# Determinism NC

### Framework

#### Determinism or the view every action is pre determined and free will doesn’t exist is true

#### [1] Causality: The first law of thermodynamics holds that nothing can be created or destroyed, thus everything must have a cause if something cannot come from nothing. This means that either A) free will, which definitionally causes it self, is illogical as it does not have one or B) our free will is caused by something which is a contradiction and proves determinism true.

#### [2] Eternalism is true: Events do not solely exist in the present but instead exist with the past and future as one continuous spectrum.

Scott Ryan, Doctor of Philosophy in Religion from Baylor University and post doc fellow at Baylor, A Short Argument for Eternalism, 2013, <http://www.scholardarity.com/?page_id=3845> ///AHS PB

Consider two such moments, for example my eating of a peanut butter sandwich for lunch yesterday and my recollection of that experience today. It seems unproblematic to say that the first moment of experience temporally precedes the second. There seems to be a real relation between the two such that the first comes before the second and the second comes after the first. The question for the non-eternalist is whether that temporal relation really obtains. If “before” and “after” are not real relations, relations that in fact obtain between two objectively existing moments of consciousness, then it seems that time is unreal and eternalism follows trivially. But if they do obtain, then the non-eternalist faces a worse difficulty. For if all that is ever real is the present moment, then there is never a time at which both moments of experience exist, and so at least one of the relata always fails to exist. Granting that my eating of the peanut butter sandwich yesterday does not exist now, if there is no sense in which it exists timelessly, then it simply isn’t “there” to be in a relation of “coming before” to the moment of my recollection. If past and present never coexist in any eternal sense whatsoever, then it should be simply meaningless to say that one comes “before” the other; the past simply fails to exist, and therefore can’t be “related” to anything. A non-eternalist might reply to this argument by saying that the past does continue to exist, but only as past—that when the Moving Finger, having writ, moves on, each moment acquires a quality of “pastness” that differentiates it from the present moment without making it fall out of existence altogether. I think this will not do, primarily for the reason Sprigge makes clear in his essay. My experience of eating a peanut butter sandwich has a certain quality of presentness that is simply part and parcel of the experience; without that quality the experience would not be what it is/was, and indeed would arguably not be an “experience” at all. (Sprigge’s own example, which has the advantage of great vividness, is a toothache.) If that moment of experience is not eternally “there” with that very quality of presentness, then it is no longer available as a temporal relatum, and when I say that the experience of eating the sandwich comes “before” my recollection of it, I am referring not to the experience itself (which no longer exists qua experience) but to its ghost. Surely this is not what we mean to say when we say one experience precedes another; the view that began by apparently cleaving to common sense in the end departs from it egregiously.

#### And this proves determinism, if the future, past, and present are fixed, then all of our future actions already exist in time making free will meaningless.

#### [3] The best neuroscientific, psychological, and medical evidence evidence free will doesn’t exist. This article is a giant literature review of different fields published on a government website

Andrea Lavazza, Neuroethics, Centro Universitario Internazionale, Arezzo, Italy, Free Will and Neuroscience: From Explaining Freedom Away to New Ways of Operationalizing and Measuring It, 2016, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4887467/> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

All these experiments seem to indicate that free will is an illusion. Yet, these relevant experiments can be interpreted in many ways. A possible view is that, in some way, determinism can be observed directly within ourselves. This interpretation might lead to the conclusion that free will is just an illusion. In fact, if one considers as a condition of free will the fact that it should be causa sui (i.e., it should be able to consciously start new causal chains), such a condition is incompatible with determinism as it is usually defined. For it, in fact, all events are linked by casual relations in the form of natural laws, which started long before we were born and which we cannot escape. However, determinism has generally been regarded as a metaphysical claim, not refutable by empirical findings. One could properly talk of automatism in the brain, not of determinism, based on the evidence available. (In any case, endorsing indeterminism might lead to consider our behavior as the causal product of choices that every time produce different results, as if we rolled a dice. This doesn’t seem to make us any freer than if determinism were overturned; cf. Levy, 2011). Most importantly, another feature of freedom seems to be a pure illusion, namely the role of consciousness. The experiments considered thus far heavily question the claim that consciousness actually causes voluntary behavior. Neural activation starts the decisional process culminating in the movement, while consciousness “comes after”, when “things are done”. Therefore, [and] consciousness cannot trigger our voluntary decisions. But the role of consciousness in voluntary choices is part of the definition of free will (but the very definition of consciousness is a matter of debate, cf. Chalmers, 1996). Empirical research in psychology also shows that our mind works and makes choices without our conscious control. As proposed by psychologist Wegner (2002, 2003, 2004) and Aarts et al. (2004), we are “built” to have the impression to consciously control our actions or to have the power to freely choose, even though all that is only a cognitive illusion. Many priming experiments show that people act “mechanically” (even when their behavior might appear suited to the environment and even refined). Automatic cognitive processes, of which we aren’t always aware, originate our decisions, and they were only discovered thanks to the most advanced scientific research. Ultimately, consciousness, which should exercise control and assess the reasons for a choice, is thus allegedly causally ineffective: a mere epiphenomenon, to use the terminology of the philosophy of mind. This is what has been called Zombie Challenge, “based on an amazing wealth of findings in recent cognitive science that demonstrate the surprising ways in which our everyday behavior is controlled by automatic processes that unfold in the complete absence of consciousness” (Vierkant et al., 2013).

