# 1AC – Whole Res

## 1AC – General

#### **Ethics must be situated within contextual, broader power structures that define us. The drive for individual purity is impossible in an ethically compromised world constituted by the likes of institutional racism, settler genocide, and environmental degradation. Individuals are inescapably entangled with each other and produced within power structures around them.**

Shotwell 16 LIVING ETHICALLY IN COMPROMISED TIMES AGAINST PURITY  Alexis Shotwell UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA PRESS MINNEAPOLIS • LONDON Shotwell.indd 3 02/08/2016 11:15:55 AM Published by the University of Minnesota Press 111 Third Avenue South, Suite 290 Minneapolis, MN 55401-2520 http://www.upress.umn.edu TJHSSTAD

Purity, and What the World Deserves The not-simple “purity made simple” soap is one knot in a tapestry of products and ways of talking about the world. A hot-yoga studio franchise in my town, “Pure Yoga,” enjoins people to become “pure yogis,” offering a dizzying array of styles of yoga unmoored from any yoga tradition in particular; Shotwell.indd 5 02/08/2016 11:15:55 AM 6 Complexity and Complicity the owners of the studios have also recently opened a vegan restaurant that serves killer gluten-free, vegan onion rings. Hot yoga, they say, “not only helps you to detox flushing toxins out of the skin through sweat, but heats up the muscles allowing you to approach the postures from a safe place” (“Discover Pure Yoga Ottawa” 2015). The shelves of ordinary food stores—let alone stores that self-identify as health-food stores—offer various products to detoxify our bodies. Cleanses, juice fasts, detox diets, ionic foot baths that draw poisons out through our feet, foot detox patches that you apply and that work overnight using herbs that activate “far infrared energy,” bottles that offer pure spring water (with or without fluoride), and Himalayan pink salt-rock lamps—all offer ways to manage something, something experienced by consumers as a toxin that we can be free of. There is a clear and growing concern about material toxins accumulating in human bodies even as there is little clarity about what a toxin actually is, if ionic baths actually cleanse anything, or how we practically might personally manage the complex systems that affect the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the substances we touch. Purity politics arise not only in our response to potential physical contamination; it is also an issue for our ethical and political situation in the world. How might our response to physical and political impurity be connected? Consider. Many of us are settlers living on unceded native land, stolen through genocidal colonial practices. We feed domestic animals more food than starving people lack, and spend money on the medical needs of pets while eating factory farmed meat and spraying our lawn with pesticides that produce cancer in domestic animals. We pay for cosmetic surgeries in a time when many people can’t access basic health care. We recycle but take plane trips to Alaska. We worry about global warming and turn on the air conditioning. We think slavery is wrong, but eat chocolate and fish produced in contexts that meet every definition of nonchattel slavery. We believe that people deserve good working conditions but buy clothing produced in sweatshops and maquiladoras because we couldn’t afford equitably sourced clothing even if we could find it. We cannot look directly at the past because we cannot imagine what it would mean to live responsibly toward it. We yearn for different futures, but we can’t imagine how to get there from here. We’re hypocrites, maybe, but that derogation doesn’t encompass the nature of the problem that complexity poses for us. The “we” in each of these cases shifts, and complicity carries differential weight with our social position—people benefiting from globalized inequality are for the most part the “we” in this Shotwell.indd 6 02/08/2016 11:15:55 AM Complexity and Complicity 7 paragraph. People are not equally responsible or capable, and are not equally called to respond. But however the bounds of the “we” are drawn, we are not, ever, pure. We’re complicit, implicated, tied in to things we abjure. This is a kind of impurity implied in the sense of “compromised living” that involves making concessions. In addition to making ethical compromises, we are also, as a recent selfhelp book about responding to toxins in our bodily environments puts it, “born pre-polluted” (Lourie and Smith 2013, 3). Our bodily boundaries are penetrated and traversed by viruses, chemicals, microbes. This way of being compromised names the sense in which we are liable to danger, vulnerable, potentially or actually damaged or sickened. Under contemporary regimes dictating individualist responses to pollution, we are made responsible for our own bodily impurity; we are called on to practice forms of defense against our own vulnerability. Charting the space between complicity and pollution, between righteousness and compromise, is difficult. If hypocrisy were the problem, really it wouldn’t be much of a problem; at least on the surface, it is something we could give up. In contrast, being co-constituted with the world, ontologically inseparable, just seems to be our condition. And yet, contemporary imperatives to detox, to eat clean, to defend against pollution, or to avoid inflammation-causing foods imply the possibility that we could be pure in the relevant sense. I juggle a knee-jerk reaction to such personalized purity pursuits (individualizing, “not in my backyard”/NIMBY, capitalist, accepting of injustice in the distributions of harm) with the recognition that, indeed, there are substances in the world that none of us should, if we want to live, be coconstituted in relation to. Environmental racism is real, workers’ bodies are wrongly incorporated as the detritus of capitalism, and militarism shapes the bodies and minds of everyone involved in war in the mold of trauma. The “moves” involved in the not-simple “purity made simple” face wash, in NIMBY politics, in avoiding BPA, in eating organic (or vegan or paleo or sugar-free), or in doing monthly detoxifying “cleanses” may seem very different from each other. And they may seem very different in turn than other practices I explore in this book—practices of forgetting in relation to our implication in colonialism or the history of disease designation, for example. There are obvious real differences involved, but they are threaded together. Let’s call the line that links them “purity politics,” or “purism.” What’s needed, instead of a pretense to purity that is impossible in the actually existing Shotwell.indd 7 02/08/2016 11:15:56 AM 8 Complexity and Complicity world, is something else. We need to shape better practices of responsibility and memory for our placement in relation to the past, our implication in the present, and our potential creation of different futures. I should say—since I try not to use the unsupported yet urgent imperatives so prevalent on the left (“we need,” “we must”), instead shifting from categorical to hypothetical imperatives—if we want a world with less suffering and more flourishing, it would be useful to perceive complexity and complicity as the constitutive situation of our lives, rather than as things we should avoid. The action that comes out of the rather undefined idea of wanting a world with less suffering is, perhaps needless to say, a moving target, and one that raises more questions than it answers. Less suffering for whom? How is suffering measured? Who has the capacity to perceive entanglement, and who has the capacity to respond? To say that we live in compromised times is to say that although most people aim to not cause suffering, destruction, and death, simply by living, buying things, throwing things away, we implicate ourselves in terrible effects on ecosystems and beings both near and far away from us. We are inescapably entwined and entangled with others, even when we cannot track or directly perceive this entanglement.

#### The global nuclear order is undergirded by complicated hegemonic structures – exposing these power relations is a prior question to discussing consequences because it carries explanatory power. Critical analysis is commonly left out of nuclear policy debates to serve the interests of the elite – calling out and analyzing specific tools of oppression is key. Thus, the role of the ballot is to challenge dominant forms of knowledge production.

