# AC – Yemen [BUTLER]

## Framework

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who provides the strategy most conducive to the process of being an ethical subject.

#### Ethics must begin with an analysis of the relationship between the self and the other, because in doing so we recognize our capacity to act in a similar way. Responsibility arises from respect for mutuality, because in seeing the ways in which we may act like the other, we are compelled to suspend judgement and improve self-knowledge.

Butler 1, Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566427 . –ilake mw

So, according to the kind of theory I have been pursuing here, what will responsibility look like? Haven’t we, by insisting on something non-narrativizable, limited the degree to which we might hold ourselves or others accountable for their actions? I want to suggest that the very meaning of responsibility must be rethought on the basis of this limitation; it cannot be tied to the conceit of a self fully transparent to itself.1 Indeed, to take responsibility for oneself is to avow the limits of any self-understanding, and to establish these limits not only as a condition for the subject but as the predicament of the human community. I am not altogether out of the loop of the Enlightenment if I say, as I do, that reason’s limit is the sign of our humanity. It might even be a legacy of Kant to say so. My account of myself breaks down, and surely for a reason, but that does not mean that I can supply all the reasons that would make my account whole. Reasons course through me that I cannot fully recuperate, that remain enigmatic, that abide with me as my own familiar alterity, my own private, or not so private, opacity. I speak as an ‘‘I,’’ but do not make the mistake of thinking that I know precisely all that I am doing when I speak in that way. I ﬁnd that my very formation implicates the other in me, that my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source of my ethical connection with others. Do I need to know myself in order to act responsibly in social relations? Surely, to a certain extent, yes. But is there an ethical valence to my unknowingness? If I am wounded, I ﬁnd that the wound testiﬁes to the fact that I am impressionable, given over to the other in ways that I cannot fully predict or control. I cannot think the question of responsibility alone, in isolation from the other. If I do, I have taken myself out of the mode of address (being addressed as well as addressing the other) in which the problem of responsibility ﬁrst emerges.

#### But, our recognition of the other and the other’s recognition of us is always governed by impersonal norms.

Butler 2, Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566427 . –ilake mw

In all the talk about the social construction of the subject, we have perhaps over- looked the fact that the very being of the self is dependent not just on the existence of the Other-in its singularity, as Levinas would have it, though surely that-but also on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other sees and listens and knows and recognizes is also subject to a critical opening. This opening calls into ques- tion the limits of established regimes of truth, where a certain risking of the self be- comes, as Levinas claims, the sign of virtue [see Foucault]. Whether or not the Other is singular, the Other is recognized and confers recognition through a set of norms that govern recognizability. So whereas the Other may be singular, if not radically personal, the norms are to some extent impersonal and indifferent, and they introduce a disorientation of perspective for the subject in the midst of recognition as an encounter. For if I understand myself to be conferring recognition on you, for instance, then I take seri- ously that the recognition comes from me. But in the moment that I realize that the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone, that I did not singlehandedly make them, then I am, as it were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you, so that I am both subjected to that norm and the agency of its use.

#### Self-understanding is also framed by norms, which makes us dependent on the recognition of the other—other ethical theories erase this fundamental incompleteness of the subject.

Butler 3, Judith. “Giving an Account of Oneself.” Verso Press, Berkley University. 2003. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1566427 . –ilake mw

The notion of singularity is very often bound up with existential romanticism and with a claim of authenticity, but I gather that precisely because it is without content, my singularity has some properties in common with yours, and so is, to some extent, a substitutable term. In other words, even as she argues that singularity sets a limit to substitutability, she also argues that singularity has no defining content other than the irreducibility of exposure, of being this body exposed to a publicity that is variably and alternately intimate and anonymous. But Hegel's analysis of the "this" points out that it never specifies without generalizing, that the term, in its very substitutability undercuts the specificity it seeks to indicate. Insofar as this fact of exposure is a collective condition and characterizes us all equally, it not only reinstalls the "we" but establishes a certain principle of substitutability at the core of singularity. You may think that this conclusion is too happily Hegelian, but I would like to interrogate it further, since I think it has ethical consequences for the problematic of giving an account of oneself, and of giving an account for another. This exposure, for instance, is not precisely narratable. I cannot give an account of it, even as it structures any account I might give. The norms by which I seek to make myself recognizable are not precisely mine. They are not born with me; the temporality of their emergence does not coincide with the temporality of my own life. So in living my life as a recognizable being, I live a vector of temporalities, one of which has my death as its terminus, but another of which consists of the social temporality of norms by which my recognizability is established. These norms are, as it were, indifferent to me, my life, and my death. This latter temporality interrupts the time of my living, but it is, paradoxically, this interruption, this disorientation of the perspective of my life, this instance of an indifference in sociality, that sustains my living. In a sense, my account of myself is never fully mine, and is never fully for me, and I would like to suggest that this "interruption" of the account always takes place through a loss of the sense of its being mine in any exclusive way. This interruption and dispossession of my perspective as mine can take place in different ways. There is the operation of a norm, invariably social, that conditions what will and will not be a recognizable account. And there can be no account of myself that does not, to some extent, conform to norms that govern the humanly recognizable, or that negotiate these terms in some ways, with various risks following from that negotiation. But, as I will try to explain later, it is also the case that I give an account to someone, and that the addressee of the account, real or imaginary, also functions to interrupt the sense of this account of myself as mine. If it is an account of myself, and it is an accounting to someone, then I am compelled to give the account away, to send it off, to be dispossessed of it at the very moment that I establish it as my account. No account takes place outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed, anonymous and unspeci- fied. If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and understandable, then I might begin with a narrative account of my life, but this narrative will be disoriented by what is not mine, or what is not mine alone. And I will, to some degree, have to make myself substitutable in order to make myself recognizable. The narrative authority of the "I" must give way to the perspective and temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of my story. We can surely still tell our stories-and there will be many reasons to do precisely that-but we will not be able to be very authoritative when we try to give an account with a narrative structure. The "I" cannot tell the story of its own emergence, and the conditions of its own possibility, without in some sense bearing witness to a state of affairs to which one could not have been present, prior to one's own becoming, and so narrating that which one cannot know. Fictional narration requires no referent to work as narrative, and we might say that the irrecoverability of the referent, its foreclosure to us, is the very condition of possibility for an account of myself, if that account is to take narrative form. It does not destroy narrative but produces it precisely in a fictional di- rection. So to be more precise, I would have to say that I can tell the story of my origin and even tell it again and again, in several ways; but the story of my origin I tell is not one for which I am accountable, and it cannot establish my accountability. At least, let's hope not, since, over wine usually, I tell it in various ways, and the accounts are not always consistent with one another. Indeed, it may be that to have an origin means precisely to have several possible versions of the origin-I take it that this is part of what Nietzsche meant by the operation of genealogy. Any one of those are possible narratives, but of no single one can I say with certainty that it is true.

#### Norms that recognize some lives as grievable yet cast others out as ungrievable are the ultimate misrecognition—they rupture the structure of reciprocal recognition because ungrievable lives are not even considered in moral calculations.

Butler 4, Judith. “Frames of War.” Verso Press. 2009. –ilake mw

Conditions have to be sustained, which means that they exist not as static entities, but as reproducible social institutions and relations. We would not have a responsibility to maintain conditions of life if those conditions did not require renewal. Similarly, frames are subject to an iterable structure-they can only circulate by virtue of their reproducibility, and that very reproducibility introduces a structural risk for the identity of the frame itself. The frame breaks with itself in order to reproduce itself, and its reproduction becomes the site where a politically consequential break is possible. Thus, the frame functions normatively, but it can, depending on the specific mode of circulation, call certain fields of normativity into question. Such frames structure modes of recognition, especially during times of war, but their limits and their contingency become subject to exposure and critical intervention as well. Such frames are operative in imprisonment and torture, but also in the politics of immigration, according to which certain lives are perceived as lives while others, though apparently living, fail to assume perceptual form as such. Forms of racism instituted and active at the level of perception tend to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable. The differential distribution of grievability across populations has implications for why and when we feel politically consequential affective dispositions such as horror, guilt, righteous sadism, loss, and indifference. Why, in particular, has there been within the US a righteous response to certain forms of violence inflicted at the same time that violence suffered by the US is either loudly mourned (the iconography of the dead from 9/11) or considered inassimilable (the assertion of masculine impermeability within state rhetoric)? If we take the precariousness of life as a point of departure, then there is no life without the need for shelter and food, no life without dependency on wider networks of sociality and labor, no life that transcends injurability and mortality. 10 We might then analyze some of the cultural tributaries of military power during these times as attempting to maximize precariousness for others while minimizing precariousness for the power in question. This differential distribution of precarity is at once a material and a perceptual issue, since those whose lives are not "regarded" as potentially grievable, and hence valuable, are made to bear the burden of starvation, underemployment, legal disenfranchisement, and differential exposure to violence and death. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to decide whether the "regard"-or the failure of "regard"-leads to the "material reality" or whether the material reality leads to the failure of regard, since it would seem that both happen at once and that such perceptual categories are essential to the crafting of material reality (which does not mean that all materiality is reducible to perception, but only that perception carries its material effects).

#### Thus the standard is recognizing grievability.

#### [:40 Kant] Prefer:

#### [1] Agency is intersubjective since we can only access agency by receiving the recognition of others. Grounding agency in rationality alone fails since a) using reason to self-reflect presupposes that the self is complete and knowable, but a social model of subject formation solves since it allows subjects to define themselves relationally and b) even if you can set ends, pursuing them is impossible absent the recognition of others—I can only drive a police car if I’m recognized to be a policeman.

#### Means you prefer my fw—if their framework can’t successfully explain agency, it’s impossible for it to obligate agents to follow it.

#### [2] Side constraint—if agents don’t recognize other agents and incorporate them into their ethical practices, the framework they’re operating under isn’t ethical because it’s only accessible to some agents.

Butler 5, Judith. “Frames of War.” Verso Press. 2009. –ilake mw

The epistemological capacity to apprehend a life is partially dependent on that life being produced according to norms that qualify it as a life or, indeed, as part of life. In this way, the normative production of ontology thus produces the epistemological problem of apprehending a life, and this in turn gives rise to the ethical problem of what it is to acknowledge or, indeed, to guard against injury and violence. Of course, we are talking about different modalities of "violence" at each level of this analysis, but that does not mean that they are all equivalent or that no distinctions between them need to be made. The "frames" that work to differentiate the lives we can apprehend from those we cannot (or that produce lives across a continuum of life) not only organize visual experience but also [and] generate specific ontologies of the subject. Subjects are constituted through norms which, in their reiteration, produce and shift the terms through which subjects are recognized. These normative conditions for the production of the subject produce an historically contingent ontology, such that our very capacity to discern and name the “being” of the subject is dependent on norms that facilitate that recognition. At the same time, it would be a mistake to understand the operation of norms as deterministic. Normative schemes are interrupted by one another, they emerge and fade depending on broader operations of power, and very often come up against spectral versions of what it is they claim to know: thus, there are "subjects" who are not quite recognizable as subjects, and there are "lives" that are not quite--or, indeed, are never-recognized as lives.

#### [:20 Util] Prefer:

#### [1] reducing agents to numbers or statistics is intrinsically violent—quantifying and aggregating life denies the grievability of each individual since it denies the other the similar personness that we have in ourselves.

#### [2] induction fails—util only works if we know states of affairs but misrecognition explains why we cannot objectively perceive the state of affairs

#### [3] conceptualizing relationships through pleasure and pain denies the power of relationships of recognition—recognition and validation from the other transcends momentary feelings

#### [:20 Ks] Prefer:

#### [1] oppression is the misrecognition of individuals and denial of their grievability since it attempts to impose static conceptions of social norms. Only by recognizing the other can we shift and disrupt these systems, which is the AC’s method for bringing people back into the system.

#### [2] change is possible—social norms are sustained through our participation in those norms, so refusing to allow norms like lack of grievability to structure our actions is how we remove them.

