# Earth First!

## Card dump

<http://home.ca.inter.net/greenweb/Ecofascism.html>

<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/j-baird-callicott-thinking-like-a-planet-the-land-ethic-and-the-earth-ethic-1.pdf>

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<https://www.pdcnet.org/symposium/content/symposium_2003_0007_0002_0173_0183> (Gaia and il ya: Reflections on the face of the earth)

#### [Put this somewhere I guess]

**Nelson ’12,** *Levinas and Adorno, Can there be an ethics of nature?,* This paper is one of many essays within the container *Fascism Nature, Levinas and environmental thought.* [available on aaaaarg.fail, ask me for the pdf if you can’t access it.] //GrouchoMarxist

Can this earthly inhabiting and use of the earth for the sake of the other, welcome and serve animal others or ethically respond to ecosystems and environments? Can we respond to nature as nature?15 This is not a possibility in the varieties of deontological ethics that dominate contemporary social thought, insofar as philosophers such as Habermas demand certain kinds of symmetry and equality for there to be ethical responsibility.16 Levinas, however, argues that responsibility is asymmetrical, as it involves a response without recuperation (OB 11). Whereas equality presupposes exchange, I am universally responsible to and for each regardless of their equality, reciprocity, or symmetry with myself (DF 21–22). I am responsible even to the other who bothers me and the enemy who persecutes me, in one of Levinas’s more provocative formulations.17 For Levinas, ethical inequality is “absolutely opposed to oppression” as it suggests a solidarity of difference rather than the sameness of biological kinship or the genus (OB 87, 159, 177). The biological notion of the human — and thus every biologically justified anthropocentrism — is ethically interrupted. In this context, inequality between humans and nonhumans in Levinas need not necessarily lead to the denial of the latter’s moral status and might indicate reasons for human responsibility to and for them. Just as I am infinitely responsible without any expectation of reciprocity to humans who need my help — the stranger, the widow, and the orphan — so there might be an analogous responsibility to nonhuman hunger, need, and persecution that is likewise seen in the faces, cries, and bodies of animals. Levinas maintained both that the animal has no face, in the context of his account of the ethics of the face, and that the animal’s face is a difficult issue. Still, the animal face, its gaze or need, can call me to respond and answer as much as any human face can in overlapping if not in identical ways. To the extent that human action is ethically defined by transcendence and responsiveness to alterity rather than nature or anthropology, as Levinas argued of biological categories applied to human existence, it is questionable to restrict the ethical to humans based on biological and anthropological reasons such as the biological differentiation of species.

#### [Explanation of Il y a]

**Diehm ’03**, *Gaia and Il y a: reflections on the face of the Earth,* ([https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/437DC11ED13337D6852574810044B435/$FILE/symposium\_2003\_0007\_0002\_0061\_0071.pdf](https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/437DC11ED13337D6852574810044B435/%24FILE/symposium_2003_0007_0002_0061_0071.pdf)) //GrouchoMarxist

Levinas, while almost certainly not familiar with the Gaia hypothesis, is clearly influenced by Darwin in his thinking about the natural world. His most basic characterization of nature **comes in his analyses of il y a**, analyses that are not to be taken as scientific hypotheses, but rather as phenomenological descriptions, the purpose of which is to reveal the "brute but impassive" materiality of nature. 16 Il y a describes, that is, the anonymous forces at play in the natural world, the material ebb and flow that ceaselessly pulses, building mountains and carving landscapes only to tear them down and begin again. Importantly, in contrast to the Heideggerian es gibt, for Levinas i1 y ais characterized not by generosity but by a cold lack thereof, an utter indifference to the existents whose lives are played out within a dispassionate cosmos. 17 In the context of the present discussion it is interesting to pay special attention to Levinas's repeated use of the phrases "it is hot" and "it is raining" to describe il y a. I

[Secret Baudrillard Card to flex on Joseph Bridges]

#### Give the aff perms on a non competitive alt, That allows us to incorporate the other into our ethical communities

**Smith ’12,** (raging alcoholic. 1993. “*The Transparency of Evil*”) *,* This paper is one of many essays within the container *Fascism Nature, Levinas and environmental thought.* [available on aaaaarg.fail, ask me for the pdf if you can’t access it.] //GrouchoMarxist

 We live in a culture which strives to return to each of us full responsibility for his own life. The moral responsibility inherited from the Christian tradition has thus been augmented, with the help of the whole modern apparatus of information and communication, by the requirement that everyone should be answerable for every aspect of their lives. What this amounts to is an expulsion of the other, who has indeed become perfectly useless in the context of a programmed management of life, a regimen where everything conspires to buttress the autarky of the individual cell. This, however is an absurdity: no one can be expected to be entirely responsible for his own life. This Christian-cum-modern idea is futile and arrogant. It is also a utopian notion with no justification whatsoever. It requires that the individual should transform himself into a slave to ~~his~~ [their] identity, his will, his responsibilities, his desire; and that he [they] should start exercising control of all [their] ~~his~~ own circuitry, as well as all the worldwide circuits that happen to cross paths within his genes, nerves or thought: a truly [This is a card from Baudrillard]

# 1AC

## 1AC v1

### Framing

**“I beseech you,** ~~my brothers~~

***Remain Faithful to the earth,***

**And do not believe those who speak to you of otherworldly hopes!”**

-Zarathustra[We don’t endorse gendered language]

#### Solipsism is the nail in the coffin for traditional theories of ethics. There is no way to confirm that any other perceived consciousness is feeling pain, or is a rational agent. External markers of consciousness are insufficient to confirm that there is actually an “experience” taking place.

**Searle ‘80**, (John. R.) *Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences* //GrouchoMarxist

One way to test any theory of the mind is to ask oneself what it would be like if my mind actually worked on the principles that the theory says all minds work on. Let us apply this test to the Schank program with the following experiment. Suppose that I'm locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose furthermore (as is indeed the case) that I know no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that I'm not even confident that I could recognize Chinese writing as Chinese writing distinct from, say, Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. To me, Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles. Now suppose further that after this first batch of Chinese writing I am given a second batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules for correlating the second batch with the first batch. The rules are in English, and I understand these rules as well as any other native speaker of English. They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols with another set of formal symbols, and all that 'formal' means here is that I can identify the symbols entirely by their shapes. Now suppose also that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols together with some instructions, again in English, that enable me to correlate elements of this third batch with the first two batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back certain Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response to certain sorts of shapes given me in the third batch. Unknown to me, the people who are giving me all of these symbols call the first batch "a script," they call the second batch a "story. ' and they call the third batch "questions." Furthermore, they call the symbols I give them back in response to the third batch "answers to the questions." and the set of rules in English that they gave me, they call "the program." Now just to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people also give me stories in English, which I understand, and they then ask me questions in English about these stories, and I give them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing the programs that from the external point of view that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in which I am locked -- **my answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speakers**. Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I don't speak a word of Chinese. Let us also suppose that my answers to the English questions are, as they no doubt would be, indistinguishable from those of other native English speakers, for the simple reason that I am a native English speaker. From the external point of view -- from the point of view of someone reading my "answers" -- the answers to the Chinese questions and the English questions are equally good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the English case, I produce the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as the Chinese is concerned, I simply behave like a computer; I perform computational operations on formally specified elements. For the purposes of the Chinese, I am simply an instantiation of the computer program. Now the claims made by strong AI are that the programmed computer understands the stories and that the program in some sense explains human understanding. But we are now in a position to examine these claims in light of our thought experiment. 1 As regards the first claim, it seems to me quite obvious in the example that I do not understand a word of the Chinese stories. **I have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the native Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing.**

#### This proves external markers of consciousness will never be enough to confirm an authentic experience of subjectivity.

#### The hard problem of solipsism mandates a theory of ethics that does not rely on a conscious experience of others. We propose that ethics emerge during a confrontation with the Other that is the construct of our minds.

**Beavers ‘90**, *Introducting Levinas to Undergraduate Philosophers, (*<http://faculty.evansville.edu/tb2/PDFs/UndergradPhil.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

