# Fem Aff

The word ought denotes a moral obligation so I value morality.

#### In order for morality to be act functional, it must be able to recognize subjective differences between individuals. Absent an examination of individual differences, ethics becomes a tool to dominate and is useless as an impartial guide to action. Young:

Young, Iris Marion. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1990. Print. CM

Some feminist and postmodern writers have suggested that a denial of difference structures Western reason, where difference means particularity, the heterogeneity of the body and affectivity, or the inexhaustibility of linguistic and social relations without a unitary, undifferentiated origin. This book seeks to show how such a **denial of difference contributes to social group oppression**, and to argue for a politics that recognizes rather than represses difference. Thus Chapter 4 argues that the ideal of impartiality, a keystone of most modern moral theories and theories of justice, denies difference. The ideal of impartiality suggests that all moral situations should be treated according to the same rules. By claiming to provide a standpoint, which all subjects can adopt, it denies the difference between subjects. By positing a unified and universal moral point of view, it generates a dichotomy between reason and feeling. Usually expressed in counterfactuals, the ideal of impartiality expresses an impossibility. It serves at least two ideological functions, moreover. **First,** **claims to impartiality feed cultural imperialism by allowing the particular experience and perspective of privileged groups to parade as universal.** **Second**, **the conviction that bureaucrats and experts can exercise their decision making power in an impartial manner legitimates authoritarian hierarchy**. Impartiality, I also suggest in Chapter 4, has its political counterpart in the ideal of the civic public. Critical theory and participatory democratic- theory share with the liberal theory they challenge a tendency to suppress difference by conceiving the polity as universal and unified, **This universalist ideal** of the civic public has **operated to** effectively **exclude from citizenship persons identified with the body and feeling**—women, Jews, Blacks, American Indians, and so on**.** A conception of justice, which challenges institutionalized domination and oppression, should offer a vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledges and affirms group differences.

#### This requires reconciliation between different groups values. Embracing pluralism is key to acknowledging the social oppression of heterogeneous groups. Young 2:

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Second, **because it assures a voice for the oppressed** as well as the privileged, **group representation better assures that all needs** and interests in the public **will be recognized** in democratic deliberations. **The privileged usually are not inclined to protect or advance the interests of the oppressed**, partly because their social position prevents them from understanding those interests, and partly because to some degree their privilege depends on the continued oppression of others. While **different groups** may share many needs, moreover, their difference usually **entails some special needs**, **which the individual groups themselves can best express.** If we consider just democratic decision-making as a politics of need interpretation, as I have already suggested, then **democratic institutions should facilitate the public expression of the needs of those who tend to be socially marginalized or silenced by cultural imperialism. Group representation in the public facilitates such expression.**

Multiple impacts:

1. Controls the internal link to any ethical system- ethics cannot operate if they exclude voices because they would be incomplete and arbitrary. Arbitrariness is a side constraint on ethical theories, because if they could exclude voices they would never be able to be a guide to action because they wouldn’t be able to prescribe consistent rules.
2. Excluding voices reinforces hierarchies which inherently privileges the have’s in society over the have not’s- that inhibits meaningful decision-making because it rests on a flawed assumptions that have been normalized. That means including voices in the political system is the only way to create ethical rules.
3. Outweighs on context- the resolution is about a government and its obligations- my framework sets up the primary obligation of the state is to ensure that all citizens have a fair shot at representing their political views. Context determines moral obligations- because different agents have different obligations at different times. For example, a teacher has an obligation to teach their students but a janitor does not.

Thus the standard is promoting inclusion in the polity.

#### The Middle East Partnership Initiative was created to increase democratic relations in Middle Eastern countries. Otterman:

(Sharon Otterman, Council on Foreign Relations) Middle East: Promoting Democracy. October 10, 2003. <http://www.cfr.org/democratization/middle-east-promoting-democracy/p7709> CM

In December 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (**MEPI**). The program **aims to lay the groundwork for** an eventual transition to **democracy in the region's autocratic and semi-autocratic countries**. **Projects** funded through the program **fall into one of four categories**:∂ **reforming and opening economies**;∂ **encouraging political change;**∂ **promoting educational reform; and**∂ **enlarging the role women play in economics and politics.**∂In his speech, Powell made it clear that **MEPI is not a "regime change" program but**, rather, **one that considers the region's governments willing partners in a U.S.-sponsored initiative**.U.S. policy has traditionally backed stable, autocratic Middle Eastern regimes and turned a blind eye to their lack of democratic structures and open economies, many experts say. But since September 11, there's been a growing recognition of this policy's shortcomings: pervasive poverty, corruption, illiteracy, and economic stagnation in much of the Arab world have fed extremism and terrorism. **Democracy has emerged as the desired long-term policy solution to the Middle East's woes**. "By failing tohelp foster gradual **paths to democratization** in many of our important relationships--by creating what might be called a 'democratic exception'--we missed an opportunity to **help these countries become more stable**, more prosperous, more peaceful, and more adaptable to the stresses of a globalizing world," said Richard N. Haass, the then-director of policy planning at the State Department, in a November 2002 speech about Middle East democracy. "Stability based on authority alone is illusory and ultimately impossible to sustain."Haass is now the president of the Council on Foreign Relations.

1-Means MEPI is an ideal vessel for democratic promotion because it is a partnership not a dominating relationship- the countries receiving US democracy aid are willing partners

2-The use of a partnership decreases the likelihood of backlash- citizens and government are willing participants so there is no reason for them to rebel against US efforts

Plan text: The United States Department of State through the Middle East Partnership Initiative should substantially increase the amount of funding to the Min Ajlina Project to enable women’s rights and leadership workshops in Israel.

MEPI explains the Min Ajlina Project:

The US-Middle East Partnership Initiative. Highlights: MEPI’s Min Ajlina Supporting Negev Bedouin Women. February 25, 2015. <http://mepi.state.gov/mh_02252010e.html> CM

One of **MEPI’s new**er **project**s, **Min Ajlina**, or "For Our Rights," recently held a December 2009 retreat for Sidre staff members, a Bedouin women’s collective. Israeli NGO Shatil is managing Min Ajlina, which **works to increase the effectiveness of Bedouin women’s organizations**, **such as Sidre, in Israel**’s Negev region. **The work Sidre does for women’s rights takes place in an environment that is traditional and patriarchal**, which makes their work challenging. For instance, polygamous marriage rates reach 35 percent and women’s rights movements are often limited in the region where they work. **Activities** at the retreat **focus**ed **on** strategic thinking and planning. Specifically, Sidre used the retreat to create a concrete and tangible vision, including **strategies to help them overcome obstacles they face in their communities**. The retreat **exercises allow**ed **Sidre to demonstrate the possibility of exchanging different opinions while preserving mutual respect and a shared commitment to amplifying Bedouin women’s voices.** Participants were excited about the session and said, "We increased our team spirit through understanding that we're all working toward the same goal… we increased our belief in our activities for women as a mission in Bedouin society… and we now have a greater understanding of the repercussion of our work on processes women in Bedouin society are going through." **Min Ajlina is also establishing greater awareness within the** Negev **community about the rights and potential of women. Activities**, which target young Bedouin women and men enrolled in local high schools and colleges, **provide a forum to discuss gender roles and the changing status of Bedouin women**. In the future, **there will be additional women’s rights and leadership workshops for young Bedouin women leaders and organizations**.

1-The project has already had a positive impact in the Negev region of Israel and there has been no backlash- it functions smoothly as a partnership so there is no coercion or regime change

2-There is support from the local community- Arab women feel they can learn about leadership and empowerment and incorporate these things into their religion and customs because the movement lacks the imperialist and Islamophobic rhetoric of some western feminist movements

Bedouin woman and activist Abu-Rabia-Queder explains the impact of NGO movements:

Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder. The Activism of Bedouin Women: Social and Political Resistance. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. <http://www.bgu.ac.il/social/models-of-activism.pdf> CM

This paper examines several models of the feminist struggle of **Bedouin women** in the Negev region in southern Israel. These women **are doubly marginalized**: as women **living under a patriarchal, male-dominated society, and** as **part of a discriminated ethnic** (Arab) **minority group in Israel**. The presented findings are based on my own triple status **as a researcher of Bedouin women’s issues in Israel**; **a feminist activist in Bedouin** women’s organizations (**NGOs**); **and a Bedouin woman who herself suffers from and fights against discrimination**. **My findings on the feminist activity of Bedouin women’s organizations are based on my active participation** in some of them. The paper analyzes the feminist activity of these NGOs in terms of three models: “reviving tradition,” “re-Islamizing patriarchy” and “rebellion.” My claim is that **these models are modes of political action and social resistance.**

She continues:

In conclusion, **Bedouin women’s organizations conduct a liberal bargain with patriarchy**. They bargain with the patriarchy **through exercising the democratic right to resist through civil action**. As Sa’ar states, “**The internalization of models of thinking and knowing is central to the working of the liberal bargain**” (2005:681). In this sense**, Bedouin women have internalized modern tools by using democratic rules in the community** arena. Through their agency, **Bedouin women hybridize internal and external elements without having to fear a loss of belonging to the community**. Instead, **they encourage reflexive invention of activism in their own terms.**

Prefer my evidence- my author is a Bedouin woman in the Negev region of Israel who has participated in US NGOs promoting empowerment- she represents the target population of the Min Ajlina Project and endorses its use.

1. She cites women from her community who feel this has made them more comfortable in their faith and community because they often feel excluded
2. She explains why empowerment of the Bedouin community is necessary because Bedouins in Israel are denied opportunities

Women in the Bedouin society experience oppression on multiple levels; they are discriminated against as a minority in Israel and also as women in a patriarchal society. Abu-Rabia-Queder:

Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder. *Feminist Studies,* Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring, 2007), pp. 161-187. Permission to Rebel: Arab Bedouin Women's Changing Negotiation of Social Roles. <http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/stable/20459128> CM

**Bedouins** (whether in recognized or unrecognized villages) **are**∂ **discriminated against by Jewish Israeli society and marginalized** within∂ Arab society in all aspects of life. **They receive few economic, cultural, and**∂ **social resources**. Like other Arab communities, **they tend to be among the**∂ **poorest people in Israel**; they lack an industrial tax base, **depending more**∂ **heavily on residential property taxes,** **and** they **receive less money from**∂ **the state** than Jewish localities. **Arab schools lack sufficient classrooms**,∂ and existing ones (especially among the Bedouins) are in poor condition,∂ with fewer libraries, sports facilities, and laboratories than Jewish schools.∂ Like other Arabs, **Bedouins are affected by such political issues as the**∂ **Intifada and the politicization of Islam**, but their main concerns are the∂ struggle for recognition of their land and daily survival. Analysis of the∂ broader political context is beyond the scope of this paper; instead, the∂ focus here is on the day-to-day lives of Bedouin women.∂ Gender Marginality in Bedouin Society. **Bedouin women are subject not only to**∂ **ethnic discrimination** as Bedouins, **but also to gender discrimination** as∂ women. Male domination is legitimized in Bedouin society by two cultural∂ codes primarily affecting the lives of women: the sexual and the collective. Sexuality plays a dual role in a woman's life. As a vehicle of procreation, she is both marginalized and important. **Her primary reproductive**∂ **role** emphasizes her connection to uncontrolled nature, which **restricts**∂ **her ability to be morally equal to men**. But her procreative power also∂ makes the woman the center of homemaking and the bearer of tradition;∂ as such, she is highly protected by Bedouin traditional law, and any∂ offense against her may lead to revenge by her collective male kin.5∂ Similarly, **girls are not permitted to interact with the male public**∂ **sphere**.6 The need for modesty is reflected in the concept of tahashum∂ (shamefulness and self-control), which requires modest, traditional dress∂ for girls and women alike. In this context, the veil is meant to defend∂ females from sexual harassment.7∂ At the same time**, the collective code plays an important role in female marginalization**. **The Bedouin woman is driven to marriage for the**∂ **sake of the collective** rather than for her own personal interest. As such,∂ she is meant to increase the size and power of the group (her extended∂ family). **Marriage occurs according to tribal relationships** and always takes∂ place within tribal limits. The collective code also infiltrates the individual's life; any person who wants to be honored in her/his group has to∂ obey the group's codes by unconditional loyalty to the tribe, and any∂ shameful behavior weakens the power of the group. In order to prevent∂ this, women are constantly watched.

#### Israeli local government is praising the organization. Shatil:

(Shatil, the New Israel Fund Initiative for Social Change) “Leading Bedouin mayors support women as agents of change” 11/16/10, accessed 4/10/16, <http://english.shatil.org.il/leading-bedouin-mayors-laud-women-as-agents-of-change/> CM

**Israel’s two leading Bedouin mayors** last week **expressed enthusiasm and support for** the thoughtful social change plans of a group of **young Bedouin women activists**.∂ “**I’m very impressed with your projects and I would like to see them implemented in Rahat**,” Faiz Abu Sahiban, **mayor of Israel’s largest Bedouin town** and chair of the Forum of Bedouin Mayors in the Negev **told a group of women graduating from the Shatil-Ma’an Bedouin Women’s Rights and Leadership course**. Abu Sahiban participated in a panel that responded to the presentation of the women’s projects. After welcoming the guests to his town, **Dr. Muhammad El Nabari, mayor of Hura**, **echoed** Abu Sahiban’s **sentiments.** Yosef Al Atauna, head of Hura’s education department also spoke and expressed his support.∂ **The mayors have the support of the Islamic Movement and their attendance at the event and support of the women and their projects was significant for Bedouin society in the Negev**. The mayors were attending the graduation ceremony and “Happening” in Hura of the SHATIL-Ma’an training course to promote Bedouin women’s leadership in the Negev. **The 20 graduates included teachers, university students and leaders in women’s NGOs in the Negev**.∂ The graduates’ field projects, carefully planned to the last detail and part of the graduation requirements of **the course include: workshops and public education on challenging stereotypes of Bedouin women in curricula**, folklore, the media and daily life; **raising awareness about equal opportunities and rights for working women**; **mothers working for children’s rights in the unrecognized villages; and support and advocacy groups for mothers of special needs children**.∂ Small groups of graduates presented their projects using multi-media and other creative approaches, and an Arabic-Hebrew booklet summarizing the course, the projects and more was distributed.∂ “The projects reflect a collective women’s vision for the way Bedouin society in the Negev should look in the next decade” said Amal El Sana AlHjuj, the course facilitator who was recently named one of 101 most influential Israelis by Haaretz’s TheMarker business magazine.∂ “The graduates’ work on the projects was serious, thoughtful and professional and **the mayors’ endorsement of them sends an important message about women’s status as social change agents in the Negev,**” said Yarona Ben Shalom Richardson, co-director of SHATIL’s Negev branch. “**This is a new and welcome development.”**∂ **Funded through** the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Office of the Middle East Partnership Initiative (**MEPI), the course included personal and group development, gaining knowledge of society, politics, social change, government and world feminist movements; the role of women in the processes of social change; and project development.**

#### The aff isn’t Western Fem- Bedouin women use a unique form of Islamic feminism that is fostered and adapted through work with women’s empowerment NGOs and helps form identities as a woman and Muslim- Bedouin woman and activist Abu-Rabia-Queder explains:

Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder. The Activism of Bedouin Women: Social and Political Resistance. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. <http://www.bgu.ac.il/social/models-of-activism.pdf> CM

**Feminist activities in non-Western societies** are usually adapted to the contextual reality of the specific culture. Occasionally they defer to Western feminism and occasionally they **adapt** it **to their own context**, or derive from it certain perspectives, thus **creating their own type of feminism**. Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) suggests the concept of “local dialect,” **which enables understanding of the unique characteristics of various types of feminism**s, including aspects of silencing, elimination and active or passive resistance. In addition, Abu-Lughod (1990) recommends the **investigation of Middle Eastern feminist movements** through nation-building, **ties with Western nations**, political status, **the ideological use of Islam** and the struggle over the use of Islamic law in the State mechanism. ∂ Much of the research conducted in patriarchal societies **has adopted this approach, especially that focusing on Bedouin women** in the Negev. From the 1990s, and particularly reflected in the research of educated women, **the Bedouin woman** of the Negev **has been described as an activist who copes and struggles** (Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2006; Pessate-Schubert, 2004). However, there are no studies that examine the agency of Bedouin women through community activism as part of the activities of women’s communal organizations.