#### Impact calc:

#### [1] Misrecognition is not caused by material conditions—how we relate our will to our actions causes some to be misrecognized. This means improving consequences alone doesn’t solve—conditions can be good yet lives can still not be recognized.

#### [2] No one instance of misrecognition is the same because each person’s identity is particular—means that it doesn’t make sense to aggregate ends under the framework

## Plan [3:10]

#### Plan: The Senate should vote to block US military aid to Saudi Arabia and Trump should comply.

Catie Edmondson and Charlie Savage, 2-13-2019, "House Votes to Halt Aid for Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen," No Publication, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/politics/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html> --ilake mw

WASHINGTON — The House voted on Wednesday to end American military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, a defiant and rare move to curtail presidential war powers that underscored anger with President Trump’s unflagging support for Saudi Arabia even after the killing of a Washington Post columnist, Jamal Khashoggi. The 248-to-177 vote, condemning a nearly four-year conflict in Yemen that has killed thousands of civilians and inflicted a devastating famine, will pressure the Republican-controlled Senate to respond. Eighteen Republicans — almost all of them hard-line conservatives with the Freedom Caucus — voted with the Democratic majority. Congress’s upper chamber in December passed a parallel resolution, 56 to 41, in a striking rebuke to the president and his administration’s defense of the kingdom. But that measure died with the last Congress after the House Republican leadership blocked a vote. Dozens of Democrats, however, softened the blow when they defected to a Republican amendment to allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.” Senate passage of the Yemen resolution could prompt Mr. Trump to issue the first veto of his presidency, and it would come after Republicans have registered their unhappiness over other foreign policy issues, such as the president’s plan to withdraw troops from Syria and Afghanistan and his threats to pull the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On Wednesday, a bipartisan group of senators introduced new sanctions on Moscow that would require the secretary of state to submit a determination of “whether the Russian Federation meets the criteria for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.” Democrats demanded Senate action. “This is their opportunity to send a message to the Saudis that their behavior on Khashoggi and their flagrant disregard of human rights is not consistent with the American way of doing business and not in line with American values,” Representative Ro Khanna, Democrat of California, the bill’s lead sponsor, said in an interview, adding that he was “relieved” that Congress finally took action on the resolution, which he first introduced in 2017. The House resolution is a rare use of the 1973 War Powers Act, which gave Congress the ability to compel the removal of military forces absent a formal declaration of war. Those powers, created in the wake of the Vietnam War, have almost never been used, as lawmakers have demurred from intervening in politically sensitive matters of war, peace and support for the troops. But the conflict in Yemen is proving to be different. Senators sponsoring their own resolution are expected to act quickly to force a vote, as lawmakers in both parties fume over how the administration has responded to Saudi Arabia’s role in the killing of Mr. Khashoggi, who was based in Virginia. Senator Christopher S. Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut and one of the sponsors, said he anticipated a vote “within the next 30 days.” The White House pre-emptively threatened to block the resolution over the weekend, with administration officials arguing in a statement of administration policy that “the premise of the joint resolution is flawed” because the United States has provided only “limited support to member countries of the Saudi-led coalition” in Yemen. Senate aides involved in the resolution say they are optimistic that it will pass, though it is unclear whether it will garner the same level of support among Republicans that it did in December. Some Republicans, mindful of an embarrassing veto showdown with Mr. Trump, are looking for other ways to show their dissatisfaction.

#### US arms are going to Saudi Arabia and those in its coalition, including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Egypt.

Ahmed Al-Haj 15, 3-26-2015, "Saudis' Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen a 'dangerous step,' Iran warns," Globe and Mail, https://web.archive.org/web/20150326221558/http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/saudi-arabia-has-150000-troops-for-yemen-operation-report/article23628188/ --ilake mw

The White House said in a statement late Wednesday that the U.S. was co-ordinating military and intelligence support with the Saudis but not taking part directly in the strikes. Other regional players were involved in the Saudi operation: The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain joined Saudi Arabia in a statement published by the Saudi Press Agency, saying they would answer a request from Hadi “to protect Yemen and his dear people from the aggression of the Houthi militias which were and are still a tool in the hands of foreign powers that don’t stop meddling with the security and stability of brotherly Yemen.” Oman, the sixth member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, didn’t sign onto the statement. Egypt also announced political and military support. “There is co-ordination ongoing now with Saudi Arabia and the brotherly gulf countries about preparations to participate with an Egyptian air and naval forces and ground troops if necessary,” it said in a statement carried by the state news agency. Four Egyptian naval vessels have crossed the Suez Canal en route to Yemen to secure the Gulf of Aden, maritime sources at the Suez Canal told Reuters on Thursday. The sources said they expected the vessels to reach the Red Sea by Thursday evening. Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco and Sudan were also joining the operation, the Saudi Press Agency reported Thursday. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies believe the Houthis are tools for Iran to seize control of Yemen and say they intend to stop the takeover. The Houthis deny they are backed by Iran.

#### US tech is responsible

Micah Zenko, 8-10-2018, "America Is Committing War Crimes and Doesn't Even Know Why," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/america-is-committing-awful-war-crimes-and-it-doesnt-even-know-why/

Pompeo, in a Wall Street Journal op-ed published Tuesday, charged that “Capitol Hill caterwauling and media pile-on” after Khashoggi’s murder should not prod the United States to degrade its alliance with Saudi Arabia in the fight against terrorists and Iran. But humanitarian groups that have long criticized the Trump administration over its Yemen policy saw Wednesday’s vote as a victory. “This result sends a strong message today: The U.S. public does not want to be complicit in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis any longer,” said Scott Paul of Oxfam. As the drama plays out in Washington, Yemen is mired in catastrophe, with millions facing famine and relying on dwindling supply lines for humanitarian aid. Yemen’s three-year conflict is considered the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. More than three-quarters of its population, or 22.2 million people, require aid, and some 14 million face starvation, according to the United Nations. More than half the population does not have access to drinking water, and the conflict has fueled the worst cholera outbreak in modern history. According to UNICEF, at least one child in Yemen dies every 10 minutes from illness and starvation. Aid workers and local physicians are struggling to help the population. The ongoing blockade of the port city of Hodeidah, where between 70 and 80 percent of Yemen’s commercial and humanitarian imports enter the country, has denied civilians access to medicine, fuel, food, and other essential items. The conflict has also devastated infrastructure, and half of all health facilities are shut or not working properly. Last month, Mattis and Pompeo called for a cease-fire within 30 days. While a pause in the violence has so far been elusive, Mattis indicated last week that U.N.-brokered peace talks between the Saudi-led coalition and Iran-backed Houthis were slated for early December in Sweden. Earlier this month, the U.S. ended refueling support to coalition aircraft engaged in the war, one of the most contentious aspects of U.S. involvement in the conflict. Until then, the U.S. Air Force had provided roughly 20 percent of the aerial refueling needs of the coalition. However, this step was not enough to quell the critics on Capitol Hill. Over the course of the three-year war, the U.S. government—beginning with the Obama administration—has also provided the Arab coalition with logistical support, aerial targeting assistance, intelligence information, and U.S.-made weapons such as precision-guided munitions. A bomb dropped by the Saudi coalition on a school bus that killed 40 children in August, for example, was supplied by the United States and made by Lockheed Martin. A new poll conducted by the International Rescue Committee and YouGov shows the American public is also growing weary of the violence. Seventy-five percent of people surveyed said they opposed U.S. military support to the coalition’s efforts in Yemen, with 82 percent of respondents agreeing that Congress must vote to end or decrease arms sales.

## Offense

Next, affirm:

#### \*First, lives of Yemeni citizens are not regarded as grievable

Kareem Fahim, 8-3-2018, Istanbul bureau chief covering the Middle East, "The deadly war in Yemen rages on. So why does the death toll stand still? &nbsp;," Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-deadly-war-in-yemen-rages-on-so-why-does-the-death-toll-stand-still-/2018/08/02/e6d9ebca-9022-11e8-ae59-01880eac5f1d_story.html?utm_term=.15ca319699c4> –ilake MW

There is no end in sight to the vicious war in Yemen, to the blood-soaked battles or careless airstrikes or waves of hunger and disease that stalk civilians even if they escape the bullets and the bombs. And yet, the death toll seems to stand still. For two years, a figure — 10,000 people — has been frequently cited by journalists and relief agencies to describe the number of civilian deaths in the conflict. The number was based largely on reports from Yemen’s crippled health network and first mentioned by a senior United Nations official in August 2016. But in public discussion of the conflict, the number has never been revised, even as the war has retained its ruthless intensity. It is almost certainly conservative and possibly grossly underestimated, according to U.N. officials and analysts who study the conflict, with one independent estimate putting the total number of Yemenis killed in combat at nearly 50,000. The undercount would reflect in part the impossible task of tallying deaths in war zones, where parties to the hostilities provide exaggerated figures while independent monitors are stymied by the violence and shifting battle lines. For some of the same reasons, officials stopped releasing death tolls in Syria’s civil war several years ago — but only after hundreds of thousands of deaths already had been counted, focusing international attention on the slaughter. In Yemen, though, the low death toll has reinforced a sense that the country’s misery is ignored by the wider world. It is rarely covered in the media because of restrictions and difficulties traveling there, but also because of a reticence about explaining the confounding array of actors and grievances attending a conflict in the poorest country in the Arab world. Yemen’s civil war broke out in late 2014 after a rebel group, the Houthis, seized control of the capital and ousted the government, and the conflict intensified when a military coalition led by Saudi Arabia intervened to fight the insurgents. Fighting gripped Yemen’s cities as the violence, along with a blockade imposed by the coalition, starved the country of imports of food, medicine and fuel. The latest battles have focused around Hodeida, a port city on the west coast controlled by the Houthis. The port is the main entry point for food and aid supplies to Houthi-controlled ­areas. Relief agencies have warned that prolonged fighting there would be catastrophic for the more than 8 million Yemenis — a third of the population — already on the brink of famine, as well as hundreds of thousands of people who live in the city. Airstrikes carried out Thursday by the Saudi-led coalition near Hodeida’s main hospital killed at least 28 people, according to Yemeni medical officials, the Associated Press reported. The overall death toll may have reached alarming levels, according to one independent tally. Data collected by ACLED, a group that studies conflicts, puts the death toll at nearly 50,000 people in the period between January 2016 and late July 2018. That number includes combatants but excludes people not directly killed during the fighting — thousands of civilians who have died of malnutrition or cholera, for instance. Last year, Save the Children estimated that 130 children were dying every day because of “extreme hunger and disease.” ACLED is still tallying data from the first nine months of the conflict, when the fighting was most intense, meaning that the death toll is certain to rise, according to Andrea Carboni, who researches Yemen for the group. ACLED says it collects information from secondary sources, corroborates it multiple times and uses the most conservative estimates when it comes to fatalities. The Post's Sudarsan Raghavan visited Yemen in late May to report on what the United Nations describes as the world's most severe humanitarian crisis. (Sudarsan Raghavan, Joyce Lee, Ali Najeeb/The Washington Post) Even then, he said, “Yemen has been very difficult.” He said areas of the country are effectively a “black hole” for information. There are often lethal attacks where actual death tolls go unreported, so the group uses a standard estimate of 10 deaths for larger-scale events and three for smaller-scale ones. Although this approach could result in inflated tolls, he said the group’s use of conservative figures and the likelihood it underestimates fatalities in some cases limit the chances of overstating the overall death toll. With the shortage of reliable data and of images and articles, the war has remained an abstraction in the international debate — reducing pressure on the combatants and their international backers to halt the fighting, said Scott Paul, a senior humanitarian officer at Oxfam America. The numbers matter, he said, because they could “bring the true scale and urgency of the ‘world’s biggest humanitarian crisis’ into focus.” The U.N. envoy to Yemen on Thursday invited the warring parties to meet in Geneva, in the latest international effort to halt the fighting after several failed attempts. Civilian casualties were highest at the beginning of the conflict, said Kiyohiko Hasegawa, a human rights officer with the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. His office and other groups detected a pattern of deaths that has continued over the course of the war, in which the majority of civilians were killed by Saudi-led coalition airstrikes that struck homes, markets and schools. The coalition receives military support from the United States. At least 6,500 civilians — including 1,625 children — were killed between March 2015 and July 19, 2018, according to data collected by the U.N. human rights office. “Our figures are probably the most conservative because of the care that goes into verifying each casualty,” Hasegawa said. The group’s data is collected by 13 monitors around the country, who confirm names, ages, addresses and other facts about the victims before including them in the death toll. “We are not able to cover every single incident that happens in Yemen,” he said. The World Health Organization, which also records deaths in the conflict, has estimated that 9,604 people were killed between March 2015 and the end of May 2018, but its figures, which do not differentiate between combatants and civilians, are also probably conservative. The source of its tally is Yemen’s devastated network of health facilities — more than half of which are closed or only partially functioning. In many cases, the bodies of those killed in fighting in Yemen are never taken to a hospital. A reliable death toll is important because “in general, its good to know the human price of war,” said Radhya Almutawakel, a co-chair of Mwatana, a Yemeni human rights group. But her group has focused on documenting human rights violations rather than arriving at death totals. “It’s not our job, and it’s impossible,” she said, even for a group like hers with a large network of researchers in almost every region of Yemen. As she watched her country disintegrate and learned the names of Yemenis killed by torture, land mines and aerial bombs, a total seemed beside the point. “One story should be very alarming,” she said, “but it’s not the case.”