#### [4] Double bind: Denying the Determinist theory of causality proves that free will doesn’t exist

Colin McGinn. British philosopher. He has held teaching posts and professorships at University College London, the University of Oxford, Rutgers University and the University of Miami, Problems in Philosophy: The Limits of Inquiry. London: Wiley, 1993. P. 80, lol I copped this card off the big questions start pack so I guess I rehighlighted it. BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

The argument is exceedingly familiar, and runs as follows. Either determinism is true or it is not. If it is true, then all our chosen actions are uniquely necessitated by prior states of the world., just like every other event. But then it cannot be the case that we could have acted otherwise, since this would require a possibility determinism rules out. Once the initial conditions are set and the laws fixed, causality excludes genuine freedom. On the other hand, if indeterminism is true [not] , then, though things could have happened otherwise, it is not the case that we could have chosen otherwise, since a merely random event is no kind of free choice. That some events occur causelessly, or are not subject to law, or only to probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices. Thus one horn of the dilemma represents choices as predetermined happenings in a predictable causal sequence, while the other construes them as inexplicable lurches to which the universe is randomly prone. Neither alternative supplies what the notion of free will requires,, and no other alternative suggests itself. Therefore freedom is not possible in any kind of possible world. The concept contains the seeds of its own destruction.

### Offense

#### Now Negate:

#### [1] The aff says that the US ought not provide military aid, but the action of giving military aid is predetermined making statements that prescribe doing otherwise incoherent.

#### [2] Determinism denies the moral value of prohibitions and obligations, if all actions are already locked in then trying to make subjects morally culpable for them is meaningless as it is already predetermined the subject would do that. This negates the prescriptive value of ought statements making the aff incoherent.

#### [3]

# Extra Stuff

either our actions are entirely determined by prior causes outside of our control, or the set of prior causes does not determine our actions. In the former case, our actions are not directed by free will, but rather by a deterministic set of prior causes. In the latter case, we have the opportunity to make a decision, but it appears to be an exercise in random selection, since the decision is left entirely open by every factor.

1. **Induction: If x actions led to y results, then x actions must be influenced by a prior x action – this means that a causal chain of events structure my actions rather than my will.**