Ritchie 19 Nick Ritchie (2019): A hegemonic nuclear order: Understanding the Ban Treaty and the power politics of nuclear weapons, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1571852 Nick Ritchie nick.ritchie@york.ac.uk Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK TJHSSTAD

The idea of “global nuclear order” has emerged as an important concept in debate on the global politics of nuclear weapons. Thinking about nuclear order has revolved around the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear deterrence, the possession and control of nuclear weapons and materials, and nuclear abolition. Most recently, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or “Ban Treaty”) negotiated in 2017 and the “humanitarian initiative on nuclear weapons” (HINW) from which it emerged represent a significant challenge to established ideas of nuclear order. They have explicitly attempted to delegitimize and stigmatize nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence through a new and unequivocal legal instrument under the auspices of the United Nations. In doing so, they provide an opportunity to develop a more critical understanding of what “global nuclear order” is, which is the purpose of this article. Indeed, the HINW emerged from deep misgivings about nuclear order—the prevailing set of ideas, institutions, and practices that comprises the global politics of nuclear weapons. The Ban Treaty, in turn, has generated fierce criticism for undermining © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group CONTACT Nick Ritchie nick.ritchie@york.ac.uk Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1571852 that order and it has coincided with a number of other destabilizing developments, including the deterioration of the U.S.-Russia relationship and nuclear arms control processes, nuclear threats by Moscow to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, a credible long-range North Korean nuclear arsenal, the potential collapse of the Iran deal, and a serious questioning of U.S. nuclear security commitments by its allies under the Trump administration. Together, these developments—the Ban Treaty on the one hand and renewed nuclear threat-making and the erosion of nuclear arms control on the other—signal a period of nuclear “ordering anxiety.” This is in many ways symptomatic of a wider geopolitical and cultural angst in the United States and industrialized North about the fate of the “liberal international order.” Both expressions of ordering anxiety—the specific nuclear dimension and the wider geopolitical frame—are at heart about the future of hegemonic structures of power in global politics. Recent analysis of global nuclear order has not engaged seriously with power and hegemony (Harnisch, 2014; Horsburgh, 2015; Walker, 2012). Neither has much of the scholarship on the humanitarian initiative (Onderco, 2017; Potter, 2017; Sauer & Pretorius, 2014), which has yet to locate it firmly in the context of the global politics of nuclear weapons. What is missing from both areas is a critical analysis of the power relations that constitute nuclear order and to which the Ban Treaty poses a significant challenge. There are important reasons for doing this: first, to understand contemporary global nuclear order and nuclear ordering anxiety; second, to understand the significance and limits of the Ban Treaty in the context of ideas of nuclear order; and third, to understand responses to both. The absence of serious engagement with hegemony in global nuclear politics is particularly surprising given its hierarchical nature, the preeminent role of the United States in ordering global nuclear politics over the past 70 years, the hegemonic authority ascribed to the NPT, and the relative stability of nuclear ordering ideas and practices developed through the 1960s and 1970s despite the inequalities they perpetuate (Nuti, 2018). The relationship between hegemony and nuclear order might appear obvious to some; perhaps an unstated but accepted state of affairs given the ready conflation of hegemony with U.S. power and the proportion of nuclear-related analysis that originates in the United States about the United States. But, as Deudney observed in 2014, “the extensive literatures on hegemony and nuclear weapons … have surprisingly little overlap, almost as if they were exploring phenomena from different eras rather than one” (p. 196). Hegemony and power are, however, slippery concepts with competing definitions and theoretical treatments in international politics and sociology (Lentner, 2006). This article develops a framework for global nuclear order using Robert Cox’s theory of hegemony that was in turn inspired by Antonio Gramsci. Cox develops an expansive concept of hegemony that 2 N. RITCHIE encompasses different forms of power. It overcomes some of the limits of realist, liberal, constructivist, and English School conceptions of hegemony, power, and the relationship between them through a more holistic framework that synthesizes material capabilities, institutions, and ideas into a structural conception of hegemony. It is this synthesis, I argue, that enables an analysis of nuclear order that more accurately captures both the complicated realities and power relations of nuclear politics at the global level, the concern with nuclear injustice and inequality underpinning the Ban Treaty, and the central role of the United States in nuclear ordering. This article, then, develops an argument about what nuclear order is and how it is reproduced, using the Ban Treaty as a way in. Nuclear order and nuclear hegemony Nuclear order Contemporary analysis of global nuclear order tends to ignore power in general and hegemony in particular, which is puzzling for the reasons outlined above. The most comprehensive account of nuclear order is provided by William Walker’s English School analysis (2000, 2004, 2012). He frames nuclear order as two interacting logics of nuclear armament (what he calls “deterrence plus”) and disarmament (“non-proliferation plus”) whose tensions are managed through a third logic of restraint as a “pragmatic middle way” based on norms, rules, and institutions, especially the NPT (Walker, 2012, p. 5). But Walker’s impressive account does not engage seriously with power and hegemony. The power to say what counts as nuclear order, what its political ends are, how the rules and values of nuclear order are shaped and operationalized, is often left in the background. Who, for example, gets to do the “management” of Walker’s systems of (dis)engagement with civil and military nuclear technologies? To what political ends are rules developed, practices legitimated, and systems managed? Just as Hedley Bull was criticized by Stanley Hoffman for not being “explicit enough in analyzing the relations between power and the common rules and institutions of international society” in his account of international society on which Walker draws (2002, p. xxvii), so too can Walker. Where power is present in the literature on nuclear order, it is usually deployed in either a realist or discursive form. Realist analysis tends to define nuclear order in terms of the relative distribution of material power amongst major states under anarchy that dictates why states do or do not acquire nuclear weapons with little or no explanatory room for institutions, norms, culture or structures of social relations (for example Bracken, 2004, p. 155; Ruhle, 2007). Discursive analysis centers on the productive power of nuclear discourses (see below) but tends to limit discussion of power in CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 3 global nuclear politics to this domain (for example Cohn, 1987; Gusterson, 1999; Moshirzadeh, 2007). Nuclear hegemony Having argued so far that we should not ignore hegemony and power in our analyses of global nuclear order but that we routinely do, I turn to Cox’s CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 5 theory of hegemony and world order to rectify this. I do so for a number of reasons. First, because Cox was expressly concerned with order as a contingent historical structure of power relations and it is the relationship between conceptions of order and established power structures in the global politics of nuclear weapons that I am interested in.

#### I affirm, Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The resolution as a value statement inherently lacks consequences – nothing happens when we endorse the aff. Thus, it is a question of the ethicality of the resolution itself – the aff is an ethical orientation against nuclear weapons. To clarify, if I win that nuclear weapons are intrinsically a tool of oppression, you should affirm under my framing. Additionally, I reserve the right to clarify on issues of implementation and specification in CX. If they don’t ask, grant me an automatic I-meet on any shells they read because I don’t know what norm they want me to defend – bidirectionality means they can read theory either way.