#### The AC solves—withdrawing support for the coalition forces all parties to be accountable for their role in the conflict through a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.

Daniel L. Byman, 12-5-2018, Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security. He previously served as the research director of the center. He is also senior associate dean for undergraduate affairs at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a professor in its Security Studies Program. Previously, Byman served as a staff member with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”) and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Prior to that, Byman was a policy analyst and the director for research in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation and worked for the U.S. government. His most recent book is "Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know" (Oxford University Press, 2015). He is the author of several other books on counterterrorism, state sponsorship of terrorism, and conflict and terrorism in the Middle East. "Yemen after a Saudi withdrawal: How much would change?," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/> --ilake mw

By itself, an end to the Saudi bombing campaign and blockade would be a milestone. The air strikes have killed thousands of Yemenis, including many children. The bombing also destroyed much of Yemen’s already-tottering infrastructure, making medical care and food distribution even more difficult. Less visibly, but more deadly, the Saudi blockade of many of Yemen’s ports and airport—done in the name of stopping Iranian arms from entering Yemen—has prevented food and humanitarian aid from entering the country as well. This has contributed to the massive famine. Strategically, a close to the Saudi intervention would also benefit a key U.S. ally in the region—Saudi Arabia. Riyadh justified its intervention as a way to counter Iran, fight terrorism and restore a stable government in Yemen. But terrorists remain active in Yemen, and stability is farther off than ever. The Saudi-backed president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, has no power base and little popular support. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Iran’s position in Yemen is stronger than ever. The war has increased the Houthis’ dependence on Iran for arms and financial support. In addition, the court of world opinion has come to see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the aggressor in the conflict, and it is Saudi Arabia whose reputation is damaged by the ongoing disaster there. Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia’s borders. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed. To improve both the strategic and humanitarian situation, any decrease in the Saudi military campaign must become the impetus for broader measures to end the war and decrease the suffering. Most important, Iran and the UAE should also be pressed to end their involvement. Yemen’s fires won’t be extinguished if outsiders no longer fuel them, but they will diminish. Hoping to seize the moment, U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths is currently trying to arrange a ceasefire and ensure the key Yemeni port of Hodeidah is open for international aid to enter the country. Griffiths is also fostering a broader dialogue, and key parties to the conflict are expressing a willingness to negotiate—a willingness that might grow if Riyadh moves to end its bombing campaign and other forms of intervention. The United States should continue to offer Saudi Arabia assistance with its territorial defense from any Houthi missiles. In addition, the Saudis are more credibly able to hold Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on the Kingdom after a withdrawal if Washington is behind them, so U.S. support for deterrence is vital. Because terrorist groups remain a concern, the United States must also continue counterterrorism operations in Yemen. All this must be supplemented by a rapid and massive humanitarian effort to move Yemenis away from the brink of starvation. An end to the Saudi intervention is a good first step to ending this suffering, but by itself it will not be enough.

#### \*Second, ignorance and apathy is what motivated Representatives who blocked a House vote on Saudi Arabia

Eric Levitz, 12-13-2018, "Democrat On Why He Voted for Yemen War: ‘I Don’t Know a Damn Thing About It’," Intelligencer, <http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/12/colin-peterson-yemen-rule-farm-bill-saudi-war.html> --ilake MW

The government of Saudi Arabia has been bombing and starving the Middle East’s poorest country for about three years, now. One recent estimate suggests that 85,000 children under 5 years old have already died from malnutrition as a result of Riyadh’s intervention in Yemen’s civil war. If the Saudis’ air strikes and blockade continue, Yemen is poised to face the worst famine humanity has seen in 100 years, according to the U.N. The United States bears much of the responsibility for all of this: Our federal government’s steadfast commitment to an alliance with the Saudis has led America to support Riyadh’s monstrous campaign by supplying it with weapons, logistical support, and midair refueling services for Saudi fighter planes. Without that last form of support, much of the Saudi campaign would be impossible. Recently, a critical mass of U.S. senators decided that abetting a world-historic war crime — for the sake of helping a totalitarian Islamist regime install its puppet government of choice in a country that is of no strategic importance to the United States — might be unwise. Two weeks ago, the Senate voted to actually allow debate on the issue. And as of Wednesday afternoon, a resolution to end American military support for the Saudi intervention was expected to pass the upper chamber. In a bizarre coincidence, right around the same time, the House Rules Committee realized that its agricultural spending bill was missing one key provision — a rule forbidding the House from voting to end U.S. military support for the Saudi war in Yemen before the end of this year. The addition of a pro-famine clause to the annual farm bill struck many Republican lawmakers as odd: When the rule came up for a vote Wednesday, 18 GOP House members voted against it. But the measure passed 206-203 anyway — because five Democratic congressmen (they were, indeed, all men) voted in favor. One of those Democrats was Minnesota’s Collin Peterson. Shortly after the vote, the Washington Post’s Jeff Stein asked Peterson about his rationale for backing the indefinite extension of a brutal war: Stein: Can you explain your vote on the Yemen resolution? Peterson: Yeah. It didn’t belong there. Stein: Why not? Couldn’t you just have come back and done another vote? Peterson: No — we’ve worked for two years on this farm bill, and I’ll be damned if I let anyone screw it up. Stein: Do you have any thoughts about the war in Yemen? Peterson: I don’t know a damn thing about it, and it should be in there and it — it didn’t do anything anyway. Stein: What do you mean by that? Peterson: All it did say was that they couldn’t have a vote or something. Didn’t authorize anything, it didn’t — you know. Our party gets off on tangents. It’s ridiculous. There are many reasons why Peterson’s explanation is … unsatisfying. For one, by all accounts, voting against the Yemen resolution would not have doomed the farm bill. But Peterson’s most fascinating argument is surely this: I voted to prolong American involvement in a foreign war (that doubles as the world’s most severe, ongoing humanitarian crisis) because I don’t know a damn thing about it! Now look: I get that Peterson’s (largely rural and conservative) constituents aren’t calling his office everyday to express their concerns about the Saudi blockade of Yemen. And I understand that Peterson is a Blue Dog Democrat, and thus, contractually obligated to scold his party for “getting off on a tangent” whenever it contemplates issues that do not concern rural white people or major corporations. But Collin Peterson is not an isolationist. He does not actually believe that the U.S. government shouldn’t involve itself in matters that don’t directly concern the good people of Moorhead, Minnesota. The representative reliably votes to expand (already gargantuan) Pentagon budgets that are designed to ensure American military hegemony over the entire planet. Which is to say: Collin Peterson believes the United States should maintain a globe-spanning military empire — but that U.S. congressmen shouldn’t be expected to read the foreign affairs section of the newspaper.

#### The AC reasserts the right to life of those in Yemen—it forces the United States and its citizens to make ungrievable lives grievable—the lives of those in Yemen are worth something and the plan holds the US accountable for its involvement.

## Underview

#### One, Aff gets RVI on T and theory. A) Reciprocity: I don’t have the ability to read T against you but you always have the option of reading both T and theory, giving you a 2-to-1 structural advantage that only the RVI rectifies. If you read only T or only theory you still had both options available, so in the 1AR I should have two options as well. B) Aff speaks first so I’m always forced to choose some interp of the topic and of what’s fair meaning there’s always the potential I violate. RVI is the only check against the use of frivolous T and theory. C) Having to prove that the AC is topical or fair skews my ability to cover substance given the time-crunched 1AR so I need to be able to win on these issues.

#### 2] Use reasonability if the aff was disclosed before the tournament started, other people have read an aff with the same advocacy, and if it can be link and impact turned.

#### A] Disclosure and other readers solves limits and any arg about the topic lit—the wiki defines the topic lit because the specific limits topic only applies to debaters, we read the lit with reference to how we can use it in debate rounds, and the wiki is the stasis for pre-tournament prep.

#### B] Link and Impact turn ground proves you could’ve answered the aff and there’s no disad to your ability to engage—competing interps is self-serving because there’s no actual abuse on T and the 1nc totally forecloses on education for the sake of a ballot.

#### 3] Use reasonability on neg theory—

A. Strat skew – competing interps forces the 1AR to overinvest in theory because I need a counterinterp, whereas reasonability gives the 1AR variability to brush off theory or go for a CI and RVI if it needs to. Outweighs – 1NC reactivity mandates the 1AR to employ different strats.

B. Neg gets bidirectional interps so they can practice both sides of the theory debate and win every round on it – reasonability solves since it tests whether there was real abuse, so it answers both directions of the interp.

# AC – Yemen [util vers]

## Framework

#### The standard is consistency with utilitarianism— Brain functions are independent of identity—proves there’s no continuous identity and it’d be contradictory to index ethics to permanent selves—our only duty is to maximize good experiences.

Olson summarizes– Eric T. Olson, professor of philosophy at the University of Sheffield ("Personal Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/identity-personal/,)](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/identity-personal/%2C%29) --ilake mw

A more serious worry for psychological-continuity views is that you could be psychologically continuous with two past or future people at once. If your cerebrum—the upper part of the brain largely responsible for mental features—were transplanted, the recipient would be psychologically continuous with you by anyone’s lights (even though there would also be important psychological differences). The psychological-continuity view implies that she would be you. If we destroyed one of your cerebral hemispheres, the resulting being would also be psychologically continuous with you. (Hemispherectomy—even the removal of the left hemisphere, which controls speech—is considered a drastic but acceptable treatment for otherwise-inoperable brain tumors: see Rigterink 1980.) What if we did both at once, destroying one hemisphere and transplanting the other? Then too, the one who got the transplanted hemisphere would be psychologically continuous with you, and would be you according to the psychological-continuity view. But now suppose that both hemispheres are transplanted, each into a different empty head. (We needn’t pretend, as some authors do, that the hemispheres are exactly alike.) The two recipients—call them Lefty and Righty—will each be psychologically continuous with you. The psychological-continuity view as we have stated it implies that any future being who is psychologically continuous with you must be you. It follows that you are Lefty and also that you are Righty. But that cannot be: if you and Lefty are one and you and Righty are one, Lefty and Righty cannot be two. And yet they are. To put the point another way, suppose Lefty is hungry at a time when Righty isn’t. If you are Lefty, you are hungry at that time. If you are Righty, you aren’t. If you are Lefty and Righty, you are both hungry and not hungry at once: a contradiction.

