during the interregnum, and these dynamics are likely to be inconsistent and contradictory. In some instances, the sheer momentum of past policy combined with bureaucratic inertia and the potency of political, military service and corporate interests, may ensure that residual aspects of the formerly hegemonic postures are adhered to even as formal nuclear alliances rupture. Even as they reach for the old anchors, these states may be forced to adjust and retrench strategically, or start to take their own nuclear risks by making increasingly explicit nuclear threats and deployments against nuclear-armed adversaries – as Japan has begun to do with reference to its “technological deterrent” since about 2012.9 This period could last for many years until and when nuclear war breaks out and leads to a post-nuclear war disorder; or a new, post-hegemonic strategic framework is established to manage and/or abolish nuclear threat. Under full-blown American nuclear hegemony, fewer states had nuclear weapons, the major nuclear weapons states entered into legally binding restraints on force levels and they learned from nuclear near-misses to promulgate rules of the road and tacit understandings. The lines drawn during full-blown collisions involving nuclear weapons were stark and concentrated the minds of leaders greatly. In a nuclear duel, it was clear that only one of two sides could fire first; the only question was which one. Now, with nine nuclear weapons states, and conflicts conceivably involving three, four or more of them, no matter how much leaders concentrate, it will not be evident who is aiming at who, who may fire first, and during a volley, who fired first and even who hit whom. In a highly proliferated world, nuclear-armed states may feel driven to obtain larger nuclear forces able to deter multiple adversaries at the same time, sufficient to conduct not only a few nuclear attacks but configured to fight more than one protracted nuclear war at a time, especially in nuclear states torn apart by civil war and post-nuclear attack reconstruction. The first time nuclear weapons are used since 1945 will be shocking, the second time, less so, the third time, the new normal.

#### Unipolarity is key to check back a litany of issues—climate change, pandemics, terrorism. However, even if primacy isn’t perfect, hegemonic transitions spur regional wars and conflict.

Zachary Keck 14, Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, 1-24, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/

Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world.¶ Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, **hegemonic transition periods have historically** been **the most destabilizing eras in history**. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states.¶ We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead.¶ All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, **America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war**, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of **great power conflict** and especially major regional wars **rises dramatically**. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals.¶ But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include **climate change**, health **pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises**, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others.¶ **A unipolar system**, for all its limitations, **is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues**. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.¶ The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governance.

### **1AC—Advantage: Civic Engagement**

#### Even though democracy in the U.S. might be a given, we are on a downward spiral towards more authoritarian tendencies and breakdown of legitimate norms.

#### Osnos 20 [Evan Osnos, staff writer in 2008 and covers politics and foreign affirs, His recent pieces include a profile of Mark Zuckerberg, a tale from Donald’s Trump war on “the deep state,” and a visit to North Korea during the nuclear crisis. The book won the 2014 National Book Award and was a finalist for the 2015 Pulitzer Prize. Previously, Osnos worked as Beijing bureau chief for the Chicago *Tribune*, where he was part of a team that won the 2008 Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting. “Why Democracy is on the decline in the United States,” <https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/why-democracy-is-on-the-decline-in-the-united-states>] JJ

The [latest edition](https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy) was published last week, and, as you might expect, it recorded the fourteenth straight year of deteriorating freedom around the world; sixty-four countries have lost liberties in the past year, while only thirty-seven registered improvements. (India, the world’s largest democracy, has seen some of the most alarming declines.) Its assessment of the United States is also disturbing. In 2009, the U.S. had a score of ninety-four, out of a hundred, which ranked it near the top, just behind Germany, Switzerland, and Estonia. In the decade since, it has slipped eight points; it now ranks behind Greece, Slovakia, and Mauritius. Looking at the United States, Freedom House analysts note the types of trends that they more customarily assign to fragile corners of the globe: “pressure on electoral integrity, judicial independence, and safeguards against corruption. Fierce rhetorical attacks on the press, the rule of law, and other pillars of democracy coming from American leaders, including the president himself.”

Explaining what, exactly, accounts for this decline is the work of a growing body of literature. Much of it focusses, of course, on the tenure of Donald Trump, but, interestingly, some scholars and advocates tend to identify a point of origin well before the election of 2016. According to Protect Democracy, a legal-watchdog group dedicated to combatting the rise of authoritarianism in America, “the growth and spread of democracies that defined the 20th Century peaked in the early days of the 21st; since 2005, the state of democracies around the world has receded.”

One of the most frequently cited theories for this change is depicted in what’s known as the “elephant graph.” The graph, which the economist Branko Milanović popularized, in 2013, is, in fact, a chart that shows income growth by stratum (or, in technical terms, by “percentiles of the global income distribution”) in the twenty years leading up to the 2008 global financial crisis. The graph got its name because it looks like an elephant: on the left, there is a plump body of rising incomes—China, India, and other beneficiaries of globalization—and, on the right, a rapidly rising trunk, which reflects the spectacular fortunes of the world’s top one per cent. The most politically significant part of the elephant is in between: the bottom of the trunk, which shows the stagnant incomes of American and European working and middle classes. Those groups have proved to be fertile bases of support for populist rebellions against democratic traditions that, from their vantage point, now appear false or obsolete.

#### Even if Biden were to get elected, we need a well-informed, engaged citizenry to reinvigorate democratic practice and reverse damages.

Gillman 17 [Hollie Russon Gillman, served as policy adviser on open government and innovation in the White House office of Science and Technology policy, fellow at New America and at Harvard’s Ash center for democratic Governance and innovation and holds a PHD from Havrvard’s Department of Government, “For democracy to survive, it requires civic engagement, <https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2017/1/31/14458966/democracy-requires-civic-engagement>, ] JJ

How do we bring citizens into democracy? Americans were accustomed to a longstanding model: institutions and their leaders as the stalwart of democracy. Not even a week into Trump’s presidency, many folks are left wide-eyed with the realization that our civic institutions are not going to work without consistent citizen pressure and activism to protect them. At a time when citizens’ [faith in institutions](http://www.edelman.com/trust2017/) and [democracy](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/americans-are-losing-faith-in-democracy--and-in-each-other/2016/10/14/b35234ea-90c6-11e6-9c52-0b10449e33c4_story.html) is at all-time lows; we each need to be vigilant and actively engaged.

Civic engagement is not just for creating better policies but also for reinvigorating democratic practice — this is an underlying condition of our current political dysfunction. There are tools from our democratic “arsenal” to support this new relationship between Americans and their government. Regardless of how we proceed, this is going to take work, and there isn’t a panacea. The new dynamic between the government and citizens is not going to fix itself. It is not going to be fixed by a new policy or a new government official. There is now no choice but to engage in a multigenerational project to reinvigorate American democracy.

First, individual citizens can hold power to account by bringing new and relevant facts into the public light. People can serve as watchdogs, activists for truth, and monitors of governance. Individual people can serve as more credible truth tellers than other parts of society that are viewed as beholden to special interests or lobbying. From photographing police violence to tracking public documents online (e.g., through the Freedom of Information Act) to ensuring that elected officials maintain their campaign promises, individuals can become purveyors of truth and put pressure on institutions and elected officials.

Take, for example, India’s [**Mumbai Votes**](http://mumbaivotes.com/), where information crowdsourced by students and activists on elected officials is viewed as credible and reliable information, often in contrast to biased [**paid news**](https://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/jan/04/india-paid-news-scandal). In an environment of declining institutional trust, there is a vacuum of facts. Individual people empowered with a smartphone or even a microphone can be the purveyors of truth and can leverage that information to hold government accountable.

Second, citizens can revitalize the power of diverse community-based organizations. For a long time, these organizations weaved the vibrant fabric of America civic and communal life. [**Alexis de Tocqueville’s**](https://books.google.com/books?id=gTX-uSzS2fAC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false) writings about early American life included the potency of civic associations for strengthening democracy. One component of these organizations was the ability for people to come together across different ideologies and beliefs.

Today these organizations are no longer as vital, diverse, or powerful as they once were, and American democracy has suffered as a result. There has been much [scholarship](https://books.google.com/books/about/Diminished_Democracy.html?id=jbBWNLkChrIC&printsec=frontcover&source=kp_read_button#v=onepage&q&f=false) on the decline of civic associations in the United States. Now is the moment to [reengage](http://www.teenvogue.com/story/how-the-womens-march-could-have-a-lasting-historical-impact) with civil society organizations — not just passively donate every year. Instead, actively participant in local chapters of a national group or a neighborhood association.

Civic organizations are not a monolith. There are some that are filled with people who share the same preconceived views, while others may have less homogeneous ideology. Given the changing relationship between citizens and government, now is the critical moment to form nontraditional alliances and more deeply engage with people with dissenting viewpoints. The goal is to strengthen critical civil society institutions, not just to feel reaffirmed. Building tolerance for peaceful dissent and disagreement toward shared democratic goods, which transcend any one person, is a critical building block for reinventing the relationship between citizens and the state.

#### Democracies are not a monolithic system—even if some democracies are problematic, ones with more accountability and civic engagement are less likely to engage in regional warfare, have armed conflict, etc.

Cortright 13 [David Cortright, American Scholar and peace activist, director of policy studies at the Kroc Institute for international peace studies at the university of Notre Dame and Chair of the Board of the Fourth Freedom forum, “How State Capacity and Regime Type Influence the prospects for war and peace, <https://oefresearch.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Cortright-Seyle-Wall-Paper.pdf> ] JJ

A recurring trend runs through nearly all of the empirical studies on the democratic peace effect. Fully mature democratic states with high threshold scores on indicators of voice and accountability have the lowest risk of war and armed conflict. The characteristics of democracy that are most strongly associated with the absence of armed conflict and violent repression are political representativeness and inclusiveness. These are made possible by, and help to sustain, essential civil liberties and human rights.

Walter, Reynal-Querol, Joshi, Davenport, and other scholars come to similar conclusions on the irenic effect of inclusive and participatory forms of governance. Jeffrey Dixon confirms these findings in his synthesis of quantitative studies on the correlates of civil war. As democracies become more inclusive, their risk of armed conflict diminishes. Discriminatory policies increase the risk of civil war, while guarantees of political freedom reduce that risk.140 The more participatory and open the political governance system the lower the chances of armed conflict and political violence. Peace is more likely when people are free to participate actively in choosing political decision makers and when diverse interests have effective political representation. Programs that foster citizen participation, inclusive institutions, accountability mechanisms, and greater public oversight bolster the conditions for peace.

The two parts of this paper examine state capacity and democracy separately, but the irenic features of these separate dimensions overlap and reinforce one another. Effective institutions prevent armed conflict when they provide security and civilian services, and when they are inclusive and representative. A narrow focus on one dimension of governance—for example building strong institutions while ignoring the need for democratic accountability—could be counterproductive. Effective capacity and democratic governance go hand in hand and need to be combined to create the greatest peace effect.

Social science research confirms that governments are better able to prevent armed conflict if they have strong institutions and maintain effective control over their territory, and if they provide the full range of public goods, including essential social services. The findings also highlight the importance of fostering governance systems with greater citizen participation and oversight, more inclusive and accountable forms of representation, and guarantees of political freedom and human rights. These and other policy approaches help to reduce the risk of armed conflict and are part of the process through which good governance promotes peace.

#### Eroding democratic norms ensures rogue use of Artificial Intelligence for malicious purposes.

Feldstein 19 – [Steven Feldstein; Published by Johns Hopkins University Press; “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence is Reshaping Repression” January 2019; Volume 30; Issue 1; pg. 40-42; <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/713721/pdf>] JJ

Here it offers a number of particular benefits to authoritarian and illiberal regimes. Despite the wide variety of nondemocratic regime types—ranging from single-party dictatorships to hybrid or semiauthoritarian regimes to military dictatorships and personalist autocracies—most of these governments maintain power through a mixture of coercion (threatening and intimidating would-be rivals) and cooptation (bribing or otherwise inducing political actors to join the ruling coalition).

A leader who opts to repress must rely on state-security forces to apply the necessary coercive measures. This brings two attendant problems. First, such repression is labor-intensive and expensive; over time, it requires an increasing amount of resources to sustain. Second, it leads to a principal-agent problem: “The very resources that enable the regime’s repressive agents to suppress its opposition also empower them to act against the regime itself.”

In other words, as a regime increasingly relies on police or soldiers to do its dirty work, it also grows more vulnerable to pressure or even insurrection from those same quarters. Leaders face a fraught choice as to whether the benefits of deploying security forces to crush challenges from without outweigh the potential threat that these forces themselves pose from within.

This is where the advantages of AI technology become apparent. Instead of relying on a dense security-force infrastructure to enable widespread surveillance, harassment and intimidation of opponents across the state’s territory, authoritarian leaders can use AI to cultivate a digital repression capability at a lower cost—and reduce principal-agent concerns.

In fact, the most advanced surveillance operations rely on relatively few human agents: many functions are instead automated through AI. Moreover, in comparison to human operatives with limited reserves of time and attention, AI systems can cast a much wider net. Because of this omnipresence, they can induce changes in behavior and create a significant “chilling” effect even in the absence of sustained physical violence. If citizens know that AI “bots” are monitoring all communications and that algorithms will pick up dissenting messages and report them to the authorities, the public has a powerful motivation to conform.

Such is the elegant simplicity of AI repression: it requires considerable fewer human actors than conventional repression, entails less physical harassment, and comes at a lower cost. Yet it may well have a more wide-ranging and systematic impact. Even before the onset of digital repression, the landscape of contemporary authoritarianism was shifting in noteworthy ways. First the erosion of democratic institutions and norms has accelerated worldwide. The verities of Democracy 2018 report estimates that around 2.5 billion people now live in countries affected by this “global autocratizationn trend.” In fact, gradual democratic backsliding has become one of the most common routes to authoritarianism.

#### That's the greatest existential risk

Talks 16 – Martin Talks, has twenty years’ experience in the digital technology and communications sectors, runs the company Matomico, a consultancy that helps companies and organisations with digital transformation and innovation initiatives, and aims to demystify the world of advanced technology, also cites Stephen Hawking, Bill Gates, and Elon Musk, “A Marketer’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence”, March 2016 Ad+

“Success in creating AI would be the biggest event in human history,” said Stephen Hawking in The Independent in 2014. “Unfortunately, it might also be the last, unless we learn how to avoid the risks.”11 In an interview with the BBC he added: “Humans, limited by slow biological evolution, couldn’t compete and would be superseded by AI.”12 Elon Musk called AI “our greatest existential threat” in a 2014 interview with MIT students at the AeroAstro Centennial Symposium. “I’m increasingly inclined to think that there should be some regulatory oversight, maybe at the national and internat`ional level, just to make sure that we don’t do something very foolish.”13 Musk has invested in a number of AI technologies through startups including DeepMind, acquired by Google for the rumoured sum of $400m (£285m) in 201414, and claims this is as a means to “just keep an eye on what’s going on with artificial intelligence”15. Bill Gates has also expressed concerns about AI. During a Q&A session on Reddit in January 2015, Gates said: “I am in the camp that is concerned about super intelligence. First the machines will do a lot of jobs for us and not be super intelligent. That should be positive if we manage it well. A few decades after that though the intelligence is strong enough to be a concern. I agree with Elon Musk and some others on this and don’t understand why some people are not concerned.”16 In July 2015, Stephen Hawking, Musk and more than 1,000 AI and robotics researchers signed a letter asking for a ban on AI warfare, warning of the potential for rampant destruction at the hands of autonomous weapon systems, which can select and engage targets without human intervention. “AI technology has reached a point where the deployment of such systems is — practically if not legally — feasible within years, not decades, and the stakes are high: autonomous weapons have been described as the third revolution in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms,” the letter said.

#### Compulsory voting spurs a cultural shift in how voting is viewed, while driving turnout---this solves better than any alternative.

Emilee Booth Chapman 18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393>, RJP

The Case for Compulsory Voting

The democratic value of increased voter turnout thus derives from the contributions of elections—as periodic moments of (approximately) universal participation—to an equally responsive government and other democratic values. But the extent to which elections satisfactorily perform this important function depends on voting rates. Consistently low turnout rates diminish many of the distinctive democratic virtues of elections. This is especially true when a substantial number of citizens in contemporary democracies never vote and when these habitual nonvoters tend to be concentrated in poor and otherwise disadvantaged groups. Many citizens do not vote in part because they do not perceive the political system as responsive to them. Public officials in turn reinforce this perception; officials have an incentive to prioritize the concerns of likely voters over those of habitual nonvoters (Griffin and Newman 2005; K. Q. Hill, Leighley, and Hinton-Andersson 1995; Martin 2003). Periodic moments of universal participation ideally prevent this kind of informal disenfranchisement, but communities with voluntary voting rely on social norms to enforce the expectation that everyone votes. In marginalized groups within large societies, such norms may not be available.

Many scholars have pointed to compulsory voting as an important step in counteracting this cycle of disengagement in marginalized communities (Birch 2009, 53–54; L. Hill 2010, 919–21; Lijphart 1997). Numerous studies have shown that compulsory voting effectively and often dramatically increases turnout rates—by 15 percentage points or more (e.g., Birch 2009, 79–97; Hirczy 1994)10—and electoral participation is distributed more evenly across society (Fowler 2013, 72; Hooghe and Pelleriaux 1998, 421–22). By promoting reliable compliance with the expectation of universal electoral participation, effectively enforced compulsory voting remedies the collective action problem that plagues vulnerable communities with chronically low turnout rates. Members of politically alienated groups have more reason to regard their vote as an instrument of political influence if they know that others like them will also vote.

The claims that increasing voter turnout through compulsory voting will improve government responsiveness to and representation of the poor and marginalized are especially plausible in light of the functions of moments of approximately universal participation, and there is at least some evidence to support these arguments for mandatory voting. Some studies, for example, have found that compulsory voting is associated with lower levels of income inequality and corruption—outcomes that benefit the poor who are less likely to vote in voluntary systems (Birch 2009, 130–31; Chong and Olivera 2008).

Compulsory voting is not the only instrument for increasing voter turnout, but, even when penalties for not voting are relatively low and excuses are permissive, compulsory voting tends to be more effective than most other measures, especially those that are comparably feasible. Relatively uncontroversial reforms focused on making voting more convenient and accessible at best increase turnout by only a few percentage points, and they do not typically draw many new voters from underrepresented groups (James 2010, 373–74). In fact, sometimes these “convenience voting” reforms can result in decreased turnout (Berinsky 2005). More dramatic convenience reforms—like Sunday voting and automatic voter registration—tend to produce more significant increases in turnout, but they still fall short of compulsory voting’s effectiveness (James 2010, 378–82). The only measure that appears comparably effective—switching from majoritarian to proportional representation— requires radical systemic change, and it may not be effective or desirable in all political or institutional contexts.11

And, of course, compulsory voting can be regarded as a complement, not simply an alternative, to other turnoutboosting reforms.

Compulsory voting is not a unique or universal solution to the problem of low voter turnout, but its combination of effectiveness and flexibility relative to other measures for increasing turnout make it a particularly valuable tool in the toolkit for democratic reform. The case for compulsory voting rests not only on its effectiveness, though, but also on its compatibility with the virtues of moments of universal participation. Compulsory voting can magnify elections’ effect on democratic norms by adding the expressive power of law to the norm of universal voting. Compulsory voting clearly sends the message that all citizens—not just the college educated or wealthy—are expected to contribute to electoral decision making. This expressive effect, reinforced by the experience of actually participating in the vote, encourages citizens to see themselves as political agents. Because of its expressive effect, compulsory voting is also valuable as an object of political support. When citizens support mandatory voting laws, they clearly express a public belief in and commitment to the value of all citizens’ participation in democracy (Engelen 2007, 29).

Because compulsory voting strengthens the public commitment to democratic norms while also increasing the government’s adherence to those norms, proponents have argued that mandatory voting also increases at least the descriptive legitimacy of a political system, and anecdotal evidence supports this claim (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997, 10). Compulsory voting has also been associated with a higher reported satisfaction with democracy (Birch 2009, 114).

Thus far, I have demonstrated that increasing voter turnout is an important goal for contemporary democratic societies, and that compulsory voting is, at least initially, an appealing means of increasing turnout. Completing the case for mandatory voting, though, requires showing that the likely costs of implementing it do not outweigh the likely benefits. In the next section, I complete this step by responding to four significant objections to mandatory voting.

#### This facilitates deep civic engagement---elections and universality are both key.

Emilee Booth Chapman 18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393>, RJP

Concern about the gap between public opinion and policy outcomes and about the disproportionate influence of wealthy citizens has recently reinvigorated the debate over compulsory voting. Proponents of compulsory voting suggest that declining and unequal voter turnout rates have exacerbated the responsiveness gap in contemporary democracies. There is ample evidence that enforced compulsory voting is among the most effective ways of increasing voter turnout. Supporters and opponents of mandatory voting disagree, however, about whether higher voter turnout is actually a valuable goal, and whether compulsion is an appropriate way of achieving it.

In this article, I argue that the case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit recognition of the unique and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democratic practice as periodic moments in which there is an ambition toward universal participation. Understanding the distinctive value of elections strengthens the case for compulsory voting in many established democracies. Addressing prominent objections to mandatory voting,1 I argue that critics who deny the value of high turnout achieved though compulsion fail to give sufficient attention to voting’s unique role in contemporary democracies.

My argument rests on the critical assumption that greater political equality, understood as government that is more equally responsive to all citizens, and greater democratic legitimacy are worthwhile goals to pursue. Thus, my argument is not directed at those criticisms of compulsory voting denying the value of a more equally responsive government.2 Though I do try to address some of the specific objections raised in these criticisms of compulsory voting, my argument is primarily addressed at the important line of criticism that high voter turnout, especially when achieved through compulsion, does not significantly contribute to political equality or meaningful democratic legitimacy.

The argument proceeds in the following steps: First, I argue that the ambition toward universal participation establishes a distinctive and important role for voting in modern democratic systems, and, to the extent that they approximate this aim of universal turnout, elections contribute in unique ways to the promotion of democratic values, especially equal responsiveness. Second, I argue that compulsory voting is a particularly good method for increasing turnout because it is more effective than other similarly feasible methods, and it can complement more substantial electoral reforms. Moreover, the method of compulsory voting is well suited to reinforce the distinctive virtues of elections. Finally, I address some major objections to mandatory voting to show that the expected benefits of mandatory voting are likely to outweigh the expected costs and that its effects will not undermine the value of high voter turnout. Before proceeding, it is worth making a few remarks about the scope of this argument. First, technically, this argument applies only to compulsory turnout; enforcing a legal requirement to cast a valid vote would require eliminating the secret ballot, which I do not advocate. In keeping with the norm in the existing literature, though, I use the more common terms mandatory voting or compulsory voting to refer to compulsory turnout. Second, this argument applies only to voting in elections (or potentially referenda) in large-scale democratic societies (i.e., nation-states, or large provinces in a federal system). The distinctive virtues of elections that I lay out in the first section of this article may be less important in smaller communities that can ensure consistent and equally effective access to other modes of participation. Finally, the argument I advance in this article only supports an all-things-concerned judgment in favor of implementing mandatory voting when the system has been designed to achieve its goals and limit negative side effects in the particular context, which, in most cases, will require appropriate complementary reforms. A desirable system of mandatory voting will, for example, require accessible polling places and an enforcement structure with reasonable penalties to ensure that the law is not overly burdensome, especially for already vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, this aricle contributes to the case that proponents of democracy should regard mandatory voting as a potentially powerful tool for democratic reform, and that it is worth figuring out how to implement it effectively and justly.

The Role of Elections in Contemporary Democracy

Proponents of compulsory voting typically justify compelling people to vote by appealing to two benefits from near-universal electoral turnout: First, higher turnout will produce a political system that is more equally responsive to all citizens; second, higher turnout will increase the perceived legitimacy of the political system (Engelen 2007, 24–25; L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014; Lijphart 1996, 1997).

Critics of compulsory voting, on the other hand, object that these arguments place too much emphasis on the act of voting while neglecting the diversity of participation that characterizes healthy democracies. Annabelle Lever (2010, 908) argues, “Voting is, at best, only oneform of democratic political participation and, from some perspectives, not an especially important or attractive one.” Other critics likewise claim that compulsory voting arbitrarily singles out one kind of participation as essential to democracy (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 31). High voter turnout, opponents contend, is not necessarily important for democracy. Moreover, compelling higher turnout is not harmless. Critics argue that compulsory voting could compromise the quality of democratic participation and that it needlessly interferes with individual liberty.

Opponents of compulsory voting rightly observe that voting is only one aspect of democracy, but they wrongly conclude that approximately universal voting is not valuable to contemporary democracy. Voting is not interchangeable with other forms of political influence. Elections play a distinctive and important role within a broader framework of democracy, a role characterized by mass participation, in fact, by an ambition toward universal participation.

Established democracies devote tremendous resources to making voting accessible. India’s 2014 Lok Sabha election, for example, required nearly a million polling places to ensure that all eligible voters, even those in the most remote parts of the country, would have a meaningful opportunity to vote (Vyawahare 2014). Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote, but also that citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity (see, e.g., Blais 2000, 95). This public attitude toward voting is distinct from attitudes toward other forms of participation; in the popular imagination, voting is singled out as the object of a duty.3

Of course, critics of compulsory voting who doubt the value of high voter turnout are also likely to be critical of this prominence of voting in public discourse and in the popular imagination. Voting is not the only way citizens participate in decision making in today’s democracies. Citizens might also contribute to public deliberation, petition their representatives, donate money to a campaign, or even stand for office themselves. Popular voting alone need not (and surely cannot) bear all of the normative weight of democracy, and fostering a more equally responsive government certainly requires attention to the significant inequities in these other domains of participation (Lever 2010). Seen in this light, the special emphasis on electoral participation may seem arbitrary and thus an insufficient basis for compelling citizens to vote.

The special emphasis on voting in popular political culture is not arbitrary or misguided, though. Rather, it is grounded in the distinctive and valuable role that periodic moments of approximately universal participation play in contemporary democratic practices. When characterized by approximately universal turnout, elections interrupt the ordinary, delegated business of government with extraordinary spectacles of democracy that command the attention of the general public and manifest the equal political authority of all citizens. Though they cannot fully instantiate democracy on their own, these moments effectively contribute to contemporary democratic practices in a number of ways.

First, the ambition toward universal participation in periodic elections helps to guard against political disengagement and alienation by defining concrete expectations for participation. Skeptics of the value of high voter turnout often argue that active participation is not essential to democracy because individuals can passively exercise political authority by deferring to their fellow citizens or to political elites. But political inaction can only be interpreted as passive participation if citizens believe it is appropriate and possible for them to intervene when they are dissatisfied with the direction of their public life. In modern societies, though, many people do not see themselves as political agents in their own right, able to exert influence over their political circumstances (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 168)

A pluralist model of democracy might simply call for citizens to take advantage of opportunities to participate whenever and however they wish, but many citizens will never participate because they never feel competent to do so, or because it simply never occurs to them. The ambition toward universal participation in elections mitigates this problem of habitual disengagement by establishing an expectation that citizens will perform their political agency on specific and predictable occasions.4 Knowing that they will be called upon to actively participate on a recurring basis provides citizens with a reason to develop an enduring political identity.5 Moreover, by directing citizens’ attention to particular political questions that they will be expected to answer, elections make the often frustrating and potentially discouraging task of figuring out what to pay attention to easier for ordinary citizens.6 This benefit is magnified by the relative information saturation that occurs around elections.

Critics of compulsory voting might argue that, rather than trying to enforce universal electoral participation, we can more effectively combat political disengagement and alienation by promoting participation in other arenas.7 But, even if nonelectoral participation can be more effective than voting at increasing political engagement and efficacy in individual cases, approximating universal participation in other forms of activism or participation would require much more radical reforms of political culture and institutions. Efforts to increase voter turnout, on the other hand, build on an extensive infrastructure of electoral administration and the existing, widespread norm that there is a duty to vote.

Moreover, periodic moments of approximately universal participation would likely still play a valuable role in a political system already characterized by widespread citizen engagement, for several reasons. First, these moments facilitate collective action. Individuals can influence public life more effectively when they are able to combine their efforts with other like-minded citizens. Insofar as elections represent occasions in which all citizens can count on each other to participate, they can help to overcome some of the coordination problems that make it difficult for large, diverse, unorganized, or underresourced groups to effectively utilize other channels of influence. Second, when citizens internalize an expectation of universal participation in elections, electoral campaigns also create a relatively attentive audience to whom political leaders and activists can address political claims,8 facilitating the introduction of new issues and the contestation of existing political divisions. Finally, periodic moments of approximately universal participation make the political involvement and formal political equality of all citizens manifest. This spectacle reinforces parties’ and elected officials’ incentives to take the interests and concerns of all citizens into account. Elections are not the only way for citizens to hold political leaders to account, but elections are still distinctively valuable mechanisms of democratic control when they predictably involve the entire citizenry in the sanctioning process. When characterized by nearly universal participation, elections provide an unambiguous reminder to public officials that they are accountable to all citizens, not just the most vocal and active. Because elections make manifest the responsiveness of the political system to the equal agency of all citizens in at least a few concrete instances, the optics of periodic moments of approximately universal participation can also contribute to the empirical legitimacy of a democratic regime. Those who find themselves on the losing side of a political decision may have a harder time maintaining the belief that they speak for a silent majority when citizens routinely reveal how they align themselves on significant dimensions of political conflict (see also Przeworski 1999).

### 1AC—Advantage: Right-Wing Populism

#### Compulsory voting counteracts right-wing extremism and populism.

[Anthoula Malopoulou 20, Docent and Researcher in Political Science at the Department of Voernment, Uppsala University, funded by the Swedish Research council and the Wallenberg Foundation, Compulsory voting and Right-wing populism: mobilization, representation, and socioeconomic inequalities] JJ

Compulsory voting is known to be a great leveller. As a tool that promotes universal turnout, it produces participation that is de facto, not only de jure, equal (Hill 2014; Lijphart 1997). But compulsory voting is also a good preventive measure against right-wing populism, or so I argue. It is preventive in that it structures the socio-political space in a manner that reduces the appeal of populist claims. In that sense, the benefits of making voting compulsory address some of the demands that are associated with the rise of right-wing populist parties. This interpretation takes for granted that populism, as problematic as it is for liberal democracy, is also a reaction to justified grievances and pragmatic inequalities. Even though they offer questionable solutions, populist parties have often mobilised vulnerable groups, enabled their political integration and provided a tool for counteracting socioeconomic inequality (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Compulsory voting serves these exact same goals, without compromising liberal-democratic ideas and institutions as does populism. he idea that universal turnout creates a barrier to radical politics is not entirely new. Empirical scholars have observed, for example, that those who hold strong partisan beliefs (as supporters of right-wing populist parties1 usually do) tend to vote in higher proportions than those with more moderate views (Hoffman, León, and Lombardi 2017); this results in an overrepresentation of radical parties in the polls. In Sarah Birch’s words: ‘if intensity of preference equates with ideological extremism, and indifference translates into moderation at the polls, the logical conclusion is that mandatory electoral participation is a useful means of stemming extremism and promoting centrist outcomes’ (Birch 2009, 52). In other words, mandatory equal participation reduces the impact of hyper-mobilised parties as it prevents them from garnering a higher support in the polls vis-à-vis their support within the entire eligible voting population. On these grounds, parties that feel particularly threatened by radical challengers have in some countries supported mandatory voting. For example, in 2013 a group of French conservative MPs promoted the introduction of mandatory voting in order to control the rise of the Front National. Low turnouts, it was argued, produced overblown support for far-right and far-left parties in the polls; this could change by forcing abstainers to vote (Micoine, Martinat, and Chevalet 2014). Likewise, in the 1920s, compulsory voting was supported as a way to counteract the excessive mobilisation of fascists and socialists (Malkopoulou 2015, 95). That the abstention of ‘the honest and moderate majority’ created political gains for the ‘turbulent and factious minorities’ (Malkopoulou 2015, 86–89) has historically been the most persistent argument in favour of compulsory voting. While the tempering effects of full participation have been a recurring theme in debates on compulsory voting, this line of reasoning has received only scant attention by students of either compulsory voting or counterradicalism. As a result, we do not know if claims about the moderating effect of compulsory voting are empirically justifiable, in the past or today. And we have very little insight into the conceptual aspects of this claim. This paper attempts to address this gap, and kickstart a discussion on the moderating effects of compulsory voting. It draws on existing empirical and normative research to explore if and how compulsory voting can deter right-wing populism. After providing some nuance on the concept of populism, in this paper I make three arguments about how compulsory voting can limit the social and political appeal of populist claims. First, I argue that, if we accept that populism aims at mobilising repressed social groups, as is often argued, compulsory voting removes the need for such forceful mobilization as it a priori solves the problem of voter mobilisation. Second, I show that, if we admit that populism is triggered by inequalities in political representation, compulsory voting is the best remedy against such inequalities. Third, if indeed the underlying causes of populism are socioeconomic inequalities, compulsory voting helps alleviating them through the effect that equal electoral participation has on public policy choices. I end by addressing an empirical objection to my argument and recommending lines for future research.