**OR**

1. **Future truths (logical determinism).** We can seemingly make true claims about the future. “I will have eggs for breakfast tomorrow (as I do every day).” Maybe I don’t *know* if that prediction is correct or not, but it seems obvious that it *is in fact* either correct or incorrect. And if statements about the future are already true or false now, it seems there’s no chance things will turn out differently. So the future is set.
2. **Causation and sufficient reason.** We think everything has a cause. My door unlocks because I turn the key, I turn the key because I want to get in, I want to get in because it’s raining, etc. And if the key fails to unlock the door, there’s a reason for that too—e.g. the lock is broken. We tend to assume there’s a reason for everything that happens and a reason it happens just the way it does and no other. We’re less ready to think things “just happen” or happen “for no reason.”
3. **Laws of nature.** This is a staple of our modern worldview. The universe is governed by laws. Whether we view the laws as just perfect regularities in events or as actual separate existents *responsible* *for* the regularities, it’s natural to think a lawful universe is fully determined.
4. **Uniformity of nature.** Here is a more basic argument to the natural-law one. We perceive orderliness in the universe; there’s regularity and predictability. (“Cosmos” even comes from the Greek for “order.”) A natural reaction to this is rather determinism than indeterminism, which is associated with irregularity and unpredictability. (I call this category “uniformity of nature” because that’s a classic term, but really it applies to the cultural and human world too; we experience orderliness and predictability in our everyday lives interacting with fellow humans.)
5. **Our normal expectations of physical and chemical theories.** Similar but not identical to the natural-law argument. Physical and chemical theories are impressively successful, and we expect them to be completely consistent. If our physics says the rocket will follow this trajectory with that speed burning this much fuel, then that will *definitely* happen *exactly* that way, unless some other factor intrudes which could and should have been accounted for. We trust chemistry to tell us exactly what will happen when two chemicals meet; they’ll always react in this way and result in just that amount of this new chemical.
6. **Time reversal symmetry of physical theories.** A more specific argument from a special theoretical property of physical theories. Physical equations are generally “time reversal symmetric”—they don’t depend on any specific direction of time; they allow you to “run” the processes they describe “both forwards and backwards” (if you “flip” the right pluses and minuses). But then it seems there’s nothing special about the “forward” direction of time; the future is just as set as the past.
7. **Eternalism.** In the metaphysics of time, *presentism* holds that only present things exist, but *eternalism* holds that past, present, and future things all exist equally; all of time is “already laid out.” Einstein’s theories seem to have this consequence, so we talk about a “block universe.” This makes the future set in the same way as logical determinism does. (Once again physical theories play a role, but there have also always been philosophical and religious arguments for eternalism.)
8. **Temporal determinism.** This is a related argument to both logical determinism and eternalism, but it doesn’t seem to depend on either of those. “Temporal determinism” is my own term. The idea is just that it’s in the nature of time that only one future is ever possible; after all we talk about *the* future just like *the* present and *the* past—it’s all singular. So whether it’s a brute fact or due to laws, causality, logic, future existents, or anything else, we might think time is just a singular straight trajectory.
9. **Queerness of indeterminacy.** I suspect this is ultimately the main source of resistance to indeterminism. Indeterminacy is just too weird and counterintuitive. We understand what it is for *us* to be uncertain whether P or not-P is true, but indeterminacy would be “uncertainty” in the things themselves, where *the world* would be “uncertain” whether P or not-P was true.
10. **Nothing comes from nothing.** Indeterminism may seem impossible due to the ancient metaphysical rule that nothing can come from nothing. If anything originated indeterministically, by definition some aspect of its existence or character would not be determined by anything else, but that seems to mean some aspect of it would not draw its being from anything else but from nothing. (A modern version of this argument could appeal to conservation of energy to disbar that “pure creation.”)
11. **Religious, theistic, and supernatural reasons.** This is just a miscellaneous category I’m including for comprehensiveness since I don’t expect it to be popular. Obviously you’ll find determinism very natural if you believe in fate, karma, or certain conceptions of God. (Divine foreknowledge I view as a subset of logical determinism.)

Denying proves it true

Negate

Ought not fails

**If Determinism is true, then an ethical calculus is incoherent since actions will happen inevitably if nature dictates.**