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One of the more interesting aspects of their struggle involves women’s participation in the male-dominated debate about Islam. These **women** have attempted to **utilize religious texts to gain cultural legitimacy for feminist social change**. **They describe the gap between Islamic writings and practices**, claiming that **Muslim society is subject to a patriarchal mentality and cannot escape from para-Islamic, tribal customs. They aim to change the personal status laws that relate to women’s rights to choose a spouse, to gain an inheritance and with regard to guardianship**. Indeed, the struggle to change these personal laws is at the heart of feminist movements throughout the Middle East (Hatem, 1993). ∂ **Men’s participation in Islamic feminism is characteristic of Middle Eastern feminism**. **Feminists**, particularly those who focus on modification of personal laws, **demand training in Muslim law, which women are usually banned from** and which is necessary in order to afford legitimacy to expression regarding this charged issue. Likewise, **feminists utilize the writings and research of experts on Muslim law.**

# Extensions

## Framework

Extend Young 1 - Pluralism is the only theory that accurately accounts for the voices of marginalized groups- means A) I control the internal link to other ethical theories because otherwise not everyone is accountable and the ethic is arbitrary and B) failing to account for voices reinforces those in power- extend the standard of inclusion in the polity

## Offense

Extend Otterman- MEPI creates democratic relations through advancements of women’s organizations- MEPI is ideal for dem promo because it is a partnership and Israel is a willing participant- decreases likelihood for backlash

Extend the advocacy and the MEPI evidence- the Min Ajlina Project has been successful and is looking to further cooperation with the US through MEPI

Extend the all three Abu-Rabia-Queder cards- Bedouin women who have participated in in these NGOs have found them empowering both as women and as an ethnic minority

Extend the Shatil evidence- Iraeli government is praising the organization and wants to expand it to other cities- and says it’s helping women take an active role in government

# Frontlines-Framework

## 1AR Mills Framework Expansion

Prefer my framework of resisting structural violence to abstract ethical theories like deontology; Ideal theories cannot account for the experiences of marginalized groups. Mills:

[Mills, Charles. *“Ideal Theory” as Ideology*. Hypatia vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 2005)] IADM

I suggest that this spontaneous reaction, far from being philosophically¶ naïve or jejune, is in fact the correct one. **If we start** **from** what is presumably¶ **the** uncontroversial **premise** **that the ultimate point of ethics is to guide our**¶ **actions** and make ourselves better people and the world a better place, **then**¶ the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be¶ deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise**. In**¶ **modeling humans,** human capacities, human interaction, **human institutions,**¶ **and human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply**¶ **different this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from**¶ **realities crucial to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice** in¶ human interactions and **social institutions**, and thereby **guarantee**ing **that** the¶ **ideal-as-idealized-model[s] will never be achieved**.¶ It is no accident that **historically subordinated groups have always been**¶ **deeply skeptical of ideal theory**, generally see its glittering ideals as remote and¶ unhelpful, and are attracted to nonideal theory, or what signifi cantly overlaps it,¶ “naturalized” theory. In the same essay cited above, Jaggar identifi es a “unity of¶ feminist ethics in at least one dimension,” a naturalism “characteristic, though¶ not defi nitive, of it” (Jaggar 2000, 453). **Marxism** no longer has the appeal it¶ once did as a theory of oppression, but it **was famous for emphasizing**, as in The¶ German Ideology, **the importance of descending from the idealizing abstractions**¶ of the Young Hegelians to a focus on “real, active men,” not “men as narrated,¶ thought of, imagined, conceived,” but “as they actually are,” in (class) relations¶ of domination (Marx and Engels 1976, 35–36). And **certainly black Americans,**¶ **and others of the racially oppressed,** **have** always **operated on the assumption**¶ **that the natural and most illuminating starting point is the actual conditions**¶ **of nonwhites**, and the discrepancy between them and the vaunted American¶ ideals. Thus Frederick Douglass’s classic 1852 speech, “What to the Slave Is¶ the Fourth [of] July?” points out the obvious, that the inspiring principles of¶ freedom and independence associated with the celebration are not equally¶ extended to black slaves: “I am not included within the pale of this glorious¶ anniversary! Your high independence only reveals the immeasurable distance¶ between us. . . . The rich inheritance of justice, liberty, prosperity and independence,¶ bequeathed by your fathers, is shared by you, not by me. . . . This Fourth¶ July is yours, not mine. You may rejoice, I must mourn” (1996, 116, emphasis in¶ original). So **given this convergence in gender, class, and race theory on the**¶ **need to make theoretically central the existence and functioning of the actual**¶ **non-ideal structures that obstruct the realization of the ideal**, what defensible¶ arguments for abstracting away from these realities could there be?¶ First, as a preliminary, we need to quickly clear away some of the ambiguities¶ and verbal confusions that might mistakenly lead one to support ideal theory.¶ All moral theory is ideal in the ideal-as-normative sense, but of course that’s¶ not the sense at stake here, so that can’t be why we need ideal theory. Nor is ideal theory just a model, which every theory requires, since we have already¶ distinguished models in the ideal-as-descriptive-model and models in the idealas-¶ idealized-model sense. Nor can it be claimed that, whatever its faults, ideal¶ theory is the only way to do ethics, or the only theory-supported/generalist way¶ to do ethics (as against unsatisfactory particularist alternatives), since there is¶ an alternative that is also generalist in the form of nonideal theory. Nor does¶ the simple appeal to an ideal (say, the picture of an ideally just society) necessarily¶ make the theory ideal theory, since nonideal theory can and does appeal¶ to an ideal also.¶ So these are either obviously bad arguments or simple confusions. What¶ are the real defenses of ideal theory? A fi rst possible argument might be the¶ simple denial that moral theory should have any concern with making realistic¶ assumptions about human beings, their capacities, and their behavior. **Ethics is**¶ **concerned with the ideal, so it doesn’t have to worry about the actual. But even**¶ **for mainstream ethics this wouldn’t work, since, of course, ought is supposed to**¶ **imply can: the ideal has to be achievable by humans.**

He continues:

As theorists of ideology emphasize,¶ this should not be thought of in terms of conscious conspiratorial manipulation,¶ but rather **in terms of social privilege and resulting differential experience, a**¶ **nonrepresentative phenomenological life-world** (mis)taken for the world, reinforcement¶ (in this case) by professional norms of what counts as respectable¶ and high-prestige philosophy, and—if not to be infl ated into the sole variable,¶ certainly never to be neglected in the sociology of belief—the absence of any¶ countervailing group interest that would motivate dissatisfaction with dominant¶ paradigms and a resulting search for better alternatives. Can **it [cannot] possibly serve**¶ **the interests of women to ignore female subordination, represent the family as**¶ **ideal, and pretend that women have been treated as equal persons?** Obviously¶ not**. Can it [cannot] possibly serve the interests of people of color to ignore the centuries**¶ **of white supremacy, and to pretend that a discourse originally structured**¶ **around white normativity now substantively**, as against just terminologically,¶ includes them? Obviously not. Can it possibly serve the interests of the poor¶ and the working class to ignore the ways in which an increasingly inequitable¶ class society imposes economic constraints that limit their nominal freedoms,¶ and undermine their formal equality before the law? Obviously not.1 If we ask¶ the simple, classic question of cui bono? then **it is obvious that ideal theory can**¶ **only serve the interests of the privileged,2 who, in addition—precisely because**¶ **of that privilege (as bourgeois white males)—have an experience that comes**¶ **closest to that ideal,** and so experience the least cognitive dissonance between¶ it and reality, ideal-as-idealized-model and ideal-as-descriptive-model. So, as¶ generally emphasized in the analysis of hegemonic ideologies, it is not merely¶ the orientation by this group’s interests that serves to buttress ideal theory, but¶ their (doubly) peculiar experience of reality

# 1AR Expansion

## YAY MEPI AND MIN AJLINA

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AND- Islamic feminism and women’s activism simultaneously fight discrimination against women and Islamophobia- Abu-Rabia-Queder:

Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder. The Activism of Bedouin Women: Social and Political Resistance. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. <http://www.bgu.ac.il/social/models-of-activism.pdf> CM

One of the more interesting aspects of their struggle involves women’s participation in the male-dominated debate about Islam. These **women** have attempted to **utilize religious texts to gain cultural legitimacy for feminist social change**. **They describe the gap between Islamic writings and practices**, claiming that **Muslim society is subject to a patriarchal mentality and cannot escape from para-Islamic, tribal customs. They aim to change the personal status laws that relate to women’s rights to choose a spouse, to gain an inheritance and with regard to guardianship**. Indeed, the struggle to change these personal laws is at the heart of feminist movements throughout the Middle East (Hatem, 1993). ∂ **Men’s participation in Islamic feminism is characteristic of Middle Eastern feminism**. **Feminists**, particularly those who focus on modification of personal laws, **demand training in Muslim law, which women are usually banned from** and which is necessary in order to afford legitimacy to expression regarding this charged issue. Likewise, **feminists utilize the writings and research of experts on Muslim law.**

# Frontlines-Contentional

## A2 Cap

#### 1- No link. Empirical evidence shows the US imperialism came through military intervention and assassinations. The 1AC plan is through aid. Petras:

James Petras. US Global Power in the 21st Century: Military or Economic Imperialism? Global Research, September 29 2014. <http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-global-power-in-the-21st-century-military-or-economic-imperialism/5404911> CM

In fact the major and minor **US imperial wars have** more **to do with “capital dis-accumulation**”, in the sense that **trillion dollar flows have gone out from the US**, hundreds of billions of dollars **in profits from resource sites** have been undermined, markets for exports have been severely weakened and exploitable productive labor has been uprooted.  At the same time **US imperialist state ‘dis-accumulates capital’, multi-national corporations, especially in the extractive sector are expanding, “accumulating capital**” throughout Latin America. This new configuration of power, the conflicting and complementary nature of 21st century US imperialism, requires that we anchor our analysis in the real, existing behavior of imperial state and extractive capitalist policymakers.  The basic premise informing this essay is that **there are two** increasingly divergent **forms of imperialism:  military driven intervention, occupation and domination; and economic expansion and exploitation of resources, markets and labor by invitation**of the ‘host country’.

Prefer my analysis- my evidence is specific to US economic interactions that lead to cap and imperialism- my evidence indicates this occurs through military action and exploitation, not aid

#### 2- Neoliberalism is sustainable and inevitable – human nature and social complexity mean only growth can produce peace – only tapping into self-interest creates a sustainable social order.

Barnhizer 06: (David, Prof of Law, Cleveland State U, ‘Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream”,’ Geo Int’l Envtl L Rev, pg. l/n)

Devotees of sustainability pin their hopes on an awakening by an enlightened populace that will rise up and insist that business and government behave in ways that reflect the idea that "[a] sustainable society is one that can persist over generations, one that is far-seeing enough, flexible enough, and wise enough not to undermine either its physical or its social systems of support." [n81](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n81) This awakening is not going to happen. **There will never be a populist revolution in the way humans value the environment, social justice, and other matters of moral consequence**. We frequently "talk the talk," but rarely "walk the walk." [n82](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n82) This discrepancy is partly an individual failure, but it is even more a result of the powerful forces that operate within our culture. Residents of Western cultures are shaped by the system in which they live. **They will never possess either the clarity of agenda or the political will** essential **to** a coherent and coordinated **shift in behavior** due to a combination of ignorance, greed, sloth, and inundation by political and consumerist propaganda. This combination means **there will be no values shift** welling up from the people and demanding the transformation of our systems of production and resource use. Paul Tournier captured the essence of the cultural forces when he observed: [**People] have become** merely **cogs in the machine** of production, tools, functions. All that matters is what they do, not what they think or feel. . . . [T]heir thoughts and feelings are . . . molded by propaganda, press, cinema and radio. They read the same newspaper each day, hear the same slogans, see the same advertisements. [n83](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n83)Feeling helpless in the face of inordinate complexity and vast impersonal forces causes us to flee from our personal responsibility **and become absorbed into the systems of institutions**. The price of the required allegiance includes accepting (or appearing to accept) the institution's values as our own. We become a contributing part of the same system that oppresses us and steals our humanity and idealism. This assimilation allows us to avoid the harshest application of the system's power while reaping the rewards of collaboration. We become, in the  [\*629]  words of Pink Floyd, "just another brick in the wall." [n84](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n84) When we attempt to talk about the need to do such things as internalize costs that are now allowed to remain external to the entities generating the harms and shifting to a system of low or no impact on the Earth's natural systems, we are talking about fundamental, non-voluntary changes in entitlements and lifestyle. Even Alan Greenspan drew severe criticism when he recently suggested that social security benefits should be reduced. [n85](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n85) Jacques Chirac's party in France has seen its public support plummet due to efforts to reduce social spending. [n86](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n86) Germans have taken to the streets in the hundreds of thousands to protest their leaders' efforts to develop plans to gain control of the German welfare state. [n87](http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.714257.8466500462&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1231738964826&returnToKey=20_T5507732879&parent=docview#n87) **It is impossible to generate the political will that would be required to change the system** we have constructed into one that satisfies the demands of sustainability. This is not surprising because the clear message is that we need economic growth. The situation we face is akin to Bangladesh where I was part of a group urging the country's Planning Minister to take potential environmental harms and ecosystem impacts into greater account in his planning. He responded that the ideas were admirable in theory but that he had to worry about generating jobs and food for 160 million people. He indicated that while he respected the arguments for sustainability his more immediate needs were to ensure jobs and food for Bangladeshis. In a similar context, while teaching international environmental law in St. Petersburg, Russia, my discussion with Russian academic colleagues related to water pollution in the area, radioactive materials dumping, and the raw air pollution from Lada cars running on 76 octane gasoline and other uncontrolled emitters of air pollution that fouled the air of this most beautiful city. At the end of the course one of my Russian colleagues said, "I found it all fascinating. But you know we have other problems with which we must deal before we can begin to worry about the environment. Perhaps in fifteen years or so we will be ready." I found myself unable to disagree with the speakers in either Bangladesh or Russia. Return to the idea of our inability to generate the political will that would be required to achieve fundamental change if we decided that the Agenda 21 type of sustainable development ideas were good social and economic strategies. Even if  [\*630]  they were desirable, **they are "impossible dreams" because the people and institutions who set policy and decide on actions in the business and governmental arenas will never accept them as guides for behavior or as requirements for decisionmaking.** This impossibility exists because we are not free and independent individuals but creatures of habit, dominated by the culture in which we exist. We desire to behave according to the dictates of the powerful systems that govern our lives and culture.

Takes out all your uniqueness claims and impact turns the K- even if you win the link it doesn’t matter because you are losing that it will make anything worse or prevent change

#### 3- The alt. doesn’t address material conditions Rejecting capitalist mindset doesn’t solve for people in poverty and stripped of political agency.

