# Agonism FW

#### I affirm

#### Violence is a constitutive feature of ethics: Because every attempt to solve it is haunted by what it excludes, ethical theories must organize rather than inhibit it, since otherwise we could conceptualize nothing at all.

Hagglund, Martin. 2006. “The Necessity of Discrimination: Disjoining Derrida and Levinas.” diacritics 34 (1): 40–71. ///AHS PB

Derrida targets precisely this logic of opposition. As he argues in Of Grammatol- ogy, metaphysics has always regarded violence as derivative of a primary peace. The possibility of violence can thus be accounted for only in terms of a Fall, that is, in terms of a fatal corruption of a pure origin. By deconstructing this figure of thought, Derrida seeks to elucidate why violence is not merely an empirical accident that befalls something that precedes it. Rather, violence stems from an essential impropriety that does not allow anything to be sheltered from death and forgetting.9 Consequently, Derrida takes issue with what he calls the "ethico-theoretical decision" of metaphysics, which postulates the simple to be before the complex, the pure before the impure, the sincere before the deceitful, and so on.10 All divergences from the positively valued term are thus explained away as symptoms of "alienation," and the desirable is conceived as the return to what supposedly has been lost or corrupted. In contrast, Derrida argues that what makes it possible for anything to be at the same time makes it impossible for anything to be in itself. The integrity of any "positive" term is necessarily compromised and threatened by its "other." Such constitutive alterity answers to an essential corruptibility, which undercuts all ethico-theoretical deci- sions of how things ought to be in an ideal world.11 A key term here is what Derrida calls "undecidability." With this term he desig- nates the necessary opening toward the coming of the future. The coming of the future is strictly speaking "undecidable," since it is a relentless displacement that unsettles any definitive assurance or given meaning. One can never know what will have happened. Promises may always be turned into threats, friendships into enmities, fidelities into betrayals, and so on. There is no opposition between undecidability and the making of decisions. On the contrary, Derrida emphasizes that one always acts in relation to what cannot be predicted, that one always is forced to make decisions even though the consequences of these decisions cannot be finally established. Any kind of decision (ethical, political, juridical, and so forth) is more or less violent, but it is nevertheless necessary to make decisions. Once again, I want to stress that violent differentiation by no means should be understood as a Fall, where violence supervenes upon a harmony that precedes it. On the contrary, discrimination has to be regarded as a constitutive condition. Without divisional marks which is to say: without segregating borders there would be nothing at all. In effect, every attempt to organize life in accordance with ethical or political prescriptions will have been marked by a fundamental duplicity. On the one hand, it is necessary to draw boundaries, to demarcate, in order to form any community whatso- ever. On the other hand, it is precisely because of these excluding borders that every kind of community is characterized by a more or less palpable instability. What can not be included opens the threat as well as the chance that the prevalent order may be transformed or subverted. In Specters ofMarx, Derrida pursues this argument in terms of an originary "spec- trality." A salient connotation concerns phantoms and specters as haunting reminders of the victims of historical violence, of those who have been excluded or extinguished from the formation of a society. The notion of spectrality is not, however, exhausted by these ghosts that question the good conscience of a state, a nation, or an ideology. Rather, Derrida's aim is to formulate a general "hauntology" (hantologie), in contrast to the traditional "ontology" that thinks being in terms of self-identical presence. What is important about the figure of the specter, then, is that it cannot be fully present: it has no being in itself but marks a relation to what is no longer or not yet. And since time the disjointure between past and future is a condition even for the slightest moment, Derrida argues that spectrality is at work in everything that happens. An identity or community can never escape the machinery of exclusion, can never fail to engender ghosts, since it must demarcate itself against a past that cannot be encompassed and a future that cannot be anticipated. Inversely, it will always be threatened by what it cannot integrate in itself haunted by the negated, the neglected, and the unforeseeable. Thus, a rigorous deconstructive thinking maintains that we are always already in- scribed in an "economy of violence" where we are both excluding and being excluded. No position can be autonomous or absolute but is necessarily bound to other positions that it violates and by which it is violated. The struggle for justice can thus not be a struggle for peace, but only for what I will call "lesser violence." Derrida himself only uses this term briefly in his essay "Violence and Metaphysics," but I will seek to de- velop its significance.12 The starting point for my argument is that all decisions made in the name of justice are made in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. If there is always an economy of violence, decisions of justice cannot be a matter of choosing what is nonviolent. To justify something is rather to contend that it is less violent than something else. This does not mean that decisions made in view of lesser violence are actually less violent than the violence they oppose. On the contrary, even the most horrendous acts are justified in view of what is judged to be the lesser violence. For example, justifications of genocide clearly appeal to an argument for lesser violence, since the extinction of the group in question is claimed to be less violent than the dan- gers it poses to another group. The disquieting point, however, is that all decisions of justice are implicated in the logic of violence. The desire for lesser violence is never innocent, since it is a desire for violence in one form or another, and there can be no guarantee that it is in the service of perpetrating the better. Consequently, my argument is not that the desire for lesser violence answers to a normative ideal or that it is inherently good. Such an argument presupposes that there is a way to objectively define and measure violence, which is an untenable presup- position. Every definition and every measure of violence is itself violent, since it is based on decisions that are haunted by what they exclude. The criteria for what counts as violence are therefore always open to challenge. Indeed, there would be no chance to pursue political critique and to transform the law if the definitions of violence were not subject to possible alteration. A contemporary example is the extension of animal rights. What formerly went unrecognized as violence in the juridical sense the abuse and killing of animals has begun to be recognized as an illegal violence. A similar transformation of the criteria for what counts as violence is still underway with regard to subordinated classes, races, and genders. If there were an objective norm for what is less violent, the range of such political critique would be limited in advance and there would be an end to politics. In contrast, Derrida argues that politics is endless since any definition of violence is itself violent and given over to possible contestation.