It is to say that ethics is an important issue for us because it governs the way in which we relate with one another. This assumption is not unfounded: indeed, St. Thomas tells us that "harm should not be given to an other". Kant's Categorical Imperative indicates that the moral agent should "treat humanity, whether in his/her own person or the person of another, not only as a means but also as an end in itself." And Mill's "principle of utility" implies others when he notes that ethics is rooted in the notion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. If ethics is concerned with the other, then it would appear that in order to fill out a complete account of ethics, the means by which two people come in contact with each other will be vitally important. Here, then is the root of Levinas' concern: to establish the source of contact between persons or the source of interpersonal meaning, and in finding this meaning, Levinas finds the ethical. To a non-philosopher, the source of contact between persons seems to be a superficial question. The answer is, at first, easy. The other person is met in experience everyday, on the street, in the classroom, in the workplace, etc. To a philosopher, however, the question is not so easy: we in the tradition recognize the difficulties inherent in interpersonal contact. Does the other person have a mind? Is the other a creation of my imagination, as Descartes asks looking out of his study at the automata that pass by dressed in coats and hats? In light of these questions, though, we can never truly deny the existence of the other in the context of the street, the classroom, or the workplace, even if we can deny such contact in a theoretical context. It is on the level of life, then, as opposed to that of theory, that Levinas has his appeal. Levinas comes directly out of the tradition established by Descartes, Kant and Husserl. "Every idea is a work of the mind," writes Descartes in his Meditations. 2 Ideas are created, invented by a mind, not discovered. This leaves Descartes with a problem: "How can [ideas] that have their origin in the mind nevertheless give us knowledge of independently real substances."3 He answers this question through proofs for God's existence and divine veracity. But as the tradition progresses, Kant notes that God cannot be used within philosophy to the extent that Descartes would like. Thus, Descartes is left alone in his world with only his ideas: there is no contact with an other who is not an other in one of his ideas. Husserl takes this to its logical consequences in the fifth of his Cartesian Meditations and notes that the other is "there," present to me, but only in the sense that the other has for me. He writes, "Consciousness makes present a 'there too', which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an 'itself-there'."4 The other of Husserl's Cartesian Meditations is not an extra-mental other, that is, one who exists independently of me; rather, the other is only the meaning that I constitute for the other. In other words, **the** meaning of being an **other comes down to my interpretation of the other**, an interpretation **which is the working of my own mind** quite apart from what or whether the other may be. If we can accept this notion that ideas are inventions of the mind, that ideas are, when it comes down to it, only interpretations of something, and if ethics, in fact, is taken to refer to real other persons who exist apart from my interpretations, then we are up against a problem: **there is no way** in which **ideas**, on the current model, **refer to independently existing other persons, and as such, ideas cannot be used to found an ethics.** There can be no pure practical reason until after contact with the other is established. Given this view towards ideas, then, anytime I take the person in my idea to be the real person, I have closed off contact with the real person; I have cut off the connection with the other that is necessary if ethics is to refer to real other people. This is a central violence to the other that denies the other his/her own autonomy. Levinas calls this violence "totalization" and it occurs whenever I limit the other to a set of rational categories, be they racial, sexual, or otherwise. Indeed, it occurs whenever I already know what the other is about before the other has spoken. Totalization is a denial of the other's difference, the denial of the otherness of the other. That is, it is the inscription of the other in the same. If ethics presupposes the real other person, then such totalization will, in itself, be unethical. If reducing the other to my sphere of ideas cuts off contact with the other, then we are presupposing that contact with the other has already been established. And if contact with the other cannot be established through ideas, then we must look elsewhere. Thus, Levinas looks not to reason, but to sensibility, to find the real other person. Sensibility, for Levinas, goes back to a point before thought originates, before the ordering of a world into a system or totality.5 Sensibility is passive, not active as thought is, and it is characterized primarily by enjoyment. Life as it is lived, (rather than understood), is lived as the satisfaction of being "filled" with sensations, the satisfaction of feeding on the environment. Departing from Heidegger who maintains that we live from things through their function as tools and implements, Levinas maintains that we live from these things as nourishments. I eat my bread; in the activity of eating it becomes a part of my body. I bathe in the music of Beethoven's "Moonlight Sonata"; in the activity of bathing. I "digest" the music. It becomes me. This "living from" is a matter of consumption, a matter of taking what is other and making it become a part of me. Levinas writes: Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the same, which is the essence of enjoyment; an energy that is other, recognized as other, recognized ... as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, me.6 This taking on of what nourishes me conveys a separation between me and what has yet to nourish me. "Enjoyment is made," writes Levinas, "of the memory of its thirst; it is a quenching."7 Enjoyment then includes the memory of once not having been satisfied with what now satisfies me. Thus, enjoyment also involves stepping back from my environment; "living from ... delineates independence itself, the independence of enjoyment and happiness ..."8 Before enjoyment, there is me and the other thing that has yet to nourish me, even if the otherness of what will nourish me becomes apparent only in enjoyment, in the "memory" of its thirst. I can represent the bread, but this will not feed me. I must eat it. But then in eating my bread, the memory of hunger, evinces a separation between the bread and me. Thus, in enjoyment, the self emerges already as the subject of its need. If Levinas is correct, then, the human being starts first as happy, satisfied with the plenum of sensations. He/she enjoys them. This enjoyment as independence is the initial formation of the I. But, this self, the self of enjoyment, constitutes an egoism. It is happy, but selfish. The self of enjoyment journeys into the world to make everything other part of itself, and it succeeds very well at this task. Cohen summarizes all of this nicely: [Sensation] is called "happiness" because at this level of sensibility the subject is entirely self-satisfied, self-complacement [sic], content, sufficient. Instead of [rational] synthesis, there are vibrations; instead of unifications, there are excitations; rather than an ecstatic self, there are margins of intensities, scattered stupidities, involutions without centers—egoism and solitude without substantial unity; a sensational happiness ... This event does not happen to subjectivity, this eventfulness, this flux, is subjectivity.9 Thus, Levinas finds on the level of sensibility a subjectivity that is more primordial than rational subjectivity.10 It is not limited by the sphere of one's own ideas, but by the egoist self that goes out to enjoy the world. What is important here is that, unlike the sphere of ideas, sensibility reaches further out into the domain of the extra-mental.11 Having established subjectivity on the level of sensibility provides Levinas with a place "where" the other can be met, not in the cabinet of consciousness, but on the street, in the classroom, or in the workplace, where the egoism of enjoyment has the possibility of becoming "filled" with sensations. Furthermore, establishing subjectivity on the level of sensibility leads Levinas to a point where he can establish that the human subject is, first and foremost, passive. Sensations come to me from the outside only to be swallowed up on the inside. But, unlike the contents of ideas, sensations are discovered, given. They are not invented. The ethical moment, **the moment in which the moral "ought" shows itself, is found**, for Levinas, **on the level of sensibility when the** egoist **self comes across something that it wants to enjoy,** something that it wants to make a part of itself**, but cannot**. That which the self wants to enjoy but cannot is the other person. The reason that it cannot enjoy the other person is not rooted in some deficiency of sensibility, but in the other person who pushes back, as it were, who does not allow him/herself to be consumed in the egoism of my enjoyment. The other resists consumption.

#### 2 implications

#### [1] The “actual” conscious status of the Other is irrelevant, all that matters Is that we confront the other and obligate ourselves to their need. This preserves ethics from solipsism.

####  [2] Confrontation with the other is always the highest layer. All ethical theories govern the interactions between perceived “agents” meaning recognition of the Other as “agent” comes before all other framing

#### The history of ethics is a history of anthropocentrism. The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best uses educational spaces to evoke a confrontation with the nonhuman Other.

* We’ll spec how to weigh specific offense in CX, we can’t clarify everything in 6 minutes.

**Davy 07** (Barbara Jane Davy, Ethics & the Environment 12.1 (2007) 39-65, An Other Face of Ethics in Levinas , <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v012/12.1davy.html>) //GrouchoMarxist

Nonhuman Others can also call oneself to responsibility, soliciting oneself in ethics. In Levinas' terms, the Other commands me before being recognized, saying "thou shalt not murder." The Other commands me, creating an anarchic obligation, prior to any system, beyond reason. The Other solicits oneself from "above and beyond" (Levinas 1969, 200). The [End Page 58] Other solicits ethics in oneself through a "gaze that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate only because it demands, deprived of everything because entitled to everything, and which one recognizes in giving" (Levinas 1969, 75). The restriction of solicitation to human speech in Levinas's work presents a significant limitation in terms of the possibility of ethics beyond the interhuman. However, it is the "call" as solicitation that is important for ethics, not the ability to speak with one's mouth, or to thematize. The face of the Other calls me into question, questioning my right to possession: "The presence of the Other is equivalent to this calling into question of my joyous possession of the world" (Levinas 1969, 75–76). Is it not our possession of the world in a very literal sense that is called into question by nonhuman others? Our possession, control, pollution, and usurpation of the whole planet is called into question by the expressions of nonhuman others, such as the dull eyes of whale carcasses classed as toxic waste.15 It is not the capacities of the Other that matter in ethics, but that the Other can provoke oneself—the Other provokes feelings of obligation in me when I perceive the Other's need. **What matters** in ethics **is who or what can interrupt oneself** and provoke a sense of obligation, not what criteria can be applied to the Other, such as whether or not they literally have faces and eyes. As Levinas says, "The primordial essence of expression and discourse does not reside in the information they would supply concerning an interior and hidden world . . . but a solicitation that concerns me by its destitution and its Height" (Levinas 1969, 200). What is significant about the nakedness of the Others is their need of something from oneself, their solicitation of oneself. The eyes of the hungry ask one to feed them. A wilting plant expresses its need of water quite as much as the eyes of a man might express his hunger. Nonhuman Others not only call humans to responsibility, but such inter-species relations approach Levinas' ideas on substitution more concretely than is often found in interhuman ethics. Consider Julia "Butterfly" Hill living in Luna, a threatened redwood tree, in effect a hostage for the tree for two years (Hill 2000).16 Other animals can provoke ethics in humans, which has lead to the formation of groups like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Plants and bodies [End Page 59] of water also move people to pursue ethical action through conservation and preservation. The provocation of solicitation does not depend on a literal face or voice but on environmentalists and Others amplifying or translating their voices, to provoke ethics in others. Llewelyn suggests that poetic speech, whether in poetry or poetic prose, can help humans hear the call of nonhuman Others. Solicitation can be amplified, because poetry can be evocative, can teach one to recognize more in Others. To evoke is to call, to inspire. Poetic speech and writing can, Llewelyn says, inspire one to ethics as does the Other. He finds that Levinas, in his later writings on aesthetics, says that a poem can actively engage a person. A poem can be a "handshake," that is, it can reach out and give of itself. Llewelyn characterizes the evocation of poetry as a human speaking for the others. However, I see it as a translation and amplification of Others who express themselves directly, giving of themselves in expression. A dog can inspire me because another human has spoken on his behalf, but he also expresses himself.17 We are obligated in justice to speak on behalf of Others, but we are first obligated in ethics to meet them face to face. Llewelyn argues that it is enough that we can recognize the needs of others for us to hear their calling of us to ethics, that they need not articulate their needs, or be aware of them. It is the need of the Other that solicits oneself, rather than an expression of that need (Llewelyn 1991, 194). **Their needs obligate us, he says, regardless if those needs are "experienced, unexperienced or unexperiencable, articulated, unarticulated or unarticulable**" (Llewelyn 1991, 195–96). Llewelyn does not follow Levinas' requirement that the Other be capable of expression. For Levinas, need is not enough for humans to be called to ethics, rather, it is only Desire that enables humans to be called to ethics.18 I agree with Levinas that for ethics to come to pass communication is necessary, but not in words. Ethics do arise in the face of the Other, but not only human faces. Ethics arise when I meet the Other as a person before allowing the themes I might apply to them to totalize the Other into something that cannot speak or be said to have a face. If the capacities of the Other are irrelevant to my being inspired to ethical action, the ability of the Other to speak, or their possession of a literal face, cannot be required for ethics to come to pass between us. If ethics do not come before epistemology, before thematization, they may not arise at all, leaving us stuck in an anthropocentric view of the world in which trees do not [End Page 60] speak, snakes do not have faces, stones do not teach us anything, water is a commodity, and the land is reduced to real estate. I would rather live in a world in which cicadas tell me it is hot out, otters tell me how to have fun, bears teach me how to respect them, and water teaches me about conservation.

#### We do not end our investigation with humans and nonhumans but instead approach otherness as an interruption caused without any regard to our preconceptions of ethics.

**Davy 2** (Barbara Jane Davy, Ethics & the Environment 12.1 (2007) 39-65, An Other Face of Ethics in Levinas , <http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v012/12.1davy.html>) //GrouchoMarxist

Ethics beyond the interhuman, as I develop them here, may not entirely coincide with what is usually thought of as environmental ethics. Environmental ethicists such as J. Baird Callicott argue that environmen al ethics must be ecocentric, ethics that protect ecosystems, habitat, or "the environment" as a collective. Some environmental ethicists feel that protecting groups, particularly species at risk, is more important than the rights of, or responsibilities toward, individual others. The ethics I develop here are not particularly "environmental" in this sense. Their strength, following Levinas's work, is in recognizing one's responsibilities for and to specific others. While my reading of Levinas finds his work partially open to the possibility of ethics beyond the interhuman, I also necessarily question his portrayal of the face of the Other in face to face relations as a human face. I argue that Levinas's writings about the face are better interpreted metaphorically, and that Levinasian ethics should not require that the call to ethics be issued literally in human speech. What is crucial in ethical relations is that the Other expresses infinity, that the Other teaches, and that the Other can provoke oneself to ethics, not that the call to ethics be given through the speech of a human face. Not only human others can provoke ethical obligations in oneself, but also other than human persons such as other animals, plants, rocks, and other entities. While this interpretation is not true to the historical Levinas, it is faithful to the spirit of his work. It is a better interpretation in the sense that it is more ethical. Extending Levinas's ethical theory beyond the interhuman is not a distor tion of his work. Rather, this critical reconstruction of his work is an ethical reading of it. As Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley have sug gested, an ethical, rather than appropriating, reading of Levinas necessarily puts his work in question rather than harmonizing its disso nant notes into a totality (Bernasconi and Critchley 1991, xii).