#### Right wing populism is uniquely dangerous in the context of the climate crisis.

Matthew Lockwood, 6-13-2019, [Matthew Lockwood is a Senior Lecturer in Energy Policy at the University of Sussex. He has worked previously at the University of Exeter, the Institute of Development Studies and the Institute for Public Policy Research, as well as for national and London governments, and a number of non-governmental organisations. He has a long-standing interest in the politics of climate and energy policy, and has published research on a range of issues including the implications of Brexit for energy policy, the political sustainability of the 2008 Climate Change Act and the politics of lobbying in the electricity sector.]"Right-Wing Populism and Climate Change Policy," Oxford Research Group, <https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/right-wing-populism-and-climate-change-policy//CHS> PK

Populist parties are often hostile to climate change policy. But there has been relatively little attention paid by researchers to links between populism and climate scepticism. The rise of what is usually called right-wing populism has become one of the defining features of politics in the post-financial crash world. The election of Trump and the 2016 Brexit referendum result in particular have come to symbolise the shattering of the mainstream consensus. Though their rise may seem sudden, populist parties have been building their presence in continental Europe over a much longer period, and made further inroads, albeit not a breakthrough, in the European Parliament elections last month. The main preoccupation of most right-wing populists has been immigration or minorities. However, it is also the case that populist party platforms are often hostile to policy designed to address climate change, and their leaders and supporters express forms of climate scepticism that place them outside the political and scientific mainstream. This pattern can be seen in settings as diverse as the US, where the Trump administration is withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, seeking to restrict climate science and even trying to bring back incandescent light bulbs, and Finland, where the populist Finns Party recently accused mainstream politicians of "climate hysteria" and argued that environmental measures would “take the sausage from the mouths of labourers”. A recent study by German consultancy group Adelphi shows that right wing populist parties have consistently voted against climate legislation in the European Parliament. Despite this pattern, and the threat to progress on mitigating climate change that it poses, there has been relatively little attention paid by researchers to links between populism and climate scepticism, and why such a relationship exists. Climate scepticism and the 'left behind' One potential explanation rests on an analysis of populism as a response to structural change in the global economy. In this approach, emphasis is given to the fact that right-wing populist parties have had particular appeal amongst those – especially male, industrial and manufacturing workers and those in less skilled white collar occupations – whose jobs, incomes and wider economic security have been most eroded by processes of globalisation, automation and de-unionisation. Political scientist Hans-Georg Betz has called this group the ‘losers of modernisation’, and more recently they have been referred to in the media as the ‘left behind’. This group have not only been unable to benefit from the rise of the knowledge economy, but they have also lost their political voice, as mainstream political parties have become more technocratic and converged on a policy agenda aimed at middle-class voters, creating a ‘cartelisation’ of politics. On this view, the ‘left behind’ have disproportionately rallied around populist parties precisely because they stand outside the consensus. Certainly, some of the characteristics of those who are more likely to express climate scepticism in surveys, i.e. being older, male, working class, fit this account of the populist base. But why would the ‘left behind’ be hostile to the climate agenda specifically? One argument is that many of the sectors most affected by structural change – manufacturing, heavy industry and mining (especially coal) – are also the most carbon intensive, so climate policies pose a further threat to livelihoods. This is a hard argument to assess, as there are relatively few studies of attitudes to climate science and policy amongst specific occupational groups . However, one challenge to this view is that the number of people working in core high-carbon industries is actually very small. For example, coal miners often play an iconic role in right wing populist narratives, but direct employment in the coal industry even in major producers is tiny, making up at most 0.5% of total employment even in countries such as Poland and Australia, and much less in the USA. This casts doubt on whether the experience of such a small group could in itself have such a decisive effect in the positioning of populist movements on climate change. Perhaps a more plausible argument is that climate policies ‘threaten to pile new burdens’, as Martin Sandbu has recently put it, on a group that already feels economically insecure and politically excluded. On this view, levies on electricity bills to subsidise the growth of renewable energy, carbon taxes and other policies are resented, in part because they are highly regressive in their incidence. The most obvious and dramatic example of this is the ‘gilets jaunes’ revolt in France, sparked by a climate-driven tax on diesel. Because many of those unable to benefit from the knowledge economy are concentrated outside of metropolitan cities, and rely more on cheaper, older cars for mobility, road transport fuel taxes seem to be especially politically toxic. However, these accounts are insufficient on their own These ‘structuralist’ explanations, which focus on material interests, are undoubtedly important, but have limits. Support for populism is not limited to poorer voters – the mean household income of Trump supporters in the 2016 Presidential election was actually higher than that for Clinton supporters (although the reverse is true for populist supporters in the UK and France). At the same time, while the structuralist account might explain why populist voters and parties dislike some climate policies, it does not by itself offer a compelling explanation of why they embrace a wider scepticism about and hostility to climate science. For this, I would argue that we must also look at the ideological content of populism for such an explanation. The role of ideology and hostility to elites Several related dimensions of right-wing populist ideology are relevant here. One is the importance of socially conservative and nationalist values for right-wing populism. These values arguably produce hostility to the climate agenda because it is seen as being espoused principally by a socially liberal, cosmopolitan elite, counter to national interests, rather than an engagement with the issue of climate change itself. Climate change is seen as the cosmopolitan issue par excellence, often identified by populists in Europe with the European Union and by those in the US with the United Nations, and bound up their hostility to those institutions. While not the primary target of current populist concern in most cases, the climate agenda can in this sense be seen as suffering a form of ‘collateral damage’. Another relevant feature of populism here is the idea that the link between ‘the people’ and political elites has been broken. Modern representative democracy promises to place power in the hands of the people but is often necessarily complex and opaque in its workings, and the tension between the promise and the reality can undermine its legitimacy. Populism promises a simpler vision of direct democracy with government by the people, rather than politicians, bureaucrats or experts. Climate policy is particularly vulnerable on this terrain: policy making in most areas means technical complexities, distributional trade-offs and compromises between different groups, but climate policy also involves high levels of uncertainty, long-time frames, impacts across multiple sectors, international collective action problems and diffuse benefits, all of which add to the opaqueness of the relationship between actions and outcomes. These features arguably make it particularly aggravating for socially conservative nationalist populists already ill-disposed to such policy on values grounds. A final aspect of populist ideology potentially at work is the theme that elites are corrupted by special interests, what the Chilean scholar Pierre Ostiguy has argued are seen by populists as ‘nefarious minorities’. The primary targets of hostility are typically immigrants, but within the sphere of climate change they are environmentalists and climate scientists, who are often accused of pushing a false agenda to further their own interests. A related issue is that populist movements have been fertile ground for conspiracy theories regarding climate change. As the result of an invisible, highly complex, global set of processes, climate change is ideal material for conspiracy theories. This can be, for example, in the framing of the ‘Climategate’ case, in which a leaked set of emails by climate scientists about publishing data was seized on as evidence for a conspiracy to gain political influence and funding. Conclusion Our understanding of the links between the drivers of populism, populist world views and climate scepticism is still at an early stage. More systematic evidence is needed to test some of the arguments discussed here. But for those who are concerned about climate change, this should be an urgent agenda. Any effective response to the populist challenge will need to rest on such an understanding.

#### Sustainable energy transition is impossible in the age of right wing populism – the plan is key to prevent irreversible warming.

Fraune and Knodt 18 (Dr. Cornelia Fraune has been working as postdoctoral researcher within the research project “emergenCity” since 2020. Before joining the research team led by Prof. Dr. Michèle Knodt in 2017, she worked as postdoctoral researcher at the University of Siegen. Michele Knodt completed a master's degree in political science at the Technical University of Darmstadt. Since 2005 Knodt has held the chair for comparative analysis of political systems and integration research at the Institute for Political Science ofTechnical University of Darmstadt . September 2018, “Sustainable energy transformations in an age of populism, post-truth politics, and local resistance,” Energy Research & Social Science, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629618305322#!>)//CHS PK

Sustainable energy transitions are especially exposed to political phenomena such as increasing right-wing populism, post-truth politics and local resistance since they are not only determined by technological innovation and market implementation but also by socio-political processes. Their embeddedness in socio-institutional processes beyond techno-economic ones is a crucial characteristic of sustainable energy transition [68]. It is caused by its origin that is problem- rather than opportunity-driven and by its substance that consists not only of technological innovation but also of political regulation of energy supply and consumption as well as climate change policies [69]. As a consequence, national governments’ climate and energy policies are central to sustainable energy transitions. In Western democracies, national government policy is heavily shaped by party competition. Political parties are important for political decision-making processes in shaping attitudes as well as representing voters’ attitudes and preferences in parliament [7]. Energy policy has always been a politicised issue in the sense of what people and policy-makers consider to be their core social goals or the core problems to be approached [26]. In contrast, increasing populism, especially right-wing populism, and post-truth politics, do not refer to a political struggle over a climate and energy policy paradigm but how climate and energy policies are subject to increasing political polarisation across the political elite and the public mass. Against the background of the idea of “socio-energy systems” [70], the increasing political polarisation of climate and energy policies indicated by populism and post-truth politics require much more research. Socio-energy systems provide a policy framework for energy transformations to “recognize that, at times, the linkages in socio-energy systems may flow entirely through social dynamics, that socio-energy systems dynamically shape and get shaped by the larger social, cultural, and political contexts in which they are embedded, and that people and organizations are complex entities – with histories, identities, and cultures – that require careful and sophisticated analysis” [70].

#### Compulsory voting shifts public policies towards the left.

Bechtel 15 [Associate Professor of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis and Research fellow at the Swiss institute for international economics and applied economic research, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/10/if-voting-were-mandatory-the-u-s-would-shift-to-the-left-discuss/>] JJ

Mandatory voting changed referendum outcomes. As soon as authorities in Vaud introduced compulsory voting, electoral support for leftist policy increased by about 8 to 15 percentage points when compared to the cantons where there was no fine. The green line in the figure equals the difference in support for leftist policies between districts in Vaud and districts in the control cantons, adjusted for their differences before the introduction of compulsory voting. Taken together, these results suggest that compulsory voting not only increases turnout, but also mobilizes new voters whose preferences are sufficiently distinct to affect public policy. These findings have implications for ongoing debates about the desirability of compulsory voting. If, for example, compulsory voting increased turnout but failed to change outcomes, low turnout would be more efficient as many citizens could save the costs of voting. Our results suggest that compulsory voting not only increases turnout, but also shifts support toward particular policies. Therefore, the efficiency argument does not seem convincing in the case we examine. Our results also answer a related question: Would mandatory voting lead to unstable political majorities, since it would bring to the polls a larger share of less-informed citizens who would vote more or less randomly on policies? After all, the opinions of those with less political knowledge [could be more easily malleable](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=9911285&jid=RAM&volumeId=3&issueId=03&aid=9911284&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S2049847014000399). That’s not what we find. In our context, compulsory voting causes a stable increase in support for leftist policies, a finding that is difficult to square with the random voting argument.

#### It empirically will spur support for continued legislation to solve climate change – most Americans will favor politicians who will back policies.

Justin McCarthy, 3-22-2019, [Justin McCarthy is a journalist and analyst at Gallup. He writes about economic, social and political topics.]"Most Americans Support Reducing Fossil Fuel Use," Gallup, <https://news.gallup.com/poll/248006/americans-support-reducing-fossil-fuel.aspx//CHS> PK

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- While the future of the Green New Deal proposed in Congress is uncertain, most Americans support the general idea of dramatically reducing the country's use of fossil fuels over the next two decades as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and address climate change. Six in 10 U.S. adults say they would "strongly favor" (27%) or "favor" (33%) policies with this energy goal, while fewer than four in 10 say they would "oppose" (19%) or "strongly oppose" (17%) them. Support for rapidly slashing the country's use of fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal is significantly higher among Democrats (80%) and independents (60%) than among Republicans (37%). These data are from Gallup's annual Environment poll, conducted March 1-10. Asked about the likelihood of dramatically reducing fossil fuel usage in the next 10 to 20 years, six in 10 Americans say it is "very likely" (22%) or "likely" (38%) to happen, roughly matching the percentage favoring proposals that have this goal in mind.

#### Climate change is linear – any reduction of emissions is necessary to limit immense suffering

Wells 19(David Wallace-Wells is a National Fellow with the New America Foundation and is a deputy editor of New York Magazine, “The Cautious Case for Climate Optimism Believing in a comfortable future for our planet probably means some giant carbon-sucking machines,” New York Magazine, February 4, 2019, <http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/book-excerpt-the-uninhabitable-earth-david-wallace-wells.html)//recut> CHS PK

It’s not too late. In fact, it never will be. Whatever you may have read over the past year — as extreme weather brought a global heat wave and unprecedented wildfires burned through 1.6 million California acres and newspaper headlines declared, “Climate Change Is Here” — global warming is not binary. It is not a matter of “yes” or “no,” not a question of “fucked” or “not.” Instead, it is a problem that gets worse over time the longer we produce greenhouse gas, and can be made better if we choose to stop. Which means that no matter how hot it gets, no matter how fully climate change transforms the planet and the way we live on it, it will always be the case that the next decade could contain more warming, and more suffering, or less warming and less suffering. Just how much is up to us, and always will be. A century and a half after the greenhouse effect was first identified, and a few decades since climate denial and misinformation began muddying our sense of what scientists do know, we are left with a set of predictions that can appear falsifiable — about global temperatures and sea-level rise and even hurricane frequency and wildfire volume. And there are, it is true, feedback loops in the climate system that we do not yet perfectly understand and dynamic processes that remain mysterious. But to the extent that we live today under clouds of uncertainty about the future of climate change, those clouds are, overwhelmingly, not projections of collective ignorance about the natural world but of blindness about the human one, and they can be dispersed by human action. The question of how bad things will get is not, actually, a test of the science; it is a bet on human activity. How much will we do to forestall disaster and how quickly? These are the disconcerting, contradictory lessons of global warming, which counsels both human humility and human grandiosity, each drawn from the same perception of peril. There’s a name for those who hold the fate of the world in their hands, as we do — gods. But for the moment, at least, many of us seem inclined to run from that responsibility rather than embrace it. Or even admit we see it, though it sits in front of us as plainly as a steering wheel. That climate change is all-enveloping means that it targets us all and that we must all share in the responsibility so we do not all share in the suffering — at least not share in so suffocatingly much of it. Since I first began writing about climate a few years ago, I’ve been asked often whether I see any reason for optimism. The thing is, I am optimistic. But optimism is always a matter of perspective, and mine is this: No one wants to believe disaster is coming, but those who look, do. At about two degrees Celsius of warming, just one degree north of where we are today, some of the planet’s ice sheets are expected to begin their collapse, eventually bringing, over centuries, perhaps as much as 50 feet of sea-level rise. In the meantime, major cities in the equatorial band of the planet will become unlivable. There will be, it has been estimated, 32 times as many extreme heat waves in India, and even in the northern latitudes, heat waves will kill thousands each summer. Given only conventional methods of decarbonization (replacing dirty-energy sources like coal and oil with clean ones like wind and solar), this is probably our best-case scenario. It is also what is called — so often nowadays the phrase numbs the lips — “catastrophic warming.” A representative from the Marshall Islands spoke for many of the world’s island nations when he used another word to describe the meaning of two degrees: genocide. You do not need to contemplate worst-case scenarios to be alarmed; this best-case scenario is alarming enough. Two degrees would be terrible, but it’s better than three, at which point Southern Europe would be in permanent drought, African droughts would last five years on average, and the areas burned annually by wildfires in the United States could quadruple, or worse, from last year’s million-plus acres. And three degrees is much better than four, at which point six natural disasters could strike a single community simultaneously; the number of climate refugees, already in the millions, could grow tenfold, or 20-fold, or more; and, globally, damages from warming could reach $600 trillion — about double all the wealth that exists in the world today. We are on track for more warming still — just above four degrees by 2100, the U.N. estimates. So if optimism is always a matter of perspective, the possibility of four degrees shapes mine.

**Warming causes extinction.**

Xu and Ramanathan 17, Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323//recut CHS PK

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

### 1AC Heg (Longer/AT: Impact Turns)

#### Partisanship is destroying strong international commitments and clear foreign policy objectives, unraveling the American century.

Trubowitz 19 [Peter Trubowitz, Professor of international relations at the London Schol of economics and political science, [https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century#](https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/will-dysfunctional-politics-finally-end-american-century), “Will Dysfunctional Politics Finally end the American Century? ]

America is suffering from a shortage of functional or ‘usable power.’ While relative power as measured by its military arsenal vis-à-vis those of its rivals has held steady, the domestic political ability of US presidents to turn the country’s tremendous power and wealth into international influence is declining. This has been the case for some time now. America’s deficit of usable power did not begin with Donald Trump, but it has grown measurably on his watch as president.

Presidents’ usable power depends on their ability to win the support of a broad cross-section of the voting public for their foreign policy agenda. Historically, presidents have relied on three tools to gain public buy-in: bipartisanship on Capitol Hill, the leader’s ability to set the terms of debate and the design of economically inclusive policies. Each contributed mightily to the public consensus underpinning US foreign policy for decades after the Second World War. Today, all three are in short supply.

Bipartisanship was the norm in foreign policymaking during the Cold War. Democratic presidents could count on the support of moderate eastern Republicans in Congress; Republican presidents relied on the support of conservative southern Democrats. Domestic voters, who worried about presidents’ partisan motives, found such bipartisan support reassuring.

So did America’s allies and friends overseas. They worried that in the absence of bipartisan support, international commitments taken by one president would be reversed or soft-pedaled when the party out of power gained control of the White House.

This is exactly what has happened since the end of the Cold War. Foreign policymaking has become increasingly partisan and erratic. Incoming presidents now look for opportunities to undo their predecessors’ legacies, something that rarely happened during the Cold War.

George W Bush withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and opposed the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court. Barack Obama ended US involvement in Iraq. Donald Trump withdrew the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, pulled out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and renounced the Iran nuclear deal. US relative power may not have changed much since the 1990s, but these examples show decline in America’s willingness to engage and commit internationally as well as in how credible others view its international pronouncements.

If hyper-partisanship has made US commitments worth less internationally, the absence of a shared vision of America’s international purpose has made bipartisanship harder to produce domestically.  To build lasting bipartisan coalitions, presidents must structure the national conversation in ways that convince voters that their administration’s preferred international policies will strengthen national security and increase economic opportunity while making it hard for their political opponents to mount an effective challenge.

During the Cold War, presidents enjoyed considerable success in structuring debate over America’s role in the world. The existence of a ‘clear and present danger’ to national security helped by making it possible for to frame the case for creating and sustaining an expansive (and expensive) American-led international order in terms of national security and anti-communism.

This formulation contributed to some forms of extremism (such as McCarthyism) and overreach (the Vietnam War). At the same time, it put internationalism on firm bipartisan footing and gave presidents considerable latitude to advance internationalist causes.

Since the end of the Cold War, presidents have struggled to secure domestic support for their foreign policies. In absence of a Soviet-style threat, Bill Clinton, George W Bush and Barack Obama all found their efforts to breathe new life into internationalism buffeted by partisan division and public pressure to ‘do less internationally’. Mounting public disillusionment with globalization compounded matters. This disillusionment is related to the problem of (non)inclusive growth.

#### Empirics prove compulsory voting decreases partisanship by compelling more moderate, non-voters.

Badger 17 [Emily Badger, New York time Journalist and Urban policy writer, “Mandatory Voting as a Cure for Extreme Partisanship?” <https://psmag.com/news/mandatory-voting-as-a-cure-for-extreme-partisanship-18582>] JJ

Political scientists will inevitably get more evidence this fall for a pattern particularly true of midterm elections: People who don't follow politics — and don't have rabid views on the most polarizing topics of the day — tend not to vote. They leave alone at the polls motivated voters with extreme views likely to elect equally extreme politicians who are, as a result, unable to work with each other.

"You have a kind of reinforcement where politicians appeal to more ideologically inspired voters, who then reinforce politicians who respond to them," said [William Galston](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/galstonw.aspx), a senior fellow at the [Brookings Institution](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/galstonw.aspx). "I've spent a lot of time thinking and doing research on this problem. It's not easy to interrupt a vicious cycle. It's one of the hardest things to do in life — and certainly in politics."

Galston's solution is a fairly radical intervention: [Make everyone vote](http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0601_innovation_galston.aspx). If the people who turn up voluntarily at the polls reinforce our worst political instincts toward conflict and obstruction, we could dilute their influence by roping absolutely everyone into the process.

Research, after all, has shown that the American population eligible to vote is considerably more moderate than the subset of people who actually do vote

"Non-voters look like the classic bell curve," Galston said, if we rate them on an ideological spectrum from left to right (see Emory political scientist [Alan Abramowitz](http://www.polisci.emory.edu/faculty%20pages/abramowitz.htm)'s new book [The Disappearing Center](http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300141627)). "That's not what the electorate looks like," he added.

Galston's proposal is, at this stage, more an intriguing thought experiment than anything else. He knows — "America being the kind of viscerally libertarian place that it is" — that the idea would be greeted by many as a gross government invasion of individual liberties. (It's an equally fun thought experiment to ponder how Tea Party patriots would react to a government mandate requiring them to fulfill what is an arguably patriotic duty.)

Galston, though, is convinced the evidence is on his side. Congress has become measurably [more polarized](http://www.psmag.com/politics/there-is-no-common-ground-anymore-3412/) over the years, a crisis that consumes countless think-thank hours in Washington. And a significant increase in voter participation would statistically bump up the percentage of self-described moderates in the electorate. "There's just no question there," Galston said.

He even cites evidence that compulsory voting laws work: [Australia](http://www.aec.gov.au/faqs/voting_australia.htm) passed one in the 1920s after officials grew alarmed by what they considered low turnout rates below 60 percent (America's turnout in the most recent midterm election: [37 percent](http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html)). Today, deterred by a fine the equivalent of a cheap parking ticket, typically 95 percent of Australians show up. Austria, Belgium, Greece and France all have varying versions of compulsory voting, some with enforcement, some without.

#### Consensus of the best theoretical and empirical research concludes US deep engagement deters conventional conflict and nuclear proliferation cascades that cause extinction

Brooks and Wohlforth ’16 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD from Yale University

Stephen Brooks, William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 103-110.

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence—and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.

This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research.

General Patterns of Evidence

Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?

Deterrence Effectiveness

The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire.1 Many quantitative findings, meanwhile, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support:

• Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.”2 Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits.3

• The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key.4

• Forward-deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies.5

• Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence.6

• Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.7

The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances—especially with nuclear-armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer—and protégés to seek—alliance relationships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.

More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation

Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.”8 These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists.9

Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed.10 Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above-average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped.

Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are:

• The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.”11 In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states.12

• Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter.13

• Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program.14 As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S.  security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.”15

• Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment.16 In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks.17

• Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur.18 But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear-armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program.19

In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.”20 Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter-proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why.

The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation

General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear-armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security.

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil-military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.”23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.”25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?”27 The more nuclear-armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use.

It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured-retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi-doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally.

Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary:  “You have ‘em or you don’t.” States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some states may choose to build dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to.

The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate:

• Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict— threats to a state’s core territorial security—that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29

• Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition. Though the United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war.

• Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30

• The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack, as both India and Israel discovered.

• In both statistical and case study tests, Vipin Narang finds that the only nuclear posture that has any effect on conventional conflict initiation and escalation is a destabilizing “asymmetrical escalatory” force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use, such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31

In short, nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more. Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism. That is, some subset of new nuclear-armed states may not be led by rational leaders, may not prove able to overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk-averse. The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces (making them susceptible to a first-strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)—are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, undeterrable nonstate actors, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. And all of these concerns emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action.

#### Patching up holes in deterrence architecture checks a Russian invasion – otherwise, escalates and goes nuclear

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Paths to Conflict

The Russian government seeks to revise the regional and international order to regain its traditional sphere of influence along its periphery, preserve and expand its geographic strategic depth, and reestablish its great power status.17 Russia perceives Europe’s current security architecture as having been established during a period of uncharacteristic Russian weakness and, therefore, tilted unfairly in favor of Western political objectives. As part of its efforts to secure its revisionist aims, Russia’s political leadership seeks to reshape the geopolitical order on the European continent to be more amenable to Russia’s national interests. Moreover, Russia’s national security strategy since the end of the Cold War has, at least implicitly, identified both the United States and the NATO Alliance as key threats to Russia’s national security.18 To weaken NATO, the Russian government seeks to undermine the political cohesion of the Alliance such that it is more difficult for NATO to muster a potent, unified response to Russian activities in Europe that challenge the status quo.

Although there is little evidence to suggest that Russia actively seeks direct military confrontation with NATO states, plausible paths to conflict exist. The Russian government prefers to achieve its revisionist goals through sub-conventional methods of conflict, including “gray zone” activities and political warfare campaigns intended to undermine NATO’s cohesion and political will while remaining below Alliance thresholds for a conventional military response.19 Russia’s aggressive actions at the sub-conventional level, however, violate long-standing norms and threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of NATO member states. As a result, Russian gray zone actions are likely to exacerbate existing tensions on the continent and cause points of friction with NATO that have the potential to devolve into crisis and even conflict.

The potential for conflict between NATO and Russia is most acute in the Baltic region. The proximity of NATO member territory to Russia and Belarus, the geographically isolated position of Kaliningrad, and the presence of sizeable Russian ethnic minorities within the Baltic states create a volatile situation ripe for crisis and miscalculation.20 Although Russia likely does not desire to incorporate the Baltic states or eastern Poland into the Russian Federation, under certain conditions it could view the seizure of territory belonging to NATO states as necessary or advantageous. The Russian government could perceive that NATO is attempting to isolate Kaliningrad and determine that it must launch a military attack into Alliance territory to re-establish its ground lines of communication with its exclave. Or, the Russian leadership could use rising tensions between ethnic Russian minorities and the governments of one or more the Baltic states to escalate a crisis as a means of undermining NATO unity and the credibility of collective defense. In this example, the Russian leadership might execute a limited military incursion into NATO member territory to seize a border region with a large ethnic Russian population to create the crisis that could divide NATO.

The Baltic region is also where the Alliance is most vulnerable to Russian aggression.21 The combination of Russia’s local military superiority, geography that favors Russia, and Russian A2/AD capabilities that form an umbrella over the region increase the potential for Russia to prevail in a conventional conflict against NATO. As a result, the Russian government could determine that its best option during a significant crisis in the Baltic region is to risk a conventional attack on one or more of the Baltic states or even Poland because it believes it could quickly achieve its objectives and keep the conflict short and limited.22

Challenges to Deterrence and Defense in the Baltic Region

NATO faces significant strategic and operational challenges that undermine the credibility of its ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression in the Baltic region.23 Although NATO’s aggregate military power far exceeds that of Russia, a viable theory of victory exists for Russia to prevail in a limited conflict by exploiting its time-distance advantage to seize Alliance territory in the Baltic region before the Alliance could effectively respond.24 A Russian ability to achieve a military fait accompli in the Baltic region would present NATO with a choice between embarking on a difficult, uncertain, and potentially escalatory counteroffensive to liberate allied territory or accepting defeat.

Russia’s “Theory of Victory”25

If Russia were to attack one or more of the Baltic states or Poland, regional geography would favor Russia. The vast majority of NATO’s military power resides in Western Europe and, more critically, in the United States. On the other hand, a significant portion of Russia’s military power, including its most capable and best-equipped forces, is based in its Western Military District, which abuts NATO member territory.26 Most of Russia’s plausible territorial objectives, like the establishment of a land bridge to its Kaliningrad exclave through Lithuania and possibly Poland, or the annexation of portions of Baltic states that have majority ethnic Russian populations, are both limited in scope and proximate to the bulk of Russian combat power. The Baltic republics are only connected to the rest of NATO by the Baltic Sea and a narrow land corridor through northeastern Poland and southern Lithuania, often called the Suwalki Gap, which is flanked on either side by Belarus and Kaliningrad.27 As a result, the Baltic republics are vulnerable to being geographically isolated by even a limited Russian attack to seize the Suwalki Gap (see Figure 1).

In a Russia-initiated conflict, the Russian military could leverage its local overmatch to seize territory rapidly and with little prior warning in one or more of the Baltic states or eastern Poland. The activities of Russian special operations forces might precede an attack with the aim of sowing disinformation, creating confusion, obscuring Moscow’s intent, and complicating NATO decision-making.28 These special operations forces could also facilitate the advance of Russian conventional forces by gathering intelligence, screening force movements, and seizing key bridges and choke points. Critically, Russia’s A2/AD capabilities could degrade and even cripple NATO’s efforts to respond quickly enough or with sufficient force to deny Russia from achieving its objectives.

After an initial seizure of NATO member territory, Russian forces could establish a formidable defensive posture, backed by their area-denial capabilities, which would pose a difficult military problem for the Alliance to overcome. As NATO would attempt to mobilize and concentrate the massive combat power necessary to roll back Russian gains, Russia could use a variety of political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and military tools to seek an end to the conflict on favorable terms. The Russian government could combine offers to negotiate a cessation of hostilities with threats to further escalate the conflict, including to the nuclear level, in order to prevent NATO from reaching a consensus on the best path forward.29 Should some NATO members balk at the costs and risks associated with a major counteroffensive, the Alliance could risk losing a conflict with Russia politically before it even attempts to win it militarily. Should the Alliance summon the political will necessary to launch a military campaign to reverse Russia’s territorial gains, its counteroffensive would be difficult, uncertain, and potentially highly escalatory.30

The Central Importance of Time

Time is central to the Russian theory of victory. Russia’s advantage in the local correlation of forces, proximity to its military objectives, and ability to act first could enable it to execute a rapid land grab in the Baltic region before NATO could effectively respond.31 Russia’s capacity to then consolidate its initial gains and establish a formidable defensive posture would pose a difficult military challenge for NATO. The long delay required for NATO to organize a ground counteroffensive after an initial Russian seizure of territory could provide the time needed for Russia to convert its military gains into a political victory.

Russia’s A2/AD capabilities would increase its time-distance advantages in at least three critical ways. First, Russian A2/AD capabilities in Kaliningrad, Belarus, and the Western Military District and would greatly reduce the ability of U.S. and allied initial response forces to gain access to the region, operate in forward areas, and contest a Russian attack in the opening stage of a conflict. Second, should Russian forces consolidate their territorial gains and assume a defensive posture, Russian A2/AD capabilities would create a much more difficult military problem for NATO to overcome. Third, these A2/AD capabilities could disrupt the deployment of additional NATO forces to Europe and their transit across the continent into the Baltic region, further extending the delay between an initial Russian attack and the start of a major NATO ground counteroffensive. This longer delay would give Russia additional time to consolidate its military gains into a political victory.

NATO initiatives to strengthen the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend against Russian aggression in the Baltic region should seek to reduce Russia’s time-distance and correlation of forces advantages. These initiatives should include changes to its military posture that would improve its ability to immediately contest a Russian offensive and shorten the time required for the Alliance to bring additional forces to bear.

Operational Challenges Posed by Russia’s

A2/AD Complex Russia’s A2/AD capabilities located in Kaliningrad, its Western Military District, and Belarus form a protective umbrella that covers much of Poland and the Baltic states. In the opening days and weeks of a conflict with NATO, these threats would create a highly contested environment that would impede the ability of U.S. and allied forces to project power into the region, to gain and maintain air superiority and information dominance in the conflict area, and, consequently, to contest a Russian invasion.32 Although NATO could likely overcome Russia’s A2/AD capabilities, the time needed to do so could give Russia ample time to achieve its military objectives.

A2/AD capabilities located in Kaliningrad present the most significant challenge to U.S. and NATO operations. Geographically, Kaliningrad is a Russian exclave within NATO member territory. This enables A2/AD capabilities located there to form a forward salient guarding the air, sea, and land approaches to the Baltic states, Belarus, and Russia. More specifically, this creates three key operational problems for NATO forces. First, it extends the depth of the battlespace that Russia could affect with its A2/AD capabilities, especially with its coastal defense cruise missiles, long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and shortrange ballistic missiles (SRBM). Second, Kaliningrad alters the geometry of the battlefield by projecting a bulge of A2/AD capabilities into NATO’s defensive perimeter that would inhibit the freedom of movement of NATO military forces between northern and central Europe, providing Russia with opportunities to launch multi-axis attacks on any such forces in the Baltic region. Third, Kaliningrad’s A2/AD capabilities form an outer defensive layer that NATO forces would have to suppress before the Alliance could use the preponderance of its air forces, which are non-stealth systems, to interdict Russian ground forces and provide support to friendly forces.

Four components of Russia’s A2/AD complex present the most significant challenges for U.S. and NATO operations: long-range precision fires; integrated air defense systems (IADS); offensive and defensive capabilities in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum; and massed artillery.

Russia’s Long-Range Precision Fires

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces have projected power into theaters and operated from bases close to conflict zones without significant interference from adversaries. Russia, however, possesses increasingly sophisticated and robust precision strike capabilities able to attack targets across the European theater, threaten Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and even attack the U.S. homeland. In a conflict in Europe, Russian air-, ground-, surface-, and subsurface-launched long-range fires could attack U.S. and allied command, control, and communications (C3) nodes; interdict ground deployment and sustainment networks; threaten SLOCs and deny maritime freedom of maneuver; strike air bases to suppress sortie generation and attrite aircraft on the ground; and attrite NATO ground forces before they could directly engage Russian forces.

Russia possesses a large and diverse inventory of precision strike weapon systems.33 This inventory includes multiple SRBM variants such as the 9K720 Iskander-M weapon system.34 The Iskander-M’s mobility allows it to relocate quickly to a new concealed location after firing, making it particularly difficult to interdict. By 2020, Russian armed forces are expected to field ten Iskander-M brigades with the combined capacity to launch approximately 480 missiles, assuming each launcher has a single missile reload. Russia has announced it will deploy Iskander-M launchers to its “missile brigade of the Western Military District,” which is likely Russia’s 152nd Missile Brigade in Kaliningrad.35 This would place ballistic and cruise missiles launched by the Iskander-M well within range of potential targets located throughout Poland and most of the Baltic states. Furthermore, its large number of 4th generation, multirole fighters can carry various loadouts of air-to-surface weapons including land attack cruise missiles (LACM). In a conflict, Russia could use these SRBMs and LACMs to strike critical nodes like bridges and rail junctions, air bases, marshaling areas, and major force concentrations in Poland and the Baltic states to disrupt and delay force flow and sustainment, make forward air bases untenable, and inflict attrition on NATO ground forces before they can reach the battle area.