#### 4- Perm is the best option. Perm promote democracy in the Middle East while (alt)- Its net beneficial

#### Material conditions are DA to the alt.

#### Alt doesn’t solve by itself

#### 5- Perm: do the plan and the alt in all other instances. Puts them in a double bind- either A) the alt isn’t strong enough to solve the minor links from the aff meaning the alt can’t solve the amount of cap in the status quo or B) the alt solves the residual links of the aff meaning there is no DA to the perm

## A2 China

1. the evidence is talking about democracy promotion that seems to increase western ideals- the Larison evidence wouldn’t be triggered by this aff (empirically proven- China hasn’t viewed MEPI or Min Ajlina as a threat in the past)
2. UQ overwhelms the link- your impacts all relate back to instability but turn: the Islamic world the aff is concerned with already faces tons of proxy wars in places like Bahrain- more instability just

## A2 Democracy Bad

#### **1- AC outweighs. Democracies are less coercive than the squo because the population in the squo has no say- also democracy allows more room for gender equality**

#### **2- T- Democratic institutions protect the minority. Systems of checks and balances make sure the majority doesn’t overrule the minority. Look to US for instance.**

#### **3- T – Democracies have less dissent if more people have their own say, which means even at the local level minorities will be able to express themselves.**

#### **4- T – Democracies minimize ethnic conflict amongst citizens if all citizens have say in the democratic process.**

#### 5- T- Democracies have higher quality of life and liberty. Lynn-Jones 98:

(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University AT

**The** **U**nited **S**tates **should** attempt to **spread** **democracy** **because** **people** generally **live better lives under democratic governments**. Compared to inhabitants of nondemocracies, **citizens of democracies enjoy greater individual** **liberty, political stability, freedom from governmental violence, enhanced quality of life, and a** much **lower risk of suffering a famine**. Skeptics will immediately ask: Why should the United States attempt to improve the lives of non-Americans? Shouldn't this country focus on its own problems and interests? There are at least three answers to these questions.

#### 6- T- Democracy promotes liberty. Lynn-Jones 98:

(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University AT

**The first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property**.22 **Respect for the liberty of individuals is an inherent feature of democratic politics**. As Samuel Huntington has written, liberty is "the peculiar virtue of democracy."23 A democratic political process based on electoral competition depends on freedom of expression of political views and freedom to make electoral choices. Moreover, **governments that are accountable to the public are less likely to deprive their citizens of human rights.** The global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. **Even imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies**, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty. Freedom House's 1997 survey of "Freedom in the World" found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were "partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free." In contrast, only 20 of the world's 73 nondemocracies were "partly free" and 53 were "not free."24

#### 7- T- Democracy prevents violence. Lynn-Jones 98:

(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University AT

Second, America should spread liberal democracy because the citizens of liberal democracies are less likely to suffer violent death in civil unrest or at the hands of their governments.27 These two findings are supported by many studies, but particularly by the work of R.J. Rummel. **Rummel finds that** democracies-by which he means **liberal democracies-between 1900 and 1987 saw only 0.14% of their populations** (on average) **die annually in internal violence. The corresponding figure for authoritarian regimes was 0.59% and for totalitarian regimes 1.48%.**28 Rummel also finds that **citizens of liberal democracies are far less likely to die at the hands of their governments. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have been responsible for the overwhelming majority of genocides and mass murders of civilians in the twentieth century. The states that have killed millions of their citizens all have been authoritarian or totalitarian: the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Nazi Germany, Nationalist China, Imperial Japan, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge.** **Democracies have virtually never massacred their own citizens on a large scale, although they have killed foreign civilians during wartime.** The American and British bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, U.S. atrocities in Vietnam, massacres of Filipinos during the guerrilla war that followed U.S. colonization of the Philippines after 1898, and French killings of Algerians during the Algerian War are some prominent examples.29 There are two reasons for the relative absence of civil violence in democracies: (1) Democratic political systems-especially those of liberal democracies constrain the power of governments, reducing their ability to commit mass murders of their own populations. As Rummel concludes, "Power kills, absolute power kills absolutely ... **The more freely a political elite can control the power of the state apparatus, the more thoroughly it can repress and murder its subjects.**"30 (2) **Democratic polities allow opposition to be expressed openly and have regular processes for the peaceful transfer of power.** If all participants in the political process remain committed to democratic principles, critics of the government need not stage violent revolutions and governments will not use violence to repress opponents.31

#### 8- T- The definitions of democracies ensure that they aren’t coercive. LAIC:

Leonore Annenberg Institute for Civics http://www.annenbergclassroom.org/term/majority-rule-and-minority-rights

In every genuine democracy today, majority rule is both endorsed and limited by the supreme law of the constitution, which protects the rights of individuals. **Tyranny by minority over the majority is barred, but so is tyranny of the majority against minorities**. **This fundamental principle of constitutional democracy, majority rule coupled with the protection of minority rights, is embedded in the constitutions of all** genuine **democracies** today. The 1992 constitution of the Czech Republic, for example, recognizes the concepts of majority rule and minority rights. Article VI says, "Political decisions shall stem from the will of the majority, expressed by means of a free vote. The majority’s decisions must heed the protection of the minorities." The Czech constitution is filled with statements of guaranteed civil liberties, which the constitutional government must not violate and which it is empowered to protect.

## A2 Democracy Causes War

#### 1- T-Democratization decreases war. Lynn-Jones 98:

[(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University] AT

The Argument: One of the most important arguments against U.S. efforts to promote democracy is the claim that countries engaged in transitions to democracy become more likely to be involved in war. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder make this argument and support it with statistical evidence that shows a correlation between democratization and war. They suggest that several causal mechanisms explain why democratization tends to lead to war. First, old elites play the nationalist card in an effort to incite conflict so that they can retain power. Second, in emerging democracies without strong democratic institutions new rulers compete for support by playing the nationalist card and search for foreign scapegoats for failures.113 This type of electoral competition increases the risk of internal and international conflict. **The argument that democratization causes war does not** directly **challenge the** usual form of the **democratic peace proposition**. Mansfield and Snyder recognize that "It is probably true that **a world where more countries were mature, stable democracies would be safer and preferable for the United States**."114 Instead, the arguments suggests that attempts to spread democracy have significant risks, including the risk of war. Responses: Mansfield and Snyder have advanced an important new argument, but even if partially true, it does not refute the case for spreading democracy internationally. Taken to extremes, the Mansfield/Snyder argument would amount to a case for opposing all political change on the grounds that it might cause instability. **Promoting democracy makes** more **sense** than this course, **because the risks of democratization are not so high** and uncontrollable that we should give up on attempts to spread democracy. First, **there are reasons to doubt the strength of the relationship between democratization and war**. Other **quantitative studies challenge the statistical significance** of Mansfield and Snyder's results, suggest that **there is an even stronger connection between movements toward autocracy and the onset of war**, find that **it is actually unstable transitions and reversals of democratization that increase the probability of war, and** argue that **democratization diminishes the likelihood of militarized international disputes**.115 In particular, autocracies are likely to exploit nationalism and manipulate public opinion to launch diversionary wars-the same causal mechanisms that Mansfield and Snyder claim are at work in democratizing states. Mansfield and Snyder themselves point out that "reversals of democratization are nearly as risky as democratization itself," thereby bolstering the case for assisting the consolidation of new democracies.116 In addition, very few of the most recent additions to the ranks of democracies have engaged in wars. In Central and Eastern Europe, for example, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia have avoided major internal and external conflicts. Of these countries, only Slovenia was involved in brief series of military skirmishes with Serbia.117 Russia has been involved in a number of small wars on or near its borders, but so far it has undergone a dramatic transition toward democracy without becoming very warlike.118 There is little evidence of international war in Latin America, which also has witnessed a large-scale transition to democracy in recent years. Countries such as Mongolia and South Africa appear to have made the transition to democracy without going to war. **The new democracies plagued by the most violence**, including some former Soviet republics and the republics of the former Yugoslavia, **are** those that are **the least democratic and may not qualify as democracies at all.** All of this evidence suggests that whatever may have increased the war-proneness of democratizing states in the past may not be present in the contemporary international system. It may be that states making the transition from feudalism to democracy became more war-prone or that the emerging democracies of the 19th century were European great powers that embarked on imperial wars of conquest. These factors will not lead today's new democracies into war. Finally, if the democratic peace proposition is correct, the higher proportion of democracies in the current international system may further reduce the risk that new democracies will not engage in war, because they will find themselves in a world of many democracies instead of one of many potentially hostile nondemocracies. Second**, it is possible to control any risks of war posed by democratization.** Mansfield and Snyder identify several useful policies to mitigate any potential risks of democratization. Old elites that are threatened by democratization can be given "golden parachutes" that enable them to at least retain some of their wealth and to stay out of jail.119 **New democracies** also **need external assistance to build up the journalistic infrastructure that will support a "marketplace of ideas" that can prevent manipulation of public opinion** and nationalistic mythmaking.120 Finally, **an international environment conducive to free trade can help to move new democracies in a benign direction**.121

Uniquely good because the aff is an instance of international cooperation, which Lynn-Jones concludes decreases threat of war.

#### 2- T- Democracies are less likely to go to war because democracies are inclined to cooperate with each other. Lynn-Jones:

[(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University] AT

The Argument: Skeptics suggest that, if the democratic peace proposition is valid, we should find that pairs of democracies behave in crises in way that reveals that shared democracy, not considerations of power and interest, caused them to avoid war. For example, tracing the process of how events unfolded should reveal that the publics in **democracies did not want war with other democracies,** that **leaders did not make military threats against other democracies**, and that **democracies adopted accommodating behavior toward other democracies**.109 Examination of historical crises, however, reveals that **democratic decision makers avoided war because they feared** defeat or that **their states would be weakened in a conflict**.110 Response: Proponents of the democratic-peace proposition do not deny that considerations of power and interest often motivate states.111 In the anarchic and competitive realm of international politics, democracies cannot avoid making such calculations. Thus **evidence that democracies are sensitive to power and interest does not refute the democratic-peace proposition.** In addition, critics of the democratic-peace proposition have not tested it fairly; they have not deduced the full range of predictions that the normative and institutional model makes about how **democracies will avoid war**. More comprehensive tests would also deduce and test hypotheses about how many political and diplomatic aspects of crises between democratic states differ from other crises. Such tests would also compare pairs of democratic states to mixed and nondemocratic pairs. John Owen has conducted such tests and finds considerable evidence to support the democratic-peace proposition.112

## A2 Econ Delay CP

#### 1- T – there’s harms in the squo that the NC prolongs which outweighs on probability – your harms are predictive but mine are systemic

#### 2- Don’t let them coopt the aff – they’ll never get to the level of economic development necessary for democracy; putting economic decisions in the hands of one autocrat makes economies really vulnerable; there’s a higher likelihood of oversight on policies; checks and balances reduce probability of mistakes

#### 3- T – support of autocracies never helps the economy – we need to do the Aff now. **Faust**:

Jörg Faust, Autocracies and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence from 20 th Century Mexico. *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* Vol. 32, No. 4 (122), Neue Politische Ökonomie in der Geschichte / New Political Economy in History (2007), pp. 305-329

There is a simple reason why **democratic structures have positive effects on indicators for broad-based economic development. To ensure** their **political survival, governments are** invariably in **need** of the **support of groups from society. Authoritarian governments** tend to **exclude broad segments of the population** from political participation. The **governments are,** for the most part, **dependent on a small number of powerful interest groups,** like economic oligarchs or the military. **Authoritarian governments are forced to buy the backing of these powerful actors by furnishing them with economic privileges. However, when it comes to economic and social policy, autocratic governments** tend to **give** far **less heed to the needs of the excluded, who make up the majority of the population**. Over the long term, **a policy that privileges powerful interest groups not only neglects broad segments of the population; it also inhibits economic innovation and efficiency.**

#### 4- T- Democracy is necessary for economic growth. Lynn-Jones:

(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University AT

Authoritarian regimes often compile impressive short-run economic records. For several decades, the Soviet Union's annual growth in gross national product (GNP) exceeded that of the United States, leading Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to pronounce "we will bury you." China has posted double-digit annual GNP increases in recent years. But **autocratic countries rarely can sustain** these rates of **growth** for long. As Mancur **Olson notes**, "experience shows that **relatively poor countries can grow extraordinarily rapidly when they have a strong dictator** who happens to have unusually good economic policies, **such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one or two** dictators."[34](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn34) The Soviet Union was unable to sustain its rapid growth; its economic failings ultimately caused the country to disintegrate in the throes of political and economic turmoil. Most experts doubt that China will continue its rapid economic expansion. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati argues that "no one can maintain these growth rates in the long term. Sooner or later China will have to rejoin the human race."[35](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn35) Some observers predict that the stresses of high rates of economic growth will cause political fragmentation in China.[36](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn36) Why do democracies perform better than autocracies over the long run? Two reasons are particularly persuasive explanations. First, **democracies-especially** liberal democracies-**are more likely to have market economies, and market economies tend to produce economic growth** over the long run. Most of the world's leading economies thus tend to be market economies, including the United States, Japan, the "tiger" economies of Southeast Asia, and the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Two recent studies suggest that there is a direct connection between economic liberalization and economic performance. **Freedom House conducted a World Survey of Economic Freedom** for 1995-96, **which evaluated 80 countries** that account for 90% of the world's population and 99% of the world's wealth on the basis of criteria such as the right to own property, operate a business, or belong to a trade union. **It found** that the **countries rated "free" generated 81% of the world's output** even though they had only 17% of the world's population.[37](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn37) **A second** recent **study confirms the connection** between economic freedom and economic growth. The Heritage Foundation has constructed an Index of Economic Freedom that looks at 10 key areas: trade policy, taxation, government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking policy, wage and price controls, property rights, regulation, and black market activity. It has found that countries classified as "free" had annual 1980-1993 real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (expressed in terms of purchasing power parities) growth rates of 2.88%. In "mostly free" countries the rate was 0.97%, in "mostly not free" ones -0.32%, and in "repressed" countries -1.44%.[38](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn38) Of course, some democracies do not adopt market economies and some autocracies do, but liberal democracies generally are more likely to pursue liberal economic policies. Second, **democracies that embrace liberal principles** of government **are likely to create a stable foundation for long-term economic growth. Individuals** will **only make long-term investments when** they are **confident** that their **investments will not be expropriated.** These and other economic decisions require assurances that private property will be respected and that contracts will be enforced. **These conditions are likely to be met when an impartial court system exists and can require individuals to enforce contracts.** Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has argued that: "The guiding mechanism of a free market economy ... is a bill of rights, enforced by an impartial judiciary."[39](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn39) These conditions also happen to be those that are necessary to maintain a stable system of free and fair elections and to uphold liberal principles of individual rights. Mancur Olson thus points out that "the **conditions** that are **needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are** exactly **the** same **conditions** that are **needed to have a lasting democracy**. ... the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights."[40](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn40) Thus liberal democracy is the basis for long-term economic growth. A third reason may operate in some circumstances: **democratic governments are more likely to have the political legitimacy necessary to embark on difficult and painful economic reforms**.[41](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn41) This factor is particularly likely to be important in former communist countries, but it also appears to have played a role in the decisions India and the Philippines have taken in recent years to pursue difficult economic reforms.[42](http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/wwwdocsname/ISP_AmerDem#fn42)

#### 5- Perm – the CP affirms since the ultimate goal is to promote democracy in the most effective way so it’s part of a long term strategy

#### 6- Perm – do the Aff now and roll it back if there are econ problems

#### 7- T – withholding democracy promotion creates regional tension. **Bucci 15**:

Steven Bucci, The Conditions are Ripe for a Major Middle Eastern War. April 3, 2015. http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2015/4/the-conditions-are-ripe-for-a-major-middle-eastern-war

But, some might say, these opposing blocs have been in place for decades, why the worry now? Quite simply, because **America is no longer playing the role it has played in the region** for a long, long time. **For decades, the U.S. served as security guarantor and diplomatic trouble-shooter for our friends in the region. The Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and other friendlies** didn’t have to worry that Iran would gain regional hegemony.  They **knew a strong, assertive America would keep Iran’s ambitions in check.**  Meanwhile, **Iran and its proxies knew they could go only so far before being** slowed and **stopped by** the judicious use of **America power.**  The credible threat of American hard power was enough to keep our friends calm and our enemies quiet. **That has changed.  Our enemies have seen the U.S. “lead from behind” in Libya,** then turn its back on our consulate in Benghazi.  They’ve seen us **draw a “red line” in Syria, then walk away when Assad called our bluff.** They’ve seen **Russia annex Crimea** and bolster the separatists in eastern Ukraine **while America refuses to provide military aid to Kiev. They’ve seen us flinch at the thought of putting American boots on the ground in the fight against ISIS.** Put it all together, and **it’s a picture of an America that** is timid, or confused, or flaccid—a nation that still **talks a good hard-power game, but lacks the will to follow through.** Moreover, they see an Administration so hungry for a “legacy” deal with Iran, that the Iranians considerable negotiating skills are not even being taxed.  In the G5+1 talks in Lausanne Secretary of State John Kerry has made concession after concession with no quid pro quo from Iran—to the point that France is now emerging as the hardliner on our side of the negotiating table.Our enemies aren’t the only ones who notice these developments. Our friends do, too. What must the Saudis and the others think when they see the administration cast aside regional ally No. 1—Israel? Can their “push out the door” be far off if they get in the way of the Administration’s single-minded drive to appease the Iranian regime? Those friends now have reason to fear that the nuclear negotiations with Iran will accelerate the U.S. withdrawal from the region or—even worse—produce an Iranian-American rapprochement at their expense. It is this fear that has led our friends to band together to defend themselves against what they know to be a growing threat: Iran. While the Obama administration may be willing to turn a blind eye to this threat in its pursuit of a nuclear deal, Iran’s neighbors do not have that luxury. **Since the U.S. has cut back** on dispensing its usual antibiotics, **our** jittery **friends in the Middle East now feel that they must counter**—strongly and immediately—the local infections promoted and exploited by **Iran. And they are sometimes doing so without consulting the U.S. The result is a Middle East more explosive and unpredictable than ever.** The conditions are now ripe for a major Middle Eastern war—one that could spill across the globe, wherever Sunni and Shia Muslims interact.  All that remains missing is a spark.   Impossible you say?  That June day in Sarajevo, no experts predicted the horrifying consequences of Garo Princip’s actions.  Today, the Saudis are massing 150,000 troops on the border with Yemen.  The Pakistanis and the Egyptians have promised ground troops.  These Sunnis Governments view their alliance as one of self-defense. But it’s a huge threat to Iran’s desires for hegemony, and Tehran may even view it as a threat to the survival of the mullahs’ regime.