#### **The nuclear threat is closely tied to a politics of fear in which catastrophes of absolute annihilation are used to mask structural, ongoing violence. The overwhelming shadow of fear cast by nuclear weapons is depoliticizing and decollectivizing preventing action.**

Alves 15 Elsa Alves, 2015, “The Specter of Chernobyl: An Ontology of Risk,” from *Hazardous Future: Disaster, Representation and the Assessment of Risk*, edited by Isabel Capeloa Gil and Christoph Wulf, ISBN 978-3-11-040652-8, recut TJHSSTAD

Accordingly, the understanding of risk I wish to undertake is much wider than the strict sense of the risk management lexicon and, to a large extent, all of the techniques concerning the governmentality of catastrophes and other types of risks in contemporary society. Risks indeed establish themselves as relations of power-knowledge in late modernity for they are an abstract product of expertise upon which government is based. Nevertheless, beyond those strategies, the Foucaultian perspective is not concerned with the nature of risk. On the other hand, in a market economy, risks may be perceived as opportunities rather than hazards to be avoided and may indeed have been increasing at the pace of the pursuit of profit according to a capitalist logic of “creative destruction”. However, when dangers reveal themselves, threatening both the exploiter and the exploited, this hypothesis also reveals itself insufficient to explain the phenomenon. Drawing on Ulrich Beck, the broad meaning of risk I wish to advocate presupposes that hazards objectively exist, which are or are not subsequently translated into the probabilistic rationality of risks. As Beck (1992, 44) says, “what escapes perceptibility no longer coincides with the unreal”. Thus, risks exist with or without our perception of them even though their symptoms always remain perceptible. The “risk society” is, therefore, as Beck argues (44), the rise of a Platonic world breaking down the Aristotelian in which reality, at least the most determinant reality for us, falls beyond our senses. Likewise, Jacques Derrida (1984), referring to the issue of nuclear war, told us that notwithstanding our modern “rhetorical condition” we could not entirely dismiss the possibility of total destruction. Similarly, Jean-Luc Nancy (2012) states in his recent essay on the Fukushima disaster that the possibility of absolute devastation is a kind of singular decision that overcomes all deliberation, i.e. all the techniques of resilience used by risk management to render hazards calculable and governable. Thus, what I mean by an ontology of risk involves how its status, apart from its constructed compound, cannot ultimately be reduced to a metaphor. Even if we cannot trace, for instance, a relationship between risks, scientific knowledge, media staging, individual perception and social representation we must, nevertheless, assume that there is a risk; the virtuality of a risk is thus real. On the other hand, I choose to use the term risk and not “uncertainty” (Beck 1992), or “vulnerability” (Lemarchand 2002), among others, because I believe this kind of distinction carries little use even in heuristic terms when one aims to grasp the ontological condition of being-in-threat or being-at-risk since, in the first place, all kinds of critical approaches always arise within the normative assertion of risk; and secondly, from the moment that highly improbable events appear to us as probable, that is, when “the calculation of risk collapses” (Beck 1992, 22), allegedly inaugurating the “risk society”, the boundary between empirical risks and generalized threats begins to blur and hence becoming commutable terms. In order to clarify this point, we return to Nietzsche’s quotation which gives us another important insight about the nature of risk moreover conveyed in Beck’s notion of “reflexive modernity”: the imminence of disaster stems from the old illusion of modernity, namely, techno-scientific progress. This “metanarrative” that was once claimed as lost appears to be, on the contrary, more inexorable when risks began being enunciated as risks. As Martin Heidegger said decades before Beck: “All attempts to reckon existing reality […] in terms of decline and loss, in terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behavior” (Heidegger 1977, 48). The very act of diagnosing in any systematic way the potential dangers, and nominating them as such in order to solve them, is in itself totally technocratic as the more risks are identified, the more man wants to be in control of technology. The narrative of risk, i.e., the anticipation of catastrophe and the risk society organized around this anticipation of catastrophes thus belongs to a radicalized narrative of progress set in a vicious circle. Correspondingly, according to the “precautionary principle” proposed by François Ewald (2009), which is theoretically close to the “heuristics of fear” of Hans Jonas (1992), we produce ever more risks or make them visible (which is an inclusive disjunction for both statements hold true) and, for such reason, we must take into consideration the most improbable hypothesis. This is so because man is the potential author of the disasters, the only entity responsible for the increasing of endogenous risks arising out of modernization. This also represents the reason that a “pedagogy of disaster” (cf. Lemarchand 2011; Debray 2011), that is, the possibility of learning from a disaster, seems likely to be impossible right from the outset. Consequently, the idea of a “reflexive modernity” that would ultimately be able to transform itself through self-criticism becomes perhaps too optimistic. On the other hand, precisely because risks are no longer foreseeable, there is a generalization and hyperbolization of doubt, or, in François Ewald’s words, there is a return of Descartes’ malicious demon standing in the way of truth (Ewald 2009). Before the incompetence of science, one can no longer separate belief from knowledge, doxa from episteme (Derrida 1984). Thus truth does seem to be regaining, as mentioned above, a metaphysical dimension beyond our Kantian “condition of possibility of knowledge”, since what threatens us most has become invisible. This epistemological crisis, in turn, easily leads to the creation of imaginary causes, to the dissemination of a culture of fear and fiction in society, presented and intensified by the media (cf. Weart 1988; Walters 2008). Consequently, our risk susceptibility and risk perception change both with the revealing of new risks by science and with real events dramatized by the media and art. What happens in fact is a dialectical relationship between the social risk discourse, individual perceptions and real threats. The reality of a risk, thus, always beckons as a specter. Therefore, the advent of science and technology did not completely abolish the faith in spirits and other ghosts. Technology itself can actually be seen as a secondary sacralization, a substitution for the previously killed God (Dupuy 2006). Furthermore, civil and military nuclear technology was determinant to this new enchantment and everyday speculation as the danger of radioactivity completely escapes our senses. As the historian Galia Ackerman eloquently puts it (cf. Dupuy 2006, 48): before the contaminated zone of Chernobyl we are more touched by metaphysics than by physics. 2 The Chernobyl disaster is many things, among them a myth, or rather a series of myths. The most recurrent trope, however, that tries to ascribe a sense to the absurd, is the apocalypse, which has so ironically been revealed (the original meaning of the word apocalypse) a priori in its name as the meaning of the Ukrainian word “Chernobyl” is wormwood, the name of the star that, according to John of Patmos, would forever poison the waters. But embedded in these stories, there is the “material” Chernobyl that has to be understood as a cultural phenomenon as well as an ontological model of contemporary risk. As I said above, the risk society is determined by the invisibility or the virtuality of the real. The Chernobyl disaster is to be read, above all, as an invisible hazard and, for this reason, as a new way of perceiving the world. In Peter Sloterdijk’s words (2009), with the nuclear, there is also a catastrophe of the phenomenal (and not only the catastrophe as a phenomenon): “the need to perceive the imperceptible hung over [us] like a new law formed as a threat”. On accepting technology as a sort of an extension of man, that is, man’s imagination transforming the world in his own image, with nuclear technology and specifically with Chernobyl, the first big techno-scientific accident, we may now instead observe the technology surprising man and challenging his/her own imagination in an unprecedented way. Therefore, nuclear catastrophe poses specific problems and limits not only our perception theory but also our imagination. When the fourth reactor of “Lenin’s” nuclear power plant in Chernobyl blew up on the night of 26 April 1986, large amounts of radioactivity were released into the atmosphere and first registered two days later by workers at the “Forsmark” nuclear power plant in Sweden, over one thousand kilometers away from Chernobyl. This first alarm warning became the indication that Chernobyl was not just an incident inside the borders of the then Soviet Union but, instead, a global accident. By global, this incorporates not only the media impact of the disaster but also the materiality or reality of the radioactive contamination. After that firsthand notification and official confirmation by the Soviet Government, the circumstances of the accident and that invisible threat, often mystified as a “cloud”, were copiously interpreted both by the media and by scientific experts. Subsequently, the scientific accounts, whether from the International Agency for the Atomic Energy or other agencies, have stated disparate conclusions about the facts concerning the accident until now, 26 years after the accident. The most controversial facet relates to the number of victims with the total of deaths ranging from 4,000 (according