#### And this also applies to politics. The very idea that a world without antagonism exists ignores the fundamental violence of life.

Chantal Mouffe, Belgian political theorist, currently teaching at University of Westminster, The Democratic Paradox, 2000 ///AHS PB

Rawls's scenario presupposes that political actors are only driven by what they see as their rational self-advantage. Passions are erased from the realm of politics, which is reduced to a neutral field of competing interests. Completely missing from such an approach is 'the political' in its dimension of power, antagonism and relationships of forces. What 'political liberalism' is at pains to eliminate is the element of 'undecidability' which is present in human relations. It offers us a picture of the well-ordered society as one from which - through rational agreement on justice - antagonism, violence, power and repression have disappeared. But it is only because they have been made invisible through a clever stratagem: the distinction between 'simple' and 'reasonable pluralism'. In that way, exclusions can be denied by declaring that they are the product of [as] the 'free exercise of practical reason' that establishes the limits of possible consensus. When a point of view is excluded it is because this is required by the exercise of reason; therefore the frontiers between [making] what is legitimate and what is not legitimate [legitimacy] appear as independent of power relations. Thanks to this leger-demain rationality and morality provide the key to solving the 'paradox of liberalism': how to eliminate its adversaries while remaining neutral. Alas, it is not enough to eliminate the political in its dimen-sion of antagonism and exclusion from one's theory to make it vanish from the real world. It does come back, and with a vengeance. Once the liberal approach has created a framework in which [antagonism] its dynamics cannot be grasped, and where the institutions and the discourses are missing that could permit that potential antagonisms manifest themselves under an agonistic mode the danger exists that instead of a struggle among adversaries, what will take place is a war between enemies. This is why, far from being conducive to a more reconciled society. this type of approach ends up by jeopardizing democracy. DEMOCRACY AND UNDECIDABILITY By bringing to light the potential consequences of Rawls's project, my aim was to reveal the danger of postulating that there could be a rational definite solution to the question of justice in a democratic society. Such an idea leads to the dosing of the gap between justice and law that is a constitutive space of modern democracy. To avoid such a closure, we should relinquish the very idea that there could be such a thing as a 'rational' political consensus; namely, one that would not be based on any form of exclusion. To present the institutions of liberal democracy as the outcome of a pure deliberative rationality is to reify them and make them impossible to transform. It is to deny the fact that, like any other regime, modern pluralist democracy constitutes a system of relations of power, and to render the democratic challenging of those forms of power illegitimate. To believe that a final resolution of conflicts is eventually possible - even if it is seen as an asymptotic approach to the regulative idea of a rational consensus - far from providing the necessary horizon of the democratic project, is something that puts it at risk. Indeed, such an illusion carries implicidy the desire for a reconciled society where pluralism would have been superseded. When it is conceived in such a way, pluralist democracy becomes a 'self-refuting ideal' because the very moment of its realization would coincide with its disintegration.