#### Reasons to prefer:

#### 1/ Ground—every topic has consequentialist arguments on both sides, whereas universalist ethics and descriptive standards are less turnable and flow clearly to one side—most fair since allows both debaters the same access to the ballot

#### 2/ Access—debaters can find util offense from the news, rather than paywall-protected legal or philosophical websites only wealthy schools have access to.

#### 3/ Actor specificity—link turns their arguments since governments have to use util and using nothing would be worse. Four warrants:

#### a. Governments have to aggregate, since policies will always harm someone—tradeoffs are inevitable and util’s the only theory that can direct those tradeoffs.

#### b. States don’t have intents—they’re collections of individuals with disparate intentions but the state is an entity external to agents and therefore doesn’t have unique intentions.

#### c. No act-omission distinction. every time the government does or doesn’t do something it’s a choice since policies are zero sum.

#### d. No intent-foresight distinction. Every action is informed by mental states, and we will the consequences of our actions.

## Advantage

#### Trump is escalating military aid to Saudi Arabia, which they use to back Yemen’s failed government against Houthi rebels in a civil war that’s been raging since 2015

Mohamad Bazzi 6-11, journalism professor at New York University. He is writing a book on the proxy wars between Saudi Arabia and Iran, 6-11-2018, "The war in Yemen is disastrous. America is only making things worse," Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/11/trump-yemen-saudi-arabi-war-us-involvement-worsening-crisis> --ilake mw

Donald Trump is quietly escalating America’s role in the Saudi-led war on Yemen, disregarding the huge humanitarian toll and voices in Congress that are trying to rein in the Pentagon’s involvement. Trump administration officials are considering a request from Saudi Arabia and its ally, the United Arab Emirates, for direct US military help to retake Yemen’s main port from Houthi rebels. The Hodeidah port is a major conduit for humanitarian aid in Yemen, and a prolonged battle could be catastrophic for millions of civilians who depend on already limited aid. With little public attention or debate, the president has already expanded US military assistance to his Saudi and UAE allies – in ways that are prolonging the Yemen war and increasing civilian suffering. Soon after Trump took office in early 2017, his administration reversed a decision by former president Barack Obama to suspend the sale of over $500m in laser-guided bombs and other munitions to the Saudi military, over concerns about civilian deaths in Yemen. The US Senate narrowly approved that sale, in a vote of 53 to 47, almost handing Trump an embarrassing defeat. In late 2017, after the Houthis fired ballistic missiles at several Saudi cities, the Pentagon secretly sent US special forces to the Saudi-Yemen border, to help the Saudi military locate and destroy Houthi missile sites. While US troops did not cross into Yemen to directly fight Yemen’s rebels, the clandestine mission escalated US participation in a war that has dragged on since Saudi Arabia and its allies began bombing the Houthis in March 2015. The war has killed at least 10,000 Yemenis and left more than 22 million people –three-quarters of Yemen’s population – in need of humanitarian aid. At least 8 million Yemenis are on the brink of famine, and 1 million are infected with cholera. The increased US military support for Saudi actions in Yemen is part of a larger policy shift by Trump and his top advisers since he took office, in which Trump voices constant support for Saudi Arabia and perpetual criticism of its regional rival, Iran. The transformation was solidified during Trump’s visit to the kingdom in May 2017, which he chose as the first stop on his maiden foreign trip as president. Saudi leaders gave Trump a grandiose welcome: they filled the streets of Riyadh with billboards of Trump and the Saudi King Salman; organized extravagant receptions and sword dances; and awarded Trump the kingdom’s highest honor, a gold medallion named after the founding monarch. The Saudi campaign to seduce Trump worked. Since then, Trump has offered virtually unqualified support for Saudi leaders, especially the young and ambitious crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is the architect of the disastrous war in Yemen. By blatantly taking sides, Trump exacerbated the proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and inflamed sectarian conflict in the region. During his visit to Riyadh, Trump announced a series of weapons sales to the kingdom that will total nearly $110bn over 10 years. Trump, along with Jared Kushner, his son-in-law and senior adviser, who played a major role in negotiating parts of the agreement, were quick to claim credit for a massive arms deal that would boost the US economy. But many of the weapons that the Saudis plan to buy – including dozens of F-15 fighter jets, Patriot missile-defense systems, Apache attack helicopters, hundreds of armored vehicles and thousands of bombs and missiles – were already approved by Obama. From 2009 to 2016, the Obama administration authorized a record $115bn in military sales to Saudi Arabia, far more than any previous administration. Of that total, US and Saudi officials signed formal deals worth about $58bn, and Washington delivered $14bn worth of weaponry. Much of that weaponry is being used in Yemen, with US technical support. In October 2016, warplanes from the Saudi-led coalition bombed a community hall in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, where mourners had gathered for a funeral, killing at least 140 people and wounding hundreds. After that attack – the deadliest since Saudi Arabia launched its war – the Obama administration pledged to conduct “an immediate review” of its logistical support for the Saudi coalition. But that review led to minor changes: the US withdrew a handful of personnel from Saudi Arabia and suspended the sale of some munitions.

### Scenario 1 – Civilians

#### US tech is responsible in Yemen—worst humanitarian crisis in centuries

Micah Zenko, 8-10-2018, "America Is Committing War Crimes and Doesn't Even Know Why," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/15/america-is-committing-awful-war-crimes-and-it-doesnt-even-know-why/

Pompeo, in a Wall Street Journal op-ed published Tuesday, charged that “Capitol Hill caterwauling and media pile-on” after Khashoggi’s murder should not prod the United States to degrade its alliance with Saudi Arabia in the fight against terrorists and Iran. But humanitarian groups that have long criticized the Trump administration over its Yemen policy saw Wednesday’s vote as a victory. “This result sends a strong message today: The U.S. public does not want to be complicit in Yemen’s humanitarian crisis any longer,” said Scott Paul of Oxfam. As the drama plays out in Washington, Yemen is mired in catastrophe, with millions facing famine and relying on dwindling supply lines for humanitarian aid. Yemen’s three-year conflict is considered the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. More than three-quarters of its population, or 22.2 million people, require aid, and some 14 million face starvation, according to the United Nations. More than half the population does not have access to drinking water, and the conflict has fueled the worst cholera outbreak in modern history. According to UNICEF, at least one child in Yemen dies every 10 minutes from illness and starvation. Aid workers and local physicians are struggling to help the population. The ongoing blockade of the port city of Hodeidah, where between 70 and 80 percent of Yemen’s commercial and humanitarian imports enter the country, has denied civilians access to medicine, fuel, food, and other essential items. The conflict has also devastated infrastructure, and half of all health facilities are shut or not working properly. Last month, Mattis and Pompeo called for a cease-fire within 30 days. While a pause in the violence has so far been elusive, Mattis indicated last week that U.N.-brokered peace talks between the Saudi-led coalition and Iran-backed Houthis were slated for early December in Sweden. Earlier this month, the U.S. ended refueling support to coalition aircraft engaged in the war, one of the most contentious aspects of U.S. involvement in the conflict. Until then, the U.S. Air Force had provided roughly 20 percent of the aerial refueling needs of the coalition. However, this step was not enough to quell the critics on Capitol Hill. Over the course of the three-year war, the U.S. government—beginning with the Obama administration—has also provided the Arab coalition with logistical support, aerial targeting assistance, intelligence information, and U.S.-made weapons such as precision-guided munitions. A bomb dropped by the Saudi coalition on a school bus that killed 40 children in August, for example, was supplied by the United States and made by Lockheed Martin. A new poll conducted by the International Rescue Committee and YouGov shows the American public is also growing weary of the violence. Seventy-five percent of people surveyed said they opposed U.S. military support to the coalition’s efforts in Yemen, with 82 percent of respondents agreeing that Congress must vote to end or decrease arms sales.

#### Saudis are dependent on US hardware and software—they cannot bomb Yemen if the US ceases aid

Bruce Riedel, 12-13-2018, Bruce Riedel is a senior fellow and director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, part of the Brookings Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence. In addition, Riedel serves as a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy. "After Khashoggi, U.S. Arms Sales to the Saudis Are Essential Leverage," Lawfare, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/after-khashoggi-us-arms-sales-saudis-are-essential-leverage> --ilake mw

Eighteen months ago, Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia and said he had concluded $110 billion dollars in arms sales with the kingdom. It was fake news then and it’s still fake news today. The Saudis have not concluded a single major arms deal with Washington on Trump’s watch. Nonetheless, the U.S. arms relationship with the kingdom is the most important leverage Washington has as it contemplates reacting to the alleged murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Follow the Money In June 2017, after the president’s visit to Riyadh—his first official foreign travel—we published a Brookings blog post detailing that his claims to have sold $110 billion in weapons were spurious. Other media outlets subsequently came to the same conclusion. When Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman visited the White House this year, the president indirectly confirmed that non-deal by chiding the prince for spending only “peanuts” on arms from America. The Saudis have continued to buy spare parts, munitions, and technical support for the enormous amount of American equipment they have bought from previous administrations. The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) is entirely dependent on American and British support for its air fleet of F-15 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, and Tornado aircraft. If either Washington or London halts the flow of logistics, the RSAF will be grounded. The Saudi army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard are similarly dependent on foreigners (the Saudi Arabian National Guard is heavily dependent on Canada). The same is also true for the Saudis’ allies like Bahrain. Under President Obama, Saudi Arabia spent well over $110 billion in U.S. weapons, including for aircraft, helicopters, and air-defense missiles. These deals were the largest in American history. Saudi commentators routinely decried Obama for failing to protect Saudi interests, but the kingdom loved his arms deals. But the kingdom has not bought any new arms platform during the Trump administration. Only one has even been seriously discussed: A $15 billion deal for THAAD, terminal high-altitude area-defense missiles, has gotten the most attention and preliminary approval from Congress, but the Saudis let pass a September deadline for the deal with Lockheed Martin. The Saudis certainly need more air defenses with the pro-Iran Zaydi Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen firing ballistic missiles at Saudi cities. The three-and-a-half-year-old Saudi war in Yemen is hugely expensive. There are no public figures from the Saudi government about the war’s costs, but a conservative estimate would be at least $50 billion per year. Maintenance costs for aircraft and warships go up dramatically when they are constantly in combat operations. The Royal Saudi Navy has been blockading Yemen for over 40 months. The RSAF has conducted thousands of air strikes. The war is draining the kingdom’s coffers. And responsibility for the war is on Mohammed bin Salman, who as defense minister has driven Riyadh into this quagmire. Shaking the arms relationship is by far the most important way to clip his wings.

#### Aid withdrawal solves—it’s key leverage against Saudi Arabia. Plan forces Saudis to seek a diplomatic solution and US support for detente makes attempts to hold Iran and the Houthis accountable.