to the Chernobyl Forum Report published in 2005) to 965,000 (according to the New York Academy of Sciences report published in 2009). The reasons for this disparity underline the epistemological crisis I referred to above related to this new invisible and virtual (although real) threat. Determining a causal relation between certain amounts of radiation exposure and objective diseases has proven highly complex and polemic. However, without scientific measurement instruments, radiation would not even have been perceived and accepted. Faced with radiation, only science can serve as a means of mediation; in the same way only that communicated through the media becomes real, but only to a certain degree. Even if the senses are incapable of seeing the danger and science is somehow incapable of accurately determining the risk, the cells will nevertheless react to it and, later on, the symptoms will confirm that reality manifested in an obscene way: either in congenital deformities or children dying of cancer. Thus, the risk has a radically new dimension of latency (idem); as Sloterdijk says referring to Heidegger’s concept of homelessness: man’s condition is homeless now, not only because his environment is being destroyed, but also and mainly because there are no possible protective niches against the latency of risk (idem). The constant need to update the number of deaths also tells us that the Chernobyl disaster was a singular event in the past, extended into an endless future and thereby occupying an indeterminate space. Consequently, Chernobyl created new temporal and spatial dimensions by the silent poisoning of humans and the environment. French sociologist Frédérik Lemarchand terms this a new model of epidemic catastrophe following Jean Baudrillard’s (1993) notion of the “transparency of evil”. The old culture of epidemics, based on the logic of confinement, is now obsolete. Formerly, physicians wanted to know where to bury the corpses and keep patients in compulsory isolation. On the contrary, the “sarcophagus”, the concrete envelope surrounding Chernobyl’s reactor, was designed to contain the radioactivity and, paradoxically, it is outside that sphere that people find the “shelter” wherein they hope to be safe (Lemarchand 2002). Radioactive contamination, instead, develops in a dialectical relationship between long-term temporality and urgency, contamination at the global scale and contamination in specific zones. However, even within specific areas, the exclusion zones, there are the so-called “hot spots” of radiation, which reveal differences in the incidence of radioactivity to an almost infinitesimal degree. Moreover, it actually becomes impossible to state that outside the delimited zone we are safe or only inside it are we in danger. Equally impossible is any statement claiming only some areas are contaminated or that everything is equally contaminated. On the other hand, Chernobyl also demonstrated how radiation could no longer be understood from a linear causality (Adam 1998). Given that effects can be displaced to varying degrees both in space and time, extended from now to subsequent generations, without any possible reversibility, that theoretical assumption must be reconsidered. The (im)possibility of reversibility, in fact, becomes a very interesting case in Chernobyl as people can watch the plants grow and the animals reproduce in apparent normality (Mycio 2005). However, this also denies the real risk and hides the damned future for generations of human and animal beings to come. If risk is deferred in time and dispersed in space, in a unique progression, it escapes not only our perception but also our science, at least its classical way of measuring and tracking causalities. The Chernobyl disaster has therefore shown that radiation represents an incommensurable hazard and thereby calling into question the scientific assumption that risks are knowable, measurable and predictable (cf. Beck 1992; Adam 1998). 3 The Chernobyl disaster is not only a disastrous outcome of Nietzsche’s “passion for knowledge” but also an ironic consequence of the “passion for real” as coined by Alain Badiou, referring to the twentieth century’s driving force, that is, the nihilistic pursuit for destruction, for the nothing, as the only thing that remains real for “it is impossible to seem to die” (Badiou 2007). However, as Slavoj Žižek (2002) points out, regarding the September 11 attacks, the “passion for real” instead ends up in spectacularization. The tragic real, because of its excessive character, is only sustainable when one fictionalizes it; in short, it can only appear to us as a specter. This is undoubtedly true as we mentioned above regarding the threat from radioactivity even if taking into account that this might be overdramatized by the media and not exactly measurable by science, the fact remains that we only know about its existence through media and science mediation. Hence, this only exists to us as a specter, that is, in its dialectical presence and non-presence to make recourse to Derrida’s concept of specter’s ontology or “hauntology” (Derrida 2006). Simultaneously, however, when the threat is invisible and potentially omnipresent, how can it be subsumed by any system of representation or analogy and how can it be processed by experience? In a society where evil becomes more and more epidemic, when it is impossible to perceive what is poisoning us, to what extent and for how long and when impossible to determine with any certainty the cause of certain symptoms, “metaphor is no longer possible”. This is Baudrillard’s thesis on a new way of evil (2007), following on from Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of becoming that I seek to apply here to the paradigmatic case of nuclear risk. When radiation penetrates and modifies our genes, there is no more “like-something”, this amounts to the abolition of all comparison or metaphor and “all that consists is Real” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). What happens, instead, is a metamorphosis or a transmutation, a becoming-something-else, malformed or not identifiable, virulently undermining not only the physical body but also the symbolic order. This is the corollary of my hypothesis: in the face of the Fukushima disaster, the specter of Chernobyl warns us that the more a catastrophe is plausible or even real, the less it can be imagined, thus resisting the symbolic order. In her essay entitled Depraved Perspective (1991), Annie Le Brun had already discussed this problem regarding the nuclear situation, distinguishing it from other types of catastrophes. She argues that since the eighteenth century, the meaning of catastrophe had been the Greek one, that is, an event that would change the order of things and inaugurate a new world. However, with the nuclear catastrophe and/or its imminent possibility, the old dialectic between real catastrophe and imaginary catastrophe was abolished. If the catastrophe is no longer an exceptional event and if it is a human deed, no longer caused by nature or God, then it escapes from our imaginary to become our real threat. Until the nuclear condition, the catastrophe would serve as a symbolic construct around which humanity would search to define itself, under the sign of accident, chance or fate. However, from the moment that the accident becomes “prophetic”, the term deployed by Virilio (Virilio and Alexievitch 2006) to describe the Chernobyl disaster, that is, when an accident has a permanent incidence, then the catastrophe loses its pivotal mission of confronting the human with the inhuman, i.e., of reaffirming identity through its contrary. When we are constantly living in a “state of exception” (Agamben 2005), that is, in permanent alert, guided by a “precautionary principle” (Ewald 2009), the censure over the original feeling of catastrophe occurs or, in other words, the catastrophe loses its singular character and becomes a banal event. Living in a permanent catastrophe, as in the case of Chernobyl, means, therefore, trivializing it, making it natural, facing the Eternal Return of the sameness (without the “Zarathustrian” joy). As Jean-Luc Nancy (2012) argues, with nuclear technology, the scope for damage becomes of such a magnitude that it no longer proves possible to calculate in terms of relative forces because a nuclear impact engraves itself into human and natural tissues, hence cancelling, on the one hand, the old dichotomy between nature and culture and, on the other hand, the possibility of conceiving force strategies: “There’s no more point in representations like ‘David and Goliath’, ‘Ulysses and the Cyclops’, or ‘Zaitochi, the blind samurai’ ” (Nancy 2012, 41). In other words, there are no more tensions, dialectics or differences, only equivalence and sameness. Jacques Derrida (1984) has already stated the same argument when discussing the possibility of a nuclear war: on the one hand, perceived as just speculation and not considered as serious or even real; on the other hand, the nuclear war as the only possible referent, the absolute horizon since it presupposes the total destruction of the archive and thus, also that of metaphor. An individual death or the destruction of part of a community can become the object of mourning and memory but the spectral presence of a nuclear catastrophe threatens not only the real human being, but also his symbolic and imaginary dimension. Thus, the only referent that is absolutely real is, paradoxically, the specter of nuclear disaster. Chernobyl as the first big techno-scientific catastrophe, both as a potential and actual catastrophe, is a spectral reality, invading our imagination and defying our symbolic world while rendering necessary what is contingent by definition, substantializing the accident and imposing “live the future already in the present” on us (Lemarchand 2006b). The Chernobyl disaster is and represents the emergence of a new spatial and temporal culture in which scientific knowledge plunges into deep doubt and being-at-risk has become our new condition, as we are trying to face the invisible, global and imminent threat.