### Advantage

#### The 1AC is a resurrection of the Gaia hypothesis. Our story begins with Lovelock, a scientist forced to define life through humanities’ travels into outer space. Lovelock begins their investigation with the hypothesis of life as entropy reduction, I.E the maintenance of disequilibrium with ones surroundings.

**Diehm ’03**, *Gaia and Il y a: reflections on the face of the Earth,* ([https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/437DC11ED13337D6852574810044B435/$FILE/symposium\_2003\_0007\_0002\_0061\_0071.pdf](https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/437DC11ED13337D6852574810044B435/%24FILE/symposium_2003_0007_0002_0061_0071.pdf)) //GrouchoMarxist

Attributing purposiveness to the activities of the biota was, of course~ bound to meet with opposition from the scientific community. Consequently, as the Gaia hypothesis developed Lovelock was pressed to explain more carefully how life could create the planetary environment. He responded by offering the "Daisyworld" model which, in it simplest form, asks us to imagine a planet inhabited by two species of daisies, one light-colored and one dark. Assuming that there is a limited range of temperatures in which daisies can grow, with an optimal point near the middle, one could postulate that when the planet's surface became minimalIy warm enough, growth would begin. The dark daisies would have an advantage, however, as their color would allow them to trap heat and thereby create for themselves temperatures closer to the optimal mean. Thus, they would grow and spread more rapidly, warming not only themselves but eventually the entire planet. As temperatures rose, however, dark daisies would be at a disadvantage as they would create for themselves conditions that were farther and farther from the mean. Light daisies, however, would now be at an advantage as their ability to reflect light would tend to create more optimal conditions. Hence, the light daisies would become more populous and bring the temperature of the planet back down. But when temperatures dipped too low the light daisies would no longer have an advantage, and the dark daisies would again begin to spread. Over time, this "push and puIl" between daisy populations would have the effect of producing temperatures that approximate the mean. 11 What is significant about this model is that it explains how the activities of living beings could produce planetary conditions comfortable for life without introducing teleology into the equation. In Lovelock's words, Daisy world operates according to "simple competition and natural selection of the two daisy species," and thus it is "a system that has no purpose in it. It does not require committees or anything like that; rather it follows from the process of natural selection tightly coupled into the physical evolution of the planet."12 This statement is echoed by Dorion Sagan and Lyon Margulis, who claim that "the radical insight delivered by Daisy World" is that regulation of planetary environmental conditions "is in principle possible without the introduction of any but the well-known tenets of biology."13 3 From Chaos to Proliferation A large part of the controversy over the Gaia hypothesisis the potential conflict between gaian science and the Darwinian worldview. This conflict is often depicted as the clash between, as we have seen, the gaian vision in which nature as a whole is thought to be purposive and the Darwinian view in which nature "progresses" aimlessly. When understood in conjunction with the Daisy world model, however, it is arguable that the Gaia hypothesis does not really challenge Darwin on this point. The gaian challenge to Darwin lies, rather, in the divergent picture that it paints of the relation between life and the non-living environment, and the new understanding of the abiotic world that accompanies such a change. The Darwinian view is of a world of lifeless chemistry to which living beings are challenged to adapt, an Earth that is set on an unwavering course against which life ceaselessly struggles. Lovelock describes this "very Victorian theory of the Earth" by saying that "the Earth scientists see the evolution of the material world proceeding strictly according to the rules of physics and chemistry with organisms on the planet merely passengers.,,14 Gaian science, on the other hand, tries to mend this split by seeing life to be more directly involved with the abiotic environment, where the non-living world is not simply that to which life adapts, but is to whatever degree modified and shaped by life itself. For gaian scientists, "life doesn't inhabit a dead world of geochernistry and try to adapt to it. It is, rather, adapting to and adapting a living world that it, itself, has made.,,15

#### The Daisyworld experiment displays a system that masterfully weaves together the organic and inorganic in the dance of il y a but more importantly it shows a whole larger than it’s constitutive parts. It is here that Gaia reveals themselves.

**Diehm 2**, *Gaia and Il y a: reflections on the face of the Earth,* ([https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/437DC11ED13337D6852574810044B435/$FILE/symposium\_2003\_0007\_0002\_0061\_0071.pdf](https://www.pdcnet.org/C12573E5003D645A/file/437DC11ED13337D6852574810044B435/%24FILE/symposium_2003_0007_0002_0061_0071.pdf)) //GrouchoMarxist

These features of the non-living world are, of course, not the end product of the activity of an "ordering agent." There is no "council of beings" that decides upon methods of creating an atmosphere, no gaian architect-terrestrial or divine-who planned the seasons or designed the seas with a view to promoting life. Nevertheless, as Peter Bunyard writes, the Gaia hypothesis provides us a view of life on Earth as "somehow transforming a chaotic system into one that has a measure of order."31 Such a transformation gives the non-living world a decidedly "pro-life" trajectory; it is the structuring of chaos into a system that is "fit" for living beings, and not simply something against which organisms must struggle. This "fit" is so remarkable, and improbable, that the presumption of design seems almost forgivable. Indeed, Sagan and Margulis claim, cautiously echoing the famous "teleological argument" of William Paley, that if we were to look solely at the results of gaian processes and not the mechanisms by which they operate "it would look as if the organisms had conspired to ensure their own survival.,,32 What we find in the Gaia hypothesis is therefore a statement about the prolific character of the abiotic Earth. To continue the stage metaphor, we could say that although the drama of life may have no director, the Gaia hypothesis suggests that the stage has somehow been "set," that the scenery is up and the lights are on. Unlike Darwin, and unlike Levinas as well, the gaian vision is of a planetary environment that has been modified by living beings such that it too is integrated into the dynamics of life, "prepared." Gaian science is thus, in essence, ecological thinking that takes the etymology of the term "eco-Iogy" seriously, seeing in the non-living world the logos of the oikos. Ivlatter, invigorated, becomes Earth. Bio-Geo-Philia What, then, of ethics? Does the shift in thinking that is prompted by the Gaia hypothesis demand a corresponding shift in our thinking about who or what the other may be, about who or what makes demands of us? Does a transformed understanding of the non-living world allow us to hear anything like the call of responsibility coming from the abiotic Earth, anything other than the terrible rumbling of il y a? Perhaps it is appropriate in addressing these questions to repeat what was said above, that Levinas tends to view the conatus essendi in terms of the opposition between, among other things, life and the non-living, the antagonism between the entropy forces at work in the world and the neg-entropic forces of the living body, the tension between the cold anonyrnity of matter and the tenderness of the living flesh. Our discussion of the Gaia hypothesis is in no way intended to deny the ethical resistance of the flesh, to cast a shadow on the penumbra of inviolability that radiates from the body of the other, from the vulnerable flesh that "faces" me and calls me to responsibility. **What gaian thinking demands is** not that we fall deaf to our obligations to living beings, but **that we recognize the way** in which **this protest in the name of life**, this bio-philia at the heart of ethics, **is not primarily a protest against the non-living world,** but is a protest in the name of the Earth, **a bio-geo-philia which pays heed to the non-living** Earth that is **woven into the living** world. Here we must be cautious. Lovelock often writes as if there were an organismic integrity at the planetary level; that is, he portrays the coupling between the biotic and the abiotic as the very close coupling found between the various constituent parts of an organism. The Daisyworld model, however, appears to work against such strong organicism. Instead of positing a gaian superorganism, what Daisyworld suggests is that there is something like a second-level order to be found in the non-living world, a structure that is not itself a living organism but rather, to use Lovelock's term, the "product" of the collective activities of living beings.33 Proponents of the Daisyworld model see an Earth upon which individual organisms work to maintain their vital corporeal boundaries, but it is also an Earth that has been provided with a definite structure, a structure that is **not itself a part of the organisms's** own somatic integrities, **but a dynamic extension of them**. Daisyworld theorists have therefore caught sight of the ways in which the bodily integrity of living organisms extends into the non-living world such that an extra-somatic context is delimited, a point that could perhaps be summarized by saying that for gaian thinkers biology is understood to be productive ofa "biosphere." What Daisyworld proposes is that the abiotic environment is integrated into the patterns of life, not as the cell is integral to the organism, but rather in the way that life is defining of a world. It is within this extra-somatic context that the potential of living beings can be realized, and this is so because, as the Gaia hypothesis shows, **the Earth is not a chaos of dead chemistry, but a chemistry vitalized, structured, worked over by the living world, not alive but enlivened by living beings.** This extra-somatic integrity can give rise to a sort of extra-bio-philia, a kind of meta-responsibility that takes us beyond our responsibilities to living beings. Levinas speaks of just this sort of meta-responsibility when he writes: Over the hands that have touched things, places trampled by beings, the things they have held, the images of those things, the fragments of things, the contexts in which those fragments enter, the inflections of the voice and the words that are articulated in them, the ever sensible signs of language, the letters traced, the vestiges, the relics-over all things, beginning with the human face and skin, tenderness spreads.34 What is important here is not Levinas's anthropocentrism, which we have already suggested Is insufficiently radical to capture the fullest sense of his thinking, but rather the indication of another sort of responsibility, a responsibility that extends to "things," to "places" and "contexts." This is **a responsibility that begins in the face, but is not contained there**, a responsibility that traces off of the body and into the places that the body inhabits, just as the body itself is not contained within its own fleshy boundaries, but traces off into the world. The tenderness of the flesh that calls me to responsibility spreads across all things, like a penumbra of inviolability that illumines the spaces beyond the living body, **a light that originates in the other, but whose rays are reflected by the surfaces they touch.** Hence the obsession with the other, this obsessive preoccupation with caring for the other, becomes an obsession for the things the other touches, a responsibility that spreads out into the places where the other has passed, the contexts in which the other dweIls. "Matter," Levinas writes, "which is invested as a tool, and a tool in the world, is also, via the human, the matter that obsesses me with its proxirnity.,,35 An obsession with mauer! lbisis an obsession that issues in an attentiveness to the patterns and rhythms of a world that is patterned by the other, a world whose contours follow the contours of the hands that trace it, the bodies that inhabit it. Consider now the Gaia hypothesis, which takes on new, and fundamentally ethical, meaning in light of these reflections on Levinas. Lovelock writes that "the air we breathe, the ocean and the rocks are all either direct products of living organisms ... or else of rocks that have been greatly modified by the presence of life, and this even includes the igneous rocks coming from volcanoes.,,36 Thus, it is not only the matter that is "invested as a tool" that belongs to a world inhabited by others, but matter itself: dirt, rocks, water, air, "earth" with a lower case "e." All of these things make up a planet invested by others, an Earth with an atmospheric composition that is composed by life, a planet with physical patterns that are pattered by living beings. These are all things to which I am also called to respond: the sweep of landscapes, the fold of mountains, the meandering bends of streams-all part of an other-than-human world, all things to which my own conatus is called to yield. Obligation follows the other to the far reaches of the Earth, transforming the bio-philia of ethics into a bio-geo-philia which asks that I shape my own movements to conform to a world that is shaped by others, a love for the Earth that shoulders responsibility for the abiotic world, bearing a task worthy of Atlas himself.