Daniel L. Byman, 12-5-2018, Daniel Byman is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, where his research focuses on counterterrorism and Middle East security. He previously served as the research director of the center. He is also senior associate dean for undergraduate affairs at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a professor in its Security Studies Program. Previously, Byman served as a staff member with the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”) and the Joint 9/11 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Prior to that, Byman was a policy analyst and the director for research in the Center for Middle East Public Policy at the RAND Corporation and worked for the U.S. government. His most recent book is "Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know" (Oxford University Press, 2015). He is the author of several other books on counterterrorism, state sponsorship of terrorism, and conflict and terrorism in the Middle East. "Yemen after a Saudi withdrawal: How much would change?," Brookings, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/05/yemen-after-a-saudi-withdrawal-how-much-would-change/> --ilake mw

By itself, an end to the Saudi bombing campaign and blockade would be a milestone. The air strikes have killed thousands of Yemenis, including many children. The bombing also destroyed much of Yemen’s already-tottering infrastructure, making medical care and food distribution even more difficult. Less visibly, but more deadly, the Saudi blockade of many of Yemen’s ports and airport—done in the name of stopping Iranian arms from entering Yemen—has prevented food and humanitarian aid from entering the country as well. This has contributed to the massive famine. Strategically, a close to the Saudi intervention would also benefit a key U.S. ally in the region—Saudi Arabia. Riyadh justified its intervention as a way to counter Iran, fight terrorism and restore a stable government in Yemen. But terrorists remain active in Yemen, and stability is farther off than ever. The Saudi-backed president of Yemen, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, has no power base and little popular support. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Iran’s position in Yemen is stronger than ever. The war has increased the Houthis’ dependence on Iran for arms and financial support. In addition, the court of world opinion has come to see Saudi Arabia, not Iran, as the aggressor in the conflict, and it is Saudi Arabia whose reputation is damaged by the ongoing disaster there. Yet even if Saudi Arabia comes to its senses or is compelled to do so, an end to the intervention would only be the beginning of what is needed. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) would still be militarily involved in the fighting against the Houthis, and it is a much more active player than Saudi Arabia on the ground in Yemen. Local actors would continue to fight: The country is highly divided, and the main factions themselves are further divided. Yemen today is a failed state, and there is no accepted political leadership to pick up the pieces. The Houthis, Iran’s ally, would be the strongest of the factions, and they are brutal and authoritarian as well as tied to Tehran. Terrorist groups like al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula would remain active, trying to establish themselves in any areas that lack a strong rival. Perhaps most important from Riyadh’s point of view, Tehran can claim a victory over its long-time rival. Although Houthi reliance on Iran would decrease as well, the alliance is likely to endure, and Iran will have influence on yet another of Saudi Arabia’s borders. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who championed the Yemen war, would be admitting his intervention failed. To improve both the strategic and humanitarian situation, any decrease in the Saudi military campaign must become the impetus for broader measures to end the war and decrease the suffering. Most important, Iran and the UAE should also be pressed to end their involvement. Yemen’s fires won’t be extinguished if outsiders no longer fuel them, but they will diminish. Hoping to seize the moment, U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths is currently trying to arrange a ceasefire and ensure the key Yemeni port of Hodeidah is open for international aid to enter the country. Griffiths is also fostering a broader dialogue, and key parties to the conflict are expressing a willingness to negotiate—a willingness that might grow if Riyadh moves to end its bombing campaign and other forms of intervention. The United States should continue to offer Saudi Arabia assistance with its territorial defense from any Houthi missiles. In addition, the Saudis are more credibly able to hold Iran responsible for Houthi missile attacks on the Kingdom after a withdrawal if Washington is behind them, so U.S. support for deterrence is vital. Because terrorist groups remain a concern, the United States must also continue counterterrorism operations in Yemen. All this must be supplemented by a rapid and massive humanitarian effort to move Yemenis away from the brink of starvation. An end to the Saudi intervention is a good first step to ending this suffering, but by itself it will not be enough.

#### Saudi allies like China can’t fill in, which means that seeking a diplomatic solution is MbS’ only option and the AC definitely solves.

Sarah Zheng, 10-22-2018, Graduated from Tufts University with a degree in international relations and film and media studies, reporter for the Post. "Trump fears China could replace US in arms sales to Saudi. He shouldn’t," South China Morning Post, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168849/china-may-seek-boost-ties-saudi-arabia-it-cant-fill-us-arms> -ilake mw

In the editorial, Turki Aldakhil said Saudi Arabia – the world’s largest oil exporter – was considering more than 30 countermeasures to be taken against the US, including trading oil in yuan instead of the US dollar. But in the military realm, China’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia lag far behind those of the US and its European allies. Beijing exported only around US $20 million in arms last year compared to US $3.4 billion from Washington, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a Swedish think tank. Jonathan Fulton, assistant professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, said China had grown more serious in its regional arms relationships with Gulf states in recent years, with the potential to serve as a “wedge” as US-Saudi relations frayed. Along with Riyadh’s previous indications that it was willing to consider funding in yuan, increased arms sales would be a “natural progression” of their relationship, he said. “Part of the reason why [Saudi Arabia] is diversifying is there’s been so many kinds of structural changes in the relationship with the US,” Fulton said. “Another important part is just obviously the commercial relationship and economic relationship between these Gulf states and China, with these energy exports. We’re seeing a lot more engagement both ways.” But as evidence piles up that Saudi Arabia ordered Khashoggi’s assassination, which the government denies, the backlash is getting louder. A bipartisan group of US senators have pressured Trump to enact sanctions and key corporate sponsors have pulled out of the high-profile “Davos in the Desert” investment forum to be held in Riyadh this month. “I would expect to see some kind of … Saudi-led way to ease the tensions between the US and Riyadh because I don’t think they can afford to let the US relationship deteriorate,” Fulton said. Simone van Nieuwenhuizen, an Australia-based researcher of China-Middle East relations at the University of Technology Sydney, said China would be “extremely unlikely” to follow US sanctions if they were levelled against Saudi Arabia, but may not necessarily increase trade with the country either. “I think China is likely to keep a low profile on this issue and see how it plays out before directly addressing it,” she said. “While its technology is developing, China still lags behind the US in the sophistication and capability of its military equipment. It simply can’t fill the gap.” Robert Mason, director of the Middle East Studies Centre at the American University in Cairo, said China would not want to get involved at this stage to avoid further tensions with the Trump administration.

#### Russia also won’t fill in—link is just threat construction on the part of the saudis to trick the US

Jeff Daniels, 5-6-2017, "Russia tries to elbow its way into Saudi Arabia arms club," CNBC, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/06/russia-tries-to-elbow-its-way-into-saudi-arabia-arms-club.html> --ilake mw

Also, Dalton said the disclosure of Saudi-Russia arms talks follows a strategy sometimes used by Riyadh: highlight alternative suppliers of weapons as a means of getting a better U.S. deal or even approval. The Saudis plan to increase military spending by nearly 7 percent this year, partly reflecting the war in Yemen and the rising military threat from Iran. The spending, almost 10 percent of the kingdom's gross domestic product, was disclosed in its 2017 budget released in December. U.S. foreign military sales to the Saudis accounted for just over half of all arms sales to the Near East/South Asia region from 2012 to 2015, representing a whopping $48.5 billion and exceeding the amount sold to Israel during the same period, according to Pentagon figures. Internationally, the Saudis were the second-largest foreign buyers of U.S. weapons in 2015 after South Korea. "I have to believe that those defense companies are going to be calling on the procurement office in Riyadh to make sure they don't lose business," said Moody's analyst Jonathan Root, who notes that the five top U.S. defense contractors do business with the Saudis. Washington's relationship with Riyadh became strained when the Obama administration put a halt to weapon sales and some military support to the desert kingdom due to concerns about possible Saudi war crimes in Yemen. That move led the Saudis to start looking elsewhere for weapons technology, including Russia. The Trump administration, though, is looking to reset ties with Riyadh. To underscore his support for the Saudis, Trump's first foreign trip abroad as president will include a visit to the kingdom later this month. He also is expected to visit Israel and the Vatican. According to Reuters, "tens of billions of dollars" in U.S. arms sales for land, air and sea use could be sold to the Saudis or announced ahead of Trump's trip to the kingdom. It also reported Friday some of the military sales are new while others have been "in the pipeline." Clearly, Moscow is unlikely to replace Washington as the kingdom's chief arms supplier. American defense firms still dominate when it comes to big-ticket arms sales to the Saudis. Even so, the Russians appear willing to sell advanced weapons systems that probably wouldn't get approved by the United States due to opposition from Israel and members in Congress. Indeed, the Saudis previously expressed interest in ballistic missiles from Russia, particularly the Iskander missile system. Back in the 1980s, the Saudis turned to China for advanced ballistic missiles. "When the Saudis struck that arms deal with China, it was because the United States was not inclined at the time to provide that kind of capability to Saudi Arabia, so they went elsewhere," Dalton said. At the same time, it's also possible Russians could one day help the Saudis develop a homegrown ballistic missile capability, which is something Iran demonstrated last year when it tested a Zolfaqar solid-fuel missile. Iran previously threatened to use the tactical missile against its rival Israel. Russia helped Iran build its first civilian nuclear power plant in 2011 and have teamed with them on a second plant. Moscow also offered assistance to the Saudis as they embarked on an ambitious $80 billion plan to build more than a dozen nuclear power plants. Then again, the Saudis still view Russians with great suspicion given Moscow maintains close ties not only to the kingdom's archrival Iran but another adversary, Syria's leader Bashar al-Assad. Saudi Arabia cut off relations with the Damascus regime back in 2012 and has been a major financier of the anti-Assad rebels. However, Russia has been a leading supplier of military arms to both Tehran and Damascus. The Saudis also have learned Russia can't always be trusted when it comes to defense technology. Earlier this year, the Kuwaiti press reported Iran's military had learned the Russians essentially threw the Tehran government "under the bus" when selling an air defense system. The Kuwaiti report indicated that the Russians had provided the Israelis with so-called codes that would allow its planes to appear as friendly, possibly on a defense system known as the S-300. Similarly, the Syrians also were apparently sold the same air defense system, which may explain why Israel was able to fly its warplanes for so many years into Syrian space and defeat air defenses. The S-300 is a surface-to-air missile system developed during the Cold War in the late 1970s but updated and now sometimes compared to Raytheon's Patriot defense system. Tehran and Damascus reportedly fixed the "codes" issue to make the system less vulnerable. When Israeli warplanes attacked a Syrian military site about two months ago, they encountered anti-aircraft missile fire, according to Syria.

### Scenario 2 – Cred

#### Heg is stable now but in danger because of Trump being Trump.

Doug **Stokes**; Trump, American hegemony and the future of the liberal international order, International Affairs, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 January **2018**, Pages 133–150, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix238 // cwk

-trump hates the eu, nato, nafta, and tpp

-u.s. thinks that the benefits of being a member of these groups is not worth the cost, even though retrenchment means losing hegemonic position in the world order

The postwar liberal international order (LIO) has been a largely US creation. Washington’s consensus, geopolitically bound to the western ‘core’ during the Cold War, went global with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the advent of systemic unipolarity. Many criticisms can be levelled at US leadership of the LIO, not least in respect of its claim to moral superiority, albeit based on laudable norms such as human rights and democracy. For often cynical reasons the US backed authoritarian regimes throughout the Cold War, pursued disastrous forms of regime change after its end, and has been deeply hostile to alternative (and often non-western) civilizational orders that reject its dogmas. Its successes, however, are manifold. Its ‘empire by invitation’ has helped secure a durable European peace, soften east Asian security dilemmas, and underwrite the strategic preconditions for complex and pacifying forms of global interdependence. Despite tactical differences between global political elites, a postwar commitment to maintain the LIO, even in the context of deep structural shifts in international relations, has remained resolute—until today. The British vote to leave the EU (arguably as much a creation of the United States as of its European members), has weakened one of the most important institutions of the broader US-led LIO. More destabilizing to the foundations of the LIO has been the election of President Trump. His administration has actively encouraged the breakup of the EU, questioned enduring US global security alliances such as NATO, and seen the advocacy of an economic nationalism that threatens to reverse globalization.1 If the dominant cultural paradigm of the early post-Cold War period was the end of history as a triumphant liberal internationalism flattened global geopolitical space, Trump’s victory represents the end of this interregnum: a rearticulation of the primacy of the nation-state, a fracture in the postwar liberal internationalist consensus and a hardening of geopolitical revisionism. Even if we dismiss President Trump’s statements as mere rhetoric, his capacity to motivate millions to vote for him, as well as broader centrifugal movements including Brexit, signal a weakening of the postwar liberal consensus. In rejecting the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), seeking to reverse the longstanding North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and placing security partners on notice, the United States is now clearly asking why it should remain the world’s hegemonic stabilizer if the costs of maintaining that order far outweigh the benefits to itself. ‘It’s possible that we’re going to have to let NATO go,’ Trump argued; when ‘we’re paying and nobody else is really paying … you feel like the jerk’.2 While it is undeniable that the United States has had to underwrite a number of costly global regimes, is Trump’s portrait accurate? The question is an important one, sitting at the heart of the administration’s cost–benefit analysis as it surveys the myriad American commitments across the globe, the reversal of which will have profound and lasting implications for world politics. In addressing that question, this article develops a number of arguments.