Russia’s anti-access systems include longer-range ballistic and cruise missiles that it could use to attack NATO seaports of debarkation, air bases, and key C3 nodes. Russia continues to expand and upgrade this inventory by developing and deploying one or more battalions of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) (believed to be 9M729 [SSC-8] missiles integrated with mobile Iskander-K launch vehicles).36 It is also increasing its inventory of Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) and 3M14 Kalibr LACMs.37 The new Kh-47M2 Kinzhal hypersonic air-launched ballistic missile, which has a purported range of 2,000 km and can be carried by modified MIG-31BM supersonic aircraft, can hold much of continental Europe at risk without the launching aircraft leaving Russian airspace.38 Submarine and bomber aircraft equipped with long-range cruise missiles extend the range of Russian long-range fires into the Atlantic and as far as the continental United States. As a result, there are no truly secure “rear” areas in Europe (see Figure 2)

Russia does have some significant limitations in its ability to strike over long ranges and with great precision. To cite one example, Russia lacks sufficient long-range, persistent ISR capabilities to support large-scale dynamic targeting operations at longer ranges.

Integrated Air Defenses The ability to gain and maintain air superiority rapidly and then use the resulting freedom of maneuver to bring massed airpower to bear has been a central aspect of U.S. military operations since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s air defense doctrine favors creating overlapping, multilayered coverage zones that enable its forces to simultaneously engage a large number of air and missile threats.39 The U.S. Department of Defense notes that Russia’s IADS encompass more than surface-to-air missile launchers; they include efforts to “jam aircraft navigation, communications, target acquisition systems, and precision weapons guidance systems,” all of which have been a priority of recent Russian military modernization efforts.40 Russia remains a leader in developing state-of-the-art radars, surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare systems, and other air defense capabilities. Russian IADS modernization programs have prioritized improving the range and guidance of its surface-to-air missile systems, as well as enhancing their capacity to operate in contested electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) environments.41 Russia has created a layered IADS along NATO’s eastern frontier that would pose a significant challenge to U.S. and allied air operations (see Figure 3).

In a conflict, Russian IADS would likely force large, non-stealth aircraft such as the E-3 Airborne Warning and Command and Control (AWACS) aircraft and the E-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) to operate from standoff distances that exceed the effective range of their sensors. Russia’s long-range strategic SAMs would create a highly lethal operating environment for 4th generation fighters and could force NATO non-stealth aircraft to use long-range air-to-surface weapons that are larger and more expensive than short-range direct attack munitions. These limitations could reduce NATO’s ability to provide air support to its ground forces engaged against Russian forces during the early days of a conflict

Neutralizing the threat from Russia’s IADS by relying on standoff attacks would take an extended period of time and require thousands of expensive long-range munitions such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM). This approach could consume a substantial portion, if not all, of NATO’s current inventory of advanced, long-range weapons. Even after the threat from Russia’s strategic SAMs has been degraded, the threat from its surviving short- and medium-range defense systems would remain.42 As a result, the allocation of a significant share of aircraft sorties would be required for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions, thereby reducing sorties allocated to interdict Russian ground forces, attack other critical targets, and support U.S. and allied ground forces. More importantly, if NATO attempts to suppress Russia’s IADS with air power alone before moving its ground forces forward to counter a Russian ground invasion, the time required to do so would advantage Russia—perhaps decisively so.

Russia’s Electronic Warfare, Cyber, and Counter-Space Capabilities

Maintaining information dominance has been an essential element of the U.S. military’s post-Cold War operations. Superior command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR) capabilities have enabled U.S. forces to possess greater situational awareness than their adversaries, act on that situational awareness quicker, and synchronize their operations more effectively across time and space. Having observed the effectiveness of the U.S. military’s information systems in operations in the Middle East and other theaters, Russia has invested heavily in counter-C3ISR capabilities in order to contest U.S. information dominance and to disrupt U.S. find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (F2T2EA) kill chains. Russian counter-C3ISR capabilities in the EMS include jammers to interfere with radars and radios, decoys that create false targets for sensors, laser dazzlers to blind electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) sensors, and camouflage that obscures potential targets to reduce their probability of detection.43 The vulnerability of U.S. and allied C3ISR forces to these countermeasures is compounded by the increasing range at which they may be forced to operate due to Russia’s area-denial capabilities. These distances could require NATO forces to use higher-power active sensors and countermeasures that would further increase their detectability and vulnerability to attacks.44

Russia has also fielded capabilities to contest space and exploit perceived vulnerabilities in U.S. and NATO space architectures.45 U.S. space capabilities are not concealed, often hosted in unprotected commercial and military satellites, and concentrated in a limited number of platforms, many of which could not be quickly replaced if damaged or compromised.46 The Russian military, on the other hand, has viable terrestrial and airborne alternatives to spacebased systems that can support operations near the Russian homeland. As a result, it is less dependent on space systems as a whole, and it would face less risk if it were to use kinetic and non-kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons during a conflict since the consequences would fall disproportionately on U.S. and NATO space systems.47

Finally, the Russian military could use cyber tools to disrupt and corrupt the NATO information flows by targeting digital data information networks that store, process, and disseminate data.48 Although the adaptation and integration of information technologies enhance the capabilities of U.S. and NATO forces, they also increase the size of their potential cybersecurity target set and create new vulnerabilities that Russia could seek to exploit.49 DoD’s Defense Science Board has warned that “major powers have a significant and growing ability to hold U.S. critical infrastructure at risk via cyberattack and an increasing potential to use cyber tools to thwart U.S. military responses.”50 Evidence suggests that the Russian government may be conducting cyber reconnaissance to collect data that would support operational planning for cyberattacks on U.S. or allied critical infrastructure in the event of a conflict with Russia.51 The U.S. Transportation Command and key civilian communications networks that support U.S. military deployment activities are especially vulnerable to Russian cyberattacks. Russia could take advantages of these vulnerabilities to non-kinetically disrupt key rail and port operations in the United States, delaying the arrival of vital U.S. reinforcements to Europe.

Russia’s Massed Conventional Artillery

Massed conventional artillery, which serves as the decisive arm of the Russian Army, may represent its greatest conventional threat to NATO ground forces.52 Unlike the U.S. military, which employs its indirect fires to allow its maneuver forces to close with and destroy enemy forces, Russia employs its maneuver forces to enable its indirect fires. As operations in Ukraine have shown, Russia uses its maneuver forces to drive adversary formations into positions of disadvantage where they can be destroyed by massed conventional artillery fire.53 Russian ground formations at all echelons include robust indirect fires that often out-range their U.S. and NATO equivalents.54 Russian motor rifle and tank regiments, brigades, and divisions place a greater emphasis on indirect fires relative to equivalent Western units. For instance, a Russian motor rifle brigade often includes two self-propelled artillery battalions and a rocket artillery battalion, whereas its rough U.S. equivalent, an ABCT, only contains one self-propelled artillery battalion.55

In a conflict with NATO, the maneuver units in a Russian main effort would likely be supported by an equal or greater number of artillery units. Russian artillery is capable of firing advanced area effects munitions including cluster munitions and thermobaric rounds, as well as artillery-delivered mines. Artillery units also possess organic ISR capabilities that include ubiquitous unmanned aerial systems and tactical signals intelligence.56 As a result, U.S. and NATO ground forces could be “out-ranged and out-gunned” by Russian forces, offsetting the traditional superiority of U.S. and allied maneuver forces.57 This could provide Russia a decisive advantage in close combat, particularly since the traditional advantage of Allied airpower could be greatly reduced, at least initially, by Russian IADS.

Consequences of the Eroding Credibility of NATO Deterrence and Defense

Collectively, these threats erode the credibility of NATO’s ability to deter and defend against Russia aggression, including aggression at the sub-conventional level in areas covered by Russian area-denial systems. Should this erosion continue, Russia may become less wary of conducting gray zone operations against Poland and the Baltic states. Even if Russian leadership believes such actions could escalate, they may not be deterred from undertaking them if they are confident Russian forces could quickly prevail in a short and limited conventional engagement against NATO.

The consequences of losing even a limited war with Russia on the European continent could prove fatal for the Alliance’s cohesion. A Russian fait accompli, especially in the face of an unsuccessful NATO military response, could reorder Europe geopolitically and greatly reduce the credibility of U.S. security commitments to its allies and friends in Europe and other regions, including in the Indo-Pacific. A Russian victory would also demonstrate NATO’s inability to defend its frontline states, which might incentivize both NATO member and nonmember European states to tilt more toward Russia’s political orbit. Moreover, although any conflict between nuclear-armed states carries with it the serious risks of nuclear escalation, this risk would likely be intensified should NATO undertake a massive conventional campaign to undo what Russia has accomplished. Russia’s asymmetric advantage in low-yield nuclear weapons and ambiguous doctrine surrounding their use in conventional conflicts could create the potential for miscalculation.58 The far better option would be to ensure that NATO has the capability and capacity to prevent Russia from achieving a fait accompli by a force of arms in the Baltic region in the first place.

Strengthening Deterrence and Defense in Europe

These challenges and threats are not insurmountable. To strengthen deterrence and defense against Russian aggression, NATO should adopt a strategy that focuses on blunting Russian aggression at the outset of conflict. This strategy could enhance deterrence by presenting a formidable defensive posture that would be difficult to overcome, demonstrating to Russia that any attack on NATO states would not be quick or painless and would likely not succeed. The prospect of a difficult, uncertain, and potentially prolonged conflict could create enough uncertainty in Russia’s decision calculus to undermine its confidence that it could realize its theory of victory. This strategy could convince Moscow that even when it feels compelled to act, de-escalation and negotiation are a better option than gambling on a risky and costly war.

If deterrence did fail, this strategy would strengthen NATO’s ability to defend against and ultimately defeat Russian aggression. At a minimum, it would raise the costs of Russian aggression, buy time for reinforcements to arrive, and put the Alliance in a more favorable position for an eventual counteroffensive to undo Russia’s temporary gains. Furthermore, it could reinforce Alliance resolve by increasing confidence among member states that NATO’s forces would ultimately prevail if Russia initiated a conflict.

The viability of this strategy would depend heavily on the ability of NATO to offset Russia’s time-distance advantage in order to negate Russia’s theory of victory. NATO’s initial defensive posture would need to be sufficiently lethal and robust to blunt Russian invasion forces at the outset of conflict in order to delay a decisive Russian victory and buy time for NATO to respond, as well as degrade Russian A2/AD capabilities to assure access and freedom of maneuver for reinforcements. Moreover, this posture would need to be sufficiently resilient to accomplish these tasks while persisting under intense and sustained multi-domain attacks. NATO would need to be able to reinforce its forward forces quickly to offset Russia’s initial advantage in the correlation of forces, counter Russian attempts to send in reinforcements, and demonstrate that each day the conflict continues, Russia would face a growing Alliance military force.

#### Only Russia war causes extinction

Nick **Bostrom 2**, winner of the Gannon Award, March, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction  
Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology,

A much greater **existential risk** **emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the  
USSR.** An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as **global and terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that **a nuclear Armageddon would occur** and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] **Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation**, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a **smaller** nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk**, since i**t would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Unipolarity is key to check back a litany of issues—climate change, pandemics, terrorism. However, even if primacy isn’t perfect, hegemonic transitions spur regional wars and conflict.

Zachary Keck 14, Assistant Editor at The Diplomat, M.A. candidate in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, “America’s Relative Decline: Should We Panic?”, 1-24, http://thediplomat.com/2014/01/americas-relative-decline-should-we-panic/

Still, on balance, the U.S. has been a positive force in the world, especially for a unipolar power. Certainly, it’s hard to imagine many other countries acting as benignly if they possessed the amount of relative power America had at the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the British were not nearly as powerful as the U.S. in the 19th Century and they incorporated most of the globe in their colonial empire. Even when it had to contend with another superpower, Russia occupied half a continent by brutally suppressing its populace. Had the U.S. collapsed and the Soviet Union emerged as the Cold War victor, Western Europe would likely be speaking Russian by now. It’s difficult to imagine China defending a rule-based, open international order if it were a unipolar power, much less making an effort to uphold a minimum level of human rights in the world.¶ Regardless of your opinion on U.S. global leadership over the last two decades, however, there is good reason to fear its relative decline compared with China and other emerging nations. To begin with, **hegemonic transition periods have historically** been **the most destabilizing eras in history**. This is not only because of the malign intentions of the rising and established power(s). Even if all the parties have benign, peaceful intentions, the rise of new global powers necessitates revisions to the “rules of the road.” This is nearly impossible to do in any organized fashion given the anarchic nature of the international system, where there is no central authority that can govern interactions between states.¶ We are already starting to see the potential dangers of hegemonic transition periods in the Asia-Pacific (and arguably the Middle East). As China grows more economically and militarily powerful, it has unsurprisingly sought to expand its influence in East Asia. This necessarily has to come at the expense of other powers, which so far has primarily meant the U.S., Japan, Vietnam and the Philippines. Naturally, these powers have sought to resist Chinese encroachments on their territory and influence, and the situation grows more tense with each passing day. Should China eventually emerge as a global power, or should nations in other regions enjoy a similar rise as Kenny suggests, this situation will play itself out elsewhere in the years and decades ahead.¶ All of this highlights some of the advantages of a unipolar system. Namely, although the U.S. has asserted military force quite frequently in the post-Cold War era, it has only fought weak powers and thus its wars have been fairly limited in terms of the number of casualties involved. At the same time, **America’s preponderance of power has prevented a great power war**, and even restrained major regional powers from coming to blows. For instance, the past 25 years haven’t seen any conflicts on par with the Israeli-Arab or Iran-Iraq wars of the Cold War. As the unipolar era comes to a close, the possibility of **great power conflict** and especially major regional wars **rises dramatically**. The world will also have to contend with conventionally inferior powers like Japan acquiring nuclear weapons to protect their interests against their newly empowered rivals.¶ But even if the transitions caused by China’s and potentially other nations’ rises are managed successfully, there are still likely to be significant negative effects on international relations. In today’s “globalized” world, it is commonly asserted that many of the defining challenges of our era can only be solved through multilateral cooperation. Examples of this include **climate change**, health **pandemics, organized crime and terrorism, global financial crises**, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, among many others.¶ **A unipolar system**, for all its limitations, **is uniquely suited for organizing effective global action on these transnational issues**. This is because there is a clear global leader who can take the initiative and, to some degree, compel others to fall in line. In addition, the unipole’s preponderance of power lessens the intensity of competition among the global players involved. Thus, while there are no shortages of complaints about the limitations of global governance today, there is no question that global governance has been many times more effective in the last 25 years than it was during the Cold War.¶ The rise of China and potentially other powers will create a new bipolar or multipolar order. This, in turn, will make solving these transnational issues much more difficult. Despite the optimistic rhetoric that emanates from official U.S.-China meetings, the reality is that Sino-American competition is likely to overshadow an increasing number of global issues in the years ahead. If other countries like India, Turkey, and Brazil also become significant global powers, this will only further dampen the prospects for effective global governance.

#### The alternative is the liberal order unraveling and multipolarity---that causes war.

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Robert Kagan, “The Twilight of the Liberal World Order,” Brookings Big Ideas for America edited by Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Press (2017): <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.31>

The liberal world order established in the aftermath of World War II may be coming to an end, challenged by forces both without and within. The external challenges come from the ambition of dissatisfied large and medium-size powers to overturn the existing strategic order dominated by the United States and its allies and partners. Their aim is to gain hegemony in their respective regions. China and Russia pose the greatest challenges to the world order because of their relative military, economic, and political power and their evident willingness to use it, which makes them significant players in world politics and, just as important, because the regions where they seek strategic hegemony—Asia and Europe—historically have been critical to global peace and stability. At a lesser but still significant level, Iran seeks regional hegemony in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which if accomplished would have a strategic, economic, and political impact on the international system. North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula, which if accomplished would affect the stability and security of northeast Asia. Finally, at a much lower level of concern, there is the effort by ISIS and other radical Islamist groups to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. If accomplished, that, too, would have effects on the global order.

However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided.

The role of the United States, however, has been critical. Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost insuperable obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism has posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful.

The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined military power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge.

Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions.

The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core order—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.

In recent years, however, the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core. As a result of many related factors—difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism—there has emerged a crisis of confidence in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project tended to elevate universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and fa cilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism; an increasing focus on the “other” in all societies; and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence.

This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable. It may indeed have been cyclical, due to inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy, which periodically have been exposed and have raised doubts about both—as happened, for instance, throughout the West in the 1930s. Now, as then, moreover, this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order. In this case, however, the key variable has not been the United States as the outside power and its willingness, or not, to step in and save or remake an order lost by other powers. Rather it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power.

That willingness has been in doubt for some time. Increasingly in the quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always apparently served and when, indeed, the United States seems to be making sacrifices while others benefit. The reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century have been largely forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing such a role has worn thin. Thus, whereas previous unsuccessful wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as in the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2007–09 have had that effect. President Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but the main thrust of his approach was retrenchment. His actions and statements were a critique of previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests.

With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have sig naled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order.

Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. The weakness of the liberal core and the abdication by the United States of its global responsibilities will encourage more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers, which may in turn exacerbate the sense of weakness and helplessness and the loss of confidence of the liberal world, which will in turn increase the sense on the part of the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests.

History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of global responsibility, to reject strategic involvement to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict.

One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltics, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. The cycle only ends if and when the great powers that make up the existing power structure, in today’s case, the United States, decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.

The new administration seems to be fixated almost entirely on the threat of radical Islam and may not believe its main problem is going to be great power confrontation. In fact, it is going to have to confront both sets of challenges. The first, addressing the threat of terrorism, is comparatively manageable. It is the second, managing great power competition and confrontation, that has historically proved the most difficult and also the most costly when handled badly.

The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear from the outset. That position should be that the United States welcomes competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.

But security competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.

If history is any guide, the next four years are the critical inflection point. The rest of the world will take its cue from the early actions of the new administration. If the next president governs as he ran, which is to say if he pursues a course designed to secure only America’s narrow interests; focuses chiefly on international terrorism—the least of the challenges to the present world order; accommodates the ambitions of the great powers; ceases to regard international economic policy in terms of global order but only in terms of America’s bottom line narrowly construed; and generally ceases to place a high priority on reassuring allies and partners in the world’s principal strategic theaters—then the collapse of the world order, with all that entails, may not be far off.

## 1AC – Framing

### FW

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1] Actor specificity:

#### A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission

#### C] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen

o/w

#### 2] Lexical pre-requisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.

#### 3] Substitutability—only consequentialism explains necessary enablers.

Sinnott-Armstrong 92 [Walter, professor of practical ethics. “An Argument for Consequentialism” Dartmouth College Philosophical Perspectives. 1992.]

A moral reason to do an act is consequential if and only if the reason depends only on the consequences of either doing the act or not doing the act. For example, a moral reason not to hit someone is that this will hurt her or him. A moral reason to turn your car to the left might be that, if you do not do so, you will run over and kill someone. A moral reason to feed a starving child is that the child will lose important mental or physical abilities if you do not feed it. All such reasons are consequential reasons. All other moral reasons are non-consequential. Thus, a moral reason to do an act is non-consequential if and only if the reason depends even partly on some property that the act has independently of its consequences. For example, an act can be a lie regardless of what happens as a result of the lie (since some lies are not believed), and some moral theories claim that that property of being a lie provides amoral reason not to tell a lie regardless of the consequences of this lie. Similarly, the fact that an act fulfills a promise is often seen as a moral reason to do the act, even though the act has that property of fulfilling a promise independently ofits consequences. All such moral reasons are non-consequential. In order to avoid so many negations, I will also call them 'deontological'. This distinction would not make sense if we did not restrict the notion of consequences. If I promise to mow the lawn, then one consequence of my mowing might seem to be that my promise is fulfilled. One way to avoid this problem is to specify that the consequences of an act must be distinct from the act itself. My act of fulfilling my promise and my act of mowing are not distinct, because they are done by the same bodily movements.10 Thus, my fulfilling my promise is not a consequence of my mowing. A consequence of an act need not be later in time than the act, since causation can be simultaneous, but the consequence must at least be different from the act. Even with this clarification, it is still hard to classify some moral reasons as consequential or deontological,11 but I will stick to examples that are clear. In accordance with this distinction between kinds of moral reasons, I can now distinguish different kinds of moral theories. I will say that a moral theory is consequentialist if and only if it implies that all basic moral reasons are consequential. A moral theory is then non-consequentialist or deontological if it includes any basic moral reasons which are not consequential. 5. Against Deontology So defined, the class of deontological moral theories is very large and diverse. This makes it hard to say anything in general about it. Nonetheless, I will argue that no deontological moral theory can explain why moral substitutability holds. My argument applies to all deontological theories because it depends only on what is common to them all, namely, the claim that some basic moral reasons are not consequential. Some deontological theories allow very many weighty moral reasons that are consequential, and these theories might be able to explain why moral substitutability holds for some of their moral reasons: the consequential ones. But even these theories cannot explain why moral substitutability holds for all moral reasons, including the non-consequential reasons that make the theory deontological. The failure of deontological moral theories to explain moral substitutability in the very cases that make them deontological is a reason to reject all deontological moral theories. I cannot discuss every deontological moral theory, so I will discuss only a few paradigm examples and show why they cannot explain moral substitutability. After this, I will argue that similar problems are bound to arise for all other deontological theories by their very nature. The simplest deontological theory is the pluralistic intuitionism of Prichard and Ross. Ross writes that, when someone promises to do something, 'This we consider obligatory in its own nature, just because it is a fulfillment of a promise, and not because of its consequences.'12 Such deontologists claim in effect that, if I promise to mow the grass, there is a moral reason for me to mow the grass, and this moral reason is constituted by the fact that mowing the grass fulfills my promise. This reason exists regardless of the consequences of mowing the grass, even though it might be overridden by certain bad consequences. However, if this is why I have a moral reason to mow the grass, then, even if I cannot mow the grass without starting my mower, and starting the mower would enable me to mow the grass, it still would not follow that I have any moral reason to start my mower, since I did not promise to start my mower, and starting my mower does not fulfill my promise. Thus, a moral theory cannot explain moral substitutability if it claims that properties like this provide moral reasons.

# Case

## XTs

### XTs—Partisanship Advantage

#### [General Long] Partisanship destroys international commitments, destroying primacy abroad. This wrecks global cooperation on warming, trade, and terrorism while locking in regional wars. Plan reverses that by forcing a more moderate voting demographic.

#### [Impact calc] Primacy solves all your proximate impacts—Owen 11 indicates US hegemony has created the most peaceful, cooperative time period in history.

### XTs—Civic Engagement Advantage

#### [General Short] Declining civic engagement and trust in institutions allows erosion of democratic norms, locking in regional conflict and litany of impacts. Plan reverses by creating a cultural shift towards politics.

## 1AR—AT Democracy Bad

### 1AR—Top Level Analytics

#### 1] It’s not enough for them to win democracies are bad in the abstract. They have to win an alternative governance system lead by Donald Trump is comparatively better at solving their impacts.

#### 2] Even if they win there is a feasible alternative which is better in the abstract, hegemonic transition periods spur regional wars—Keck 14.

#### 3] Pursuit of democracy in the United States is inevitable—we’re not going to abandon a governance system that has worked for 300 years, making their impacts inevitable. Democracy is not monolithic--it’s a question of whether we want a Trumpian democracy or a full democracy.

### 1AR—AT Climate Change Impact

#### Democracies better at solving warming because of free information.

Looney 16 Robert Looney [Robert E. Looney is a Distinguished Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He specializes in issues relating to energy security and economic development in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.], 6-1-2016, "Democracy Is the Answer to Climate Change," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/01/democracy-is-the-answer-to-climate-change/>

Even in these countries, however, democracy is at work subtly prodding the government toward greater environmental responsibility. For now, this work is taking place at the provincial, state, and municipal levels. [British Columbia](http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/07/british-columbias-carbon-tax) has imposed a carbon tax, [California](http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-cap-and-trade-is-working-in-california-1411937795) has initiated a cap-and-trade carbon plan, and [Melbourne](https://www.melbourne.vic.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/zero-net-emissions-update-2014.pdf) has set a goal of zero net emissions by 2020. In most cases where local action has taken place, the effects of climate change have already begun to affect people’s lives. Once the consequences of climate change begin to be felt in other parts of these countries, it is reasonable to expect movements of this sort to gain momentum.

Public concerns about the effects of climate change are unlikely to have the same force in authoritarian regimes as in democracies for two basic reasons. Authoritarian regimes almost invariably prioritize energy security and equity over environmental sustainability, since rising fuel prices risk social unrest. This overarching concern with [keeping energy prices low](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240515305_Subsidies_for_fossil_fuels_and_climate_change_A_comparative_perspective) encourages increased usage of fossil fuels and a bias against green technologies. At the same time, authoritarian governments control information through state dominance of the media and access to official data. For example, China recently reported a sizable drop in coal consumption to placate citizens’ concerns about the country’s choking air pollution. According to the New York Times, however, Chinese coal consumption during the period of supposed reduction actually [rose](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/04/world/asia/china-burns-much-more-coal-than-reported-complicating-climate-talks.html) by 600 million tons, an increase equal to 70 percent of annual coal usage in the United States. Even as Chinese greenhouse gas emissions from coal grew, a [Pew Research report](http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/05/climate-change-concerns-chinese-citizens-plummets) noted the number of Chinese who expressed serious concern about global warming fell from 41 percent in 2010 to just 18 percent in 2015. The only explanation for the drop the report’s author could suggest was a relative lack of public discussion of climate change.

Fortunately, one of democracy’s greatest advantages is the ability of a free press to facilitate the dissemination of information and knowledge. Journalists have already begun to press home the direct link between human-induced climate change and weather-driven events, such as [California’s record drought](http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/21/science/climate-change-intensifies-california-drought-scientists-say.html?_r=0) and the increased number and intensity of [Australian bushfires](http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/20/australia-climate-council-urgent-action-temperature-records-summer-march). As voters become better informed, so too will democratic governments adopt better policies to promote climate stability.

### 1AR—AT Econ Impact

#### Democracies are much better for the economy due to their investment in citizens.

**Dizikes 19 [**Peter Dizikes, The social sciences, business, and humanities writer at the MIT News Office “Democracy fosters economic growth: Researchers find vast gains in productivity after countries democratize,” <https://news.mit.edu/2019/study-democracy-fosters-economic-growth-acemoglu-0307>] JJ

But a new study co-authored by an MIT economist shows that when it comes to growth, democracy significantly increases development. Indeed, countries switching to democratic rule experience a 20 percent increase in GDP over a 25-year period, compared to what would have happened had they remained authoritarian states, the researchers report.

“I don’t find it surprising that it should be a big effect, because this is a big event, and nondemocracies, dictatorships, are messed up in many dimensions,” says Daron Acemoglu, an MIT economist and co-author of the new paper about the study.

Overall, Acemoglu notes, democracies employ broad-based investment, especially in health and human capital, which is lacking in authoritarian states.

“Many reforms that are growth-enhancing get rid of special favors that nondemocratic regimes have done for their cronies. Democracies are much more pro-reform,” he says.

### 1AR—AT Disease

#### Democracies are comparatively better at solving for pandemics—transparency and accountability.

**Berengaut 20 [**Ariana A. Berengaut, director of programs and strategic planning at the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement and a senior adviser to National Security Action] JJ

Yet good public-health practice doesn’t just require control. It also requires transparency, public trust, and collaboration—habits of mind that allow free societies to better respond to pandemics. Democracies’ ability to cope with COVID-19 will soon be tested; after a proliferation of cases in South Korea, Japan, and Italy in recent days, officials are weighing how to respond. But citizens of democratic nations can reasonably expect a higher level of candor and accountability from their governments.

American citizens, for example, can count on the objectivity and accuracy of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, whose weekly morbidity and mortality report has been a fixture of critical communication between the government and the public in one form or another since the late 1800s. Reliable reporting enables epidemiologists to predict a disease’s trajectory, researchers to develop treatments and vaccines, responders to trace transmission, and the public to protect itself.

## 1AR—AT Primacy Bad

#### 1] It’s not enough for them to win primacy bad in the abstract. They have to offer an alternative vision of the international order that is comparatively better.

#### 2] Even if idealistically, there is an alternative IO that is better, hegemonic transition periods spur regional wars—Keck 14.

#### 3] Thousands of years of empirics indicate US primacy has fostered an unprecedented amount of global cooperation, economic competitiveness, and international peace—owens 14.

#### 4] The US will try to defend it inevitably – decline causes war—it’s a question of what kind of hegemony we want.

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and Internatio nal Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf>)

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

### AT: Heg Dead

#### The US retains a plethora of advantages in multiple areas of global leadership in spite of Trump – solution to new challenges is not total abandonment of the US-led global order but refinement and recommitment of our approach to shaping it

--Trump sucks but fundamental pillars of grand strategy remain

--Strong economy, tech innovation, geographical distance, alliances, etc all remain

Schake 19

Kori Schake, Deputy Director General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the author Of Safe Passage: The Transition From British to American Hegemony. She served on the National Security Council and in the U.S. State Department in the George W. Bush administration, “Back to Basics: How to Make Right What Trump Gets Wrong,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2019, accessed through Georgetown libraries

U.S. President Donald Trump's sharp-elbowed nationalism, opposition to multilateralism and international institutions, and desire to shift costs onto U.S. allies reflect the American public's understandable weariness with acting as the global order's defender and custodian. Over the last three decades, post—Cold War triumph- alism led to hubris and clouded strategic thinking. After the 9/11 attacks, Wash- ington stumbled badly in Afghanistan and Iraq; more recently, Russia has reasserted itself in eastern Europe and the Middle East, and China's economic and military power have significantly expanded. Even among Trump's oppo- nents, these developments have led many to conclude that the only solution is a fundamental rethinking of U.S. strategy.

This is an overreaction. In truth, the pillars of U.S. strategy for the past 70 years—committing to the defense of countries that share U.S. values or interests, expanding trade, upholding rules-based institutions, and fostering liberal values internationally—have achieved remarkable successes and will continue to serve the country well going forward. Although some changes are certainly necessary, the biggest risk now is that the United States will in the process of making those changes scrap what is best about its foreign policy.

In his blunt and often crude way, Trump has proved brilliant at poking holes in pieties and asking pointed questions about long-standing principles. His answers to those questions, however, have been self-defeating at best and dangerous at worst. By revealing what happens when U.S. strategy becomes untethered from the ideas that built the American-led order, Trump's time in offce should serve as a wake-up call—but not as a cause for fundamental change. On the contrary: as the costs of an "America first" approach become clear, advocates of a more traditional, global- minded American leadership will get another hearing. They should seize the opportunity by offering a vision of a reformed and updated U.S. foreign policy. But a new vision of the U.S. role in the world should reaffrm some core principles—namely, that the United States can best achieve its objectives through mutually beneficial outcomes that reduce the need for enforcement and encourage like-minded countries to share burdens.

YOU NEVER HAD IT SO GOOD

For all the panic and self-doubt that the political turmoil of recent years has brought, the current crisis is hardly without precedent. In fact, for most of its history, the United States faced more formidable challenges and had fewer resources than it does today. George Washington would have loved to negoti- ate a multilateral trade deal from a position of economic strength rather than having to bring a fledgling nation into being amid hostility from much stronger states. Abraham Lincoln would have considered banding allies together to counter a rising China an easy day's work compared with passing the 13th Amendment or preventing international recognition of the Confederacy. Franklin Roosevelt would have been right to see managing a glut of capital as less compli- cated than resuscitating the entire U.S. economy.

The United States has the most propitious geopolitical environment any country could hope for: surrounded by oceans and peaceful, cooperative neighbors. The U.S. economy generates jobs and drives technological innovation. The country's hegemony in the global balance-of-payments system is so secure that investors are indifferent to its indebtedness and Washington can impose sanctions on foreign entities and governments with impunity. The United States is a dominant power that other strong states voluntarily work to support rather than diminish—a historical anomaly. Its military is so capable that its adversaries have to operate on the margins of the conflict spectrum, in the realm of insurgency or information warfare. The country's cultural products are appealing and accessible, and its language serves as the lingua franca for international transactions.