#### 8- T – economic instability means political instability which means it’s advantageous to transition now

#### 9- Income inequality increases chance of democracy. Przeworski:

(Adam Przeworski, Department of Politics, NYU) Democracy and Economic Development. http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/sisson.pdf

(3) The impact of income distribution is difficult to assess, given the paucity of data, but it appears that **dictatorships are more vulnerable when inequality of functional distribution of income is large (labor share in manufacturing is low) and when household incomes are becoming more concentrated.**

## A2 Elections Bad

#### 1- T- Elections are desirable. Lynn-Jones

[(Sean M. Lynn-Jones, Editor, International Security; Series Editor, Belfer Center Studies in International Security) "Why the United States Should Spread Democracy" Discussion Paper 98-07, Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University] AT

The Arguments: One of the most prominent recent criticisms of attempts to promote democracy claims that democratic elections often have few positive effects, especially in countries that do not have liberal societies or other socioeconomic conditions such as a large middle class and a high level of economic development. These arguments imply that electoral democracy may be undesirable in many countries and that the United States should not encourage its spread. Democratically elected governments may turn out to be illiberal regimes that oppress their citizens.122 The process of holding democratic elections in multiethnic societies can fan the flames of ethnic conflict.123 Democracy does not guarantee economic success and may even hinder it.124 Responses: These **criticisms of electoral democracy** are important reminders that democracy is imperfect and so are democracies. They also call attention to the need to promote the spread of liberal principles, as well as democratic electoral procedures. They do not, however, amount to a persuasive case against U.S. support for elections in other countries, for the following reasons. First, Zakaria **overstate**s **the extent to which new democracies are illiberal or are becoming so**. He argues that the Freedom House ratings show that 50% of democratizing countries are illiberal democracies. He classifies countries as "democratizing" if their combined Freedom House scores for political rights and civil liberties (each measured on a 7-point scale with 1 denoting the most freedom and 7 the least) fall between 5 and 10. He regards countries as illiberal if they have a greater degree of political freedom than civil liberties. Zakaria's claim that there is a growing number of illiberal democracies may be correct. After all, there are now more emerging democracies. But **whether states have fewer civil liberties than political rights is a problematic way to distinguish between liberal and illiberal democracies**. In 65% of the states classified as illiberal democracies by Zakaria, the difference between civil liberties and political rights is only one point on the 7-point Freedom House scale. In no case is the difference greater than 2 points. Moreover, classifying countries as illiberal on the basis of whether they have more civil liberties than political rights leads to some absurd distinctions. For example, Zakaria's criteria would classify France as an illiberal democracy because it scores higher on political rights (1) than civil liberties (2), and Gabon as a liberal democracy because its civil liberties score (4) is higher than its political rights (5). Zakaria notes that he does not rely on Freedom House for classifications of individual states, only for overall statistical measures. Freedom House's 1997 ratings show that civil liberties have improved in 10 of the countries Zakaria identifies as "democratizing" and fallen in only 4. The most recent Freedom House ratings also show that 81 of 117 democracies are now classified as "free" whereas only 76 of 117 were "free" in 1995. Thus **there actually seems to be a slight trend toward liberalization, even as the overall number of democracies remains constant**.125 In light of the absence of democratic and liberal traditions **in many new democracies** (particularly in the former Soviet Union and Africa), it is remarkable that **freedom continues to flourish** to the extent that it does.126 Second, Zakaria and Kaplan overlook the extent to which **the holding of elections is** (a) **an important way of removing authoritarian leaders, and** (b) **part of** the process of **encouraging the growth of liberal values**. **The principle that leaders should be selected in free and fair elections can become an international norm that can be used to persuade authoritarian leaders to step aside**, sometimes gracefully. Marcos in the Philippines and Pinochet in Chile were removed from power largely because of the growing international belief in the electoral principle. It is hard to imagine that elections in Burma, for example, could produce an outcome worse than the current SLORC regime. **Elections do not only remove unpopular authoritarians,** however; **they also encourage the development of liberal habits and principles such as freedom of speech** and of the press. Holding a free and fair election requires that these principles be followed. Elections alone do not guarantee that constitutional liberalism and the rule of law will be adopted, but they do focus the attention of the voting public on the process of freely electing their governments. Third, it is not clear what forms of government the United States should support instead of democracy. Zakaria believes the United States should "encourage the gradual development of constitutional liberalism across the globe."127 Most proponents of promoting democracy would agree that this is a worthy goal, but **it is hard to promote liberalism without promoting democracy**. There are few contemporary examples of liberal countries that are not democracies. Zakaria cites Hong Kong under British rule as an example, but this experience of a liberal imperial power engaging in a rather benign authoritarian rule over a flourishing free-market economy has already ended and is unlikely to be repeated. Earlier historical examples of liberal nondemocracies include Britain in the early 19th century, and possibly other European constitutional monarchies of that century. As Marc Plattner and Carl Gershman of the National Endowment for Democracy point out, none of the examples is a "practical vision" for the 21st century.128 Zakaria praises East Asian countries on the grounds that they "have accorded their citizens a widening sphere of economic, civil, religious and limited political rights," and suggests that they, much like Western countries around 1900, are on the road to liberty.129 But most observers-including some East Asians-would argue that these countries have curtailed political liberties (and sometimes bragged about it in the debate over "Asian values") and are hardly a model of liberalization that the United States should encourage. Thus it is difficult to see how Zakaria's analysis can support a viable U.S. policy of supporting liberalism without also supporting democratic elections. Fourth, Kaplan and, to a lesser extent, Zakaria, exaggerate the degree to which elections per se are responsible for the problems of new democracies, many of which had the same problems before elections were held. In the area of ethnic conflict, for example, **democratic elections** may **ameliorate existing conflicts** instead of exacerbating them. The evidence is mixed, but **the need to build electoral coalitions and the liberal practices of free speech and freedom of association necessary to hold elections may promote ethnic accommodation**, not hostility.130 These arguments suggest that Zakaria, Kaplan, and other critics of electoral democracy have taken the valid point that "elections are not enough" too far. **The U**nited **S**tates **should support democracy and liberalism**; supporting only the latter risks not achieving either.

## A2 Fem DA:

1. the first Ottaway card is terrible- not specific to the 1AC- the card is specific to aid and civil societies but my aff is helping not just fund NGOs but to aid them in putting on workshops- it’s not blind funding to check a box
2. the other warrant in ottoway is about current governments but the cooperation is ongoing and there has been no problem- err aff on this issue because im the only one doing weighing and also my evidence is specific
3. Turn: the fact that the MEPI and Otterman evidence cite an inclination to continue increasing the project means the aff will just further the movement and people will get more involved rather than creating a ruse of solvency
4. On the second Ottaway card uniqueness overwhelms the link- the conservative Arab population isn’t the one resisting transition of women it’s the Jewish majority in Israel due to the conflict b/w the Israelis and the Bedouins- also the aff cites instances of Arab men endorsing our movement and that specifically Islamic fem (not western fem which Ottaway critiques) is characteristic of significant male participation
5. On the uniqueness claim prefer my evidence because more recent- postdates by three years and is also more specific than the ottoway evidence because its from Bedouin women who cite their own experiences of recent and ongoing oppression because the current programs are underfunded and not expanding fast enough

## A2 Gender K

1. No link- the MEPI program is working with pre-existing NGOs and your Naber evidence is based on places like Egypt where we’ve historically used military intervention- not specific enough
2. Extend the Abu-Rabia-Queder card- explains how this program has fought sexism and Islamophobia in Negev- extend the reasons to prefer my author- more authentic as well as specific to the plan text- takes out your Handrahan evidence
3. PERM: Do the 1AC and embrace the mindset shift the alt advocates for- AC is a net benefit because we further an initiative Arab women have had success with- puts him in a double bind either a) the alt solves all residual links or b) the alt wasn’t strong enough in the first place so no harm to affirming

## A2 Imperialism

#### 1- Perm do both – that solves best – we have to take action to reduce imperialism. **Bilgin 11:**

[Pinar, International Relations Professor at Bikent, “Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective”, 2011, p 60-61] PO

Admittedly, **providing a critique of existing approaches to security**, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, **is only a first step**. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, **thinking** and writing are not enough in themselves. They **should be compounded by** other forms of practice (that is, **action taken on the ground**). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, **students of** critical approaches to **security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices** (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes:**Thinking about thinking is important, but**, more urgently, **so is thinking about doing**…. **Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice**: it is important for Critical Security Studies to **engage with the real by suggesting policies**, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs.

#### 2- Turn - promotion of democracy is key to combating imperialist representations – perm is best because the alt assumes that Arabs can’t protect themselves, which reinscribes orientalism. **Sadiki ’11:**

[Larbi, specialist in Arab democratisation, revolution and transitions, and has been an academic at Australian National University, Exeter University, Westminster University and Qatar University, “The mathematics of the Arab Spring”, Aljazeera, June 6 2011 (english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/05/2011531132934920499.html)] PO

Two fundamental principles must be understood in order to grasp the mathematics of the Arab Spring.∂ On the Arab side, **return to autarchy is self-defeating**. Pride and greatness have been returned to Arabness, and there is no longer any need to engage in autarchic brands of discourse. Autarchy has been the fundamental currency of dictators keen on secluding the Arab masses from the flow of ideas hostile to their own selfish rule. This has been done in the name of all kinds of ideologies.∂ **This is the moment for spreading** cosmopolitanism of **good governance, moral protest, anti-authoritarian resistance, and social justice**. This is a shared space - in which Arab narratives and struggles engage with like-minded currents transcending geography and time.∂ **"Hands off our Arab Spring"-type narratives ignore the global voices and ethical forces who are joining in this emancipatory moment** being ushered in. So **to recoil via autarchic propositions goes against the spirit of this movement.**∂It is as if they are claiming that the Arab Spring has not recharged the batteries of self-confidence enough for Arab nations to engage the outside world with confidence, self-assertion and a greater capacity for self-representation.∂ Autarchy only reinforces Orientalist narratives that have misrepresented Arabs for so long through images of invisibility, inferiority, and an incapacity to speak back.∂ Conditionality in reverse∂ Similarly, no patronage from the Western powers is needed.∂ Arabs in Tunisia and Egypt have reclaimed - and in Libya, Syria and Yemen are in the process of reclaiming - the right to self-govern.∂ Hence the current moment demands a transition from the idea of conditionality imposed by the donors to a new conditionality, in reverse, imposed by the recipients of the funds. That is, **good governance must be thought of as a two-way street**: where there are equal obligations on the donor and the recipient.∂ The donor community has generally flouted its own rules of good governance by plugging authoritarian rule into the global financial system by way of handouts, grants, and funds. ∂ These have typically had much to answer for in terms of reproduction of autocracy, corrupt regimes - the likes of which WikiLeaks has revealed Western governments' intimate knowledge of - and the procurement of technology of oppression that prolong dictatorship; Mubarak and Ali are but two examples of this.∂ The injustice and irony in all of this is that debt incurred by non-representative regimes is still counted as legally binding, which shackles the oppressed citizenry to billions that are owed from morally questionable transactions organised by the very institutions that have preaching "good governance" since the early 1990s.∂ Democratisation: from mathematics to morality∂ A return to ethical basics and conditionality is necessary, and can acheived by these means:∂ Funds and grants are to be dispensed only to governments "of the people" - which means democratically elected governments, complete with a system of legitimate checks and balances. Right now, this excludes the transitional governments of Egypt and Tunisia. Both have presented cases for billions of dollars from the funds on offer by the West, however, neither is representative of the people.∂ Technical **aid**, materials or training for the military, police or intelligence **must be in accordance with the rules of upholding democratic rule** and the principles of good governance - meaning that they are subject to transparency, and with full knowledge and approval of elected parliaments and other civic bodies and institutions.∂ Aid, including that given to non-governmental organisations, must not limit the choice of recipients when it comes to choosing a developmental path. It must not be subject to the values and interests of the donors whose free market economies, in this instance, are very difficult to replicate in an Arab world - the goals of which include robust sustainable development solutions and distributive mechanisms aimed at equal opportunity, social justice, and poverty eradication.∂ **The bulk of aid must be geared towards** addressing "the two Ds": i) **democratic consolidation**, with the root problem of youth disaffection, loss and disenfranchisement, and ii) distribution to deal with the acute problems of marginalisation - which is the root problem of youth disenfranchisement.∂ Civic-capacity building must be factored into the process of aiding Arab democracy-building. And it must include the re-training of police forces and the dismantling of the apparata of oppression one by one. Police and intelligence forces have traditionally been the enemies of the Arab populace. This must change. ∂ Through conditionality in reverse, **good governance becomes a mutually binding contract**. It will ensure that Arab-Western political and economic engagement is underpinned by ethics of shared obligations and responsibility. By doing it this way, **external finances will bring** relief, goodwill, **dialogue** and friendship **instead of** burdening the Arab and Western worlds with fear, **distrust** and acrimony.∂ The currency of freedom∂ It still remains to be seen how, and even if, the masters of world finance put their money where their mouth is. In particular, for now, no dispensing of aid must proceed until elected representatives of the people - and independent civil society groups - are in a position to deliberate and reflect freely on the terms and plans of the aid to be given.∂ The only given in this discussion is that the organisers of Tahrir Square and Habib Bourguiba Avenue have spoken in favour of dignity and freedom, which is the currency of the Arab Spring. There is no need to fear for these masses and their epic resistance against tyranny.∂ It is a resource they can, if need be, also direct towards resisting financial hegemony.∂ **What is reassuring about the new-found morality of resistance is that it rejects autarchy**. It speaks the lingua franca of freedom - which transcends geography, religion, nationality and ethnicity. **It uses Western technological innovations for the purpose of self-empowerment.**

#### 3- Perm do the aff and the alt in all other instances – double bind – either a) alt is sufficient to overcome the link or b) alt doesn’t solve- either way you affirm