#### Support of the coalition is this decade’s Iraq War – Obama went in without a plan–decks U.S. cred.

Israa Saber, 11-15-2018, "Experts discuss the war in Yemen and the role of international actors," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/11/15/experts-discuss-the-war-in-yemen-and-the-role-of-international-actors/

Bruce Riedel, senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy, expanded on the U.S. role in the war in Yemen. In addition to air refueling and intelligence support, the United States supports the Saudi air force most directly through the provision of spare parts, technical upgrades, and maintenance. Without U.S. sales of spare parts, the Saudi air force would be grounded in a matter of days, giving Washington tremendous leverage. It hesitates to use this leverage because “there is a fantasy in the Trump administration that somehow if the Saudis are able to defeat the Houthis, this will be a mortal blow to the government of Iran. This is a complete fantasy.” The Saudis will not unilaterally call for an end to the war either, Riedel said. Despite the war costing Saudi Arabia $50 billion per year, it is “Mohammed bin Salman’s signature policy initiative…his prestige is linked to the outcome of this war and he needs some kind of victory, whatever that is, to be done [with the war].” But, perhaps the most practical solution is for a unilateral Saudi cessation of air strikes and all military activity on the ground along with a complete lifting of the blockade. Riedel believes that all parties need to get off the battlefield and negotiate an end, though this won’t necessarily lead to an agreement. Byman asked Abo Alasrar and Riedel to elaborate on their perspectives on the role of outside powers in this conflict. For Abo Alasrar, the Houthis are “strategically” wreaking havoc on Yemen, though it is only Saudi Arabia’s image that has been damaged. Riedel agrees that “the Saudis have mistakenly maneuvered themselves into the position where all the blame is on them and very, very little blame is on anyone else. That’s not a mark of a very astute strategy and policy. That’s a mark of recklessness.” Byman invited Rand to address some of the issues that both the previous and current administrations face regarding this war. Rand emphasized that the Obama administration was never completely comfortable with its decision to support the coalition, but support was given in an attempt to soothe fears in the Gulf that the United States was no longer a reliable ally. The administration’s most consequential mistake was in failing to set limits on support—whether that be time or munition limits. “There was never a thoughtful discussion of how [the war] ends, what the strategy is,” Rand said. So, perhaps the lesson learned is that “there is no such thing as kind of, sort of supporting a coalition that goes to war in the Middle East. U.S. credibility is immediately on the line.”

#### Credible leadership is key to prevent geopolitical turmoil and arms races – multilateralism can’t solve. Brands ’15:

Brands, Duke University Public Policy Professor, 15 (Hal, 8-3-15, "Fools Rush Out? The Flawed Logic of Offshore Balancing," The Washington Quarterly, twq.elliott.gwu.edu/fools-rush-out-flawed-logic-offshore-balancing, accessed 8-20-15, llc)

The fundamental reason is that both **U.S. influence and international stability are thoroughly interwoven with a robust U.S. forward presence.** Regarding influence, the protection that Washington has afforded its allies has equally afforded the United States great sway over those allies’ policies.43 During the Cold War and after, for instance, **the United States has used the influence provided by its security posture to veto allies’ pursuit of nuclear weapons**, to obtain more advantageous terms in financial and trade agreements, and even to affect the composition of allied nations’ governments.44 More broadly, it has used its alliances as vehicles for shaping political, security, and economic agendas in key regions and bilateral relationships, thus giving the United States an outsized voice on a range of important issues. To be clear, this influence has never been as pervasive as U.S. officials might like, or as some observers might imagine. But by any reasonable standard of comparison, it has nonetheless been remarkable. One can tell a similar story about the relative stability of the post-war order. As even some leading offshore balancers have acknowledged, the lack of conflict in regions like Europe in recent decades is not something that has occurred naturally. It has occurred because the “American pacifier” has suppressed precisely the dynamics that previously fostered geopolitical turmoil. That pacifier **has limited arms races and security competitions by providing the protection that allows other countries to under-build their militaries**. It has soothed historical rivalries by affording a climate of security in which powerful countries like Germany and Japan could be revived economically and reintegrated into thriving and fairly cooperative regional orders. It has induced caution in the behavior of allies and adversaries alike, deterring aggression and dissuading other destabilizing behavior. As John Mearsheimer has noted, the United States “effectively acts as a night watchman,” lending order to an otherwise disorderly and anarchical environment.45 What would happen if Washington backed away from this role? The most logical answer is that both U.S. influence and global stability would suffer. With respect to influence, the United States would effectively be surrendering the most powerful bargaining chip it has traditionally wielded in dealing with friends and allies, and jeopardizing the position of leadership it has used to shape bilateral and regional agendas for decades. The consequences would seem no less damaging where stability is concerned. As offshore balancers have argued, it may be that U.S. retrenchment would force local powers to spend more on defense, while perhaps assuaging certain points of friction with countries that feel threatened or encircled by U.S. presence. But it equally stands to reason that **removing the American pacifier would liberate the more destabilizing influences that U.S. policy had previously stifled**. Long-dormant security competitions might reawaken as countries armed themselves more vigorously; historical antagonisms between old rivals might reemerge in the absence of a robust U.S. presence and the reassurance it provides. Moreover, **countries that seek to revise existing regional orders in their favor**—think Russia in Europe, or China in Asia—might indeed applaud U.S. retrenchment, but they **might just as plausibly feel empowered to more assertively press their interests**. If the United States has been a kind of Leviathan in key regions, Mearsheimer acknowledges, then “take away that Leviathan and there is likely to be big trouble.”46 Scanning the global horizon today, one can easily see where such trouble might arise. In Europe, a revisionist Russia is already destabilizing its neighbors and contesting the post-Cold War settlement in the region. In the Gulf and broader Middle East, the threat of Iranian ascendancy has stoked region-wide tensions manifesting in proxy wars and hints of an incipient arms race, even as that region also contends with a severe threat to its stability in the form of the Islamic State. In East Asia, a rising China is challenging the regional status quo in numerous ways, sounding alarms among its neighbors—many of whom also have historical grievances against each other. In these circumstances, **removing the American pacifier would** **likely** **yield** not low-cost stability, but **increased conflict and upheaval**. That conflict and upheaval, in turn, would be quite damaging to U.S. interests even if it did not result in the nightmare scenario of a hostile power dominating a key region. It is hard to imagine, for instance, that increased instability and acrimony would produce the robust multilateral cooperation necessary to deal with transnational threats from pandemics to piracy. More problematic still might be the economic consequences. As scholars like Michael Mandelbaum have argued, the enormous progress toward global prosperity and integration that has occurred since World War II (and now the Cold War) has come in the climate of relative stability and security provided largely by the United States.47 One simply cannot confidently predict that this progress would endure amid escalating geopolitical competition in regions of enormous importance to the world economy.

#### Plan solves: Changing policy in reaction to human rights violations bolsters cred. Lagon ’11:

[Mark P. Lagon](https://www.cfr.org/bio/mark-p-lagon), 10-19-2011, "Promoting Human Rights: Is U.S. Consistency Desirable or Possible?," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/promoting-human-rights-us-consistency-desirable-or-possible

Given differing U.S. human rights policies for Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen, was Ralph Waldo Emerson correct to say that “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds”? More on: Human Rights Bahrain United States A broad-minded view is that more consistency in promoting human rights would in fact better serve U.S. credibility and national interests. Presidencies past too often sacrificed human rights for other foreign policy objectives. From the Spanish-American War through the Vietnam War, U.S. policy was often a tale of assertive intervention in other lands for strategic interests in the name of “saving” or “civilizing” them. In the mid-1970s, the United States established a formal “human rights” policy with a dedicated State Department bureau headed by Patricia Derien under President Jimmy Carter. Carter made human rights a central theme, suggesting the United States had an “inordinate fear of Communism,” while exposing abuses by U.S. allies (as he still does). Among other shifts, Carter backed away from a repressive Shah of Iran in large part due to that regime’s human rights abuses. Equally moralistic in tone, Ronald Reagan began his presidency with the converse tilt. He appointed Jeane Kirkpatrick as ambassador to the United Nations (UN), drawn to her critique of Carter policy in Iran and elsewhere, titled “Dictatorships and Double Standards.” She argued that traditional autocracies were more likely to evolve and liberalize than totalitarian regimes, which seek greater social control. This led her to reject a policy of pressing more strongly for reform in the autocracies, which were often U.S. Cold War allies, than in the totalitarian states. But Reagan ultimately recognized that U.S. interests were bound up in pushing Cold War allies to reform and democratize, from El Salvador and Chile to South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan. The presidential outlier on human rights in the late twentieth century was George H. W. Bush. In Kiev, he cautioned Eastern Europeans against “suicidal nationalism” in seeking independence from Moscow (dubbed the “Chicken Kiev” speech by the late William Safire). He dispatched senior aides to reassure and toast Beijing’s leaders shortly after the Tiananmen Square massacre. After masterfully leading a coalition to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, he resisted militarily ousting Saddam Hussein, even though Saddam had gassed his own Kurdish citizens. One must acknowledge that the intrusive UN sanctions regime put in place instead to constrain Saddam’s power in fact caused humanitarian harm to civilians for twelve years.

## Solvency

#### Plan: The Senate should vote to block US military aid to Saudi Arabia and Trump should comply.

Catie Edmondson and Charlie Savage, 2-13-2019, "House Votes to Halt Aid for Saudi Arabia’s War in Yemen," No Publication, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/13/us/politics/yemen-war-saudi-arabia.html> --ilake mw

WASHINGTON — The House voted on Wednesday to end American military assistance for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, a defiant and rare move to curtail presidential war powers that underscored anger with President Trump’s unflagging support for Saudi Arabia even after the killing of a Washington Post columnist, Jamal Khashoggi. The 248-to-177 vote, condemning a nearly four-year conflict in Yemen that has killed thousands of civilians and inflicted a devastating famine, will pressure the Republican-controlled Senate to respond. Eighteen Republicans — almost all of them hard-line conservatives with the Freedom Caucus — voted with the Democratic majority. Congress’s upper chamber in December passed a parallel resolution, 56 to 41, in a striking rebuke to the president and his administration’s defense of the kingdom. But that measure died with the last Congress after the House Republican leadership blocked a vote. Dozens of Democrats, however, softened the blow when they defected to a Republican amendment to allow intelligence sharing with Saudi Arabia to continue when “appropriate in the national security interest of the United States.” Senate passage of the Yemen resolution could prompt Mr. Trump to issue the first veto of his presidency, and it would come after Republicans have registered their unhappiness over other foreign policy issues, such as the president’s plan to withdraw troops from Syria and Afghanistan and his threats to pull the United States from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On Wednesday, a bipartisan group of senators introduced new sanctions on Moscow that would require the secretary of state to submit a determination of “whether the Russian Federation meets the criteria for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.” Democrats demanded Senate action. “This is their opportunity to send a message to the Saudis that their behavior on Khashoggi and their flagrant disregard of human rights is not consistent with the American way of doing business and not in line with American values,” Representative Ro Khanna, Democrat of California, the bill’s lead sponsor, said in an interview, adding that he was “relieved” that Congress finally took action on the resolution, which he first introduced in 2017. The House resolution is a rare use of the 1973 War Powers Act, which gave Congress the ability to compel the removal of military forces absent a formal declaration of war. Those powers, created in the wake of the Vietnam War, have almost never been used, as lawmakers have demurred from intervening in politically sensitive matters of war, peace and support for the troops. But the conflict in Yemen is proving to be different. Senators sponsoring their own resolution are expected to act quickly to force a vote, as lawmakers in both parties fume over how the administration has responded to Saudi Arabia’s role in the killing of Mr. Khashoggi, who was based in Virginia. Senator Christopher S. Murphy, Democrat of Connecticut and one of the sponsors, said he anticipated a vote “within the next 30 days.” The White House pre-emptively threatened to block the resolution over the weekend, with administration officials arguing in a statement of administration policy that “the premise of the joint resolution is flawed” because the United States has provided only “limited support to member countries of the Saudi-led coalition” in Yemen. Senate aides involved in the resolution say they are optimistic that it will pass, though it is unclear whether it will garner the same level of support among Republicans that it did in December. Some Republicans, mindful of an embarrassing veto showdown with Mr. Trump, are looking for other ways to show their dissatisfaction.