### AT: Heg Unsustainable

#### Grand strategy is strong – their authors are overly pessimistic and exaggerate relative advantage of rising powers, but locking in allied credibility and long-term primacy guarantee stability

**Brands 18** [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments." American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump." Page 11-16]

This argument is not baseless, for America’s margin of superiority has slipped from its post–Cold War peak. In 1994, the United States accounted for nearly one-fourth of global GDP and 40 percent of world military spending, with those numbers rising even higher by the early 2000s. By 2015, however, these statistics had fallen— not dramatically, but not trivially—to 22.4 percent of global GDP and 33.8 percent of world military spending. The share of global wealth and power wielded by America’s core treaty allies had also declined, from roughly 47 percent of global GDP and 35 percent of global military spending in 1994 to roughly 39 and 25 percent, respectively, in 2015. Meanwhile, the share wielded by the chief challenger to American primacy rose dramatically. In 1994, China accounted for just 3.3 percent of global GDP and 2.2 percent of world military spending; by 2015 two decades of booming economic growth and double-digit annual increases in military spending had taken those numbers to 11.8 and 12.2 percent, respectively.19 By these common measures of global power, the world is not as unbalanced as it used to be. As the global power gap has narrowed, Washington has also been faced with more—and arguably more severe—threats to its position and interests than at any time since the Cold War. Greatpower competition has returned, as Russia and China test the contours of an order that they never fully accepted, and that they now have greater capacity—economic, military, or both—to challenge. Moscow and Beijing are seeking to assert primacy within their own regions, probing the distant peripheries of the U.S. alliance system, and developing military capabilities that severely threaten America’s ability to project power and uphold its security commitments in eastern Europe and the western Pacific. China’s antiship ballistic missiles and its coercion of its neighbors, like Russia’s hybridwarfare activities and its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, represent growing challenges to U.S. military superiority in key areas of Eurasia, and to the benign regional orders Washington has sought to maintain.20 Meanwhile, the long-standing challenge of handling rogue actors has also become more difficult as those actors have become more empowered. North Korea boasts a sizable nuclear arsenal and is rapidly developing a reliable intercontinental strike capability with which to underwrite its serial provocations.21 Iran is fanning sectarianism, fighting multiple proxy wars, and destabilizing an already-disordered Middle East as it also emerges from punishing international sanctions. The Islamic State is losing ground militarily, but it has shown the capacity of nonstate actors to sow chaos across a crucial region while also spreading and inspiring terrorism across the globe. The world is ablaze, it sometimes seems. In virtually every key region, the United States confronts rising challenges to the post–Cold War order. The world ideological climate is now more contested as well. After being in retreat for decades, authoritarian regimes are increasingly pushing back against liberalizing currents, as the 2008 global financial crisis and its aftermath have raised questions about whether democracies can deliver the goods. Russia, China, and other authoritarian regimes have meanwhile reentered the global ideological competition in significant ways, touting the virtues of centralized control and “state capitalism,” and pushing back against Western concepts of political liberalism and human rights. Even countries that are part of the U.S.-led alliance system have regressed politically. Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has proclaimed the rise of the “illiberal state” as an antidote to the weaknesses of liberal democracy, and his example has gained admirers in Poland, Slovakia, and elsewhere. As a result of all this, although democracy remains very robust by historical standards, the advance of electoral democracy has stalled over the past decade, and some contend that a “democratic recession” is under way.22 If history ever ended, it has restarted once more. In the realm of ideas, as in the realm of geopolitics, American primacy seems less daunting than before. Finally, there are questions about the trajectory of America’s own engagement with the world. The United States has experienced significant real declines in defense spending since 2011, forcing difficult trade-offs among force structure, readiness, and modernization. Indeed, Washington is increasingly facing a crisis of strategic solvency, as America’s undiminished commitments outstrip its shrinking capabilities.23 At the same time, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have encouraged pro-retrenchment sentiments at home; they have also raised doubts regarding America’s judgment in starting wars and its ability to conclude those wars successfully. Overseas, U.S. partners in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia now appear concerned that America might undertake a broadbased withdrawal from key regions; for their part, Americans seem less convinced as to why the United States should retain such an assertive strategy when there is no obvious existential threat to national security to justify it. According to one poll conducted in 2013, 52 percent of Americans—the highest proportion in decades—believed that the country should now “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own.”24 Not least, there is the simple fact that a candidate who derided U.S. alliances and overseas commitments, who angrily denounced the pursuit of free trade and globalization, and who promised—on the stump, at least—major changes in American foreign policy was elected president in 2016. These factors have collectively fed into a narrative of national ennui and decline that is more pronounced than at any time since the 1970s. Yet if this narrative is not baseless, it is overstated. For the idea that the era of American primacy has passed—that we are now entering or have already entered a truly multipolar world—is far from the truth. By virtually all key measures, the United States still has substantial, even massive, leads over its closest competitors. In 2016 the United States claimed a nearly US$18.6 trillion GDP that was almost US$7.5 trillion larger than China’s, and it possessed a per capita GDP (a crucial measure of how much money a government can extract from its citizens to pursue geopolitical ends) roughly four times that of China. In the military realm, U.S. annual defense spending was still nearly three times that of China as of 2015—a reminder that although China is closing the gap on Washington in certain respects, the overall gap remains significant indeed.25 In fact, America’s global lead is probably far bigger than indicated by simple numerical measures such as GDP and percentage of global military spending. GDP is a commonly used but problematic way of comparing U.S. and Chinese economic strength. It is merely a snapshot, rather than a fully explanatory measure of how wealth accrues over time; it does not account for factors such as the damage that China is doing to its own long-term economic potential through the devastation of its natural environment; it understates important U.S. advantages such as the fact that American citizens own significant minority shares in foreign corporations. By a more holistic measure of national economic strength—“inclusive wealth,” which takes account of manufactured capital, human capital, and natural capital—the United States was still roughly 4.5 times wealthier than China as recently as 2010. Add in the enormous long-term economic problems that China faces—from declining growth rates, to a massive asset bubble, to a rapidly aging population—and forecasts of coming Chinese economic supremacy become more tenuous still.26 The U.S. military lead is even more extensive. As a recent study by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth concludes, although China’s ongoing military buildup presents significant, even severe, regional challenges for the United States, at the global level there is still simply no comparison. The United States possesses massive advantages in high-end power-projection capabilities such as aircraft carriers, fourth- and fifth-generation tactical aircraft, nuclearpowered submarines, AWACS, and heavy unmanned aerial vehicles. These advantages have been amassed over decades, through enormous and accumulating investments, and so it will take decades—if not longer—for China to come close to matching the United States. These metrics, moreover, do not reflect the other, more intangible advantages that the U.S. military possesses—the years of recent experience in complex operations, the extraordinarily high levels of human capital, the flexible command-and control structures that permit initiative and adaptation. “Rather than expecting a power transition in international politics,” Brooks and Wohlforth write, “everyone should start getting used to a world in which the United States remains the sole superpower for decades to come.”27 Finally, any consideration of global power dynamics must evaluate the role of allies: the United States has dozens of them, whereas China and Russia have few, if any. (Those that they do have, countries such as Belarus and North Korea, make up a veritable international most-wanted list.) America’s allies give it geopolitical leverage, diplomatic influence, and military access that other countries can only envy; they add enormously to the overall weight of the Western coalition of which Washington remains leader. As of 2015, the United States and its core treaty allies in Asia and Europe accounted for roughly three-fifths of global wealth and global military spending—a share that was moderately diminished from twenty years earlier, but still very impressive by nearly all other historical comparisons.

#### U.S. heg is sustainable – neg authors are wrong – it doesn’t cause overstretch or free-riding

Carla Norloff 18, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto, PhD in International Relations from the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Hegemony and inequality: Trump and the liberal playbook, January 2018, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, <https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/1/63/4762707>

LIO = Liberal International Order

The second relevant theoretical approach is grounded in Waltzian realism. According to this approach, states should pursue their national interest defined narrowly, responding to threats that affect them directly. The doctrine of restraint, also called selective engagement, sees the maintenance of long-term hegemony as exceedingly costly and futile, breeding resentment and requiring rivals to be defeated and outcompeted in a continuous effort to thwart attempts at balancing. Balancing occurs when states seek to reduce the military power of exceptionally dominant states. The tendency for states to balance power is a hard systemic law, which no state can escape, and which guarantees that a unipolar distribution of power will eventually become bipolar or multipolar. Academic advocates of selective engagement approve of Trump's call for a more restrained foreign policy while distancing themselves from his other ideas.44 They believe America's postwar grand strategy spills too much blood and treasure and carries high opportunity costs,45 and that the United States should instead pursue a strategy of offshore balancing, refocusing policies around a narrow definition of the national interest limited to preserving regional hegemony in the western hemisphere and preventing the rise of regional hegemons.46 They consider US security interests to be at stake in three areas—Europe, east Asia and the Persian Gulf—with only east Asia requiring significant onshore engagement.47 Broadly agreeing with Trump, they say allies have to learn how to fend for themselves, and that the US should introduce uncertainty about forthcoming military support.48 In order to improve the plight of fellow Americans, the United States should reorientate public policy around domestic goals, giving up some international goals. For proponents of these arguments, America's international commitments clash with its domestic commitments.¶ Three flawed assumptions¶ Three features of the LIO emerge as problematic from these two perspectives. First, other countries free-ride on US political and economic leadership. Second, there are fundamental trade-offs between America's military and economic capability: US security commitments are responsible for US economic decline. Third, there are fundamental trade-offs between America's international and domestic posture. On the basis of this analysis, to promote America's national interest, the grand strategy supporting the LIO should be replaced with strategic restraint; the US should stop bearing a disproportionate share of the costs associated with solving global problems and let others take care of themselves, restricting US involvement to protecting vital security interests, defending the homeland and preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon.¶ However, the three assumptions underlying this analysis, and criticisms of the LIO, mischaracterize America's liberal dilemma. The first questionable assumption is that international cooperation resembles a public goods problem whereby the US, as the largest state, bears disproportionate costs while free-riding allies reap disproportionate benefits. Second, the negative repercussions of US security commitments for US economic strength are rarely balanced against the full benefits of US security commitments to the United States itself. Third, the assumption that there is an international–domestic trade-off and that whatever resources have been ‘squandered’ on international engagement can readily be diverted to the pursuit of productive, welfare-enhancing, domestic goals grossly understates both US benefits from the LIO and the risks attached to dismantling ‘selected’ parts of the LIO.49¶ When international cooperation is cast as a public goods dilemma, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the hegemon is in a disadvantageous position. But the public goods analogy does not adequately capture the essence of international cooperation, because few issues are characterized by the properties that define public goods—non-rivalry and non-exclusion.50 Rather, the hegemon provides a mix of public and private goods, or imperfect public goods.51 Despite these recognized flaws, and much scholarship to the contrary, the public goods version of HST remains influential.¶ Rejecting the ‘exploited hegemon’ version of HST, several scholars point to the ways in which the hegemon is positionally primed to benefit disproportionately from underwriting the LIO.52 They argue that public goods provision offers more opportunities than constraints, and, while they recognize that free-riding is a possible threat to the hegemon's long-term rule,53 they emphasize the ways in which the hegemon can use its dominance to internalize positive externalities and externalize negative externalities.54 As long as the hegemon is not providing pure public goods, the distribution of gains will not necessarily favour other states. And as long as the distribution of gains does not favour other states, providing an open economy does not necessarily compromise the hegemon's security interests or its position of dominance.55¶ The founders of HST, Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner, believed that hegemonic orders were particularly robust during the hegemon's ascendancy, and therefore worried greatly about the future of US hegemony and the LIO as the US underwent relative decline in the 1970s and 1980s.¶ Contemporary scholars, on the other hand, emphasize the cyclical property of postwar hegemony, seeing the United States as capable of reversing phases of decline by using different levers of power to avoid absolute decline.56 They see different forms of power interacting favourably for the hegemon, with financial dominance reinforcing commercial dominance, commercial dominance facilitating financial dominance, and security dominance boosting both commercial and financial dominance.57¶ Since the 1980s, IR scholars have tended to view the United States as militarily strong yet economically weak, a development hastened with the rise of China and other emerging economies in the third millennium.58 But even today, after many rounds of decline (and ascent), the United States has no peer competitor either militarily or economically. Commercially robust but financially vulnerable, China ranks as the world's third largest military power after Russia and the United States. While Russia's military continues to be the US military's principal rival, it is not as potent as it was under the Soviet Union. And while Russia's economy is not as debilitated as it was under the Soviet Union, it continues to be frail. Japan and Germany, two of America's principal allies, are economically strong, but militarily weak.¶ As figures 1 and 2 reveal, the United States has sustained its economic lead throughout the postwar era, boasting the world's first economy with an unrivalled capacity for economic output, an impressive commercial record and an unsurpassed financial position. US economic performance is grossly underrated. First, as shown in figure 1, which displays US GDP, trade and company size, US GDP is still roughly a quarter of global GDP (just below the dotted 25 per cent line). Declinists take the considerable fall in America's postwar share of global GDP as a sign of weakness. But it is unrealistic to think that the United States would continue to command a third of global GDP as it did immediately after the Second World War—particularly since much of the observed decline was the result of deliberate efforts by the United States to bolster its allies in western Europe and east Asia through the Marshall Plan and other initiatives.59 What is rather remarkable is that, even with the rise of non-allies such as China, America's share of world GDP has stabilized around a quarter and continues to be nearly twice as large as China's share. Second, as also shown in figure 1, US commercial capability aggregated into its combined share of world exports and imports—trade—is slightly higher than China's. But exports and imports are not the best way to measure commercial prowess, because the contemporary web of production globalizes manufacturing. Owing to global supply chains, imported final goods include intermediate inputs and technology produced and developed in the United States that do not show up as exports but nonetheless provide American jobs and income. And when exporting final goods, US firms depend on low trade barriers to import low-cost intermediate inputs. The United States' ability to spread production worldwide has been accompanied by long-term rising trends in numbers of foreign affiliates, value added and net income, generating significant profits for the United States.60 As shown in figure 1, the aggregate value of US companies far exceeds that of any other country.¶ Figure 1:¶ Great Power production and commercial capability, 2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Great Power production and commercial capability, 2016¶ Figure 2:¶ Great Power financial and military capability, 2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Great Power financial and military capability, 2016¶ Third, few assessments compare the relative financial capabilities of Great Powers. Studies often favour narrow definitions of financial power over broader assessments. Some focus on the relative size of US financial markets, some on financial networks, some on reserve currency issuance, but few provide an aggregate picture.61 These incomplete portrayals lead to gross underestimation of US financial power.62 As shown in figure 2, US financial markets account for slightly more than a quarter of the global total, and US reserve currency provision far surpasses that of any other state or states, and that of the eurozone.¶ Fourth, as also demonstrated in figure 2, the United States is the world's most formidable military power, its capabilities far exceeding those of any other nation. Taking into account front-line capabilities on the ground, on the sea and in the air, as well as the capacity for reconnaissance, strategic transport and communication to project power, the United States has no rival.63¶ The United States' multidimensional power base clearly puts it in a class above rival powers. Yet its privileged position in the international system is even greater than what these snapshot barometers indicate, because significant synergies exist between the various dimensions.64¶ US security dominance supports US commercial and monetary dominance, and its commercial and monetary dominance are mutually supportive. First, by providing security guarantees, stabilizing hot-spots and securing sea lanes, the United States ensures that international trade and finance can occur without disruption. This is of great value to the United States itself because, as the world's single largest economy, it has a high stake in guaranteeing stable economic relations. Second, propping up the financial realm, America's vast security network provides incentives for allies to continue supporting the dollar's role as the number one global currency.65 Third, the dollar's global role gives the United States the capacity to borrow at exceptionally low rates, providing it with extraordinary macroeconomic flexibility to ease balance of payments adjustments, particularly trade adjustments.66 Fourth, America's commercial position bolsters the dollar's global role by facilitating trade adjustment as governments, particularly in emerging markets, continue to finance US deficits by holding dollar assets in the hope of gaining continued access to US markets.67¶ ‘America first’ promises to touch all of these areas, overhauling longstanding US policies in the security, commercial and monetary spheres. But its real menace lies in its potential for sparking drastic changes by overturning policies in just one sphere. If the United States ceases to defend allies, and reduces its commitment to secure the international environment, cross-border trade and investment will operate in a more uncertain setting. While it is impossible to predict which policy is most likely to unleash an unfavourable chain of events, a hypothetical example can be used to illustrate the presumptive cascade. If we assume the United States follows through with significant commercial retreat, then we should expect monetary consequences. With the United States ceasing to account for a significant portion of international trade, official and private investors will increasingly hold alternative currencies for reserves and payment. If the diversification out of dollars is substantial, the dollar could gradually lose its centrality in the monetary order, complicating the adjustment of US trade imbalances. Balance of payments difficulties could very well ricochet back in the monetary sphere, with a crisis of confidence over trade imbalances triggering a run on the dollar. With the dollar under pressure, its international role for governments and private actors could come into question. If the dollar is no longer widely used for reserves and payments, US financial markets will lose importance relative to other financial markets. A diminished role for US financial markets implies lower demand for US assets, raising US borrowing costs. And the loss of US borrowing privileges will have security ramifications, since financing US military power will become more expensive.68 With these developments, America's slippage in the ranks of Great Powers will be assured.¶ The real liberal dilemma¶ President Trump misidentifies the nature of the redistribution problem confronting America, misinterpreting unequal internal redistribution as unequal external redistribution. The liberal dilemma is not that the LIO distributes gains unfavourably to the United States, but that not everyone in the United States wins because US domestic policies have not kept pace with global economic integration. Economic globalization can deepen domestic inequality. Import competition causes some sectors to shrink, and workers employed in contracting sectors may not be fully absorbed in expanding sectors. Neo-classical trade theory predicts that economic activity will increase in the sector using the country's abundant factor since its reward will increase relative to that of the scarce factor.69 In the case of an advanced capital-abundant country such as the United States, this means that the reward to capital will increase relative to labour. Financial globalization has even more acute effects on the distribution of income, further raising the reward to capital relative to labour.70 However, since suspending international economic exchange reduces national welfare gains, countries are better off expanding the pie, and compensating losers with the higher gains available from economic globalization. The United States needs to bring back ‘embedded liberalism’ to redistribute benefits from openness through greater safeguards and labour adjustment programmes, including trade adjustment, so that the LIO can begin to work for all Americans.71¶ Dissatisfaction with the international distribution of income is, however, insufficient to explain the backlash against globalization. President Trump correctly identified the liberal dilemma inside the United States as the clash between liberal ideals and the preservation of a racial hierarchy which put ‘white America first’—a contradiction which has resulted in a racial and educational divide at the ballot box.72 To fully understand waning American support for the LIO, one must look to the unravelling of America's liberal identity as a principal cause of the less secure domestic foundations of the LIO. Some elements of America's liberal identity, such as ‘political democracy, constitutional government, individual rights [and] private property based economic systems’, remain intact. However, other elements, such as ‘toleration of diversity in non-civic areas of ethnicity and religion’ are in jeopardy.73 In fomenting an ‘us and them’ division between Americans and foreigners alleged to be exploiting the United States, and by stoking an internal division between Americans of different ethnicities and faiths, Trump unveiled an international and domestic hierarchy that some thought no longer existed. How did these factors intermingle with income inequality in the 2016 US elections?¶ The extent of inequality in the United States¶ Income inequality in the United States has increased since the late 1960s. By 2015, the top 5 per cent earned 28 times as much, and the top 20 per cent 16 times as much, as the lowest 20 per cent of Americans. This share has risen over time irrespective of the incumbent president's party affiliation, as shown in figure 3, which traces this development back to the late 1970s. Below I use mean income data from the US Census Bureau to discern the effect of income inequality on different ethnic groups. Ideally, this analysis would be performed using median income data, but this is not consistently available across all measures of interest.74¶ Figure 3:¶ Income inequality between the top and bottom income earners in the United States, 1978–2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income inequality between the top and bottom income earners in the United States, 1978–2016¶ Concerns about income may have loomed large in the 2016 presidential elections. It could be, for instance, that by 2016 income inequality in the United States had reached a tipping point, a level that Americans were no longer prepared to tolerate. The only vote margin—that is, the difference in percentage of votes between Republicans and Democrats—that was consistently and substantially different from those in the 2008 and 2012 elections was the margin for those earning less than US$50,000 a year. Although this group—arguably the most affected by the widening income gap—still supported the Democratic candidate overall (though to a lesser extent than in the two previous elections), the margin between the Democratic and Republican votes narrowed to 12 points from 22 points in 2008 and 2012. The margins for higher-income groups were not as wide, nor were they significantly different from the levels recorded in the 2008 and 2012 elections. In an anti-establishment election, factors other than income, such as Clinton's ‘elitism’, might have been a liability. But the unfavourable opinion of Clinton (81 per cent) was less strong among those who voted for Trump than disapproval of former President Obama (89 per cent).75 It is, however, possible that dissatisfaction with Clinton was greater within the group earning under US$50,000.¶ While income did matter in the 2016 election, it was not, on its own, the most important predictor of the outcome. As shown in figures 4 and 5, income did play a role, but primarily as it intersected with other factors, particularly education and colour.76 In the following paragraphs I consider the income growth of non-college-educated whites relative to college-educated whites; and the absolute income (including income growth) of non-college-educated whites relative to the overall non-college-educated population.¶ Figure 4:¶ Income growth among US citizens with education below college degree level, 1998–2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income growth among US citizens with education below college degree level, 1998–2016¶ Figure 5:¶ Income growth among US citizens with education above college degree level, 1998–2016¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income growth among US citizens with education above college degree level, 1998–2016¶ In 2016, white voters without a college degree voted for Trump (66 per cent) with much higher percentages than in 2012 (61 per cent) and 2008 (58 per cent), and with much higher margins (see figure 4). But white voters without a college degree (both those with and those without a high school diploma) supported Trump despite experiencing greater income growth during the full span of Obama's presidency than any other white group defined by educational level. Their income expansion was also stronger than any other education group during Obama's second term (2012–2016). However, during Obama's first term (2008–2012), their income did not grow as fast as that of white Americans with advanced degrees, although they did better than those with an associate (i.e. two-year college) degree or bachelor's degree. Despite stronger income development than college-educated income earners, whites without a college degree voted for Trump with a 37-point margin, whereas whites with a college degree favoured Trump with only a 3-point margin. Although these numbers suggest that something other than income explains Trump's victory, it could still be that the higher margins for white voters without college degrees reflect discontent with low real incomes.¶ If low real incomes explain Trump's support among white voters without college degrees, we should find general support for Trump among voters with low real incomes. However, since 1998 the mean income of whites without college degrees has always been higher than the mean income of all those without college degrees. If their income remained higher, was their income growth slower? During the full length of Obama's presidency, and during his first term, whites without a college degree experienced higher growth than all income earners without a college degree. Only during Obama's second term did the mean income of whites without a college degree underperform the income of all earners without a college degree. The growth differential between the two groups during this period,77 however, is quite small, for both those with and those without a high school diploma: the mean income of workers without a high school diploma increased by 13.41 per cent, compared to 12.99 per cent growth for whites without a high school diploma. The mean income of all workers with a high school diploma increased by 5.73 per cent; of whites with a high-school diploma, by 5.60 per cent. It is noteworthy that during Obama's second term the overall mean income of all earners with a college degree increased less than for whites with a college degree. The biggest difference was for whites with an advanced degree, who earned US$1,394 a year less than the mean income of all recipients of advanced degrees. Yet despite slower income growth, white college graduates were disinclined to vote Republican in the 2016 elections (see figure 5).¶ If dissatisfaction with income played a role in explaining why white voters without a college degree endorsed Trump, the only evidence for it is the relatively lower income growth of white earners without college degrees compared to all earners without college degrees between 2012 and 2015. Disaggregating the income differential for non-college-educated whites, those without a high-school diploma experienced 0.43 per cent lower income growth, and those with a diploma 0.13 per cent lower income growth, than all non-college-educated earners within the corresponding educational group. It is highly unlikely that these small percentage differences explain why whites without a college degree favoured Trump with a 37-point margin whereas all earners without a college degree favoured Trump with only a 7-point margin.¶ If income mattered only in conjunction with education and colour in the 2016 elections, income might have been more decisive in distressed regions. One of the biggest surprises in the 2016 presidential election was how the Democrats lost the ‘blue wall’ states in the ‘Rust Belt’—Pennsylvania in the north-east; Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan and Ohio in the mid-west. The Democrats also lost Florida in the south, a traditionally Republican state, which Obama won in 2008 and 2012.¶ Declining employment and income are said to have contributed to support for Trump in conventionally Democratic states. But there are several problems with this explanation. While the decline in the mid-west is real, it has been in the making for a very long time. During the Obama years, specifically between 2008 and 2016, income in the mid-west rose more sharply than in all other regions. During Obama's second term, both white and overall income growth was stronger in the mid-west than in any other region. Yet the Republican vote exceeded the Democratic vote in the mid-west by the second-highest margin of any region (see figure 6). Moreover, during the same period, income growth for whites was higher than for all ethnic groups combined; and yet whites in the mid-west voted Republican by a margin of 20 points, compared to a margin of 5 points for the region overall. However, during Obama's second term, white income growth in the mid-west was lower than in all other regions except for the west. Overall income growth was worse in the mid-west than in all other regions. Yet the white margin in favour of Trump was stronger in the mid-west (20 points) than in the west (5 points), and the overall margin in favour of Trump in the mid-west (5 points) was considerably lower than for whites in the mid-west (20 points).¶ Figure 6:¶ Income growth by region and race, 1998–2015¶ View largeDownload slide¶ Income growth by region and race, 1998–2015¶ Given the higher proportion of whites in the mid-west (76 per cent) than nationally (61 per cent), and the higher number of voters in the region aged over 25 years without a college degree (71 per cent) than nationally (55 per cent),78 it is likely that factors of education, colour and income combine to explain the level of support for Trump in 2016.¶ In the 2016 election, racial polarization, as measured by the difference between white and non-white preferences for Trump, was highest in the south, second to highest in the mid-west and north-east, and lowest in the west. These cleavages were most apparent in the south and mid-west. White voters were aligned with Trump in the south (67 per cent) and the mid-west (57 per cent), non-white voters with Clinton in the south (77 per cent) and mid-west (75 per cent).¶ Racially differentiated voting patterns do not necessarily mean that voting is racially motivated. It could be that whites are generally more cons ervative on a range of issues and that their views were therefore better aligned with the policies espoused by the Republican than the Democratic candidate. Yet that would not explain why so many white college-educated voters fled the Republican presidential nominee in 2016 (see figure 5). Rather, there exists some evidence that racist attitudes encouraged a portion of the white electorate to align with Trump. For example, 80 per cent of white evangelical Christians supported Trump.79 Their vote is important because although they account for a lower share of the population today (17 per cent) than in 2008 (21 per cent), they still account for 26 per cent of the vote because a lot of them turn out to vote.80 Their high proportion of the vote suggests that racism might have been a relevant issue. In the months before the elections, a non-partisan study by the American Values Atlas revealed that white evangelicals were less likely to perceive discrimination against blacks, with only 36 per cent saying blacks were discriminated against ‘a lot’, compared to the national average of 57 per cent.81¶ Trump and the liberal playbook¶ In 2016, socio-cultural fissures within the United States played a critical role in the election of the presidential candidate most disparaging of the LIO. Trump's call to put America ‘first’ internationally, and white Christians ‘first’ domestically, resonated with non-college-educated white voters who saw their historic privileges fading. Not all grievances were racially motivated; certainly, some poorer non-college-educated whites compared their present situation unfavourably with the rosier circumstances of their families' past.82¶ The relationship between education and race was first noted over seven decades ago. Gunnar Myrdal's 1944 book An American dilemma was famously cited in the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and helped desegregate education in the United States by demonstrating that education could not be separate but equal for blacks.83 Myrdal went further, calling for an ‘educational offensive against racial intolerance’ and the forging of an ‘American creed’, a civic culture with equal rights for all Americans, to overcome the contradiction between American liberal ideals and the reality of racial discrimination.84¶ Since then, great progress has been made. Blacks, and other minorities, in the United States are equal before the law and have equal political rights, and greater social and economic opportunities, than before. Education has no doubt played a significant role in reducing explicit racist behaviour or individual racism, that is, ‘overt acts by individuals, which cause death, injury or the violent destruction of property’.85 But discrimination is a problem beyond what most people would recognize as specific instances of racist behaviour. Institutional racism is a ‘less overt, far more subtle, less identifiable’ form of racism, which ‘originates in the operation of established and respected forces in society’.86 The concept of white privilege is the flip side of institutional racism and refers to the unearned benefits enjoyed as a result of being white.87 The concept is not intended to mean that every white person is ‘privileged’ or that no other form of privilege exists. It is intended to expose the existence of an implicit racial hierarchy in society and the political, economic and legal inequality which it reproduces.88 Attempts to attenuate white privilege are met with suspicion and opposition by those who benefit from it. For example, today a majority of white Americans (55 per cent) believe they are discriminated against, and nearly half of them (26 per cent) attribute this to US ‘laws and government policies’.89 Whites who believe they face institutional racism are unlikely to see a difference between policies designed to reduce unmerited privileges and policies that reduce merited privileges. They are also unlikely to appreciate how restrictive the scope for affirmative action is. For example, in the case of university admissions policies, quotas have been unconstitutional since the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Many states even forbid the use of race in admissions procedures. Where states do permit the use of race, it may be used only as one criterion in promoting diversity, and only if all other methods fail, as laid down in the 2013 Supreme Court decision in Fisher v. University of Texas.¶ The political scientist and public intellectual Walter Russell Mead has explained the 2016 election outcome as a ‘Jacksonian revolt’ in which many ‘white Americans find themselves in a society that talks constantly about the importance of identity, that values ethnic authenticity, that offers economic benefits and social advantages based on identity—for everybody but them’.90 Another political scientist, Mark Lilla, proposes an end to identity politics as a way to secure broader support for liberal policies.91 I agree with Mead that identity politics cannot be unilateral, and I agree with Lilla that the American habit of categorizing individuals according to essentialist criteria is contrary to liberal principles. But I am not sure either of them would agree that there has been an essentialist identity politics in the United States, going back at least to the eighteenth century, constructed around the primacy of a white American identity of European Christian descent. Reactions against this unspoken identity politics lay beneath claims of institutional racism long before Trump gave voice to a ‘white America first’ policy at home.¶ College-educated white Americans are more likely to recognize the advantages attached to being white (47 per cent) than white Americans without college degrees (17 per cent).92 A possible reason for this is that higher education fosters liberal attitudes, and provides exposure to different ethnic groups, limiting blatant forms of racism.93 But even though college-educated whites are less inclined to vote for their privilege, and more prepared to see their privilege, there is plenty of room in the liberal playbook for race-based discrimination. There's a playbook in force that liberals are supposed to follow. The playbook prescribes responses to different forms of racism, and these responses tend to be outraged responses. When no colleague or friend is threatened by charges of racism, the playbook works. But the playbook can also be a trap leading to bad decisions because discriminatory practices often implicate someone's colleague, friend, family or wider community. The trap is especially pernicious in higher education, where people tend to overestimate their liberal inclinations, and where opportunities, support and intellectual attribution are largely network-based.94 It is therefore unsurprising that a higher percentage of college-educated blacks (55 per cent) say they have been disadvantaged by their race than non-college-educated blacks (29 per cent). An even higher percentage of all blacks (81 per cent) who at some point attended college say they were treated differently because of their race: perhaps an overlooked factor in the reasons why blacks are less likely to finish college.95¶ In addition to the different experiences and beliefs about race to which education gives rise, a partisan divide exists, with Republicans (43 per cent) more likely than Democrats (27 per cent) to say whites, rather than blacks, experience a lot of discrimination.96 Only 37 per cent of Republicans (against 76 per cent of Democrats) say racism is a problem.97 Attitudes towards blacks also extend to other groups. From the 2016 exit polls, we know that Trump voters were more likely to support a wall along the Mexican border (85 per cent) than Clinton voters (10 per cent), to support deportation of illegal immigrants (83 per cent vs 14 per cent) and view immigration as the most pressing problem for the country (64 per cent vs 33 per cent).98¶ Overall, the evidence presented in this article suggests not only that education and race were strong predictors of the 2016 presidential vote, but that racism was a contributing factor.¶ Summary and conclusion¶ Trump did not create angst about America's dominant position in the world, or about white America's dominant position vis-à-vis other ethnic groups, but he tapped into these two currents more unabashedly than any other presidential candidate in postwar history. This article deconstructs ‘America first’ into two components, an international component and a domestic component, which share common symptoms (lost greatness) and common remedies (redistribution).¶ In the first two sections of this article, I discussed the international component, and how ‘America first’ threatens to undermine the LIO. I showed how ‘America first’ reflects concerns about American decline and American overextension in three areas: the security, trade and monetary spheres. A common theme in this narrative is how the United States is being exploited by other countries, and how disengaging from the LIO presents a better path forward. In the security area, the world should no longer count on the US to act as global policeman or to tolerate unfair burden-sharing within security alliances. In trade, the US will no longer stand by as other countries free-ride on America's openness. In the monetary realm, the dollar's global role is not as good as gold. While Trump's views on the LIO are quite idiosyncratic, and have yet to be fully implemented, declinists and proponents of retrenchment share certain aspects of this outlook.¶ In opposition to this perspective, I have provided broad-based metrics demonstrating that the United States remains by a long way the leading state in the world today, and argued that it would be a lot worse off under alternatives to the LIO than it has been in the postwar era and is today. A counterfactual setting, where the United States does not provide international security, would be a more uncertain and more economically fragile one, with more limited commerce and investment. A United States of America in which the commercial and financial playing field, including the dollar's role, no longer spans the globe, but is domestically confined, will reduce US prosperity and geopolitical reach. Yet there is a growing sense, correctly identified by President Trump, that America's global engagement is not benefiting all Americans.

### AT: Heg Causes War

#### US is constrained from endless temptation—cold war and Iraq syndrome proves. Frequency doesn’t correlate with the magnitude of deaths they want.