#### Thus we must not attempt to eradicate disagreement in politics but rather embrace it. Agonism entails creating an sphere of discourse where everything is open to contestation.

**Mouffe 2**

Once the theoretical terrain has been delineated in such a way, we can begin formulating an alternative to both the aggregative and the deliberative model, one that I propose to call 'agonistic pluralism'.30 A first distinction is needed in order to clarify the new perspective that I am putting forward, the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political'. By 'the political', I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. 'Politics', on the other side, indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence in conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'. I consider that it is only when we acknowledge the dimension of 'the political' and understand that 'politics' consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations, that we can pose what I take to be the central question for democratic politics. This question, pace the rationalists, is not how to arrive at a consent without exclusion, since this would imply the eradication of the political. Politics aims at [but] the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an 'us' by the determination of a 'them'. The novelty of democratic politics is not the overcoming of this us/them opposition - which is an impossibility - but the different way in which it is established. The crucial issue is to establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. Envisaged from the point of view of 'agonistic pluralism', the aim of democratic politics is to construct the 'them' in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed but as an 'adversary', that is somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question. This is the real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, which does not entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that we disagree with but treating those who defend them as legitimate opponents. This category of the 'adversary' does not eliminate antagonism, though and it should be distinguished from the liberal notion of the competitor with which it is sometimes identified. An adversary is an enemy. but a legitimate enemy. one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico political principles of liberal democracy: liberty and equality. But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of value. there is no rational resolution of the conflict. hence its antagonistic dimension.3 This does not mean. of course, that adversaries can never cease to disagree, but that does not prove that antagonism has been eradicated. To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion man a process of rational persuasion (in the same way as Thomas Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific paradigm is a conversion). Compromises are, of course, also possible; they are part and parcel of politics; but they should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation. Introducing the category of me 'adversary' [this] requires complexifying the notion of antagonism and distinguishing two different forms in which it can emerge antagonism properly speaking and agonism. Antagonism is struggle between enemies. while agonism is struggle between adversaries. We can therefore reformulate our problem by saying that envisaged from the perspective of 'agonistic pluralism' the aim of democratic politics is to transform "antagonism into agonism”. This requires providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary. An important difference with the model of 'deliberative democracy' is that for 'agonistic pluralism', the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic designs.

#### **Thus the standard is consistency with Agonistic Democracy. Prefer:**

#### [1] Preserving the agonistic sphere is a side constraint on any ethical theory: If we restricted discourse so certain moral systems weren’t evaluated this would create a double bind for your framework as it would either A) be excluded making talking about and using it impossible B) it would be impossible to determine its truth when not faced with all alternatives and possible criticisms.

#### [2] Performativity: Criticism of Agonism both in this round and in philosophical literature presupposes that not setting limits on ideological conflict is legitimate, because attacking the aff is inherently Agonistic. Additionally responding to the AC is a contradiction because you assume your responses are treated as legitimate and my framework is open to contestation, however equal access to discourse doesn’t matter the judge just should evaluate your arguments.

#### [3] The aff’s understanding of antagonism is a pre requisite to any conception of both social and philosophical identity.

**Mouffe 3**

In coming to terms with pluralism, what is really at stake is power and antagonism and their ineradicable character. This can only be grasped from a perspective that puts into question the objectivism and essentialism which arc dominant in democratic theory. In Hegemony, and Socialist strategy ,l we delineated an approach that asserts that any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power. This means that any social objectivity is ultimately political and has to show the traces of the acts of exclusion which govern its constitution; what, following Derrida, can be referred to as its 'constitutive outside'. This point is decisive. It is because every object has inscribed in its very being something other than itself and that as a result, everything is constructed as difference~. that its being cannot be conceived as pure 'presence' or 'objectivity'. Since the constitutive outside is present within the inside as its always real possibility every identity becomes purely contingent. This implies that we should not conceptualize power as an external relation taking place between two pre-constituted identities, but rather as constituting the identities themselves. This point of con8uence between objectivity and power is what we have called 'hegemony'

#### [4] Meaning is contingent on its social context, for example the word Rock can refer to motion, music, and object depending upon its use. Thus words and therefor linguistic rules have no transcendental basis we can empirically deduce. Agonism solves this because individuals compare and fight for their own meanings in a democratic space where a right answer doesn’t exist, thereby creating meaning. Absent this rules like the resolution would A) be incoherent and B) Independently would be unfollowable because we never would know if past meanings would hold up in every new context absent social interpretation.