#### Thus I affirm: The united states ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.

#### We’ll defend implementation if you want but it’s not necessary for our offense

#### We’ll spec whatever you want in CX, I don’t like theory debates

[We don’t spec types of aid but here’s a general list of things we’ll defend if you want us too. 1 Equipment: Helicopters, armored cards, mortars/missiles, guns and ammunition. 2 Training: Combat skills, equipment maintenance, resource management. 3 Construction: Military Bases, Aircraft Hangers, Military Schools. 4: Transportation + Logistics: Air transport, Land transport, fueling. 5 Sustainment: Foreign military salaries, facility maintenance, communications and intelligence. List from: <http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-military-and-police-aid-programs-basic-guide-purpose-type-recipient>]

#### Military aid is the selected microcosm of knife placed in the back of the inorganic substrate that supports life. Carbon emissions are the 21st centuries twisted Daisyworld in which we shape the earth in a way that steals life from the Other.

**Clark et al ’10**, Militarization and the environment: a panel study of Carbon Dioxide emissions and the ecological footprints of nations 1970 – 2000. (<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.827.235&rep=rep1&type=pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

To evaluate the proposed theorization, we employ two key military measures: military expenditures per soldier and military participation. Military expenditures data46 include all current capital expenditures on the armed forces, including: peacekeeping forces, defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects, paramilitary forces that are trained and equipped for military operations, and military space activities. More specifically, such expenditures include operation and maintenance, procurement, military research and development, military and civil personnel (including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel), and **military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country**) .Military expenditures per soldier (ln) is calculated by dividing total military expenditures by total military personnel. Total military personnel estimates are gathered from the World Bank47 and total military expenditures are obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).48 This variable measures the high-tech nature, or capital intensiveness, of national militaries.49 Military participation (ln) is the ratio of military personnel per 1000 population. Military personnel data (from the World Bank)50 counts active duty military personnel and paramilitary forces if the training, organization, and equipment suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. Like others, we treat this variable as an indicator of the relative labor intensity of nations’ militaries. 51 Additional Independent Variables Military expenditures as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) (ln) are obtained from the World Bank52 based on SIPRI’s military expenditures data and total GDP data in constant US dollars. Prior cross-national research on carbon dioxide emissions includes these data as a measure of nations’ relative military investments and expenditures.53 More importantly, controlling for military expenditures as percentage of GDP allows for more rigorous assessments of the effects of military expenditures per soldier and military participation in particular, and treadmill of destruction theory in general. GDP per capita (ln) is included as a control for level of economic development. These data, which we gather from the World Bank,54 are measured in constant 2000 US dollars. Data for all other variables described below are obtained from the same source. Political-economic approaches, including treadmill of production theory, the metabolic rift, and world-systems analysis, as well as structural human ecology, all argue that development is a key driver of environmental degradation measured by scale and intensity.55 Indeed, prior research on carbon dioxide emissions and ecological footprints (total and per capita for both) consistently shows a positive association between these outcomes and level of economic development.56 Total population (ln), measured in thousands, is included only in the analyses of total carbon dioxide emissions. Social scientists working in the structural human ecology tradition argue that population is a key driver of scale-level environmental outcomes.57 Manufacturing as percentage of total GDP controls for the extent to which a domestic economy is manufacturing-based. Most perspectives in the social sciences posit that all else being equal, nations with larger manufacturing sectors will consume larger and more intensive amounts of fossil fuels and other resources, which contribute to increases in both carbon dioxide emissions and overall consumption-based environmental impacts. Urban population as percentage of total population controls for a country’s level of urbanization. Prior cross-sectional and panel analyses reveal positive associations between urbanization and a variety of environmental outcomes, including the total and per capita ecological footprints of nations,58 as well as the emission of carbon dioxide and other noxious gases.59 While perhaps the most common measure of urbanization for cross-national research in the environmental social sciences, we acknowledge its relative limitations. Percentage of population aged 15–64 controls for the extent to which a nation’s population is adult and non-dependent. Structural human ecology60 posits that all else being equal, nations with relatively larger non-dependent adult populations will consume more fuels and natural resources, which increases both the intensity and scale of carbon dioxide emissions, as well as per capita ecological footprints. Exports as percentage of total GDP (ln) controls for the extent to which a country is integrated into the international trading system. While the potential environmental impacts of trade are not the focus of the current study, recent analyses show a positive association between exports and carbon dioxide emissions.61 A partial explanation for these ªndings is that in order to be relatively competitive in the world-economy, trade and other forms of economic globalization create added pressures for less-developed countries to lower environmental standards for export-oriented production. Since levels of exports are used in the ecological footprint calculations, we exclude this predictor from the per capita footprint analyses. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables in both of our datasets. We note that all three outcomes have moderate to strong positive bi-variate associations with military expenditures per soldier and military participation. Military expenditures per soldier and GDP per capita are highly correlated in both datasets, a problem we address below.62 Results and Discussion The ªndings for the panel analyses are reported in Table 3. For all predictors we provide unstandardized coefªcients, the absolute values of t-statistics, and standardized coefªcients. For each tested model, we report values for R-square within, R-square between, and R-square overall. Two models are tested for all three dependent variables.63 For both per capita dependent variables, the ªrst model—labeled as Model A—consists of military expenditures per soldier, military participation, military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, and GDP per capita. For total carbon dioxide emissions, Model A also consists of total population. The second model—labeled as Model B—includes all Model A predictors plus manufacturing as a percentage of GDP, urban population, percentage of population aged 15 to 64, and exports as a percentage of GDP.64 For reasons noted above, the latter predictor is excluded from the ecological footprint per capita analyses. Before discussing the results of interest, we brieºy summarize the associations between the outcomes and the additional predictors. As expected, the effect of total population on total emissions is positive and relatively strong in magnitude, which corresponds with prior research on scale-level emissions and assertions of structural human ecology. For all three outcomes, we ªnd that the effect of level of economic development is positive and slightly reduces in magnitude with the introduction of other controls in Model B. For the footprint analyses, the relative magnitude of GDP per capita’s effect is small to moderate, and its statistical signiªcance is at a marginal level in Model B (p value .095). Since most past research on ecological footprints reveals strong positive effects of level of development, we speculate that these ªndings are largely a function of high collinearity between GDP per capita and military expenditures per soldier. Further, the reduced sample size of the footprint analyses may enhance the collinearity between GDP per capita and military expenditures per soldier. While the effects of economic development are not the focus of the current study, we return to this issue below. However, the positive effect of economic development on all three outcomes is consistent with various political economy orientations in the environmental social sciences as well as structural human ecology. In analyses not reported here (but available upon request), inclusion of the centered quadratic for GDP per capita produced positive correlations with all of our dependent variables, contradicting the curvilinear associations predicted by environmental Kuznets curve theory.65 The effects of manufacturing as a percentage of GDP and urban population on total emissions and per capita emissions are positive, indicating the importance in controlling for both when investigating anthropogenic emissions measured by scale and intensity. However, their effects on per capita ecological footprints are non-signiªcant. The effects of population age structure in the context of the percentage of population aged 15 to 24 and world-economic integration in the form of exports as a percentage of GDP are non-signiªcant for total carbon dioxide emissions and per capita carbon dioxide emissions. Conversely, per capita footprints are positively associated with relative levels of nondependent populations. While not the focus of the current study, these differing effects highlight the importance of assessing how the impacts of various political economic and human ecological drivers differ across environmental outcomes. Lastly, the effect of military expenditures as a percentage of GDP is nonsigniªcant in all reported models. Considering the weak bi-variate associations between this predictor and both total and per capita carbon dioxide emissions as well as the per capita footprints of nations, the non-signiªcant effects are not surprising. We now turn to the results of interest: the effects of military expenditures per soldier and military participation. As indicated in Table 3, military expenditures per soldier and military participation positively affect both total and per capita carbon dioxide emissions. Thus, it appears that, all else being equal, nations with more high-tech and labor intensive militaries emit relatively higher overall levels and greater intensities of anthropogenic carbon dioxide gas. Further, the magnitudes of their effects on total and per capita emissions are certainly not trivial. Likewise, the per capita ecological footprints of nations are positively associated with both military participation and military expenditures per soldier, with moderate magnitudes. Thus, we ªnd substantial support for treadmill of destruction theory from a comparative perspective. As articulated by the theory, countries with technologically advanced and labor-intensive militaries require enormous amounts of resources for their infrastructures and research and development, as well as to maintain their relative size and power.

#### Carbon emissions reduce the sea of otherness through a violent destruction of biodiversity. Destruction of the biosphere is the destruction of the extra-somatic aspects of the Other.

McCoy et al. 14 — David McCoy, Professor of Global Public Health at the Centre for Primary Care and Public Health at Queen Mary University London, Ph.D. from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Fellow of the UK Faculty of Public Health, Hugh Montgomery, Sabaratnam Arulkumaran, Fiona Godlee, 3/26/14, “Climate Change and Human Survival” The British Journal of Medicine, Editorials, doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g2351

The IPCC has already concluded that it is “virtually certain that human influence has warmed the global climate system” and that it is “extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010” is anthropogenic.1 Its new report outlines the future threats of further global warming: increased scarcity of food and fresh water; extreme weather events; rise in sea level; loss of biodiversity; areas becoming uninhabitable; and mass human migration, conflict and violence. Leaked drafts talk of hundreds of millions displaced in a little over 80 years. This month, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) added its voice: “the well being of people of all nations [is] at risk.”2 Such comments reaffirm the conclusions of the Lancet/UCL Commission: that climate change is “the greatest threat to human health of the 21st century.”3 The changes seen so far—massive arctic ice loss and extreme weather events, for example—have resulted from an estimated average temperature rise of 0.89°C since 1901. Further changes will depend on how much we continue to heat the planet. The release of just another 275 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide would probably commit us to a temperature rise of at least 2°C—an amount that could be emitted in less than eight years.4 “Business as usual” will increase carbon dioxide concentrations from the current level of 400 parts per million (ppm), which is a 40% increase from 280 ppm 150 years ago, to 936 ppm by 2100, with a 50:50 chance that this will deliver global mean temperature rises of more than 4°C. It is now widely understood that such a rise is “incompatible with an organised global community.”5 The IPCC warns of “tipping points” in the earth’s system, which, if crossed, could lead to a catastrophic collapse of interlinked human and natural systems. The AAAS concludes that there is now a “real chance of abrupt, unpredictable and potentially irreversible changes with highly damaging impacts on people around the globe.”2 And this week a report from the World Meteorological Office (WMO) confirmed that extreme weather events are accelerating. WMO secretary general Michel Jarraud said, “There is no standstill in global warming . . . The laws of physics are non-negotiable.”6

### Underview

#### 1. Perceiving the Other as an agent places a reference point to reality and is necessary for individual subject formation, confrontation with the other is a prerequisite to all epistemologies.