#### A politics of fear generated through securitization enables the reproduction of a permanent state of exception that results in endless otherization and racialized targeting.

Aradau & Van Munster 09 [Claudia, Prof of International Politics and Co-chair of the Research Centre in IR, Rens, Senior researcher and coordinator for the Peace, Risk and Violence research unit, “Exceptionalism and the ‘War on Terror’: Criminology Meets International Relations,” British Journal of Criminology 49.5, p.689-92, GDI-GMW] recut TJHSSTAD

Unpacking IR’s reading of the exception is important in order to grasp how the exception is more than a ‘ transparent tactic by political authorities to gain the upper hand in the politics of authority ’( Welch 2007 : 138). For Schmitt, exceptionalism does not simply refer to the creation of moral panics by means of which state elites can further their interests, often by undermining civil liberties. Rather, it is a ‘ general concept in the theory of the state ’( Schmitt 1985 a) that accounts for the limits of order. In this interpretation, crime and war share many similarities, opening a dialogue between criminology and IR. Therefore, arguing that the representation of the ‘ war on terror ’should be discarded in favour of a criminal justice approach ( Zedner 2005 ) does not take into account the similarities that counter-terrorist policies share when considered from the perspective of exceptionalism. In IR, Marieke de Goede has shown that distinctions between the US pre-emptive practices and the European supposed reliance on the rule of law do not account for European policies on data retention and asset freezing, for example. These policies show Europe as a world leader in pre-emptive security policies (De Goede 2008 b). Although criminological readings have interpreted the exception through the role of the executive power at the expense of judicial power, the perspective endorsed here argues that the exception is constitutive of all law. The exception defi nes the existence and possibility of the functioning of the law. Law and social order depend upon a ‘ founding crime ’or upon an act of war. This is the paradox of modern liberal political communities that defi ne themselves as governed by the rule of law: the law needs a ‘ founding crime ’ , a moment of violence or injustice —the exception —in order to function ( Burke 2002 ; Derrida 2005 ). Exceptional practices are not simply irregular occurrences prompted by opportunistic definitions of threat, but are constitutive of sovereignty, modern law and political communities. For Schmitt, exceptionalism exists not only in the capacity to override the law, but also in the capacity to call the legal order into being: ‘ Order must be established for juridical order to make sense. A regular situation must be created, and sovereign is he who defi nitely decides if this situation is actually effective ’(Schmitt 1985 b: 13). Therefore, exceptional policies have constitutive effects upon society, which blur the distinction between ‘ normal ’law and ‘ extraordinary ’crime. Criminalization undergirds the functioning of the law, although, in practice, there will be differences in the degree of institutionalization of exceptionalism. While writings on moral panic generally invoke stages of escalation (in which there are calls for strong measures) and innovation (referring to increased powers of the police), they remain wedded to an understanding of moral panic as refl ective/non-refl ective rather than constitutive of social reality ( Murji 2001 : 174 – 5). Exceptions, we have suggested, are constitutive of society and of what we take to count as law and order. Exceptionalism, moreover, turns fear of the enemy into the constitutive principle of social order. In an IR perspective, the politics of fear performs the ordering of the community. According to Jef Huysmans (2006), exceptionalism reshapes political communities in three respects: it redistributes fear and trust, it reconsiders inclusion and exclusion and it institutes a predisposition towards violence. 6 Although fear of crime has been an important topos of criminological research, debates about state crimes and moral panics often ignore the ways in which exceptional policies revolving around fear feed back into society. Instead, fear has been thought to be either an emotional reaction to elements associated with crime, a political discourse of fear ( Furedi 2006 ; Mythen and Walklate 2006 a) or an ‘ unconscious displacement of other fears which are far more intractable and do not display the modern characteristics of knowability and decisionability ’( Hollway and Jefferson 1997 : 263). These defi nitions can be integrated in an analysis of moral panics as distortions or exaggerations of criminal behaviour ( Rothe and Muzzatti 2004 ). IR scholars have argued that the construction of enemies and the governance of dangers through exceptional policies do not simply concern the identifi cation of threats or risks, perceptions or the cultural underpinnings and meanings associated with a particular threat. Rather, the securitization of dangers is a ‘ politically constitutive act that asserts and reproduces the unity of a political community ’ (Huysmans 2006: 49). Exceptional policies, Huysmans (2004 : 338) has argued: … are not simply about civil liberties, the legality of going to war, and the constitutional limits to strengthening executive-centred government. Since these political, legal and social contests strongly reiterate fear of the enemy they directly bear upon the extent to which one is structuring and possibly institutionalizing fear of the enemy as the organizing principle of politics in both national and international society. The question then becomes to what extent security responses that claim to aim at protecting freedom and equality are actually displacing freedom and equality with fear of the enemy as the central principle around which politics is organized. Huysmans has expanded the conceptualization of the exception in relation to law by unpacking the matrix of liberal power as consisting of a tripartite relationship between the rule of law, political leadership and the popular will. This means that the exception is not only a question of the limits of law and the increasing role of discretion within late modern legal arrangements, but also underpins questions of political representation and of the constitution of law ( Huysmans 2004 ). The exception allows for the arbitrary exercise of power by both political leadership and the ‘ people ’and undermines the constitution of law through the ‘ will of the people ’ . It also severs the external representative links between political leadership and the people. This raises questions not just about how the norm needs an exceptional constitutive moment, but also about how exceptional measures distort and challenge the functions of representation in liberal democracies. This approach has informed IR analyses that have revealed the continuities within liberal states of illiberal practices that stem from the exceptional governance of risks and dangers ( Aradau and van Munster 2007 ; 2008; De Goede 2008 b; Neocleous 2008 ). Fear integrates political communities according to friend/enemy lines and creates homogeneous identities that need to be defended. The politics of fear collapses processes of representation and unifi es the ‘people’and the political leadership. Unlike some of the criminological literature, fear is understood not as an emotion, but as a ‘ particular principle of making human relations intelligible in a certain way ’ (Huysmans 2006: 52).