#### [5] Politics is at its heart and individual act. Logically, indexes do not require each one to act, rather can operate independently.

 Enoch, David. "Giving Practical Reasons." Philosophers Imprint. The Hebrew University, Mar. 2011. Web. <https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/pod/dod-idx/giving-practical-reasons.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0011.004>. I should also note something it does not take for the role played by the given reason in the receiver’s practical reasoning to be appropriate. **It is not required that the role be**, as it were, **ultimate**. In other words, it is perfectly consistent with robust reason-giving thus understood that there be a further, fuller, perhaps more basic story of why it is that B does and should take A’s relevant intentions as reason-giving. **Perhaps**, for instance, **B is a simple utilitarian**, and let’s further assume that simple utilitarianism is indeed the true fundamental story about all reasons for action. **If so, B will take A’s request as a reason to [act] if** and only if, and because, **doing so will maximize utility**. But this does not mean that she doesn’t take, in those cases, A’s request to be a (nonultimate) reason. The crucial question is whether the ultimate (or perhaps just more basic) story here is one that goes through the reasongiver’s special intentions identified above (and the receiver’s recognition thereof), as in the case of the utilitarian request-receiver, in which case we may have a case of robust reason-giving; or whether the more basic story here works directly, leaving no role for the specific intentions that make reason-giving robust (as is the case in the dictator’s child example). Cases of this latter type are not, on the account I’m suggesting here, cases of robust reason-giving. And **this seems to me the independently plausible result** here. Notice that the intentions mentioned above do not include something like the intention that B actually Φs. This is so because **A can give B a reason to [act] Φ knowing well that other reasons may be relevant, including possibly stronger reasons not to [act] Φ**.52 Indeed, it seems to me A can make a genuine request that B Φs, all the time acknowledging that if certain other considerations bear on the case, B should not (all things considered) Φ. We do not want to restrict robust reason-giving to just the cases in which the reason-giver intends the given reason to outweigh all others. For similar reasons, **A need not intend that the given reason be the only reason** for which B Φs.

#### This justifies Agonism because since individuals are free to create and act upon their own viewpoints, politics must not try to compel conformity but instead allow open space for expression.

# Offense

#### Thus I affirm The United States federal government ought to grant reporters the right to protect the identity of confidential sources. Even if CX checks are bad on theory, evaluate them in cases of T and spec because bidirectional shells make it impossible to meet NC interps. Additionally reevaluate the aff under all neg T and Spec interps, because A) they are just paradigms for how we debate the res so winning one isn’t a reason to exclude my remaining offense B) they are just reasons to drop the arg . because they just restrict negs options, so winning they are bad just means the neg shouldn’t be restricted. Additionally, all neg theory arguments are counter-interps, because I implicitly take a stance on certain norms in the 1AC.

Margot Harris, Is It Finally Time For A Federal Shield Law?, July 26, 2018 is the solvency advocate , <https://www.newsmediaalliance.org/fed-shield-law-2018/> ///AHS PB