Bruce **Young (ND)**, *An Introduction to Levinas,* (<http://english.byu.edu/faculty/youngb/levinas/levinas3int.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

Besides introducing me to moral responsibility, the Other also makes the world "real." That is, I know the world is not just an illusion because I have it in common with the Other. Reality thus becomes genuinely "exterior"—and at the same time, I become genuinely "interior," because I am now truly differentiated from the external world and because I have been called upon to turn to my resources (what belongs to me and is in some sense a part of my "interior" world) so as to respond to and serve the Other. This "calling upon" and "responding" is the basis of language or conversation; and through language (discourse, conversation) the world becomes "communicable," something that can be shared. The Other is identified with "infinity" (hence the title Totality and Infinity): because I cannot contain or possess the Other or reduce the Other to a finite concept or image, the Other is, in that sense, without bounds. The Other thus produces in me "the idea of Infinity": the idea of something more than I can contain. Since I can never fully satisfy my obligation to the Other, my responsibility for the Other is also "infinite." Ethics is thus not first of all a matter of "reciprocity": I do not owe certain things to the Other only in return for what has been done for me. The obligation toward the Other comes with the relationship itself, which precedes any actions performed or even any thoughts by which I would be able to measure my own and the other's relative obligations. Furthermore, I can never get out of myself in such a way as to "objectively" (from the outside) compare the relative obligations of myself and the other. My unique position as a self depends on my responsibility to the other, which (as far as I am concerned) always precedes and exceeds any obligation the other may have toward me.

#### 2. Politics are the articulation of ontological principles, fiat is fake, Nothing happens after the round. Only the epistemologies we create and leave with are constitutive of debate.

**Smith ’12,** *The Earthly Politics of Ethical An-arche, Arendt, Levinas, and Being with Others,* This paper is one of many essays within the container *Fascism Nature, Levinas and environmental thought.* [available on aaaaarg.fail, ask me for the pdf if you can’t access it.] //GrouchoMarxist

An ecological politics must be informed by the ethical, rather than just the instrumental, importance of the more-than-human world. Without such ethics “nature” is regarded only as a resource to be divided between human protagonists. Such a resource-based politics would not be ecological in any important sense since it can relatively easily be encompassed within already existing (anthropocentric) political paradigms. On the other hand, if ethics is understood, as it often is by environmental philosophers, in naturalistic terms, as a system of more or less “objective” values or principles grounded in the ontology of the natural world, this leaves little or no room for politics to take place. That is to say, politics becomes merely a matter of correctly enunciating and then systematically applying these ontologically derived ethical principles, a matter of biopolitical management rather than the creative public expressions of individuals. Roughly speaking, while the former strategy reduces (ecological) ethics to nothing more than (human) politics, the latter strategy binds politics to a supposedly inescapable natural order of things. A real ecological politics — one that is both ecological and political — must therefore find ways to articulate ethics and politics so that each is informed by the other but neither is reduced or opposed to the other. Only this kind of politics can begin to express the intricacies of our beingwith-more-than-human-Others — the complex events that compose our sharing the world. This chapter argues that Emmanuel Levinas’s understanding of ethics and Hannah Arendt’s understanding of politics might be (ecologically) articulated in just such a way.

# 1AR

## General

### Overview (long)

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best uses educational spaces to evoke a confrontation with the nonhuman Other.

#### External markers of consciousness will never be enough to confirm a conscious experience is taking place. To preserve ethics from the problem of hard solipsism we hold that ethics begins with a confrontation with the other that presumes nothing about their capabilities. The other interrupts our subjectivity and calls into question our ownership of the universe. The alterity and similarity of the other generates a debt that is transcendent and infinite, but it begins with the command “Thou shall not kill.”

#### We hold that life is dependent on an immaterial substructure which allows it to exist. However the lines between the substructure and it’s superstructure begin to blur when life shapes it’s environment and the environment shapes life. This creates a “bleed” of otherness that places us in debt not only to the Other but the conditions of the earth that allow for their existence. And thus Gaia is born.

#### Carbon emissions as a result of military expenditure, aid in particular, reduce the sea of otherness in a twisted destruction of biodiversity whereby we shape the Otherness of the Earth and kill it’s own inhabitants. This violates the basic structure of ethics and requires a reorientation of ourselves away from the destructive mindset of anthropocentrism.

### Overview Short

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best uses educational spaces to evoke a confrontation with the nonhuman Other.

#### We hold that ethics begins with a confrontation with the other regardless of their conceived ability. The Other challenges our ownership of the universe. The alterity and similarity of the other generates a transcendent debt that begins with the command “Thou shall not kill.”

#### Life could not exist without a supportive biosphere. However the lines between the biosphere and individual organisms blurs when life shapes it’s environment and the environment shapes life. This creates a “bleed” of otherness that places us in debt to the conditions that make life possible, and thus Gaia is born.

#### Carbon emissions as a result of military expenditure reduce the sea of otherness in a twisted destruction of otherness through the destruction of biodiversity. This violates the basic structure of ethics and requires a reorientation of ourselves away from the destructive mindset of anthropocentrism.

### Generic Anthro indicits

#### The vast majority of these answers do not apply.

#### We’ve won a critical sequencing question that the aff to a prerequisite to ethics. That’s the framing sheet. This means even if they win “anthro good” we’ve won that dismantling anthro is a pre-req to an analysis of good meaning the aff always comes first.

# Framing

## Util

### You’re wrong

#### Cross apply Searle ’80. External markers of pain will never be enough to determine if there’s actually an experience of pain going on. I could program a robot to perfectly mimic the effects of being in pain but they wouldn’t actually be experiencing anything. We’ve won a critical sequencing question about how ethics governs the interactions between subjects meaning the aff will always be a prior question.

#### Without the aff nobody will care about being Utilitarian. People do horrible shit all the time knowing they’re causing someone else pain. Only our theory has explanatory power for this phenomena of why people are motivated to respond to/ignore suffering.

#### Any moral theory that doesn’t have a sound epistemic basis collapses to nihilism, if they can’t demonstrate the fundamental presuppositions of their framework you vote aff on risk of offense.

## Kant

### Your wrong

#### Your framework is equivalent to one person speaking a language they made up yesterday. If you’re the only person that speaks a language, and you make all the rules, nothing you say can be grammatically incorrect. Without confronting the other reason boils down to the structure of your individual experience which can never become transcendent meaning your framework falls apart at the seams.

#### We’ve won a critical sequencing question coming off of the Beavers ’90 evidence that in order to be a Kantian we must first recognize the other as being rational so I know to respect them. Case in point Kant was a racist dick-bag because he didn’t recognize POC as being rational agents. This means the Aff will ALWAYS be a prior question.

#### Any moral theory that doesn’t have a sound epistemic basis collapses to nihilism, if they can’t demonstrate the fundamental presuppositions of their framework you vote aff on risk of offense.

## Generic Levinas indicts

### Necessary =/= good

#### They’ve critically mishandled the framing debate by confusing nnecessity with qualitive judgements. I.E it is bad that Ebola exists but that doesn’t mean Ebola doesn’t exist. Even if they’re right about 100% of their claims we’ve won that framing ethics through the other is a necessary perquisite to ethics meaning the affirmative is a necessary consequence of reality that we just have to deal with.

### “Levinas was anthro”

#### Even if he was virtually every author in the 1AC has identified why Levinas was originally wrong and rectified his mistakes. Even if they’re right they need to prove why the 1AC’s articulation of Levinas’ theory is anthro which they haven’t done.

#### Read more Levinas, the man had his faults but he reached the conclusion that animals can have a face in *The Name of a Dog: Or natural Rights* which is more than most other French philosophers were doing at the time.

# Wonk

## General

### Education tag on

#### Education is a bad impact, 2 warrants

#### Me standing up and giving a 45 minute 1AC lecturing you about Levinas could be really education but it would destroy the fundamental quality of debate as a competitive activity.

#### Education is unquantifiable, standardized testing has shown as much. But fairness can be delineated through standards like equal prep burdens and limits. Prefer our voters on measurability.

## Spec Shells

### Must spec regime

#### C/I – I’ll defend the violation

#### Prefer

#### Ground: Spec kills neg ground for DA’s and forces them to run generics like Baudrillard every round because they forgot to prep out one of the 200 countries the res applies too

#### Predictable limits: The res is the main guide to prep but the res doesn’t spec a regime. Spec kills the topic as a stasis point and explodes the negative prep burden

#### Ground and predictable limits are the key internal links to fairness

#### Clash is a prerequisite to the judges ability to adjudicate the round, no interaction forces judge intervention is unfair to both sides.

#### Prefer fairness, debate is structured by wins and losses so fairness must be part of it’s intrinsic structure.

### Must spec aid

#### C/I – I’ll defend the violation

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Predictable Limits – specifying a country and type of aid explodes neg prep.

#### 2. Ground – affs will exclude as much neg ground as possible – negs can’t rely on PICs or DAs to most types of aid, which makes it impossible to answer plans specific countries.

#### On Ground Shift

#### 1. 2NR theory solves better – judges universally condemn shifting. Every reason why shiftiness is bad is a reason why it’s even easier to win 2NR theory.

#### 2. Generics solve – NCs, Ks, and most DAs link to all types of aid.

#### 3. They don’t solve – I can always shift on other issues or spec even further in the 1AR.

# DA

## General

### Aff first

#### Aff comes first, our offense comes from our orientation towards the face of Gaia, not from any post fiat offense. Extend our Doty 07 evidence, our speech acts have pretty much zero effect on micropolitics BUT our speech acts can evoke a confrontation with the face of the nonhuman other. Evaluate pre-fiat offense first, 3 warrants.

#### It actually happens: If we win the internal solvency chain on the aff then we win a real world impact to the aff. Until they prove that me reading the aff will literally trigger the DA aff comes first.

#### Risk of offense: If we’re wrong and you vote aff, nothing bad happens we just don’t do anything. But if you reject the face of the other and we’re right that implicates our personal ethical systems. If we have a 1% risk of offense, you vote aff.

#### There’s a critical sequencing question the Neg has overlooked: Smith ’12 indicates an epistemic foundation is a prerequisite to ethical actions meaning the aff will always be a prior question to engaging in political solutions. You have to vote aff before you can consider voting neg.

## Base

#### 1. If Trump’s base doesn’t like the plan, normal means is veto override – that solves the DA because he gets to maintain credibility.