#### Other cards

Lavazza

The first relevant, and now well-known, strand of research on the brain correlates of free will was that pioneered by Libet et al. (1983), which focused on the allegedly unconscious intentions affecting decisions regarded as free and voluntary. It should be noted that the concepts involved—“conscious intentions”, “voluntary decisions”, “free decisions”—have no clear and shared definition (Nachev and Hacker, 2014), and the experiments themselves have been differently interpreted and often criticized (Lavazza and De Caro, 2010). In any case, Libet’s experiments and their variants have been repeated several times until very recently, confirming their findings with a sufficient degree of reliability. Libet based his work on Kornhuber and Deecke’s (1965) discovery of the bereitschaftpotential: the RP, a slow build-up of a scalp electrical potential (of a few microvolts), mainly measured through electroencephalography (EEG), that precedes the onset of subjectively SVM (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965). According to its discoverers, the RP is “the electro-physiological sign of planning, preparation, and initiation of volitional acts” (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1990). “The neurobiologist John Eccles speculated that the subject must become conscious of the intention to act before the onset of this RP. Libet had the idea that he should test Eccles’s prediction” (Doyle, 2011). In his experiments, Libet invited the participants to move their right wrist and to report the precise moment when they had the impression that they decided to do so, thanks to a big clock they had in front of them (Libet et al., 1983). In this way, it was possible to estimate the time of awareness with respect to the beginning of the movement, measured using an electromyogram (which records the muscle contraction). During the execution of the task, brain electrical activity was recorded through electrodes placed on the participants’ scalps. The attention was focused on a specific negative brain potential, namely the RP, originated from the supplementary motor area (SMA): a brain area involved in motor preparation, which is visible in the EEG signal as a wave that starts before any voluntary movement, while being absent or reduced before involuntary and automatic movements. When one compares the subjective “time” of decision and what appeared at a cerebral level, the result appears as a striking blow to the traditional view of free will (Libet, 1985, 2004). In the experiment, the RP culminating in the execution of the movement starts in the prefrontal motor areas long before the time when the subject seems to have made the decision: participants became aware of their intention to take action about 350 ms after the onset of such potential. The volitional process is detected to start unconsciously 550 ms before the action is made in the case of non-preplanned acts and 1000 ms before in the case of preplanned acts. Thus these findings seem to show that our simple actions (and therefore, potentially, also more complex ones) are triggered by unconscious neural activity and that the awareness of those actions only occurs at a later time, when we think we are willing to act. In the first phase of its intervention in the debate on free will, therefore, neuroscience seemed to argue for a deflation of freedom. Neuroscientists identified a specific aspect of the notion of freedom (the conscious control of the start of the action) and researched it: the experimental results seemed to indicate that there is no such conscious control, hence the conclusion that free will does not exist. However, it is important to highlight that this interpretation strongly depends on the idea that free choices or actions are fully internally generated, in the sense that they are not externally determined—where “external” means outside the subject’s conscience and the subject is something akin to the self. As we shall see, though, this distinction seems to be neither relevant nor truly informative when considering if and how choices are free.

#### Second neuroscience claim

A slightly different trend of research compared to Libet’s comprises studies suggesting that the conscious intention of an action is strongly influenced by events that occur after the action itself was performed. In this sense, intentions are therefore partially reconstructed according to a process of inference, based on elements that come after the action. For instance, a study by Lau et al. (2006) has produced results that empirically support this hypothesis. The authors have used transcranic magnetic stimulation (TMS) on the pre-supplementary motor (pre-SM) area, while the subjects were performing Libet’s task. The stimulation of the pre-SM through TMS happened at different time intervals, in relation to a simple voluntary movement. When the stimulation was applied 200 ms after the movement, the judgment W was moved back in time, indicating that the perception of the intention was influenced by the neural activity of the pre-SM after the motor action was made (cf. also Lau et al., 2004; Lau and Passingham, 2007). In another experiment, Banks and Isham (2009) have set a slightly different version of Libet’s task: participants were asked to push a button whenever they wanted, and later they had to indicate the precise moment when they had the intention to do so. When they pushed the button, subject received an auditory feedback with a delay from 5 to 60 ms, so as to give them the impression that the response happened after they pushed the button. Even though the subjects weren’t aware of the delay between the action and the auditory feedback, the intention to press the button was reported as happening later in time, according to a linear function with the delay of the auditory signal feedback. The identification of the moment in which the subject had intended to press the button—measured by judgment W—was therefore largely determined by the apparent time of the subject’s response, and not the actual answer. This result indicates that the people evaluate the time when they have had the intention to take an action based on the consequences of their action and not just on the motor action itself. Kühn and Brass (2009) conducted an experiment combining the paradigm of the stop signal (Logan et al., 1984) with an intentional action paradigm. The subjects had to react in the quickest possible way by pushing a button as soon as a stimulus (e. g., a letter) was displayed at the center of a computer screen. Sometimes, just after the presentation of the stimulus, either a stop signal or a decision signal was shown: in the first case, the subjects had to try to stop responding; in the second case they could decide whether to press the button or stop responding. In the decision trials in which subjects had provided an answer, the subjects were asked if it had actually been the result of a decision, or if it had been inhibited—that is, if they had not been able to stop before the decision signal was presented. The results have shown that in some instances, the subjects judged as intentional responses—i.e., as the result of a decision—those answers that in reality, on the basis of reaction times, were failed inhibitions. In other words, sometimes the subjects had a subjective experience of having intentionally decided to perform an action that they had actually not decided to take. These studies have empirically supported the hypothesis that the intentions to take voluntary actions are strongly influenced by events occurring after the execution of the action. In addition, they seem to confirm that the brain motor system produces a movement as the final result of its inputs and outputs; consciousness would be “informed” of the fact that a movement is going to occur and this would produce the subjective perception that the movement was decided voluntarily (Hallett, 2007).