In February 2018, the Department of Justice notified New York Times reporter Ali Watkins that her email and phone had been seized as part of a leak investigation — a case that resulted in the June 7 arrest of James Wolfe. Watkins’s three-year relationship with the high-ranking aide on the Senate Intelligence Committee (which she covered before joining the Times) soon became public fodder. The titillating nature of the story, coupled with the increasingly tense relationship between the Trump administration and the press, seemed to have reignited the public’s interest in a federal shield law. The Watkins case was met with a deluge of think pieces, Twitter wars and outrage from free press advocacy groups. The calls for federal protection of reporters’ privilege extended beyond an outraged internet; this past Tuesday, Representative Jim Jordan (R-Ohio) led a hearing before the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittees on Intergovernmental Affairs and Healthcare, Benefits, and Administrative Rules entitled “Shielding Sources: Safeguarding the Public’s Right to Know.” Representatives and witnesses representing a range of affiliations to the media industry discussed H.R. 4382, the Free Flow of Information Act, which was first introduced in the House in November 2017. The measure would provide federal protection for journalists, shielding them from being compelled to disclose their sources in court. Witness testimony shed light on the importance of a federal shield law — a necessary addition to the state-level protections journalists have now. According to Lee Levine, senior counsel at Ballard Spahr, LLP, 49 states and the District of Columbia have adopted shield laws, but these protections vary in scope, and none can[t] protect journalists from having to give up their source during a federal investigation.. Conflicting laws and judicial precedent have rendered journalists and the legal community wholly unsure about what rights journalists [they] have to protect their sources. Rick Blum, policy director at the Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP) said that, “depending on what court you’re fighting the subpoena in, you may get a different result.” Indeed, some states have shield laws allowing journalists “absolute privilege,” while others have shield laws that cover only “qualified privilege” and contain some exemptions. A reporter fighting a subpoena in Oregon (an absolute privilege state), for example, would likely fare better in court than a reporter in North Carolina (a state with qualified privilege). While a federal shield law would not supersede state laws, protection on the federal level would send a clear message about the importance of preserving the relationships journalists have with their sources. Jordan, the chairman of the subcommittee, stressed the urgency of reclaiming First Amendment protections and issued a stern reminder that Congress cannot look the other way while the government intimidates journalists in pursuit of their confidential sources. He went on to applaud earnest bipartisan efforts to move forward with a federal shield law, saying that both he and colleague Jamie Raskin (D-Md.) agree that the government cannot “intimidate or censor the town crier, be it the chief contributor to The New York Times or a freelance journalist from the 4th district of Ohio.” Raskin, meanwhile, echoed the sentiments of his late father, philosopher Marcus Raskin, reminding the assembled that “democracy and its operating principle, the rule of law, require[s] a ground to stand on and that ground is the truth.” That truth, he explained, comes from the indispensable service that journalists provide. While not everyone can attend congressional hearings or city council meetings or travel to warzones to determine the meaning and reality of foreign policies, we are all impacted by these events and should be “equally invested in ascertaining the truth of what is happening in our names as citizens.” Without a robust and free press, this cannot happen. Subcommittee members and witnesses didn’t shy away from the role the current administration plays in the oppressive environment for journalists. Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-Ill.), referencing the United States’ plummet to number 45 on the World Press Freedom Index (a list compiled by Reporters Without Borders to reflect the independence of the press around the world), asked witnesses to state the ways in which the Trump administration has specifically threatened a free press. The RCFP’s Blum emphasized that journalists have thick skin and can take personal jabs and criticisms from the president, but Donald Trump’s attempts to discredit the industry as a whole have damaging implications. When a leader calls the press “the enemy of the people” and tells the public they can’t believe what they read, journalists’ ability to tell the critical untold narratives is undermined. “It’s harder to write a story if their audience or sources don’t think they’ll be given a fair shake,” Blum said. Moreover, the public now struggles to determine what is true — an issue that rises above partisanship. Perhaps most importantly, witness testimony revealed the very tangible loss we’ll experience if reporters face continued intimidation. Sharyl Attkisson, investigative correspondent at FullMeasure, shared with the committee some of the award-winning stories she’s reported — stories that only came to light because of confidential sources: an investigation into fraud within the Red Cross after the influx of 9/11 donations; a report contradicting false information the government and BP provided in the wake of the 2010 oil spill — critical contributions to public discourse. Information from confidential sources can be “the genesis of a story,” she explained. Attkisson also alleged that the U.S. government engaged in unauthorized and illegal surveillance of her laptops and phones, and said she felt she could no longer guarantee her sources the protection they required to come forward. Raskin closed the hearing by reiterating that journalists underscore a healthy democracy — that they are “the life blood of American political culture.”

#### That Affirms

#### [1] The benefits of the aff are empirically proven. We lead to the breakdown of dominant structures of power.

William Blankenberg, Professor of Journalism at the University of Madison Wisconsin, The Utility of Anonymous Attribution, pub 1992, Method: The study analyzed a selection of approximately 5000 articles from The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The LA Times, which used sources on political matters, it then identified whether the source was anonymous or not and determined whether the viewpoints expressed where critical of the government VIA a comprehensive preset list of key words ///AHS PB