#### Turn - the K cedes the political -- debating democracy promotion improves the direction of policy and corrects governmental misinformation. **Walt ’11:**

[Stephen M., Professor of International Affairs @ Hahvahd, “International Affairs and the Public Sphere,” July 21, 2011 (<http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/>)] PO

Second, and more importantly, **an independent academic community is an essential counterweight to official efforts to shape public understanding of key foreign policy issues**. Governments enjoy enormous information asymmetries in many areas of political life, but these advantages are especially pronounced when dealing with international affairs**.****[[5]](http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/" \l "foot_5)Much of what we know about the outside world is ultimately derived from government sources** (especially when dealing with national security affairs), **and public officials often go to considerable lengths to shape how that information is reported** to the public. Not only do governments collect vast amounts of information about the outside world, but they routinely use secrecy laws to control public access to this information. Government officials can shape public beliefs by leaking information strategically, or by co-opting sympathetic journalists whose professional success depends in part on maintaining access to key officials.[[6]](http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/" \l "foot_6)Given these information asymmetries and their obvious interest in retaining public support for their preferred policies, it is hardly surprising that both **democratic and non-democratic leaders use their privileged access to information to build support for specific policies, at times by telling outright lies to their own citizens**.[[7]](http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/" \l "foot_7)∂ This situation creates few problems when the policies being sold make good strategic sense, but the results can be disastrous when they don’t. In such cases, alternative voices are needed to challenge conventional wisdoms and official rationales, and to suggest different solutions to the problem(s) at hand. Because scholars are protected by tenure and cherish the principle of academic freedom, and because they are not directly dependent on government support for their livelihoods, they are uniquely positioned to challenge prevailing narratives and policy rationales and to bring their knowledge and training to bear on vital policy issues. If we believe that unfettered debate helps expose errors and correct missteps, thereby fostering more effective public policies, then a sophisticated, diverse and engaged scholarly community is essential to a healthy polity.∂ Third, **the scholarly world also offers a potentially valuable model of constructive political disagreement.** Political discourse in many countries (and especially the United States) has become increasingly personal and ad hominem, with little attention paid to facts and logic; a trend reinforced by an increasingly competitive and loosely regulated media environment. Within academia, by contrast, even intense disputes are supposed to be conducted in accordance with established canons of logic and evidence. Ad hominem attacks and other forms of character assassination have no place in scholarly discourse and are more likely to discredit those who employ them than those who are attacked. By bringing the norms of academic discourse into the public sphere, academic scholars could help restore some of the civility that has been lost in recent years.∂ For all of these reasons, **it is highly desirable for** university-based **scholars** to play a significant role in public discourse about key real-world issues and **to engage directly with policymakers** where appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, academic research can provide policymakers with relevant factual knowledge, provide typologies and frameworks that help policymakers and citizens make sense of emerging trends, and create and test theories that leaders can use to choose among different policy instruments. Academic theories can also be useful when they help policymakers anticipate events, when they identify recurring tendencies or obstacles to success, and when they facilitate the formulation of policy alternatives and the identification of benchmarks that can guide policy evaluation. Because academic scholars are free from daily responsibility for managing public affairs, they are in an ideal position to develop new concepts and theories to help us understand a complex and changing world.[[8]](http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/" \l "foot_8)∂ The picture sketched here is obviously something of an ideal type, and I am not suggesting that that the academic world consistently lives up to these expectations. As noted above, university-based scholars of international affairs—and especially the disciplines of political science and history—have increasingly focused on narrow and arcane topics and are contributing less and less to policy formation or public discourse.[[9]](http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/" \l "foot_9) And when academics do address topics of obvious policy relevance or public interest, the results are often presented in impenetrable, jargon-ridden prose and disseminated in venues that neither policymakers nor the public are likely to read. Even when scholars have something useful to say, in short, their tendency to “speaking in tongues” diminishes their impact on the public sphere.∂ Why Is There a Gap between Academia and the Public Sphere?∂ To some degree, **the gap between the ivory tower and the world of policy arises because the two spheres have different agendas and operate under different incentives and constraints. Academics focus on developing generalizations and testing conjectures as rigorously as possible, while policymakers and the public are often preoccupied with individual cases** (i.e., whatever is in the headlines or in a policymaker’s in-tray). Thus, scholars are delighted whenever they identify a powerful general tendency, but policymakers may be more interested in figuring out how to overcome that general tendency or worried that the case at hand might be an exception to it. Academics strive to make their work as accurate as possible, even if this takes more time, but **policymakers cannot always wait until a complete analysis is possible**.[[10]](http://publicsphere.ssrc.org/walt-international-affairs-and-the-public-sphere/" \l "foot_10) To take a recent example, **policymakers in the Obama administration had to respond to the 2011 “Arab Spring” long before anyone fully understood what was driving these events or where they might lead**. Given these different agendas, **it is not surprising that policymakers often find academic scholarship to be of less value than the scholars who produce it might wish.**

#### 5- Framework – let me weigh the fiated impacts of the aff against the K – that’s a) key to aff ground because otherwise the neg can just moot all my offense b) key to policymaking education and political engagement – it’s important to debate the actual impacts of the plan – that’s a reason why even if fiat is illusory, post-fiat policy debate is still good

#### 6- Turn - discussion of democracy promotion key to breaking down Islamophobia. **Telhami ‘5:**

[Shibley, Anwar Sadat professor for peace and development @ the University of Maryland, “Democracy: Rising Tide or Mirage”, Middle East Policy, Vol. 12 Issue 2, May 23, 2005] PO

I think we all agree that, **no matter how we define democracy, the Middle East badly needs** political and economic **reform**, and that **most people in the region** desperately **want it**. I’d like to focus on two aspects of this issue. One is the extent to which American foreign policy is linked to democratic moves in the region. The second is how the public sees both the issue of democracy and the American role in that issue. I will begin with the American role. In our public discourse, there’s been a very quick move to claim all of these things that have transpired as moves towards democracy – in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the Palestinian areas and Iraq**. One of the failures in this discourse is to differentiate between the impact of the Iraq War itself on the issue of political reform in the region and the advocacy of democracy as a priority in American foreign policy and the actual consequences for political reform in the region.** Those are not the same things. To begin with, I would argue that the consequences of the Iraq War have been largely negative on the issue of reform in the Middle East, and that the consequences of the advocacy of democracy have been more positive on reform in the Middle East. Let me give you examples of what I mean and how the region sees it. I do public opinion polls in six Arab countries: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan. I ask questions about political issues and foreign policy, the United States, the role of the media. In 2004, which is the last one I took, we asked people in those six countries: do you believe that the Middle East is more democratic or less democratic than it was before the Iraq War? The vast majority of people in every country believed the Middle East had become less democratic than it was before the Iraq War. We asked why that was the case. Certainly part of it is probably psychological. Ninety percent of the people opposed the war, and it’s very hard to come back and say, well, something good came out of it. But I think there’s something objective that they’re seeing that transpired before, during and immediately after the war. You had a situation where 90 percent of the public passionately opposed the Iraq War. They believed that it went against Arab interests.

Arab governments had to make a strategic decision whether they supported the United States or not. They made a strategic decision generally to support the United States, and in the process they became far more insecure. They preempted organizations, they arrested people, they limited freedom of speech – and in the case of Egypt, extended the emergency law on the eve of the war. That’s what the public saw, and that is what the public is reacting to. So, in general, I think the war has had, at least in the short term, a negative impact on reform. The advocacy of democracy I see as a completely separate issue. One can even argue that the Iraq War delayed the possibility of democracy. **The advocacy of democracy has had a generally positive impact**, although I think it is sometimes exaggerated. I want to state again that as of 2004, based on our survey, when you asked Arabs whether they believed American policy intends to spread democracy in the Middle East, the vast majority said no. So there is mistrust. The public in the region does not see the advocacy of democracy as a priority in American foreign policy, and they’re basing that on a historical trend: the reversals in the past, the contradictions, and the double standards on a variety of issues. They think this is a tactical move by the United States. Marina has already talked about Iraq. I think, in general, **having elections is good; people in the Arab world are** somewhat **inspired by elections**. But the general interpretation is that you still have an American occupation, that this is a Shia empowerment; and that there is an intent to weaken the Arabs in the Muslim world. In the case of the Palestinian areas, I think it’s fair to say that it’s not a direct consequence of the advent of democracy. The Palestinians had elections in the middle 1990s. They had been asking for elections for a couple of years, but they were not granted elections while Arafat was still alive, for fear that he would win and be empowered as a consequence. In fact, there was a delay of elections until Arafat died. In the case of Lebanon, it’s not an issue of democracy. But it is important for democracy to have people stand up to authority and take risks. That’s inspiring. The sight of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese taking to the streets is consequential for people in the Arab world. But if you look at the responsiveness of Syria, one can argue that the American factor was only part of it. Clearly, the demonstrations themselves were first and foremost driven by the assassination of Rafik Hariri. But the Syrian responsiveness was not related only to the American position. It was related to the fact that you had a UN resolution and a French-American position. The Syrians could probably have withstood American pressure if they had had unanimous support in Europe and the Middle East. I think we ought to be careful here in terms of cause and effect relating to Syria. In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, one can argue that there is domestic pressure for reform, and both of these governments are responding to it. But you can also argue that these governments responded in part to pressure from the United States. They believe that they had to; that the United States is making this a priority; that the president of the United States needs to show some results – for political reasons at least. I don’t think these governments believe that the Bush administration is advocating democracy as an end in itself. They believe that the administration is using it to get strategic cooperation from them and to claim political credit at home. Each one of them has given the administration enough to claim political credit. The problem for the administration will be that once they have moved a country from the negative to the positive side of the ledger, their hands are tied. It’s very hard politically to move it back. We’ve seen this with Libya. It was claimed that they no longer had weapons of mass destruction. Now Libya is on the positive side of the ledger, regardless of its authoritarianism. The minute you move it back, you lose ground politically in the United States. So now our hands are tied and we have a problem. **Whatever the intent of the advocacy for democracy**, I think **it opens up space**. **It takes away the Tiananmen Square option for governments in the Middle East, and that allows people to be more empowered to test the waters**. They can take more risks. There is a second impact that most of us haven’t thought about enough. **It’s been profoundly helpful in our own discourse in America. It has overshadowed the “clash of civilizations” thesis. Suddenly Arabs are normal people** in the American discourse. There is no barrier of culture or religion; it is just bad governments. We talk about an Arab Spring as we talk about a Prague Spring. **This is a helpful discourse in America, and it might in the end even reduce the sharpness of the clash on the other side.**

#### 7- Imperialism isn’t the root cause of the aff’s impacts —the K encourages violence in opposition to the US – policy action is key which means the alt fails. **Kiely ’95:**

[Ray, Prof of International Politics, “Third Worldist Relativism: A New Form Of Imperialism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 25 No. 2, 1995] PO

Nevertheless, there is now a belief in the west, even among those on the Left, that there is case for western intervention in the Third World in the post-Cold War era. This is said to be the case because “oppressed peoples are looking for forms of western intervention that can save them from the horrors visited on them by their ‘own’ and neighbouring regimes....To uphold national sovereignty and damn intervention is to give a free hand to genocide" (Shaw 1993: 16). What is crucial here is that Shaw justifies intervention on the basis of the sound observation that conflicts exist within the Third World. and these cannot simply be read off from the actions of an omnipresent “West.” This is made clear when Shaw (1993: 17) argues that “(t)he left has a particular duty to respond. not to the self-serving nationalist rhetoric of corrupt and repressive third world governments, but to the people who suffer from them." This statement echoes Bill Warren's critique of (some versions of) dependency theory, which all too easily justified a reactionary nationalism in the name of so-called anti-imperialism (Warren 1980: chs.l and 7).∂ On the other hand, **many people** on the western Left **argue that intervention and imperialism amount to** one and **the same thing**, and they cite the history of reactionary and bloody interventions by the western world since 1945 (or earlier - Chomsky's 1993 taken us back to 1492). On this baSiS. interventions in the 19905 in the Gulfand Somalia are regarded as imperialist in character (Pilger 1993: 10-11). There are however competing strands within this school of thought. which I allude to below.∂ The problem with these two views is that they tend to talk past each other. While both approaches may appeal to the justice of their respective positions. it is seldom spelt out what is meant by this concept. a weakness intensified by the one-sided nature of both approaches. On the one hand. the interventionists appeal to justice and the rights of subjects (rather than states) in the periphery. but they tend to do so in isolation from the real world of international politics. On the other hand. **opponents of intervention focus on realpolitik and the bloody history of western interventions, but in so doing they tend to provide no clear grounds for any forms of intervention**. These points can be illustrated by an examination of the competing positions in the Gulf War.∂ The interventionists argued that United Nations’ action to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait was largely justifiable (Halliday 1991). The best criterion for what constitutes a just war can be found in the work of Michael Walzer (1977). He argues that war is justified when it is in response to an act of aggression by one state against the territorial integrity of another. In a new edition of this work Walzer (1992: xi-xxiii) has argued that the Gulf War constitutes a just war. This is so for the following reasons: There are strong grounds for dismissing this position as every bit as opportunist as that of the worst hawks in successive United States' administrations. Saddam Hussein’s nationalism can hardly be described as progressive - he was an old ally of the United States. especially during the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war. his treatment of Kurds within Iraq has been brutal and he has persistently attempted to control the cause of Palestinian national liberation (Halliday 1990: 73). To simply assume that Saddam Hussein was now a progressive anti-imperialist because he had fallen out with his old allies is naive at best and at worst represents a mirror-image of the US approach that “our enemy's enemy is our friend.” (Elliott 1992: ll) Furthermore. Iraqi treatment of those living in Kuwait during the occupation can hardly be described as a "liberation" - rather. it was characterised by extremely repressive measures against the population. Moreover. to point to isolated examples of successful social programmes in Iraq (Gowan 1991) is hardly sufficient (and indeed is patronising) to secure progressive credentials. Once again. Warren's point that **anti-imperialist rhetoric is** not necessarily progressive seems pertinent.∂ **A** less extreme anti-interventionist **position was to not take sides in the war. but at the same time not call for action against the Iraqi regime. The basic justification** for this view **was that the international order was so unjust and exploitative that no one had the right to impose their will on anyone else**. Of course **this view abstracts from the fact that the Iraqi regime had done just that.** and it becomes a call for lack of action the logic of this view is that there can be no change for the better until the glorious day of world-wide socialism. Moreover. **this view implicitly** **was** on the view that the capitalist state always unproblematically serves the functional needs of capital. and so **actions by capitalist states are always seen as inherently "bad."** So. according to this view the West intervened in the Gulf because it suited its interests. but is reluctant to intervene in Bosnia because it too suits its interests. While I think that there is a great deal of truth in this assertion. it takes things too far. Just because the West has no intrinsic interest in intervention in Bosnia does not mean that we should simply leave it there (or worse still appeal to the Yugoslavian “class struggle" in a way that totally abstracts from the concrete conditions in the region). as many Marxists in the west imply (see C allmicos 1993) - instead. when there is a case for some form of intervention (as I believe there is in Bosnia) there should be criticism of western governments precisely on the grounds that strategic or economic interests should not determine foreign policy (Magas 1992). The common assertion that these interests always win the day is to dismiss the struggle for alternatives from the outset. Similarly, **just because intervention in one place may take imperialist forms** (such as in Somalia in 1992-3) **does not mean that the case against any form of intervention is established.**∂ Standard western **Left views** (which I show below have much in common with post-modernism) can again be seen as based on an approach which **is defeatist**. **The structures of** international **capitalism are seen as so universally bad that there is no room for reform** within this system. **Struggle for reforms against this system is** thereby **discounted at the outset**. We are therefore forced back to the logic of a Frankian “pessimism of the intellect, pessimism of the will" (Bernstein and Nicholas 1983). in which there is no hope for the Third World until the glorious day of redemption (that is world-wide revolution led by “the vanguard party"). As Elliott (1992: ll) argues.∂ this perspective “proffered an abstract internationalism whereby **the cure for all remediable ills was postponed to an indefinite future**...”∂ So, to summarize: **the pro-Iraq position is based on a patronising Third Worldist/ dependency approach in which all the ills of a country are blamed on the West and so anti-westem positions are automatically progressive.** The anti-sanctions position rests on a similarly misguided view that the “world-system" is so omnipresent and bad that the call for reforms within it is doomed to failure.