#### Nuclear weapons are used to advance the capitalist, militarist, and imperialist interests of powerful nations through the threat of coercion and destruction. These states also exert influence over global politics to generate asymmetrical nuclear norms and institutions to preserve and mask their power.

Ritchie 2 Nick Ritchie (2019): A hegemonic nuclear order: Understanding the Ban Treaty and the power politics of nuclear weapons, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1571852 Nick Ritchie nick.ritchie@york.ac.uk Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK TJHSSTAD

The material foundation of nuclear order is chiefly nuclear weapons and the nuclear complexes that support them.2 This is based in a fundamental sense on Bernard Brodie’s observation in 1946 that “everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and that its destructive power is fantastically great” (p. 41). This material dimension has two key features at the global level: first, the continual development of nuclear weapons and their use to threaten, coerce and reassure in order to advance states’ interests; second, the use of other forms of military and economic compulsory power to control the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others. The first has been dominated by the United States and Soviet Union/Russia in terms of their massive nuclear arsenals capable still now of civilizational omnicide. This includes the use of nuclear weapons as a form of compulsory power based on permanent preparations for short-notice preemptive or retaliatory nuclear attacks to try and affect the behavior of other states through general and tailored nuclear threats. It has involved successive generations of nuclear weapons, nuclear delivery systems, and missile defenses in an effort to bolster the credibility and capability of nuclear deterrent threats, as well as innovations in nuclear strategy generally pioneered by the United States (Freedman, 1989). In fact, the United States’ and Russia’s capacity for nuclear violence has been at the heart of material compulsory power in global nuclear order. This has included consistent pursuit of nuclear superiority, particularly by the United States, through more accurate and flexible weapon systems in order to fight and “win” a nuclear war should deterrence break down, preemptively if necessary, even as both states have consolidated and reduced their weapon systems through arms control agreements (Lieber & Press, 2006; Rosenberg, 1983). The material presence of nuclear weapons with command and control systems capable of rapid and unprecedented violence has now become a permanent feature of global politics, evidenced in the massive investment across all nuclear-armed states in nuclear modernization programs. The second dimension has involved a range of disciplinary mechanisms to surveil, control, reform and punish the nuclear aspirations of others, particularly subordinates who violate hegemonic preferences (Lake, 2014, p. 67). A core purpose of the emergent nuclear order was to control the spread of the new weapon primarily by those that already had them, even whilst 8 N. RITCHIE developing and threatening to use their own. U.S. power has been central to this process, chiefly to control the dissemination of nuclear weapons that could jeopardize its ability to project power and promote its interests, notably in the key regions of Europe, the Middle East and East Asia, and thereby reproduce its singular power position in the Western bloc during the Cold War and on a more global basis since (Russett, 2011, p. 73). This has taken the form of what Gavin (2015, p. 11) calls “strategies of inhibition” applied to friends and foes alike, including aid, conventional arms sales, alliances and extended nuclear deterrence, export controls and sanctions, interdiction and sabotage, and direct military attack. For example, the United States used its alliance relationships to coerce the likes of Germany, South Korea and Taiwan to terminate their nuclear weapon programs through the threat of abandonment (Gerzhoy, 2015) and to limit their nuclear cooperation agreements with other countries (Gray, 2012). This extended into the post-Cold War period with a new focus on preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by regional “rogue states” alongside calls for new “mini-nukes” to potentially attack such states as part of a more aggressive shift from nuclear non-proliferation to counter-proliferation (Kristensen & Handler, 1996; Roberts, 1993). The United States and its allies now routinely exercise compulsory military, economic, and diplomatic power as a means of nuclear ordering, up to and including counter-proliferation war and the vast system of counter-proliferation sanctions, legal judgements, and diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and through the UN Security Council (including the use of United States courts as international courts through extraterritorial application of its domestic law). No other state comes close to the depth and breadth of compulsory material power exercised by the United States in relation to nuclear ordering. Institutions and nuclear order Formal institutions are the second pillar of Cox’s historical structures because they stabilize and perpetuate a particular order by legitimizing its norms, generating consent for unequal power through common rules and obligations, co-opting dissenters, absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas, and “administer [ing] the order with a certain semblance of universality (i.e., not just as the overt instrument of a particular state’s dominance)” (Cox, 1983, p. 139; also Hurrell, 2007, p. 72). Institutional power is exercised through the different relations actors have with an institution in terms of their capacity to shape agendas, mobilize collective action, and constrain or enable specific institutional practices and choices. Informally, however, compulsory power is never far away from institutionalized consent and institutions often represent “frozen configurations of privilege and bias that continue to shape the future choices of actors” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 52; also Cox, 1981, p. 136). CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 9 The NPT is widely accepted as the preeminent international institution of nuclear order. The treaty established a formal hierarchy of weapon-possessor states and an informal hierarchy of nuclear technology suppliers. Its focus was not on nuclear weapons themselves, but on their acquisition by other states beyond the five that had by then developed them. In that context, the treaty was the product of a temporary superpower condominium to preclude any restraints on their nuclear weapon production complexes and military competition and to retain an unbridgeable qualitative and quantitative lead over other nuclear-armed or arming states, whilst working to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by others, notably West Germany (Brands, 2007; Millar, 1971). In doing so, they recognized the need to secure acceptance from an expanding number of post-colonial states in the global South and skeptical allies to institutionalize an unequal hierarchy of nuclear power in terms of the possession of nuclear weapons through a range of incentives and engagement opportunities, such as the NPT’s five-yearly review conferences (Hunt, 2015). The result of this “nuclear Yalta” was a powerful institution of nuclear ordering that privileged the five states recognized by the treaty as nuclear weapon states (NWS: United States, Soviet Union, France, United Kingdom, and China), but particularly the two nuclear superpowers (Popp, 2014, p. 200). The NPT has since become an institution used to legitimize the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five and a postCold War U.S. role as NPT enforcer through a range of disciplinary practices. It has become a hegemonic vehicle that constitutes and is used to reinforce a particular conception of nuclear order. An institutional chain of enforcement centered only on non-proliferation commitments runs through the NPT to the UN Security Council via the second core institution of global nuclear order: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Board of Governors. The IAEA’s mandate negotiated in the 1950s is a further example of superpower collusion to try and manage and control the nuclear programs of others. Its mandate and work program, originally centered on technical assistance, now reproduces a nuclear order dominated by non-proliferation and safeguards (Roehrlich, 2018). A network of other institutions has grown up around the NPT and IAEA to monitor and control nuclear energy and weapon programs, notably exclusive export control cartels and transnational regulatory networks such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee. These institutions are not neutral but politicized fora that fix systems of bias, privilege and inequality that in turn shape how actors participate in them and their capacities to act (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 52). The NPT nuclear weapon states are central to these core institutional sites of nuclear ordering at a global level. There are two other important ordering institutions, and the United States is uniquely embedded in both. First, the series of nuclear alliance relationships 10 N. RITCHIE through the formal institution of NATO and its Nuclear Planning Group and the informal institution of bilateral nuclear alliance relationships in Asia, with all the opportunities and challenges for nuclear control this affords. Second, the political-technocratic institution of bilateral U.S.-Russia nuclear arms limitation. This was developed to organize and constrain the Cold War nuclear arms competition and manage the risk of nuclear violence in crises through limits on the number and types of strategic nuclear delivery systems and, for a period, missile defenses. Arms control emerged as a technical and managerial response to the Cold War ideological and political competition that displaced disarmament as means of reducing nuclear risk. Powerful states, in particular the United States, also have a greater capacity to select how, when and which institutions and norms to draw on or ignore to legitimize particular actions (e.g., demonizing and sanctioning the Iranian but not Israeli nuclear program), rewrite the rules (e.g., through the 2008 nuclear trade agreement with India and attempts to secure Indian membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group), extend institutional reach (e.g., expanding the criminalization and intrusive regulation of nuclear activity post-9/11 through UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the U.S.-led nuclear security summits), and set agendas (e.g., working with allies, the other NPT nuclear weapon states, and civil society to organize the “non-proliferation complex” around a particular conception of nuclear threat, order, and appropriate responses (Craig & Ruzicka, 2013)).