#### 2. Trump’s base is shrinking after the midterms, but he’ll never acknowledge the decline

Greenberg 11/17 Stanley B. Greenberg (Democratic pollster). “Trump Is Beginning to Lose His Grip.” *New York Times*. November 17, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/17/opinion/sunday/trump-is-beginning-to-lose-his-grip.html

Second, Mr. Trump and his party maintained their principal base with white working class voters, the shift among women notwithstanding, and Democrats still need to do better. Nonetheless, Democrats got their wave in part because a significant portion of male and female white working class voters abandoned Mr. Trump and his Republican allies. In 2016, the white working class men that Mr. Trump spoke most forcefully to as the “forgotten Americans” gave him 71 percent of their votes and gave only 23 percent to Hillary Clinton. This year, the Republicans won their votes with a still-impressive margin of 66 to 32 percent. But what was essentially a three-to-one margin was deflated to two-to-one, which affected a lot of races. Working people are not fools, and Mr. Trump promised them a Republican president who would never cut Social Security, Medicare, or Medicaid; who would repeal Obamacare but provide “insurance for everybody”; who would get rid of bad trade deals and “drain the swamp,” as he never tired of saying. Instead, had Mr. Trump’s effort to replace Obamacare passed, it would have imposed vast cuts in retirement programs and driven up health insurance costs. His tax reforms were heavily weighted to large corporations and the top 1 percent. So it is no surprise that more than half of white working class men now believe that Mr. Trump is “self-dealing” and corrupt. The Democratic Senate candidates in Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio and Pennsylvania called out the president on these issues and won by more than double digits. There is a long way to go, but 10 percent of 2016 Trump voters supported Democrats this year, and 40 percent of moderate Republicans either voted Democratic or stayed home. For Mr. Trump, this setback will be corrosive, unless he decides to acknowledge the “shellacking” and starts to actually “drain the swamp.” Don’t hold your breath.

#### 3. Withdrawal from Syria thumps

Clement 12/20 Scott Clement (staff writer). “Trump’s pullback in Syria runs strongly against the views of his political base.” The Washington Post. December 20, 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/20/trumps-pullback-syria-runs-strongly-against-views-his-political-base/?utm_term=.5828c482918c>

President Trump’s decision to withdraw all U.S. military forces from Syria this week caught military leaders and lawmakers off-guard, drawing criticism from across party lines. But the surprise announcement also marks a rare instance in which Trump has broken strongly with his political base, which has widely supported military efforts to combat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Public opinion polls on this issue, while sporadic, have shown most Americans supported sending ground troops to battle the Islamic State in 2015. They have also found little sign that public support for military action against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, was waning, as it had with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trump’s withdrawal poses a test for how far Republicans will follow his lead on foreign policy, an issue that has often split the party between Trump’s strongest supporters and those who are less enthusiastic. The most recent gauge of U.S. involvement in Syria was a July poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, which found that 57 percent of Americans overall favored using U.S. troops “to fight against violent Islamic extremist groups in Iraq and Syria.” Broken down by party, support for U.S. troop involvement was highest among Trump’s fellow Republicans at 69 percent, compared with 54 percent of Democrats and 51 percent of independents who supported U.S. troops for this purpose. The poll found a similarly wide gap even among Trump’s strongest supporters, with 70 percent of Republicans who have a “very favorable” view of Trump saying they favor using troops against Islamic extremists in Iraq and Syria. Support was also broad among Republicans who share Trump’s skepticism of international military alliances. Among Republicans who said the United States should decrease its commitment to NATO — an alliance Trump has criticized as not providing enough benefit for the United States — 62 percent favored using U.S. troops to fight against violent Islamic extremists.

### Oil shocks

### Terror

# CP

## Conditional aid

## General Pics

# K

## Case outweighs

### Subject formation

### Facts don’t care about your feelings

## Eco-pess

## Afro-pess

## Queer Theory

#### Vote aff to affirm the caress of the Queer other. The caress is the recognition of validity of love for the self and the other only possible through the aff’s framing.

**Demont ’17**, *Caressing Radical Alterity: For a Queer Ethic of Embodiment in Contemporary Films and Literature* [We do not endorse gendered language] (https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5062&context=etd)

The notion of Caress developed by Levinas and its feminist and queer critique will allow me to introduce the main theme of this dissertation: touch as a paradigmatic figure of the ethical relation to Otherness. One of the characteristic features of Levinas’ ethics is its rupture from the Enlightenment’s conceptualization of the subject, a subject that takes shape through a solipsist and isolated reflexivity. Levinas’ thinking seeks to break free from the paradigm of the Cartesian subject (and Husserl’s) – a subject who is the perfect and transparent overlapping of the I on the ego - and his definition of the subject as res cogitans. To this egocentric ontology, Levinas opposes a philosophy where the subject is always already and necessarily in relation with the other. Instead of an ethics that will be founded on an ontology, Levinas’s original thought resides in this reversal in which ethic founds the ontology of the subject4 . On that matter, his premises are close to those of other contemporary philosophers such as Jacques Lacan or Georges Bataille, for whom the existence of the subject is irrevocably founded in the other. For Levinas, the subject is here immediately open to the authenticity and tangibility of the world and, before it can gain access to conceptual thinking, the subject is called to being through the language of the other, that is to say its address, and, as I will argcue later, through the Caress. The relation to the other is therefore pre-conceptual, prediscursive, and can never be reduced to a set of predicates or representations that would inevitably precipitate ethics into a philosophical discourse on the nature of being (what is the other?); that is to say an ontology. This foundational ground generates a particular challenge for Levinas: that of accounting for the specific relation that brings the subject to existence, as this relation always escapes from the containing grip of language and representational thinking. In order to account for this pre-conceptual dimension, Levinas will develop the famous and often misunderstood notion of the Face. Instead of appearing in the reflexive turn back of the subject on itself, a conceptual gesture that one could call a volte-face, Levinas argues that the subject is summoned in the face to face with the other. But Levinas gives a specific meaning to his concept of the Face, for as it is often misunderstood, the Face for Levinas “is not the color of the eyes, the shape of the nose, the ruddiness of the cheeks, etc.”(Entre Nous, 232). Beyond these sensitive manifestations of the face, it is its power to expresses the vulnerability, the fragility, the lack-of-being, and the mortality of the other that Levinas retains. The Face therefore must not be understood literally and in a narrow way but through its evocative power. In fact the Face does not even have to manifest itself in a specific face. In a famous example, Levinas insists that if I stand in line outside of Lubyanka in Moscow while waiting for news from friends and relatives arrested for “political crimes,” the exposed neck of the other in front of me can evoke the vulnerability of the other and summon my ethical responsibility as efficiently as his face. The Face is therefore understood as a concept more than as the center of human expression, a concept that aims to render the immediate and fundamental responsibility that I experience for the other’s vulnerabilty. The face “summons me, demands me, claims me: as if the invisible death faced by the face of the other – pure otherness, separated somehow from all unity – were my “business”” (145). Levinas’ understanding of the Other is the third aspect of his philosophy that needs to be developed in order to understand the originality of his perspective. As we have already seen, Levinas greatly distrusts the way in which the metaphysical tradition attempts to make sense of the other in a strictly conceptual way without taking into account the more fundamental experience of alterity. For Levinas, the gesture that consists in thinking the other instead of experiencing it, is a gesture that aims at containing, mastering, and trapping the unsurmountable otherness of the other in the web of conceptual abstractions that the philosophers spread into the world in order to make sense of it. As Levinas insists “Thought, qua learning [apprendre], requires a taking [prendre], a seizure, a grip on what is learned, and a possession. The ‘seizing’ [saisie] of learning is not purely metaphorical… The being that appears to the knowing subject not only instructs it, but ipso facto gives itself to it.” (EN, 125-26). To this seizing of the other, Levinas opposes an intersubjective relation whose excess can never be fully rendered. Even if the face-toface brings the subject into existence, it is a subject of mastery. On the contrary, because of its ungraspability the encounter with the other interrupts my sovereignty and my power to assign meanings to the world. For its fundamental resistance to domestication, the other is “a gap in the horizon”, an infinite “relation with a depth”, a hole is punctured in the constraining fabric of my discursive sovereignty. For Levinas, the other does not even present itself as a being that could be reduced to a genus, “He does not enter entirely into the opening of being in which I already stand as in the field of my freedom. It is not in terms of being in general that he comes toward me” (EN, 9-10). The singularity of the other is therefore preserved in the face-toface. It is in this context that one can make sense of Levinas’ assertion that “The other is the only being that I can want to kill” (EN, 9) since despite the diversity of specificities that covers and shapes the existence of the other, it is the interruption of my being that the other provokes that is the object of my violence. In the face-to-face, I experience the vulnerability of the other as well as my own, and this radical experience pierces the sheath of my being as a genus (white, male, middle class, etc.) that I cannot even soothe with a humanitarian and universalist philosophy since the very common ground on which it is founded (the identification of a shared and same humanity) crumbles under the infinite excess of the Other. This radical understanding of the face-to-face, that is to say its fundamental untamable excess and its power to break “the ‘rigor’ of being,” is probably one of the most polemical and useful aspects to develop a queer ethics. Contrary to Slavoj Žižek’s argument that Levinas’ otherness is somewhat dumbed down, Levinas manages to offer a conceptualization of the other that is both dynamic and concrete. Since the other always appears in and as a singular experience, the generality of language (and socio-historical categories) can never fully exhaust its existence. There is therefore no definable subjective position that can guarantee the access to the other since its “surplus of significance” always escapes the tangled olio of my conceptual thinking.

## Baudrillad

### Lol

#### Dammit you ruined everything!! This was a Baudrillard aff all along! Hyper-conformity to the system of sign exchange is the only way to remove symbolic value from everything including resistance. The neg rearticulates the sign economy by demanding that you vote for them instead of the aff.