#### 8- Case outweighs – it’s try or die for the aff – even if they access long term solvency for sexism, that doesn’t matter if they can’t solve the proximate cause- there is a system that disadvantages Bedouin women– that justifies perm, do the aff then the alt because we alleviate oppression in the short term so we can combat imperialism in the long term

#### 9- Aff framework precludes – determines which impacts we care about/whether we care about impacts – the K doesn’t impact to my framework because the alt doesn’t include more people in the political system

## A2 Islam is Patriarchal

#### 1- States are patriarchal not the Islamic faith- Bedouin woman and activist Abu-Rabia-Queder explains:

Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder. The Activism of Bedouin Women: Social and Political Resistance. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. <http://www.bgu.ac.il/social/models-of-activism.pdf> CM

**Within Islamic discourse, women’s inferior status is justifed by legal sources** (Kuzma, 2003). Thus, for example, **researchers of Iranian feminism have demonstrated that**, in a State whose legitimacy derives from Islamic law, **the discussion about the status of women relates to their loyalty to the regulations of Islam**. When the State is presented in the Iranian political debate as the protector of faith, Iranian **women who strive to promote feminist demands answer** the State’s accusations **by emphasizing that it does not meet its religious responsibilities** (Kuzma, 2003).

Prefer my evidence- my author is a Bedouin woman in the Negev region of Israel who has participated in US NGOs promoting empowerment- she has lived experience as a Muslim feminist

#### 2- T- Western feminism is Islamophobic. Hernann:

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**There is a pervading myth** — amongst some Muslims and non-Muslims alike — **that [Islam promotes intolerance](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcFoPkzYXog" \t "_blank)** against women and LGBTQIA+ individuals.∂ **This myth**, however, is a dangerous one, as it often **prevents non-Muslim feminists from** more actively **engaging Muslim communities.**∂Consequently, **instead of** expanding and **empowering the feminist community,** well-intentioned non-Muslim **feminists sometimes alienate potential Muslim allies** and reproduce anti-Muslim prejudices.∂ **This creates a divide between feminist and Muslim communities**. It excludes while inadvertently requiring conformity.∂ So, Why the Myth?∂ Narrowly citing the Qur’an (Islam’s holy text) and various Hadiths (teachings and accounts of the Prophet Muhammad), some Muslims argue that Islam is[cissexist](http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/why-our-feminism-must-be-intersectional/), requires patriarchy, and forbids homosexuality.∂ However, many other Muslims maintain that Islam demands compassion, acceptance, and love.∂ Arguing that an omniscient God created humanity — *including the vast diversity within it* — they insist that we should not discriminate against one another.∂ As such, Islam does not promote intolerance. *People* *say* that Islam promotes intolerance. ∂ Unfortunately, this happens in other religions, too.∂ Some Christians, for example, have used the Bible to advance [cissexism](http://www.focusonthefamily.com/socialissues/social-issues/transgenderism/our-position" \t "_blank),[patriarchy](http://www.whatchristianswanttoknow.com/how-to-respect-your-husband-7-helpful-hints/" \t "_blank), and [homophobia](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OVznV4O4sto" \t "_blank).∂ The dogmatic insistence of oppressive perspectives prevents some communities — *whether they’re* [*Christian*](http://everydayfeminism.com/2014/06/come-out-evangelical-christian-parents/)*, Muslim, and so on* — from acknowledging problematic religious interpretation.∂ Instead, they use these interpretations to validate their own prejudices against gender and sexual minorities.∂ This minimizes the perspectives of [religious allies](http://everydayfeminism.com/2014/07/solidarity-with-muslim-women/). As a result, less-informed feminists risk regurgitating problematic interpretations.∂ But why?∂ A major reason why **some Westerners insist** — *despite many Muslim communities arguing the contrary* — that **Islam is intolerant is because of pervasive Islamophobia.** ∂Somewhat ironically, **Islamophobia itself is a racialized form of intolerance characterized by prejudice** against, hatred towards, and fear of Islam, Muslims, and ethnic groups perceived to be Muslim.∂ Generally, North American and European societies privilege Christianity. They also have a history of openly marginalizing other religious groups, especially those racialized as non-white.∂ In the US, for example, since at least the first Gulf War, and especially since 9/11, American attitudes towards Muslims have become increasingly hostile.∂ Indeed, America’s money-hungry, imperialistic culture “validated” the enslavement of Black people, [genocidal manifest destiny](http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/if-you-really-love-you-some-indians/), and the colonization of countries like the [Philippines](http://historywired.si.edu/detail.cfm?ID=171" \t "_blank). Similarly, it now “validates” anti-Muslim oppression.∂ Political forces have sculpted the Islamophobic prejudices that we have been taught to consume. As a result, we support militaristic policies of predatory resource extraction, political and economic clientelism, and so on.∂ Equivalently, the influx of Muslim immigrants has heightened [xenophobic](http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/racist-anti-immigration/)and hyper-nationalist sentiments across Europe, especially as they are regularly blamed for the continent’s stagnant economy and pervasive unemployment.∂ In these contexts, therefore, **Muslim communities are regularly characterized as the root of** many social and political **problems.**∂As a result, many **non-Muslim Westerners continue to view Islam as dangerous** and Muslim individuals and communities as violent and oppressive.∂ Furthermore, in the US, many also insist that, as it is supposedly a “Christian country,” Muslims are either foreign or un-American.∂ Many politicians and pundits alike point to domestic and foreign “Islamic terrorism” as evidence of the religion’s supposed danger and non-conformity to Western values.∂ However, when Christian terrorism occurs, these same pundits rarely blame Christianity.∂ Instead, they blame the individual, problematically labeling him — *and it usually is a “him”* — as “[mentally disturbed](http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/disability-is-not-a-bad-word-why-ableist-language-matters/),” an exception to the rule of Christian peacefulness.∂ Whereas we are taught that it is acceptable to oppress Islam, we are similarly taught that Christianity is the [appropriate religion to follow](http://everydayfeminism.com/2014/12/black-atheists-representation/).∂ Consequently, often only the most extreme Islamist rhetoric makes the news or trends on social media. This reproduces Islamophobia, as it showcases a vocal (though tiny) minority while drowning out the perspectives of the mainstream Muslim majority.∂ What Does the Myth Do?∂ **Islamophobia promotes problematic interpretations of Islam** amongst many non-Muslims. As a result, many — *including non-Muslim feminists and allies*— misunderstand Muslim experiences.∂ The limited and violent portrayal of Islam in the media has led many feminists to perceive Islam as anti-woman and anti-LGBTQIA+.∂ While these feminists might have intentions to advocate for individuals they perceive to be oppressed, they are building a resistance and movement based on stereotypes originally developed to promote a racist and capitalist agenda.∂ Such a perspective robs Muslim women and LGBTQIA+ individuals of their agency and transforms them into [victims in need of saving](http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/feminism-fails-muslim-women/).∂ Perhaps the clearest example of this is the [French ban on headscarves](http://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/frances-hijab-ban-causing-tension" \t "_blank). Starting in the early 2000s, in the “spirit of secularism,” France banned signs of faith in schools, hospitals, and other public institutions. Forbidden items included Christian crosses, the Jewish kippa, and Islamic headscarves.∂ However — *and in an explicit expression of institutionalized Islamophobia and Judeo-Christian privilege* — for the most part, only clothing associated with Islam has been policed.∂ Many French Muslim women decried the law. They argued that it [violated their civil right](http://www.hrw.org/news/2004/02/26/france-headscarf-ban-violates-religious-freedom" \t "_blank) to express themselves.∂ They also highlighted a racist double standard: Christianity — a religion mostly practiced by those racialized as white — was glorified. However,Islam — a religion mostly practiced by those racialized as non-white — was heavily demonized.∂ Complaining of state oppression and criticizing the false notion that one cannot be both Muslim and French, many resisted the law.∂ Indeed, many French Muslim women began wearing veils and headscarves when they had not previously done so in a [demonstration of solidarity](http://www.i-mag.org/intellectual-sections/non-profit-organisations/74-prohijab-hijaab-our-freedom-our-choice-our-right.html" \t "_blank).∂ Many non-Muslim feminists, however, came out in support of the ban. Interpreting Islam as patriarchal, they [explained away](http://everydayfeminism.com/2014/12/the-problem-with-privilege-explaining/) Muslim women’s responses as examples of internalized oppression.∂ Instead of perceiving them as feminists, many condescendingly suggested that these Muslim women were incapable of breaking their submission to men.∂ Of course, there were and are cases of women who veil not by choice, but because domineering fathers and husbands require it. And there are a few Muslim women who support the headscarf ban.∂ Nonetheless, fixating upon these cases while dismissing others devalues many Muslim feminist perspectives.∂ This is not to suggest that all non-Muslim feminists are Islamophobic.∂ However, when feminism is interpreted monolithically, sometimes even well-intentioned feminists risk reproducing Islamophobic (and consequently, white supremacist) perspectives.∂ By perceiving Muslims as victims of “Islamic patriarchy,” many fail to embrace people’s whole identity and person.∂ Interpreting Islam specifically — *and religion more generally* — as some kind of enemy prevents us from truly engaging with the people with whom we work.∂ Insisting upon particular articulations of feminism is [exclusionary](http://everydayfeminism.com/2014/11/trans-exclusive-feminism-looks-like/). This can be especially troubling to female and queer Muslims who rightfully anticipate allyship from feminists, but sometimes encounter antagonism or dismissal instead.∂ Prejudicially failing to fully embrace Muslim feminists creates a divide between queer and feminist communities. This divide has multiple consequences.∂ 1. It prevents progressive Muslims from more actively engaging feminist circles and vice versa. ∂ Consequently, **non-Muslim feminists cannot benefit from the inclusion of Muslim perspectives. As a result, feminism itself risks reproducing Islamophobia** and latent Christian privilege.∂ This is an issue of [intersectionality](http://everydayfeminism.com/2015/01/why-our-feminism-must-be-intersectional/).∂ We need to validate, value, and learn from everyone’s experiences and expressions. We should not place thought or ideas on a hierarchy.∂ Islam itself is inclusive. It insists upon the equality of all humans and argues for compassion and love over divisiveness and oppression. We can — and should — incorporate these perspectives within feminism.

## A2 Good Governance PIC

#### T- “Good governance” is also colonialist Chyzhkova 11:

(Anna, Coordinator at United Nations System in Guinea-Bissau) “Unit 3: Neo-Liberalism and Governance: Good and Good Enough Governance” Nov 7, 2011 AT

By 1990’s, after the end of the Cold War, in the context of the demise of communism and growing pro-democratic movements, the USA were showing to the world the direction of ‘the only possible’ path to a greater quality and freedom, namely democratic neo-liberalism (Grieg et al., 2007). At the same time, the democratic **neo-liberal**ism **proponents**, financial institutions and aid donors were **point**ing **to** the direction of what did not allow the structural adjustment to work out the way it should have during the 80’s – the quality of governance. So the new theory was born, namely **the quality of governance as the condition for development. Quality of governance, with the variety of meanings attributed by different international actors to the concept of good governance** (democracy and protection of human rights, sound administration and efficient management), became a new condition for aid disbursement. Political condition for aid became a rival to the economic condition. As per World Bank: “Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance. By ‘governance’ is meant the exercise of political power to manage a nation’s affair” (The World Bank, cited in Leftwich, 2000**). Good governance proponents tried to shape the South to the model of the West in terms of good governance structure, and failed to explore if there are necessary conditions to house and sustain good governance** (Leftwich, 2000**). The proponents of the good governance theories, in the early days, pointed to corruption, lack of accountability, and disregard for the rule of law and so on as main cause of bad governance**, whereas Mike Moore saw ‘political underdevelopment’ as the root cause of poor governance (Moore, 2001). Thus, the long list of “wishes” related to good governance in the South was set by the West. **It was an unrealistic list of conditions to be met to qualify for aid disbursement. No country could have hoped to have this required list of characteristics,** as per Hewitt (Hewitt, 2011). **Developing countries** (aid recipients), **found themselves with the long unrealistic ‘to do list’ trying to adjust their structures again**. Since ‘to do’ adjustment list was long and aid was needed badly (many countries were heavily indebted by that time**), governments were treating problems and implementing reforms simultaneously which represented a high risk of achieving little**. Very quickly governments found themselves to work towards aid donors’ priorities rather than on their own priorities or those can tangibly make a difference to the poverty reduction.

#### 2- T-The vagueness of “good governance” allows Western powers to bully recipient countries into working towards Western priorities. Chyzhkova 11:

[(Anna, Coordinator at United Nations System in Guinea-Bissau) “Unit 3: Neo-Liberalism and Governance: Good and Good Enough Governance” Nov 7, 2011] AT

As mentioned above, the results of the neo-liberalism proliferation and “one fit all” approach, similarly to modernisation, were not giving expected results in relation to undeveloped countries. **As neo-liberalism established in the past the conditions for aid** (economic conditions) with the set of structural adjustment policies, **so did the ‘new’ good governance theory through political conditions,** imposing long set of structural adjustment policies too. Both, **modernisation and democratic neo-liberalism pointing towards good governance were shaped to the Western model.** The long list of good governance characteristics to be reached in a short period with no adapted “guidelines” brought a new set of problems, just as modernisation brought ‘problems to all possible solutions’ (Hans Singer). **Just as modernisation created the bigger gap between rich**er **and poor**er, **good governance was** mainly **aiming at reforms** but **not** necessary at **reaching poor**. As Short cited in Leftwich said “**Although this covered a wide range of institutions and purposes, much of it brought no direct benefit to the poor”,** referring to good governance policies (Short, 1997:5 cited in Leftwich, 2000, p.123). **Elite of developing countries still remained main counterpart of the aid donors and citizens were neither consulted nor involved, since governments living on unearned money (aid) do not need to bargain anything with its citizens**. **Just as the World Bank could not provide reliable and objective data on country situation by using only GNP measure, so could not good governance proponents measure objectively the good governance level.** Just as the multitude of indexes for development measurement were created by aid donors according to their needs, **good governance’s meanings and its use depended on the priority of donor. John-Jean Barya saw “the political conditionality as another ideological device to reinforce the hegemony in Africa…”** (cited in Moore, 1993, p.52). The West was incoherent through its protectionism of western markets while advocating for free market, democratic neo-liberalists similarly wanted to cut on military expenditure in the South as sign of good governance, while putting no constraints on the international arm trade (Moore, 2001). Just as during the Cold War race between the USA and USSR, developing countries could manipulate in order to get protection and aid from one of another side, so similarly during the 1990s and onward developing countries use the competiveness and lack of coordination among donors to obtain more and to manipulate aid.

#### 3- T - Words don’t change the intention of the policy, meaning that all harms off the AC still apply.

#### 4- Non-unique to solving backlash because Middle Eastern values oppose Western culture. “Good governance” doesn’t quell opposition.

#### 5- T – Good governance is more imperialistic because Western culture has imposed its view on what “good” governance is on other cultures.