Brooks, et al. 12(John Ikenberry, Ph. D in Political Science from Chicago, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, Co-Director of Princeton’s Center for International Security Studies; William Wohlforth, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College; Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University; “Don’t Come Home, America”, http://www.carlanorrlof.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/DontComeHomeAmerica.pdf)

Undoubtedly, possessing global military intervention capacity expands opportunities to use force. If it were truly to “come home,” the United States would be tying itself to the mast like Ulysses, rendering itself incapable of succumbing to temptation. Any defense of deep engagement must acknowledge that it increases the opportunity and thus the logical probability of U.S. use of force compared to a grand strategy of true strategic disengagement. Of course, if the alternative to deep engagement is an over-the-horizon intervention stance, then the temptation risk would persist after retrenchment. The main problem with the interest expansion argument, however, is that it essentially boils down to one case: Iraq. Sixty-seven percent of all the casualties and 64 percent of all the budget costs of all the wars the United States has fought since 1990 were caused by that war. Twenty-seven percent of the causalities and 26 percent of the costs were related to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. All the other interventions—the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, the subsequent airstrike campaigns in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, Libya, and so on—account for 3 percent of the casualties and 10 percent of the costs.66 Iraq is the outlier not only in terms of its human and material cost, but also in terms of the degree to which the overall burden was shouldered by the United States alone. As Beckley has shown, in the other interventions allies either spent more than the United States, suffered greater relative casualties, or both. In the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War, for example, the United States ranked fourth in overall casualties (measured relative to population size) and fourth in total expenditures (relative to GDP). In Bosnia, European Union (EU) budget outlays and personnel deployments ultimately swamped those of the United States as the Europeans took over postconflict peacebuilding operations. In Kosovo, the United States suffered one combat fatality, the sole loss in the whole operation, and it ranked sixth in relative monetary contribution. In Afghanistan, the United States is the number one financial contributor (it achieved that status only after the 2010 surge), but its relative combat losses rank fifth.67 In short, the interest expansion argument would look much different without Iraq in the picture. There would be no evidence for the United States shouldering a disproportionate share of the burden, and the overall pattern of intervention would look “unrestrained” only in terms of frequency, not cost, with the debate hinging on whether the surge in Afghanistan was recklessly unrestrained.68 How emblematic of the deep engagement strategy is the U.S. experience in Iraq? The strategy’s supporters insist that Iraq was a Bush/neoconservative aberration; certainly, there are many supporters of deep engagement who strongly opposed the war, most notably Barack Obama. Against this view, opponents claim that it or something close to it was inevitable given the grand strategy. Regardless, the more important question is whether continuing the current grand strategy condemns the United States to more such wars. The Cold War experience suggests a negative answer. After the United States suffered a major disaster in Indochina (to be sure, dwarfing Iraq in its human toll), it responded by waging the rest of the Cold War using proxies and highly limited interventions. Nothing changed in the basic structure of the international system, and U.S. military power recovered by the 1980s, yet the United States never again undertook a large expeditionary operation until after the Cold War had ended. All indications are that Iraq has generated a similar effect for the post–Cold War era. If there is an Obama doctrine, Dominic Tierney argues, it can be reduced to “No More Iraqs.”69 Moreover, the president’s thinking is reflected in the Defense Department’s current strategic guidance, which asserts that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”70 Those developments in Washington are also part of a wider rejection of the Iraq experience across the American body politic, which political scientist John Mueller dubbed the “Iraq Syndrome.”71 Retrenchment advocates would need to present much more argumentation and evidence to support their pessimism on this subject.

# F/L—Topicality/Theory

## 1AR - Topicality

### 1AR—T A

#### Counter-interp: I can specify a country

#### “A” is singular.

Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a IB

used as a function word before singular nouns when the referent is unspecified

#### Both readings are correct.

Cambridge Dictionary

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/a>

a

determiner

used to mean any or every thing or person of the type you are referring to:

#### Specific instances prove generics which also means I meet

Cimpian et al 10 (PhDs – Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or “Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and are likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1. Generics’ truth conditions Some of the first experimental evidence for the idea that the truth of a generic statement does not depend on the underlying statistics was provided by Gilson and Abelson (1965; Abelson & Kanouse, 1966) in their studies of “the psychology of audience reaction” to “persuasive communication” in the form of generic assertions (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966, p. 171). Participants were presented with novel items such as the following: Altogether there are three kinds of tribes—Southern, Northern, Central. Southern tribes have sports magazines. Northern tribes do not have sports magazines. Central tribes do not have sports magazines. Do tribes have sports magazines? All items had the same critical feature: only one third of the target category possessed the relevant property. Despite the low prevalence, participants answered “yes” approximately 70% of the time to “Do tribes have sports magazines?” and other generic questions similar to it. Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977) writes that “there are many cases where […] less than half of the individuals under consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50% of books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic form

#### Debate solves arbitrary linguistic intuitions—we can determine the most predictable interp based on factors like clash and limits. Semantics are a floor not a ceiling—if we have a sufficiently predictable interpretation of the topic then division of ground is more important.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash—allows us to go in-depth on particular parts of the literature which allows for more nuanced debates because different states are different

#### 2] Aff ground—No Advantage applies to all democracies because each one has different geopolitical situations.

#### Pics are comparatively worse—a) It forces 1AR restart mooting the 1AC and creating a 13-7 time skew b) negs have generics like politics and Econ DA but affs don’t have any vs pics

#### 3] Functional limits—A viable aff needs strong uniqueness on democratic backsliding and low voter turnout. Means random countries like the “Norway Aff is unfeasible.

#### 4] Overlimiting: They make whole res the only topical aff which is devastating vs specific negs

#### 5] Reasonability—good is good enough and key to avoid substance crowdout

### 1AR—T Full Democracy

#### CI: Democracy = Flawed democracy And Full Democracy

EIU 19 EIU [The Economist Intelligence Unit (The EIU) is the research and analysis division of The Economist Group, the sister company to The Economist newspaper. Created in 1946, we have over 70 years’ experience in helping businesses, financial firms and governments to understand how the world is changing and how that creates opportunities to be seized and risks to be managed. Given that many of the issues facing the world have an international (if not global) dimension, The EIU is ideally positioned to be commentator, interpreter and forecaster on the phenomenon of globalisation as it gathers pace and impact.], 2019, “Democracy Index 2019” <http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-2019.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=democracyindex2019> AG

Democracy Index 2019, by regime type

Full democracies 22

Flawed democracies 54

Hybrid regimes 37

Authoritarian regimes 54

#### 1] Predictability: Full democracy is not a word within the resolution. It’s unpredictable and arbitrary to expect teams to center prep around these words.

#### 2] Topic Lit—Core debates about compulsory voting center around the United States—they arbitrarily exclude core controversies.

#### 3] Aff ground: There are no solvency advocates for compulsory voting for “Full Democracies.” No reason to institute a radical policy when they’re fully democratic.

#### 4] Functional limits—A viable aff needs strong uniqueness on democratic backsliding and low voter turnout. Means random countries like the “Norway Aff is unfeasible.

#### 5] Reasonability—competing interps encourages the neg to always shift the goalpost with arbitrary interps that skirt topical discussion—voting neg incentivizes T-reliant neg strategies which outweighs the offense solved by their interp

# F/L—Counterplans

## 1AR—Top Level Analytics

#### Double bind: Either the counterplan can’t sufficiently increase voter turnout and the case outweighs or it increases voter turnout so much it links to its own net benefit.

## 1AR—Top Level Solvency Deficits for Advantage CPs

#### Decades of voting trends indicate that making voting easier or more accessible fails to correlate with higher turnout.

**Berinsky 16** [Adam Berinsky, Mitsui Professor of Political Science at MIT and serves as the director of the MIT political experiments research lab, he is also the author of the 2004 book Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America and the 2009 book in Time of War; Understanding Public Opinion from World war II to Iraq, <https://ssir.org/articles/entry/making_voting_easier_doesnt_increase_turnout>, “Making voting Easier Doesn’t Increase Turnout.” ] JJ

Furthermore, the act of voting became easier as well. In the last 20 years, election officials have enacted a number of different reforms designed to increase turnout by easing restrictions on the casting of ballots including early voting, the relaxing of stringent absentee balloting procedures, and universal voting-by-mail (VBM) in states such as Oregon and, most recently, Colorado. Taken together, the changes over the last 40 years have greatly reduced the direct costs of registration and voting; it has never been easier to cast a ballot than it is today

But the effects of these reforms have surprised scholars and reformers alike. The recent wave of electoral reforms does not seem to have had any significant effect on voter turnout. And there is even evidence that some of the new reforms may have actually decreased turnout.

#### **Reforms focused on making the electoral process more accessible only encourage already-politically active members to participate, recreating systems of partisanship.**

**Berinsky 16** [Adam Berinsky, Mitsui Professor of Political Science at MIT and serves as the director of the MIT political experiments research lab, he is also the author of the 2004 book Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America and the 2009 book in Time of War; Understanding Public Opinion from World war II to Iraq, <https://ssir.org/articles/entry/making_voting_easier_doesnt_increase_turnout>, “Making voting Easier Doesn’t Increase Turnout.” ] JJ

Moreover, contrary to the predictions of Piven and Cloward, lowering the costs of voting might skew the electorate in important ways. Research by myself and others indicates that the wave of voting reforms have had significant, if unintended consequences, on the types of people who turn out to vote. In particular, reforms designed to make voting easier actually magnify the existing socioeconomic biases in the composition of the electorate.

These two unexpected consequences have a common cause. The problem, I believe, is that when we talk about the “costs” of voting, we have been thinking about the wrong kinds of costs—the direct costs of registering to vote and casting a ballot. Most politicians and scholars have focused reform efforts on these tangible barriers to voting, making it easier for all citizens to vote, regardless of their personal circumstances. But, as I have argued [elsewhere](http://apr.sagepub.com/content/33/4/471), the more significant costs of participation are the cognitive costs of becoming involved with and informed about the political world. Studies of voting from the last 60 years make this point clear. Political interest and engagement, after all, determine to a large extent who votes and who does not.

By focusing on the wrong kind of costs, we have lost sight of the real effects of reforms such as early voting and voting by mail. Rather than stimulating the unengaged, who are relatively deficient in political and economic resources, reforms to make voting easier mostly serve to keep existing voters voting. Thus, any slight increase in turnout works by ensuring that politically engaged voters continue to come to polls election after election. Nonvoters are left behind. Without engaging this segment of the US public, turnout will remain low.

#### This facilitates deep civic engagement---elections and universality are both key.

Emilee Booth Chapman 18. Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford, “The Distinctive Value of Elections and the Case for Compulsory Voting,” American Journal of Political Science. November 15, 2018. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/ajps.12393>, RJP

Concern about the gap between public opinion and policy outcomes and about the disproportionate influence of wealthy citizens has recently reinvigorated the debate over compulsory voting. Proponents of compulsory voting suggest that declining and unequal voter turnout rates have exacerbated the responsiveness gap in contemporary democracies. There is ample evidence that enforced compulsory voting is among the most effective ways of increasing voter turnout. Supporters and opponents of mandatory voting disagree, however, about whether higher voter turnout is actually a valuable goal, and whether compulsion is an appropriate way of achieving it.

In this article, I argue that the case for compulsory voting rests on an implicit recognition of the unique and valuable role that elections play in contemporary democratic practice as periodic moments in which there is an ambition toward universal participation. Understanding the distinctive value of elections strengthens the case for compulsory voting in many established democracies. Addressing prominent objections to mandatory voting,1 I argue that critics who deny the value of high turnout achieved though compulsion fail to give sufficient attention to voting’s unique role in contemporary democracies.

My argument rests on the critical assumption that greater political equality, understood as government that is more equally responsive to all citizens, and greater democratic legitimacy are worthwhile goals to pursue. Thus, my argument is not directed at those criticisms of compulsory voting denying the value of a more equally responsive government.2 Though I do try to address some of the specific objections raised in these criticisms of compulsory voting, my argument is primarily addressed at the important line of criticism that high voter turnout, especially when achieved through compulsion, does not significantly contribute to political equality or meaningful democratic legitimacy.

The argument proceeds in the following steps: First, I argue that the ambition toward universal participation establishes a distinctive and important role for voting in modern democratic systems, and, to the extent that they approximate this aim of universal turnout, elections contribute in unique ways to the promotion of democratic values, especially equal responsiveness. Second, I argue that compulsory voting is a particularly good method for increasing turnout because it is more effective than other similarly feasible methods, and it can complement more substantial electoral reforms. Moreover, the method of compulsory voting is well suited to reinforce the distinctive virtues of elections. Finally, I address some major objections to mandatory voting to show that the expected benefits of mandatory voting are likely to outweigh the expected costs and that its effects will not undermine the value of high voter turnout. Before proceeding, it is worth making a few remarks about the scope of this argument. First, technically, this argument applies only to compulsory turnout; enforcing a legal requirement to cast a valid vote would require eliminating the secret ballot, which I do not advocate. In keeping with the norm in the existing literature, though, I use the more common terms mandatory voting or compulsory voting to refer to compulsory turnout. Second, this argument applies only to voting in elections (or potentially referenda) in large-scale democratic societies (i.e., nation-states, or large provinces in a federal system). The distinctive virtues of elections that I lay out in the first section of this article may be less important in smaller communities that can ensure consistent and equally effective access to other modes of participation. Finally, the argument I advance in this article only supports an all-things-concerned judgment in favor of implementing mandatory voting when the system has been designed to achieve its goals and limit negative side effects in the particular context, which, in most cases, will require appropriate complementary reforms. A desirable system of mandatory voting will, for example, require accessible polling places and an enforcement structure with reasonable penalties to ensure that the law is not overly burdensome, especially for already vulnerable populations. Nonetheless, this aricle contributes to the case that proponents of democracy should regard mandatory voting as a potentially powerful tool for democratic reform, and that it is worth figuring out how to implement it effectively and justly.

The Role of Elections in Contemporary Democracy

Proponents of compulsory voting typically justify compelling people to vote by appealing to two benefits from near-universal electoral turnout: First, higher turnout will produce a political system that is more equally responsive to all citizens; second, higher turnout will increase the perceived legitimacy of the political system (Engelen 2007, 24–25; L. Hill in Brennan and Hill 2014; Lijphart 1996, 1997).

Critics of compulsory voting, on the other hand, object that these arguments place too much emphasis on the act of voting while neglecting the diversity of participation that characterizes healthy democracies. Annabelle Lever (2010, 908) argues, “Voting is, at best, only oneform of democratic political participation and, from some perspectives, not an especially important or attractive one.” Other critics likewise claim that compulsory voting arbitrarily singles out one kind of participation as essential to democracy (Brennan in Brennan and Hill 2014, 31). High voter turnout, opponents contend, is not necessarily important for democracy. Moreover, compelling higher turnout is not harmless. Critics argue that compulsory voting could compromise the quality of democratic participation and that it needlessly interferes with individual liberty.

Opponents of compulsory voting rightly observe that voting is only one aspect of democracy, but they wrongly conclude that approximately universal voting is not valuable to contemporary democracy. Voting is not interchangeable with other forms of political influence. Elections play a distinctive and important role within a broader framework of democracy, a role characterized by mass participation, in fact, by an ambition toward universal participation.

Established democracies devote tremendous resources to making voting accessible. India’s 2014 Lok Sabha election, for example, required nearly a million polling places to ensure that all eligible voters, even those in the most remote parts of the country, would have a meaningful opportunity to vote (Vyawahare 2014). Public discourse and the widespread belief in a duty to vote suggest a further publicly shared belief that it is important not only for citizens to have ample opportunity to vote, but also that citizens actually take advantage of that opportunity (see, e.g., Blais 2000, 95). This public attitude toward voting is distinct from attitudes toward other forms of participation; in the popular imagination, voting is singled out as the object of a duty.3

Of course, critics of compulsory voting who doubt the value of high voter turnout are also likely to be critical of this prominence of voting in public discourse and in the popular imagination. Voting is not the only way citizens participate in decision making in today’s democracies. Citizens might also contribute to public deliberation, petition their representatives, donate money to a campaign, or even stand for office themselves. Popular voting alone need not (and surely cannot) bear all of the normative weight of democracy, and fostering a more equally responsive government certainly requires attention to the significant inequities in these other domains of participation (Lever 2010). Seen in this light, the special emphasis on electoral participation may seem arbitrary and thus an insufficient basis for compelling citizens to vote.

The special emphasis on voting in popular political culture is not arbitrary or misguided, though. Rather, it is grounded in the distinctive and valuable role that periodic moments of approximately universal participation play in contemporary democratic practices. When characterized by approximately universal turnout, elections interrupt the ordinary, delegated business of government with extraordinary spectacles of democracy that command the attention of the general public and manifest the equal political authority of all citizens. Though they cannot fully instantiate democracy on their own, these moments effectively contribute to contemporary democratic practices in a number of ways.

First, the ambition toward universal participation in periodic elections helps to guard against political disengagement and alienation by defining concrete expectations for participation. Skeptics of the value of high voter turnout often argue that active participation is not essential to democracy because individuals can passively exercise political authority by deferring to their fellow citizens or to political elites. But political inaction can only be interpreted as passive participation if citizens believe it is appropriate and possible for them to intervene when they are dissatisfied with the direction of their public life. In modern societies, though, many people do not see themselves as political agents in their own right, able to exert influence over their political circumstances (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 168)

A pluralist model of democracy might simply call for citizens to take advantage of opportunities to participate whenever and however they wish, but many citizens will never participate because they never feel competent to do so, or because it simply never occurs to them. The ambition toward universal participation in elections mitigates this problem of habitual disengagement by establishing an expectation that citizens will perform their political agency on specific and predictable occasions.4 Knowing that they will be called upon to actively participate on a recurring basis provides citizens with a reason to develop an enduring political identity.5 Moreover, by directing citizens’ attention to particular political questions that they will be expected to answer, elections make the often frustrating and potentially discouraging task of figuring out what to pay attention to easier for ordinary citizens.6 This benefit is magnified by the relative information saturation that occurs around elections.

Critics of compulsory voting might argue that, rather than trying to enforce universal electoral participation, we can more effectively combat political disengagement and alienation by promoting participation in other arenas.7 But, even if nonelectoral participation can be more effective than voting at increasing political engagement and efficacy in individual cases, approximating universal participation in other forms of activism or participation would require much more radical reforms of political culture and institutions. Efforts to increase voter turnout, on the other hand, build on an extensive infrastructure of electoral administration and the existing, widespread norm that there is a duty to vote.

Moreover, periodic moments of approximately universal participation would likely still play a valuable role in a political system already characterized by widespread citizen engagement, for several reasons. First, these moments facilitate collective action. Individuals can influence public life more effectively when they are able to combine their efforts with other like-minded citizens. Insofar as elections represent occasions in which all citizens can count on each other to participate, they can help to overcome some of the coordination problems that make it difficult for large, diverse, unorganized, or underresourced groups to effectively utilize other channels of influence. Second, when citizens internalize an expectation of universal participation in elections, electoral campaigns also create a relatively attentive audience to whom political leaders and activists can address political claims,8 facilitating the introduction of new issues and the contestation of existing political divisions. Finally, periodic moments of approximately universal participation make the political involvement and formal political equality of all citizens manifest. This spectacle reinforces parties’ and elected officials’ incentives to take the interests and concerns of all citizens into account. Elections are not the only way for citizens to hold political leaders to account, but elections are still distinctively valuable mechanisms of democratic control when they predictably involve the entire citizenry in the sanctioning process. When characterized by nearly universal participation, elections provide an unambiguous reminder to public officials that they are accountable to all citizens, not just the most vocal and active. Because elections make manifest the responsiveness of the political system to the equal agency of all citizens in at least a few concrete instances, the optics of periodic moments of approximately universal participation can also contribute to the empirical legitimacy of a democratic regime. Those who find themselves on the losing side of a political decision may have a harder time maintaining the belief that they speak for a silent majority when citizens routinely reveal how they align themselves on significant dimensions of political conflict (see also Przeworski 1999).

## 1AR—50 States CP

### 1AR—Circumvention

#### Trump will circumvent the CP with litigation tactics because he sees increased voting turnout as a threat.

**Wehle 20** [Kimberly Wehle, joined law school of University of Baltimore after years of teaching as an Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma college of Law, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/04/donald-trump-election-disruption-2020-294721>, “worried Trump will Disrupt Voting this Fall? Here’s what to Watch for] JJ

Republicans have reportedly amassed a [$20 million](https://www.vox.com/2020/5/8/21251839/vote-by-mail-voting-laws-republicans-costs-supreme-court) war chest for use in challenging state efforts to expand access to the polls due to the coronavirus. So far, multiple suits are already pending across the country over whether Americans should be able to vote by mail or instead risk their health by braving the physical polls during the pandemic. In [Texas](https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/27/texas-vote-by-mail-coronavirus/), the state supreme court recently sided with Republican attorney general Ken Paxton in ruling that “a voter’s lack of immunity to Covid-19, without more, is not a ‘disability’” that justifies voting by mail.

Although the success of such suits under various states’ laws is uncertain, what is certain is that litigation takes time, and as those lawsuits wend way their way through the court system, measures designed to make voting more accessible in the midst of the coronavirus health crisis could be put on hold through Election Day. Tying up expanded voting measures in court through the fall is itself a win if the goal is to minimize the number of people who cast ballots in November—people whom Trump fans believe will most likely vote against him and in favor of his presumptive opponent, Joe Biden.

### 1AR—PDB

#### Permutation do both—shields the link to the net benefit because Trump is seen as following states, destroying a potential rallying point.

### 1AR—Links to the Net Benefit

#### Links to the net benefit—CP increases voter turnout exactly the same amount as the affirmative because states rule on federal elections.

#### Links to the net benefit— Compacts need presidential and congressional approval –

Adam Winkler 11, is Professor of Law at UCLA and a specialist in American constitutional law. His scholarship has been cited and quoted in landmark Supreme Court cases. He also received a master’s degree in political science from UCLA. “Healthcare Opponents’ Latest Effort to Circumvent the Constitution: Interstate Compacts.” 2011. <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/republicans-latest-effort_b_833956.html>

[Interstate compacts](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstate_compact) are commonplace contractual agreements that states use to handle regional problems. They are used to establish agencies and rules for transportation systems that traverse state lines (like the Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in and around D.C.), waterways between states (like the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey), and any number of other multi-state issues, from environmental protection to waste disposal to cross-border adoption. Such agreements are perfectly legitimate. In fact, the Constitution itself envisions them. Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” If Congress consents, therefore, states may enter into binding contracts with other states. [Health care opponents](http://www.texaspolicy.com/press_releases_single.php?report_id=3574) are encouraging states to enter into a [compact](http://www.healthcarecompact.org/) that would exempt them and their residents from the demands of the Affordable Care Act, especially the requirement that most individuals have insurance. Yet such a compact faces the same insurmountable hurdle as the House Republicans’ repeal effort back in January. Any such compact would need to be signed by the president. Backers of the health care compact argue that because the “Interstate Compact Clause” only speaks of consent of “Congress,” approval only requires a vote by the House and the Senate. The law, they say, does not need to be submitted to the president. Perhaps they didn’t read all of the Constitution. The “Presentment Clause” of Article I, section 7 mandates that “Every Bill” and “Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary... shall be presented to the President of the United States” for his signature. In 1983, the Supreme Court in a case called [*INS v. Chadha*](http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0462_0919_ZO.html) held that every act of Congress that has “the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons” is required to be presented to president. (The only exception is a constitutional amendment, which must have the support of 2/3ds of both houses of Congress — the same number required to override a president’s veto, making the executive’s approval irrelevant.) The health care compact is clearly designed to alter people’s legal rights and duties, such as eliminating the legal obligation to have health insurance. Other than a judicial ruling that a law is unconstitutional, the only vald way to reverse a federal law is by legislation passed by both houses of Congress and presented to the president. As the Court explained in *Chadha*, “Presentment to the President and the Presidential veto were considered so imperative that the draftsmen took special pains to assure that these requirements could not be circumvented.” And yet Republicans, who have made such [a grand show lately of their allegiance to the Constitution](http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/us_house_constitution), are now seeking to circumvent those requirements. So much for following the original intent of the Framers. Historical practice also indicates that presidential approval is necessary. Compacts have long been submitted to the president for his signature. Indeed, President Franklin Roosevelt twice vetoed congressional acts consenting to interstate compacts. Ironically, supporters of the health care compact may be subtly undermining their allies’ effort to overturn the health care law in court. The court cases assert that the law was beyond Congress’s limited powers under the Constitution. Yet the Supreme Court held in [one landmark case on interstate compacts](http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?friend=nytimes&navby=volpage&court=us&vol=449&page=449) that congressional approval is only required where “the subject matter of the agreement is an appropriate subject for congressional legislation.” Compact proponents, who have repeatedly said that Congress must give its consent to the health care compact, are basically conceding that the health care law was within Congress’s authority.

### 1AR—PDCP

#### Permutation do the Counterplan—normal means = decentralized, state administration.

#### Congressional Research Service 19 [Congressional Research Service, works exclusively for the United States congress providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation, “The State and local Role in Election Administration: Duties and Structures, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45549.pdf>[ JJ

The administration of elections in the United States is highly decentralized. Elections are primarily administered by thousands of state and local systems rather than a single, unified national system. States and localities share responsibility for most election administration duties. Exactly how responsibilities are assigned at the state and local levels varies both between and within states, but there are some general patterns in the distribution of duties. States typically have primary responsibility for making decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking). Localities typically have primary responsibility for conducting elections in accordance with those rules (implementation). Localities, with varying contributions from states, typically also have primary responsibility for paying for the activities and resources required to conduct elections (funding).

### 1AR—Theory

#### 50 States CP is a voting issue—moots 6 minutes of the 1AC by coopting the aff and skirts discussions away from the core controversy of compulsory voting good/bad towards a federal/state debate, destroying topic education.

## 1AR—Automatic Voter Registration

### 1AR—Solvency Deficit

#### [Partisanship] Can’t solve partisanship—the people who would vote in the CP are those who are interested in politics but slightly busy, recreating the same cycles of ideological extremism.

#### [Civic Engagement] Can’t solve civic engagement—

#### 1] 1AC champan indicates that civic engagement only happens when voting is obligatory because citizens now see themselves as political agents fulfilling their duties.

#### 2] Meta-level studies indicate that alternative policies focused on accessibility or turnout rather than a cultural change cannot access long-term voter turnout.

#### 3] Unless there is universal participation, marginalized voters have an adverse reaction towards civic engagement because of perceived incompetency.

#### 4] Universal participation in elections uniquely mobilizes a sense of unity towards a common purpose.

#### Decades of trends indicate automatic registration has negligible effect on turnout.

**Berinsky 16** [Adam Berinsky, Mitsui Professor of Political Science at MIT and serves as the director of the MIT political experiments research lab, he is also the author of the 2004 book Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America and the 2009 book in Time of War; Understanding Public Opinion from World war II to Iraq, <https://ssir.org/articles/entry/making_voting_easier_doesnt_increase_turnout>, “Making voting Easier Doesn’t Increase Turnout.” ] JJ

A brief survey of some of these studies paints a clear picture. Two different [research](http://apr.sagepub.com/content/27/3/296.full.pdf) [teams](http://apr.sagepub.com/content/34/4/479.full.pdf) concluded that the Motor-Voter Act did not change turnout rates in the United States. Likewise, making the act of voting easier does not seem to have increased turnout rates consistently. My research with political scientists Nancy Burns and Michael Traugott [found](https://poq.oxfordjournals.org/content/65/2/178.abstract) that VBM increased turnout slightly in Oregon. But political scientists Thad Kousser and Megan Mullin conclude that VBM actually decreased turnout in California. In a similar vein, political scientist Barry Burden and his colleagues have [argued](http://ajps.org/2014/01/18/barry-burden-early-voting-is-convenient-but-decreases-overall-turnout/) that early voting thwarts traditional mobilization activities, thereby counteracting any gains that could rise from lowering the direct costs of voting. The balance of evidence is clear: lowering the direct costs of voting does little if anything to increase turnout.

#### Very few people report that registration as the cause for not voting.

**Schwalenberg 18** [[Lianna Schwalenberg, Journalist at the badger Herald reporting on political especially election trends, “To increase voter turnout, don’t look to automatic voter registration,” <https://badgerherald.com/opinion/2018/10/03/to-increase-voter-turnout-dont-look-to-automatic-voter-registration/>] JJ

The problem with this argument is that it doesn’t guarantee that more people will vote. Registering to vote will get easier, but it will only make more people register to vote. The argument assumes people do not vote because it is inconvenient to do so. In fact, according to surveys conducted by the[Pew Research Center](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/06/01/dislike-of-candidates-or-campaign-issues-was-most-common-reason-for-not-voting-in-2016/), 25 percent of registered voters said the reason they did not vote in 2016 was that they didn’t like the candidates or campaign issues, while only 4 percent said registration problems.

### 1AR

## 1AR—Conscientious Voter PIC

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### [Partisanship] Can’t solve partisanship—once attending the ballot box Is seen as optional, people will be less incentivized to come out and circumvent compulsory voting.

#### [Civic Engagement] Can’t solve universal democratic engagement—plan is comparatively better because 1] it gives the signal that it is every citizen’s obligation to at least participate but 2] it empowers marginalized groups who know that there are millions like them engaged within the system.

**Engelen 07** [Bart Engelen, moral and political philosopher affiliated with the Tilburg Centre for ethics and Philosophy of Science, research is situated on the borders between ethics, political philosophy, and economics, “Why Compulsory Voting can Enhance Democracy,”] JJ

Abstention is a form of free-riding behavior: although there are benefits if everybody votes, the individual abstainer gives in to the incentive to abstain. However, this is not universalizable: if everybody reasons this way, nobody will participate and the democratic system will lose its legitimacy and ultimately disappear. Compelling citizens to participate makes voting more rational for the individual, thereby preventing free-riding and securing the valuable existence of the democratic state. This is true for several other duties, all of which contribute to upholding the three branches of a modern state. Citizens have to pay taxes to preserve the continuity of the state as a whole, including the executive power. They have to respect the law and serve in juries to preserve the continuity of the judicial power. Analogously, they have to participate in elections to preserve the continuity of the legislative power. To avoid the Bart Engelen Why Compulsory Voting Can Enhance Democracy 30 Acta Politica 2007 42 totalitarian tendency of solving all free-rider problems by means of state compulsion, I have emphasized the importance of democracy and its values.

### 1AR—PDCP

#### Not a single polity doesn’t allow exemptions—normal means

**Birch 08 [**Sarah Birch, department of political economy in 2016 as professor of political science, as well as director of research, “A comparative study of compulsory voting,”] JJ

No polity has full compulsory electoral participation, strictly speaking, because all make exceptions for people in certain circumstances. Exemptions fall into two categories: exclusions from the right to participate and exclusions from the legal obligation to participate

#### Normal means--Compulsory voting means the Australia model---and fines.

Jane **Mbah 19**. Department of Private and Public Law Faculty of Law, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu University Anambra State, Nigeria, “Making a Case for Compulsory Voting in Nigeria,” International Journal of Academic Research and Reflection, Vol. 7, No. 1. 2019

Mandatory voting is a system in which voters are obliged to vote in elections or attend a polling place on voting day. If an eligible voter does not attend a polling place, or lodge a postal vote, he or she may be subject to a penalty such as fines or community service. There are many countries that have been implementing mandatory voting system. Australia is known to have operated this system for a century now. The Australian law mandates every citizen aged 18 years and above to vote in all elections. This has secured the participation of at least 94% of the eligible citizens in their electoral process unlike the United States of America that recorded only 57% turn out in their last Presidential election1. This does not mean however that all the citizens of the country are happy with the compulsory requirement for their participation. Although many countries such as the United Kingdom are indicating the possibility of adopting Australian model in making voting mandatory, some Australians argue that compulsory voting requirement stifles political freedom and threatens the basic principles of democracy. In the words of Jason Kent, a renowned opponent: "People have been sentenced to jail terms for not voting. It's disgusting. It's far from being democratic. We are not a democracy if we can't vote democratically”.2 Mr. Kent further argues: "High voter turnout is a myth when you consider that 10% of Australians are not even registered. When that myth is debunked, I think you'll see a dramatic shift in public perception of compulsory voting".3 . He believes that the so celebrated is not the total number of eligible voters but a percentage of registered voters and that if voters were allowed to vote voluntarily, it would be easier to hold the politicians accountable. "If voting was democratic, politicians would be beholden to the voters, they couldn't hold a gun to our heads and force us to vote, they'd have to give us a good reason to vote. They'd have to inspire us”.4

#### Permutation do the counterplan—the plan allows for exemptions for conscientious voters.

**CBC Radio 19** [CBC Radio, Canada’s top radio destination for news, current affairs, and arts and cultural programming that is distinctly Canadian, “In Australia, voting is mandatory, easy and often fun. Is there a lesson for Canada?” <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/mandatory-voting-canada-s-weediversary-fighting-alongside-the-kurds-atwood-archives-dolly-parton-more-1.5324795/in-australia-voting-is-mandatory-easy-and-often-fun-is-there-a-lesson-for-canada-1.5324822>”] JJ

The right to not vote would ensure eligible voters, including some Indigenous people who conscientiously object to the federal government, have a legal exemption.

In Australia, those who skip the vote must provide a reason for their absence — sickness, religious exemption or conscientious objection are all accepted — or pay a small fine, typically amounting to less than $20.

A similar model could work in Canada, Pal says, adding that any penalties must be low to ensure voters who simply couldn't make it out aren't unduly burdened.

### 1AR—No link

#### No link to privacy violation—people can submit a blank ballot.

Frances Jenner 19. Currently a writer at Latin America Reports and is based in Medellín, Colombia, covering violence, minority rights and politics. She has lived in Vietnam, Spain and France, and her work has been published on The Next Web, The Bogota Post and Sapiens Magazine. “Does obligatory voting strengthen democracy or violate its ideals?” Latin America Reports. November 14, 2019. <https://latinamericareports.com/obligatory-voting-strengthen-democracy-violate-ideals/3726/>, RJP

What are the advantages of compulsory voting?