#### Weapons production and proliferation is tied to colonialism and oppression – nuclear testing on indigenous and island populations and the threat of nuclear weapons used to coerce smaller nations prove. Elimination creates a unified international stance against nuclear weapons as a tool of oppression.

Intondi 18 (Vincent, Associate Professor of History, Director of the Institute for Race, Justice & Community Engagement, and Coordinator for History and Political Science at Montgomery College in Takoma Park, “The Dream of Bandung and the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” *CRITICAL STUDIES ON SECURITY*, pp. 1-4) recut TJHSSTAD

It is no surprise that many of the states supporting the treaty have majority non-white populations. Indeed, since 1945, states with majority non-white populations and individuals throughout the African diaspora have actively advocated for nuclear disarmament, often connecting the nuclear issue with the fight for racial equality and liberation movements around the world. While this position is not monolithic, as China, North Korea, Pakistan and India have all produced nuclear weapons, support for the TPNW keeps with the overall trend when one considers the passage and ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) and Pelindaba (African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty). This intervention will briefly examine the links between race, colonialism and the nuclear ban treaty. On 1 March 1954, the United States detonated a hydrogen bomb, code-named ‘Bravo’, on the north-western corner of Bikini atoll. A flash of blinding light illuminated the area as a fireball of intense heat shot skyward at a rate of 300 miles an hour. Within minutes, an enormous cloud filled with radioactive debris rose more than 20 miles and generated winds hundreds of miles per hour. The gusts blasted the surrounding islands and stripped the branches and coconuts from the trees. The explosion sent sand, coral, plant and sea life from Bikini’s reef and the surrounding lagoon waters high into the air. A little over an hour after the explosion, 23 fishermen aboard the Japanese fishing vessel Daigo Fukuryu Maru (‘Lucky Dragon No. 5ʹ) watched in awe as radioactive dust began to fall on them. The men aboard the ship were oblivious to the fact that the ash was fallout from the hydrogen bomb test. Shortly after, the men’s skin began to itch as they vomited from the fallout. One man, Aikichi Kuboyama, died 6 months later. Three to four hours after the blast, the same ashy dust began to rain down onto the 64 people on Rongelap atoll (located about 125 miles east of Bikini) and also onto the 18 people residing on Ailinginae atoll. The thermonuclear weapon test was about a thousand times more powerful than the atomic bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Higuchi 2008, 334). From 1946 to 1958, the United States conducted 67 nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands. While it has been decades since the last nuclear test, research continues to illustrate the horrific and long-lasting effects these tests have had on the land, residents and culture of the Marshall Islands. Moreover, as Dan Zak (2015) writes, ‘[t]his is not something one gets over quickly’. Analysing the suffering residents of the Marshall Islands have endured, it is no wonder that in 2012, the Marshall Islands formally came out in support of the nuclear weapons ban. Writing to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), Christopher Loeak, President of the Marshall Islands, declared (2012) that ‘the world should never allow suffering and devastation resulting from nuclear testing to be visited upon the human race, ever [...] the Republic of the Marshall Islands pledges its full support for this important cause’. The Marshall Islands are not alone. From nuclear testing on Native American lands to uranium mining in the Congo, people of colour have continuously been the victim of environmental racism and ‘nuclear colonialism’, which is why many African nations enthusiastically support the TPNW. In the summer of 1959, France announced plans to test a nuclear weapon in the Sahara. Frightened and angered, many Africans saw the French test as another form of European colonialism. Those who lived in Ghana feared that nuclear fallout would devastate their cocoa industry, a vital source of national revenue. The independent states of Africa asked France to cancel the test plans and the United Nations passed a resolution urging France to abandon the test. France ignored the pleas and argued that unless other nuclear powers gave up their weapons, it had to proceed (Daily Defender 1959a, 4; Daily Defender 1959b, 10; Daily Defender 1958, 10). A year earlier, Ghana hosted the Conference of Independent African States. It resolved that ‘nuclear testing should be suspended, means taken to reduce the arms race, and called for African representation in international arms control agencies’ (Plummer 2013, 69). The next year, Ghana established the Ghanaian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Ghana CND, along with British and American activists, most notably the civil rights leader Bayard Rustin, attempted multiple times to stop French nuclear test, even physically laying their bodies on the line. However, in early 1960, France exploded several nuclear bombs in Africa (Anderson 1997, 219–20; Sutherland and Meyer 2000, 36–7; Carter 1977, 128; Taylor 1988, 161; Bennett 2003, 23). After the French tests, Kwame Nkrumah, the revolutionary leader who had led Ghana’s fight for independence and was Ghana’s first president, focused his energy on organising a special All-African Conference to coordinate action against further nuclear tests and to develop ongoing forms of peace activism in Africa. The Ghanaian Government planned the Conference on Positive Action for Peace and Security in Africa, in Accra in April 1960. The meeting brought together overseas peace groups with representatives of African governments, liberation movements and union federations and drew prominent pacifists from around the world (Willoughby 1960; Carter 1977, 140; Wittner 2007). Nkrumah declared that the threat of nuclear weapons was of the utmost importance. The African leader reassured delegates in his opening address that they had come to Accra ‘first to discuss and plan future action to prevent further use of African soil as a testing ground for nuclear weapons’ (Allman 2008, 93–4). Ralph Abernathy, Dr Martin Luther King, Jr.’s top aide in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, joined with advocates of armed struggle such as Frantz Fanon to unanimously applaud the activists who tried to stop the nuclear tests and urged further protests against nuclear testing (Allman 2008, 93–4; Carter 1977, 140; Wittner 2007). In June, a week-long assembly on disarmament convened in Accra. ‘The World Without the Bomb’ conference included 130 participants from non-aligned countries and formed the Accra Assembly. Two years later, Haile Selassie and Kwame Nkrumah openly objected to the Soviet Union’s plan to test a nuclear weapon. In a message sent to Soviet ambassador A.V. Budakhov, Selassie stated, ‘We have learned with dismay of the Soviet Union’s stated intention to explode a 50-megaton bomb on October 31. We must express to your excellency our deep concern with the potential consequences for those who find themselves in its path’. Nkrumah also expressed ‘deep concern’ over the plans and asked Nikita Khrushchev to reconsider (Daily Defender 1961, 8). From nuclear weapons testing to uranium mining and from the actual use of nuclear weapons to the mere threat of use, race, colonialism and nuclear weapons, all have been inextricably linked since 1945. One could argue that these links have never been clearer. Indeed, as much of the non-white world joins together to ban nuclear weapons, the United States and other nuclear-armed states ignore, boycott and act as if this historic treaty will have no consequences. However, one only needs to look at what happened to land mines, chemical weapons and cluster munitions to predict what the future holds for these horrific weapons. The passage of the TPNW has shown what is possible when nations and committed individuals join together for peace, and while it did not abolish nuclear weapons, it has edged the world a bit closer to the dream set at the Bandung Conference: a world without racism, colonialism and nuclear weapons.