#### 6- T-Renaming corrupts the term—it forces a never ending search for newer terms. Schram 95:

Sanford F. Schram, Associate Professor of Political Science at Macalester College, former Visiting Professor at the La Follette Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin and Visiting Affiliate at the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, “Discourses of Dependency: The Politics of Euphemism,” Words of Welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and The Social Science of Poverty, Published by The University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 0816625778, p. 21-23

**Renaming** not only loses credibility but also **corrupts the terms used**. This danger is ever present, given the limits of language. Because **all terms are partial and incomplete** characterizations, **every new term can be invalidated** as not capturing all that needs to be said about any topic.22 With time, the odds increase that **a new term will lose its potency as it fails to emphasize neglected dimensions of a problem**. As newer concerns replace the ones that helped inspire the terminological shift, **newer terms will be introduced** to address what has been neglected. Where disabled was once an improvement over handicapped, other terms are now deployed to make society inclusive of [end page 24] all people, however differentially situated. The “disabled” are now “physically challenged” or “mentally challenged.” The politics of renaming promotes higher and higher levels of neutralizing language.23 Yet a neutralized language is itself already a partial reading even if it is only implicitly biased in favor of some attributes over others. Neutrality is always relative to the prevailing context. **As** the **context** **changes**, **what was** once **neutral** **becomes** seen as **biased**. Implicit moves of emphasis and de-emphasis become more visible in a new light. “Physically” and “mentally challenged” already begin to look insufficiently affirmative as efforts intensify to include people with such attributes in all avenues of contemporary life.24

#### 7- T - It is impossible to establish a metric for good or bad discourse. There are an infinite number of beliefs and assumptions so holding me accountable for a single term is arbitrary and counterproductive since it assumes we should prioritize one set of standards over all others.

**8- T- The term is grounded in imperialistic logic. Simonis:**

(http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/11037/ssoar-2004-simonis-defining\_good\_governance\_-\_the.pdf?sequence=1)

Third, **good governance is normative in conception**. **The values that provide the underpinning for governance are the values postulated by the defining actors and institutions. This last point deserves special consideration.** If donor-conceptualized standards of good governance were insisted upon**, it would imply an insistence that Western-derived standards of conduct be adopted in nonwestern politico-cultural contexts.** Scholars have also raised the problem of possible contradictions and trade-offs among the elements, for instance, economic growth, labor conditions, civil liberties, and the protection of the environment.

## A2 NGO Monitor

1. The NGO Monitor is an Israeli website based out of Jerusalem to criticize NGOs that undermine Israeli power- independent reason to discount this source- it is funded by private donors who act to promote Israeli nationalism- of course they would say that NGOs revealing their human rights abuses are bad. NGO Monitor writes:

<http://www.ngo-monitor.org/reports/ngos_and_the_negev_bedouin_issue_in_the_context_of_political_warfare/>, 11/6/13, accessed 4/10/16, NGO Monitor

**NGO Monitor was founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation**. **All our funding is provided by private donors** and foundations, and **NGO Monitor receives no governmental support**.∂ NGO Monitor receives significant financial support from Research + Evaluation = Promoting Organizational Responsibility and Transparency (REPORT) (Formerly AFNGOM), which provided a grant of $1 million in 2015. Click here to see a list of donors to REPORT (Formerly AFNGOM).∂ In addition, **donors to NGO Monitor include**: Peter Simpson, **Jerusalem Orion Foundation**

Thus prefer the Abu Rabia Queder evidence because she is a Bedouin woman who speaks from personal and community experiences- her analysis of the Min Ajlina Project is the most likely to be unbiased because she does not have any stake in US aid, only in programs that help Bedouin women- if it didn’t make a difference there is no political reason for her to support it.

1. The NGO monitor criticizes some Bedouin supporting NGOs but not MEPI. They criticize: The NCF, Adalah, ACRI, Bimkom, RHR, HRW, and EMHRN. None of their articles on the issue cite MEPI, Min Ajlina, or related programs. They even write:

<http://www.ngo-monitor.org/reports/transparency_and_due_diligence_in_u_s_government_funding_for_israeli_and_palestinian_ngos_update/>, NGO Monitor, 6/24/14, Accessed 4/10

**According to NGO Monitor research, of the (approximately) 47 NGOs funded by MEPI from 2012-2014, 43 are not inherently biased against Israel.**

An incredibly pro-Israel group can only fault 4 MEPI programs, and they don’t ever criticize Min Ajlina- that’s a good success rate and proves there is no reason to discount MEPI- no program has a 100% approval rate, but if this is the only criticism he can find I think we’re doing well.

## A2 Torrossian

This evidence is ridiculous- the article is by a far right blogger concerned about “American blood needlessly spilt” but can’t cite a single instance of MEPI’s Min Ajlina Project experiencing violence, and also only criticizes MEPI not Min Ajlina directly. He’s a stark pro-Israelite- the evidence is biased and unfounded

## A2 TPP/PTX

#### Turn – Congress has empirically supported democracy promotion – Turkey proves Pecquet 15:

[Julian, congressional correspondent, “Congress concerned over Turkey's drift from democracy”, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/turkey-authoritarianism-erdogan-civil-society.html>] OP

**US lawmakers are pressing** the Barack **Obama** administration **to beef up support for Turkey’s civil society as an antidote to** Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s perceived drift toward **authoritarianism**. Five key House members wrote to Secretary of State John Kerry on March 27 urging him to launch a “formal dialogue” with Turkey aimed at strengthening political freedoms. They want the State Department to make clear that democratic governance is just as important as other priorities, such as economic cooperation and trade that already have their own regular bilateral forums. “We urge you to continue to stress the importance of media freedom, separation of powers, human rights, and the rule of law in your discussions with President Erdogan and other senior Turkish government officials," the lawmakers wrote in a letter obtained by Al-Monitor. "To this end, we strongly recommend the establishment of a formal dialogue with Turkey on these matters in parallel with ongoing discussions on trade and investment, security, and culture and education." The push is spearheaded by Rep. Bill Keating, D-Mass., who was the top Democrat on the Foreign Affairs panel on Europe last year and now holds that spot on the terrorism and trade subcommittee. Also signing on are the chairmen and ranking members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Reps. Ed Royce, R-Calif., and Eliot Engel, D-N.Y.; Armed Services Committee ranking member Adam Smith, D-Wash.; and Rep. Tom Rooney, R-Fla., a member of the intelligence and foreign aid spending panels. "**To remain silent on all of this could create the impression that we acquiese — and we don't**," Keating told Al-Monitor in an interview in his office. "And if there's going to be joint efforts economically and on other fronts, **these are issues that have to be discussed" — lest Ankara conclude that US officials "don't care about that stuff."**

#### 2- Political capital doesn’t exist – more likely winners win – that turns the DA. **Hirsch ’13:**

[Michael, chief correspondent for National Journal, “There’s no such thing as Political Capital,” National Journal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207>] PO

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “**pol**itical **cap**ital” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, **if someone had talked** seriously **about** Obama having enough political **capital to oversee** passage of both **immigration** reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—**this person would have been** **called crazy** and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, **for reasons that have** very **little to do with** Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “**pol**itical **cap**ital”—chances are fair that **both will** now **happen.** What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on **immigration** reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It **has** almost **entirely to do with** just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the **Hispanic vote** in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of **pol**itical **cap**ital—or mandates, or momentum—**is** **so** **poorly defined** that presidents and **pundits** often **get it wrong.** “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice, depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that **pol**itical **cap**ital **is**, at best, **an empty concept**, and that **almost nothing in the academic literature successfully** quantifies or even **defines it**. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; **there is never** any **known amount of cap**ital. “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But **if he picks issues** that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—**there is no reason to think he can’t win** far **more victories than** any of the careful **calculators of pol**itical **cap**ital now **believe is possible**, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some **early wins**—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will **create momentum**, and one win may well lead to others. “**Winning wins**.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

#### 3- Turn - forcing controversial fights key to Obama’s agenda- try or die for the link turn **Dickerson 15:**

[John, Slate, “Go for the Throat!”, 18 January 2015 ([www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/01/barack_obama_s_second_inaugural_address_the_president_should_declare_war.single.html))] PO

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. **The challenge for** President **Obama’s** speech is the challenge of his **second term: how to be great when the environment stinks**. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: **The president** who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation **can only cement** **his legacy** if he destroys the GOP. If he wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack **Obama** of the first administration **might have approached the task by finding** some **Republicans to deal with** and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. That's the old way. He has abandoned that. He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the Republicans are dead set on opposing him. They cannot be unchained by schmoozing. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other constraints will limit the chance for cooperation. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. Through a series of clarifying fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or **cause a** rift in the party **that will leave it**, at least temporarily, **in** disarray.

#### 4- Non-unique -- zero chance congress rejects TPP post-TPA. **Stoltzfoos 15:**

[Rachel, Reporter @ Daily Caller, Daily Caller, 6/23/15, ([**http://dailycaller.com/2015/06/23/congress-secures-trade-promotion-authority-for-obama/**](http://dailycaller.com/2015/06/23/congress-secures-trade-promotion-authority-for-obama/))] PO

TPA would give Congress more power to shape the trade agreement by defining specific objectives the president must work toward in a deal, and by setting new transparency rules. But **once the president submits a deal to Congress, TPA greatly restricts the Senate’s ability to block or complicate** the deal. Any deal the president submits to Congress in the next six years is almost guaranteed to pass**, because the Senate must promptly approve or reject the deal with no chance to amend it** and little time for debate. And **just 51 votes would be required** for passage — a far cry from the 61 votes required for major legislation. (RELATED: Why Are Senate Republicans So Eager To Cede Their Trade Authority To Obama?)What do you think? Obama says **he needs TPA to conclude** a massive trade deal, the **T**rans-**P**acific **P**artnership, which he is currently negotiating with 11 other countries. And the Republicans who fought for the deal say TPA is key to future free trade agreements that will benefit the U.S. economy.What do you think? Critics contend its a dangerous concession of Senate power to a president that can’t be trusted.

#### 5- TPP will fail – stalemate with Japan on cars and agriculture. Bases 15:

[Daniel, senior Congressional correspondent, "U.S., Japan have 'significant gaps' on auto market access: U.S. official", Reuters, [www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/31/us-usa-trade-idUSKBN0MR00H20150331](http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/31/us-usa-trade-idUSKBN0MR00H20150331)] PO

(Reuters) - Acting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Wendy **Cutler said** on Monday **that "significant gaps**" in the trade negotiations **remain between the United States and Japan regarding** access for U.S. **automobiles** in the Japanese market.∂ "**Japan has zero tariffs on autos** and trucks, and **yet access to the Japanese automotive market is limited**. There is an array of non-tariff barriers in Japan that have effectively closed the Japanese auto market to U.S. producers," Cutler said in prepared remarks on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations delivered at the Japan Society in New York.∂ "And as a result, **when Japan joined the (TPP) negotiation**, we asked and **Japan agreed to launching a separate bilateral parallel negotiation on automotive non-tarrif measure issues**. And on these issues we are making good progress, but we have more work to do," Cutler said.∂ A Japanese negotiating team spent the prior week in Washington, working on the issue.∂ The U.S. and Japan are part of a 12-nation TPP negotiation that is expected to wrap up by mid-year.∂ Cutler, whose remarks were interrupted twice by hecklers protesting the TPP, also said **a second critical sticking point in bilateral trade talks with Japan is access for U.S. agricultural products.**

#### 6- Turn – TPP hurts developing countries – 9 warrants

obv don’t read w/ link turn

Rowden 15:

[Rick, “9 Ways the TPP is Bad for Developing Countries”, Foreign Policy, 7/7/15 (<http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/9-ways-the-tpp-is-bad-for-developing-countries/>)] PO

**1.** The TPP **forces equal rules on unequal partners**.∂ We don’t let professional NFL teams play football against toddlers, but this basic truism is tossed out when it comes to economies in the TPP. The **TPP** **members that are already rich** and industrialized (Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) **are aggressively seeking** uniform tax and financial policies and **low** levels of **regulation** around the world in order to reduce operating costs for their multinational corporations — which had a hand in drafting the text of the agreement. They claim that in today’s globalizing economy, trade agreements must be based on “fairness” and “a level playing field” — premised on the idea that a government’s tax, financial, or trade policies should not provide preferential support for domestic companies.∂ But though the TPP’s six **developing-country members** are each at very different stages of economic development, what they all have in common is that their domestic firms **are far less advanced** and competitive than those from the more advanced economies. Correspondingly, each of these countries needs to support its domestic industries with its own unique mix of subsidies; long-term, low-interest subsidized credit; supportive technology policy; and research and development. The TPP would forbid many of these policies in the name of “fairness,” ignoring the fact that its developing and developed members are at different stages of economic development and, therefore, have diverging needs.∂ **2.** The TPP **forbids using** trade **policy to protect domestic industries.**∂ Going further than current World Trade Organization rules, the TPP seeks deep cuts in quotas, tariffs, and other protective trade policies, ensuring that nascent manufacturing industries in its developing members will face massive competition from far more competitive foreign firms. The TPP would also **prohibit levying taxes on the export of raw materials** — a policy **that encourages** such **resources to stay at home** and be available for use by domestic manufacturers. But this demand that all should play by the same rules and lower their levels of trade protection in equal measure is especially egregious because **it defies** the historical record and its **key lessons about what developing countries must do to industrialize** successfully. In fact, today’s rich countries developed their manufacturing sectors with [high levels of trade protection](http://www.amazon.com/Kicking-Away-Ladder-Development-Perspective/dp/1843310279/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1429860744&sr=8-1&keywords=Kicking+Away+the+Ladder" \t "_blank) and other state support, often for decades at a time, until they were finally able to compete in world markets. They [realized](http://www.amazon.in/How-Rich-Countries-Poor-Stay/dp/1586486683" \t "_blank), through trial and error, that trade should be liberalized only after domestic firms become competitive internationally — not before.∂ **3.** The TPP **bans using government procurement to assist domestic firms**.∂ The rich countries in the TPP negotiations are demanding that foreign corporations be allowed to compete with domestic companies for government procurement contracts. But historically, countries have used procurement as an explicit form of assistance for their domestic firms. This has led the Malay Economic Action Council to warn that “if Malaysian Government procurement was conducted on a level playing field, many Malaysian companies would go under.”∂ The TPP limits regulation of foreign investors too much.∂ The TPP proposes that no special regulations be allowed to apply to **foreign investors**, meaning they **must be treated no differently from domestic companies**. But this is another example of hypocrisy — most industrialized countries long used “local content” rules and other regulations to ensure that foreign investment transferred technology and purchased local goods and services to boost domestic sectors. However, according to a [leaked draft of the TPP’s Investment chapter](https://wikileaks.org/tpp-investment/" \t "_blank), any policies that favor local ownership would be considered “discriminatory” and prohibited.∂ **4**. The TPP undermines the sovereignty of national courts and **scares countries from adopting new regulations.**∂ To enforce the TPP’s new deregulated standards, it also proposes to radically extend the traditional definition of “unfair expropriation or nationalization” of a foreign investment to include “the expectation of gain or profit.” Thus, it **allows a corporation to sue a signatory nation** for enacting new regulations or laws — even those that address public-interest concerns like labor and environmental rights — **if it believes these would deprive it of “expected profits**.” According to this investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, already found in many recent trade and investment agreements, if a new law or regulation ends up costing foreign investors “lost planned profits,” they can sue the government to either get rid of the law or pay up to hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and penalties to the investors. The ISDS feature takes disputes [out of domestic courts](http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/18/us/review-of-us-rulings-by-nafta-tribunals-stirs-worries.html" \t "_blank) to secretive international tribunals that have the power to overturn judgments of national courts and offer no chance for appeal. For example, the tobacco giant Philip Morris is presently [suing Uruguay](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/big-tobacco-puts-countries-on-trial-as-concerns-over-ttip-deals-mount-9807478.html" \t "_blank) because the latter’s public health regulations on cigarette advertising are hurting the sales it had “expected” there.∂ While rich-country trade negotiators say that such assurances for investors are needed to attract foreign investment, Nobel laureate and economist [Joseph Stiglitz](http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/nov/08/trade-agreements-developing-countries-joseph-stiglitz" \t "_blank) notes that many multinational corporations already have investment insurance through either their own governments or the World Bank’s [MIGA](https://www.miga.org/" \t "_blank) and that the real reason for ISDS is political: to **create “a chilling effect” in the less advanced TPP countries**, in which the threat of lengthy, multimillion-dollar lawsuits is enough to make governments reluctant to adopt laws or regulations that may offend foreign investors. In so doing, foreign corporations seek to achieve by stealth — through secretly negotiated trade agreements — what they could not attain in an open political process. Although a growing number of developing countries around the world (Brazil, India, South Africa) refuse to allow ISDS clauses in future agreements, the TPP apparently still includes the provision.∂ **5.** The TPP **makes countries more vulnerable to financial crises.**∂ The TPP goes against new thinking on [best practices](http://prospect.org/article/exporting-financial-instability" \t "_blank) regarding capital controls — restrictions on the ability of investors to bring in or take out vast amounts of capital from countries overnight. Even the IMF [reversed](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/POL120312A.htm" \t "_blank) its long-standing opposition to capital controls in 2012, finally agreeing with mounting research showing that capital controls may be useful in ensuring financial stability in a crisis by stemming sudden outflows or disruptive inflows. Yet despite this new conventional wisdom, **the TPP would block developing countries from using capital controls.**∂As if nothing was learned from the 2008 financial crisis, the TPP also calls for a whole range of financial liberalization rules that would block countries from regulating speculative financial activities and would further **deregulate the financial services sector**. Economist Anton Korinek of Johns Hopkins University [explained](https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/moneco/v68y2014isps55-s67.html" \t "_blank) that such excessive financial deregulation is similar to relaxing safety rules on nuclear power plants: It may reduce costs and increase profits for the nuclear industry, and may even reduce electricity rates — while increasing the risk of a nuclear meltdown. Similarly, financial deregulation increases the profits of the financial sector at great risk to the rest of society, and it threatens the financial stability of developing and developed TPP members alike.∂ **6.** The TPP undermines **public health.**∂ Many health groups such as [Doctors Without Borders](http://www.msfaccess.org/content/tpp-still-terrible-deal-poor-peoples-health" \t "_blank) have campaigned against the TPP because its rules on **intellectual property rights** (IPR) **would keep cheaper generic drugs out of reach for millions of poor people** in developing countries. According to a [leaked draft](https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/" \t "_blank) of the IPR chapter, the TPP would greatly extend existing patents and copyrights on essential drugs and expand the scope of patents and copyrights beyond finished products to include coverage of many components of finished goods. If enacted, such rules would considerably undermine developing countries’ [ability to address public health](https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/IEO-2011-02-g.pdf" \t "_blank) needs — meaning that **more people would die**.∂ **7.** The TPP **blocks companies from acquiring needed technology.**∂ The IPR chapter would also significantly stunt the development of manufacturing firms in developing countries because it would considerably raise the costs of and create new barriers to accessing needed manufacturing technologies, thereby [hampering](http://www.citizen.org/documents/NZleakedIPpaper-1.pdf" \t "_blank) firms’ ability to engage in reverse-engineering — a key step in the learning-by-doing process [used by all rich countries](http://www.dime-eu.org/files/active/0/MaySell.pdf" \t "_blank) when they were first developing.∂ **8**. The TPP **undermines state-owned companies**.∂ The TPP proposes breaking up state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which have been cornerstones of East Asia’s successful industrialization strategy for many decades. Not only would the proposed reforms significantly curtail state support for such firms, but they would also commercialize current SOEs in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Singapore. These countries would be locked into such constraints going forward and would be prevented from offering state support to any new or future SOEs. Once again, this **blocks developing countries from using strategies that rich countries used themselves.** As rich countries learned long ago, when private investors are unable or unwilling to invest in strategic sectors, the state needs to step in and play the role of “entrepreneur of last resort.”∂ Some developing-country policymakers in TPP countries may be agreeing to these rules in the belief that accepting them is necessary to attract foreign investment and secure participation in global value chains. Others, it is widely believed, think that signing onto the **TPP** will give them some added protection from China’s growing influence in the region. If so, such shortsighted strategies **may come at the high price of** forgoing **successful long-term** national **economic development.**