Obligatory voting increases voter turnout. In theory, this would encourage people from lower socio-economic backgrounds to participate, resulting in a government selection process that better represents the population.

In practice, forcing people to go to the ballots does not force them to vote. For individuals who do not wish to vote for any candidate, they can submit an empty envelope (blank vote) or a voting paper that is invalid in some way (spoiled vote), which can either be accidental or intentional. This may appear counterproductive, but in fact it supplies the country with important data, said Ben Raderstorf, a non-resident fellow at inter-American think tank The Dialogue in conversation with Latin America Reports.

### 1AR—Theory

#### PICs are a voting issue – they steal aff offense and restart the debate in the 1AR, shifting debates from core literature towards the margins by letting them pick the most desirable slice of offense in the resolution – reading it as a disad solves content education, but the PIC artificially inflates the worth of a bad net benefit

## 1AR—Holiday CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### [Partisanship] Can’t solve partisanship—the people who would vote in the CP are those who are interested in politics but slightly busy, recreating the same cycles of ideological extremism.

#### [Civic Engagement] Can’t solve civic engagement—

#### 1] 1AC champan indicates that civic engagement only happens when voting is obligatory because citizens now see themselves as political agents fulfilling their duties.

#### 2] Meta-level studies indicate that alternative policies focused on accessibility or turnout rather than a cultural change cannot access long-term voter turnout.

#### 3] Unless there is universal participation, marginalized voters have an adverse reaction towards civic engagement because of perceived incompetency.

#### 4] Universal participation in elections uniquely mobilizes a sense of unity towards a common purpose.

### 1AR—Inequality DA

#### CP exacerbates an unequal demographic by a) burdening service employees and b) only solving for wealthy people’s problems.

**Nwanevu 16** [Osita Nwanevu, Slate staff writer, former intern at Harper’s magazine, slate, the Chicago Reader, NPR, and In These Tiems, Editor-in chief of the south side weekly, an alternative week covering the south side of Chicago, senior editor at the New Islander, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/11/an-election-day-holiday-might-not-increase-turnout-studies-demonstrate.html>, “Maybe Making Election Day a National Holiday Wouldn’t really work] JJ

He’s right, of course, but it’s not clear that making Election Day a federal holiday would be a desirable or effective solution to our dismal turnout record. As Inc.’s Suzanne Lucas [pointed out](http://www.inc.com/suzanne-lucas/no-election-day-should-not-be-a-federal-holiday.html) recently, a federal holiday would actually burden many retail and service employees at the kinds of workplaces that don’t shut down for federal holidays:

Retail. Restaurants. Hospitals. Smaller businesses that can’t afford to lose a day of revenue, and if they do, they certainly can’t afford to pay people for the time off.

What does that mean? If you make election day a federal holiday, you’ll have all the people who work in these types of jobs still having to work, being inundated with customers who have the day off and [they won’t have child care because the schools will be closed](http://www.inc.com/suzanne-lucas/the-very-best-preparation-for-business-ownership-raising-8-kids.html).

The question of who would benefit from an Election Day holiday is further complicated by looking more closely at the Census Bureau’s data on nonvoters. In 2014, registered voters from households making more than $150,000 a year were the most likely to say they were too busy to head to the polls—more than 35 percent of them claimed so, while none of the income brackets less than $40,000 had more than 25 percent of respondents report they were too busy. Unsurprisingly, lower-income nonvoters are more likely than wealthier nonvoters to cite illness and disability or trouble getting to the polls as problems. Wealthier nonvoters, less impeded by these kinds of challenges, say they have mostly their schedules to blame. Given this, an Election Day holiday would remove a significant barrier to participation for relatively well-to-do potential voters while doing little to make voting easier for a significant number of less privileged ones.

### 1AR—Voter Turnout

#### Meta-level regressive analysis between 13 states indicates there is no correlation between holiday voting and turnout.

**Henry S. Farber 09** [[Increasing voter turnout: Is democracy Day the Answer? Professor at Princeton University, this paper was written for the industrial relations section, <https://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp01dn39x153g/1/546.pdf> ] JJ

My analysis, which is similar in spirit to WFM, exploits the fact that 13 states grant state employees election day (some in even years only) as a paid holiday. The test I present is intuitive and is based on the “natural experiment” of some states having this policy of granting state employees an election day holiday. Using data from voting supplements to the Current Population Survey in November 2004 and 2006, I compare voter turnout among state employees in the “holiday” states to voter turnout among state employees in non-holiday states. In order to allow for unmeasured differences across states in voter turnout common to 2 all voters, I use non-state employees (both private sector and other public sector) as control groups in a difference-in-difference framework. The results are clear-cut. Granting workers the day off does not increase voter turnout.

## 1AR—Natives CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficit

#### Rollback is a massive solvency deficit—native people are not unique—people of color will also want exemptions once there are carveouts. This is why universal participation is necessary—chapman 18.

### 1AR—No link

#### The link differential is tiny—they coopt allowing the federal government strengthen its primacy and state power as well—evaluate through SOL.

### 1AR—PDCP

#### Permutation do the cp/no link to net benefit—the plan allows for exemptions for conscientious voters.

**CBC Radio 19** [CBC Radio, Canada’s top radio destination for news, current affairs, and arts and cultural programming that is distinctly Canadian, “In Australia, voting is mandatory, easy and often fun. Is there a lesson for Canada?” <https://www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/mandatory-voting-canada-s-weediversary-fighting-alongside-the-kurds-atwood-archives-dolly-parton-more-1.5324795/in-australia-voting-is-mandatory-easy-and-often-fun-is-there-a-lesson-for-canada-1.5324822>”] JJ

The right to not vote would ensure eligible voters, including some Indigenous people who conscientiously object to the federal government, have a legal exemption.

In Australia, those who skip the vote must provide a reason for their absence — sickness, religious exemption or conscientious objection are all accepted — or pay a small fine, typically amounting to less than $20.

A similar model could work in Canada, Pal says, adding that any penalties must be low to ensure voters who simply couldn't make it out aren't unduly burdened.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### Federal government should not have jurisdiction over who’s native—normal means = blood quantum that wishes natives out of existence.

#### Martin and Treuer 12 [Michel Martin, Weekend host of *All Things Considered,* Anton Treuer, American academic and author specializing in the Ojibwe language and American Indian studies. Professor of Ojibwe at Bemidji State University, Minnesota and a 2008 Guggenheim] JJ

Well, most of the 571 federally recognized reservations in the United States use blood quantum as the primary criteria for determining who can be a citizen of that native nation. What it is is it's an old-fashioned term for a proven percentage of native blood.

MARTIN: From your book, you say that blood quantum is the percentage of a person's racial lineage that can be documented as Indian.

TREUER: Right.

MARTIN: Blood quantum was first used in Virginia in the 18th century to restrict the rights of people with half or more native ancestry. And by the 1930s, the federal government and many tribes were using blood quantum to determine who was eligible for tribal citizenship. So you can see where I think in the modern world this would be pretty controversial. Has anybody suggested that that's not appropriate anymore?

TREUER: Yes. And I'd be the first of the people to suggest that that is no longer appropriate. I don't think it ever really was. The system was designed in the late 1800s but further refined in the early 1900s, and this was the height of the eugenics movement and so forth. And really, the system was designed to kind of have native people breed themselves out of existence and it was really a highly flawed measure.

#### Civic duty voting can redress racial inequalities and increaser representation by reducing voter suppression.

**Dionne Jr. 20** [E.J. Dionne Jr., senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a syndicated columnist for the Washington Post, and University Professor in the Foundations of Democracy and culture at Georgetown University, “Universal Voting: Your questions, our answers, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/08/06/universal-voting-your-questions-our-answers/>] JJ

Universal civic duty voting would also help ensure increased political participation in communities of color that have long confronted exclusion from our democracy. With the reforms that would necessarily accompany it, civic duty voting would permanently block voter suppression measures. The reprehensible police killing of George Floyd shocked the conscience of the nation and forced its attention to entrenched racial injustice. Floyd’s death, and those of Rayshard Brooks and Breonna Taylor, called forth large-scale protests around the country against police violence that has long been an enraging fact-of-life in Black neighborhoods. The new movement is demanding a thoroughgoing overhaul of policing but also a larger confrontation with racism. The demand for equal treatment has been reinforced by unequal suffering during a pandemic whose costs to health, life, and economic well-being have been borne disproportionately by communities of color. Voting rights, equal participation, and an end to exclusion from the tables of power are essential not only for securing reform, but also for creating the democratic conditions that would make social change durable. Police brutality, as an expression of systemic racism, is not merely about how Americans are policed but whose voices are heard on policing. Universal voting could amplify long-suppressed voices so that long-denied solutions to systemic racism are represented in the voting booth and enacted in legislatures. “Give us the ballot,” Martin Luther King Jr. declared in 1957, “and we will transform the salient misdeeds of bloodthirsty mobs into the calculated good deeds of orderly citizens.”5 As our nation opens its mind and its heart to forms of social reconstruction that were far removed from the public agenda only months ago, we believe that transformative adjustments to our voting system are now in order.

## 1AR—Lottery CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### [Civic Engagement] Can’t solve civic engagement—

#### 1] 1AC champan indicates that civic engagement only happens when voting is obligatory because citizens now see themselves as political agents fulfilling their duties.

#### 2] Meta-level studies indicate that alternative policies focused on accessibility or turnout rather than a cultural change cannot access long-term voter turnout.

#### 3] Unless there is universal participation, marginalized voters have an adverse reaction towards civic engagement because of perceived incompetency.

#### 4] Universal participation in elections uniquely mobilizes a sense of unity towards a common purpose.

#### [Civic Engagement] Can’t solve civic engagement—The plan spurs a culture of political engagement which the CP can’t access because it relies on external, not intrinsic motivators.

**The Times Editorial Board 15** [Sewell Chan, graduated from Harvard with a degree in social studies and received a master’s degree in politics from Oxford, Jon Healey, Kerry Caganaugh, Mariel Garza, <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-voteria-vote-to-win-cash-lottery-20150421-story.html>, “Editorial: Vote and win $2500: It’s a losing idea] JJ

Frustrated by the appallingly low turnout in local elections, the nonprofit Southwest Voter Registration Education Project is planning a cash lottery — or [voteria](https://svrep.org/voteria/rules.php) — to get voters to the polls for the Los Angeles Board of Education District 5 race. Anyone who legitimately casts a ballot in the May 19 contest between incumbent Bennett Kayser and challenger Ref Rodriguez will be automatically entered into the drawing. After the election is certified, the group will randomly select one person from the voting pool.

The winner gets $25,000. The losers are the people who still believe in the integrity of the democratic process.

This gimmick perverts the motivation to vote. It demeans the value of voting. And it’s the most superficial pseudo-solution to a very real problem in Los Angeles, which is the pervasive civic malaise that prevents so many eligible voters from feeling truly engaged. In fact, the voteria only underscores the cynical view that people don’t care about their local government anymore and the only way to get them to vote is to bribe them.

#### [Civic Engagement] Turn—The CP worsens democratic deliberation by cheapening the process of voting.

**Duffy and Matros 11** [John Duffy, professor at the University of Pittsburgh, Alexander Matros, University of South Carolina and Lancaster University Management School, “On the Use of Fines and Lottery Prizes to Increase Voter Turnout, <http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~duffy/papers/EB-14-V34-I2-P89.pdf>] JJ

The use of prizes to lure voters to the polls has been implemented in a municipal election in Norway in 1995 and in a parliamentary election in Bulgaria in 2005 with mixed results regarding turnout. In the U.S. a $1 million turnout lottery was proposed but voted down in Arizona in 2006 (Archibald (2006), Ornstein (2012)).

Opponents of using lottery prizes to increase turnout argue that voting is a “civic duty” that would be cheapened by awarding a price for voting and that those likely to be enticed to show up to vote only by the addition of a lottery prize would be unlikely to acquire information about the issues or candidates that were on the ballot.

#### [Voter Turnout] The CP can’t solve partisanship because politicians have political incentive to campaign in unequal ways under a lottery system, reinforcing ideological extremism.

**Pinsker 14** [Joe Pinsker, Senior staff writer at *The Atlantic,* mainly covering electoral politics and relationships, <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/08/would-the-chance-at-a-cash-prize-get-more-people-to-vote/378800/>, “Would the Chance at a Cash Prize Get More People to vote?”

A voting lottery might increase turnout, but to Schwartz, that’s beside the point. For one thing, he believes that such a program “virtually guarantees” that the people who turn out to vote will be less informed than the group that currently votes. On top of that, he says, “the money that corrupts the entire political system will be used to assure that some people are more likely to know about cash-for-voting than others.”

Pedro Noguera, another critic of cash-for-grades programs and a professor at New York University, says that a lottery wouldn’t be enough to overcome the belief, held by many, that voting can't change one's life. He thinks we’d be better off with anything that lowers the barriers to voting—for example, providing citizens with multiple days on which they can vote.

Democracy may be a series of experiments, but this one seems less auspicious than most. The prospect of winning thousands of dollars might well coax out a number of apathetic Angelenos, but if there’s anything to be learned from [the current state of campaign financing](http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/25/crooked-dead), it’s that we should probably be supporting initiatives that would extract money from politics—not initiatives that inject more into it.

#### [Voter Turnout] Even if financial incentives can increase turnout, a lottery system would not be able to.

**Alter 15** [Charlotte Alter, national correspondent for TIME, she covers politics, youth activism, “Philadelphia Residents Could win $10,000 for voting, <https://time.com/4085367/philadelphia-voting-lottery/> ] JJ

According to a 2013 study by Fordham University professor Costas Panagopoulos published in the [Journal of Politics,](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8820778&fileId=S0022381612001016) small incentives don’t really change voters’ minds, but voter turnout can dramatically increase if there is more money on the table. Panagopoulos found that mailing voters $2 barely increased their likelihood to vote, but mailing them $10 or $25 made them significantly more likely to turn up at the poles. But he also wrote that lottery incentives, like the $1 million lottery proposed in Arizona in 2006 but rejected by voters, likely wouldn’t work because it ends up amounting to only 50 cents per voter.

### **1AR—Illegal**

#### The CP is illegal under federal elections—gets rollbacked.

**Alter 15** [Charlotte Alter, national correspondent for TIME, she covers politics, youth activism, “Philadelphia Residents Could win $10,000 for voting, <https://time.com/4085367/philadelphia-voting-lottery/> ] JJ

It’s illegal under federal law to pay for turnout when there is a federal candidate on the ballot, but when there’s no federal candidate the election rules are up to the state, explains Richard L. Hasen, a professor at U.C. Irvine School of Law specializing in election law. Further, Pennsylvania’s bribery statute only outlaws payments for voting for a particular candidate, not payment for voting in general, according to Adam Bonin, a Philadelphia lawyer who specializes in campaign law compliance, meaning the *Citizen*should be fine on legal grounds.

What about that famous “I Voted” sticker, given out as a reward for punching your ballot nationwide? While it’s illegal to provide incentives for voting in federal elections, those stickers are allowed because they’re considered too minor to truly incentivize anything. “You’re not voting because you can get a sticker out of it,” says Bonin. “But it is illegal to say, ‘come in with your ‘I Voted’ sticker and Starbucks will give you a free coffee.”

## 1AR—Weekend CPs

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### [Partisanship] Can’t solve partisanship—the people who would vote in the CP are those who are interested in politics but slightly busy, recreating the same cycles of ideological extremism.

#### [Civic Engagement] Can’t solve civic engagement—

#### 1] 1AC champan indicates that civic engagement only happens when voting is obligatory because citizens now see themselves as political agents fulfilling their duties.

#### 2] Meta-level studies indicate that alternative policies focused on accessibility or turnout rather than a cultural change cannot access long-term voter turnout.

#### 3] Unless there is universal participation, marginalized voters have an adverse reaction towards civic engagement because of perceived incompetency.

#### 4] Universal participation in elections uniquely mobilizes a sense of unity towards a common purpose.

#### CP can’t meaningfully increase voter turnout—national trends prove.

**Nwanevu 16** [Osita Nwanevu, Slate staff writer, former intern at Harper’s magazine, slate, the Chicago Reader, NPR, and In These Tiems, Editor-in chief of the south side weekly, an alternative week covering the south side of Chicago, senior editor at the New Islander, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/11/an-election-day-holiday-might-not-increase-turnout-studies-demonstrate.html>, “Maybe Making Election Day a National Holiday Wouldn’t really work] JJ

For instance, moving Election Day to a weekend, which would also remove work as an obstacle for many, is commonly supported on the grounds that most countries with weekend voting have higher turnout rates than the U.S. But [an analysis of voter turnout in democracies since 1945](https://books.google.com/books?id=plYRx0sFT-cC&pg=PA15&lpg=PA15&dq=weekend+voting+turnout&source=bl&ots=piiIVZxPji&sig=PI3sZNyCFpjvIwpJplEDluLyiDY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjWh6b7jorQAhWj24MKHfnoBLc4ChDoAQgsMAM#v=onepage&q=weekend%20voting%20turnout&f) determined that while countries with weekend voting do tend to have higher turnout than the U.S., adopting weekend voting hasn’t actually increased turnout within countries that have it. For what it’s worth, America’s turnout rate in 2012—53.6 percent of the voting-age population—was [roughly the same or higher](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/02/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/) than recent turnout rates in a few countries with weekend voting including Poland (53.8 percent in 2015) and Japan (52 percent in 2014). [Switzerland](http://katieandkay.com/switzerland/how-to-vote-in-switzerland/), despite weekend voting, the mailing of ballots to all citizens, and the availability of online voting in some jurisdictions, has the lowest voter turnout rate in the developed world—38.6 percent. For many there and elsewhere, election weekend is just another weekend. Similarly, there’s nothing that would stop voters here from treating a Democracy Day like just another day off.

### 1AR—Too Difficult

#### Weekend voting is an administrative hassle, creating worker shortage and cost nightmares.

**Simon 12** [Richard Simon, covered the California congressional delegation and other issues on Capitol Hill until 2014 in the LA times, <https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2012/01/moving-the-election-from-tuesday-to-weekends-faces-challenges-government-report-says-.html>, “Shifting Election day to weekend poses problems, report says”] JJ

A GAO survey of election officials, however, found concerns about the challenge and cost of securing ballots and voting equipment over the Saturday night of a weekend election.

Recruiting polling workers could be another problem.

"Election officials in one local jurisdiction said that about one-fourth of their approximately 23,000 poll workers for the 2010 general election were county employees and students. A weekend election would essentially end the incentives -- paying county employees their salary and excusing students from classes -- that the jurisdiction successfully used in the past to attract them to work at the polls on a Tuesday when they would normally be at work or at school," the report says.

#### Lack of poll workers ensures decrease in democratic norms and administrative hassles which deck voter turnout.

**Vasilogambros 18** [Matt Vasilogambros, writes about immigration and voting rights for Stateline. Before joining Pew, he was a writer and editor at the Atlantic, where he covered national politics and demographics. Previously he was a staff correspondent at National Journal and has written for Outside. He is a graduate of Drake University, “FEw people want to be poll workers, and that’s a problem, <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/10/22/few-people-want-to-be-poll-workers-and-thats-a-problem>] JJ

Local election officials are dealing with a myriad of issues ahead of November’s contentious midterms, not least of which is securing systems from malicious actors. One lesser-known problem that continues to concern them is the national shortage of poll workers.

They greet you at the plastic folding table set up in your neighborhood’s library, church or fire station, asking you for your name, address and, depending on your state, photo ID before handing you a ballot or directing you to a voting machine. More than just glorified receptionists, these underpaid few are really the gatekeepers to democracy.

Poll workers can be the difference between a smooth election and long lines, mass confusion and miscounted ballots.

## 1AR—Universal Mail-In CP

### 1AR—Solvency Deficits

#### [Partisanship] Can’t solve partisanship—the people who would vote in the CP are those who are interested in politics but have slight accessibility issues, which replicates ideological extremism.

#### [Civic Engagement] Can’t solve civic engagement—

#### 1] 1AC champan indicates that civic engagement only happens when voting is obligatory because citizens now see themselves as political agents fulfilling their duties.

#### 2] Meta-level studies indicate that alternative policies focused on accessibility or turnout rather than a cultural change cannot access long-term voter turnout.

#### 3] Unless there is mandatory universal punishment, marginalized voters have an adverse reaction towards civic engagement because of perceived incompetency.

#### Making voting easier cannot solve voter turnout.

### 1AR—Voter Fraud

#### ] Universal Mail doesn’t work— it opens us up to more voter fraud and lost ballots, historical instances prove

Miller 4/11 – “More than 16M mail-in ballots went missing from 2016 and 2018 elections: Report“; April 11, 2020; <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/more-than-16-million-mail-in-ballots-went-missing-from-2016-and-2018-elections-report> Ad+

Roughly 16 million mail-in ballots ended up missing in the 2016 and 2018 elections, according to federal data.

Data from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission and the Election Administration and Voting Surveys for both the 2016 and 2018 elections show that 16.4 million ballots that were sent to registered voters by mail went missing, according to Breitbart News.

In the 2018 election, about 42.4 million ballots were mailed to registered voters. Of those mailed, more than 1 million were undeliverable, more than 430,000 were rejected, and nearly 10.5 million went missing.

“Putting the election in the hands of the United States Postal Service would be a catastrophe,” J. Christian Adams, president of the Public Interest Legal Foundation, said. “In 2018 and 2016, there were 16 million missing and misdirected ballots.”

“These represent 16 million opportunities for someone to cheat," Adams said. "Absentee ballot fraud is the most common, the most expensive to investigate, and can never be reversed after an election. The status quo was already bad for mail balloting. The proposed emergency fix is worse.”

The problem was especially bad in California, where 1.4 million mail-in ballots went missing in Los Angeles County alone during the 2018 election. In Orange County, the number was 374,000. The California counties of San Diego, Sacramento, Riverside, San Bernardino, Alameda, and Santa Clara combined for 1.6 million missing ballots.

Several states are debating whether to hold primary elections in person or to switch to an all mail-in ballot system to quell the spread of the coronavirus.

Earlier this month, the Public Interest Legal Foundation determined that there are thousands of ineligible voters, including many dead people, on the voter rolls in New Mexico who could receive mail-in ballots.

# F/L—Disadvantages

## 1AR—Elections DA

### 1AR—Impact Calculus

#### Primacy solves all the proximate impacts—

#### Loss of US Hegemony turns your impacts—

### 1AR—Impact D (Warming)

#### Dem victory doesn’t solve climate change – policy inertia and GOP control of the Senate and SCOTUS block any action

Goldwyn 20 [David L. Goldwyn, chairman of the Energy Advisory Group and a non-resident senior energy fellow at the Atlantic Council, January 9, 2020. “Regardless of who is president in 2020, climate change will be at the bottom of the US agenda.” <https://www.euronews.com/2020/01/09/regardless-of-who-is-president-in-2020-climate-change-will-be-at-the-bottom-view>] JJ

A new Democratic president, on the other hand, will likely face a Republican Senate and a conservative Supreme Court. Both will act as limits on new legislation and expansive interpretation of existing authorities (such as those under the Clean Air and Water Acts). For these reasons, the major overarching challenges facing the US (and indeed global) energy markets will, regrettably, remain unresolved. Whichever administration takes office in January 2021, it will not be able to solve the systemic energy transition puzzle that has bedevilled policy makers (and their increasingly angry constituents) the world over. The forces of inertia will limit both the ability of a Trump administration to dismiss climate change and that of a Democratic administration to address it. A rational course would see policymakers consider both a national climate policy and a just energy transition that embraces necessary new infrastructure of all types, while addressing the economic impacts of that transition on all sectors. That pathway is not yet in sight in 2020. As the calendar turns to 2021, volatility in markets and politics remains the only certainty.z

#### Paris fails and gives false hope, which makes fighting climate change impossible.

Beslik, helped create the Paris accord, ’19 (Sasja, international financial expert, HeadOfSustainableFinance@Nordea, <https://medium.com/in-search-of-leverage/5-reasons-why-the-paris-agreement-is-a-joke-and-how-we-can-fix-it-4b636409bb05>, March 18) BW

The Paris climate agreement is a joke. And I should know — I was there when it was drafted. Three and a half years ago, I was one of the hundreds of politicians and heads of industry who convened in Paris with a singular goal: Devise a plan to combat global warming and avoid a global environmental disaster. We quickly realised that doing so would require an international public works project the scale of which the world has never seen. The political leaders deliberated for a month about to how to accomplish such a momentous feat, with myself and the other financial professionals in attendance offering guidance. The group eventually settled on a wide-ranging pledge to reduce carbon emissions, invest in sustainable energy and minimise any further damage to the environment. The agreement was signed by 195 countries and was quickly celebrated as a historic achievement. The climate crisis has been averted, people thought at the time. Nonsense. Many of my colleagues and I insisted the stipulations in the agreement weren’t strict enough to stave off the effects of global warming, but our pleas were ignored, and the agreement was passed anyway. The result is a hollow accord that, despite its perception, does nothing to address the existential threat of climate change. In fact, it all but assures the destruction of the world and mass human tragedy. To be more specific: 1. The carbon emission goals are not nearly ambitious enough. The overall goal in the Paris Agreement — to keep global warming “well below 2 degrees Celsius” — is ambitious. The problem is that the nationally determined contributions (the commitments) are not. Scientists predict that, even if the countries in the Paris Agreement honor their carbon reduction commitments, the Earth’s temperature will increase by 3 degrees Celsius by the end of century compared to pre-industrial levels. Climatologists have long said that just a 2 degree increase will cause a worldwide catastrophe. The participating countries need to significantly increase their individual carbon reduction efforts. 2. The agreement doesn’t include a global tax on carbon. If recent history has taught us anything, it’s that fear of global disaster isn’t enough to change people’s behaviour. Money always moves the needle, however. In terms of global warming, that means instituting a global tax on carbon. Without a carbon tax, there is no financial incentive for countries to stop using cheap fossil fuels and transition to more sustainable sources (which means countries will never do it). 3. There’s no way to punish countries that don’t honor the agreement. One of Donald Trump’s first acts as United States president was to leave the Paris Agreement. The tragedy isn’t that the U.S. will no longer honor the accord (although it is a major setback). The tragedy is that the U.S. was allowed to do it with zero repercussions. The Paris Agreement doesn’t include any punishments for countries that don’t honor their commitments. Countries can continue polluting and burning fossil fuels and emitting CO2 at alarming rates without having to suffer any negative consequences. There is no regulatory body to keep countries accountable and check if they’re meeting their goals. There are no sanctions or monetary fines for countries that don’t. Nothing. 4. There aren’t enough incentives for investing in sustainability. Research has shown the most effective way to address climate change is to take investment dollars away from companies that harm our planet, and to invest that money in companies that actively promote environment and social sustainability. Unfortunately, the Paris Agreement does little to encourage this redirection of funds. 5. The agreement gives us false hope. This is perhaps the most sinister aspect of the Paris Agreement. Politicians and industry leaders from around the world have celebrated the agreement as a monumental step toward addressing climate change (ha!). This gives people the false perception the problem is solved and we don’t need to do anything else, which couldn’t be any further from the truth. The futility of the agreement is evident in the continued destruction of our planet. In the years since the agreement was signed, global carbon emissions have risen by approximately 4 percent. And over the past year, emissions from all fossil fuel sources increased: coal emissions increased 1 percent, oil by 1.7 percent and gas by 3 percent. We haven’t even reached the peak in carbon emissions.

### 1AR—Impact D (Arms Racing)

**Arms races are inevitable – American actions don’t influence buildups**

Kroenig 18—Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Ph.D. in Political Science from UC Berkeley (“Arms Races,” Chapter 7 in *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters*, Oxford University Press, pages 150-151)

**The Enemy Is Building for Other Reasons** The spiral model maintains that US opponents build nuclear weapons in an action-reaction cycle of responses to US procurement decisions, but this argument does not take into account the possibility that states also expand their strategic arsenals for many other reasons. Evidence of **enemy nuclear expansion or modernization** is not necessarily evidence that the United States has **provoked an arms spiral**. On the contrary, in many cases, US enemies engage in arms buildups regardless of **what** the U**nited** S**tates does**. Indeed, **i**nternational **r**elations scholarship has posited a number of drivers **of state nuclear arms expansions** other than **action-reaction arms racing**. Some scholars argue that military organizational cultures intrinsically favor offensive doctrines and this encourages the construction of large military forces, which are necessary to sustain offensive strategies.33 Others assert that scientists working on issues of national security cause nuclear weapons enhancements through the dispassionate pursuit of technical breakthroughs, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads or nuclear cruise missiles.34 Still others point to defense industries’ interest in constantly upgrading weapons to support commercial growth, occasionally matched by policymakers’ and politicians’ needs to acquire what are arguably unnecessary weapons to support their defense industrial base or local economies. In short, these scholars argue that what appears to be an arms race for the latest capabilities is actually the result of **largely domestic considerations**.35 Scholars argue that external threats are often cited to justify these programs, but that **international developments are not the central drivers**.36 Most of these studies focus on the determinants of US nuclear expansion during the Cold War, but the basic theoretical arguments equally apply to other states, including US rivals. In their previously classified study on the Cold War arms competition, for example, Ernest May, John Steinbruner, and Thomas Wolfe concluded that they **could not find evidence** of an action-reaction arms race.37 The authors concluded that military expansion in the Soviet Union was driven by a mix of internal and external factors, but that there was **scant evidence** that procurement decisions on one side or the other were the result of direct interactions with the **opponent’s procurement plans**. (p.151) US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown agreed that **US nuclear weapons were not the primary cause of Moscow’s nuclear expansion**. When asked about American actions contributing to the Soviet nuclear modernization in congressional testimony, Secretary Brown famously, and pithily, replied, “when we build, they build. When we stop, they build.”38 In recent years, Brown’s aphorism can be taken even further to “when we cut, they build.” President Obama vowed to rid the world of nuclear weapons and worked to reduce the size of the US nuclear arsenal in the hope that other nations would follow America’s lead. If the spiral model of arms races is correct and enemy nuclear postures are a response to American arms buildups, then **we should have expected other states to also downsize** their arsenals, or at least maintain current levels, as the United States reduced. Instead, **Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea all went in the other direction**, **expanding and modernizing their arsenals**. As Brad Roberts, a deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile defense policy in the Obama administration, explains, the United States was “apparently alone among the states with nuclear weapons to believe that it has more nuclear weapons than it needs.”39 This provides additional **evidence against the spiral model** of arms races and support for the idea that US enemies **build for reasons that have little to do with US behavior.** Due to their head start, **Russia and China** are completing nuclear modernization cycles while Washington continues to debate whether and how to modernize its own forces. Critics charge that US plans risk provoking a new arms race, but it is hard to see how that is possible, given that adversary nuclear modernization programs are already well underway. A more accurate description would be that there is an arms race taking place, and the United States is sitting it out. As then–Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter argued in 2016, US nuclear modernization programs are “not intended to stimulate competition from anyone else, we know they aren’t having that effect because the evidence is to the contrary.”40 In sum, to the degree that nuclear expansion and modernization programs in US rivals are driven by considerations other than US nuclear capabilities, then **arms races are not a direct cost of a robust US nuclear posture**.

### 1AR—Impact D (Prolif)

#### Allied proliferation is very unlikely, and allied assurances are inevitably threatened by irreversible geopolitical trends

McKenzie 20 [Pete McKenzie, national security journalist, co-hosts “The Un-Diplomatic Podcast” on international affairs and national security with Dr. Van Jackson, March 25, 2020. “America’s Allies Are Becoming a Nuclear-Proliferation Threat.” https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/03/americas-allies-are-becoming-nuclear-proliferation-threat/164057/]

Opening the box Experts emphasize that the risk of allies rapidly nuclearizing is low. “There’s a number of hurdles that allies would have to get very powerfully motivated to overcome,” said Michael Mazarr, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. But Volpe observed that “opening that box and having to ask those questions about the U.S. commitment is worrisome…The proliferation risk is low. The problem is that it’s increased. It was an almost 0 percent risk for a long time, and the reason there’s lots of interest is that that risk has gone up in a noticeable way.” Moreover, that risk will grow. According to Nicholas Miller, assistant professor of government at Dartmouth: “There are geopolitical trends that are making this happen, and are going to make it increasingly common…The shift towards multipolarity with the rise of China, the relative decline of the U.S, and Russia behaving increasingly assertively—that all makes a lot of our allies feel more insecure. That’s going to persist, so these conversations will continue.” Part of the Trump administration’s legacy will be the corrosion of America’s ability to control those risks. Previous administrations restrained proliferation by denying other governments access to technology, coercing them through threats, and reassuring them through commitments. But the rise of Russian and Chinese nuclear-technology providers has made the first option far less effective. And it would be counterproductive to coerce already-nervous allies with the type of confrontational strategies used against states like Iran and North Korea. The only useful tool the next president will have is reassurance, itself badly dulled by the current president. “From an allied perspective, you look at the U.S. and you think, ‘Well, for four years I’ll get assurance, but then the administration will change and the commitment might die again’,” Santoro said. “It’s going to be very hard for the next administration to recommit to U.S. obligations.”