#### Cumulative probability means a nuclear war of unprecedented magnitude is a mathematical certainty in the status quo – increasingly unstable geopolitical arrangements make nuclear annihilation likely.

Snyder and Ruyle 17 – (Brian, Department of Environmental Science, Louisiana State University; Leslie, Center on Conflict and Development, Texas A&M University; ‘The abolition of war as a goal of environmental policy’; Science of The Total Environment Volumes 605–606, 15 December 2017, Pages 347-356 Science of The Total Environment; <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.06.223>) recut TJHSSTAD

3. On the current path, nuclear war is inevitable Anatomically modern humans developed about 200,000 years ago. Barring anthropogenic or astronomically caused extinction, the natural end of the biosphere may not occur for at least 1.5 billion years when the Sun becomes powerful enough to initiate a runaway greenhouse effect (Wolf and Toon, 2014). Thus, humans potentially have a significant amount of time left to live on Earth. As a result, even if there is a small annual chance of nuclear war, the cumulative probability of biospheric destruction via nuclear war is essentially certain. As Martin Hellman (1985) wrote: On our current path, World War III is not just a possibility. It is a mathematical certainty. This inevitability can best be understood by first considering a hypothetical, suicidal “game”: Toss a coin until it shows a head for the first time. Then you are shot. If you play this insane game continually, you are guaranteed to die… In this game the probability of being shot with n trials or tosses is 1-(0.5)n, so there is a 50 percent chance of being killed on the first trial; there is a 75 percent chance of being killed by the second trial; and there is a 99.9999 percent chance of being shot within the first 20 trials. Fig. 1 shows the probability of avoiding a nuclear exchange over time if the chance of nuclear war ranges from 0.5% per century to 10% per century. Of course, the actual chances of a nuclear war are unknowable, but we present these numbers as a reasonable range based on the events of the last 70 years (discussed below). Even in the most optimistic case, the probability of surviving 50,000 years without nuclear war is only 8%. In 2008, the Future of Humanity Institute conducted a poll of informed participants to ask their opinion on the probability of certain catastrophic human events occurring before 2100. The panelists selected a probability of human extinction due to nuclear war at 1%. Of course, it is far more likely that a sub-extinction event will occur than a complete extinction event. Another way to address the question of the probability of nuclear war is to imagine running the last half of the 20th century over again and asking in how many “model runs” does nuclear war occur. Between 1950 and 2000 (roughly the dawn of the hydrogen bomb to the end of the century) there are four notable times that a nuclear war nearly occurred: during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, on November 9, 1979, when the U.S.'s NORAD command displayed a Soviet attack, on September 26, 1983 when the Soviet early warning system malfunctioned, and on January 25, 1995 when Russian systems mistook a Norwegian rocket launch for a Trident Launch (Hoffman, 1998). If we were to run these 50 years over again 100 times allowing for some stochastic variation in the military and political leaders making the decisions, how many times would nuclear war result? Alternatively, we could describe these “close calls” as having a probability of resulting in a nuclear exchange of 10% each (President Kennedy suggested that the chance of war during the Cuban Missile Crisis was “between 1 in 3 and even” (Allison, 2012)). Since there were four close calls in a 50 year period, we have an expected frequency of close calls of eight per century, and given a 90% chance of avoiding war in each close call, we have a 43% chance (0.98) of avoiding nuclear war each century. With the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis, all four of the “close calls” described above were accidental. Yet, there have been additional cases in which the use of nuclear weapons was seriously considered by U.S. presidents. According to Hellman (1985): President Truman threatened to use nuclear weapons in 1946 against the Soviet Union's continued occupation of Iran, in 1948 during the Berlin crisis, and in 1950 in Korea. President Eisenhower threatened their use in 1953 in Korea, in 1954 in Viet Nam, and in 1958 in both the Middle East and China. President Kennedy considered the use of nuclear weapons in 1961 during another Berlin crisis… Presidents Johnson and Nixon both considered the use of nuclear weapons in Viet Nam… While these American threats are well documented, it is highly probable that the leaders of the Soviet Union and the other nuclear powers have also been tempted to consider using nuclear weapons… Thus, in a 25 year period (1946–1971), democratically elected U.S. presidents considered initiating a nuclear war approximately 10 times. While the likelihood of a U.S. nuclear attack to counter communist aggression may have been reduced since the end of the Cold War, it is shortsighted to think that the next centuries will be devoid of similarly dangerous conflicts. Indeed, it is not clear that the risk of nuclear war has actually decreased since the end of the Cold War. In the past 20 years, Pakistan and North Korea have developed nuclear weapons, and the consensus in the international community is that Iran has attempted to do so. Further, prior to his election in 2016, Donald Trump suggested that additional nuclear proliferation to U.S. allies such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea may be warranted (Kleiner, 2016). While nuclear proliferation to non-major powers may be unlikely to lead to multi-billion ton nuclear exchanges in the near term, it is hard to imagine how the proliferation of nuclear weapons would decrease the chances of a nuclear exchange over the long term. In addition to their proliferation in space, the control of nuclear weapons also spreads over time. In the U.S., periodic elections alter the person who decides whether or not to use nuclear weapons. As time progresses, it becomes more and more likely that an unstable or unqualified leader will assume the U.S. presidency. As of 2017, Vladimir Putin has a powerful grip on Russia's leadership, but he will, at some point, relinquish power with uncertain succession. Similarly, new (or existing) leadership in India, China, Israel, Pakistan, North Korea or another nuclear-armed nation could lead to a nuclear war in the coming years, decades, or centuries.

# 1AR – O/V

### General

# 1AR – XT

### XT Shotwell [A2 Ideal Theory]

### XT Ritchie [A2 Util]

**XT Koh and Niemi**

**XT Mills**

# 1AR – Util

## O/V – Util Dump

## A2 Specific Justifications

### A2 TJF

### A2 ASPEC

### A2 Epistemic Modesty

# 1AR – LARP

## O/V – A2 Extinction

### Cards – High Probability Impacts First

## O/V – Eliminate Trick

## A2 rearmament

## A2 Nuclear Renaissance

## A2 Deterrence

## A2 Alliances

## A2 Space DA

## A2 CBW DA

## A2 Asteroids PIC

## A2 Oil Spills PIC

## A2 Space PIC

# 1AR – K

# 1AR – A2 Theory

## A2 Spec

### O/V

### A2 Spec Enforcement Mechanism

### A2 Spec States

### A2 Spec Process

## 1AR – A2 Combo Shells

### Reject Combo Shells

# 1AR – Truth Testing

### Koh and niemi

### XT Koh and Niemi

# 1AR – Phil

## O/V – A2 Ideal Theory

## A2 GCB

## A2 Kant