#### US arms are going to Saudi Arabia and those in its coalition, including the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Egypt.

Ahmed Al-Haj 15, 3-26-2015, "Saudis' Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen a 'dangerous step,' Iran warns," Globe and Mail, https://web.archive.org/web/20150326221558/http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/saudi-arabia-has-150000-troops-for-yemen-operation-report/article23628188/ --ilake mw

The White House said in a statement late Wednesday that the U.S. was co-ordinating military and intelligence support with the Saudis but not taking part directly in the strikes. Other regional players were involved in the Saudi operation: The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain joined Saudi Arabia in a statement published by the Saudi Press Agency, saying they would answer a request from Hadi “to protect Yemen and his dear people from the aggression of the Houthi militias which were and are still a tool in the hands of foreign powers that don’t stop meddling with the security and stability of brotherly Yemen.” Oman, the sixth member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, didn’t sign onto the statement. Egypt also announced political and military support. “There is co-ordination ongoing now with Saudi Arabia and the brotherly gulf countries about preparations to participate with an Egyptian air and naval forces and ground troops if necessary,” it said in a statement carried by the state news agency. Four Egyptian naval vessels have crossed the Suez Canal en route to Yemen to secure the Gulf of Aden, maritime sources at the Suez Canal told Reuters on Thursday. The sources said they expected the vessels to reach the Red Sea by Thursday evening. Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco and Sudan were also joining the operation, the Saudi Press Agency reported Thursday. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies believe the Houthis are tools for Iran to seize control of Yemen and say they intend to stop the takeover. The Houthis deny they are backed by Iran.

#### Plan solves AQAP—two internal links

Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, 10-19-2018, "Al-Qaeda thrives in Yemen despite US counterterrorism campaign," alaraby,  [https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/10/19/al-qaeda-thrives-in-yemen-despite-us-counterterrorism-campaign /](https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2018/10/19/al-qaeda-thrives-in-yemen-despite-us-counterterrorism-campaign%20/) recut ilake mw

Furthermore, the United States has given impunity and military support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose policies in Yemen have allowed al-Qaeda to thrive, including secretly supporting the faction – undermining any US efforts to defeat AQAP. The UAE have supported Salafi militias with friendly or non-hostile ties to AQAP, such as Abu al-Abbas, commander of a Salafi militia listed on the US terrorism list for al-Qaeda ties. The Associated Press also reported in August that the coalition had "cut deals" with AQAP, giving them cash to withdraw. In some cases, AQAP fighters have simply joined the coalition. The USA was also reportedly aware of the deals and held off airstrikes as they occurred. Fuad Rajeh argues that if such coalition support to al-Qaeda continues, it could lead to the long-term presence of extremisms. "New generations of al-Qaeda will be powerful in Yemen and terrorist networks may have different names," he said. It indicates America's battle against al-Qaeda in Yemen is contradictory if its coalition allies foster and aid the faction. Similarly, as al-Qaeda has capitalised and recruited many fighters because of the chaos in Yemen since 2015, and some civilians have even voiced support of the faction because of the stability it provides. As the United States has sold tens of billions of dollars' worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia since the war began, it shows America in another contradictory move is complicit in the destruction of the Yemeni state. This and Saudi Arabia's bombing campaign disintegrates the Yemeni state, allowing AQAP to flourish. "Only ending the Yemen conflict and strengthening the democratic transition can they prevent the rise of extremism, which has been allowed to flourish because of the states America has backed," added al-Bukhari. The USA can help push for a peaceful solution to the conflict, while halting military support for Riyadh's coalition, if it is sincere about defeating extremism in Yemen.

## Underview

#### 1] Aff gets RVI on T and theory. A) Reciprocity: Aff can’t read T but neg always has the option of reading both T and theory, giving them a 2-to-1 structural advantage that only the RVI rectifies. If they read only T or only theory, they still had both options available, so in the 1AR I should have two options as well. B) Aff speaks first so I’m always forced to choose some interp of the topic and of what’s fair meaning there’s always the potential I violate. RVI is the only check against the use of frivolous T and theory. C) Having to prove that the AC is topical or fair skews my ability to cover substance given the time-crunched 1AR so I need to be able to win on these issues.

#### 2] Use reasonability if the aff was disclosed before the tournament started, other people have read an aff with the same advocacy, and if it can be link and impact turned.

#### A] Disclosure and other readers solves limits and any arg about the topic lit—the wiki defines the topic lit because the specific limits of the topic only apply to debaters, we read the lit with reference to how we can use it in debate rounds, and the wiki is the stasis for pre-tournament prep.

#### B] Link and Impact turn ground proves you could’ve answered the aff and there’s no disad to your ability to engage—competing interps is self-serving because there’s no actual abuse on T and the 1nc totally forecloses on education for the sake of a ballot.

#### 3] Use reasonability on neg theory—

A. Strat skew – competing interps forces the 1AR to overinvest in theory because I need a counterinterp, whereas reasonability gives the 1AR variability to brush off theory or go for a CI and RVI if it needs to. Outweighs – 1NC reactivity mandates the 1AR to employ different strats.

B. Neg gets bidirectional interps so they can practice both sides of the theory debate and win every round on it – reasonability solves since it tests whether there was real abuse, so it answers both directions of the interp.

#### 4] Aff gets access to 1AR theory since otherwise it’s impossible to check back for infinite NC abuse. 1AR theory needs to be drop the debater—I don’t have time to split between substance and theory so it’s the only way to rectify abuse. No neg RVIs because they don’t need it—they can split the NR, which would equalize NR-2AR time skew. And, neg abuse outweighs aff abuse since they can react whereas I’m forced to adapt. No new 2nr framing issues—be paradigmatically opposed to new in the 2 arguments and they had their chance in the NC.

#### 5] Pre-fiat indicts of AC spikes is a reason to prefer your interp and reject a spike or spikes, not a reason to drop the debater. This is most logical since an interp that indicts an AC spike only justifies why that spike is a bad norm, not the fact that the spike being run is proactively bad.

# Substance FL

## XT [util]

### Generic

Extend the civilians scenario

Extend the credibility scenario—Best recent evidence shows US international cred is on the brink—that’s Samuels 9/13. Supporting Saudi war kills cred—Saudis are seen as aggressors in the conflict and the decision to go to war was seen as poorly planned. Plan solves—retailiating against HR abuses restores cred.

### VS Conditions CP

Extend the plantext: the House of Representatives should pass HCR 138, which ends military aid to Saudi Arabia. Aid withdrawal is key—it ends the civil war in yemen, which is just a proxy war between iran and saudi arabia, because not having aid grounds the saudi air force and forces negotiations. Means there’s a huge net ben to the perm—the cp prolongs the continual death of millions that the zenko ev describes.

ON the CP:

1] Perm do the aff then the counterplan—remove aid now then gradually return aid. Xa riedel 12-13—US aid is leverage but aid is NOT LEVERAGE UNLESS WE USE IT

2] perm do the aff—the counterplan is the aff. A) whenever we pass policies there are implicit condditions about when we will stop using the policy and B) even if you try to do the cp saudis would just violate the conditions—the khanna 10-20 evidence warrants why MBS is increasing aggression now.

### VS Terror DA

#### 1] no link—cross apply hcr 138—plan gives counterterror aid

#### 2] cross apply fenton-harvey--

## XT [Butler]

### Generic

Extend the standard of recognizing grievability—ethics arises from reciprocal recognition so we have an obligation to recognize grievability because the norms that govern our relationships with the other deem certain subjects worthy of our recognition while simultaneously casting other lives aside, making respect and recognition of the other impossible.

the framework is not a question of impact aggregation but of making ungrievable lives grievable.

death not term ! its inevitable so not bad in its own ,the thing we’re trying to do is make lives recognizesd as valuable

even if death is bad, the framework doesn’t hold us responsaible for deaths even if our actions may have caused them — the consequence fo the death is not INTRINSIC to the action of righting friability

### Vs Ks

There’s prefat offense to the ac

### Vs Util

## FL

### AT Senate passed legislation

#### Legislation is symbolic—still needs an unlikely victory in the House and for Trump not to veto it, which I fiat.

Igor Bobic and Akbar Shahid Ahmed, 12-13-2018, "Senators Vote To End U.S. Support For Saudi Arabia In Bloody Yemen War, Despite GOP Objections," HuffPost, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/yemen-saudi-arabia-senate-war\_us\_5c115e46e4b0ac53717b8c7a --ilake mw

The historic 56-41 vote on a resolution from Sens. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.) and Mike Lee (R-Utah) represents the first time the Senate has voted to end a U.S. military operation not approved by Congress. It’s also a major loss for the Saudis, who are already worried about mounting criticism in Washington over their government’s role in the murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi. But the passage of the resolution is symbolic, at least for the moment. It will not legally require President Donald Trump to withdraw American intelligence and logistical assistance for the Saudi effort because the GOP has quashed attempts to pass similar bills in the House this session and, even if passage there was possible, Trump has already threatened to veto the resolution. “Today is the beginning of a new day in terms of the Congress acting on military issues,” Sanders said after the vote, adding that it is important for the public to see that “their elected representatives are about to take back their constitutional responsibility on the issues of war.” Because the resolution was considered “privileged” under the 1973 War Powers Act, which limits military actions abroad without a formal congressional declaration of war, senators were able to force a vote on it after an initial attempt to bring it up failed in March. Since then, outrage over the Khashoggi killing, fresh accusations of war crimes by the Saudis and their partners in Yemen and fierce advocacy have helped the bill’s advocates rack up significant new support. They won over 10 Democrats ― all 49 voted for the legislation this time around ― and in an earlier vote on whether the Senate should take up the proposal, dramatically secured 14 Republican votes. Only two GOP members, Lee and his ally Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.), ultimately stood by the bill. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) loudly condemned it, warning that it could help Iran, which is supporting the Yemeni rebel group that the Saudis are fighting. CIA Director Gina Haspel helped stiffen senators’ resolve to admonish the kingdom in a briefing last week in which she offered details of a classified CIA assessment that blames de facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman for the Khashoggi assassination, undercutting Trump’s claims that the crown prince might not have been involved. The fact that a U.S.-made bomb killed dozens of children in a Yemen school bus in August also helped convince several Democrats who previously opposed ending the policy to change their minds, according to Murphy. “I think this resolution was going to pass even if Khashoggi was never murdered. I think the momentum was just growing,” Murphy told reporters Wednesday.

## AT Econ DA

### Uq

#### Their evidence is just about the US economy – it can’t be generalized to global trends

### Link

#### 1] No link—it’s a question of possibility vs probability—the saudis could inflate oil prices but their evidence does not say that saudis will inflate prices

#### 2] Turn—removing aid means that saudis won’t disrupt oil prices if they want aid back

#### 3] nonunique-- lots of alt causes for saudis interfering with oil prices—their evidence says saudis are considering retaliatory measures because of US economic sanctions over khashoggi’s death—sanctions have no relationship to military aid

#### 4] alt solvency—even if removing aid destabilizes our relationship with saudis we can maintain it through economic investments and oil deals.