**No prolif impact**

John **Mueller 18**. Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist at Ohio State University and a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute Nov/Dec 2018 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-10-15/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter

HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM? Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go nuclear, it’s game over—which is why any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible measures, up to and including war. That logic might seem plausible at first, but it breaks down on close examination. Not only has the world already survived the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the ~~craziest~~ [most reckless] mass murderers in history (Stalin and Mao), but proliferation has slowed down rather than sped up over time. Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. This is because nuclear weapons turn out to be difficult and expensive **to acquire** and strategically provocative **to possess.** They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they would. Pakistan and Russia may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan’s prestige be increased if it became nuclear? Did China’s status improve when it went nuclear—or when its economy grew? And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved? Alarmists have misjudged not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects. Proliferation is incredibly dangerous and necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and lead them to dominate their region. The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea seems to be that once a country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear. Except, of course, that in three-quarters of a century, the United States has never been able to get anything close to that obedience from anybody, even when it had a nuclear monopoly. So why should it be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? It is far more likely that a nuclear rogue’s threats would cause its rivals to join together against the provocateur—just as countries around the Persian Gulf responded to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait by closing ranks to oppose, rather than acquiescing in, his effort at domination.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### Massive voter turnout would allow more representation from marginalized communities.

**In these Times Editors 20** [In these Times, Investigative reporting about corporate malfeasance and government wrongdoing, analysis of national and world affairs, and cultural criticism that matters, <https://inthesetimes.com/article/mandatory-voting-democracy-working-class-turnout>] JJ

Regard­less, we do know that vot­er turnout is espe­cial­ly low among the poor — in Novem­ber 2014, for exam­ple, just 36% of eli­gi­ble vot­ers showed up, but for peo­ple mak­ing less than $10,000 a year, the num­ber fell to [25%](https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-577.pdf). His­tor­i­cal research also reveals that mar­gin­al­ized com­mu­ni­ties who get the vote wield it to enhance equal­i­ty. The expan­sion of suf­frage to women led to an [increase](http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/LottKenny.pdf) in gov­ern­ment spend­ing, for exam­ple, and the abo­li­tion of lit­er­a­cy tests for vot­er reg­is­tra­tion [shift­ed](https://www.demos.org/research/why-voting-matters-large-disparities-turnout-benefit-donor-class) the dis­tri­b­u­tion of gov­ern­ment funds to areas with larg­er Black pop­u­la­tions. It’s pos­si­ble that a raft of poli­cies to pro­mote full par­tic­i­pa­tion could have a sim­i­lar impact.

#### **Even slightly increased black turnout will flip four key swing states in the Election, preventing 45 from becoming President.**

**Kilgore 11/15/19** [Ed Kilgore, political columnist at New York Magazine, former Democratic Strategist, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/11/how-can-democrats-get-the-black-turnout-they-need-in-2020.html>, “Black Turnout could make or break democrats in 2020”] JJ

Conversely, a return to higher black turnout could be a key element in toppling Trump next year. In a major study from the Center for American Progress, Ruy Teixeira and John Halpin [project](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/politics-and-elections/reports/2019/10/24/476315/path-270-2020/) that natural demographic trends in the last four years plus a return to 2012 levels of African-American voting would flip four states — Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin — and give Democrats a 294-244 majority in the Electoral College. And even if black voting turnout doesn’t quite hit those levels, in many states even marginal changes in turnout and Democratic vote-share could make the difference in a close race.

#### Compulsory voting shifts public policies towards the left.

Bechtel 15 [Associate Professor of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis and Research fellow at the Swiss institute for international economics and applied economic research, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/12/10/if-voting-were-mandatory-the-u-s-would-shift-to-the-left-discuss/>] JJ

Mandatory voting changed referendum outcomes. As soon as authorities in Vaud introduced compulsory voting, electoral support for leftist policy increased by about 8 to 15 percentage points when compared to the cantons where there was no fine. The green line in the figure equals the difference in support for leftist policies between districts in Vaud and districts in the control cantons, adjusted for their differences before the introduction of compulsory voting. Taken together, these results suggest that compulsory voting not only increases turnout, but also mobilizes new voters whose preferences are sufficiently distinct to affect public policy. These findings have implications for ongoing debates about the desirability of compulsory voting. If, for example, compulsory voting increased turnout but failed to change outcomes, low turnout would be more efficient as many citizens could save the costs of voting. Our results suggest that compulsory voting not only increases turnout, but also shifts support toward particular policies. Therefore, the efficiency argument does not seem convincing in the case we examine. Our results also answer a related question: Would mandatory voting lead to unstable political majorities, since it would bring to the polls a larger share of less-informed citizens who would vote more or less randomly on policies? After all, the opinions of those with less political knowledge [could be more easily malleable](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=9911285&jid=RAM&volumeId=3&issueId=03&aid=9911284&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S2049847014000399). That’s not what we find. In our context, compulsory voting causes a stable increase in support for leftist policies, a finding that is difficult to square with the random voting argument.

#### [Insert Card here about why data from other countries is better]

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### Trump wins re-election in a landslide—prioritize primary analysis over polls.

#### KLTV 8/21 [KLTV Digital Media Staff, <https://www.kltv.com/2020/08/21/prolific-predictor-elections-says-trump-wins-landslide/>, “Prolific Predictor of Elections says Trump wins 2020 in Landslide, dual ABC/Telmundo-affiliated television station licensed to Tyler, Texas, United States] JJ

The chances that President Donald Trump wins re-election in 2020 is near certain, according to a political science professor whose election model has a history of correctly predicting election results.

Stony Brook University professor Helmut Norpoth’s Primary Model shows President Trump has a[91-percent chance of winning re-election](https://news.stonybrook.edu/facultystaff/maverick-modeller-helmut-norpoth-predicts-another-win-for-trump/), according to his interview with Stony Brook News.

Norpoth’s model relies on the results of presidential primaries, not polls that are often used as indicators of popularity. According to Norpoth, Biden is in a much weaker position than Trump because of his poor showing in the first two primary races.

Norpoth was one of a handful of pollsters who correctly predicted Trump’s victory in 2016, and his Primary Model has predicted [five of the six presidential elections since 1996](https://news.stonybrook.edu/facultystaff/maverick-modeller-helmut-norpoth-predicts-another-win-for-trump/). When applied to previous elections, the model correctly predicted 25 of the last 27 elections, missing only the 2000 election in which George W. Bush defeated Al Gore and the 1960 election in which John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon.

“The key to the November election is the primaries,” Norpoth told [Fox News in July](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/professor-doubles-down-on-prediction-model-showing-trump-having-91-percent-chance-of-winning-election-despite-polls). “The early primaries are giving us a lot of information. Based on that, Donald Trump won them very easily in his party. Joe Biden, the likely nominee for the Democrats, had a great deal of trouble, pulled it together, but on balance is that stronger performance of primaries that gives Donald Trump the edge in November.

“People have forgotten how Joe Biden did in New Hampshire,” Norpoth added during his interview with Stony Brook News. “He was terrible. He got 8.4 percent of the vote, which is unbelievable for a candidate with any aspirations of being president.”

#### Trump will win in a landslide—polls are not accurate for 45.

**Evans 8/20** [Jon Evans, anchors WECT News, was named “anchor of the year,” won first place awards from the RTDNAC for Special Reports on Seeveral issues, “Rep. Rouzer predicts President Trump will win Re-election “in a landslide.” <https://www.wect.com/2020/08/20/rep-rouzer-predicts-president-trump-will-win-re-election-landslide/>] JJ

Congressman David Rouzer (R-NC7) told a group of supporters in Wilmington Thursday he believes President Donald Trump will win re-election in November “in a landslide” over democratic nominee Joe Biden. Rep. Rouzer, who is serving his third term in the U.S. House representing North Carolina’s Seventh Congressional District, believes polls showing the former vice-president leading the incumbent republican may not paint a clear picture.

“I know from 2016 he (President Trump) never led in a poll, at least not one that I recall,” Rep. Rouzer said after his remarks to several dozen people. “He was always down two or three (points), and he wins the state by two-point-eight percent, three percent. There was about a three to four underpoll for Trump in 2016. I think you can double that in 2020. The reason I think you can double that is I think there are a lot of people that quite honestly, they don’t want to tell the pollsters which way they are going to vote for president.”

### 1AR—Third Parties

#### Third parties allows Trump to slide in, especially with Biden’s lead being less than Clinton’s in 2016.

**Sattler 8/16/20** [Jason Sattler, USA Today, RealClearPolitics highly regarded journalist, “Trump has a plan to steal the election and it’s not clear Democrats have a plan to stop him,” <https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/08/16/donald-trump-steal-2020-election-democrats-must-stop-him-column/3372658001/> ] JJ

And there’s the inflation of third-party candidates to help Trump have a chance to slip through the Electoral College, though he has no chance of ever getting near 50% of the popular vote. But this time, [Republican operatives](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kanye-west-ballot-campaign-gop/2020/08/09/bfc8e58a-d8ce-11ea-9c3b-dfc394c03988_story.html) are actually trying to [Mickey Mouse Kanye West](https://www.businessinsider.com/democrats-complain-kanye-west-submitted-wisconsin-papers-late-bogus-signatures-2020-8) onto the ballot, with bogus signatures in some cases, in an effort to [hurt Joe Biden](https://www.forbes.com/sites/randalllane/2020/08/06/exclusive-kanye-west-indicates-that-his-spoiler-campaign-is-indeed-designed-to-hurt-biden/#7de094cd6397).

You could argue that all these ploys by Trump and Republicans to rig this election are the flailing of a dying movement. What else is Trump going to do as the least popular incumbent of the century overseeing the worst job losses in U.S. history and the highest COVID-19 death count in the world? It’s not like they’re fooling voters.

While it’s true that Biden has maintained a more convincing lead over Trump in national polls than Hillary Clinton did four years ago, polls of the key battleground states this month look almost identical to those that pitted Trump against Clinton in August 2016 — except [Trump is doing slightly better](https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2020/president/us/trump-vs-biden-top-battleground-states-2020-vs-2016/).

### 1AR--Trump Rigs Mail

#### Trump can steal election through voter suppression.

**Sattler 8/16/20** [Jason Sattler, USA Today, RealClearPolitics highly regarded journalist, “Trump has a plan to steal the election and it’s not clear Democrats have a plan to stop him,” <https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/08/16/donald-trump-steal-2020-election-democrats-must-stop-him-column/3372658001/> ] JJ

There is the voter suppression. But instead off just preventing voting in key states with needless ballot restrictions, the Trump campaign is fighting all efforts to make voting in the middle of pandemic easier and safer, including hobbling the U.S. Postal Service and increasing the cost of mail-in voting. And the President isn’t even hiding his goal—preventing voting by mail (probably so he can claim victory on election night regardless of his eventual results).

#### Trump can shut down the election by invoking a national quarantine.

**Wehle 20** [Kimberly Wehle, joined law school of University of Baltimore after years of teaching as an Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma college of Law, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/04/donald-trump-election-disruption-2020-294721>, “worried Trump will Disrupt Voting this Fall? Here’s what to Watch for] JJ

With a second coronavirus wave, Trump could issue a national quarantine that forces voters to stay home on Election Day

If Dr. Anthony Fauci’s prediction becomes reality and we see a second wave of sickness, death and overwhelmed emergency rooms in the fall, Trump can endeavor to [order](https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/05/15/national-quarantine-constitutional-261165) people to stay home under the [Public Health Service Act](https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/58/STATUTE-58-Pg682a.pdf), which gives the executive branch power to enforce quarantines.

Passed in 1944, the statute authorizes executive branch officials to take steps “necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases … from one State … into another State or possession,” and allows the president, upon the recommendation of the Health and Human Services (HHS) secretary, to “provide for the apprehension, detention, or conditional release of individuals … for the purpose of preventing” the spread of disease.

#### Trump can rig the election by pressuring state governors to create voting restrictions.

**Wehle 20** [Kimberly Wehle, joined law school of University of Baltimore after years of teaching as an Associate Professor at the University of Oklahoma college of Law, <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/06/04/donald-trump-election-disruption-2020-294721>, “worried Trump will Disrupt Voting this Fall? Here’s what to Watch for] JJ

With some exceptions, Republican governors of red states that voted for Trump in 2016 were [less likely](https://fortune.com/2020/05/22/coronavirus-restrictions-states-lockdown-stay-at-home-shelter-in-place-coviod-19-red-blue-states-trump/) to issue stay-at-home orders—which Trump has [publicly disfavored](https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/17/trump-states-stay-at-home-orders-192386)—than their blue-state counterparts. The fewest restrictions were in South Dakota, Idaho, Missouri, Utah and Wisconsin, a perennial swing state. Given this recent history, it’s easy to imagine that if Trump continues to warn of a “rigged election” and call for voting restrictions in response to states’ post-Covid voting changes, Republican governors and secretaries of state would likewise fall in line with what the president suggests.

More specifically, under pressure from or allegiance to Trump, Republican secretaries of states, governors or Republican-dominated state legislatures could take last-minute steps to purge registered voters, close polling places or shorten early voting hours, restrict voting by mail or make other changes that could inch Trump across the finish line irrespective of the legitimate needs and wants of individual voters.

It wouldn’t be the first time that politicians tweaked election rules and affected the results, even in races where they had a clear personal stake in the outcome. [In 2000](https://www.npr.org/2018/11/12/666812854/the-florida-recount-of-2000-a-nightmare-that-goes-on-haunting), Florida’s secretary of state and co-chair of George W. Bush’s presidential campaign in Florida, Katherine Harris, certified Bush as the popular vote winner after halting a recount that was prompted by an exceedingly slim, 537-vote margin over his opponent, Al Gore. A lawsuit famously ensued regarding the counting of confusing punch-card ballots marred by “hanging” or “dimpled” chads. Harris’ certification was overturned by the Florida Supreme Court, but ultimately endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court, thus deciding the presidential election.

In 2016, Georgia’s secretary of state Brian Kemp—a self-proclaimed “Trump conservative”—[refused to recuse himself](https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/georgia-governor-kemp-abrams/575095/) from the role of secretary of state and chief election official when he announced his run for the governorship. Under Kemp, over 1.5 million voters—or 10.6 percent of Georgia voters—were removed from the rolls in the two years prior to the election, and 214 polling places were shuttered, mostly in neighborhoods with predominantly minority residents. Just days before the election, Kemp reportedly put 53,000 voter registration applications on hold, reasoning that the names on the applications were not an “exact match” with information in other state databases because of hyphens, accents, typos, and the like. Kemp won the race by approximately [54,000 votes](https://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/georgia-governor) over Democrat Stacey Abrams.

### 1AR—Impact Turn (Top Level)

#### Reject new 2NR Impact cards—1AR strategy was predicated on the strategic vision of the 1NC to read a shitty impact card. Worst-case scenario, the 2AR gets cards against new 2NR evidence.

### 1AR—Impact Turn (Civil War)

#### Trump loss will spur a civil war.

**Waldman 20** [Paul Waldman, columnist covering politics education Swarthmore College, BA in political science, University of Pennsylvania, PhD in communication, <https://prospect.org/politics/if-trump-loses/>] JJ

But the Trumpists will see little role for themselves in that process. They never had a policy agenda to unite around, one that could be easily championed by another politician. Sure, there were some things they wanted (mostly on immigration), but they aren’t going to wait on line for hours to rally for upper-income tax cuts and environmental deregulation. It was Trump they loved, in all his crude, hateful glory. No future campaign, no policy fight will make them feel the way Trump did. They could pour their energies into the anti-Biden movement, the next iteration of the Tea Party. But having tasted the ecstatic glory of Trumpism, will that really have much appeal?

They’ve been convinced that the system is inherently corrupt, yet there is no program they advocate to reform it. There isn’t a hypothetical set of rules you could institute that would make the system what they want it to be. It’s corrupt and always will be, they’re convinced, so the only acceptable state of affairs is for someone with Trump’s majestic power to take temporary control of all its corrupt means and force it to serve his own ends. When he’s gone, it goes right back to what it was before.

So if you’re a Trumpist but Trump has permanently retreated to Mar-a-Lago, what would be the point of engaging in traditional political action? Are you going to knock doors for some pale imitation of Trump, let alone the Marco Rubio or Nikki Haley types who will be running for president in 2024? What’s even the point of voting?

That may be the most serious danger the Republican Party faces post-Trump. They could decide to put this horrifying period behind them, raise up more mainstream leaders, and construct an appeal that reaches beyond their shrinking base. But as they do so, a significant chunk of their voters may just drop out, seeing nothing in Republicans worth supporting.

We should also be prepared for the possibility of a spasm of violence after the election. If you’ve spent years nodding your head as Trump and others tell you that the white man is being targeted by sinister forces that are literally out to destroy everything you believe in, and then Trump is defeated, you may conclude that politics is no longer a viable path to save the country and violent revolution is the only alternative. As private citizen Trump tweets out all his bitterness and Democrats triumphantly take the reins of power, we could see more mass shootings and attempts to trigger a civil war.

### 1AR—Impact Turn (Lashout)

#### Trump loss will spur Middle Eastern lashsout.

**Lissner 20** [Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “The Other way Trump Could Destroy the Next Presidency” <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/other-way-trump-could-destroy-next-presidency/615130/> PHD Candidate in the Government Department at Georgetown University and International Security Studies predoctoral fellow at Yale University] JJ

Imagining more extreme forms of sabotage is also possible. Even as a lame duck, President Trump will remain the commander in chief until Biden takes the oath of office on January 20, 2021. Already, the Trump team is [reportedly](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/08/06/trumps-foreign-policy-team-is-hedging-against-biden-win/) working to lock in its foreign-policy priorities by killing the Iran nuclear deal, pushing through troop withdrawals from Germany, and levying new rounds of tariffs and tech restrictions; after the election, the president could undertake more dramatic moves, such as announcing an intent to leave NATO or ordering all combat troops to depart Afghanistan. Though improbable, Trump could defy the norm of consultation with the president-elect and lead the nation into conflict with a foreign adversary such as Iran—or decline to act when faced with an imminent domestic or global threat. Even if Biden immediately reversed or denounced such eleventh-hour maneuvers, the policy whiplash would undermine America’s already-damaged credibility as an ally and an adversary.

#### That escalates and draws in great powers – extinction!

John Scales Avery 11-6-13, Lektor Emeritus and Associate Professor at the University of Copenhagen & has received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work. “An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War.” 11-6-2013. http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.

The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.

In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.

Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

### 1AR—Impact Turn (Unpredictability Good)

#### Trump’s unpredictability acts as a great deterrent and bolsters US primacy.

**Mcghee 1/6** [Kaylee Mcghee, Journalist for the Washington Examiner, specializes in international affairs, <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/president-trumps-foreign-policy-is-unpredictable-and-thats-a-good-thing>, “Trump’s Foreign policy is unpredictable, and that’s a good thing” ] JJ

President Trump’s foreign policy often appears to make little sense, and that’s exactly why it works.

If it wasn’t before, the United States is now “unpredictable,” [said](https://nypost.com/2020/01/04/us-is-totally-unpredictable-after-killing-qassem-soleimani-french-ambassador/) Gerard Araud, the former French ambassador to the U.S. Araud was responding to Trump’s decision to order the killing of Iranian terrorist leader Qassem Soleimani — a decision that at first glance [seemed to contradict Trump’s vow to end “endless wars.”](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/how-killing-qassim-soleimani-fits-in-with-the-trump-doctrine) Trump has said one thing, and then acted in a completely different manner, and now it’s hard to determine what Trump’s strategy is, if there even is one, Araud explained.

“The Americans are now totally unpredictable,” Araud said. “There was no response to Iranian attacks against oil tankers, a U.S. drone, and Saudi oil fields, but out of the blue comes this surprising hit on Soleimani. We are depending on the unpredictable reaction of one man.”

Araud, of course, did not intend to compliment Trump’s foreign policy. But that’s exactly what he did. Trump’s chaos is itself a deterrent, and Soleimani’s death was a clear message to Iran that if the regime tries to act against U.S. interests again, there will be severe, unpredictable consequences.

It’s reminiscent of the old Nixonian “madman theory,” when former President Richard Nixon warned communist leaders that “the madman was loose” and that he’d do anything to win the Vietnam War. It had its faults, of course, but this strategy did help the Nixon administration force the North Vietnamese government’s hand.

## 1AR—Econ DA

### 1AR—Impact Calculus

#### Case turns econ—owens indicates that US leadership has fostered in an unprecedented era of stable, economic growth due to investments in capitalist ideals. This would be destroyed if we withdrew from the international order.

### 1AR—No link

#### No link--Plan doesn’t affect welfare spending—Austria proves.

**Hoffman, Leon and Lombardi 17** [Mitchell Hoffman, Gianmarco Leon and Maria Lombardi, Professor **Mitchell Hoffman** specializes in labor economics, behavioral economics, organizational economics, productivity, and strategy. Recent projects have included (1) study of workers’ overoptimistic beliefs about their productivity, (2) an analysis of employee referral networks, and (3) an investigation of discretion in hiring. Hoffman has worked on research with companies in a number of different industries including high-tech, trucking, consumer goods, call-centers, and grocery stores on projects using large firm datasets and/or randomized experiments, **Ginmarco Leon**, I am an Associate Professor at the department of Economics and Business at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, I am also an Affiliated Professor at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics and at IPEG-Barcelona, and a Research Affiliate at CEPR. My current research interest is focused in three broad areas of development and political economics: (i) understanding voter behavior, i.e. turnout decisions and candidate choices, (ii) study of the selection and incentive mechanisms for public sector workers; and (iii) the effects of shocks (i.e. civil conflict, pollution) on human capital accumulation, **Maria Lombardi**, Assistant Professor, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, School of Government [CV] I have a PhD in Economics from Universitat Pompeu Fabra. My main research interests are in the areas of Development Economics and Economics of Education (January 25, 2017) Compulsory Voting, Turnout, and Government Spending: Evidence from Austria | Cato Institute. Retrieved August 22, 2020, from <https://www.cato.org/publications/research-briefs-economic-policy/compulsory-voting-turnout-government-spending-evidence> //smhs MM]

Despite the importance of elections to democracy, many people do not vote. Many European countries have seen a steep decline in voter turnout over the past 30 years, with record low rates in the 2009 and 2014 elections for the European Parliament. Ethnic minorities, immigrants, and poor voters in Europe are significantly less likely to vote, potentially distorting the political process. In the United States, turnout also exhibits large disparities along socioeconomic and racial lines. Such disparities in turnout are believed to cause disadvantaged groups to be underserved by the political process. One policy that is often used to try to address these issues is making voting mandatory. As of 2008, 32 countries had a compulsory voting (CV) law in place and more had utilized CV at some point during the last 50 years. In March 2015, U.S. president Barack Obama proposed CV for the United States, arguing that if “everyone voted, then it would completely change the political map of this country. The people who tend not to vote are young, they’re lower income, they’re skewed more heavily towards immigrant groups and minority groups.… There’s a reason why some folks try to keep them away from the polls.” However, little is known empirically about how CV affects voter behavior, politician behavior, and especially government policy. Our research examines the impact of CV laws on turnout, political competition, and fiscal policy using a unique natural experiment in Austria. Since World War II, Austria’s nine states have had compulsory or voluntary voting at different times for different types of elections, allowing us to do well‐​controlled statistical comparisons. Austria provides a compelling case study for multiple reasons. First, the variation in CV laws is significant across states and over time. Second, like the United States and many other countries, Austria exhibits socioeconomic disparities in turnout, with poor and underserved groups being less likely to vote than the rich. In addition, with the exception of one Swiss canton (Vaud), Austria is the sole modern democracy to have within‐​country variation in CV for national elections. In our main results, using state‐​level voting records on state, parliamentary, and presidential elections from 1949–2010, we find that CV increases turnout from roughly 80 percent to 90 percent. Impacts on turnout vary across the three types of elections, but are sizable. Interestingly, however, we find that the introduction or removal of CV does not appear to affect the composition or level of state‐​level spending. These “zero effects” are reasonably precisely estimated and robust to different specifications that deal with concerns regarding possible omitted variables or endogenous changes in CV laws. How could it be that CV had large impacts on voter turnout but did not affect policy outcomes? Our analysis shows that there was a marginal increase in invalid votes, but this increase was by no means as large as the increase in turnout. Further, CV did not affect electoral outcomes: vote shares for liberal or conservative parties did not change significantly, nor did the number of parties running for office or the victory margin in state or parliamentary elections. Hence, it seems that the political landscape stayed mostly unaffected by the sizable changes in turnout due to CV. To complement our main aggregate analysis and dig further into mechanisms, we use repeated cross sections of individual‐​level data to analyze interaction effects of CV laws with voter characteristics. While our statistical power is more limited compared to our main analyses, our results still suggest that voters swayed to vote because of CV were often female and low‐​income. They also seem more likely to have low interest in politics, no party affiliation, and be uninformed (as proxied by newspaper reading). These results are consistent with a story where voters who vote or abstain due to the introduction or repeal of CV may not have strong policy or partisan preferences, thereby having little or no effect on electoral outcomes. Our work relates to three main literatures. First, an important literature analyzes how changes in turnout and electorate composition affect public policy, often looking at the impacts of enfranchising particular groups of people. For example, the enfranchisement of women in the United States led to increases in government health expenditures, as did the adoption of electronic voting in Brazil, which effectively enfranchised illiterate voters. Similarly, post–Civil War laws restricting voting for blacks in the U.S. South had sizable impacts on public policy. Our findings do not contradict this literature, but complement it, suggesting that the extent to which changes in turnout affect policy depends importantly on whether these policies affect a group of the population with specific policy preferences. Second, our paper speaks to the literature on the determinants of voter turnout. Scholars have analyzed interventions aimed at increasing turnout, often using randomized experiments. In nonexperimental studies a significant literature examines the impact of voting costs, often reaching different results from different changes in costs. We complement this literature by not only looking at the effects of the cost of voting on turnout, but we go further and analyze what happens with government policy. Third, our results relate to a small but burgeoning literature analyzing CV. A number of theoretical contributions argue that CV reduces welfare, whereas others show that compulsory voting (or costly voting) allows an aggregation of preferences that can be welfare increasing. In empirical work, abolishing CV significantly decreased turnout in Switzerland despite the fact that fines were small and not enforced. In a cross‐​country study, researchers show that countries with CV have lower income inequality. Other findings show that CV increases turnout, but doesn’t affect political information. Using a field experiment in Peru providing information about changes in abstention fines, another study shows that a reduction in the fines decreases turnout, and consistent with our findings, that the reduction is driven by uninformed, uninterested, and centrist voters. A few prior studies address the specific case of CV in Austria. Results suggest that adoption of CV lead to significant increases in turnout. The paper closest to ours analyzes the effects of the repeal of CV by the Austrian parliament in 1992 on turnout and on changes in party vote shares. Although the analysis period is much shorter, the magnitude of the effects found on electoral participation and party vote shares are broadly consistent with ours. Our paper goes beyond these studies in three main ways. First and foremost, not only do we analyze the political consequences of CV, but we also look at impacts on policy outcomes. Second, we complement the analysis of aggregate data with individual‐​level information on political preferences and voting behavior, allowing us to study the shift in the composition of the pool of voters resulting from CV. Our results provide evidence that even if CV increases turnout, it need not significantly affect government spending. Of course, our results are specific to Austria, although we think they would be relevant for other advanced democracies with high turnout, such as Germany and the Scandinavian countries. It is less obvious how they would extrapolate to other countries with lower turnout rates such as the United States.

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### 1] Non-unique—the United States has a massive welfare system right now and none of their impacts have been triggered. Force them to read evidence contextualized to how much the aff uniquely increases spending.

#### 2] Partisanship preventing stimulus relief thumps—the economy is tanking now.

**Gandel 8/21/20** [Stephen Gandel, senior writer for TIME, covering real estate, economics, and wall state, “Economy is slumping again as Washington puts stimulus on hold, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/economy-projected-to-slump-again-with-no-stimulus-coming/>] JJ

A growing number of economists are saying that the recent recovery, driven by a reopening of the economy and Washington stimulus, is slowing — and may end as soon as this month. The forecasts are the latest sign that the failure of [President Donald Trump and Democrats to reach a deal on an additional stimulus bill](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-relief-bill-stimulus-democrats-white-house-negotiations-impasse/) is starting to drag down the economy in the wake of the [continued pandemic](https://www.cbsnews.com/live-updates/coronavirus-disease-answers-frequently-asked-questions/).

On Thursday, the government reported that [1.1 million people had applied](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/unemployment-report-jobless-claims-rose-last-week-2020-08-20/) for new state unemployment benefits. That was up 135,000 from the week before, and higher than expectations. Most economists had expected the new claims to stay under 1 million. The number of self-employed applicants seeking jobless aid — 543,000 — also increased from the prior week.

There have been a lot of brinkmanship moments in Washington over the last decade, but never have the stakes been as high as today," Bank of America's top global economist Ethan Harris, wrote in a note to clients on Friday. "Every passing week without meaningful legislation lengthens the mini-recession."

Earlier this week, economists at UBS said they too had seen a slowing of the economy. "Our high-frequency data suggests that the speed of recovery has now tapered off in August," UBS strategist Ajit Agrawal said in a note to clients on Thursday.

BofA's Harris said the economy may already be headed for a "W," or double-dip, recession. That's when the economy starts to turn down again even before it has fully recovered. The last time that happened was in the early 1980s. Economists up until recently had been predicting a V-shaped recovery, which is one that bounces back quickly. That appears to be less and less of a possibility.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### Welfare boosts the economy and solves collapse

**Steinberg 14**

[Sarah Ayres Steinberg, Prior to joining JPMorgan Chase, Sarah was Senior Economic Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress, where she led CAP’s research on workforce development and expanding apprenticeships. Her research has been cited by The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post, among others. She has a bachelor’s degree in government and sociology from Dartmouth College.Sarah Ayres Steinberg joined JPMorgan Chase & Co. in 2015 as Vice President of Global Philanthropy for New Skills at Work, a $250 million global workforce training and demand-driven training initiative. Her work focuses on promoting economic opportunity and prosperity through investments in workforce practice, innovation, and policy. Sarah is the Program Officer for New Skills for Youth, a $75 million, five-year global career readiness initiative launched in January 2016 and aimed at investing in high-quality, career-focused education that prepares young people to prosper in the growing global economy. (March 31, 2014) The Safety Net Is Good Economic Policy - Center for American Progress. Retrieved August 18, 2020, from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2014/03/31/86693/the-safety-net-is-good-economic-policy/> //smhs MM]

The report attempts to back up this assertion with social-science research, but it is not the unbiased, evidenced-based review that it claims to be. Rep. Ryan’s report relies on a combination of overstating the evidence, ignoring relevant studies, and simply misrepresenting the research to make the argument that the safety net creates a “poverty trap.” This issue brief reviews economic research on the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs; a significant body of research demonstrates that not only have anti-poverty programs successfully raised millions of families out of poverty, but they also increase the economic mobility of recipients and support broader economic growth. In particular: The War on Poverty succeeded in reducing the poverty rate by one-third, from 26 percent in 1967 to 16 percent in 2012 Far from serving a static underclass of the perpetually poor, safety net programs benefit the majority of Americans—70 percent—at some point in their lives Safety net programs boost economic mobility, making poor children more likely to graduate from high school, attend college, and enter the middle class Poverty costs the U.S. economy more than $500 billion every year, the result of low productivity, poor health, and high levels of crime and incarceration There is also little evidence that the safety net reduces labor participation by much, if at all. Some policies—such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, or EITC—have been shown to increase work among recipients—as Rep. Ryan acknowledges. Where policies do negatively affect labor participation, the result is small and has a very limited impact on poverty levels. A comprehensive review of the literature reveals that the safety net supports social mobility and strengthens our economy. The safety net increases economic mobility A significant body of evidence supports the view that, far from creating a so-called poverty trap, the safety net actually reduces poverty, increases economic mobility, and strengthens our national economy. Moreover, studies have shown that many antipoverty programs, especially those that target children, offer an excellent return on investment to taxpayers.

### 1AR—Impact Turn (Dedev)

#### Stopping growth solves extinction from eco collapse – decoupling is impossible even under perfect conditions, and transition dangers are overhyped

Hickel 18 [Jason Hickel is an anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. Why Growth Can’t Be Green. Foreign Policy Magazine. September 12, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/]

Warnings about ecological breakdown have become ubiquitous. Over the past few years, major newspapers, including the Guardian and the New York Times, have carried alarming stories on soil depletion, deforestation, and the collapse of fish stocks and insect populations. These crises are being driven by global economic growth, and its accompanying consumption, which is destroying the Earth’s biosphere and blowing past key planetary boundaries that scientists say must be respected to avoid triggering collapse.

Many policymakers have responded by pushing for what has come to be called “green growth.” All we need to do, they argue, is invest in more efficient technology and introduce the right incentives, and we’ll be able to keep growing while simultaneously reducing our impact on the natural world, which is already at an unsustainable level. In technical terms, the goal is to achieve “absolute decoupling” of GDP from the total use of natural resources, according to the U.N. definition.

It sounds like an elegant solution to an otherwise catastrophic problem. There’s just one hitch: New evidence suggests that green growth isn’t the panacea everyone has been hoping for. In fact, it isn’t even possible.

Green growth first became a buzz phrase in 2012 at the United Nations Cosnference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro. In the run-up to the conference, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the U.N. Environment Program all produced reports promoting green growth. Today, it is a core plank of the U.N. Sustainable Development Goals.

But the promise of green growth turns out to have been based more on wishful thinking than on evidence. In the years since the Rio conference, three major empirical studies have arrived at the same rather troubling conclusion: Even under the best conditions, absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use is not possible on a global scale.

