# V1

## Part one is the illness

#### Disability does not function within linear time – rather, it is implicitly queer. Just as time ceases to exist for the non-reproducing queer body, so too does it not exist for the disabled. Linear time is linear progress – this is a stance that crip temporality will always fail. Rather, disability exists in a constant queercrip state of prognosis, without a successful or even existent and predictable future.

Kafer 13 [Kafer, Alison. Feminist, queer, crip. Indiana University Press, 2013.]

One could argue that queer time is crip time, and that it has been all along. Queer time is often defined through or in reference to illness and disability, suggesting that it is illness and disability that render time “queer.” Not only might they cause time to slow, or to be experienced in quick bursts, they can lead to feelings of asynchrony or temporal dissonance; depression and mania are often experienced through time shifts, and people with various impairments move or think at a slower (or faster) pace than culturally expected. These shifts in timing and pacing can of necessity and by design lead to departures from “straight” time, whether straight time means a firm delineation between past/present/ future or an expectation of a linear development from dependent childhood to independent reproductive adulthood. Glimpses of these possibilities can be seen in recent queer theory. Elizabeth Freeman, for example, begins the “Queer Temporalities” issue of GLQ with a hint that illness and disability might be catalysts to thinking time differently, or queerly; riffing on Shakespeare’s “the time is out of joint,” she links this description of “skeletal dislocation” to a queer asynchrony, an experience of time in, on, and across the body. Imagining time as “out of joint” allows the possibility that time’s “heterogeneity can be felt in the bones,” that time “is” a body.43 Just as quickly as she names this dislocation or disability, however, she moves away from it, focusing only on queer temporalities “beyond somatic changes like puberty, aging, or illness.”44 What happens, though, if we do not move “beyond somatic changes” but think about queer/crip temporalities through such changes, through these kinds of skeletal dislocations, or illness, or disease? In an attempt to begin that kind of inquiry, I use this section to trace potential links and overlaps between queer temporalities and what we can call “crip time.” I Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips | 35 focus primarily but not exclusively on Judith Halberstam, not only because she has written extensively on the possibilities of queer temporalities but also because her work so clearly approaches the terrain of disability studies (even though she has yet to mark that closeness).45 If queerness is, in Freeman’s terms, “a set of possibilities produced out of temporal and historical difference,” and thus a kind of temporality (or temporalities), then thinking through queer disability requires thinking about crip temporalities.46 I am particularly interested in highlighting the work of illness and disability in articulations of queer time, drawing out the ways in which queer theorists deploy ideas of illness or disability to define queer time. Although I argue that disability categories are already at work in queer temporalities, I think there is more to be done in terms of tracing or creating connections, and I begin some of that work here, using queer temporalities to read disability experiences and reading crip temporalities as resembling queer time. For Halberstam, queers are queer not only because of their objects of desire but also because they do too much of the wrong thing at the wrong time; attending to queer temporalities enables us to see queerness as “more about a way of life than a way of having sex.”47 She argues that time is foundational in the production of normalcy, such that engaging in particular behaviors at particular moments has become reified as the natural, common-sense course of human development. “Normative narratives of time,” in other words, “form the base of nearly every definition of the human in almost all of our modes of understanding, from the professions of psychoanalysis and medicine, to socioeconomic and demographic studies on which every sort of state policy is based, to our understandings of the affective and aesthetic.”48 These normative narratives of time presume a linear development from a dependent childhood to an independent adulthood defined by marriage and reproduction.49 Halberstam thus focuses most of her attention on how queer subcultures operate outside “the paradigmatic markers of life experience—namely, birth, marriage, reproduction, and death.”50 In articulating queerness through temporality, Halberstam highlights “strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules, and eccentric economic practices.”51 How might we read each of these categories of queer temporality in and through illness and disability? Let’s begin with “strange temporalities”: Halberstam introduces her notion of queer time by talking about the early time of the AIDS epidemic, when “[s]ome gay men responded to the threat of AIDS . . . by . . . making community in relation to risk, disease, infection, and death.”52 Although Halberstam does not limit queer time to the time of illness and infection, she describes it as “emerg[ing] from the AIDS crisis,” a context that forced gay communities to focus on “the here, the present, the now.” That focus, argues Halberstam, pushed gay communities out of more mainstream temporal logics, ones in which the future was not continually diminishing with each death, or each diagnosis, or each symptom.53 Instead, the queer time of the epidemic deflects attention away from the future altogether, attending only to this moment, finding urgency in the present. By Halberstam’s reading, it was living, and dying, with AIDS 36 | Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips that pushed (some) gay men out of a normative life course and into queer ruminations on urgency and emergence. Given that Halberstam’s iteration of queer temporality stresses illness as much as sex, one could certainly make the argument that the time of the epidemic is both queer and crip time.54 Tom Boellstorff offers “the time of coincidence” as another queer temporality, one in which time “falls rather than passes”; he refers here to the coincidence of two cycles of time, as in “May 23rd ‘falls’ on a Tuesday,” finding in this concept of synchrony a way to move beyond strict linear time. It allows for two cycles of time (such as days of the week and numbers of the month) to be running simultaneously yet not perfectly parallel, creating circular moments of coincidence rather than straight (in both senses of the word) lines of forward movement.55 Is it possible, though, to read more into this notion of “falling” time, a phrasing that suggests a modality more akin to stumbling, tripping, and impaired bodies than walking ones? What is the time of falling, and how might we read disability into this focus on coincidence, on simultaneity? Or how might we read the distinction between falling and passing time as a distinction between falling and passing in time? I am reminded here of Eliza Chandler’s meditation on falling on the sidewalk, her exploration of how tripping up her feet leads to tripping up categories of identification and disidentification. Falling on the sidewalk, she explains, becomes a moment of falling into disability; it is the falling that identifies her to others as disabled, plunging her into categories and identifications that trip her up. Falling makes passing impossible, even as she moves from one to the other moment by moment, even as she inhabits one category in her mind at the same time as she inhabits another in the eyes of others. The experience of falling in time leads Chandler to recognize how shame and pride coincide in her body on the sidewalk, a queer awareness of how her body falls into, exceeds, and fails expectations all at the same time.56 It is, at least in part, this link between falling and failure that renders crip temporalities queer. Notions of failure and excess, and acts of failing to adhere to some societal norms while or by exceeding others, run throughout discussions of queer temporality. Chandler knows that by falling she lives up to expectations about what disability does, even as she fails expectations about what the body does; failure and success thus coincide in the moment of falling. We can move from “falling” to “falling ill” as another form of strange temporality. As Freeman herself suggests, living with illness can push time “out of joint,” opening up alternative logics and orientations. Anthropologist Sarah Lochlann Jain explores how cancer diagnoses and prognoses interrupt “the idea of a time line and all the usual ways one orients oneself in time—one’s age, generation, and stage in the assumed lifespan.”57 Living in “prognosis time” is thus a liminal temporality, a casting out of time; rather than a stable, steady progression through the stages of life, time is arrested, stopped. Paradoxically, even as the very notion of “prognosis” sets up the future as known and knowable, futurity itself becomes tenuous, precarious. But this Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips | 37 very precariousness can, as Halberstam finds in AIDS narratives, become an impetus for erotic investment in the present, in one’s diagnosed body. Laura Hershey reports that inadvertently learning the nature of her diagnosis— and, as a result, her prognosis—changed her whole orientation to the world; she was familiar with living with disability, but discovering her prognosis fundamentally altered her relationship to futurity, even though her body remained unchanged. Sitting alone at school, she ran across the definition of muscular dystrophy in the dictionary: “A genetic disorder in which the body’s muscles weaken and eventually waste away.” At that moment, she writes, “All the futures I had imagined for myself were now replaced by this newly-revealed, short future: ‘eventually waste away.’”58 For Hershey, the time of prognosis is a single moment of telling but also an extended, if not indefinite, period of negotiation and identification. During that period, past/present/future become jumbled, inchoate. The present takes on more urgency as the future shrinks; the past becomes a mix of potential causes of one’s present illness or a succession of wasted time; the future is marked in increments of treatment and survival even as “the future” becomes more tenuous.59 The strange temporality of diagnosis/prognosis seems all the more dislocating, all the more dis- and reorienting, for those falling out of or exceeding diagnostic categories. How might we understand the experiences of those with chronic fatigue and chronic pain, or those with multiple chemical sensitivities (MCS), struggling for years to find a medical professional or social services provider to recognize their impairments? Or the veteran trying again and again to get the government to acknowledge and address the effects of Agent Orange or Iraq War Syndrome or PTSD?60 “What is the ‘time,’” in Christopher Nealon’s framing, “of the repeated attempt?”61 Nealon pushes here for an understanding of queer time that includes the temporal experiences of marginalization and disavowal; how, he wonders, is the repeated experience of being denied recognition an orientation to time?62 His question reminds me of the stories and images in Rhonda Zwillinger’s powerful The Dispossessed, a profile of people with MCS who have lived through years of failed attempts to get their condition recognized, years that clearly took a toll; some of those Zwillinger profiled ran out of time, ultimately committing suicide out of frustration and isolation. As Roberta S. puts it, “For the past 16 years I have lived in my car, traveling from place to place looking for a ‘safe’ place so I can be indoors. I am so worn out I think I will die soon.”63 With these stories in mind, I supplement Jain’s “prognosis time” with the time of undiagnosis: the shuttling between specialists, the repeated refusal of care and services, the constant denial of one’s experiences, the slow exacerbation of one’s symptoms, the years without recognition or diagnosis, the waiting. Thinking about diagnosis and undiagnosis as strange temporalities opens the door to still other framings of crip time, of illness and disability in and through time. What would constitute a temporality of mania, or depression, or anxiety? If we think of queer time as involving archives of rage and shame, then why not also panic attacks 38 | Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips or fatigue? How does depression slow down time, making moments drag for days, or how do panic attacks cause linear time to unravel, making time seem simultaneously to speed up and slam shut, leaving one behind?

#### Disability is unique in that it exists in of itself as a fluid state. There is a truism to the literature: If we live long enough, we will eventually all become disabled. And, this becomes our greatest fear. This creates a viscious cycle of self-hatred in disabled folx. We understand what it is to be oppressed through ableism and yet still perpetuate it. But, this leaves no possibility to radically challenge other forms of oppression and expect to succeed.

#### Queer/crip scholarship begins the story of resistance by positing itself as definitionally against the norm, and moving to dismantle the concept of the norm in the first place.

McRuer 10 [McRuer, Robert. "Compulsory able-bodiedness and queer/disabled existence." The disability studies reader 3 (2010): 383-392.]

Th e crisis surrounding heterosexual identity and able-bodied identity does not automatically lead to their undoing. Indeed, as this brief consideration of As Good As It Gets should suggest, this crisis and the anxieties that accompany it can be invoked in a wide range of cultural texts precisely to be (temporarily) resolved or alleviated. Neither gender trouble nor ability trouble is suffi cient in and of itself to unravel compulsory heterosexuality or compulsory able-bodiedness. Butler acknowledges this problem: “Th is failure to approximate the norm [ . . . ] is not the same as the subversion of the norm. Th ere is no promise that subversion will follow from the reiteration of constitutive norms; there is no guarantee that exposing the naturalized status of heterosexuality will lead to its subversion” (“Critically Queer,” 22; qtd. in Warner, “Normal and Normaller” 168–169, n. 87). For Warner, this acknowledgment in Butler locates a potential gap in her theory, “let us say, between virtually queer and critically queer” (Warner, “Normal and Normaller,” 168–169, n. 87). In contrast to a virtually queer identity, which would be experienced by anyone who failed to perform heterosexuality without contradiction and incoherence (i.e., everyone), a critically queer perspective could presumably mobilize the inevitable failure to approximate the norm, collectively “working the weakness in the norm,” to use Butler’s phrase (“Critically Queer,” 26).9 A similar gap could be located if we appropriate Butler’s theories for disability studies. Everyone is virtually disabled, both in the sense that able-bodied norms are “intrinsically impossible to embody” fully, and in the sense that able-bodied status is always temporary, disability being the one identity category that all people will embody if they live long enough. What we might call a critically disabled position, however, would diff er from such a virtually disabled position; it would call attention to the ways in which the disability rights movement and disability studies have resisted the demands of compulsory able-bodiedness and have demanded access to a newly imagined and newly confi gured public sphere where full participation is not contingent on an able body. We might, in fact, extend the concept and see such a perspective not as critically disabled but rather as severely disabled, with severe performing work similar to the critically queer work of fabulous. Tony Kushner writes: Fabulous became a popular word in the queer community—well, it was never unpopular, but for a while it became a battle cry of a new queer politics, carnival and camp, aggressively fruity, celebratory and tough like a streetwise drag queen: “FAAAAABULOUS!” [ . . . ] Fabulous is one of those words that provide a measure of the degree to which a person or event manifests a particular, usually oppressed, subculture’s most distinctive, invigorating features. (vii) Severe, though less common than fabulous, has a similar queer history: a severe critique is a fi erce critique, a defi ant critique, one that thoroughly and carefully reads a situation—and I mean reading in the street sense of loudly calling out the inadequacies of a given situation, person, text, or ideology. “Severely disabled,” according to such a queer conception, would reverse the able-bodied understanding of severely disabled bodies as the most marginalized, the most excluded from a privileged and always elusive normalcy, and would instead suggest that it is precisely those bodies that are best positioned to refuse “mere toleration” and to call out the inadequacies of compulsory able- bodiedness. Whether it is the “army of one-breasted women” Audre Lorde imagines descending on the Capitol; the Rolling Quads, whose resistance sparked the independent living movement in Berkeley, California; Deaf students shutting down Gallaudet University in the Deaf President Now action; or ACT UP storming the National Institutes of Health or the Food and Drug Administration, severely disabled/critically queer bodies have already generated ability trouble that remaps the public sphere and reimagines and reshapes the limited forms of embodiment and desire proff ered by the systems that would contain us all.10 Compulsory heterosexuality is intertwined with compulsory able-bodiedness; both systems work to (re)produce the able body and heterosexuality. But precisely because these systems depend on a queer/disabled existence that can never quite be contained, able-bodied heterosexuality’s hegemony is always in danger of being disrupted. I draw attention to critically queer, severely disabled possibilities to further an incorporation of the two fi elds, queer theory and disability studies, in the hope that such a collaboration (which in some cases is already occurring, even when it is not acknowledged or explicitly named as such) will exacerbate, in more productive ways, the crisis of authority that currently besets heterosexual/able-bodied norms. Instead of invoking the crisis in order to resolve it (as in a fi lm like As Good As It Gets), I would argue that a queer/disability studies (in productive conversations with disabled/queer movements outside the academy) can continuously invoke, in order to further the crisis, the inadequate resolutions that compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory able-bodiedness off er us. And in contrast to an able-bodied culture that holds out the promise of a substantive (but paradoxically always elusive) ideal, a queer/disabled perspective would resist delimiting the kinds of bodies and abilities that are acceptable or that will bring about change. Ideally, a queer/disability studies—like the term queer itself—might function “oppositionally and relationally but not necessarily substantively, not as a positivity but as a positionality, not as a thing, but as a resistance to the norm” (Halperin, 66). Of course, in calling for a queer/disability studies without a necessary substance, I hope it is clear that I do not mean to deny the materiality of queer/disabled bodies, as it is precisely those material bodies that have populated the movements and brought about the changes detailed above. Rather, I mean to argue that critical queerness and severe disability are about collectively transforming (in ways that cannot necessarily be predicted in advance) the substantive uses to which queer/disabled existence has been put by a system of compulsory able-bodiedness, about insisting that such a system is never as good as it gets, and about imagining bodies and desires otherwise.

#### Thus, vote aff to endorse the queer cripping of debate’s linear and binary views of time and identity. We must understand that disability is NOT a one off event, so we advocate for looking at narratives of disability as interconnected and fluid in order to remove barriers to care and understanding

#### Pedagogically, queercrip understandings of the world have been left on the backburner – this centers conformity within our educational experiences, further shutting out anyone who deviates from the norm. Inclusionist education is not enough – when educational spaces like these put disability and queerness as an afterthought, they reinscribe traditional understandings of humanness as a template otherized bodies cannot fit into.

Mitchell and Snyder 14 [David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder and Linda Ware. "“[Every] Child Left Behind”: Curricular Cripistemologies and the Crip/Queer Art of Failure." Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies 8, no. 3 (2014): 295-313. https://muse.jhu.edu/]

Odysseus’s experiences on Phaeacia provide an historical example of the insights awaiting those who undertake pedagogical practices informed by curricular cripistemologies. Curricular cripistemologies involve the development of teaching pedagogies that deviate from core teachings by foregrounding crip/queer content as fortunate failure. This pedagogical “incoherence” offers important social options for constructing alternative ethical frameworks for living. An alternative ethical framework results in the creation of useable crip/queer maps that, from a curricular cripistemological standpoint, are otherwise absent from normative teaching approaches. One overarching goal of such content is to provide opportunities for crip/queer embodiments to better speak to the political dilemmas of contemporary experience. The pedagogy of curricular cripistemology depends upon the insights of human interdependency illustrated in the examples above. It is neither a discourse of “specialness” wherein we learn to value disabled people as “human” too, nor tolerate their incapacities when we discover them scraping out an existence alongside others; nor do we find the value of disability guaranteed in overcoming social barriers wherein crip/queer peoples’ incapacities are offset by the compensatory qualities of an otherwise “extraordinary body” ([Garland-Thomson 5](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/558369%22%20%5Cl%20%22b12)). Nor do we discover disability as an opportunity for political correctness wherein all bodies are valued for “diversity” in a relativistic equation of multicultural differences. We witness this philosophical tendency [End Page 297] even in disability studies, for example, in the universalist cast of arguments that “everyone’s disabled” featured in Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson’s “embodied ontology” (27) and Lennard Davis’s “dismodernism” (273). Relativistic valuations of difference often lead to a process explained by Lee Edelman as neoliberal normativity’s “tenacious will to sameness by endlessly turning the Other into the image of itself” (59). Instead of these various strategies for culturally rehabilitating disabled people’s experiences into recognizable normativities, curricular cripistemologies cultivate ways of realizing failure as an appropriate response to the finite goals of inclusionism. For instance, curricular cripistemologies critically assess how communities place limits on the facilitation of crip/queer people’s participation. Such forms of inclusionism often result in false perceptions of absence as a “chosen” exile and a naturalized condition of non-normative existence. While social spaces superficially appear open to all who wish to navigate them, curricular cripistemologies unveil architectural, aesthetic, and moral spaces of inclusion that, paradoxically, strictly police ways of being different for the bodies they include. Consequently, there is no inclusionism that does not come replete with a strategy of making estranged bodies better fit normative expectations. Paradoxically, then, curricular cripistemologies necessarily promote failure of rehabilitative regimens as a worthy goal. One’s rehab is another’s resistance, particularly when rehab requires classroom pull-outs to perform yet another battery of the MMPI (diagnostic assessment tests). Curricular cripistemologies reject the form-fitting mold of neoliberal normativities as substantively under-performing. Likewise, in The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference, Roderick A. Ferguson explores the impact of educational diversity strategies of cultural incorporation in public schools. Ferguson identifies late 1960s inclusionist practices as institutional ways of robbing minority students of alternative insights while seeming to embrace them (190). Similarly, inclusionist practices place crip/queer bodies in the compromising position of making normative practices more desirable: of course, they want to be like us, the story of institutional normalization goes, because our ways naturally enshrine that which all human beings desire. In this sense, curricular cripistemologies actively explore alternative modes of navigating the world as crip/queer embodiments. In effect, cripistemological pedagogies actively leave behind the goal of arriving at identities domesticated of their defining differences. Such approaches to the teaching mission force an encounter with the often discomforting content of living interdependently with others. [End Page 298] “Every Child Left Behind,” or the Crip/Queer Art of Failure Most indicators point to the fact that inclusionist practices have resulted in new kinds of exclusion as opposed to integration. For example, while students with disabilities make up 13% of student populations, those labeled with intellectual disabilities receive a diploma only 36.6% of the time; 22% drop out. The rest (59%) finish their schooling but receive no diploma and, over the course of their education, spend time with non-disabled peers only in art, gym, or music classes ([Smith 4–5](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/558369%22%20%5Cl%20%22b27)). In other words, inclusionism’s primary purpose of molding crip/queer bodies into tolerated neoliberal normativities scores a less than passing mark. This article may be understood, then, as a companion to recent disability studies in education (DSE) efforts regarding the ongoing critique of inclusionist practices that leave all children behind. If one can be included only by passing as non-disabled then much of the value of crip/queer experiences is lost in traditional pedagogical practices. In undertaking this exposure of pedagogical heteronormativities we seek to accomplish three specific tasks: 1) engage disability studies in a dialogue with Judith Halberstam’s important recent work on “the queer art of failure” (147); 2) draw out how queer theorizing of the last decade can be productive for disability studies even though, as Robert McRuer and Anna Mollow point out, a more direct engagement with disability has been slow in coming within queer studies (3); and 3) pursue what may seem, at first, to be a counter-intuitive argument in the best interests of actively promoting a certain kind of failure in the context of curricular cripistemologies. All of these objectives emerge in our recent teacher training projects to more effectively address shortcomings foundational to inclusionist methodologies now operative in most public schools across the U.S. To accomplish the alternative crip/queer goals of curricular cripistemologies we intend to explain why failure is necessary when educational inclusion operates as an exclusionary undertaking in, perhaps, the most entrenched, neoliberal, and common sense institution of all: public education. By neoliberal we mean to define education as part of a newly emergent “tolerance” of multicultural differences. In particular, our critique centers on inclusionism as a neoliberal gloss of diversity initiatives that get some disabled students in the door while leaving the vast majority of crip/queer students behind. Neoliberal educational practices cultivate further funding opportunities by advancing claims of successful normalization rather than drawing upon crip/queer differences as sources of alternative insight. Curricular cripistemologies, in contrast, openly advocate for the productive potential of failing normalization [End Page 299] practices (if they were ever obtainable in the first place) because such goals entail erasing recognitions of the alternative values, practices, and flexible living arrangements particular to crip/queer lives.