What this suggests is that anonymity permits not just more information but more antagonistic information. The virtue of this is that the First Amendment is grounded in a marketplace assumption that expects the "truth" - a viable public opinion, among other things - to rise from competing arguments. Anonymous attribution can enhance diversity and competition of viewpoints in a mass communication system that tends to value authority and "responsibility." As Roshco says, "Off-the-record information allows reporters to develop a degree of analytic knowledge about the matters they report. Even though self-interest may motivate "regular' confidential sources, such sources often enable reporters to offset some of the manipulative control inherent in publicity."21 The "manipulative control inherent in publicity" is not the only restraint on robust debate in news columns. Journalists' habitual reliance on stablished sources is well documented.22 So is newsroom socialization.23 The norms of attribution favor authority and conformity.24 Anonymous attribution is a way around constraints for both sources and reporters, with a potential benefit for the public. But the possibility that anonymity can cloak mischief makes editors wary. Quite likely the status difference between editors and reporters figures into this, with editors suspecting that the integrity of reporters is lower than their own. In many newsrooms, the use of anonymous attribution requires that the reporter identify the source to an editor. Wariness of anonymous attribution sometimes results from confusing secrecy with deceit. They're not the same. As Sissela Bok says, "To confuse secrecy and deception is easy, since all deception does involve keeping something secret-namely, that about which one wishes to deceive others. But while all deception requires secrecy, all secrecy is not meant to deceive."25 Secrecy in aid of critical truth-telling is quite valuable and finds formal approval in shield laws. Confidentiality is untenable when lies are told or legitimate privacy is invaded. Such expressions would be unethical under any kind of attribution. They are not unique to anonymous attribution. Whether viewed from an ethical or economic perspective, utility implies a calculation of costs and benefits. The intangibility of costs and benefits of anonymous attribution makes the equation hard to specify, though we can infer, from Table 5, that [empirically] anonymous attribution was associated with a 42 percent increment in critical coverage in the years 1988 through 1991.

#### [2] Logic: It is impossible to say an individual agent does not have the right to take an action since the capacity for choice in democratic pluralism entails the ability to choose whether you protect identity or not when you engage in the agonistic sphere

#### [3] The ability to protect ones identity is key under agonism, leaving behind preconceived notions of ones self creates new and different kinds of political engagement which are key to preserving the openness of agonistic democracy.

Asenbaum, H, Anonymity and Democracy: Absence as Presence in the Public Sphere, 2018, <https://westminsterresearch.westminster.ac.uk/download/262dbdddf063e82fb0662f67f459e8f7d90f88942b940d649d356a0a4f10d47e/130360/Anonymity_Democracy_final.pdf> ///AHS PB

The starting point for developing a more complex understanding of anonymity beyond a mere equation with privacy, is the observation that anonymity does not only facilitate identity negation but also affords identity creation. Sociologists like Erving Goffman (1956) pointed out decades ago that new identities are constructed on the foundation of the hidden identity. The mask— be it physical or virtual—serves both identity negation and creation. In the literature on anonymous political participation, identity negation is framed in terms of freedom of speech. Concealing identity appears necessary in the face of various repressive forces in society. Anonymity appears as negative freedom—as a means of becoming invisible and avoiding detection. Regarding online communication, Akdeniz (2002) argues: “Apart from facilitating freedom of expression, anonymity enables users to prevent surveillance and monitoring of their activities on the Internet from commercial companies and from the government” (233). Identity negation does, however, not only protect from interference of state and economic actors but also from peer pressure by family, friends, and colleagues. According to Barendt, the secret ballot was introduced in the late 19th century in the US and UK not only to protect workers from their employers; the voting booth also proved especially important to women gaining suffrage in the early- and mid-20th century as it shielded from the influence of husbands and fathers (Barendt 2016, 156ff). Identity negation, be it through voting booths, computer screens, or masks, results in the emergence of new imaginaries and alternative personae. Ruiz (2013) claims: “[T]he mask does not negate identity; instead it signifies the possibility of a multiplicity of identities... It suggests a way of thinking about blankness as a means not only of erasing difference but also as a means of articulating [it] difference” (275). Employing anonymity bestows democratic subjects with the ability to reinvent their appearance and thus influence their perception by others, be it through wearing a mask, designing an avatar, or creating a pseudonym. The literature on masked collective action interprets playful experimentation with a diversity of identities as having liberating effects. The democratic subject is temporarily relieved from the constraints of the one and only identity in the public sphere, which is subject to governance surveillance and commercial targeting. Mikhail Bakhtin (1996 [1968]), a prominent scholar on the carnivalesque, wrote: “The mask is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation, with gay relativity and merry negation of uniformity and similarity; it rejects conformity to oneself” (39, emphasis added).

#### That also proves the inescapability of the AC, if X and Mouffe prove that identities are always reconstituted through exclusion and relations, and that it is possible to present multiple identities in the social sphere, a conception of Identity cannot be limited to certain expressible aspects and thus is always unable to a reporter making revealing it impossible.