Pawlett 7 [Dr. William, prof. of Sociology and Cultural Studies, University of Wolverhampton, “Against Banality” pgs. 88-90] BBro
**The social**, Baudrillard argues, can no longer be represented, it **can only be simulated**. The silence of the silent majorities ‘isn’t a silence which does not speak, it is a silence which refuses to be spoken for in its name . . . far from being a form of alienation, it is an absolute weapon’ (1983: 22). The **masses**, for Baudrillard, **are** not subjects (of history, of nation-states or of desire) but **objects**. The masses are incited to speak, to participate and interact, they are polled and consulted, they are flattered by the media and by politicians – endlessly being told that they are ‘sophisticated’, aware, not easily duped. Everything is offered, and all that is required in return is that they be social, that they are cultured, educated and responsible. But they are not: this is the ‘retaliation’ or ‘revenge’ of the object (ibid.). Like the object of scientific study, the masses elude any ‘objective’ form of enquiry because they ‘send back the same conforming signals, the same coded responses, with the same exasperating, endless conformity’ (1983: 33). Asked a question, they will conform and reply to it, but this produces only a ‘circular truth’; not a truth about the world but a ‘truth’ about a question. Influenced by Alfred Jarry’s pataphysics, defined by Jarry (1996: 22) as ‘the science of imaginary solutions’, Baudrillard describes the masses as ‘a pataphysics of the social’ (1983: 34). Sociology, as ‘cumbersome metaphysics of the social’ (ibid.), cannot comprehend the masses. Sociology, like any science, is metaphysical because it is based upon certain founding beliefs or a faith that practitioners must hold in order for their discipline to function: ‘The scientist cannot believe that matter, or living beings, do not respond “objectively” to the questions he puts, or that they respond to them too objectively for his questions to be sound’ (1983: 34). This is the problematic of hyper-conformity Baudrillard draws from Jarry (1996, 1999). Resistance, then, can take many forms: silence and ‘withdrawing into the private’ are, Baudrillard asserts, part of a long-standing resistance to ‘the social’, compulsory education, policing, medicine, social security and information. **Hyperconformity**, it seems, **is a** more contemporary **strategy of resistance**, one that is closely linked to the mass-mediated, digital age. **The masses** ‘**accept everything** and re-direct everything en bloc into the spectacular, without requiring any other code, without requiring any meaning, ultimately without resistance, but **making everything slide into an indeterminate sphere**’ (1983: 43–4). Baudrillard does not neglect to theorise resistance, as both Kellner (1989: 216) and Callinicos (1989: 80–7, 144–8) claim. Instead he theorises in a non- or post-Marxist manner, which, in itself, is unforgivable to Marxists. Yet for Baudrillard effective resistance cannot be dialectical because synthesis or resolution is the very dynamic of the capitalist system as it constantly revolutionises itself through the sign code. In other words **critique is rapidly absorbed by simulation**: accused of racism, sexism, homophobia or exploitation of the ‘Third’ World, **the system will** immediately **generate signs to the contrary**. For Baudrillard the only strategy remaining is the annulment of the meaning of signs into indeterminacy. Further, the masses ‘know there is no liberation, and that the system is only abolished by pushing it into hyperlogic’ (1983: 46). While the supposed apathy and inertia of the people was useful to the system of power in the first and second orders, now the system needs to nurture active audiences and active participatory citizen-consumers. The masses refuse. They throw apathy and inertia back at the system, now ‘doubled’ into hyper-apathy, hyper-inertia. The masses are a force of reversal and annulment, an ‘inverse simulation’ held out to the system ‘to be swallowed up in’ (1983: 29–30): Defiance is not a dialectic . . . it is a process of extermination of the structural positions of each term, of the subject position of each of the antagonists, and in particular of the one who hurls the challenge.... Exchange value is no longer its logic. Its logic abandons positions of value and positions of meaning. The protagonist of defiance is always in the suicidal position, but it is a triumphant suicide: it is by the destruction of value, the destruction of meaning (one’s own, their own) that the other is forced into a never equivalent, ever escalating response. (Baudrillard, 1983: 69–70) In order to understand Baudrillard’s thinking here we need to draw out the relationship between the remainder, residue or surplus and the notion of defiance. For Baudrillard utility was the dominant principle of the first order and, far from being surpassed, ‘use and use-value constitute a fundamental ethics. But it exists only in a simulation of shortage and calculation’ (1983: 78). Utilitarianism is a ‘cruel and disillusioning moral convention’ (ibid.). Life is reduced to use-value; death is ‘sequestered’, separated and made irreversible. Defiance and suicide ‘reverse’ death, they re-engage the system’s construction of life/death at the level of symbolic relations. Suicidal defiance ‘would abolish life asuse-value’ (ibid.) by giving life symbolic stakes, giving it the force of destiny, which is intolerable to the system. Further, ‘it is not that everything should be reversed; just the remainder should be’ (1983: 78). This is a somewhat cryptic remark, but, for Baudrillard, The social exists on the double basis of the production of remainders and on their eradication. If all wealth were sacrificed, people would lose a sense of the real. If all wealth became disposable, people would lose a sense of the useful and the useless. The social exists to take care of the useless consumption of remainders so that individuals can be assigned to a useful management of their lives. (Baudrillard, 1983: 78) It is this assignation of useful (self) management that must be defied, and it is only defied effectively, according to Baudrillard, by challenging the system’s separation of life and death into binary oppositions. The system of equivalences – sign-value, exchange-value and use-value – must be shattered. The system safeguards equivalence through ‘controlled squandering’ (1983: 79), which, we can assume, applies to the ceremonial system of potlatch as well as to modern consumer societies. Modern societies no longer perform sacrifices as such but they do develop many means of waste, in war, in consumption, in road accidents and in Baudrillard’s examples: space exploration, missile systems, supersonic air travel. However, Baudrillard suggests, the sudden and disproportionate ‘pouring back’ of surplus into the system threatens its ruin. These vague, underdeveloped but interesting speculations seem to have been shelved for a time before re-emerging in Baudrillard’s theorisation of terrorism.

#### Perm, vote aff to vote neg - I know this is a terrible arg, but it proves the absurdity of their claim that all exchange is reduced to capitalist semiotics - they’ll say vote neg to vote aff to vote neg but if they do that I’ll be giving the 2AR so good luck with that dawg. B: their automated response proves they’re still invested in the technical communicative form of debate and C: attempt to theorize mutual exclusivity is an attempt to distinguish between hostage and terrorist which is a link.

#### Watch them try to pin down whether this aff is Levinas or Baudrillard in the 2NR. It should be really funny. By placing the 1AC in a state of indeterminacy it cannot be exchanged for anything as it won’t have a "set worth” until the 2AR when I can no longer change it. This decimates the sign system which relies on the exchangeability and reversibility of all interactions meaning the performance of the aff solves back for their links and justifies the perm with the net benefit of the giant meme that is the AC.

### Flex on Joseph Bridges

[Put this at the top of the other response, Don’t forget to actually switch out the Smith ’12 card if you hit Bridges]

#### Dammit you ruined everything!! The Smith ’12 card in the under-view is actually a card from Baudrillard from “*On the Transparency of Evil”* check the brackets at the end of the card.This was a Baudrillard aff all along! Hyper-conformity to the system of sign exchange is the only way to remove symbolic value from everything including resistance. The neg rearticulates the sign economy by demanding that you vote for them instead of the aff.

### Hostage taking

#### *Whoops!* You shouldn’t steal cards from my wiki and expect to win on them.

#### Attempting to take the aff hostage reaffirms the sign economy through the concept of intellectual property, the aff was never mine. It belongs to the earth. Vote aff to destroy the concept of intellectual property.

Bifo 07(Franco Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Academia di belle Arti in Milan, and Founder of A/traverse, Technology and Knowledge in a Universe of Indetermination, SubStance #112, Vol. 36 no. 1, trans. Giuseppina Mecchia, pp. 68-72)

Today the whole system is swamped by indeterminacy, and every reality is absorbed by the hyperreality of the code and simulation. The principle of simulation governs us now, rather than the outdated reality principle. Finalities have disappeared, the models generate us now. […] Capital no longer belongs to the order of political economy: it operates with political economy as its simulated model. With the digitalizing of production, the abstraction of capital makes a qualitative leap. Not only is production an abstract production of value, but the economic indicators are autonomous from the system of production, and are constituted as a synchronic, structural, self- referential, and autonomous system, independent from the real world. The increasingly financial nature of our economy means exactly this. The stock markets are the places where obsessions, psychological expectations, fears, play, and apocalyptic ideologies regulate the game. Realist economies were governed by their goals, the naïve goal of producing use value for the satisfaction of specific needs, or the subtler goal of valorization as the increase of invested capital. Now, instead, it is impossible to explain our economies on the basis of their goals, whether we identify them with the intentions of certain individuals or certain groups or with the goals of an entire society. The economy is governed by a code, not by its goals:Finality is there in advance, inscribed in the code. We can see that nothing has changed **–** the order of goals has simply ceded its place to a molecular play, as the order of signifieds has yielded to the play of infinitesimal signifiers, reduced to their aleatory commutation. The economy therefore appears as a hyper-reality, a simulated, double, and artificial world that cannot be translated in terms of real production. The mental nature of today’s economy is not only expressed by the technological transformation of the productive process, but by the global code in charge of interpreting the process constituting our entire world. Consequently, the science of economics can no longer explain the fundamental dynamics governing humanity’s productive activities; nor can it explain their crisis. Economics has to be replaced by a global science whose characteristics and field of inquiry are still unknown: a science that would be able to study the processes of formation of Cyberspace, understood as the global network of signs-commodities. In an interview published in 1993 by the Californian magazine Wired, Peter Drucker develops once again the theme of the inadequacy of economic categories associated with the digitalization of productive processes: International economic theory is obsolete. The traditional factors of production – land, labor, and capital – are becoming restraints rather than driving forces. Knowledge is becoming the one critical factor of production. It has two incarnations: knowledge applied to existing processes, services, and products is productivity; knowledge applied to the new is innovation. […] Knowledge has become the central, key resource that knows no geography. It underlies the most significant and unprecedented social phenomenon of this century. No class in history has ever risen as fast as the blue-collar worker and no class has fallen as fast. All within less than a century. Furthermore, Drucker remarks that the concept of intellectual property, which is the juridical concept that was at the basis of classical economy and of the capitalist system, no longer has any meaning in an age when the circulating commodity is information and the market is the info-sphere**:** We have to rethink the whole concept of intellectual property, which was focused on the printed word. Perhaps within a few decades, the distinction between electronic transmissions and the printed word will have disappeared. The only solution may be a universal licensing system. Where you basically become a subscriber, and where it is taken for granted that everything that is published is reproduced. In other words, if you don’t want everybody to know, don’t talk about it. The system of property regarding the products of intellectual labor no longer works in the age of the reproducibility of information. As a conclusion to these observations on the obsolescence of economics as a generalized interpretive code, I would like to quote André Gorz, who writes in his Métamorphoses du travail: Discipline by means of money is a hetero-regulation that interrupts the communicational infrastructure ensuring the symbolic reproduction of the experiential world. This means that all the activities that transmit or reproduce cultural acquisitions, knowledge, taste, manners, language, mores […], and that allow us to find our bearings in the world as givens, certitudes, values, and self-explanatory norms; all these activities cannot be regulated by money or by the state without causing serious pathologies in our world of experience. Money (i.e. economics) and the State (i.e. politics) are no longer able to govern or to discipline the world of production, now that its center is no longer a de-brained force, a uniform and quantifiable time of manual work. That center is now occupied by mind flows, by the ethereal substance of intelligence, which eludes every measurement and cannot be subjected to any rule without inducing enormous pathologies and causing a truly maddening paralysis [destruction] of cognition and affectivity.

## Crip-pess

### Perm

#### Perm, vote aff to embrace ethical vulnerability. Our framing is uniquely positioned to reform ableist conceptions engraned into society. Only an open encounter with the other has a risk of solvency.