#### The cruel optimism of a politics of hope implicates a neoliberal understanding of exactly which bodies are valuable and leaves disability as the aftermath of expendability. The disabled identity cannot be cured with a pill. It cannot be cured with cruches or ramps or prosthetics either. We can try to change our bodies, but we can never change our position as disabled folx.

Puar 09 [Jasbir K. Puar (2009) Prognosis time: Towards a geopolitics of affect, debility and capacity, Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory, 19:2, 161-172, DOI: 10.1080/07407700903034147. Jasbir K. Puar is Associate Professor of Women's & Gender Studies at Rutgers University. She has also been a Visiting Lecturer in the Department of Performance Studies at NYU and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Cultural Inquiry in Berlin.]

Massumi, for his part, specifically rejects the normative designation of positive and negative affect (because that puts us back in the realm of emotion), suggesting that affect brings with it generative temporality – a biopolitical will that pushes ever forward. Despite his redirection towards ontology – part of longstanding efforts to detoxify fears of biological determinism and to destabilize linguistic reductionism – or, perhaps because of this redirection, Massumi is acutely aware of and not at all dismissive of the fields of the social, the representational, the cultural, the discursive, the epistemological; rather he worries about the dearth of heuristic devices that do not privilege these primary bifurcations in the first place. Encounters with social, cultural, and capitalist infrastructures (literal, built, architectural, ideological, public policy – encounters where bodily capacity may be rendered inadequate or challenged) potentially render affective capacity, in its productive movement, exploitative and exploited. Affective capacity in this sense – that is, a toggling between ontology and epistemology as they cycle in mobius tandem – occupies a steady tension with its opposite, incapacity, or what I will refer to in this essay as ‘‘debility.’’ Thus, the variegated population construction that Jain and Clough key in on draws our attention to the differing and ever-changing sense of hope that Massumi develops in ways that are structural, temporal, and spatial, at once – not embedded in the individuated body, or in a specific sense of bodily capacity. (The democratization of hope as affective capacity for all bodies – one of the main tenets of the technoscience literature on affect – thus has its limits: who is ultimately included in the designation ‘all bodies’?) In an essay on the temporal dimensions of cancer, Jain argues that ‘‘all of us in American risk culture live to some degree in prognosis’’ (2007, 79). She suggests that ‘‘living in prognosis’’ might be a more helpful articulation of this simultaneous sense of life and death, whereby prognosis may reflect a ‘‘measure of hope.’’ I would say her formulation lends itself to both ontological and epistemological senses of hope. First, as affective futurity hailed as a generative capacity of the human body, even as it is both reflected by and manipulated through relations to statistical probability. Second, in terms of the way hope is rendered in the fantasy of empirical certainty, what Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas call ‘‘the political economy of hope’’ (2005, 439–63), despite the fact that, as Jain reminds us, we either die or do not yet not die, we don’t ‘‘70, or 42, or 97 percent die’’ (2007, 81). In this relation of hope to prognosis, I am indebted to Jose´ Esteban Mun˜oz’s longstanding work on the ‘‘politics of hope’’ as well as Lisa Duggan’s and Mun˜oz’s collaborative thinking on the subject. As they argue, being able to produce hope modulates punitive distinctions between good and bad neoliberal subjects (for example, a good neoliberal patient is hopeful), even as ‘‘hope’’ remains, in Duggan’s words, ‘‘a risk’’ that must be taken in order to reconfigure the very forms of sociality that produce the dialectic between hope and hopelessness in which we are situated in the first place.5 Again, all these formulations of hope make clear that this capacity is not discretely of the body, that it is always already shaped by and bound to interface with prevailing notions of chance, risk, accident, luck, and probability, as well as with bodily limits – incapacity, disability, and debility. In my new project, provisionally entitled Debility and Capacity (of which I will here offer a brief, preliminary sketch), I intend to foreground questions of affect as bodily capacity not only in relation to forms of living and dying, but also to debility and disability. Why do these relations between affect, debility, and capacity matter? In Terrorist Assemblages, I propose a rapprochement of Foucauldian biopolitics and Achille Mbembe’s necropolitical critique of it through what I call a ‘‘bio-necro collaboration,’’ one that conceptually acknowledges biopower’s direct activity to death, while remaining bound to the optimalization of life, and the nonchalance that necropolitics maintains towards death even as it pursues killing as a primary aim. Mbembe’s critique localizes necropolitics, both in temporal terms through slavery and colonization as well as spatial terms – the plantation and the colony and postcolony are his circumscribed ‘‘deathworlds.’’ In this pivotal intervention, he displaces the Holocaust (and Foucault’s focus on Europe) as the dominant trauma of the modern era. Still, Mbembe perhaps places too great an emphasis on the specific sites used to discipline subjects as opposed to more diffuse networks of control, an ironic localization for necropolitics because it once again excuses the investment biopolitics maintains in mapping death in relation to living. Here, I want to deconstruct the bio-necropolitical collaboration much further, using debility and capacity to think about bodies and events that confound attempts to fold easily into and out of the distinctions between living and dying, and to reflect shifting, capacious, porous and contradictory parameters of bio and necro politics. These are of course older historical questions about the changing contours of what counts as a living body, reanimated by emergent technologies. Surveillance technologies and related bioinformatic economies – DNA encoding and species preservation, stem-cell research, digitization, biometrics, life logging devices, regenerative medical sciences, whose role includes increasing the contact zones and points of interface between bodies, and their subindividual capacities (not to mention related technologies developed to manage the constant amassing of information) – renew all sorts of questions about bodies and their materialities. What is a body in informational terms? Where does a body – and its aliveness – begin and where does it end? If we view information itself as a form of life (or life itself as a compendium of information) we might be led to ask: What is a life? When does it begin and end? And, who owns it? What defines living? In turn, what counts as a death – as dying?6 Why, as Donna Haraway once asked, should a body end at the skin? (1991). Kaushik Sunder Rajan favors the formulation ‘‘biocapital’’: neoliberal circuits of political economy which he argues are generating incipient forms of materiality as well as changing the grammar of ‘‘life itself.’’ New forms of currency – biological material and information – simultaneously produce the materialization of information on the one hand, and a decoupling from its material biological source on the other. As such, we have a constitutive contradiction informing this dialectic between bodily material and information: ‘‘information is detached from its biological material originator to the extent that it does have a separate social life, but the ‘knowledge’ provided by the information is constantly relating back to the material biological sample ...It is knowledge that is always relating back to the biological material that is the source of the information; but it is also knowledge that can only be obtained, in the first place, through extracting information from the biological material’’ (Sunder Rajan 2006, 42). If the value of a body is increasingly sought not only in its capacity to labor but in the information that it yields – and if there is no such thing as excess, or excess info, if all information is eventually used or is at least seen as having imminent utility – we might ask whether this is truly a revaluing of otherwise worthless bodies left for dying. If statistical outliers as well as species can live through DNA, what does it mean to be debilitated or extinct? Are all bodies really available for rehabilitation? I am particularly interested in approaching these questions from the vantage point of queer theory to put duress on assumptions about what queer bodies are, and to see what queer methods obtain once we let go of the discrete organic queer body as its literal referent. I am reminded of a recent comment by Elizabeth Povinelli, who notes that queer theories remain mired in and beholden to ‘‘a certain literalism of the referent’’ of its narrowly constructed proper object.7 (Which calls forth the following questions: Why do we need a literal referent? How literal is the referent? And then, What is that literal reference?). Queer disability studies has taken up these issues, pushing at the boundedness of bodies, by exploring the ‘mutation’ or deviance of a body that is purportedly whole and organic.8 While it has generally pursued these questions around the subjectivities and political agendas that are and ought to be produced through the intersections of subject formations like ‘‘queer’’ and ‘‘disabled’’ (that is, queer disabled subjects or disabled queer subjects), these intersections push at the definitional boundaries of each term. In large part, this is because these intersections remind us certainly at the very least because they remind us of the historical entanglements that have produced disabled bodies as already queer (both in their bodily debilities and capacities but also in their sexual practices regardless of sexual object choice) as well as queer bodies that are allegedly intrinsically debilitated. As Robert McRuer writes, ‘‘despite the fact that homosexuality and disability clearly share a pathologized past ... little notice has been taken of the connection between heterosexuality and able-bodied identity’’. ‘‘Compulsory able-bodiedness’’ and compulsory heterosexuality are mutually constituitive, argues McRuer.9 But I would also add, compulsory able-bodiedness is absolutely a prerequisite not only for homonationalist subjects but also for certain exceptional queer subjects, those imbued with a self-proclaimed capacity for transgression, subversion, or resistance. Further, despite this rich field of inquiry, this domain of scholarship too often remains mired in what Robert McRuer and Nicole Marcotic term ‘‘disability culturalism’’ – a myopic focus on representational politics – along with variants of ‘‘barbarism’’ and ‘‘crip nationalism’’ that reinscribe the centrality of prevailing discourses on race, national identity, gender, and region, producing privileged disabled bodies in distinction to various ‘‘others.’’10 Meanwhile, the disability scholarship interested in moving beyond an individual subject that is Euro-American, white, middle-class, and neo-liberal is impoverished. Africanist Julie Livingston, for example, notes that ‘‘while four-fifths of the world’s disabled persons live in developing countries, there is a relative dearth of humanities and social science scholarship exploring disability in non-Western contexts’’ (2006, 125n16). My intent, then, is twofold: to stretch the perceived contours of material bodies and to infuse queer disability studies with formulations of risk, calculation, prognosis, and statistical probability, whereby identity is understood not as essence, but as risk coding. What happens to congenital disabilities, for example, if they are positioned not merely in ideological terms as pathologies but as informational errors in DNA coding that can be corrected, where the disabled body is productive and not considered to be lacking the capacity for regeneration? This is a very intentional move away from self-other constructs of normality and pathology; instead, I am interested in the way populations are constructed through prevailing ideas of variability and risk. In this move away from normativity and pathology, I wonder how we might view queer and gender non-normative bodies in bio-informatic and statistical terms. How does Jain’s suggestion that we are all ‘‘living in prognosis’’ – that is, living (and dying) in relation to statistical risk, chance, and probability, when populations are assessed based on indices of health, illness, disability, debility, infirmity, disease, fertility, environmental safety, climate change – offer a more dynamic frame for comprehending our multivalent and ever-shifting relations to life and death? Jain offers, but does not develop, the proposition that ‘‘living in prognosis’’ might be usefully deployed to re-tool disability studies beyond its current imbrication in Euro-American identity-based rights politics, moving us – as she suggests – from the disabled subject to the prognostic subject, from the subject of disability to the subject of prognosis, thus changing the category of disability itself, while temporally decomposing the common disability activist mantra: ‘‘you’re only able-bodied until you’re disabled.’’ Prognosis time, then, ‘‘severs the idea of a time line,’’ puts pressure on the assumption of an expected life span – a barometer of one’s modernity – and the privilege one has or does not have to presume what one’s life span will be, hence troubling any common view of life phases, generational time, and longevity. When and how do we stop saying things like, he died so young or she was too young to die? Jain’s query is instructive in this regard: ‘‘If you are going to die at 40, should you be able to get the senior discount at the movie when you’re 35? (Is the discount a reward for long life or for proximity to death?) This relation to time makes death central to life in prognosis, death as an active loss – as if there were some right to a certain lifespan – rather than just something that happens to everybody at the end of life’’ (2007, 81). Prognosis time should ideally articulate with other theories of queer temporality and social death that work through the unevenness of how populations live and get to live time, from Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s framing of a carceral racism that produces premature death (2007), to Lauren Berlant’s elaboration of the ‘‘slow death’’ maligned populations must often bear (2007), to Michael Ralph’s argument about an artistic creativity that ‘‘surplus time’’ engenders in hip-hop artists – that is, time ‘‘freed up’’ by virtue of a prognosis that says you don’t have much time to live, a euphoric release of freedom occasioned by the sense that you have exceeded the dismal prognosis that you will die at an early age (2006). The political mandate behind such rethinking about disability – or, as I argue, a move from disability to debility – would not be to disavow the crucial political gains enabled by disability activists globally, but to invite a deconstruction of what ability and capacity mean, affective and otherwise, and to push for a broader politics of debility that destabilizes the seamless production of abled-bodies in relation to disability. This entails theorizing not only specific disciplinary sites but also broader techniques of social control, marking a shift in terms from the regulation of normativity (that is, the internalization and regulation of self/other subject formation) to what Foucault calls the regularization of bodies and affect, and what Agamben renders as the difference between regulating to produce order (discipline) and regulating disorder (security) (20 September 2001). This deconstruction therefore shifts slightly from ‘reclaiming’ the singular as well as ordinary capacities of disabled bodies and questioning the enforced normativity produced by abled-bodies, two interventions which disability studies has admirably taken up quite well. Instead, it is about deconstructing the presumed, taken-for-granted capacitiesenabled status of abled-bodies. Porously resignifiying the categories of disability and debility may aid in addressing what Bryan S. Turner calls ‘‘ontological contingency’’ (2006), eloquently described by Rosemary Garland-Thomson as ‘‘the truth of our body’s vulnerability to the randomness of fate.’’ She continues: ‘‘Each one of us ineluctably acquires one or more disabilities – naming them variably as illness, disease, injury, old age, failure, dysfunction, or dependence. This inconvenient truth nudges most of us who think of ourselves as able-bodied toward imagining disability as an uncommon visitation that mostly happens to someone else, as a fate somehow elective rather than inevitable’’ (2009, 19). Here, the insights of postcolonial, transnational, and area studies scholars provide pivotal interventions into the field of disability studies. For example, in her work on bodily-impaired miners in Botswana who do not necessarily articulate their plight in relation to disability, Livingston uses the term debility defined broadly to encompass ‘‘experiences of chronic illness and senescence, as well as disability per se’’ (2006, 113). While historically many bodily infirmities ‘‘were not regarded as disabilities: indeed they were ‘‘normal’ and in some cases even expected impairments’’ (2006, 120), her usage of debility is also demanded because there is a problem with the linguistic deployment of such a predicament in Setswana – there is no word that translates easily to ‘‘disability.’’11 Her research suggests a relation to the necropolitics of debility that is more expansive, foregrounding colonial and postcolonial violence, labor migrations, economic exploitation, and the interventions of western bio-medicine (such that impaired miners are termed ‘‘lucky,’’ in local discourses, because of access to ‘‘the most clear cut system for processing newly impaired persons and providing them with tools [wheelchairs, leg braces, and prosthetic limbs] for managing their newly uneven and often arbitrary bodily states’’ (2006, 111)). Overall, her work prompts an investigation into a disarticulation of ‘‘disability’’ from ‘‘disabled subjects’’ by asking, what does it mean to have a disability but not identify as disabled? Conversely, to identify as disabled without having, in regards to the representational forces of Darstellung and Vertretung, a disability? As disability is arguably the latest newcomer to the queer intersectional fray – a form of what Rey Chow deems ‘‘(post)structuralist (significatory) incarceration’’12 – I want to push Jain further around the formation of a subject of prognosis by problematizing the predominance of subject formation itself, thinking instead of disability and debility in terms of assemblages. The prognostic subject is tethered to what Sunder Rajan calls the patient-in-waiting who is inevitably hailed as a consumer-in-waiting, enabled – literally and conceptually – by the ‘‘experimental subject’’ that is increasingly displaced from conventional forms of manual labor to biocapital regimes where information is extracted from bodily material, often from people of color in/from the global south. As Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell write, ‘‘the wealthy can purchase the fantasy of a regenerative body at the expense of the health of other, less valuable bodies’’ (2006, 187). Neoliberal regimes of biocapital produce the body as never healthy enough, and thus always in a debilitated state in relation to what one’s bodily capacity is imagined to be; aging itself is seen as a debility, as some populations live longer but also live with more chronic illness. Regenerative medicine produces the experience of ‘‘double biological time’’: as the body ages, the possibility (often unrealistic) of restoring its various parts to at least an originary state proliferates, and a certain promised return to capacity accompanies the experience of aging through debility (Waldby and Mitchell 2006, 125). In fact, being ‘‘better than well’’ emerges as the alibi for the translation of sensation and affect into symptom and thus the rationale for all types of medical intervention, manufacturing the ‘‘continual enlargement of the domain of the therapeutic’’ (Sunder Rajan 2006, 144). (One example of this would be the historical emergence of shyness as a Social Anxiety Disorder, whereby psychotropic drugs Women & Performance: a journal of feminist theory 167 become ‘‘personality optimizers.’’13 Another example is the burgeoning field of ‘‘cosmetic neurology,’’ a term used to ‘‘describe the practice of using drugs developed for recognized medical conditions to strengthen ordinary cognition,’’ such as the growing use of Ritalin and Adderall amongst college students and marathon poker players [Talbot 27 April 2009, 35]). Fear of the social – that is, any notion of illness as a form of social unrest or dis-ease – becomes muted through the production of fear of one’s own body. Jackie Orr’s Panic Diaries, for example, historicizes the transition from ‘‘nuclear panic’’ to Panic Disorder, from the invocation of the social body to the pathologization of the individuated body that is solely responsible for its health, thus to blame if unable to deal with its own responses (2006). Finally, the neo-liberal consumer subject of health assumes the right not to be injured in the usage of products, even as accidents that derive from product design can annually be predicted with statistical precision, and mapped onto the bodies that are likely to be implicated in these dynamics. Meanwhile, other bodies are employed in the production processes precisely because they are deemed available for injury – they are, in other words, expendable, bodies whose debilitation is required in order to sustain capitalist narratives of progress.14 The subject of prognosis, then, still proceeds through developmentalist time, still foregrounding an individuated subject in relation to populations

#### The reliance on stable temporal calculations locks queer bodies into a violent understanding of straight time

Halberstam 5 [Jack, In A Queer Time And Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives]

Queer time and space are useful frameworks for assessing political and cultural change in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (both what has changed and what must change). The critical languages that we have developed to try to assess the obstacles to social change have a way of both stymieing our political agendas and alienating nonacademic constituencies. I try here to make queer time and queer space into useful terms for academic and nonacademic considerations of life, location, and transformation. To give an example of the way in which critical languages can sometimes weigh us down, consider the fact that we have become adept within postmodernism at talking about “normativity,” but far less adept at describing in rich detail the practices and structures that both oppose and sustain conventional forms of association, belonging, and identification. I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability, and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality. And so, in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts (drug addicts, for example) are characterized as immature and even dangerous. But the ludic temporality created by drugs (captured by Salvador Dall as a melting clock and by William Burroughs as “junk time”) reveals the artificiality of our privileged constructions of time and activity. In the works of queer postmodern writers like Lynn Breedlove (Godspeed), Eileen Myles (Chelsea Girls), and others, speed itself (the drug as well as the motion) becomes the motor of an alternative history iils their queer heroes rewrite completely narratives of female rebellion (Myles 1994; Breedlove 2002). The time of reproduction is ruled by a biological clock for women and by strict bourgeois rules of respectability and scheduling for married couples. Obviously, not all people who have children keep or even are able to keep reproductive time, but many and possibly most people believe that the scheduling of repro-time is natural and desirable. Family time refers to the normative scheduling of daily life (early to bed, early to rise) that accompanies the practice of child rearing. This timetable is governed by an imagined set of children’s needs, and it relates to beliefs about children’s health and healthful environments for child rearing. The time of inheritance refers to an overview of generational time within which values, wealth, goods, and morals are passed through family ties from one generation to the next. It also connects the family to the historical past of the nation, and glances ahead to connect the family to the future of both familial and national stability. In this category we can include the kinds of hypothetical temporality-the time of “what if” -that demands protection in the way of insurance policies, health care, and wills. In queer renderings of postmodern geography, the notion of a body-centered identity gives way to a model that locates sexual subjectivities within and between embodiment, place, and practice. But queer work on sexuality and space, like queer work on sexuality and time, has had to respond to canonical work on “postmodern geography” by Edward Soja, Fredric Jameson, David Harvey, and others that has actively excluded sexuality as a category for analysis precisely because desire has been cast by neo-Marxists as part of a ludic body politicS that obstructs the “real” work of activism (Soja 1989; Harvey 1990; Jameson 1997). This foundational exclusion, which assigned sexuality to body/local/personal and took class/global/political as its proper frame of reference, has made it difficult to introduce questions of sexuality and space into the more general conversations about globalization and transnational capitalism. Both Anna Tsing and Steve Pile refer this problem as the issue of “scale.” Pile, for example, rejects the notion that certain political arenas of struggle (say, class) are more important than others (say, sexuality), and instead he offers that we rethink these seemingly competing struggles in terms of scale by recognizing that while we tend to view local struggles as less significant than global ones, ultimately “the local and the global are not natural scales, but formed precisely out of the struggles that seemingly they only contain” (Pile 1997, 13). A “queer” adjustment in the way in which we think about time, in fact, requires and produces new conceptions of space. And in fact, much of the contemporary theory seeking to disconnect queerness from an essential definition of homosexual embodiment has focused on queer space and queer practices. By articulating and elaborating a concept of queer time, I suggest new ways of understanding the nonnormative behaviors that have clear but not essential relations to gay and lesbian subjects. For the purpose of this book, “queer” refers to nonnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity in space and time. “Queer time” is a term for those specific models of temporality that emerge within postmodernism once one leaves the temporal frames of bourgeois reproduction and family, longevity, risk/safety, and inheritance. “Queer space” refers to the place-making practices within postmodernism in which queer people engage and it also describes the new understandings of space enabled by the production of queer counterpublics. Meanwhile, “postmodernism” in this project takes on meaning in relation to new forms of cultural production that emerge both in sync with and running counter to what Jameson has called the “logic” of late capitalism in his book Postmodernism (1997). I see postmodernism as simultaneously a crisis and an opportunity-a crisis in the stability of form and meaning, and an opportunity to rethink the practice of cultural production, its hierarchies and power dynamics, its tendency to resist or capitulate. In his work on postmodern geography, Pile also locates post modernism in terms of the changing relationship between opposition and authority; he reminds us, crucially, that “the map of resistance is not simply the underside of the map of domination” (6).