A team of scientists led by the German researcher Monika Dittrich first raised doubts in 2012. The group ran a sophisticated computer model that predicted what would happen to global resource use if economic growth continued on its current trajectory, increasing at about 2 to 3 percent per year. It found that human consumption of natural resources (including fish, livestock, forests, metals, minerals, and fossil fuels) would rise from 70 billion metric tons per year in 2012 to 180 billion metric tons per year by 2050. For reference, a sustainable level of resource use is about 50 billion metric tons per year—a boundary we breached back in 2000.

The team then reran the model to see what would happen if every nation on Earth immediately adopted best practice in efficient resource use (an extremely optimistic assumption). The results improved; resource consumption would hit only 93 billion metric tons by 2050. But that is still a lot more than we’re consuming today. Burning through all those resources could hardly be described as absolute decoupling or green growth.

In 2016, a second team of scientists tested a different premise: one in which the world’s nations all agreed to go above and beyond existing best practice. In their best-case scenario, the researchers assumed a tax that would raise the global price of carbon from $50 to $236 per metric ton and imagined technological innovations that would double the efficiency with which we use resources. The results were almost exactly the same as in Dittrich’s study. Under these conditions, if the global economy kept growing by 3 percent each year, we’d still hit about 95 billion metric tons of resource use by 2050. Bottom line: no absolute decoupling.

Finally, last year the U.N. Environment Program—once one of the main cheerleaders of green growth theory—weighed in on the debate. It tested a scenario with carbon priced at a whopping $573 per metric ton, slapped on a resource extraction tax, and assumed rapid technological innovation spurred by strong government support. The result? We hit 132 billion metric tons by 2050. This finding is worse than those of the two previous studies because the researchers accounted for the “rebound effect,” whereby improvements in resource efficiency drive down prices and cause demand to rise—thus canceling out some of the gains.

Study after study shows the same thing. Scientists are beginning to realize that there are physical limits to how efficiently we can use resources. Sure, we might be able to produce cars and iPhones and skyscrapers more efficiently, but we can’t produce them out of thin air. We might shift the economy to services such as education and yoga, but even universities and workout studios require material inputs. Once we reach the limits of efficiency, pursuing any degree of economic growth drives resource use back up.

These problems throw the entire concept of green growth into doubt and necessitate some radical rethinking. Remember that each of the three studies used highly optimistic assumptions. We are nowhere near imposing a global carbon tax today, much less one of nearly $600 per metric ton, and resource efficiency is currently getting worse, not better. Yet the studies suggest that even if we do everything right, decoupling economic growth with resource use will remain elusive and our environmental problems will continue to worsen.

Preventing that outcome will require a whole new paradigm. High taxes and technological innovation will help, but they’re not going to be enough. The only realistic shot humanity has at averting ecological collapse is to impose hard caps on resource use, as the economist Daniel O’Neill recently proposed. Such caps, enforced by national governments or by international treaties, could ensure that we do not extract more from the land and the seas than the Earth can safely regenerate. We could also ditch GDP as an indicator of economic success and adopt a more balanced measure like the genuine progress indicator (GPI), which accounts for pollution and natural asset depletion. Using GPI would help us maximize socially good outcomes while minimizing ecologically bad ones.

But there’s no escaping the obvious conclusion. Ultimately, bringing our civilization back within planetary boundaries is going to require that we liberate ourselves from our dependence on economic growth—starting with rich nations. This might sound scarier than it really is. Ending growth doesn’t mean shutting down economic activity—it simply means that next year we can’t produce and consume more than we are doing this year. It might also mean shrinking certain sectors that are particularly damaging to our ecology and that are unnecessary for human flourishing, such as advertising, commuting, and single-use products.

But ending growth doesn’t mean that living standards need to take a hit. Our planet provides more than enough for all of us; the problem is that its resources are not equally distributed. We can improve people’s lives right now simply by sharing what we already have more fairly, rather than plundering the Earth for more. Maybe this means better public services. Maybe it means basic income. Maybe it means a shorter working week that allows us to scale down production while still delivering full employment. Policies such as these—and countless others—will be crucial to not only surviving the 21st century but also flourishing in it.

#### Warming causes extinction – a confluence of nonlinear and unpredictable effects – action now is key

Melton 19 [Michelle Melton is a 3L at Harvard Law School. Before law school, she was an associate fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she focused on climate policy. Climate Change and National Security, Part II: How Big a Threat is the Climate? January 7, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate]

At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, climate change will remain a creeping threat that will exacerbate and amplify existing, structural global inequalities. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, climate change will exacerbate humanitarian crises—some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel, as well as material and financial assistance. It will also aggravate natural resource constraints, potentially contributing to political and economic conflict over water, food and energy.

The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security.

By contrast, if emissions continue to creep upward (or if they do not decline rapidly), by 2100 climate-related national security threats could be existential. The question for the next hundred years is not, “are disparities politically and economically manageable?” but, “can the global order, premised on the nation-state system, itself based on territorial sovereignty, survive in a world in which substantial swathes of territory are potentially uninhabitable?”

National Security Consequences of Climate Change to 2050

Scientists can predict the consequences of climate change to 2050 with some measure of certainty. (Beyond that date, the pace and magnitude of climate change—and therefore, the national security threat posed by it—depend heavily on the level of emissions in the coming years, as I have explained.) There is relative agreement across modeled climate scenarios that the world will likely warm, on average, at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by about 2050—but perhaps as soon as 2030. This level of warming is likely to occur even if the world succeeds in dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as even the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report implicitly admits. In other words, a certain amount of additional warming—at least 1.5°C, and probably more than that—is presumptively unavoidable.

Looking ahead to 2050, it can be said with relative confidence that the national security consequences of climate change will vary in degree, not in kind, from the national security threats already facing the United States. This is hardly good news. Even small differences in global average temperatures result in significant environmental changes, with attendant social, economic and political consequences. By 2050, climate change will wreak increasing havoc on human and natural systems—predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world—with attenuated but profound consequences for national security.

In particular, changes in temperature, the hydrological cycle and the ranges of insects will impact food availability and food access in much of the world, increasing food insecurity. Storms, flooding, changes in ocean pH and other climate-linked changes will damage infrastructure and negatively impact labor productivity and economic growth in much of the world. Vector-borne diseases will also become more prevalent, as climate change will expand the geographic range and intensity of transmission of diseases like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera. Rising public health challenges, economic devastation and food insecurity will translate into an increased demand for humanitarian assistance provided by the military, increased migration—especially from tropical and subtropical regions—and geopolitical conflict.

Long-term trends such as declining food security, coupled with short-term events like hurricanes, could sustain unprecedented levels of migration. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe portends the kinds of population movements that will only accelerate in the coming decades: people from Africa, Southwest and South Asia and elsewhere crossing land and water to reach Europe. For the United States, this likely means greater numbers of people seeking entry from both Central America and the Caribbean. Such influxes are not unprecedented, but they are unlikely to abate and could increase in volume over the next few decades, driven in part by climate change-related food insecurity, climate change-related storms and also by economic and political instability. Food insecurity, economic losses and loss of human life are also likely to exacerbate existing political tensions in the developing world, especially in regions with poor governance and/or where the climate is particularly vulnerable to warming (e.g., the Mediterranean basin). While the Arab Spring had many underlying causes, it also coincided with a period of high food prices, which arguably contributed to the protests. In some situations, food insecurity, economic losses and public health crises, combined with weak and ineffectual governance, could precipitate future conflicts of this kind—although it will be difficult to know where and when without more precise local studies of both underlying political dynamics and the regionally-specific impacts of climate change.

2100 and Beyond

While the national security impacts of climate change to 2050 are likely to be costly and disruptive for the U.S. military—and devastating for many people around the world—at some point after 2050, if warming continues at its current pace, changes to the climate could fundamentally reshape geopolitics and possibly even the current nation-state basis of the current global order.

To be clear, both the ultimate level of warming and its attendant political consequences is highly speculative, for the reasons I explained in my last post. Nonetheless, we do know that the planet is currently on track for at least 3-4°C of warming by 2100. The “known knowns” of higher levels of warming—say, 3°C—are frightening. At that 3°C of warming, for example, scientists project that there will be a nearly 70 percent decline in wheat production in Central America and the Caribbean, 75 percent of the land area in the Middle East and more than 50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat, and sea level rise could displace and imperil the lives hundreds of millions of people, among other consequences.

But even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century. At these levels of warming, some regions of the world would be literally uninhabitable, likely resulting in the depopulation of the tropics, to say nothing of the consequences of sea-level rise for economically important cities such as Amsterdam and New York. Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could theoretically accommodate the resulting migrants, this presumes that the political response to this unprecedented global displacement would be orderly and conflict-free borders on fantasy.

The geopolitical consequences of significant levels of warming are severe, but if these changes occur in a linear way, at least there will be time for human systems to adjust. Perhaps more challenging for national security is the possibility that the until-now linear changes give way to abrupt and irreversible ones. Scientists forecast that, at higher levels of warming—precisely what level is speculative—humanity could trigger catastrophic, abrupt and unavoidable consequences to the ecosystem. The IPCC has considered nine such abrupt changes; one example is the potential shutting down of the Indian summer monsoon. Over a billion people are dependent upon the Indian monsoon, which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall; relatively minor changes in the monsoon in either direction can cause disasters. In 2010, a wetter monsoon led to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which directly affected 20 million people; a drier monsoon in 2002 led to devastating drought. Studies suggest that the Indian summer monsoon has two stable states: wet (i.e., the current state) and dry (characterized by low precipitation over the subcontinent). At some point, if warming continues, the monsoon could abruptly shift into the second, “dry” state, with catastrophic consequences for over a billion people dependent on monsoon-fed agriculture. The IPCC suggests that such a state-shift is “unlikely”—that is, there is a 10 to 33 percent chance that a state-shift will happen in the 21st century—but scientists also have relatively low confidence in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms in this and other large-scale natural systems.

The consequences of abrupt, severe warming for national security are obvious in general, if unclear in the specifics. In 2003, the Defense Department asked a contractor to explore such a scenario. The resulting report outlined the offensive and defensive national security strategies countries may adopt if faced with abrupt climate change, and highlighted the increased risk of inter- and intra-state conflict over natural resources and immigration. Although the report may be off in its imagined timeframe (positing abrupt climate change by 2020), the world it conjures is improbable but not outlandish. If the Indian monsoon were to switch to dry state, and a billion people were suddenly without reliable food sources, for example, it is not clear how the Indian government would react, assuming it would survive in its current form. Major wars or low-intensity proxy conflicts seem likely, if not inevitable, in such a scenario.

This is not to say that a parade of climate horribles is certain—or even likely—to come to pass. Scientific understanding of the sensitivities in the climate system are far from perfect. It is also possible that emissions will decline more rapidly than anticipated, averting the worst consequences of climate change. But this outcome is far from guaranteed. And even if global emissions decline precipitously, humanity cannot be sure when or whether the planet has crossed a climate tipping point beyond which the incremental nature of the current changes shifts from the current linear, gradual progression to a non-linear and abrupt process.

Within the next few decades, the most likely scenario involves manageable, but costly, consequences on infrastructure, food security and natural disasters, which will be borne primarily by the world’s most impoverished citizens and the members of the military who provide them with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But while the head-turning national security impacts of climate change are probably several decades away, the nature of the threat is such that waiting until these changes manifest is not a viable option. By the time the climate consequences are severe enough to compel action, there is likely to be little that can be done on human timescales to undo the changes to environmental systems and the human societies dependent upon them.

#### No nuclear winter – consensus of scientists support recent models that disprove the theory

Russell Seitz 11, a former associate of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University’s Center for International Affairs, “Nuclear winter was and is debatable”, Nature. 7/1/2011, Vol. 475 Issue 7354, p37-37. 1

Alan Robock's contention that there has been no real scientific debate about the 'nuclear winter' concept is itself debatable (Nature 473, 275–276; 2011). This potential climate disaster, popularized in Science in 1983, rested on the output of a one-dimensional model that was later shown to overestimate the smoke a nuclear holocaust might engender. More refined estimates, combined with advanced three-dimensional models (see http://go.nature.com/kss8te), have dramatically reduced the extent and severity of the projected cooling. Despite this, Carl Sagan, who co-authored the 1983 Science paper, went so far as to posit “the extinction of Homo sapiens” (C. Sagan Foreign Affairs 63, 75–77; 1984). Some regarded this apocalyptic prediction as an exercise in mythology. George Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology protested: “Nuclear winter is the worst example of the misrepresentation of science to the public in my memory,” (see http://go.nature.com/yujz84) and climatologist Kerry Emanuel observed that the subject had “become notorious for its lack of scientific integrity” (Nature 319, 259; 1986). Robock's single-digit fall in temperature is at odds with the subzero (about −25 °C) continental cooling originally projected for a wide spectrum of nuclear wars. Whereas Sagan predicted darkness at noon from a US–Soviet nuclear conflict, Robock projects global sunlight that is several orders of magnitude brighter for a Pakistan–India conflict — literally the difference between night and day. Since 1983, the projected worst-case cooling has fallen from a Siberian deep freeze spanning 11,000 degree-days Celsius (a measure of the severity of winters) to numbers so unseasonably small as to call the very term 'nuclear winter' into question.

## 1AR—Fem Representation DA

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### Non-unique—US has one of the worst gender representation rates in the world.

**Newburger 19** [Emma Newburger, CNBC Reporter covering climate change and politics, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/04/the-us-ranks-75th-in-womens-representation-in-government.html>, “Despite gains, the US ranks 75th globally in women’s representation in government] JJ

But despite historic wins — and the building momentum behind [several high-profile female candidates](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/21/four-women-expected-to-run-for-president-in-2020.html) for the 2020 presidential election — the U.S. lags far behind other countries on women representation in government.

In fact, it ranks 75th out of 193 countries, according to recent data from [the Inter-Parliamentary Union](http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm), an advocacy group that tracks rankings. This year’s historic percentage of women-held Congressional seats doesn’t even meet the [global average](http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm) of 24.1 percent representation.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union list ranks countries based on the percentage of women in a lower or single House, whose powers are more comparable across countries. Women in the U.S. Senate are not considered as part of the ranking, since upper houses tend to vary in terms of function and structure.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### Even if there’s an initial decline, more political access creates long-term positive trends.

**Abby Cordova and Rangel 17** [Abby Cordova and Gabriel Rangel, Professors at the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky, “Addressing the Gender Gap: The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Women’s Electoral Engagement, <https://polisci.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Cordova%26Rangel_Compulsory%20Voting_ID%20CPS-15-0568_website.pdf>] JJ

First, when all citizens are required by law to cast a ballot, discussion of politics becomes vibrant and political information more readily available during electoral campaigns (Birch, 2009; Shineman, 2012). Consequently, individuals who typically have a harder time acquiring political information, such as women, have more opportunities to receive or be exposed to information about contending political parties. Second, women should be more inclined to seek information about political parties during electoral campaigns in countries with enforced CV laws. Due to their more limited resources, women in these countries are more likely than men to perceive the cost of voting in election after election as an expensive non-recoverable cost (i.e., a sunk cost).4 Women should then be particularly motivated to actively seek information on political parties to avoid wasting their vote.

#### Empirics over series of countries and long periods of time indicate that CV systems have more gender equality than VV ones.

**Abby Cordova and Rangel 17** [Abby Cordova and Gabriel Rangel, Professors at the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky, “Addressing the Gender Gap: The Effect of Compulsory Voting on Women’s Electoral Engagement, <https://polisci.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Cordova%26Rangel_Compulsory%20Voting_ID%20CPS-15-0568_website.pdf>] JJ

In short, as CV laws create opportunities and motivations for women to acquire political information, we should observe higher rates of female engagement with the electoral process and its main actors, particularly political parties. In this paper, we search for evidence supporting these expectations by taking into account multiple indicators of electoral engagement. Our empirical analyses rely on post-election survey data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) gathered between 1996 and 2011 in a large number of countries across all regions of the world. The results of our multilevel analysis are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Compared to VV systems, countries that promote voter turnout through enforced CV laws have smaller gender gaps not only in voting, but also in political party information, electoral campaign attentiveness, political party attachment and participation in electoral campaigns. Notably, these results are robust even after we account for the effect of women’s numeric representation in the legislature and the proportionality of the electoral system.

## 1AR—Minority Representation DA

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### Minority representation is abysmally low in the United States.

**Brown and Atske 19** [Sara Atske and Anna Brown, research associates focusing on social and demographic trends at the Pew Research Center, “Blacks have made gains in U.S. political leadership, but gaps remain, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/18/blacks-have-made-gains-in-u-s-political-leadership-but-gaps-remain/>] JJ

As of 2019, there is greater representation in some areas – 52 House members are black, putting the share of black House members (12%) on par with the share of blacks in the U.S. population overall for the first time in history. But in other areas, there has been little change (there are three black senators and no black governors).

The share of blacks serving in a presidential Cabinet was at or above parity with the population during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. But there was Wonly one black Cabinet secretary during Obama’s first term, and the same is true so far in Donald Trump’s administration.

### 1AR—Straight Turn

#### Civic duty voting can redress racial inequalities and increaser representation by reducing voter suppression.

**Dionne Jr. 20** [E.J. Dionne Jr., senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a syndicated columnist for the Washington Post, and University Professor in the Foundations of Democracy and culture at Georgetown University, “Universal Voting: Your questions, our answers, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/08/06/universal-voting-your-questions-our-answers/>] JJ

Universal civic duty voting would also help ensure increased political participation in communities of color that have long confronted exclusion from our democracy. With the reforms that would necessarily accompany it, civic duty voting would permanently block voter suppression measures. The reprehensible police killing of George Floyd shocked the conscience of the nation and forced its attention to entrenched racial injustice. Floyd’s death, and those of Rayshard Brooks and Breonna Taylor, called forth large-scale protests around the country against police violence that has long been an enraging fact-of-life in Black neighborhoods. The new movement is demanding a thoroughgoing overhaul of policing but also a larger confrontation with racism. The demand for equal treatment has been reinforced by unequal suffering during a pandemic whose costs to health, life, and economic well-being have been borne disproportionately by communities of color. Voting rights, equal participation, and an end to exclusion from the tables of power are essential not only for securing reform, but also for creating the democratic conditions that would make social change durable. Police brutality, as an expression of systemic racism, is not merely about how Americans are policed but whose voices are heard on policing. Universal voting could amplify long-suppressed voices so that long-denied solutions to systemic racism are represented in the voting booth and enacted in legislatures. “Give us the ballot,” Martin Luther King Jr. declared in 1957, “and we will transform the salient misdeeds of bloodthirsty mobs into the calculated good deeds of orderly citizens.”5 As our nation opens its mind and its heart to forms of social reconstruction that were far removed from the public agenda only months ago, we believe that transformative adjustments to our voting system are now in order.

## 1AR—Uninformed Voter DA

### 1AR—General

#### 1] Case solves uninformed voter DA—it creates a cultural shift in the United States so that voters are more politically engaged and informed.

#### 2] Non-unique—uninformed voters are voting for right now—literally all of fucking trump’s base.

#### 3] No distortionary impact – it’s rooted in racist policy, most voters are already uninformed but rational, and downstream effects solve.

Dionne and Rapoport et. al 20 (E J, and Miles Rapoport. Brookings Institution & The Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation @ Harvard. “Lift Every Voice The Urgency of Universal Civic Duty VOTING.” *Brookings*, Brookings Institute, 20 July 2020, [www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Br\_LIFT\_Every\_Voice\_final.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Br_LIFT_Every_Voice_final.pdf). pp40-41) DLuo

The “Ignorant Voters” Argument Responding to President Obama’s suggestion in 2015, Trevor Burrus of the Cato Institute warned Americans to consider that their “fully informed” vote “will count as much as a person who chooses his candidate by throwing a dart at [a] board with all the candidates’ pictures.”105 This is a concern that Burrus shared with Jason Brennan, who has written at length about how “voters don’t know best,” and has argued that citizens lack the specialist “knowledge” required for voting. (The book chapter in which Brennan argues that “[c]ompulsory voting changes the quality of the electorate” is titled: “Should we force the drunk to drive?”)106 At a basic level, this argument is an objection to democracy itself—which some on the right have acknowledged with their insistence over the decades that “the United States is a republic, not a democracy.” (We are, or aspire to be, a democratic republic.) Historically, citizens were excluded as being “unqualified” to vote on the grounds that they lacked information, education, or a sufficient property stake. But this is precisely the attitude toward voting that we have rejected by steadily broadening the franchise, eliminating not only property tests but also poll taxes and “literacy tests.” The scare quotes are appropriate, since literacy tests were often used in the Jim Crow era to disqualify Black, but not white voters. Brennan, for one, doesn’t think much of the electorate that exists now, without compulsory voting. He writes that “most voters are already ignorant, biased, economically innumerate, and misinformed.” He adds that “the median voter is better informed than the median nonvoter, but not by much.”107 If opponents of compulsory voting are primarily interested in an electorate that passes the sorts of tests they might administer to root out the “ignorant” and the “biased,” their problem is not with compulsory voting but with broad democratic participation itself. Moreover, there is an impressive political science literature, from V. O. Key Jr.’s classic The Responsible Electorate to Samuel Popkin’s more recent The Reasoning Voter, arguing that voters are more rational in their choices than democracy’s critics would suggest. As Key put it in the first sentence of his book: “The perverse and unorthodox argument of this little book is that voters are not fools.”108 This view lies at the heart of this report. No democratic system—and, for that matter, no governing system—is perfect because human beings are not angels, as James Madison observed. But liberal democracy works because combining majority rule with guarantees of individual rights has historically done a better job than other regime types in preserving liberty and representing the popular will. The more inclusive electorate that civic duty voting would create will better represent the popular will. It’s worth noting that this democratic instinct was reflected in our survey even among opponents of our proposal, the vast majority rejected a fear of “undereducated voters” as a major reason for their view. We also believe universal voting could increase citizen knowledge because it would free up resources now spent on turning out 40 to 60 percent of the electorate to the tasks of persuasion and voter education. It would also require candidates and parties to direct their campaigns to the entire electorate, and not simply those on some A-List of “likely” voters. Universal voting could also strengthen the nation’s civic culture more broadly and encourage a new commitment to civics education. With voting a requirement for all, high schools would have new incentives to ensure that students receive the requisite tools for active citizenship, and other community institutions would have a similar interest. Universal voting would create new opportunities to build a culture of citizenship.

### 1AR—Link Turn

#### 1] informed voters are often “older citizens” who tend to lean more conservatively.

### 1AR—Internal Link Defense

#### The aff is not worse than the squo—information is overblown—informed voters don’t make better conclusions.

#### Klein 15 [Ezra Klein, The editor-at large and founder of gox. Before that, he was a columnist and editor at the Washington Post, a policy analyst at MSNBC, written for the new Yorker, “Why the most informed voters are often the most badly misled,’” <https://www.vox.com/2015/6/8/8740897/informed-voters-may-not-be-better-voters>] JJ

n 2006, the political scientists Christopher Achens and Larry Bartels presented a paper titled [**"It Feels Like We're Thinking: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy."**](http://www.princeton.edu/~bartels/thinking.pdf) In it, Achens and Bartels make a point that is so obvious we often forget its implications: "Very few politically consequential facts are subject to direct, personal verification."

In other words, an informed voter rarely knows anything firsthand, the way we know the sky is blue and the sun rose this morning. Everything she knows is taken on trust; an informed voter is only as good as her information sources. And because we all get to choose which information sources to believe, voters with more information are not always more informed. Sometimes, they're just more completely and profoundly misled.

Looking at the 1996 election, for instance, Achens and Bartels studied whether voters knew the budget deficit had dropped during President Clinton's first term (it had, and sharply). What they found will shake anyone who believes more information leads to a smarter electorate: how much voters knew about politics mattered less than which party they supported. Republicans in the 80th percentile of political knowledge were less likely to answer the question correctly than Democrats in the 20th percentile of political knowledge.

## 1AR—Lashout

### 1AR impact calc

#### Primacy turns all their impacts--Hegemonic transition periods spark regional war which create Noko war since they are revisionist powers looking to take over the international order.

#### Primacy solves their arguments—Our kagan evidence indicates revisionist powers are checked by US military hard power.

### 1AR—Uniqueness

#### This DA is missing uniqueness—trump knows he’s losing—impact should have already been triggered.

#### Cillizza 20 [Chris Cillizzza, “Here’s proof Donald Trump knows he’s losing,” <https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/18/politics/2020-debates-trump-biden/index.html>, “CNN politics reporter and editor-at large, covering national politics including the White House, Congress, and every district they represent. His reporting lives under the brand, “The point with Chris Cillizza” and includes a nightly newslater] JJ

Trump's approval rating in [Gallup data](https://news.gallup.com/poll/312572/trump-job-approval-slides.aspx) took a double-digit hit in recent weeks and a slew of [swing state](https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/04/politics/electoral-map-2020-election-donald-trump-joe-biden/index.html) and [national polling](https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/our-new-polling-averages-show-biden-leads-trump-by-9-points-nationally/) shows him trailing Biden by significant margins.

It's absolutely no coincidence that faced with those numbers, the Trump campaign has reversed its position on debates.

Conventional political wisdom dictates that the candidate pushing for more debates is the candidate who is trailing. That person needs debates to create a moment (or moments) that can change the momentum and trajectory of the contest.

That person isn't usually the incumbent. Typically challengers push for more debates because they need a forum to land the one big punch that can change things.

And so, it's very telling that Trump now finds himself needing more than the standard three debates. It means that the President doesn't think he's winning right now -- and doesn't necessarily see a way to get to victory without more debates.

### 1AR—Thumpers

#### Millions of thumpers disproves wag the dog—stock market falling 1000 points, Trumpcare being prevented by mccain, coronavirus failure.

### 1AR—Wag the Dog wrong

#### Their wag the dog card happened three years ago but their impact still hasn’t been triggered—be heavily skeptical about their spectacular claims.

### 1AR—IL Defense

#### 3] He won’t strike – deals, relations, perception of war

TASS 8-8 [TASS, 8-8-2020, "Trump vows to quickly achieve deals with Iran, N. Korea if re-elected," TASS, https://tass.com/world/1187127 WASHINGTON, August 8. /TASS/. US President Donald Trump said that if re-elected, he would achieve agreements with Iran and North Korea ‘very quickly.’] srey

"If and when we win, we will make deals with Iran very quickly. We'll make deals with North Korea very quickly," the US leader told reporters in Bedminster, New Jersey, on Friday. "If I didn’t win the election in 2016, our country would be - maybe it would be over by now - in war with North Korea," he continued. "You would have been at war with North Korea, and it would have been a very bad war." "And we have relationship with North Korea, which is something <…> never established by the previous administration," Trump added.

## 1AR—Stimulus

### 1AR—Impact calculus

#### Our impact solves the Impact—Kagan indicates that US hard military checks back Chinese revisionism in the slightest.

### 1AR—Non-Unique

#### ]Non-unique The GOP said the stimulus bill was “*dead on arrival*” and other bills are *already complicating* its passage

Wang 7-9 – writer and journalist about financial subjects and contributed to www.WalletHacks.com. Graduate from Carnegie Mellon University with a Masters in Software Engineering. Wang uses his analytical skills to navigate the financial world. It's through this training that he tries to distill complex financial ideas into simple steps regular folks can use to take control of their money and build wealth. (Jim, “Second Stimulus Check Update: Here’s Everything We Know Right Now.” Forbes. July 9, 2020. DOA: July 11, 2020. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jimwang/2020/07/09/second-stimulus-check-update-what-we-know-so-far/#7c9da0a42c0d)//MGalian>

The leading Democrat stimulus check proposal comes from the Heroes Act. This bill passed the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives but was considered “dead on arrival” in the Republican Senate. Still, it’s the only comprehensive stimulus proposal from either party to pass with a vote from either chamber. The Heroes Act proposes a one-time $1,200 direct payment for each adult ($2,400 for joint tax returns) and each child (up to three children). The maximum $6,000 household payment is for a family of five. This bill addresses the qualification gaps the Cares Act overlooks that most likely should qualify for a stimulus payment. For instance, non-citizen spouses and college students did not qualify for the first $1,200 stimulus check. A $1,200 stimulus payment is also a good baseline as Representative Bobby Rush (D-IL) proposed a $1,200 check for Pell Grant recipients. This group of low-income college students was left out of the original Cares Act legislation. One of the most aggressive stimulus check proposals comes from Representatives Ro Khanna (D-CA) and Tim Ryan (D-OH). These two congressmen propose a $2,000 monthly payment and $500 per child (up to three children) for at least six months. A monthly stimulus payment is very unlikely in 2020, but maybe Congress and Trump will lobby for a one-time $2,000 stimulus check instead of another $1,200 one-time payment. That would be larger. How Quickly Could We Receive a Second Stimulus Check? This stimulus bill requires bipartisan support in the House and Senate to pass. The Cares Act underwent several revisions before landing on President Trump’s desk for his signature. How quickly both chambers pass this forthcoming bill depends on how quickly both parties come to an agreement. The Senate is set to return to work on July 20th through August 7th but the House is set to start their summer recess on August 3rd. The House is scheduled for votes through July 31st. If Congress is able to pass a bill before July 31st and it is signed by the President, then it would take a little more than two weeks after passage for the first checks to go out. The first stimulus checks could start going out in late August or early September. If they cannot come to an agreement and stick to the current schedule, then the next Senate recess starts on August 7th and runs until September 8th. The House returns on the 8th as well. It doesn’t appear that either chamber is willing to work through the recess at this time to pass the fourth stimulus bill - but that could change in a few weeks. The only silver lining that helps Americans get their checks sooner faster is that the IRS has your direct deposit information on file from the first stimulus check. Your payment may be delivered by debit card or paper check if the IRS doesn’t have your bank details. Also, the stimulus check won’t be the only issue in the bill - and many of these could cause problems for the bill’s passage.

### Link—

#### No link—this card is from 2016, which is during the Obama administration—obviously not specific to the current political situation—the GOP has changed a lot from four years.

#### missing internal link—this card merely says republicans hate compulsory voting but never says republicans will stop being bipartisan after access.

### 1AR—Impact uniqueness

#### 1] China trade war proves the impact is momentously high that neither side wants military conflict

#### 2] Double bind: The economic contraction we had in covid is enough to pass the brink and the DA should’ve been triggered or there’s no clear brink for the impact.

#### 3]

## 1AR—Wag the Dog DA

### 1AR—No Impact

#### Trump will use diversions like wiretapping, not going to war – His go-to move is tweeting

Harris 17 (Michael, writer, journalist and documentary filmmaker. He was awarded a Doctor of Laws for his “unceasing pursuit of justice for the less fortunate among us.” His nine books include Justice Denied, Unholy Orders, Rare ambition, Lament for an Ocean and Con Game, “Wagging the Dog”, https://ipolitics.ca/2017/03/05/wag-the-dog/)

The Director of National Intelligence at the time, James Clapper, has categorically denied that the FBI either sought or was given such a warrant. He also categorically denied that any intelligence agency wire-tapped Trump, either as president-elect or presidential candidate. That view was echoed by a bevy of senior intelligence officers. That would mean that Trump is playing Birther politics again. It would mean that the alleged wire-tap was at best illegal, clandestine and a crime. Or that the whole thing is made-up. Just as Trump spent years insisting that Obama was not an American citizen — a claim he made against all the evidence — he is now slandering the former president again, this time as a crook who abused the powers of the presidency to damage a political foe. The essence of public accusation of a crime is the provision of proof. Instead, Sean Spicer has already said that until Congress does what Trump has asked for, neither he nor the president will be commenting further on the matter. The president is effectively asking the House and Senate intelligence committees to find the evidence he doesn’t have — a hapless diversion from their real task of figuring out whether Vladimir Putin was playing footsie with the Trump team.

#### Vote fraud is Trump’s wag the dog – Won’t use military strikes

Barry 17 (Lynn, letter to USA Today, “Voter fraud was, and is, just a distraction”, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/02/15/voter-fraud-just-distraction-tellusatoday/97956970/)

It has become clear to me that this whole voter fraud insistence by President Trump is the new “wag the dog” to keep the nation’s attention from the real bite. Stephen Miller, policy aide to the president, commanded viewers to focus on voter fraud and his condescending tone almost dared anyone to not concentrate on this issue above other suspicious issues like Russian involvement with now ex-National Security Adviser Michael Flynn and others in power in the current administration. As a country, we must be vigilant and act swiftly. Innocent until proven guilty seems naive in the face of harder and harder to prove innocence. Let’s not become distracted. We must stay the course of investigating what ties there are between our new administration and Russia.

#### Wikileaks proves he can divert attention without military action

LCN 17 (Lima Charlie News, military news, “Trump tweets and Wikileaks raise allegations of textbook diversion”, https://www.limacharlienews.com/politics-society/trump-tweets-obamawiretap-wikileaks/)

In the midst of the controversy, as if on cue, Wikileaks announced another document dump. On Tuesday, the controversial organization released a “trove” of alleged C.I.A. hacking methods used to break into smartphones, computers and Internet connected televisions, dubbed “Vault 7 Part 1 ‘Year Zero’: Inside the CIA’s global hacking force.” It appears, however, that none of the documents have any relevance to the President’s allegations of an Obama wire tap, or any examples of how these CIA methods have been used against actual foreign (or domestic) targets. Intelligence experts were quick to question whether the Wikileaks dump was merely a classic diversion from the real issues surrounding the Trump campaign of Russian influence on Election 2016. Malcolm Nance, US Navy veteran, intelligence expert and author of “The Plot to Hack America: How Putin’s Cyberspies and WikiLeaks Tried to Steal the 2016 Election,” tweeted, “Like any good intelligence op. Russian[s] know how to deceive on all levels. Another FSB/@wikileaks release to save Trump. Almost laughable.”