**Tavin ’15**, *Representation of art as an ethical and political act,* (<https://www.academia.edu/25601390/Representation_of_art_as_an_ethical_and_political_act_1>) //GrouchoMarxist

When looking at a representation of people with disabilities in one way or another, viewers always bring along a full range of biases, assumptions, and beliefs. For many these are informed by stereotypical and objectifying representations in sideshows, art history, popular culture, and medical visualizations (Eisenhauer, 2007; 2008). This article asks if Elomaa’s and his collaborative group are able to challenge the representation of “othering” and instead bring more ethical and vulnerable level to the interpretation. Encountering an artwork as a vulnerable act is based on Emmanuel Levinas’s thoughts on ethics (Levinas, 2008; 2009). Vulnerability comes from the approach where openness to the “Other’s” otherness is on the base of the encountering. This approach tries to avoid a knowing position over the other person. Levinas calls this active position taking as ethical passivity. The other person opens up her/his infinity and the unexpectedness of the alterity. The alterity of the other should not be confused with person’s abilities or characteristics, such as disability (Levinas, 1987). When looking at the photographs it is possible to ask ethical questions: How am I looking at the person in the picture and how does the person in the picture look back to me? What kind of hospitality does s/he receive from me?

## Barber

### Perm

#### Barber agrees that we should orient towards the possibility of making new worlds and a study of power. If we win solvency then Barber flows aff.

Barber 16 Assistant professor of philosophy and religious studies at Pace University [Daniel Colucciello Barber, Fall/Winter 2016, “World-Making and Grammatical Impasse”, Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences Volume 25, Numbers 1 & 2, Project Muse, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

Critique does not oppose so much as reproduce the world. Opposition to the world without this critical diversion entails antagonism toward both the world-as-given and the world-as-possible. Such antagonism opposes the given world and refuses the possibility of transit from this opposition. The possibility that is supposed to emerge from critique is refused; it is retracted by analysis of its role in reproducing what is critiqued. Whereas critique establishes relation between what it opposes and what (subsequent to such opposition) is supposed to become possible, antagonistic analysis articulates what it opposes without any possibility of relation. To operate in this manner is not to lessen antagonism. It is, on the contrary, to intensify antagonism through the refusal of that release valve called possibilization. An instructive instance of such analysis is found in Gil Anidjar’s argument that the discourse of the secular, though it calls itself worldly, though it makes itself into that which possesses access to worldliness, ultimately produces an essentially dominative relation to whatever is named world. Along these lines, to participate in the discourse of the secular—no matter how critical of domination that participation may be—is “certainly not to deal with ‘local and worldly situations,’ if by that one means the world populated by the oppressed (and by a perfectly ‘secular’ play of market forces gently trickling down on them), those all too often considered to have no ‘critical distance’ visà-vis their own lives, ‘archaic’ ideals, and, indeed, worlds.”5 What should here be stressed is that such an argument holds not only in cases where the secular names the given world but also in cases where the secular is proposed as a means of opposing the domination of this given world. To invoke the secular at all, even in service of an emancipatory possibility, “is to oppose the world and those who inhabit it rather than those who make it unlivable” (S, 50). The secular, as a discourse of the world, is a matter of domination—in every instance. This is to say that the domination entailed by the secular continues to exist even in those cases where the discourse of the secular would be invoked as a means of defending that which is named world against given domination, or of expressing the possibility of a world without domination. Anidjar therefore opposes the secular both as it names the given world of domination and as it names the possibility of a world opposed to such domination. Yet this opposition is against the given and possible moments of the secular—and not explicitly against the given and possible moments of the world. So does Anidjar, having [End Page 183] opposed given-possible relationality in terms of the secular, then reintroduce given-possible relationality in terms of the world? He does not. Instead of granting attention to an expansion of the world, such that the world would name not only that which is dominated by the secular but also that which presents a possibility beyond the secular, Anidjar focuses attention on the world as an effect of power. The world does not expand beyond the secular; the world is instead used to intensify attention to “that which makes and unmakes it” (S, 50). Any division between world (as name of secular domination) and world (as name of that which is dominated by the secular, and which might invoke a possibility beyond the secular) is collapsed into world (as that which is made and defined by the secular). The world appears only once, and this appearance calls attention to the power by which it is made.

## Cap

### Links

### Perm

#### Perm, make the alt greener with an injection of eco-socialism. Pure class analysis fails to contend with the exhaustible nature of natural resources ignoring the role ecology plays in class. Prefer the theory with the most explanatory power.

 **Pepper ’93**. *Eco-socialism from deep ecology to social justice.* (<https://aaaaarg.fail/upload/david-pepper-ecosocialism-from-deep-ecology-to-social-justice-1.pdf>) //GrouchoMarxist

‘Marxist theory has not yet been grounded in ecological science, despite efforts from socialists from Podolinski to Commoner to persuade Marxists otherwise’, says O’Connor (1991c). He notes that traditional accounts of historical materialism emphasize how humans transform nature and downplay nature’s effects on humans and the rhythms of nature’s economy. Deleage (1989) thinks that there is in fact a total concept of the society nature relationship in Marx, but that in concentrating his analysis on the capital-labour relationship, Marx lost an opportunity to explore it. And it remains largely unexplored by Marxists. He accuses Marx of asserting (in Grundrisse) that capitalism could emancipate itself from natural limits, of ascribing no intrinsic value to natural resources (labour being the only source of value) and of totally neglecting energy balances in his descriptions and evaluations of the production process. Martinez-Allier (1990) adds that although Engels was interested in energy flow and the second law of thermodynamics, he rejected energy accounting in economics, as too difficult. Hence, because of all this, and the ‘metaphysical status’ which they accord to the production process, **Marxian economics** are no different from mainstream economics, and **use the same language as capitalism**. Neither Marx nor later Marxists considered how an economy (capitalism) based on using (allegedly) exhaustible resources might use up the means of production. Furthermore, ‘**A preoccupation with the intertemporal allocation of exhaustible resources is** generally **absent** from Marxist economics, and this is not because the problem did not exist before 1973’ (ibid., 220). Martinez-Allier believes that there is no school of Marxist ecology because Marx’s view of history (i.e. in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, 1875) envisages unlimited development of productive forces under socialism. A Marxist discussion of communism without growth is thus still pending—but, as Deleage puts it: ‘One must ask questions about the physical limits to growth and more profoundly about the entropic nature of all economic activity’

# 1AR shells

## Voters to staple on

### Fairness (the best voter)

#### Debate is a game – it may have educational benefits, but it is structured by wins and losses. This means that competitive equity must be an intrinsic part of its structure – two implications.

#### 1. Fairness is an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and requires effective competition between the aff and the neg – the only way for any benefit to be produced from debate is if the judge can make a decision between two sides who have had a relatively equal chance to prepare for a common point of debate.

#### 2. Fairness also comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it. Any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, because it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. They can’t say case outweighs T because lack of preparation prevents rigorous testing of the 1AC claims – if we win fairness we don’t have to “outweigh” other impacts.

#### Drop the Debater, three warrants

#### Any abuse on the neg splits the 1AR when we have to go for theory but if they win on the shell then they can turn back to substance in the 2NR. The round has been irreparably skewed and until they invent a time machine to fix the 1Nc this shell is drop the debater

#### If we win fairness is inherent to the structure of debate then the violation is ethically equivalent to breaking speech times or any other inherent rule of debate. That justifies drop the debater for breaking the structure of debate.

#### Deters abusive practices: Theory changes the way people debate and if I win my norm is net better for the sport you aff on a risk of deterrence

## General

### 1AR theory good.

#### We get 1AR theory, only way to check neg abuse, without 1AR theory the neg can be infinitly abusive and we couldn’t stop them. Our shell is a warrant of why this matters.

### “Just read a shell at the bottom of the aff”

#### There’s infinitely more ways for the neg to be abusive than we could possibility list in six minutes.

#### Pre-empts are probably bad and open us up to a shit-ton of K ground so nah.

#### The onus shouldn’t be on us to read 7 shells so you’re not unfair, you should just not be abusive.

## Lol Fuk you Stony point

### 1AR Shell

#### Interpretation: If a debater/team does not disclose previously read positions on the NDCA caselist wiki (for any reason) they may not use said wiki to prep out other debaters cases.

#### To clarify THIS IS NOT SAYING YOU MUST DISCLOSE, that’s your business. The interp says IF you don’t disclose THEN don’t use the wiki.

#### Violation: Stony point has had a multi-year policy against disclosing (screenshot included) but used the wiki to prep out [X]



#### Standards:

#### Prep

#### Not disclosing while using the wiki to prep other people out creates an unfair prep imbalance. You have access to every argument I’ve ever read while I know nothing about any of yours. This gives them infinite pre-round prep time while I’m left in the dark.

#### EVAULATE THIS SHELL DIFFERENTLY. I’m homeschooled, I’m the only person I can rely on to do prep that I can use. They go to a school with a dedicated debate coach with several really good teammates (#ArnavLove). Disclosure imbalances allow big schools to not disclose but still prep out small schools that do disclose guaranteeing big schools stay on top and small schools stay on the bottom.

#### The voter is fairness

#### Debate may be a game but it is structured by wins and loses this means that competitive equity must be part of it’s intrinsic structure. Unfair actions break the structure of debate, that justifies drop the debater

#### The quality of arguments in round cannot be separated from our inability to prepare for them. Prep is the key internal link to fairness. Any argument you think they’re winning on substance is a link, not a reason to vote for them.

#### Them showing up to round is a concession that fairness comes first. Starting this round begins with an assumption that the judge will be a fair evaulater otherwise nobody would participate.

#### Drop the debater 4 warrants

#### Deters abusive practices: let word get out to coaches and competitors that crowding out small school debaters and setting an unfair playing field is not ok

#### 1AR theory automatically goes to drop the debate: I’ve already split my 4 minute 1AR which is a dangerous move since the neg just has to win defense to the shell and then collapse to substance. Default to drop the debater for abusive neg practices to fix side imbalances.

#### Drop the arg doesn’t work when It’s already skewed in round strategy and distracted from substance, until they turn back time to not be abusive this shell is drop the debater.

#### If we win fairness is inherent to the structure of debate then the violation is ethically equivalent to breaking speech times or any other inherent rule of debate. That justifies drop the debater for breaking the structure of debate.

## Condo bad

#### Interp: The negative debater may only read one advocacy which must be unconditional

#### Violation: (the neg reads multiple advocacies or one condo advocacy)

#### Standards:

#### First is Strat Skew and clash: Reading multiple condo advocacies skews my 1ar strategy because I can’t leverage or talk about the aff very much since doing so would prevent me from answering neg arguments- also skews my strategy because I can’t answer each argument in much depth meaning I’m stuck with shallow responses the 2nr can beat back easily- harms fairness because it reduces aff ballot access and gives neg an unfair advantage by incentivizing strategic gimmickery rather than argumentation skills. 1 conditional advocacy solves all of their offense – they get to pick between the squo and their advocacy which means they still have a quantitative 2:1 skew to make a coherent strategy.

#### That’s the key internal link to fairness:

#### Clash is a prerequisite to your ability to adjudicate the debate. If I read an AC and they read an NC without arguments and case and the round was over there’d be no clear winner. If we win they’ve irreparably skewed our 1AR strategy then any argument they win on substance is a link to the shell and not a reason to vote for them