## PART 2- Framing

#### Debate mandates endless ability checks, internalized ableism and psychic violence. It is UNDENIABLY authoritarian. The aff takes an active stance against playing into norms and resisting assimilation– we have to upset standards.

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While **rhetorical arenas are** commonly **cast as equalizing playing fields**, there is a way in which even the socratic can **yield to the authoritarian**. If we think of disability as a relationship defined in part by the terrain of normativity and in part by individual traits, one must recognize how **the entrance of an impaired body into an elitist highly competitive academic space necessarily entails the focusing of micro-aggressions onto such a body**, both in the structure of normative communications and in the framing of intellectual worth by efficiency. /// If one considers the design of political and scholarly competitive environments, one imagines two gazes through which players are evaluated. The first type of evaluation considers the intellectual performance of the player. The second evaluation monitors interpersonal conduct. /// I will call the first evaluative frame "pedagogical judgment" to reference how performance of ability as well as intellect are measured according to valuable and worthlessness. /// The second frame will be called "interpersonal judgment" to reference how performances of normative sociality are graded according to their closeness to pregiven notions of how the social should be played in various instances. /// The dual conditions of pedagogical and interpersonal judgment, as a **grids of meaning that are projected across bodies** as a function of a designed organizational structure, cooperate in the production of educational spaces as gesturally normative as well as intellectually normative. /// **Gestural as well as intellectual normativities** act as a net around which **atypical** or disruptive **embodiments are captured and disciplined**. On a social level, the truth of intellect is captured in good habits and appearances, but the multiplicity of types of intelligence may be forgotten about. Similarly, the standardization of gestural economies is a well known falsity, as different cultures require different emotional responses to situations. /// Conditions of **judgment set a value to bodies**, based on their ability to pass an inspection or to fulfill a given criteria. A condition of judgment can thus only isolate one aspect or strand of the complexity of human functioning. A condition of judgment is necessary to grade someone accord to hierarchies, but it is also a condition of peril. Competitions thrive on failure: the loss of a debater feeds **debate as an elite culture**. **To exist in debate is to constantly answer numerous ability checks positively**. /// It may thus be possible to view [understand] conditions of judgment as an **ableist emanation from the origin of professionalism**, which raised the rank of professionals whose bureaucratic trials achieved apparent value. In a condition of judgment, the body becomes paralyzed **[incapacitated] by** two sets of **institutional limitations**. Disablement is not merely a spatial or economic process but is a process in teaching limbs and lips and bodies to move properly. **Disabled bodies must labor** **to** ensure that their voices, their bodies, their words will **not fall out of synch.** To **suppress the wildness that hides in the body**, in such instances, the containment of the self is an additional extra labor and **the appearance of** **disability connotes a debt**. **Self-containment is** thus an additional **endless debt that disables impaired bodies**. In having to pay penance for our burdensome conditions, we learn to accept less than ideal circumstances. /// Multiple modes of subversion exist. One of such normative ways of rebelling is disaffiliation. In abandoning and repatriating from the intellectual or interpersonal standards, it may be possible to self-represent in the opposite standards or unevenly distribute resources to gain an advantage. **The most resistant option is to** endeavor to **change the terms of the standards themselves**, the bars that **force a representation of ableness for entrance into normativities**. In the speech or **invocation of other possible worlds**, if it can be heard, others may gather. The establishment of a communal stake in a new group identity upsets the apparatus by which integration appears as the only option. **Upsetting ableist assimilation** will bring many others who resigned to hermetically life in opposition into a possible alliance with you. ///

**The role of the ballot is to endorse the discourse that most authentically represents underlying power methodologically and performatively. Nayar 99 bracketed for ableist language:**

[Jayan Nayar (School of Law, University of Warwick), “Orders of Inhumanity” *Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs.* 599, Fall, 1999] SF

The "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. It does not exist today. There is no such thing as the global "one world." **The world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed** through and **in human relationships.** It is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that dominate. **Power** indeed **does lie at the core of human misery, yet we [fool] ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there. Power, when all the complex networks** of its reach **are untangled, is personal; power does not exist out there,**  [\*630**]  it only exists in relationship**. To say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. **There can exist no power if the subservient relationship is refused**--then power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence.  **Changing the world therefore is a misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed**. And the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own. And the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "I" of all of us. And so, to change our relationships, **we must change the "I" that is each of us. Transformations of "structures" will soon follow**. This is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. This is, perhaps, the essential message of Mahatmas...Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But **there are** **necessary prerequisites** **to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask** the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "**toward what end?" These questions**, obviously, **impinge on our vision** and judgment. **When we** attempt to **imagine transformations toward preferred human** futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because **we are oblivious to violence** or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And **without doubt, the perspectives of the** observer, commentator, and **actor become** **crucial determinants**. **It is necessary**, I believe, **to question** this, **"our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers** and critics, **but is** also **one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where** **we stand very much as participants**. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

#### Discussions of the merits of the normative model of LD debate have to happen in order for us to have discourse about what happens within any given round.

#### Prefer the aff’s use of storytelling through poesis- lived experiences are key to understanding the past, present, and future of disability and order

Campbell 03 [Fiona Anne Kumari Campbell (B.L.S. (Hons) Latrobe; J.P. (Qual) Qld), 2003, Centre for Social Change Research, School of Humanities and Human Services, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia, “THE GREAT DIVIDE: ABLEISM AND TECHNOLOGIES OF DISABILITY PRODUCTION,” pg 2-3//BWSKR]

The telling of stories is a significant medium for the communication of ideas and values of culture as well as the transmission of the ‘memory’ of a body of people; a form of anamnesis that makes connections between the past, present and the future. Stories help us make sense of the world and the way in which we interpret the ‘nature’ of things and interpolate ways of difference. Sometimes these stories are explicitly named and actively exchanged, whilst others are more mundane, somewhat insidious - passing on in a multitude of remnants, connected, disconnected, contrary and multiple, eventually taking on the status of being considered a naturalized state of affairs, part of an a priori objective form of social ordering. The focal concerns of this doctorate relate to matters of ordering, disorder and constitutional compartmentalization between the ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ (c.f. Canguilhem, 1978) and the ways that stories about wholeness, health, enhancement and perfection are told. The Great Divide is for all intents and purposes a story (stories) about the creation and production of a certain kind of difference known under the contemporary neologism ‘disability’. As such, the stories are not finished, they are ongoing, they are highly contestable and the scripts are therefore necessarily partial. I have not set out to provide stories that speak of coherency or indeed conspiracy. Rather, just as the neologism ‘disability’ is elusive and catheretic, patterns of disorder and incongruity become the order of the day. This dissertation will demonstrate that the neologism ‘disability’ easily evades capturing and enumeration. I am in agreement with Barbara Altman (2001) who argues that disability’s inherent complexity leaves such a2 phenomenon empirically indefinable unless such stories of ‘disability’ are reduced to a focus on a specific (contained) aspect of lived experience. Uncritical stories and namings of disability are in a deconstructed sense, stories of disability fabrication – stories that seem to objectively tell us how ‘disability’ and its kindred twin ‘impairment’ are to be framed and thus understood. Undeniably a significant amount of storytelling that masquerades as disability is not really about impairment or disablement at all – the ‘real’ story being told is about ableism – the ways our bodies should be or at least strive to become. The ableist story unfolds as a comportment of living from our early years as a child and into adulthood, creating a code that helps each of us to make sense of the contingencies and exigencies of living.

Debaters must disclose all positions on the wiki- independent voter. K2 accessibility because Full text is really hard for disabled debaters to read bc of processing issues. Also, they didn’t disclose their Ks and theory like they said that they have gone for which is bad for debaters w anxiey and ptsd- I need a check to see if ur positions talk abut sexual assault to prevent being triggered- voting issue you should reject ableism

# V2

#### Disability does not function within linear time – rather, it is implicitly queer. Just as time ceases to exist for the non-reproducing queer body, so too does it not exist for the disabled. Linear time is linear progress – this is a stance that crip temporality will always fail. Rather, disability exists in a constant queercrip state of prognosis, without a successful or even existent and predictable future.

Kafer 13 [Kafer, Alison. Feminist, queer, crip. Indiana University Press, 2013.]

One could argue that queer time is crip time, and that it has been all along. Queer time is often defined through or in reference to illness and disability, suggesting that it is illness and disability that render time “queer.” Not only might they cause time to slow, or to be experienced in quick bursts, they can lead to feelings of asynchrony or temporal dissonance; depression and mania are often experienced through time shifts, and people with various impairments move or think at a slower (or faster) pace than culturally expected. These shifts in timing and pacing can of necessity and by design lead to departures from “straight” time, whether straight time means a firm delineation between past/present/ future or an expectation of a linear development from dependent childhood to independent reproductive adulthood. Glimpses of these possibilities can be seen in recent queer theory. Elizabeth Freeman, for example, begins the “Queer Temporalities” issue of GLQ with a hint that illness and disability might be catalysts to thinking time differently, or queerly; riffing on Shakespeare’s “the time is out of joint,” she links this description of “skeletal dislocation” to a queer asynchrony, an experience of time in, on, and across the body. Imagining time as “out of joint” allows the possibility that time’s “heterogeneity can be felt in the bones,” that time “is” a body.43 Just as quickly as she names this dislocation or disability, however, she moves away from it, focusing only on queer temporalities “beyond somatic changes like puberty, aging, or illness.”44 What happens, though, if we do not move “beyond somatic changes” but think about queer/crip temporalities through such changes, through these kinds of skeletal dislocations, or illness, or disease? In an attempt to begin that kind of inquiry, I use this section to trace potential links and overlaps between queer temporalities and what we can call “crip time.” I Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips | 35 focus primarily but not exclusively on Judith Halberstam, not only because she has written extensively on the possibilities of queer temporalities but also because her work so clearly approaches the terrain of disability studies (even though she has yet to mark that closeness).45 If queerness is, in Freeman’s terms, “a set of possibilities produced out of temporal and historical difference,” and thus a kind of temporality (or temporalities), then thinking through queer disability requires thinking about crip temporalities.46 I am particularly interested in highlighting the work of illness and disability in articulations of queer time, drawing out the ways in which queer theorists deploy ideas of illness or disability to define queer time. Although I argue that disability categories are already at work in queer temporalities, I think there is more to be done in terms of tracing or creating connections, and I begin some of that work here, using queer temporalities to read disability experiences and reading crip temporalities as resembling queer time. For Halberstam, queers are queer not only because of their objects of desire but also because they do too much of the wrong thing at the wrong time; attending to queer temporalities enables us to see queerness as “more about a way of life than a way of having sex.”47 She argues that time is foundational in the production of normalcy, such that engaging in particular behaviors at particular moments has become reified as the natural, common-sense course of human development. “Normative narratives of time,” in other words, “form the base of nearly every definition of the human in almost all of our modes of understanding, from the professions of psychoanalysis and medicine, to socioeconomic and demographic studies on which every sort of state policy is based, to our understandings of the affective and aesthetic.”48 These normative narratives of time presume a linear development from a dependent childhood to an independent adulthood defined by marriage and reproduction.49 Halberstam thus focuses most of her attention on how queer subcultures operate outside “the paradigmatic markers of life experience—namely, birth, marriage, reproduction, and death.”50 In articulating queerness through temporality, Halberstam highlights “strange temporalities, imaginative life schedules, and eccentric economic practices.”51 How might we read each of these categories of queer temporality in and through illness and disability? Let’s begin with “strange temporalities”: Halberstam introduces her notion of queer time by talking about the early time of the AIDS epidemic, when “[s]ome gay men responded to the threat of AIDS . . . by . . . making community in relation to risk, disease, infection, and death.”52 Although Halberstam does not limit queer time to the time of illness and infection, she describes it as “emerg[ing] from the AIDS crisis,” a context that forced gay communities to focus on “the here, the present, the now.” That focus, argues Halberstam, pushed gay communities out of more mainstream temporal logics, ones in which the future was not continually diminishing with each death, or each diagnosis, or each symptom.53 Instead, the queer time of the epidemic deflects attention away from the future altogether, attending only to this moment, finding urgency in the present. By Halberstam’s reading, it was living, and dying, with AIDS 36 | Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips that pushed (some) gay men out of a normative life course and into queer ruminations on urgency and emergence. Given that Halberstam’s iteration of queer temporality stresses illness as much as sex, one could certainly make the argument that the time of the epidemic is both queer and crip time.54 Tom Boellstorff offers “the time of coincidence” as another queer temporality, one in which time “falls rather than passes”; he refers here to the coincidence of two cycles of time, as in “May 23rd ‘falls’ on a Tuesday,” finding in this concept of synchrony a way to move beyond strict linear time. It allows for two cycles of time (such as days of the week and numbers of the month) to be running simultaneously yet not perfectly parallel, creating circular moments of coincidence rather than straight (in both senses of the word) lines of forward movement.55 Is it possible, though, to read more into this notion of “falling” time, a phrasing that suggests a modality more akin to stumbling, tripping, and impaired bodies than walking ones? What is the time of falling, and how might we read disability into this focus on coincidence, on simultaneity? Or how might we read the distinction between falling and passing time as a distinction between falling and passing in time? I am reminded here of Eliza Chandler’s meditation on falling on the sidewalk, her exploration of how tripping up her feet leads to tripping up categories of identification and disidentification. Falling on the sidewalk, she explains, becomes a moment of falling into disability; it is the falling that identifies her to others as disabled, plunging her into categories and identifications that trip her up. Falling makes passing impossible, even as she moves from one to the other moment by moment, even as she inhabits one category in her mind at the same time as she inhabits another in the eyes of others. The experience of falling in time leads Chandler to recognize how shame and pride coincide in her body on the sidewalk, a queer awareness of how her body falls into, exceeds, and fails expectations all at the same time.56 It is, at least in part, this link between falling and failure that renders crip temporalities queer. Notions of failure and excess, and acts of failing to adhere to some societal norms while or by exceeding others, run throughout discussions of queer temporality. Chandler knows that by falling she lives up to expectations about what disability does, even as she fails expectations about what the body does; failure and success thus coincide in the moment of falling. We can move from “falling” to “falling ill” as another form of strange temporality. As Freeman herself suggests, living with illness can push time “out of joint,” opening up alternative logics and orientations. Anthropologist Sarah Lochlann Jain explores how cancer diagnoses and prognoses interrupt “the idea of a time line and all the usual ways one orients oneself in time—one’s age, generation, and stage in the assumed lifespan.”57 Living in “prognosis time” is thus a liminal temporality, a casting out of time; rather than a stable, steady progression through the stages of life, time is arrested, stopped. Paradoxically, even as the very notion of “prognosis” sets up the future as known and knowable, futurity itself becomes tenuous, precarious. But this Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips | 37 very precariousness can, as Halberstam finds in AIDS narratives, become an impetus for erotic investment in the present, in one’s diagnosed body. Laura Hershey reports that inadvertently learning the nature of her diagnosis— and, as a result, her prognosis—changed her whole orientation to the world; she was familiar with living with disability, but discovering her prognosis fundamentally altered her relationship to futurity, even though her body remained unchanged. Sitting alone at school, she ran across the definition of muscular dystrophy in the dictionary: “A genetic disorder in which the body’s muscles weaken and eventually waste away.” At that moment, she writes, “All the futures I had imagined for myself were now replaced by this newly-revealed, short future: ‘eventually waste away.’”58 For Hershey, the time of prognosis is a single moment of telling but also an extended, if not indefinite, period of negotiation and identification. During that period, past/present/future become jumbled, inchoate. The present takes on more urgency as the future shrinks; the past becomes a mix of potential causes of one’s present illness or a succession of wasted time; the future is marked in increments of treatment and survival even as “the future” becomes more tenuous.59 The strange temporality of diagnosis/prognosis seems all the more dislocating, all the more dis- and reorienting, for those falling out of or exceeding diagnostic categories. How might we understand the experiences of those with chronic fatigue and chronic pain, or those with multiple chemical sensitivities (MCS), struggling for years to find a medical professional or social services provider to recognize their impairments? Or the veteran trying again and again to get the government to acknowledge and address the effects of Agent Orange or Iraq War Syndrome or PTSD?60 “What is the ‘time,’” in Christopher Nealon’s framing, “of the repeated attempt?”61 Nealon pushes here for an understanding of queer time that includes the temporal experiences of marginalization and disavowal; how, he wonders, is the repeated experience of being denied recognition an orientation to time?62 His question reminds me of the stories and images in Rhonda Zwillinger’s powerful The Dispossessed, a profile of people with MCS who have lived through years of failed attempts to get their condition recognized, years that clearly took a toll; some of those Zwillinger profiled ran out of time, ultimately committing suicide out of frustration and isolation. As Roberta S. puts it, “For the past 16 years I have lived in my car, traveling from place to place looking for a ‘safe’ place so I can be indoors. I am so worn out I think I will die soon.”63 With these stories in mind, I supplement Jain’s “prognosis time” with the time of undiagnosis: the shuttling between specialists, the repeated refusal of care and services, the constant denial of one’s experiences, the slow exacerbation of one’s symptoms, the years without recognition or diagnosis, the waiting. Thinking about diagnosis and undiagnosis as strange temporalities opens the door to still other framings of crip time, of illness and disability in and through time. What would constitute a temporality of mania, or depression, or anxiety? If we think of queer time as involving archives of rage and shame, then why not also panic attacks 38 | Time for Disability Studies and a Future for Crips or fatigue? How does depression slow down time, making moments drag for days, or how do panic attacks cause linear time to unravel, making time seem simultaneously to speed up and slam shut, leaving one behind?

#### The reliance on stable temporal calculations locks queer bodies into a violent understanding of straight time

Halberstam 5 [Jack, In A Queer Time And Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives]

Queer time and space are useful frameworks for assessing political and cultural change in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (both what has changed and what must change). The critical languages that we have developed to try to assess the obstacles to social change have a way of both stymieing our political agendas and alienating nonacademic constituencies. I try here to make queer time and queer space into useful terms for academic and nonacademic considerations of life, location, and transformation. To give an example of the way in which critical languages can sometimes weigh us down, consider the fact that we have become adept within postmodernism at talking about “normativity,” but far less adept at describing in rich detail the practices and structures that both oppose and sustain conventional forms of association, belonging, and identification. I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability, and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality. And so, in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologize modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts (drug addicts, for example) are characterized as immature and even dangerous. But the ludic temporality created by drugs (captured by Salvador Dall as a melting clock and by William Burroughs as “junk time”) reveals the artificiality of our privileged constructions of time and activity. In the works of queer postmodern writers like Lynn Breedlove (Godspeed), Eileen Myles (Chelsea Girls), and others, speed itself (the drug as well as the motion) becomes the motor of an alternative history iils their queer heroes rewrite completely narratives of female rebellion (Myles 1994; Breedlove 2002). The time of reproduction is ruled by a biological clock for women and by strict bourgeois rules of respectability and scheduling for married couples. Obviously, not all people who have children keep or even are able to keep reproductive time, but many and possibly most people believe that the scheduling of repro-time is natural and desirable. Family time refers to the normative scheduling of daily life (early to bed, early to rise) that accompanies the practice of child rearing. This timetable is governed by an imagined set of children’s needs, and it relates to beliefs about children’s health and healthful environments for child rearing. The time of inheritance refers to an overview of generational time within which values, wealth, goods, and morals are passed through family ties from one generation to the next. It also connects the family to the historical past of the nation, and glances ahead to connect the family to the future of both familial and national stability. In this category we can include the kinds of hypothetical temporality-the time of “what if” -that demands protection in the way of insurance policies, health care, and wills. In queer renderings of postmodern geography, the notion of a body-centered identity gives way to a model that locates sexual subjectivities within and between embodiment, place, and practice. But queer work on sexuality and space, like queer work on sexuality and time, has had to respond to canonical work on “postmodern geography” by Edward Soja, Fredric Jameson, David Harvey, and others that has actively excluded sexuality as a category for analysis precisely because desire has been cast by neo-Marxists as part of a ludic body politicS that obstructs the “real” work of activism (Soja 1989; Harvey 1990; Jameson 1997). This foundational exclusion, which assigned sexuality to body/local/personal and took class/global/political as its proper frame of reference

#### Queer/crip scholarship begins the story of resistance by positing itself as definitionally against the norm, and moving to dismantle the concept of the norm in the first place.

McRuer 10 [McRuer, Robert. "Compulsory able-bodiedness and queer/disabled existence." The disability studies reader 3 (2010): 383-392.]