#### 7- No impact – there’s no risk of protectionism, Ahearn 09:

[Raymond, CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “The Global Economic Downturn and Protectionism,” Policy Archive, 23 March 2009, <http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/19395.pdf>] PO

There are a number of reasons why **the threat of** a return to **protectionist**, beggar-thy-neighbor **policies could be vastly overstated**. Unlike the 1930s, **today’s global economy has** several **strong firewalls** to prevent governments from raising trade barriers that result in a cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation. These firewalls include more institutionalized obstacles to protectionism built into the WTO system, more policy instruments to address the economic slowdown, and a more interdependent and open world economy than existed in the 1930s. In addition, some in today’s **media** may **tend to overstate the threat** of protectionism **by not** always **distinguishing between** protectionist **actions and** protectionist **pressures** and/or by equating legitimate forms of protection with protectionism. The fact that there is ample room for increases in trade measures and barriers that are consistent with the rules and obligations of the WTO often may go unappreciated in some press coverage. These trade measures and barriers include increases in applied tariffs to bound rates, and imposition of countervailing and antidumping duties, so-called ‘defensive’ trade measures.4 **Protection for limited periods** of time and **under prescribed conditions is built into the** rules of the **WTO** as a political safety valve and as a recognition of the human and social costs that are associated with the often wrenching adjustments that accompany increased trade competition. Firewalls Against Protectionism WTO rules today serve to keep a lid on trade barriers of its 153 members through an elaborate set of mutual obligations and dispute settlement procedures. Unlike the 1930s when countries could impose higher trade barriers unilaterally without violating any international agreements or anticipating a foreign reaction, under today’s rules members can take their disputes to the WTO for settlement rather than engaging in reciprocal retaliatory actions. The fact that countries violating WTO obligations can face WTO-sanctioned retaliation helps constrain outbreaks of unilateral actions that could be mutually harmful.5 Pressures for protection are also dampened by a world economy that is much more interdependent and integrated than in the 1930s.6 Leading **producers** have become so international in their production operations and supply chains that they **have** developed **a vested interest in resisting protectionism**.7 Many industries that have faced import competition in the past – such as televisions and semiconductors—have found that international diversification or joint ventures with foreign partners are a more profitable way of coping with global competition than blocking goods at the border. In addition, many domestic industries have less incentive to ask for import restrictions because foreign rivals now produce in the domestic market, eliminating the benefits of trade barriers for domestic firms.8 Unlike the early 1930s, when governments took little responsibility for propping up financial institutions and were unable to pursue expansionary monetary policies due to fixed exchange rates under the gold standard, policymakers around the world today are adopting expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. These expansionary policies, in turn, have the capability of dampening protectionist pressures and demands that stem from job losses and related economic hardship with lower interest rates and increased expenditures on unemployment benefits and health care benefits.9 A related consideration is that today’s world economy is much more open than the world economy of the 1930s. Average tariffs on world trade have come down from the 50% range in the 1930s, to the 25% range in the 1980s, and to less than 10% today.10 Under these circumstances, **it would require tremendous increases** in protection **to get** the world back to **anywhere near the** conditions of the 19**30s**, although a major increase in tariffs (e.g. a doubling) would be disruptive even if it left tariffs well below the 1930s levels. Scorecard of Protective Measures To Date Empirical support exists for the view that existing legal, economic, and political firewalls are restraining today’s protectionist pressures. Most importantly, Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s Director General, reported in January 2009 that most WTO members have successfully kept domestic protectionist pressures under control “with only limited evidence of increases in trade restricting or trade distorting measures” taken during the last six months of 2008. This assessment was based on the first report of the WTO secretariat on the trade effects of the global economic crisis. The report found only “limited evidence” of an increase in tariffs, non-tariff barriers or trade-remedy actions by member countries, but noted that the most significant actions taken in response to the global crisis have involved “financial support of one kind or another to banks and other financial institutions and to certain industries, notably the automobile industry.”11 The WTO report notes tariff increases on selected products being implemented by India, Russia, Ecuador, and Ukraine. Countries adopting non-tariff measures include Indonesia (port of entry barriers) and Argentina (import licensing requirements). Argentina was cited for measures that attempt to boost exports of selected products. But the report indicates that there has been “no dramatic increase” in antidumping investigations in the second half of 2008 compared to first half of 2008, but raised the possibility of increased trade remedy actions in 2009.12 The World Bank, which has also been monitoring trade restrictions proposed and adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis, reached a conclusion similar to that of the WTO. Its initial report determined that there have been 47 trade restrictive measures imposed since the financial crisis began last summer, including 17 from G-20 countries, but that “these measures have probably had only marginal effects on trade flows to date.” In addition to the measures cited by the WTO, the World Bank report cited China’s import ban on various food products from the EU, and export subsidies provided by the EU, China, and India. Contrary to the WTO report, the World Bank report determined that “the number of antidumping cases (both investigations initiated and imposition of duties) surged in 2008.”13

#### 8- No solvency -- trade doesn’t solve war – historically proven. Martin et al 7:

[Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics and CEPR, “Make Trade Not War?”, The Review of Economic Studies, April 23, 2007, pg. 75] PO

**Does globalization pacify international relations**? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, **the correlation** between trade openness and military conflicts **is not** a **clear** cut one. **The first era of globalization**, at the end of the 19th century, **was a period of rising trade openness and multiple military conflicts**, culminating with World War I. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). **There is no clear evidence that the 1990s, during which trade flows increased dramatically, was a period of lower** prevalence of **military conflicts**, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

## A2 Western Fem Islamophobic

#### 1- The aff isn’t Western Fem- Bedouin women use a unique form of Islamic feminism that is fostered and adapted through work with women’s empowerment NGOs and helps form identities as a woman and Muslim- Bedouin woman and activist Abu-Rabia-Queder explains:

Sarab Abu-Rabia-Queder. The Activism of Bedouin Women: Social and Political Resistance. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. <http://www.bgu.ac.il/social/models-of-activism.pdf> CM

**Feminist activities in non-Western societies** are usually adapted to the contextual reality of the specific culture. Occasionally they defer to Western feminism and occasionally they **adapt** it **to their own context**, or derive from it certain perspectives, thus **creating their own type of feminism**. Deniz Kandiyoti (1988) suggests the concept of “local dialect,” **which enables understanding of the unique characteristics of various types of feminism**s, including aspects of silencing, elimination and active or passive resistance. In addition, Abu-Lughod (1990) recommends the **investigation of Middle Eastern feminist movements** through nation-building, **ties with Western nations**, political status, **the ideological use of Islam** and the struggle over the use of Islamic law in the State mechanism. ∂ Much of the research conducted in patriarchal societies **has adopted this approach, especially that focusing on Bedouin women** in the Negev. From the 1990s, and particularly reflected in the research of educated women, **the Bedouin woman** of the Negev **has been described as an activist who copes and struggles** (Abu-Rabia-Queder, 2006; Pessate-Schubert, 2004). However, there are no studies that examine the agency of Bedouin women through community activism as part of the activities of women’s communal organizations.

Prefer my evidence- my author is a Bedouin woman in the Negev region of Israel who has participated in US NGOs promoting empowerment- she represents the target population of the Min Ajlina Project and endorses its use. Their evidence is from generic philosophers who haven’t experienced Islamic fem

2-Extend the MEPI evidence- the Min Ajlina Project is a pre-existing fem NGO in Negev- the aff is furthering cooperation with an initiative that enhances the Bedouin culture

# Frontlines-Theoretical

## Default Reasonability

1. Competing interps creates a race to the bottom- means that debaters are more likely to read frivolous theory in an attempt to create a marginally better interpretation for debate- this is bad because it decreases substantive discussion and education
2. The reasons that reasonability is arbitrary all devolve to why there’s no brightline- identifying and justifying a brightline not only solves but makes T/theory easier to evaluate because it gives you a clear way to comprehend what is real abuse- the argument that it involves to CI doesn’t make sense because it doesn’t, it just leads to us being forced to provide a proper weighing metric for abuse-that’s different

Thus- default reasonability with a brightline of structural abuse- this means they have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the structure of the aff makes it logically impossible to negate without reading theory- if they have any offense on case you can drop the shell because they have proven the only abuse is substantive- substantive abuse isn’t a reason to justify punishment because it just means there was a hard argument to answer- that’s just good debating

And- aff isn’t structurally abusive- there’s a 1:1 burden structure and you can make turns, links to Ks, have a methodology debate, read solvency deficits, etc- these all offer you the same strategic advantages you could have if I read a generic AC

## Counter Interp

A) Counter Interp: The aff may defend an increase of funding from the US Department of State to MEPI for the Min Ajlina Project as long as A) the neg have full text of my aff B) there is a solvency advocate C) they are willing to check in CX and D) accept generic links to DAs -

B) I meet

Solves 100% of their offense- Disclosure solves all predictability claims- I’ve disclosed consistently all year- even though this aff is new you have my contact info- you could have gotten the info meaning you could have prepped out the aff- Solvency advocate, links, and disclosure solve clash and ground arguments- having a solvency advocate means there is literature on my advocacy so you could have researched and found indicts to it- accepting links means you could have read your generic DAs- disclosure means you could have known the aff so that takes out “its too hard to research a million plans” arguments that don’t have a brightline any way-checks in CX mean I am forced to commit to an advocacy and will spec if you ask so we could have avoided a theory debate (thus err aff)- generic DA links also solve all ground and research claims because as long as you have a disad that links to a whole res aff you have an answer

1. Standards:
2. Depth of discussion- Specific focuses encourage more in-depth discussion and increased research on specific issues rather than broad discussion of the resolution as a general principle- key to education because a) key to real world education- people need to be able to learn in-depth about certain subjects and b) key to fairness- the neg has unlimited counterplan and DA ground so the aff must be able to pick a specific advocacy to weigh against them to be competitive

## On the T-DP

1. the Lappin ev creates a distinction between democracy assistance and democracy promotion- you can’t clarify in CX what the difference is or which one you defend or the definition of which one you defend- independent reason to err aff on the issue- unclear interp means he can shift the meaning in the 2N to better fit the 1AR- stable advocacy k2 fairness because otherwise they can spin a new defense of the interpretation and moot 100% of my offense
2. T- you’ve had the aff and all of my frontlines it’s ridiculous to claim you need more limits for the round to be fair- the counterinterp solves 100% of your offense
3. T- resolvability is also mooted by the counterinterp because you have all of my prep and everything is disclosed and has solvency advocates- there are so many ways to have a really good in-depth debate but you chose to go for T

## RVIs Good

#### 1- Competing interps mandates RVIs- if the goal is to create the best norms for debate you should vote for whoever has the most offense because they are winning their interp is better, so RVIs make sense

#### 2- The aff has a 7-4-6-3 time disadvantage on neg theory so grant an RVI to level the playing field

#### 3- RVIs disincentive frivolous theory so they’re better for norm setting

#### 4- RVIs force the debate onto one layer so we debate the interp more in-depth; better under competing interps

#### 5- Without RVIs theory is a one-way street; means we set bad norms just because some people are better at the theory debate

## A2 Resolution in General

The resolution only specifies the topic area as a starting point for debate- it still allows for in depth discussion of plans. Madsen and Chandler:

A tradition in and of itself does not warrant the perpetuation of that tradition.6 Calling the topic **a "resolution" is merely a semantic distinction not justifying resolutional focus. Debaters** through convention lean to **treat the resolution as a problem area**. The resolution as problem area fulfills two critical functions; [as] **it serves as notice of the area for debate and it demarcates aff**irmative **and neg**ative **ground** (Herbeck, Katsulas and Leeper 151). Further the resolution as problem area meshes with the jurisdictional view of the resolution. [but as] **The resolution merely outlines the jurisdictional grant which is available to the judge, it does not dictate that the affirmative advocate the entirety of that jurisdictional grant** (Madsen and Louden 78).

1. Interpretation: If the affirmative reads a plan text of *(insert plan text here)*, then they do not have to specify a) by how much they increase funding, b) what strategies and activities are done to help women’s rights as long as the all of the aff cards are is disclosed to you full text, I am willing to spec, grant you disad ground, and have a solvency advocate- mitigates 100% of your offense