#### 5] Saudis will hold prices steady—the link is threat construction, against the saudis’ best interest and even if they do, US oil fills in the gaps right now

Amy M. Jaffe, 10-18 Amy Myers Jaffe is the David M. Rubenstein senior fellow for energy and the environment and director of the program on energy security and climate change at the Council on Foreign Relations., 10-18-2018, "Can The Oil Threat Spare Saudi Arabia from America’s Wrath?," POLITICO Magazine, <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/10/18/saudi-arabia-oil-221612> --ilake mw

Talk like that makes one wonder: Given the current tight oil market, can Saudi Arabia hold the world hostage, as it did during the 1973 oil embargo? Although the immediate crisis could possibly decompress with accountability within Saudi intelligence leadership, my sense of market conditions is that Saudi Arabia could absolutely wreak some havoc, but not for long. Removing oil from the current market could increase prices, perhaps precipitously—at least in the short run. Depending on how much oil was removed from the market and how the Trump administration responded regarding enforcement of Iranian oil sanctions, oil prices might briefly jump up sharply. But western countries would almost certainly release strategic stocks (the G-7 unified statement on freedom of the press is salient) and, eventually, an easing of Texas pipeline bottlenecks by early 2019 would allow the flow of more U.S. tight oil to the global market. Higher prices would cause oil demand to fall, especially in the developing world. In other words, retaliating in the oil market could be a brief, Pyrrhic victory for Saudi Arabia, unless it were done in tandem with other important oil producers. For example, Moscow could inject itself into the situation by suggesting it could collaborate with Riyadh on any oil-supply cuts and try to elicit a pound of flesh from the U.S. or even China. Several pundits have explained why unsheathing the oil weapon would not be in Saudi Arabia’s self-interest, and current oil prices, which have risen only modestly in recent days, reflect that belief.

### AT Tonnesson

#### 1] Turn—protectionism decreases the risk of war—if we cut ties with other countries there will be no reason for a nuclear war to start

#### 2] turn—trade competition generates collusion—states can work together to maximize economic gains—OPEC is an example of how this was done with oil—prefer the turn because it’s most specific to the link about oil

#### 3] nonunique—alt causes like migration, ethnic and territorial disputes could escalate to nuclear war.

## AT Prolif da

### AT uq

#### Trump has destabiliized our relationship with Iran in the year since the evidence was written—the disad is false because the link story would have been triggered already

### AT Link

#### 1] Turn—removing aid makes developing nukes harder—we share less information, tech, and materials—countries won’t have the materials or information necessary to build

#### 2] alt solvency—the UN can enforce nonprolif and neigboring states can sign nonprolif agreements

#### 3] no link—their evidence isn’t specific to saudi arabia—mbs doesn’t want nukes now so unless they can warrant why mbs changes his mind about wanting nukes, don’t vote on the disad

#### 4] Alt solvency—we can pressure mbs not to proliferate using humanitarian aid and trade deals—not with military aid

### AT Kronig escalation impact

#### 1] Turn—widespread proliferation deters conflict—if all countries know that any conflict will go nuclear then they will proactively avoid conflicts or aggression.

#### 2] nonunique—lot of alt causes like oil tension, ethnic conflict, and terrorism might trigger nuclear action if all states are trigger-happy

#### 3] past the brink—Kronig says that if Iran or Turkey develops nukes then other states will follow suit—iran and turkey already have nukes.

# \*\*AT T\*\*

## UV Extension

### RVI: Timeskew

#### Extend timeskew—I need to be able to win on theory because the 1ar is too time crunched for me to be able to split my time between theory and substance and still win. Outweighs on structural abuse—I can’t change speech times in the round but all their offense for no rvis could be solved by them not reading theory

#### [AT Infinite abuse] 1] timeskew outweighs on probability since its unstrategic to read 1ncs that violate every interp but every 1ar against T is hard because of timeskew

#### [AT Chilling effect] 1] TURN Chilling effect is good; it only disincentivizes bad theory since true interps don’t have good counterinterp offense and 2] timeskew outweighs on scope since only some debaters are chilled

#### [AT Logic] 1] TURN it’s most logical to reward me for the work I do on theory 2] timeskew outweighs on magnitude because being a little illogical has no impact but timeskew can cause side bias

#### [AT incentivizes uplayering] 1] TURN rvis disincentivize uplayering since debaters know that they could lose on theory and 2] timeskew controls the root cause—if flows are lost its because we ran out of time

### Reasonability XT

#### Extend the reasonability brightline—the aff was disclosed before the tournament and other people have read it, which solves any standard about research, limits, or the topic. The wiki is constitutive of the topic literature since the topic only applies to debaters and the wiki is what we use to cut prep.

#### Reasonability + winning the RVI means you affirm on theory—reasonability changes the standard of what is sufffiencent to win the theory debate from offense/defense to defense.

#### Prefer reasonability:

#### Extend the a. that Reasonability solves 1ar overinvestment in theory—reasonability means that I get an extra strategic option on theory [which outweighs arbitrariness on magnitude

#### \*AT Competing interps\*

#### [AT Arbitrary] Reasonability isnt arbitrary if I have a brightline and prove it’s a good brightline

#### [AT race to the bottom] Race to the bottom is good—gets us back to substantive education which is best since its most portable; theory education stays in the round

#### [AT collapses to CI] Even if reasonability might be similar it doesn’t mean that the debate is the same and reasonability is still net better—any risk of offense for why you should prefer reasonability answers this arg

## AT Nebel

### CI

#### Counterinterp: Affirmatives may specify an authoritarian regime.

#### Prefer on T-lit and Clash:

#### All regimes have different political specifics and aid packages, so it would a) be impossible to cut off all aid with a blanket policy and b) no authors in the lit write about universally ending aid, they write about specific countries.

Patricia L Sullivan 11 – “Is Military Aid an Effective Tool for U.S. Foreign Policy?” Scholars Strategy Network, 2011, scholars.org/brief/military-aid-effective-tool-us-foreign-policy. Ilake mw

The world is much more complicated than any one model can capture. Each nation receiving major military aid has a unique relationship with the United States that changes over time. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the connections between U.S. military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the governments that received aid between 1990 and 2004 reveals a pattern largely consistent with the Reverse Leverage model. In general, U.S. military aid proved to be negatively correlated with cooperation by the nations receiving the aid. In fact, national governments that received aid exhibited less cooperative behavior toward the United States than governments given no military aid. Some countries that received U.S. military aid became more cooperative with increased levels of assistance. But aid was less likely to induce cooperation from formal U.S. allies. In practice, the United States did not punish defiance with reductions in aid; nor did it reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. The opposite pattern prevailed, because higher levels of cooperation from nations we assisted were correlated with decreased military aid in subsequent years, while reductions in cooperative behavior were often followed by increased aid. Can Military Aid Advance American Foreign Policy Goals? Given these patterns, U.S. policymakers face a difficult dilemma. Providing military assistance may be the only way to gain influence in key countries – such as Pakistan – located in strategically crucial parts of the world. Even if aid does not have a positive effect on the level of cooperation with the United States overall, the U.S. may still get specific benefits. Policymakers, however, still have to cope with the limited utility of military aid for inspiring cooperation with overall foreign-policy goals. Providing military assistance may at times allow the United States to avoid the costs of direct military interventions, but leaders should take care not to hurt long-term American security interests. U.S. leaders must: Have realistic expectations. Realize that military aid might achieve short-term security goals, but will not usually induce general cooperation. Acknowledge constraints on flexibility. Military aid is not a very effective carrot or stick, because it cannot easily be turned on and off. Immediate U.S. security needs may impel aid, but don’t imagine that flows of aid can be calibrated over time to change a foreign government’s policy preferences. Be cognizant of the risks. Providing military aid to foreign governments can backfire. Arms transfers to developing countries have been linked to increases in human rights abuses and may impede democratization. Military assistance can enable client states to aggress against their neighbors – which may hurt American interests in the region. Finally, when alliances shift or governments are replaced, America can find itself in combat against an enemy equipped with U.S-made weapons sent at an earlier time. That is what happened in Afghanistan. We gave arms to Afghans and Arabs to fight the Soviets in the 1980s, only to see many of the same fighters turn against us in 9/11 and afterwards.

#### Means that an aff that meets the interp doesn’t exist so the interp’s structurally unfair—no affs meet—and it forecloses on education since we can’t have a debate if there’s no lit on both sides of the issue. Controls the internal link to semantics—Sullivan says that the meaning of the word military aid changes based on what country it’s given to so t-lit rather than gbp analysis defines the lit.

### Interp

I meet

#### ON SEMANTICS:

#### 1] Sullivan outweighs on specificity—has empirics about aid which is unique to this topic. Their ev gets laundered on every topic so the probability their ev applies is also really low.

#### 2] reversibility—sullivan warrants why it’s almost impossible to change aid relations in the squo which is why an aff that meets their interp will never exist

#### ON LIMITS:

#### 1] Impact turn—neg already gets specific ground like pics and disads, so exploding liits gives affs an equal footing. Aff spec doesnt trade off with neg ground since even if I specced type of aid + country, they could still read specific CPs like conditions and politics disads in the recipient country which means you shouldn’t buy any ground net benefit to the tva.

#### prefer pragmatics over semantics:

#### [a] grammar shifts constantly and the meaning of words can be changed or added depending on context—it’s illogical to impose one interpretation of language.

#### [b] collapses to pragmatics—we use pragmatic interpretations of language while debating what is semantically correct.

#### [c] unverifiable—dictionaries can still define words differently; semantics doesnt exist—no one entity has the power to define the correct meaning

#### [d] infinite regress proves pragmatics first—dictionaries just use or modify definitions from previous dictionaries so pragmatics are the root cause.

### On the Interp

#### t-lit outweighs semantics:

#### [1] semantic definitions come from the topic literature, so t-lit link turns semantics

#### [2] low probability of semantics because the resolution committee might have meant “some authoritarian regimes” or “all authoritarian regimes”—omission of the article doesnt prove that the definition flows towards the generic interpretation. high probability that topic lit is skewed towards specific countries since the possible number of abstract arguments is limited.

## AT Saudis are Totalitarian

#### EIU rates saudi arabia as an authoritarian regime

http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy\_Index\_2018.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=Democracy2018



#### Prefer:

#### 1] intent to define

#### 2] specificity to saudi arabia

#### 3] holistic review – considers political culture – means i meet their definition

#### Saudi arabia is an authoritarian regime

Jeffrey Fields 10-22, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, University of Southern California – Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences, 10-22-2018, "Saudi Arabia is a repressive regime – and so are a lot of US allies," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabia-is-a-repressive-regime-and-so-are-a-lot-of-us-allies-105106> --ilake mw

The alleged assassination of Khashoggi by Saudi operatives may seem surprising because of the 31-year-old crown prince’s reputation as a moderate reformer. Salman has made newsworthy changes in the conservative Arab kingdom, allowing women to drive, combating corruption and curtailing some powers of the religious police. Still, Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s most authoritarian regimes. Women must have the consent of a male guardian to enroll in college, look for a job or travel. They cannot swim in public or try on clothes when shopping. The Saudi government also routinely arrests people without judicial review, according to Human Rights Watch. Citizens can be executed for nonviolent drug crimes, often in public. Forty-eight people were beheaded in the first four months of 2018 alone. Saudi Arabia ranks just above North Korea on political rights, civil liberties and other measures of freedom, according to the democracy watchdog Freedom House.

## AT regimes plural

#### Counterinterpretation: Affirmatives may specify one authoritarian regime.

#### Limits: if there are 48[[1]](#footnote-1) authoritarian regimes, allowing affs to specify multiple explodes the number of affs—there are 1128 different ways to choose 2 countries and 17,296 ways to choose 3 countries—speccing multiple increases the number of affs on the topic by an order of magnitude.

AT semantics

1. Theres a lot of ways to be gramatically correct
1. https://infographics.economist.com/2018/DemocracyIndex/ [↑](#footnote-ref-1)