Th e crisis surrounding heterosexual identity and able-bodied identity does not automatically lead to their undoing. Indeed, as this brief consideration of As Good As It Gets should suggest, this crisis and the anxieties that accompany it can be invoked in a wide range of cultural texts precisely to be (temporarily) resolved or alleviated. Neither gender trouble nor ability trouble is suffi cient in and of itself to unravel compulsory heterosexuality or compulsory able-bodiedness. Butler acknowledges this problem: “Th is failure to approximate the norm [ . . . ] is not the same as the subversion of the norm. Th ere is no promise that subversion will follow from the reiteration of constitutive norms; there is no guarantee that exposing the naturalized status of heterosexuality will lead to its subversion” (“Critically Queer,” 22; qtd. in Warner, “Normal and Normaller” 168–169, n. 87). For Warner, this acknowledgment in Butler locates a potential gap in her theory, “let us say, between virtually queer and critically queer” (Warner, “Normal and Normaller,” 168–169, n. 87). In contrast to a virtually queer identity, which would be experienced by anyone who failed to perform heterosexuality without contradiction and incoherence (i.e., everyone), a critically queer perspective could presumably mobilize the inevitable failure to approximate the norm, collectively “working the weakness in the norm,” to use Butler’s phrase (“Critically Queer,” 26).9 A similar gap could be located if we appropriate Butler’s theories for disability studies. Everyone is virtually disabled, both in the sense that able-bodied norms are “intrinsically impossible to embody” fully, and in the sense that able-bodied status is always temporary, disability being the one identity category that all people will embody if they live long enough. What we might call a critically disabled position, however, would diff er from such a virtually disabled position; it would call attention to the ways in which the disability rights movement and disability studies have resisted the demands of compulsory able-bodiedness and have demanded access to a newly imagined and newly confi gured public sphere where full participation is not contingent on an able body. We might, in fact, extend the concept and see such a perspective not as critically disabled but rather as severely disabled, with severe performing work similar to the critically queer work of fabulous. Tony Kushner writes: Fabulous became a popular word in the queer community—well, it was never unpopular, but for a while it became a battle cry of a new queer politics, carnival and camp, aggressively fruity, celebratory and tough like a streetwise drag queen: “FAAAAABULOUS!” [ . . . ] Fabulous is one of those words that provide a measure of the degree to which a person or event manifests a particular, usually oppressed, subculture’s most distinctive, invigorating features. (vii) Severe, though less common than fabulous, has a similar queer history: a severe critique is a fi erce critique, a defi ant critique, one that thoroughly and carefully reads a situation—and I mean reading in the street sense of loudly calling out the inadequacies of a given situation, person, text, or ideology. “Severely disabled,” according to such a queer conception, would reverse the able-bodied understanding of severely disabled bodies as the most marginalized, the most excluded from a privileged and always elusive normalcy, and would instead suggest that it is precisely those bodies that are best positioned to refuse “mere toleration” and to call out the inadequacies of compulsory able- bodiedness. Whether it is the “army of one-breasted women” Audre Lorde imagines descending on the Capitol; the Rolling Quads, whose resistance sparked the independent living movement in Berkeley, California; Deaf students shutting down Gallaudet University in the Deaf President Now action; or ACT UP storming the National Institutes of Health or the Food and Drug Administration, severely disabled/critically queer bodies have already generated ability trouble that remaps the public sphere and reimagines and reshapes the limited forms of embodiment and desire proff ered by the systems that would contain us all.10 Compulsory heterosexuality is intertwined with compulsory able-bodiedness; both systems work to (re)produce the able body and heterosexuality. But precisely because these systems depend on a queer/disabled existence that can never quite be contained, able-bodied heterosexuality’s hegemony is always in danger of being disrupted. I draw attention to critically queer, severely disabled possibilities to further an incorporation of the two fi elds, queer theory and disability studies, in the hope that such a collaboration (which in some cases is already occurring, even when it is not acknowledged or explicitly named as such) will exacerbate, in more productive ways, the crisis of authority that currently besets heterosexual/able-bodied norms. Instead of invoking the crisis in order to resolve it (as in a fi lm like As Good As It Gets), I would argue that a queer/disability studies (in productive conversations with disabled/queer movements outside the academy) can continuously invoke, in order to further the crisis, the inadequate resolutions that compulsory heterosexuality and compulsory able-bodiedness off er us. And in contrast to an able-bodied culture that holds out the promise of a substantive (but paradoxically always elusive) ideal, a queer/disabled perspective would resist delimiting the kinds of bodies and abilities that are acceptable or that will bring about change. Ideally, a queer/disability studies—like the term queer itself—might function “oppositionally and relationally but not necessarily substantively, not as a positivity but as a positionality, not as a thing, but as a resistance to the norm” (Halperin, 66). Of course, in calling for a queer/disability studies without a necessary substance, I hope it is clear that I do not mean to deny the materiality of queer/disabled bodies, as it is precisely those material bodies that have populated the movements and brought about the changes detailed above. Rather, I mean to argue that critical queerness and severe disability are about collectively transforming (in ways that cannot necessarily be predicted in advance) the substantive uses to which queer/disabled existence has been put by a system of compulsory able-bodiedness, about insisting that such a system is never as good as it gets, and about imagining bodies and desires otherwise.

#### Thus, vote aff to endorse the queer cripping of debate’s linear and binary views of time and identity. We must understand that disability is NOT a one off event, so we advocate for looking at narratives of disability as interconnected and fluid in order to remove barriers to care and understanding

#### Pedagogically, queercrip understandings of the world have been left on the backburner – this centers conformity within our educational experiences, further shutting out anyone who deviates from the norm. Inclusionist education is not enough – when educational spaces like these put disability and queerness as an afterthought, they reinscribe traditional understandings of humanness as a template otherized bodies cannot fit into.

Mitchell and Snyder 14 [David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder and Linda Ware. "“[Every] Child Left Behind”: Curricular Cripistemologies and the Crip/Queer Art of Failure." Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies 8, no. 3 (2014): 295-313. https://muse.jhu.edu/]

Odysseus’s experiences on Phaeacia provide an historical example of the insights awaiting those who undertake pedagogical practices informed by curricular cripistemologies. Curricular cripistemologies involve the development of teaching pedagogies that deviate from core teachings by foregrounding crip/queer content as fortunate failure. This pedagogical “incoherence” offers important social options for constructing alternative ethical frameworks for living. An alternative ethical framework results in the creation of useable crip/queer maps that, from a curricular cripistemological standpoint, are otherwise absent from normative teaching approaches. One overarching goal of such content is to provide opportunities for crip/queer embodiments to better speak to the political dilemmas of contemporary experience. The pedagogy of curricular cripistemology depends upon the insights of human interdependency illustrated in the examples above. It is neither a discourse of “specialness” wherein we learn to value disabled people as “human” too, nor tolerate their incapacities when we discover them scraping out an existence alongside others; nor do we find the value of disability guaranteed in overcoming social barriers wherein crip/queer peoples’ incapacities are offset by the compensatory qualities of an otherwise “extraordinary body” ([Garland-Thomson 5](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/558369#b12)). Nor do we discover disability as an opportunity for political correctness wherein all bodies are valued for “diversity” in a relativistic equation of multicultural differences. We witness this philosophical tendency [End Page 297] even in disability studies, for example, in the universalist cast of arguments that “everyone’s disabled” featured in Tom Shakespeare and Nicholas Watson’s “embodied ontology” (27) and Lennard Davis’s “dismodernism” (273). Relativistic valuations of difference often lead to a process explained by Lee Edelman as neoliberal normativity’s “tenacious will to sameness by endlessly turning the Other into the image of itself” (59). Instead of these various strategies for culturally rehabilitating disabled people’s experiences into recognizable normativities, curricular cripistemologies cultivate ways of realizing failure as an appropriate response to the finite goals of inclusionism. For instance, curricular cripistemologies critically assess how communities place limits on the facilitation of crip/queer people’s participation. Such forms of inclusionism often result in false perceptions of absence as a “chosen” exile and a naturalized condition of non-normative existence. While social spaces superficially appear open to all who wish to navigate them, curricular cripistemologies unveil architectural, aesthetic, and moral spaces of inclusion that, paradoxically, strictly police ways of being different for the bodies they include. Consequently, there is no inclusionism that does not come replete with a strategy of making estranged bodies better fit normative expectations. Paradoxically, then, curricular cripistemologies necessarily promote failure of rehabilitative regimens as a worthy goal. One’s rehab is another’s resistance, particularly when rehab requires classroom pull-outs to perform yet another battery of the MMPI (diagnostic assessment tests). Curricular cripistemologies reject the form-fitting mold of neoliberal normativities as substantively under-performing. Likewise, in The Reorder of Things: The University and Its Pedagogies of Minority Difference, Roderick A. Ferguson explores the impact of educational diversity strategies of cultural incorporation in public schools. Ferguson identifies late 1960s inclusionist practices as institutional ways of robbing minority students of alternative insights while seeming to embrace them (190). Similarly, inclusionist practices place crip/queer bodies in the compromising position of making normative practices more desirable: of course, they want to be like us, the story of institutional normalization goes, because our ways naturally enshrine that which all human beings desire. In this sense, curricular cripistemologies actively explore alternative modes of navigating the world as crip/queer embodiments. In effect, cripistemological pedagogies actively leave behind the goal of arriving at identities domesticated of their defining differences. Such approaches to the teaching mission force an encounter with the often discomforting content of living interdependently with others. [End Page 298] “Every Child Left Behind,” or the Crip/Queer Art of Failure Most indicators point to the fact that inclusionist practices have resulted in new kinds of exclusion as opposed to integration. For example, while students with disabilities make up 13% of student populations, those labeled with intellectual disabilities receive a diploma only 36.6% of the time; 22% drop out. The rest (59%) finish their schooling but receive no diploma and, over the course of their education, spend time with non-disabled peers only in art, gym, or music classes ([Smith 4–5](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/558369#b27)). In other words, inclusionism’s primary purpose of molding crip/queer bodies into tolerated neoliberal normativities scores a less than passing mark. This article may be understood, then, as a companion to recent disability studies in education (DSE) efforts regarding the ongoing critique of inclusionist practices that leave all children behind. If one can be included only by passing as non-disabled then much of the value of crip/queer experiences is lost in traditional pedagogical practices. In undertaking this exposure of pedagogical heteronormativities we seek to accomplish three specific tasks: 1) engage disability studies in a dialogue with Judith Halberstam’s important recent work on “the queer art of failure” (147); 2) draw out how queer theorizing of the last decade can be productive for disability studies even though, as Robert McRuer and Anna Mollow point out, a more direct engagement with disability has been slow in coming within queer studies (3); and 3) pursue what may seem, at first, to be a counter-intuitive argument in the best interests of actively promoting a certain kind of failure in the context of curricular cripistemologies. All of these objectives emerge in our recent teacher training projects to more effectively address shortcomings foundational to inclusionist methodologies now operative in most public schools across the U.S. To accomplish the alternative crip/queer goals of curricular cripistemologies we intend to explain why failure is necessary when educational inclusion operates as an exclusionary undertaking in, perhaps, the most entrenched, neoliberal, and common sense institution of all: public education. By neoliberal we mean to define education as part of a newly emergent “tolerance” of multicultural differences. In particular, our critique centers on inclusionism as a neoliberal gloss of diversity initiatives that get some disabled students in the door while leaving the vast majority of crip/queer students behind. Neoliberal educational practices cultivate further funding opportunities by advancing claims of successful normalization rather than drawing upon crip/queer differences as sources of alternative insight. Curricular cripistemologies, in contrast, openly advocate for the productive potential of failing normalization [End Page 299] practices (if they were ever obtainable in the first place) because such goals entail erasing recognitions of the alternative values, practices, and flexible living arrangements particular to crip/queer lives.

#### Not all bodies are the same nor do they ever have the same experiences. Universality is cruelly optimistic and forces identity to be static- only the 1ac’s acceptance of embodied performance can break the model of universality.

Hedva 16 [Johanna Hedva (writer and activist), May 10 2016, Guts Magazine, “In Defense of De-Persons” <http://gutsmagazine.ca/in/> //BWSKR]

“We must now collectively undertake a rewriting of knowledge as we know it.” —Sylvia Wynter I want to make a defence of “de-persons.” According to the American Psychiatric Association, I am one. That is, I have been diagnosed with depersonalization/derealization disorder (DP/DR for short), which means that I have “significant, persistent, or recurrent depersonalization (i.e., experiences of unreality or detachment from one’s mind, self, or body).” What that means is that, at various times, my body, self, environment, and the world itself do not feel real. There are many ways to talk about “personhood,” and many of them are discourses about what isn’t personhood, or more sinisterly, who does not qualify to be part of that category. DP/DR falls into this kind of discourse on personhood: the kind that defines who is not. The suffix “–hood” as it is attached to the word “person” is important here: “–hood” means “a state of condition or being.” So, when we’re talking about personhood, by definition, the state of the condition or the being of a person can be said to be different than the person. In other words, personhood is apart from the person, personhood is not the person. There is another way of looking at “–hood”: the Proto-Germanic etymology of “–hood” can literally be translated to mean “bright appearance.” I am moved by this at the same time that I’m antagonistic to what it arrogates—the implication that to “be” anything one must not only appear, but also be bright. Before I go further, I’d like to claim the soil that I stand on, so I can dig as deep as I can down into it. I am not a representative for a specific kind of experience; I am presentative of it. That is, I’m doing it right now, in front of you, and in front of myself. I am a proponent of aporia: thinking with holes in it, thinking that contradicts itself, that circles back, that reveals the knotting and fraying and re-weaving of an argument so that it contains all of its mistakes, so that you can see them, and so that I won’t forget how I got here. My address is from an affirmation of messiness, a testimony of and to disorder, an honouring of incomplete-ness. Anne Boyer writes: “It’s not just our errors we become brave about, but our projects’—and our own—incompleteness.” So here I am, in transit. If I’m going to wander around personhood, I’ve got to reckon with universality, because universality is the foundation for how we construct “persons.” It’s the bedrock beneath the patches of soil upon which all of us stand. Sara Ahmed explains it: The universal is a structure not an event. It is how those who are assembled are assembled. It is how an assembly becomes a universe… The universal is the promise of inclusion… Universalism is how some of us can enter the room. It is how that entry is narrated as magical; as progress. I am guilty of hoping for such magic. I’ve played the game of universalism, as we all have: it’s the main game in town. So this is me trying to get out of town. The concept of the “person” that has been defined, deployed, policed, and immured by universality is one that promises self-determined completeness, wholeness, and power. In other words, that which can be both mastered and the master. A defence of a de-person could be said to be an embodiment of incompleteness, a demonstration of bad thinking, a performance of un-comprehension, a refusal of mastery at all. Again, I’m trying to get out of town—I’m headed for the wilds.

#### Rules were invented for the unruly-We must accept and embody our unstable bursts of existance in order to take down the systems of oppression.

Hedva 16 [Johanna Hedva (writer and activist), May 10 2016, Guts Magazine, “In Defense of De-Persons” <http://gutsmagazine.ca/in/> //BWSKR]

In capitalism, the primary purpose of one’s life—both ideologically and materially—is to accumulate value. This is done through one’s labour, but of course primarily relies upon the exploitation of the labour of others and various resources of all kinds. As Silvia Federici has argued, such exploitation requires an accumulation of differences, beyond Marx’s “primitive accumulation” of natural and labour resources, to justify itself: self/other, white/black, male/female, society/nature, us/them, life/death. “The order that collects differences, the order that collects what Marx called labor still objectifying itself, is the order of governance,” write Moten and Harney. Governance was invented for that which is ungovernable—I’d like to suggest that it was invented for de-persons in their promiscuous lack of self-control (a feeling of detachment from, or unfamiliarity with, the world). Within such a system**, the person who is unable to labour because of their difference from the normatively ableist** well, is considered not only useless because they cannot work to accumulate value, but they also stand in direct opposition to two important tenets of capitalist ideology. The first is the premise that capitalist technology can take command of the body. As Carolyn Lazard has written: Capitalism objectifies the body. It views the body as an exploitable resource and attempts to render it indestructible and unstoppable with the aid of technology… And yet as advanced capitalism has deemed the physical body an obsolete, outdated tool, the body still remains. It continues to fail under capitalist conditions and gets pathologized as illness. The body is another inconvenience that must be enhanced and optimized. The second tenet the de-person antagonizes is the promise that neoliberalism can reduce everything, including the decision to survive, down to personal choice, a matter of willpower, and a problem the market can solve. In neoliberalism, “wellness” is a prevarication: it usually stands in for “life,” but life in terms of wealth, race, power, and, primarily, ability. Wellness in this context is paradoxically both an innate moral virtue and an individual’s own responsibility to maintain—and is soaked in ableism. Mia Mingus puts it perfectly: Ableism cuts across all of our movements because ableism dictates how bodies should function against a mythical norm—an able-bodied standard of white supremacy, heterosexism, sexism, economic exploitation, moral/religious beliefs, age, and ability.

# PART 2- Framing

#### Debate mandates endless ability checks, internalized ableism and psychic violence. Assimilation into normative debate fails – we have to upset standards.

Richter 15. Zahari Richter is a Policy Debate Coach, is a Ph.D. Candidate in Communications and has a Master’s in Disability Studies. <https://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2015/01/conditions-of-judgment-ableist-ranking.html> “[Conditions of Judgment: Ableist ranking structures in educational and political environments](https://stimstammersandwinks.blogspot.com/2015/01/conditions-of-judgment-ableist-ranking.html)” “///” indicates paragraphs Language edited NT 17

While **rhetorical arenas are** commonly **cast as equalizing playing fields**, there is a way in which even the socratic can **yield to the authoritarian**. If we think of disability as a relationship defined in part by the terrain of normativity and in part by individual traits, one must recognize how **the entrance of an impaired body into an elitist highly competitive academic space necessarily entails the focusing of micro-aggressions onto such a body**, both in the structure of normative communications and in the framing of intellectual worth by efficiency. /// If one considers the design of political and scholarly competitive environments, one imagines two gazes through which players are evaluated. The first type of evaluation considers the intellectual performance of the player. The second evaluation monitors interpersonal conduct. /// I will call the first evaluative frame "pedagogical judgment" to reference how performance of ability as well as intellect are measured according to valuable and worthlessness. /// The second frame will be called "interpersonal judgment" to reference how performances of normative sociality are graded according to their closeness to pregiven notions of how the social should be played in various instances. /// The dual conditions of pedagogical and interpersonal judgment, as a **grids of meaning that are projected across bodies** as a function of a designed organizational structure, cooperate in the production of educational spaces as gesturally normative as well as intellectually normative. /// **Gestural as well as intellectual normativities** act as a net around which **atypical** or disruptive **embodiments are captured and disciplined**. On a social level, the truth of intellect is captured in good habits and appearances, but the multiplicity of types of intelligence may be forgotten about. Similarly, the standardization of gestural economies is a well known falsity, as different cultures require different emotional responses to situations. /// Conditions of **judgment set a value to bodies**, based on their ability to pass an inspection or to fulfill a given criteria. A condition of judgment can thus only isolate one aspect or strand of the complexity of human functioning. A condition of judgment is necessary to grade someone accord to hierarchies, but it is also a condition of peril. Competitions thrive on failure: the loss of a debater feeds **debate as an elite culture**. **To exist in debate is to constantly answer numerous ability checks positively**

**The role of the ballot is to endorse the discourse that most authentically represents underlying power –micropolitics are key to real, macro change while fiat removes the self from our discussion. Nayar 99 bracketed for ableist language:**

[Jayan Nayar (School of Law, University of Warwick), “Orders of Inhumanity” *Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs.* 599, Fall, 1999] SF

The "world," as we perceive it today, did not exist in times past. It does not exist today. There is no such thing as the global "one world." **The world can only exist in the locations and experiences revealed** through and **in human relationships.** It is often that we think that to change the world it is necessary to change the way power is exercised in the world; so we go about the business of exposing and denouncing the many power configurations that dominate. **Power** indeed **does lie at the core of human misery, yet we [fool] ourselves if we regard this power as the power out there. Power, when all the complex networks** of its reach **are untangled, is personal; power does not exist out there,**  [\*630**]  it only exists in relationship**. To say the word, power, is to describe relationship, to acknowledge power, is to acknowledge our subservience in that relationship. **There can exist no power if the subservient relationship is refused**--then power can only achieve its ambitions through its naked form, as violence.  **Changing the world therefore is a misnomer for in truth it is relationships that are to be changed**. And the only relationships that we can change for sure are our own. And the constant in our relationships is ourselves--the "I" of all of us. And so, to change our relationships, **we must change the "I" that is each of us. Transformations of "structures" will soon follow**. This is, perhaps, the beginning of all emancipations. This is, perhaps, the essential message of Mahatmas...Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But **there are** **necessary prerequisites** **to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask** the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "**toward what end?" These questions**, obviously, **impinge on our vision** and judgment. **When we** attempt to **imagine transformations toward preferred human** futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because **we are oblivious to violence** or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And **without doubt, the perspectives of the** observer, commentator, and **actor become** **crucial determinants**. **It is necessary**, I believe, **to question** this, **"our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers** and critics, **but is** also **one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where** **we stand very much as participants**. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

#### Prefer the aff’s use of storytelling through poesis- lived experiences are key to understanding the past, present, and future of disability and order

Campbell 03 [Fiona Anne Kumari Campbell (B.L.S. (Hons) Latrobe; J.P. (Qual) Qld), 2003, Centre for Social Change Research, School of Humanities and Human Services, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia, “THE GREAT DIVIDE: ABLEISM AND TECHNOLOGIES OF DISABILITY PRODUCTION,” pg 2-3//BWSKR]

The telling of stories is a significant medium for the communication of ideas and values of culture as well as the transmission of the ‘memory’ of a body of people; a form of anamnesis that makes connections between the past, present and the future. Stories help us make sense of the world and the way in which we interpret the ‘nature’ of things and interpolate ways of difference. Sometimes these stories are explicitly named and actively exchanged, whilst others are more mundane, somewhat insidious - passing on in a multitude of remnants, connected, disconnected, contrary and multiple, eventually taking on the status of being considered a naturalized state of affairs, part of an a priori objective form of social ordering. The focal concerns of this doctorate relate to matters of ordering, disorder and constitutional compartmentalization between the ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ (c.f. Canguilhem, 1978) and the ways that stories about wholeness, health, enhancement and perfection are told. The Great Divide is for all intents and purposes a story (stories) about the creation and production of a certain kind of difference known under the contemporary neologism ‘disability’. As such, the stories are not finished, they are ongoing, they are highly contestable and the scripts are therefore necessarily partial. I have not set out to provide stories that speak of coherency or indeed conspiracy. Rather, just as the neologism ‘disability’ is elusive and catheretic, patterns of disorder and incongruity become the order

#### My speech rejects our attachment to norms that drain authenticity from discourse. Genocides don’t become fairy tales when we spread them. Debate’s norms fictionalize suffering through absurdity, to distract us from the oppression and inaccessibility of the space itself. Spurlock and Spanos 1:

[William V. Spanos 2011 Kdebate.com Interview,<William V. Spanos is a highly acclaimed author, World War II Veteran, POW at Dresden, distinguished professor of English and Comparative Literature at the SUNY Binghamton and well known in the competitive world of high school and intercollegiate academic debate..> William V. Spanos: An Interested Debate Inquiry An interview with Christopher Spurlock, <http://kdebate.com/spanos.html>]

The reason I asked you that question is because I've always thought that **the debate** system is **a rigged process,** by which I mean, in your terms, **it's framed to exclude anything that the frame can't contain and domesticate. To frame also means to "prearrange"** so that a particular outcome is assured," **which also means the what's outside of the frame doesn't stand a chance: it is "framed" from the beginning**. It was, above all, the great neo-Marxist Louis Althusser's analysis of the "problematic" - **the perspective or frame of reference fundamental to knowledge production** in democratic-capitalist societies -- that enabled me to see what the so called distinterestness of empirical inquiry is blind to or, more accurately willfully **represses** in its Panglossian **pursuit of the truth**. Althusser's analysis of the "problematic" is too complicated to be explained in a few words. (Anyone interested will find his extended explanation in his introduction --"From Capital\* to Marx's Philosophy" -- to his and Etienne Balibar's book \*Reading Capital\*. It will suffice here to say that we in the modern West have been \*inscribed\* by our culture --"ideological state apparatuses (educational institutions, media, and so on)-- by **a system of knowledge production that goes by the name of "disinterested inquiry," but in reality the "truth" at which it arrives is a construct, a fiction, and thus ideological. And this is precisely because, in distancing itself from earthly being** --the transience of time --this system of knowledge production privileges the panoptic eye in the pursuit of knowledge. This is what Althusser means by the "problematic": a frame that allows the perceiver to see only what it wants to see. Everything that is outside the frame doesn't exist to the perceiver. He /she is blind to it. It's nothing or, at the site of humanity, it's nobody. Put alternatively, the problematic -- **this frame, as the very word itself suggests, \*spatializes\* or \*reifies\* time -- reduces what is a living, problematic force and not a thing into a picture or thing so that it can be comprehended (taken hold of, managed), appropriated, administered, and exploited by the disinterested inquirer.** All that I've just said should suggest what I meant when, long ago, in response to someone in the debate world who seemed puzzled by the strong reservations I expressed on being informed that the debate community in the U.S. was appropriating my work on Heidegger, higher education, and American imperialism. I said then -- and I repeat here to you -- that **the traditional form of the debate, that is, the hegemonic frame that rigidly determines its protocols**-- is unworldly in an ideological way**. It willfully separates the debaters from the world as it actually is**-- by which I mean as it has been produced by the dominant democratic I capitalist culture --**and it displaces them to a free-floating zone**, a no place, as it were, where all things, nor matter how different the authority they command in the real world, are equal. But in \*this\* real world produced by the combination of Protestant Christianity and democratic capitalism things -- and therefore their value --are never equal. They are framed into a system of binaries-Identity/ difference, Civilization/barbarism I Men/woman, Whites/blacks, Sedentary/ nomadic, Occidental/ oriental, Chosen I preterit (passed over), Self-reliance I dependent (communal), Democracy I communism, Protestant Christian I Muslim, and so on -- in which the first term is not only privileged over the second term, but, in thus being privileged, is also empowered to demonize the second. Insofar as the debate world frames argument as if every position has equal authority (the debater can take either side) **it obscures and eventually effaces awareness of the degrading imbalance of power in the real world and the terrible injustices it perpetrates.** Thus framed, debate gives the false impression that it is a truly democratic institution, whereas in reality it is complicitous with the dehumanized and dehumanizing system of power that produced it. It is no accident, in my mind, that this fraudulent form of debate goes back to the founding of the U.S. as a capitalist republic and that it has produced what I call the "political class" to indicate not only the basic sameness between the Democratic and Republican parties but also its fundamental indifference to the plight of those who don't count in a system where what counts is determined by those who are the heirs of this quantitative system of binaries.

Debaters must disclose all positions on the wiki-theory school isn’t even on the wiki- independent voter. K2 accessibility because Full text is really hard for disabled debaters to read bc of processing issues. Also, they didn’t disclose their Ks and theory like they said that they have gone for which is bad for debaters w anxiey and ptsd- I need a check to see if ur positions talk abut sexual assault to prevent being triggered- voting issue you should reject ableism

# Frontlines

## CX

#### aff cx:

because I have done the best job performatively and methodologically rexposing the inner workings of power in this space. i say that its through policymaking debate we are unable to expose these inner workings

• you can contest w an alternative method for performing or these issues

#### neg cx:

what is a “deliberation technique”

how does this apply to the AC’s unique discourse

how does this work in the context of this round right now

why couldn’t you engage?

#### Here is an expansive, but not exhaustive, list of cites of arguments that would link into my aff and provide for a good methodological debate:

**K of Performance and Poetry**

Alvarez, PhD Candidate, 17 (Maximillian, 3-8, https://thebaffler.com/blog/circulate-now-mobilize-later)

Daniel 97 Jamie Owen Daniel, English Department, The University of Illinois at Chicago, “Does &quot;poetrymakes nothing happen?&quot;: The Case for Public Poetry as a Counter-Public Sphere”, 1997, http://english.rutgers.edu/does.htm , accessed January 30, 2002.

**Debate can’t solve issues**

Fahey 16 [Sean Fahey (Debate Coach, VBI Writer/Instructor, PDI Research Fellow, Rebel Without A Cause, my favorite human), “An Open Letter to the LD Community: Are We Putting Our Pedagogical Money Where Our Mouth Is?” The Public Debate Initiative. November 25, 2016. <https://publicdebateinitiative.org/2016/11/25/an-open-letter-to-the-ld-community/>]

**QUEER OPTIMISM:**

**Muñoz ’09** [Muñoz prof/chair of performance studies @ NYU 2k9 (José Esteban, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity)]

Manalansan ‘15 [Martin F. Manalansan IV (Associate Professor of all of the following at The University of Illinois: Gender and Women's Studies, Asian American Studies, Anthropology, Latin American and Caribbean Studies, LAS Global Studies, Center for East Asian and Pacific Studies, and Center for Global Studies. The author holds a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from The University of Rochester and studied philosophy, Asian Studies and anthropology at the University of the Philippines. As part of claims about futurity, the author references lived excahnges with queer trans women of color. The author also references concurring professional exchanges with David L. Eng, Professor of English at the University of Pennsylvania; Gayatri Gopinath, who  is an associate professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and director of Asian/Pacific/American Studies at New York University.; Roderick Ferguson, who is a professor of African American and Gender and Women's Studies in the African American Studies Department at the University of Illinois, Chicago; Chandan Reddy, who is an Associate Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality Studies at the University of Washington; and the late José Esteban Muñoz, was an American academic in the fields of performance studies, visual culture, queer theory, cultural studies, and critical theory); “A Question from Bruno Latour” This article is part of the series Queer Futures. Fieldsights - Theorizing the Contemporary, Cultural Anthropology Online, July 21, 2015 - <https://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/703-a-question-from-bruno-latour>]

**Discourse Ks, especially indicts of the word queer**

Samuelson-Roberts 15:MIRIAM SAMUELSON-ROBERTS “WHY “QUEER”? IS IT A SLUR?” 2015. http://queergrace.com/queer/

**ANTIPOLITICS:**

[Carl Boggs (National University, Los Angeles), “The Great Retreat: Decline of the Public Sphere in Late Twentieth-Century America”, 1997. http://www.nyu.edu/steinhardt/e/pdf/humsocsci/mias/readings07/10.pdf]

**EUROTRASH:**

Smulewicz-Zucker, Editor of Logos and adjunct professor of Philosophy at Baruch College, CUNY, and Thompson, Associate Professor of Political Science at William Paterson University, ’15 (Gregory and Michael J., “Introduction,” in Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics, pg. 1-32)

Johnson, Senior Research Fellow at the Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre (BICOM), professor of democratic theory and practice, editorial board member of Dissent magazine, and Senior Research Associate at The Foreign Policy Centre, ’15 (Alan, “Slavoj Žižek’s Linksfaschismus,” in Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics, Chapter 4)  (eurotrash)

Schwartz, Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University, ’15 (Joseph, “Being Postmodern While Late Modernity Burned: On the Apolitical Nature of Contemporary Self-Defined “Radical” Political Theory,” in Radical Intellectuals and the Subversion of Progressive Politics, ed. Gregory Smulewicz-Zucker and Michael J. Thompson, Chapter 7) (eurotrash)

**DECADANCE:**

Lewis Gordon 6—professor at philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at University of Connecticut Storrs—2006 (Disciplinary Decadence: Living Thought in Trying Times, p 28-29)

 Lewis Gordon—professor of philosophy, African and Judiac Studies at the University of Connecticut— 14 (“Disciplinary Decadence and the Decolonization of Knowledge,” Africa Development 39.1: 81-92, 86-88).

Bhambra and Margree 10 (Gurminder K. and Victoria, University of Warwick and University of Brighton, &quot; Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’,” Economic and political Weekly, April 2010, Volume xlv, Issue 15)

**SETCOL:**

Tuck & Yang; Yang ’14 [Tuck, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto, and Yang, Associate Professor at Ethnic studies department at UC San Diego, 2014 (Eve and K. Wayne, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” 2014, http://townsendgroups.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/tuckandyangrwords\_refusingresearch.pdf, accessed July 17, 2016)]

Berlant ‘99 [Berlant, George M. Pullman Distinguished Service Professor of English at the University of Chicago, 1999 (Lauren, “The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy and Politics” in the book Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics and the Law by Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, The University of Michigan Press, 1999, Pg 49-54)]

Tuck & Yang; Yang 2 [Tuck, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies inEducation (OISE), University of Toronto, and Yang, Associate Professor at Ethnic studies department at UC San Diego, 2014 (Eveand K. Wayne, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” 2014,http://townsendgroups.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/tuckandyangrwords\_refusingresearch.pdf, accessed July 17, 2016)]

Tuck & Yang; Yang 3 [Tuck, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto, and Yang, Associate Professor at Ethnic studies department at UC San Diego, 2014 (Eve and K. Wayne, “R-Words: Refusing Research,” 2014, http://townsendgroups.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/tuckandyangrwords\_refusingresearch.pdf, accessed July 17, 2016)]

**Cap root cause of ableism**

THOMAS SACZKOWSKI - University of Toronto, Community Development and Global Affairs Collaborative Program, Graduate Student “NARRATIVES OF VIOLENCE: THE RELATIONSHIP OF MASCULINITY AND ABLEISM”, November 20, 2011, https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/30054/1/Narratives\_of\_Violence\_tspace.pdf JJN

**FEM**

Masters- (Jytte, Masters @ U South Africa, Accepted Thesis Paper for Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT, [uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/10500/570/1/dissertation.pdf](http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/10500/570/1/dissertation.pdf))

## 1ar

#### Debate is ableist and forces ability checks- thats richter 15 and our inherency. Also, debate forces linear views of time, i.e. enology of the K. This has some pretty big impacts. The first is an exclusion DA, where queer and disabled individuals are not pedagogically allowed to enter the space because of its view of time and identity- that’s Mitchel and Snyder 14. Second is the idea that linear time always excludes usThe linearity of time is bad- that’s kafer 13-it follows this idea that we go from child to adolescent to adult and recycles, but thats not accessible to the disabled and queer body, both because our warrants on reproductive futurity but also that we live in the prognosis, the undefined and fluid existence of time. Thus the solvency- queer cripping. This can be seen in the performance of the 1ac as well as my physical speech act. This is our method- being myself in a space that forces me to be anyone but myself.

Disability and queerness do not function in linear time- it is in the prognosis, the purgatory, of which our existence hs no future, and lives in rapid and unstable bursts- thats kafer and Halberstam. Debate is ableist and forces ability checks- thats richter 15 and our inherency.   big impacts. 1. exclusion DA, where queer and disabled individuals are not pedagogically allowed to enter the space because of its view of time and identity- that’s Mitchel and Snyder 14. Second is the idea that linear time always excludes usThe linearity of time is bad- that’s kafer 13-it follows this idea that we go from child to adolescent to adult and recycles, but thats not accessible to the disabled and queer body, both because our warrants on reproductive futurity but also that we live in the prognosis, the undefined and fluid existence of time. Thus the solvency- queer cripping. This can be seen in the performance of the 1ac as well as my physical speech act. This is our method- being myself in a space that forces me to be anyone but myself.

## Overview on T

Disability and queerness do not function in linear time- it is in the prognosis, the purgatory, of which our existence hs no future, and lives in rapid and unstable bursts- thats kafer and Halberstam. Debate is ableist and forces ability checks- thats richter 15 and our inherency.   big impacts. 1. exclusion DA, where queer and disabled individuals are not pedagogically allowed to enter the space because of its view of time and identity- that’s Mitchel and Snyder 14. Thus the solvency- queer cripping. This can be seen in the performance of the 1ac as well as my physical speech act. This is our method of poesis- understanding hwo disability fucntions with ived experience allows us to understand how to have better solutions in the future, that’s campbell.

AC comes first- rules are for the ungovernable-the 1ac’s critical contestation into the question of ungovernable consciousness opens up a form of debate that engages with valuable knowledges outside of statist discourse, their interp predetermines debates away from intellectual exploration, our arg is that that is capitalist nonsense and obsessions with linear time are meant to suppress the deviant bodies from forming a coherent body politic- also means no TVA. Also, its k2 to having an intellectual groundwork for a system of debate that lets us have practical liberation strategies tahts McRuer- reset of norms are in response to violent structuring of identity formation in debate thats richter.

The aff is also an impact turn to T for 2 reasons- 1. Your conception is based in the universalizable maxim of what is fair, which is what we critique. 2. Predictable stasis points prioritize static views of time and identity, which we say is uniquely bad. also key to authenticity- over transparency of arguments leads to scripting of social discussions- your not an avticist, you’re just reading a pre-scripted 2nr your coach wrote youThis means we control the internal internal link- w.out accurate view of how we exist in debate we cant have accurate policy discourse – the aff allows us to understand now we are complicit in the oppression we try to solve back, and make better informed args on how we execute policies. This o/w limits- we should prioritize being critically educated and better advocates over havin the same bland rounds about util and extinction

## Bllshit

### Presumption

No presumption, the 1ac wins solvency so you can vote aff. View the 1ac in a vacuum- Rejecting linear time solves back ableism. Also, actions are moral! We shuld take steps to confront ableism that is a moral stance

### Skep

Independent voting issue- ableism is bad, either abeism is bad an the aff isn’t skeptical or ableism is good and that’s an independent voting issue

## T Line by Line

### Counter-Interp

CI: the interp plus my aff

1. Solves predictable limits- its all affs on the topic plus my aff so you don’t have an infinite prep burden
2. ac is a good idea- if we win any risk of solvency then the ci solves
3. accessibility- the aff is good for queer and disabled debaters because it allows us to understand our indetities without attatchment to norms that oppress us. THIS O/W YOUR STANDARDS- the abuse you talk about is abt in the round, but the aff is key to getting queer/disabled debaters into the space itself.

CI: the interp with my aff!

1. ac is a good idea- if we win any risk of solvency then the ci solves
2. authenticity- over transparency of arguments leads to scripting of social discussions- your not an avticist, you’re just reading our old framework blocks that whit gave you
3. 1ac is key to having an intellectual groundwork for a system of debate that lets us have practical liberation strategies tahts McRuer- reset of norms are in response to violent structuring of identity formation in debate thats richter.
	1. also, critical contestation understand how args function and our place within them- means the aff is k2 policy discourse and foreign policy- it allows us to understand now we are complicit in the oppression we try to solve back, and make better informed args on how we execute policies
	2. internal link- w.out accurate view of how we exist in debate we cant have good arguments about the topic

also err aff on T- the 1nc can collapse to one sentence in the shell and moot 6 min of GOOD ac offense

### A la carte

The interp rhetoric is what we critique- normative ideas of what actions should be taken are based on the linear views of time that value stability over the real lived experiences of queer and disabled bodies

On engagement-

1. Your dialogue arg is abhorrent- the 1ac is grouned in academic work, you just chose to ignore it. If we win any reason why you could have engaged, you shouldn’t vote on T because no real abuse.
2. The 1ac doesn’t protest your ability to test the aff. Its predictable, the ev is out there, and you could link in so many ways- ie a boggs cede the political k, word piks, queer optimism, cap, etc Check out Harvard westlae’s wiki for some detailed prepouts to tis aff it exists lol.
3. Cx and disclosure solve- you had access to the entirety of the 1ac an hour before the round- this solves back research accessibility and neg ground because you had full access but didn’t use it. Open source also solves- means not a monologue- its not my fault that you didn’t prepare
4. Structuring to favor the aff is good because we shoud be forefronting queer/crip scholarship- that’s Mitchel and Snyder
5. Enagement is terminal defense at best- I read an aff that indicted T and im affirming, and you told me that I should affirm the topic- if anything, thats your best engagement, so you did
6. You aren’t negating my identity- you are negating the method of the aff-that solves dialoguism
7. ON LEEK- turn Policy debate is innacessile because it forces us to perform as actors that we can never bealso fiat is illusory means only value in round args/impacts
8. Footnoting DA- the TVa ushes the discourse aside to make it easier for you- that’s not good
9. Switch side doesn’t solve- we should reject ableism and homophobia in ALL instances, not just the ones that are convienent for you.
10. Ballot paradox non unique- logical fallacy, no int link btwn my wanting the ballot and voting neg. Wanting discourse and a ballot are not mutually exclusive. Also, our way to be competitive is different than yours and we win tat our process is good so vote aff.

On framing

1. Turn- Intrinsicness is subjective and favors neurotypical views of decision making. Vote aff to reject ableist thinking
2. Our process is good because we reject their process- proves the AC method because I broke norms
3. the T debate is a question of if the aff is desirable enough to respond. We’ve proven that the aff is good to discuss, which is the net ben to the ci. give us an rvi because T debate is not a question of the burden of topicality but rather a question of whether the aff is good or not. if we prove its good and they dont debate it they should lose. also means reasonability- its not about being ‘reasonably topical’ its about being a reasonably desirable action.
4. You say tva or on the neg, but no, that doesn’t solve. Also, means tthat if u could prepare for the framing on neg, you should have been prepared for the aff
5. also err aff on T- the 1nc can collapse to one sentence in the shell and moot 6 min of GOOD ac offense

### 2a overviews

Overview: crossapp richter-debate is bad and so are its norms. The 1ac impact turns T because they emphasize stable norms but we say stability is bad. AC also a prereq- our framing proves we need to understand how we are complicit in violence, but the 1ac just replicates the violent form of stability with the label of woke and accessible.

### I meets

#### We meet- the aff defends the hypothetical implementation of a policy- our advocacy of endorsing the queer prognosis of time is an intrest, and the aff argues that this view should be adopted, which is a procedure

Merriam- Webster 18 [Merriam-Webster Dictionary (America's leading and most-trusted provider of language information), 2018, Merriam-Webster, “Policy,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/policy

Definition of policy plural policies 1 a : prudence or wisdom in the management of affairs b : management or procedure based primarily on material interest 2 a : a definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions b : a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body

we meet- we defend an advocacy that is topical- it talks about a topic and that topic is the normative aspects of debate

### Procedural Fairness/Normsetting

1. Cross apply from the aff- this is just straight/liner time
2. AC impact turns Fairness
3. Accessibility and critical education come first
4. Non verifiable and no briteline, I adhered to speech times, I did CX. There is no briteline for how much procedural fairess was lost, and it is non verifiable if it was lost in the first place

#### Fuck ‘real world advocacy.’I could never be your ‘policymaker’- to be a politician and to be mentally ill are incompatible

Thomson 15 [Alex Thomson (editorial assistant at the New York Times), nov/dec 2015, Politico, “Could America Elect a Mentally Ill President,” <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/politics-mental-illness-history-213276> //BWSKR]

Political taboos, campaign dealbreakers and electoral glass ceilings are crumbling. Members of Congress are openly gay and bisexual, there’s a black man in the White House, and a woman may be next. Voters have accepted all sorts of behavioral warts and missteps in their political candidates, too. DUIs? A mistake of their youth. Draft dodgers? There’s a long list. Womanizers? A much longer list. Illegal drugs? In just a few short elections, we’ve gone from a president who “didn’t inhale” to one who openly admits using cocaine in his youth. Yet one large taboo remains stubbornly fixed—mental illness. Sure, it’s part of the conversation, in that pundits these days can, and do, speculate casually about whether Donald Trump has narcissistic personality disorder, Joe Biden has slid into depression, Hillary Clinton is clinically paranoid or Jeb Bush will be undone by a Freudian sibling tangle. But here’s the really sick thing: For a politician to admit to seeing a psychiatrist would likely be far more politically damaging than any of the possible symptoms of actual mental illness. For a president or a candidate, it’s the “kiss of death,” says Burton Lee, George H.W. Bush’s presidential physician. It would “create a crisis of confidence” in the country, says David Axelrod, former senior adviser to President Barack Obama. “I’d like to believe I’m wrong,” he adds, but a commander in chief who disclosed a mental illness would face an almost insurmountable political problem: “Every time he said a cross word or expressed frustration, people would say, ‘He’s having one of those days.’” Instead, Axelrod wryly notes, “We just watch their hair turn gray.” More than 40 years have passed since Thomas Eagleton, the 1972 Democratic vice presidential candidate, withdrew from the race after revealing that he had been hospitalized for depression. Since that political firestorm, the issue has remained firmly off-limits: No Democratic or Republican nominee running for president or vice president has disclosed mental illness or treatment for it ever since—to do so would be politically incurable. And as recently as the last election cycle, congressional and state-level campaigns were digging up past psychiatric treatment to bludgeon their opponents. “Any vulnerability can be exploited by people and will be,” explains Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House and presidential candidate, whose late mother had bipolar disorder. “That’s just the nature of a very rough-and-tumble-type business.” As a result, the notion of politicians merely consulting with a mental health professional remains the topic of only hushed conversations or forceful denials. When President Bill Clinton admitted to infidelity and impeachment loomed, talking to a psychiatrist remained a political nonstarter. Aides told reporters that Clinton was seeking the counsel of Christian ministers but was “not under any medical treatment for any psychiatric or mental condition.” Even two decades later, “crazy” remains a politically acceptable epithet, whether it’s Obama taunting Republican opponents or Representative Trey Gowdy quipping that he did not want to wrangle members of the House in a leadership position because he did not “have a background in mental health.” Yet, a review of the historical record finds that past commanders in chief, even well-regarded ones, struggled with mental health problems throughout their presidencies. “It’s a cliché that you have to be nuts to run for president,” says Evan Thomas, the journalist and historian whose latest book is an intimate biography of President Richard Nixon. “Like most clichés, it’s at least partly true.” Psych\_sidebarlead2.jpg THE BIG IDEA Diagnosing the Urge to Run for Office By POLITICO MAGAZINE 10/29/15 07:20 PM EDT America's leading mental health practitioners ask the question: are you nuts to run for president? Nixon and John F. Kennedy clandestinely filled their medicine cabinets with psychotropic drugs, recently uncovered documents reveal. In fact, Kennedy aide and historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. suggested in his journals that several modern presidents were mentally unbalanced; he recorded top aides arguing whether President Lyndon Johnson was clinically paranoid or a manic-depressive, and fretted that there was no constitutional “procedure for dealing with nuts.” In other words, mental illness is surely more common in Washington than the public knows or wants to believe. In 2006, after an embarrassing car accident, Representative Patrick Kennedy, JFK’s nephew, became a rare politician to announce he would seek treatment for his addiction and bipolar disorder. Soon, Kennedy says, several congressional colleagues privately revealed their own illnesses to him—but would not make them public. After interviewing more than three dozen people for this article, I found only one current member of Congress who has been open while in office about struggling with mental health: freshman Arizona Representative Ruben Gallego, an Iraq War veteran who suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. When it comes to their mental health, however, politicians, including the one with the nuclear launch codes, are “just like everybody else,” Lee says. Some diagnoses are dangerous, but others are manageable with treatment. For instance, he says, “A president can function very well if he has a mild anxiety disorder or obsessive compulsive [disorder].” Which raises the question: When roughly a fifth of American adults use medication and millions go to talk therapy for their mental health, why shouldn’t the people governing the country be able to as well? \*\*\* Weaver\_lead1.jpg POLITICS Winning Isn’t Everything By JASON ZENGERLE Huck\_lead\_right.jpg THE POLITICO MAG PROFILE The Invisible Man By SIMON VAN ZUYLEN-WOOD peterson-001.jpg OPTICS Front Row at the Political Theater By MARK PETERSON It would be hard for any public figure afflicted by the most severe mental illnesses—with symptoms like psychosis, hallucination and catatonic behavior—to evade notice or fully carry out his or her duties. But most people in psychiatric care do not have such debilitating disorders. Still, American politicians have historically grappled with milder symptoms—powerful mood swings, depression and anxiety—while serving in office, including the White House. Those afflictions can be exacerbated by the job. While scientists are still trying to understand the underlying medical causes of most mental illnesses, they are at least partly environmental; high stress can cause completely rational feelings of grief, concern and disappointment to become something more unstable. In the White House, Axelrod says, “The pressures are beyond anything that human beings are designed to handle.” During the 1960 race, an aide misplaced Kennedy’s medication. “Find that bag,” he instructed. In the hands of his opponents, he said, “it would be murder.” Yet the presence of such ailments, particularly at the highest levels of government, remains little known and little discussed. Asked whether Obama has ever consulted a psychiatrist, a White House official declined to discuss the president’s medical care. While the White House occasionally releases summaries of the president’s health, presidents and their doctors have lied and obfuscated in the past. Even after a president leaves office, medical records are considered private, not public record. As a result, the little we know about presidents’ mental health comes from sporadic glimpses at diaries or health records released only under rare circumstances. Abraham Lincoln was famously melancholy, experiencing periods of such deep depression throughout his lifetime that he contemplated suicide and spent weeks at a time bedridden. The future president even tried the 19th-century version of an antidepressant: “blue mass” pills that, unfortunately for Lincoln, were a poisonous combination of ground mercury, rosewater and honey. (“The opposition researchers of today would have been very eager to discover Lin coln’s propensity for depression,” says presidential historian Michael Beschloss. “If they had, we might have lost perhaps our greatest president.”)

#### Policy debate is inaccessible for disabled people.

Richter 15. Zahari Richter is a Policy Debate Coach, is a Ph.D. Candidate in Communications and has a Master’s in Disability Studies. “2 Disability analyses of Policy Debate” [CORNELL DEBATE ]<http://zachrichter.weebly.com/awkward-gestures-blog/-2-disability-analyses-of-policy-debate>. 7/23/2015) [LL 17]

The Inaccessible game One part of my experience with policy debate is a reflection of my experiences as a disabled gamer. Like with the Nintendo 64 controller or later, the keyboard or mouse, I just could not figure out how to hold the controller. Intercollegiate debate also has an inaccessible interface. Video game controllers: expect you to move in certain ways, to hold the mouse and hold multiple fields of attention, attain a certain level of game space feeling and knowledge with the visuals, sounds and uses of the controller. Debate, similarly, relies on nonverbal and verbal engagements with the judge or person opposite them in the room---these engagements have steeper learning curves for some than others because communication itself is a culturally soaked activity. Like using a mouse is bad on my dexterity, using a face is bad for my communicative impairments. I did my best debating when I could shake my body into an emotional-speech inferno. When I was allowed to not use a flow, I gave better speeches. The multiple activities of taking notes and speech preparation illegitimately favor those with certain types of spatial and study based intelligence and brutally punish those whose learning styles or form of intelligence departs from debate norms. Video games also, would punish players for incomplete knowledge or use of the controls, but in video games, I would enter cheat codes because it is better to see some of the game than be held back terribly due to dexterity and spatial limits. Debate sees an unusual part of the academy where highly scholarly activities are taking place, but note-takers are not available and assistance with the material or the translation of it into other forms is also not available. In this way, like video games, debate on the basis of their justification of competitiveness builds inaccessibility into its game. The inaccessibility of the debate space in a broad way is due to the twin combinations of institutional over-arrogance: the snobbery of knowledge in the academy, the brutishness of professional sports. A true conversation has to be had about inaccessibility in the debate world, about whether organizations such as the NDT should advertise that they exclude disabled people on the basis of not having access services built in. Campbell has written about inaccessibility as having negative health effects upon the disabled, it also has negative social effects, isolating disabled people for over-reacting to the elitist condition of the place. Then, most debaters in the debate world who are disabled hide it because of the scorn placed upon it. And even this try at hiding sometimes falls apart and they are left having to scrounge for excuses. Compliance is hardly a step. Disabled people are widely excluded from debate on the basis of the narcissism among debaters that think of their activity as a touchstone for future leaders. Accessibility would bring in a far wider population and further activate debate as tool for wider radicalization. The affirmation of the disabled person in the debate space could open prisons, nursing homes and hospitals to participate, then informing and persuasively empowering other forsaken members of the disabled world. 2. Debate as trauma: how debate traumatizes and how debate changes trauma Debate or the competitive policy debate that I participated in almost always takes place in a school and involves contestants speaking loudly and often emotionally at each other about politics at a high and fast volume. This amounts to the taking of the childhood classroom intimidation to its furthest level; in a debate when you make a mistake you may anger up to four other people in the room, staring at you. The rapid-fire exchanges, the emotionality of debate are part of what make it memorable but also how it gives the formative childhood traumas of the school house a new lease on life through repetitions of scolding by both classmate and teacher. The fast speech also offers an air of intensity. The hyperbolous building upon adolescent schoolyard nightmares by debate with the high degree of academic veneer coating its language, result in debate losses seeming to resonate back to failures of intellect that put into question self-value that was already fecked by repeated miscommunications. For many of us, debate rounds on important things echo in our dreams for years afterward. Then, the echoing of traumatic debate experiences across time can be felt in the form of how the voice and body react to argumentative encounters. Hostile debate norms literally code the reactions former debaters when they get into an argument. A fierceness can often be heard when you hear a former debater arguing. For the debater, who has used interpersonal communication as a fencing stick for two competitors to brandish intellectually against each other, to show weakness in an interaction is to lose. Debate expectations and rules seem to stick to the body; even when debate life is filled with critiques of those rules. The traumatic stickiness of the habits of the debate world as well as its psychosocial intensity justify all the more clearly why debate norms need to be overhauled**.**

### Predictable limits

1. the aff is disclosed
2. on contestability- you are able to contest the aff- we say you need a counter method and counter performance or at least just indict ours. We don’t ask or force you to defend that debate is not ableist, or that ableism doesn’t exist.
3. Better to under than overlimit- specifically with this topic. Because of broad definitions almost all affs are not topical in some way- if we police affs and only allow a certain aount that falls under ‘topical’ then we could only have debates about the general principle

### Ground

1. you are able to contest our METHOD!
2. the aff is a stable advocacy- disclosure and cx solve
3. no reason why negating in this case is necessary- you are given ground. you can contest my method and performance. You also have hundreds of other rounds to talk about topial debate- THEY GIVE NO REASON WHY THIS ROUND IS KEY TO TALK ABOUT THE TOPIC. their only reason would be that it will make them lose, but maybe they should lose so that they can learn to engage in arguments like the AC

### Deliberation

1. this isn’t specific to our micro political actions. there is no impact of the deliberation argument that links to the specific performance of the 1ac

2. prognosis of time args would mean that there is no impact- even if the alt right can use something hypothetically we say reject their notions of futurity

3. you could deliberate!

4. TURN- deliberate formats such as debate are bad and must be rehauled thats our richter 15 ev

5. this doesn’t make any sense. if the topic is bad and inaccessible for a certain group- i.e. how i cannot affirm bc i am not seen as a good source, then T is never reasonable

6. reasonability is subjective

7. no we say that normative debate fails to solve- we outweigh on circularity- there is no way to overhaul the system through adhering to what the system wants us to be- to clarify by forcing me to be someone i am not i am forced to abandon my queer crip identity. I cannot be a policymaker, so I can’t defend that aff they want while being myself. this o/w on terms of accessibility.

### Inacessibe

YOU AWERE ABLE TO RESPOND 1. Open sourced I tod u what the aff would be 2. Cx checks 3. The lit is out there you just didn’t prepare for it that’s not my problem- means you can weigh the aff.

1. disclosure solves- Harvard Westlake has some p specific cae negs to my args and they are fully accessible to you
2. inaccessibility in debate is inevitable, so vote aff to take an active syance against inaccessibility. Also, you’re from Harker I very much doubt thatyou don’t have the prep to respond- don’t coopt small shool narrativs bc you didn’t cut enough cads on isability lit
3. aff is Not oppression Olympics- you can mae args about how my method is excluisionary, Its not abut my identity, its abiut the identity in general

### Cede the political

1. NO IMPACT- we are in a debate round. My reading this aff will not lead to the alt right walking in and coopt the round
2. Forces a linear view of the future that we reject

### Switch side

1. this is a bad norm- there are some times where you can’t switch side. For example, on the conscription I couldn’t affirm and be myself because I will never be conscripted because I have been hospitalized and I have ptsd. I cant own a handgun either bc of my disability. I cannot be my queer/crip self and affirm this topic because I will never be a policymaker, let alone be a source that find credible because of my severe mental illness.

### TVA

1. there is no TVA- disabled people are not seen as reliable sources, so we wouldn’t even be in the game
2. ‘topical version of the aff’ forces us to abandon micropolitical discourse like the aff- we would just be talking about helping the universal monolith of ‘disabled people’ but doing NOTHING for the people in our community who are disabled

## T framing

their version of fairness is bad and exclusionary- accessibility always comes first

ON IPX- Accessibility comes 1st

1. It establishes who is allowed to enter the debate space in the first space, whereas fairness only evaluates the injustice within the round- you can only be unfair if you are able to compete
2. The shell is forced assimilation- that’s Richter 15- you force us to adhere to what you think debate ‘should’ be. We argue that debate norms are bad and should be overhauled, so the AC turns the shell
3. Fairness in this context is circular- they claim being unfair is bad, yet they still allow injustice in the debate space by reading T

On education-

1. Your education model is bad that’s micthel and Snyder 14

## Ks

### Anthro

1. UQ overwhelms the link- anthro links to the generics of the AC but not to any of the specifics of the AC- means that the impacts are diminished because they could read this in literally any other round but we argue that the AC’s method is key to combat ableism in debate

#### Perm do both without the word “vegetal”- the word “vegetable” is a slur to refer to those in comatose as a substitute for acknowledging their disability.

Smith 09 [ s.e. smith (s.e. smith is a recalcitrant, grumpy person with disabilities who enjoys riling people up, talking about language, tearing apart poor science reporting, and chasing cats around the house with squeaky mice in hand) Disabled Feminists, “Ableist Word Profile: Vegetable”http://disabledfeminists.com/2009/10/21/ableist-word-profile-vegetable/ //BWSKR]

Today’s word: vegetable, in reference to a person in a coma. I hope I don’t need to explain why this is ableist, people. Here’s an illustrated guide. These are vegetables: Photograph of vegetables in large baskets at a farmers market, including eggplant, bell peppers, tomatoes, summer squash, and bok choy. Image taken by computix and licensed under Creative Commons. Photograph of vegetables in large baskets at a farmers' market, including eggplant, bell peppers, tomatoes, summer squash, and bok choy. Image taken by computix and licensed under Creative Commons. This is a person: Photograph of a tattooed person with short dark hair crouched in a sea-green bathtub, arms outstretched and head in the tub. Photograph taken by J. Star and licensed under Creative Commons. Photograph of a tattooed person with short dark hair crouched in a sea-green bathtub, arms outstretched and head in the tub. Photograph taken by J. Star and licensed under Creative Commons. Vegetables are tasty delicious things which we consume. People are, well, people. People are not vegetables. Ever. There is a medical condition with the unfortunate name Persistent Vegetative State (PVS). The origins of the term are a bit unclear, but I think we can safely assume that they are probably not favourable to people with disabilities. This condition is actually misdiagnosed and confused with other conditions; for example, locked-in syndrome can resemble PVS. I would also like to note, for the record, that it is possible to recover from this state, unlike a vegetable, which cannot recover after you have eaten it. But just because doctors use the word “vegetative” when discussing a particular medical condition doesn’t mean that you should use it, especially if you are not even using it to refer to that medical condition. Or even that they should use it, honestly. It is unbelievably offensive to call someone a vegetable. So, when in the heck did we start referring to people as vegetables?! Around the 1850s, people began using the term to talk about things which were dull, boring, and uneventful; the slang terms “dull as a turnip” and “turnip head” are also relics of the idea that vegetables are boring. By 1921, it was in use to refer to people who lived lives perceived as dull by others. Which is, you know, not very cool, but is also a usage rarely heard today, because when the word is used in reference to people, it is used almost exclusively to talk about people who have experienced traumatic brain incidents and are unconscious, or awake, but not aware. It’s not really clear which medical condition people are thinking of when they talk about someone as a “vegetable,” although presumably it is supposed to reference a coma or similar state from which someone will not recover. Whatever people are using it to refer to, it needs to stop. People should not refer to someone in a coma as a “vegetable.” They should use the proper medical term for whatever condition that person actually has. Since that person is not in a state to communicate about which term they would prefer, going with an actual medical diagnosis is reasonable. This term also shouldn’t be used in a slangy way as in “don’t drink and drive, or you might become a vegetable.” How about just “don’t drink and drive, you might severely injure yourself or others”? Now then. That’s not hard, is it? Now, here’s a personal anecdote which I think explains why the term “vegetable” offends me so deeply. A few years ago, a man who had been a friend of mine in high school was involved in a serious car accident. He was airlifted to the nearest hospital capable of dealing with severe trauma, but it quickly became evident that he was not going to recover and was in fact actively dying. So, his family made the choice to donate his still-viable organs. When I attended the memorial (which included several very touching readings of letters from people who had received organs from him), I saw a woman walk up to his grieving mother and sister and say “well, at least you did the right thing and donated his organs once you knew he was going to be a vegetable.” Yeah. Case closed.

1. Perm double bind-either the alt isn’t strong enough to solve back the harms of the AC or it is strong enough to solve back the links- means u prefer the perm in either world

#### The net bens are the Mitchell and Synder 14 card- disabled and queer individuals will always be on the backburner and the NC’s inclusive education is not enough, and the AC’s discourse about how the debate space uniquely hams disabled people- prefer authentic and particular discourse that’s nayar 99

### “Silence”

#### Metaphors of overcoming silence equate experiences of those unable to do so as inauthentic.

Chen 13 (Mel Y Chen, “Asian American Speech, Civic Place, and Future Nondisabled Bodies”, p. 91-92, http://uclajournals.org/doi/abs/10.17953/amer.39.1.n6t6477372245h46)

Following Piepzna-Samarasinha in her call to envision alternative methods of organizing and activism, I am interested in how contemporary public protest and slogans—many of which are mobilized in community organizing—articulate themselves (sometimes in subtle ways) in terms of race and disability. I consider how these slogans both construct a certain audience of address and, as part of their less apparent consequences, erase or render impossible others. With a focus on Asian American constructs and disability politics, I look at the idealized future bodies implicated in protest slogans dependent on common political appeals to imagined able-bodiedness or nondisability. In particular, I am concerned with the well-known slogan “silent no more,” which is utilized in a host of contexts across the ideological spectrum, from domestic violence awareness campaigns to anti-choice, anti-abortion testimonials. “Silent no more” appeals are arguably constructed on ideals of white liberal civic (speechly) participation and political representation. These ideals have endured throughout decades of formation of what Wendy Brown calls “the collective insurrectionary subject.”7 For the “silent” in the activist engagements of “silent no more” to at once be a metaphor for a condition of disenfranchisement or oppression and to also always have the possibility of being literally interpreted suggests an implicit but generally unacknowledged effect of expelling and banishing all things “silent” to the past, and hence also from a possible future. As Brown writes, “the belief that silence and speech are opposites is a conceit underlying most contemporary discourse about censorship and silencing.”8 The use of “silence” in the context of protest speech also assumes that to speak—to “break the silence”—is to reverse or overcome a dynamic in which speechlessness is equated with powerlessness. In addition, the silence-speech bifurcation enables the assumption, according to Brown, that “when an enforced silence is broken, what emerges is truth borne by the vessel of authenticity or experience.”9 Thus when silence endures, the capacity for truth-telling or “authentic” experience is presumed to be absent, or at least muffled. What is meant by silence and speech, of course, is always an open question. Silence and speech are multiplicitous in meaning, as feminist writers such as Audre Lorde and Adrienne Rich have noted.10 If we begin with perhaps the most literal kind of silence, we assume it means no perceivable, differentiated sound—an absence of detectable frequencies. In linguistics and language studies, silence can certainly be understood as an absence of (meaningful) linguistic production, along the lines of what Brown glosses as negativity. It can also be understood as integral to speech, in the case of the phonetic class of plosives such as “t,” “p,” in which no auditory signal is produced until the short burst which completes the plosive articulation. Silence also operates integrally to speech, in the form of a pause, a demarcation of a turn, or the completion of an idea. Silence can also be understood as a positive linguistic entity in itself, a “communicative device” particular to a given cultural arena and serving a special function. Thus, silence can function as a refusal to participate, or as an observance or show of respect. However, such accounts seem still to focus on the structural significance of silence and hence they do not account for the many incidental silences that fall out of discomfort: the loss for words, the lack of authority to speak, the experience of risk, or the start-up time of making an effort in a new language. When non-English-speaking immigrants or those who have non-normative modes of speaking enter the consideration, silence itself necessarily becomes more complex. For instance, sign language users are frequently depicted as “silent,” but the auditory linguistic criterion of silence only applies to oral speech, not signing. Even the idea that signers are “soundless” is unfounded; the attribution of “silence” derives more from assumptions and audist ideology than from actual practice. There are many examples of both this stereotype and efforts to gainsay it. For instance, Karen Nakamura, in her anthropological study of the cultures and politics of deafness in postwar Japan, observes that “gatherings of deaf people are rarely silent. The deaf parties that I attended were just as raucous as any hearing gathering of Japanese people.”11

### “Stand”

Chen 13 (Mel Y Chen, “Asian American Speech, Civic Place, and Future Nondisabled Bodies”, p. 91-92, http://uclajournals.org/doi/abs/10.17953/amer.39.1.n6t6477372245h46)

By extending Piepzna-Samarasinha’s proposition to value acts and figurations of politics that are done “flat on our ass in bed,” this essay thus begins, not ends, with a reversal of the premise by which ability is attached to liberatory politics.2 I am less concerned with articulating an identitarian “we” of address than I am aware of the ways in which a reliance on historical identity can blockade intersectional contours as well as present contingencies, precluding a recognition of the multiple agencies and epistemologies necessary for a robust pursuit of justice. These concerns about identity’s limits have been articulated for both Disability Studies and Asian American Studies. The grammar of ableist liberatory fervor is succinctly captured, for instance, in the widespread use today of declamatory campaigns that urge one to metaphorically “stand with” various populations or politicians. Such a metaphor is constructed on the figurative imagining of a literal standing. The question becomes what might it mean to “stand with” a figural group, when standing for wheelchair users, or those chronically ill “flat on our ass in bed,” cannot readily invite such “politically aligned” embodied action.

### Antiblackness

#### INDEPENDENT VOTER- you shouldn’t read antiblackness if you aren’t black- my opponent coopts the oppression faced by black bodies in society without ever having to experience that oppression their self, which makes the advocacy less meaningful and makes debate worse because they are able to win rounds for their non-black advocacy while black and brown debaters are made fun of in rounds for reading literature related to their own identities

#### CHECK YOURSELF! privilege recognition is independently good, but also makes for better debates because there is better education. An integral part of actually understanding the critical literature that we read is understanding our privilege in relation to the literature, anything else is dishonest academia

The AC turns the K- Ontology is ableist-it is based on psychoanalysis which perpetrates the linear view of medical disability. Also, the k is based on a genealogical study of blackness, but the ac argues that this is not accessible to queer and disabled people because we ecist in lines of flight. This is an intersectionality DA to the k- you exclude people at the intersection of blackness and disability.

No link- we reject cruel optimism, that’s hedva

#### A Neg ballot allows the judge to take pleasure in the suffering of the black body and is dependent on the notion of the black body as fungible – turns the case

Hartman 97 (Saidiya Hartman, Associate prof of English at Cal Berk, 1997, Scenes of Subjection p. 25-6. SPP)

Rankin was not alone in his desire to slip into blackness and experience the¶ suffering of slavery "firsthand," so to speak. On the contrary, the popularity of¶ Uncle Tom's Cabin and The Octoroon indicates the willingness of others to suffer,¶ too. The elasticity of blackness and its capacious affects enabled such flights and¶ becomings. Moreover, in this case, the figurative capacities of blackness and the fungibility of the commodity are directly linked. The fungibility of the commodity, specifically its abstractness and immateriality, enabled the black body or blackface mask to serve as the vehicle of white self-exploration, renunciation, and enjoyment.¶ 22 Therefore, the ability to put on blackness must be considered in the context¶ of chattel slavery and the economy of enjoyment founded thereupon. Antebellum ·¶ formations of pleasure, even those of the North, need to be considered in relation to¶ the affective dimensions of chattel slavery since enjoyment is virtually unimaginable¶ without recourse to the black body and the subjection of the captive, the diversions¶ engendered by the dispossession of the enslaved, or the fantasies launched by the¶ myriad uses of the black body. For this reason the formal features of this economy of¶ pleasure and the politics of enjoyment are considered in regard to the literal and¶ figurative occupation and possession of the body. This reading attempts to elucidate¶ the means by which the wanton use of and the violence directed toward the black body come to be identified as its pleasure and dangers-that is, the expectations of slave property are ontologized as the innate capacities and inner feelings of the enslaved, and moreover, the ascription of excess and enjoyment to the African effaces the violence perpetrated against the enslaved**.** In light of these issues, the¶ schematic analysis of minstrelsy and melodrama that follows focuses on the convergence¶ of violence and pleasure, which is identified as one of the primary attributes of¶ this economy of enjoyment, rather than providing a close reading of the texts of¶ minstrelsy and melodrama. Scant attention is paid to the white spectator's identification¶ with blackface characters. Instead, the major issue explored is the relation¶ between pleasure and violence-that is, the facility of blackness in the other's self-fashioning¶ and the role of pleasure in securing the mechanisms of racial subjection.¶ In other words, this economy of enjoyment is interrogated through a consideration¶ of the dynamics of possession and close scrutiny of the object of property and its¶ uses.

#### White supremacy finds pleasure in the pain of the black body That reifies hierarchies and perpetuates antiblack violence. Turns case

Hartman 97 [saidya Hartman, professor at Columbia University specializing in African American literature and history. She grew up in Brooklyn and received her B.A. from Wesleyan University and Ph.D. from Yale University, Scenes of Subjection, Accessed: 4/25/14, NC]

What concerns me here is the spectacular nature of black suffering and, conversely, the dissimulation of suffering through spectacle. In one respect,the combination of imagined scenes of cruelty with those culled from the unquestionable authority evidences the crisis of witnessing that results from the legalsubjection of slaves. At the same time, the spectacular dimension of slavery engender the crisis of witnessing as much as the representation of black testimony since to the degree that the body speaks it is made to speak the master’s truth and augments his power through the imposition and intensification of pain. All of this is further complicated by the “half-articulate” and “incoherent song” that confounds the transparent of testimony and radically complicates the rendering of slavery. In light of these concerns this chapter wrestles with the following questions: Does the extension of humanity to the enslaved ironically reinscribe their subjugated statues? Do the figurative capacities of blackness enable white flights of fantasy while increasing the likelihood of the captive’s disappearance? Can the moral embrace of pain extricate itself from the pleasure borne by subjection? In other words, does the scene of the tyrannized slave at the bloodstained gate delight the loathsome master and provide wholesome pleasures to the upright and the virtuous? Is the act of “witnessing” a kind of looking no less entangled with the wielding of power and the extraction of enjoyment? Does the captive’s dance allay grief or articulate the fraught, compromised, and impossible character of agency? Or does it exemplify the use of the body as an instrument against the self? The scenes of subjection considered here– the coerced spectacles orchestrated to encourage the trade in black flesh; scenes of torture and festivity*; the tragedy of virtuous women and the antics of outrageous ~~darkies~~*all turn upon the simulation of agency and the excesses of black enjoyment. The affliction of performance and blackness can be attributed to the spectacularization of black pain*and racist conceptions of Negro nature as carefree, infantile, hedonistic, and indifferent to suffering and to an interested misreading of the interdependence of labor and song common among the enslaved.* The constitution of blackness as an abject and degraded condition and the fascination with the other's enjoyment went hand in hand. Moroever blacks were envisioned fundamentally as vehicles for white enjoyment, in all sundry and unspeakable expressions; this was as much the consequence of the chattel status of the captive as it was of the excess enjoyment imputed to the other*, for those forced to dance on the decks of slave ships crossing the Middle Passage, step it up lively on the auction block, and amuse the master and his friends were seen as the purveyors of pleasure.* The amazing popularity of the "darkies" of the minstrel stage must be considered in this light. Contending variants of racism, ranging from the proslavery plantation pastoralism to the romantic racialism of abolitionists, similarly constituted the African as childish, primitive, contented, and endowed with great mimetic capacities. Essentially, these characteristics defined the infamous and renowned Sambo. This history is of central importance when evaluating the politics of pleasure, the uses of slave property, the constitution of the subject, and the tactics of resistance. Indeed, the convergence of terror and enjoyment cannot be understood outside it.

#### PERM DO BOTH- net ben is the performance of the 1ac and the intersectionality DA

#### Perm do the alt in the aff’s mindset- the reorientation of identity formation in the 1ac is a prereq to understanding blackness

#### Alt alone fails- coalitions are the net ben to the perm. Metaphorizing blackness and disability excludes disability and shames black disabled people.

**Lukin 13.** Josh Lukin is an Associate Professor of Instruction at Temple University and served Modern Language Association’s Committee on Disability Issues in the Profession as well as Temple’s Interdisciplinary Faculty Council on Disability Disability and Blackness, pages 308-315 in “The Disability Studies Reader: Fourth Edition” (eds. Lennard J. Davis) “///” indicates paragraphs Language edited [RECUT BY NT 17] DR 15

I believe that African Americans see **[understand] disability** in the same way that everybody else sees [understands] it—perceiving people with disabilities [disabled people] **as worthless, mindless**—without realizing that this is the same attitude held by others toward African Americans. This belief in effect **cancel**s **out the black identity they share with a disabled black person**, both socially and culturally, because the disability experience is not viewed [understood] in the same context as if one were only black, and not disabled. Because of this myopic view, **I as a black disabled person could not share in the intellectual dialogue** viewed[understood] as **exclusive to black folk**. In other words, **I could be one or the other but not both**. /// Although the black community acknowledged the existence of disability, Lacy felt that it did not recognize the possibility of people with disabilities [disabled people] having a group identity. “I also discovered . . . that many African-Americans consider being black as having a disability, and so they **didn’t** really **identify with disability as a disability** but just as one other kind of inequity that black people had to deal with.” With the late Seventies came the “504 Demonstration,” the Stonewall Inn of the disability rights movement. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 had contained a provision making it illegal for any federally funded institution or activity to discriminate against the disabled; but this passage, like the lines in the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting sex discrimination, was not taken seriously by the federal government. Like the women’s movement of a decade earlier, and the desegregation movement before that, the disability movement took to direct action to compel the state to keep its promise. For twenty-five days, disability activists occupied the San Francisco offices of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, ultimately prompting HEW to grant their demands that the antidiscrimination law be enforced with no exceptions. /// Johnnie Lacy was among the many disabled citizens who gained a new understanding of the position of the disabled in society, realizing that a newly self-aware minority was no longer going to ask meekly for the favor of equal opportunity: /// I saw disabled people demanding things . . . that should have been theirs . . . and I immediately made the connection . . . I had worked in the anti-poverty program before, and poor [Black and Latino] people were given the same kinds of lack of respect and the same kinds of treatment. /// At this point, Lacy did not feel she had to deny or disavow her other identities to accept her newly affirmed status as a member of the disability community: the education she received in and around the 504 Demonstrations gave her, /// a sense of pride as a disabled person, not as a black person and not as a woman. But it . . . brought the three together for the first time to me. And sort of made me feel like a whole person . . . I could identify myself with a whole group of people that I never identified and that I didn’t really know existed. It was like sharing my experiences as a disabled person for the first time, sharing my insights . . . It was like being with a group of people who saw themselves as people, not as objects of pity . . . people, like I say, were being empowered and they were not blaming themselves. /// As an activist in the new movement, working at Berkeley’s Center for Independent Living and similar institutions, Lacy found herself on the other side of the divide: instead of feeling frustrated with the black community’s limited understanding of disability culture, she became a kind of ethnographic guide to the largely white disability community, trying to educate its members who had no clue as to how to approach the black community. Although she quickly taught her white colleagues to avoid openly condescending behavior, she had more difficulty with their ignorance of cultural difference: /// It’s just that they came from backgrounds where . . . they just didn’t have that much exposure to people of color, and they truly did not know how to outreach with these folks. They just felt that if you’re disabled, that’s the only thing, you know, that’s important. /// She struggled to explain how many minority cultures had different attitudes toward community and family than did the independence-minded white professional class, and how those differences were relevant to the Independent Living Movement. Ultimately the movement’s minority outreach resources improved with the recruitment of more activists of color who had received and given training in the “504 group.” /// The obstacles to recognition and understanding between the two movements, black and disabled, are discussed further by blind black activist Donald Galloway in the Berkeley oral history archive. Working at the Center for Independent Living in 1973, he was punished for advocating a larger minority presence: /// I was the only black, and I started bringing black people into the center as drivers and attendants, and bringing in professional types . . . I went to the board of directors at the center, and said, we’re going to start a black caucus to make sure we get our voice heard. That went over like a lead balloon . . . because the attitude was that we were all one, and there’s no need for it . . . I got kicked off the board because of my position. /// But while the disability movement took some time to perceive the need for attention to race, Galloway recalls Bay Area black leaders who were responsive to the needs of the disabled in the Seventies. He was among those who brought the Black Panther Party into an alliance with the 504 demonstrators and persuaded the black elected officials of Berkeley to support the Center for Independent Living (see Schweik for a detailed account of the other individuals involved in that alliance). /// Yet, despite his personal successes in connecting with black organizations on specific issues, Galloway ultimately shared Lacy’s feeling that there was a gap in mutual understanding between the movements: ///To be realistic about it, **the black community**, even now, the organized black community **did not** really **identify with the struggle of** people with disabilities **[disabled people]** in the same way. I think that we, as disabled people, identify with the black movement. But the black movement . . . did not want to include people with disabilities [disabled people] in the movement . . . In fact, Senator Humphrey, during the 1973 debate . . . when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 came up to be voted on, he wanted to include people with disabilities, and the black organized community said, “No . . .” /// Only in the Nineties, when a broad coalition was required to save the Civil Rights Act, did Galloway see a mutually respectful alliance forming. His description of it is telling: /// We came in and basically helped to bail— not to bail—to help them, to help us to—it’s hard to call them and us, because I’m a part of both groups, so I’m bouncing back and forth, so you understand when I said them and us. We had to go in and help support the reauthorization of it. It was successful. And now they are beginning to understand that we needed to support each other . . . It’s that kind of awareness that’s beginning to happen between the different groups. The women’s movement went through the same thing. /// II. SCHOLARSHIP/// The issues behind Galloway’s struggle over which group to call “them” and “us” are illuminated by a recollection Johnnie Lacy has of a Community Action agency meeting in the Sixties: /// I can remember one manager standing up and declaring very loudly that he didn’t see [understand] a difference between disabled people and black people, because he was black, and he felt just as disabled as a disabled person. And I think he got a big support for that statement. And I think it clearly was a **dividing point, between the way blacks** saw **[understood] disability and the way that black disabled people** saw [**understood] disability**.

#### Black bodies are pathologized through the logic of disability. Along the Middle Passage, dismemberment was used to eradicate black subjectivity

Erevelles 14 (Nirmala Erevelles is a Professor in the Social Foundations of Education and Instructional Department of Education Leadership, Policy, and Technology Studies at the University of Alabama, “Crippin’ Jim Crow: Disability, Dis-Location, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline”, p. 85-89

Although Alexander claims that this group is defined largely by race, I argue that this group is defined at the crucial intersection of race, class, and disability. Interestingly, Alexander almost intuitively gestures toward such an analysis. In marking the historical continuities between Jim Crow laws and mass incarceration, she writes that, “the degraded status of Africans was justified on the grounds that Negroes, like the Indians, were an uncivilized lesser race, perhaps even more lacking in intelligence and laudable human qualities than the red-skinned natives” (25). Here, Alexander seems unaware that disability as deviant pathology is utilized to assign African slaves a degraded self-worth. This unawareness results in her nonrecognition of the constitutive relationship of race and disability where racialized bodies became disabled and disabled bodies became racialized within the specific historical conditions of a burgeoning capitalism (Erevelles 2011). In her essay “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: Notes on an American Grammar,” Hortense Spillers (1987) locates the “origins” of African American subjectivity in the (trans)Atlantic slave trade that starts with the unimaginable violence during the Middle Passage, continues through the dehumanization of slavery, and finally concludes by exposing dominant conceptualizations of the contemporary “Black Family” as a tangle of pathology. However, just like Alexander’s book, Spillers’ essay, detailing the historical practices that enabled the black body to be pathologized, is as much about disability as it is about race, even though the word “disability” is not mentioned once in her essay. I find this startling because the “scene[s] of actual mutilation, dismemberment, and exile” (67) that Spillers’ describes in her essay produce disabled bodies—**black disabled bodies without gender, without genitalia, without subjectivity**—who in an ironic turn are transformed into commodities that are exchanged in the market for profit. I call it ironic because it is in this “becoming” disabled that the black body is at the height of its profitability for the slave masters and it is the historical, social, and economic context of this “becoming” that I foreground. But profitability in colonialist/protocapitalist contexts has its even darker side. If profits could not be realized from the enslaved body, then of what value is the body? In the introduction, Chapman, Ben-Moshe, and Carey draw on Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell’s work to argue that “both English and German sources during the eugenics era portrayed . . . the death of disabled people as a benefit to the nation” just as enslaved black bodies were deemed a benefit to the nation so long as they represented a valuable labor force. Thus, in a curious complication, although on the one hand “becoming disabled” as described in Spillers’ text rendered black bodies as profitable to slave masters, this profitability was only temporary because it “overlooks the mortality that always accompanies slave systems, particularly for human chattel who become disabled as a result of inhumane labor and living conditions or for those killed after being born with a disability on slave plantations” (Snyder and Mitchell 2006, 122). To the ship crew of mostly European men undertaking the Middle Passage, those bodies, “black as Ethiops, and so ugly, both in features and in body, as almost to appear (to those who saw them) the images of a lower hemisphere” (De Azurara as qtd. in Spillers 1987, 70) were nothing more than cargo to be transported to the New World by sea and to be traded for unimaginable profit because of their obvious “physical” impairments. Here, the conceptualization of black subjectivity as impaired subjectivity is neither accidental nor metaphorical. Rather it is precisely at that moment when one class of human beings was transformed into cargo that black bodies become disabled and disabled bodies become black. Further, it is also important to note that blackness itself does not stand in for skin color. Black and disabled are not just linguistic tropes used to delineate difference, but are, instead, materialist constructs produced for the appropriation of profit in an historical context where black disabled bodies were subjected to the most brutal violence. Spillers describes the brutal violation of black flesh with “eyes beaten out, arms, backs, skulls branded, a left jaw, a right ankle, punctured; teeth missing, as the calculated work of iron, whips, chains, knives, the canine patrol, the bullet” (67). Although Spillers (1987) describes these markings on the flesh as “the concentration of ethnicity” in a culture “whose state apparatus, including judges, attorneys, ‘owners,’ ‘soul drivers,’ ‘overseers,’ and ‘men of God,’ apparently colludes with a protocol of ‘search and destroy’” (67), I argue that these same markings on the flesh, quite simply, also produce impairment. Here, impairment is not just biological/natural, it is also produced in a historical, social, and economic context where the very embodiment of blackness and disability “bears in person the marks of a cultural text whose inside has been turned outside” (p. 67). Here, the historical conditions of a nascent colonialist transnational expansion of capitalism are responsible for the violent reconfiguration of the flesh such that **it becomes almost impossible to even imagine the sovereign subject**, now mutually constituted via race, disability, and gender as a dehumanized commodity. Thus, rather than posing a simple causal effect (viz. that slavery produces disability), I argue, on the other hand, that both disability/impairment and race are neither merely biological nor wholly discursive, but rather **are historical materialist constructs imbricated within the exploitative conditions of transnational capitalism.** A similar imbrication of race and disability can be observed in the historical context of Jim Crow. Interestingly enough, one story of the origin of the term “Jim Crow” describes how in 1830, a white, minstrel show performer, Thomas “Daddy” Rice, blackened his face with charcoal paste or burnt cork in imitation of a crippled, elderly black man dancing and singing the lyrics to the song, “Jump Jim Crow.” Here, yet again, is an often unremarked intimate association of race and disability that materialized into legal statutes that “enforce[d] and reinforce[d] the compulsory crippling and enfeeblement of entire ‘colored populations’” (Schweik 2009, 186). Here, yet again, black bodies and disabled bodies are inextricably intertwined in the punitive patrol of bodily boundaries. Alexander (2010) locates the origins of Jim Crow in the backlash against the gains earned by the former slaves during the Reconstruction Period enacted by the southern elite plantation class. Following the civil war, the dearth of social laws and customs to maintain white control gave rise to white elite fears of a possible insurrection by an angry mass of black men. It was in this context that vagrancy laws and other laws accusing African Americans of “mischief” and “insulting gestures” were utilized to incarcerate large numbers of African American men who then became part of the convict labor force and who thus reentered into yet another system of extreme repression and control. Moreover, the severe agrarian depression of the late 1880s and 1890s enabled an unlikely alliance between poor /working class whites and African Americans in the south. Thus, it was around this time that the white elite fearful of a possible challenge to its social and economic power proposed a slew of segregation laws intended to drive a wedge between poor whites and African Americans—laws that later came to be known as Jim Crow. Thus, by the turn of the century, every state in the South supported laws that sanctioned racial ostracism in virtually every aspect of social life that extended to schools, churches, hospitals, prisons, cemeteries, asylums, etc. (Alexander 2010). Jim Crow, therefore, enabled even lower class whites to maintain some sort of psychological superiority over African Americans. In many ways the vagrancy laws just described above appear to be the precursor to the “ugly laws”—public ordinances that were proposed in the late 1800s that barred any “person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated, or . . . deformed, so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object” (293) to remain in public view or else be to fined or imprisoned (Schweik 2009). Schweik argues that these unsightly beggar ordinances were used to define a certain form of despised whiteness—disabled white trash—and therefore functioned as an “allegory of identity” (185), fleetingly exposing the very real class antagonisms and ableist assumptions in an already racially stratified society. Recognizing “ugly laws” as part of the same project as Jim Crow, Schweik observes that such ordinances reveal an oppressive “investment in, the disciplining of, the anxious management of skin . . . loaded with social as well as medical significance” (187). Alexander (2010), in marking parallels between Jim Crow and mass incarceration, echoes Schweik’s observation when she argues that what it means to be a criminal in our collective consciousness has become conflated with what it means to be black (193) . . . For black youth, the experience of being “made black” often begins with the first police stop, interrogation, search, or arrest. The experience carries social meaning – this is what it means to be black (194) . . . For the [racial caste] system to succeed . . . black . . . [youth] must be labeled criminals before they are formally subject to control . . . This process of being made a criminal is, to a large extent, the process of “becoming” black. (195) Here, Alexander describes “becoming” black as a “‘body-based’ disqualification” (Snyder and Mitchell 2006, 400) that presumes an in-built inferiority/ deviance **that being biologically encoded would therefore be almost impossible to transcend.** What Alexander misses in her analysis is that disability serving as the “master trope of human disqualification” (Mitchell and Snyder 2001, 3) is deployed to give oppressive credence to this flawed equation: criminal = black youth. Here, remapping the historical continuities with earlier times, the simultaneous process of “becoming black” AND “becoming disabled” described uncritically as “natural” deviance foregrounds a complex intersectional politics of race, class, and disability that is used to justify the incarceration of “outlaw” bodies that eventually become profitable commodities in the neoliberal prison-industrial-complex of late capitalism. Furthermore, the historical continuities between Jim Crow, the ugly laws, and the contemporary context of mass incarceration mirror in many ways eugenic ideologies that imagined a “uniquely modern utopian fantasy of a future world **uncontaminated by defective bodies** — either disabled, racialised, or both at the same time” (Mitchell and Snyder 2003, 861).

#### Tropes of disability determine the pathology of blackness – the K is a prior question

Taylor 14 (Ashley Taylor, “The Discourse of Pathology: Reproducing the Able Mind through Bodies of Color”, 11/6/14, [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/hypa.12123/full)](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1111/hypa.12123/full%29)

Du Bois's distinction between these realms still resonates loudly with contemporary analyses of race consciousness and black subjectivity. The current criticism and oft-times rejection of race essentialism results from the acknowledgment that race is a social and discursive construction that marks some bodies as different, based, albeit contingently, on morphological differences (Alcoff 2006, 196). As Linda Martín Alcoff argues, race is something that exists “on the body itself,” as the act of interpretation of “visible” difference is made indistinguishable from the act of seeing (196–97). Racial designations are therefore always over-determined by visible differences. Further, racial classifications are always those of nonwhiteness. These discursive demarcations of nonwhiteness are normative to the extent that they are accompanied by a designation of some embodiments as lacking, as less than, as incomplete. In this binary the white subject is whole, stable, and healthy, whereas the nonwhite subject suffers an inchoate and unstable being-in-the-world; the latter is always a “dependent category” (Orosco 2002, 74). Thus Du Bois's original invocation shows that the black subject is one who is split between worlds, between ways of identifying and being identified that are beyond his control. This splitting is presented as the result of racist misrecognition, as the racial—black—subject is recognized only in relation to and as a negation of white subjectivity. Kelly Oliver describes this process of misrecognition: whereas the “normal”—white—subject develops his ego in seeing himself reflected back in the other, the black, racialized subject's experience is reversed, as he sees himself not in the other, but rather through the eyes of the other, to recall Du Bois's description. Oliver writes, “the racist mirror binds the black subject to an egoless body that is fragmented and powerless” (Oliver 2001, 33; emphasis added). I emphasize these key descriptors to remark on the disunity that is attributed to and that is used to describe black subjectivity; if, as Oliver contends, this “socially split subjectivity [is] inherent in racism” (33), then **the experience of racism is the experience of fragmentation and psychic instability.** Oddly, then, because of Harris's use of the tropes of madness and autism—tropes of the disabled mind—her framing of multiple consciousnesses invites us to **associate the described multiplicity of black subjectivity with pathology,** even while she works to reclaim multiple consciousnesses as an adaptation to a racist world. Of course, Harris's invocation of tropes of mental incompetence—the autistic and the madman—occurs in the theoretical context of acknowledging the socially patterned denigration of people of color. Her participation in the discourse of pathology is therefore different from that which was illustrated in my earlier examples from Frye or of Jeantel. Nevertheless, her perfunctory use of such tropes—and unexamined association between mental disability (madness, autism) and undesirable subjectivity—is an important example of the way in which mental ableism operates within academic theorizing aimed at challenging oppressive discourse, leaving intact the ideal of the able mind. Consider, further, María Lugones's iconic description of “world-traveling” as “a kind of ontological confusion about myself that we, women of color, refer to half-jokingly as ‘schizophrenia’” (Lugones 1987, 8–9). For Lugones this “traveling”—albeit imposed and compulsory as a matter of survival—has subversive potential; boundary-crossing can invite playfulness between dominant and nondominant worlds or subjectivities and amount to a more playful or embracing sense of “plurality in each of us.” She describes her experience, as a woman of color, as a “two-imaged self” (13), crossing between worlds in which she is characterized as either “playful” or as serious: it is possible to “take a hold of a double meaning” of oneself, to embrace and allow for internal contradiction and incompatibility (14). Finally, it is “an openness to being a fool… a combination of not worrying about competence, not being self-important, not taking norms as sacred and finding ambiguity and double edges as a source of wisdom and delight” (17). Playfulness is fundamentally not an expression of competence, an assertion of wholeness, stability, or completed subjectivity. Lugones therefore clearly affirms the normalcy of the perceived-as-inchoate subject. However, although her recommendations and her embracing of the “two-imaged self” seem to offer a way out of our binary of the able/disabled mind, her references to the “schizophrenic” movement of multiple consciousnesses and “openness to being a fool” fail to disrupt the trope of mental disability itself. She embraces incompleteness, but invites the association of psychiatric disability (schizophrenia) with ontological confusion, and cognitive disability (being a “fool”) with incompetence.3 **So long as the association of mental disability with incompetence is upheld, we cannot adequately confront the continuous maintenance of compulsory able-mindedness and, importantly, its easy association with people of color**. As Nicki reminds us, it is not (only) that we need to subvert the link between mental disability and incompetence, but, moreover, **we need to dispel the deeply ingrained assumption that our mind is ever under our complete control** (Nicki 2001, 93), indeed, that any of us ever meets the ideal of able-mindedness. Lugones's insights do take us halfway in questioning this myth of control, but nevertheless retain the association of mental disability with incompetence.

### Baudrillard

#### Baudrillard romanticizes disabled bodies

Campbell 9 [Fiona Kumari Campbell, “Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness”, 2009, <https://www.freelists.org/archives/sig-dsu/08-2013/pdfyWdtytodrO.pdf> //BWSKR]

In my discussion on internalised ableism in Chapter 2, I have already made mention of the numbers of disabled people standing in line to join the queue of the enhanced. These are the disabled people who live out their lives from an ableist standpoint where disability can only be viewed from the perspective of negative ontology. The anti-disabled disabled re at worst norm junkies and at best norm emulators. Jean Baudrillard rather discourteously in my opinion suggests that disabled people would make excellent candidates in the transhuman project: Such are the blind, and the handicapped; mutant figures because mutilated and hence close to commutation, closer to this telepathic, telecommuniational universe than we others: humans all-too-human, condemned by our lack of disabilities to conventional forms of work. By the force of circumstance the disabled person is a potential expert in the motor or sensorial domain. And it is not by chance that the social is aligning itself more and more with the handicapped’, and their operational advancement they can become wonderful instruments because of their handicap. They may precede us on the path towards mutation and dehumanization. (Baudrillard, 1988 cited Over boe, 1999, p. 21) This romanticisation of suffering bodies (endemic to certain kinds of Christian theology) has been replaced by a new Baudrillardian transhuman romanticism, where disabled people are likened in closer proximity to the twilight zone of mutation. Some disabled people with a mindfulness towards their impairment gravitate to transhumanism in order to gain supra-abilities. We have to cast our minds beyond the dust of a mere instrumental argument about the attraction of post-human technologies for disabled people and focus on the discursive shifts in the overall meaning and positioning of abnormality. My interest is in the ‘lot’ of those able-bodied people – who may become the ‘new disabled’, the new aberrancy, and oppositional sentiency produced by the transhuman. My hunch is that whilst the movement towards transhumanism may bring gifts for the movement towards transhumanism may bring gifts for the contemporary ‘needy’, the transhuman project, as it is founded on an unbridled form of ableism combined with an ‘obsessive technological compulsion’, will involve a meagre shuffling of the deckchairs – a rearranging of ‘bums in seats’. The rankings remain the same (albeit with new labels that tell us and others who we are). Transhumanism reasserts systems of ranking bodies; vertical and horizontal rankings creating global raced divides. Its appetite is fed by the moral panic of a world awash with disorders, enveloped by dementia as the population ages (Chatterjee, 2007). The schema of Hughes (2001) further diminishes the ‘rights’ of people with intellectual disability (only having the right to life) and bears with it an inference that enhancement technologies can do ‘nothing’ for those deemed severely retarded [sic]. Little is said within this new ranking about the creation or broadening of new kinds of ‘intellectual’ disability because of the emergence of cognitively enhanced post-humans and the stripping or delimitation of characteristics deemed to be cognitive. The point being that not all cognitive enhancements will be valued. There may be a division between those enhancements that transcend or favour disembodied virtues, rather than enhancements geared towards the senses or emotions. Within this world of the transhuman ableism as an ethos is undisputed. ON first sight a transhumanist understanding of disability would appear to be progressive in its rejection of the disabled body as defective. However, since normalcy is under its logic quashed and the pathological is expanded, ALL human bodies are defective! What do Extropian’s and other transhumanists think about human impairment, anomalous bodies regarded as disabled? It is hard to tell – explicit discussion about disability concerns in the literature has been limited (for exceptions, see Bostrom, 2006; Wolbring, 2006a, 2007). However, my intuition is that disability as a form of legitimate sensibility would be frowned upon. Stock (2002), for instance, appears ambivalent – he notes that deaf people who want deaf children can utilise new reproductive technologies to make that selection. Yet when it comes to any ethical consideration of these choices, Stock’s response is that these choices should be left to parents until these choices amount to child abuse or endanger society. Simplicity of the argument aside, Stock demonstrates little awareness of contested notions of child abuse and social

### Competitiveness

#### Competitiveness presents the facade that “every student can succeed” with enough effort while leveling all difference in favor of the productive worker

Dudley-Marling and Dippo 95 (Curt Dudley-Marling is a professor of education in the faculty of education at York University, Toronto, Ontario. Don Dippo is an associate professor in the faculty of education at York University, “What Learning Disability Does: Sustaining the Ideology of Schooling”, 8/1/1995, SAGE Journals, p. 410-412, http://journals.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/002221949502800704)

One of the principal needs fulfilled by the category of learning disabilities is that it explains an anomaly in the discourse of schooling. One of the most powerful tenets of schooling that is taken for granted is that effort and capacity are what count. There is, however, a group of children who appear to have the potential (IQ) but do not succeed in school even with effort. The theory of learning disabilities— generally understood as a discrepancy between ability (IQ) and achievement presumed to be due to neurological factors—explains this anomaly by adding another factor, (dis)ability, to the achievement equation. Normally, capacity plus effort results in school success, unless a disability intervenes—in this case, a learning disability. Learning disability theory also functions to preserve conventional assumptions about the role of potential and effort in school achievement by placing responsibility for school failure within individual students. This enables schools to explain the anomaly of learning disabilities without having to consider more troubling explanations for school failure—for example, that factors such as race, class, culture, gender, and ethnicity are as important in school success as either effort or capacity. Stories that are part of learning disabilities folk wisdom about eminent men like Rodin, Einstein, and Edison who overcame their learning disabilities (Coles, 1987; Lerner, 1981) further reinforce the role of effort in school discourse by providing tangible evidence of the value of schooling and hard work. Learning disability theory also functions to sustain beliefs about the role of individual differences in schools. The very presence of school programs for students with learning disabilities understood in terms of both inter- and intra-individual differences—supports the belief that schools recognize, accept, and accommodate individual differences. However, contradictions in the discourse of learning disabilities— which mirror contradictions about individual differences in the discourse of schooling—reveal another meaning of "difference" in schools. Learning disabilities rhetoric may be about difference, but learning disabilities practice, which stresses (a) adaptive behavior; (b) coping strategies; and (c) right (i.e., normal) ways of thinking (abstract, not concrete; Carrier, 1986), talking, and interacting, has the effect of "normalizing" students while leaving unchallenged conventional notions of what is normal or natural. The assumption that learning disabilities persist throughout life (American Association for Children and Adults with LD, 1985) means that individuals labeled as learning disabled need to learn strategies to overcome their disabilities. But there is the sense that "overcoming" means minimizing or eliminating differences (i.e., "passing for normal"). So at the same time that the field of learning disabilities accommodates diversity by providing for the needs of individual children and adults, it limits diversity in the schools by reinforcing a rigid, narrow definition of what counts as normal behavior. Learning disability theory, at least the way it is constructed in schools, reveals the true meaning of difference and diversity in our schools: **Differences, in the name of education, are to be leveled. A key assumption in the discourse of schooling, that "competition is good," depends on the corollary, "competition is fair."** Presumably, competition is acceptable only if everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. The behavioral, skills-based instruction that is the foundation of learning disability practice sustains the belief that school curricula are culturally neutral (i.e., fair) by limiting the discussion of teaching practice to "method." However, "disputes about . . . correct procedures, whether in medicine or in teaching, are never merely technical" (Fulcher, 1989, p. 263). They are located within a moral system of values and a political system that has established a hierarchy of values (Fulcher, 1989). But, if instruction equals method, then there is no reason to consider the cultural or moral content of what is being taught. From this perspective, the strong relationship between family income and school achievement (Edelsky, 1991) is seen not as a challenge to the cultural fairness of school curricula, but as an affirmation of the values of middle and upper-middle-class homes. Another contradiction in learning disability discourse further reinforces the myth that school curricula are unbiased. The behavioral technology that dominates learning disabilities practice acknowledges individual differences through its promise to "begin where the child is." However, the claim that behavioral laws are universal—applying to everyone, all the time—effaces individual differences based on factors such as race, class, culture, ethnicity, and gender. Behaviorism sustains assumptions of fairness by implying that, because we are all the same anyway, questions about cultural fairness do not really matter. Finally, learning disabilities provide a practical solution to a dilemma created within school discourse when provisions are made to offer humane alternatives to the rigorous competition of schooling. Historically, many middle- to upper-middle-class parents, who had certain aspirations for their children, were willing, even anxious, to accept extra support for their children when they struggled in school. However, these same parents were unwilling to accept the price of existing special education programs, which **included giving up any realistic chance of highpaying, prestigious, secure careers** for their children (Carrier, 1986; Sleeter, 1987). The field of learning disabilities, by constructing its clients as "normally intelligent," provides support for individual students without necessarily blocking either their own or their politically influential parents' aspirations (see Note 2). Assumptions about schooling do not exist, and cannot be understood, apart from the social context within which schools reside. In the next section we examine the ideological context that creates the need for such a category as learning disabilities by explicating the relationship between school-based discourse and dominant discourse outside of schools. Ideology of Schooling: The Context That Creates the Need The field of learning disabilities has arisen in a context in which discussions of schooling are increasingly limited to the role of schools in serving the needs of the economy. In this section we take up both the economic conception of schooling and the issue of who benefits from such a view. The Needs of the Economy Critics of public education who view schooling through the lens of economic competition conclude that schools are riot adequately preparing students for the rigors of the workplace. Education reforms emerging from governments and the business communities stress bringing schooling even more closely in line with society's economic needs. Historians of education in Canada and the United States have observed that the motivating forces behind compulsory schooling have always been some combination of social control and economic development (what the British liked to call "gentling the masses"; see Cremin, 1988; Houston & Prentice, 1988; Osborne, 1991). The **production of responsible citizens and productive workers** has long been touted as the only legitimate goal of compulsory public schooling. In current social, political, and economic contexts, there are certain versions of "the responsible citizen" and "the productive worker" that are more highly valued than others. Media pundits, politicians, and business leaders make daily pronouncements about the knowledges, skills, and attitudes needed to be responsible and productive in a postindustrial society. These authorities seem clear on the kinds of adults the future will require, and schools are very much implicated in the process of producing them. According to this vision, the responsible school citizen (and future productive worker) is one who has learned, among other things, to do homework on time, to not question the authority or expertise of the teacher, to compete for grades, and generally not to make trouble. It matters little in the long run (though one would never surmise this from the current debates) whether classrooms are organized around texts and workbooks or activity centers, as long as the expectations for students focus on obedience and conformity. To better serve the needs of the economy, promote productivity, and enhance international competitiveness, education institutions, from departments of education to classrooms, are increasingly expected to become more accountable, to ensure effectiveness of instruction, and to **enforce uniform standards of excellence**. Such "reform" measures, we are assured, will create a "win/win" situation both for society (through the economy) and the individual. The economy benefits by being continuously provided with a high-quality human resource, and the individual benefits by being provided with a learning environment that supports individual growth and achievement—"where everyone can be the best they can be and develop to their true potential." These images of good citizenship and productive workers, and the kinds of learning environments based on efficiency of instruction and individual achievement they require, both assume and promote an understanding of the person that Apple (1982), following MacPherson (1962), called "possessive individualism." From within this frame of reference, Apple (1982) noted that the mark of a good pupil is the possession and accumulation of vast quantities of skills in the service of technical interests. As an ideological mechanism in the maintenance of hegemony this is rather interesting. In the larger society, people consume as isolated individuals. Their worth is determined by the possession of material goods. . . . The accumulation of such goods or of the ' 'cultural capital'' of technical competence—here atomistic bits of knowledge and skills measured on pre-tests and post-tests—is a technical procedure, one which requires only the mastery of the prior necessary technical skills and enough time to follow the rules, at one's own pace, to their conclusion. (p. 262) Within this dominant discourse of schooling (based on the twin pillars of "normal distribution" and "meritocracy"), every student can achieve to ~~her or his full~~ (their) potential (not equal, but normally distributed) when placed in a competitive environment that supports and encourages each student to put forth her or his own best effort, while making allowances for individual differences in rate of accumulation (i.e., working at one's own pace). It is important to note how difference is acknowledged in this account. Difference in capacity (as determined by IQ) is recognized; hence equality of achievement or outcome is never expected. Rather, the claim is that schools can provide equality of opportunity for each student to achieve to her or his full potential. **Difference in ability is also recognized but is defined as a matter of pace**—some are fast and some are slow, but all can get there (to a uniform standard or to their true potential?), given sufficient time. Given differences in capacity and differences in ability, the determining factor in achieving to one's full potential is effort. And here is where **individualizing is most insidious: Best effort is required and best effort is expected, and a competitive environment is what really brings out best effort.** Those who do not achieve to their full potential, given sufficient time and the right learning environment, have only themselves to blame—they are lazy, unmotivated, not willing to put forth the effort, and, therefore, deserving of their fate (low academic achievement and the consequent lack of social and economic rewards).

### Climate

#### The embracement of disability is a prerequisite to effective climate change discourse that challenges the productive destruction of the environment

Wolbring, Gregor 2009 (Gregor is a ability governance researcher, a health researcher, a vari-ability//ability/disability studies scholar, a governance of science and technology researcher, a bioethicist and a biochemist., “A Culture of Neglect: Climate Discourse and Disabled People”, http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/viewArticle/173/0)

Although climate change will disproportionately impact disabled people, despite the less than stellar record of disaster adaptation and mitigation efforts towards disabled people, and despite the fact that other social groups (such as women, children, „the poor‟, indigenous people, farmers and displaced people) are mentioned in climate-related reports such as the IPCC reports and the Human Development Report 2007/2008, the same reports do not mention disabled people. Even worse, the majority of the material generated by, and physically set up for, discourses on climate, is inaccessible for many disabled people (Australian Human Rights Commission). For instance, the IPCC report, Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, contains Box 8.2: Gender and natural disasters, makes the following points: (a) “men and women are affected differently in all phases of a disaster, from exposure to risk and risk perception; to preparedness behaviour, warning communication and response; physical, psychological, social and economic impacts; emergency response; and ultimately to recovery and reconstruction”; (b) “natural disasters have been shown to result in increased domestic violence against, and post-traumatic stress disorders in, women”; and (c) “women make an important contribution to disaster reduction, often informally through participating in disaster management and acting as agents of social change. Their resilience and their networks are critical in household and community recovery.” The content of Box 8.2 acknowledges the existence of different perspectives and contributions to the climate discourse, and that it is beneficial to explore these differences. It seems reasonable to assume that differences in perspectives, contributions and impact may well also exist between people with and without disabilities, and that it may be likewise beneficial to explore these differences. Disabled people are differently affected in all phases of a disaster, from exposure to risk and risk perception; to preparedness behaviour, warning communication and response; physical, psychological, social and economic impacts; emergency response; and ultimately to recovery and reconstruction. Disabled people could also make an important contribution to disaster reduction, often informally through participating in disaster management and acting as agents of social change. Their resilience and their networks are critical in household and community recovery, important as distributors of relief efforts and in reconstruction design. The Bonn Declaration from the 2007 international conference, Disasters are always Inclusive: Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Emergency Situations, highlighted many problems disabled people are facing and gives recommendations for inclusive disaster preparedness planning, for inclusive response in acute emergency situations and immediate rehabilitation measures, and for inclusive post-disaster reconstruction and development measures. Many workshops were initiated by disabled people groups, such as Rehabilitation International. However, the disabled people disaster adaptation and mitigation discourse is not mainstreamed. Advocacy by people with disability for accessible transport and universal or “life-cycle” housing (among other things) shows how they can contribute significantly to more effective social systems and public facilities. These benefit everyone and help to shift public expectations towards accessible and flexible amenities and services—for example, emergency response and evacuation procedures are much easier for all if such facilities are universally accessible. Most suggestions by disabled people for a more integrative, accessible physical environment and societal attitude benefit everyone, and gain special importance with the ever-increasing proportion of elderly people in society. The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report is intended to be a balanced assessment of current knowledge on climate change mitigation. However, none of the 2007 IPCC reports mention disabled people. Does that mean that disabled people are not impacted by, or impact, climate change? Does no knowledge of adaptation, mitigation and adaptation capacity from a disabled people lens exist, or does the knowledge not reach the IPCC, or does the IPCC judge this knowledge as irrelevant? This culture of neglect and unbalanced assessment of knowledge evident in the IPCC reports was recognised before for rise of a „global‟ climate discourse. For instance, a 2001 Canadian government document asked that research agendas be developed with the involvement of, among others, disabled people (Health Canada). The 2009 Nairobi Declaration on Africa‟s response to climate change (paragraph 36) also asks for the involvement of disabled people (African Ministerial Conference on the Environment). However, so far nothing has trickled up to the international bodies, like the IPCC, or leading conferences such as the United Nations Climate Change Conference Copenhagen 2009. Where Will It End? In his essay, “We do not need climate change apartheid in adaptation”, in the Human Development Report 2007/2008, Archbishop Desmond Tutu suggests that we are drifting into a situation of global adaptation apartheid—that adaptation becomes a euphemism for social injustice on a global scale (United Nations Development Programme). He uses the term “adaptation apartheid” to highlight the inequality of support for adaptation capacity between high and low income countries: “Inequality in capacity to adapt to climate change is emerging as a potential driver of wider disparities in wealth, security and opportunities for human development”. I submit that “adaptation apartheid” also exists in regard to disabled people, with the invisibility of disabled people in the climate discourse being just one facet. The unwillingness to accommodate, to help the “other,” is nothing new for disabled people. The ableism that favours species-typical bodily functioning (Wolbring, “Is there an end to out-able?”; Wolbring, “Why MBIC?”) and disablism (Miller, Parker, and Gillinson)—the lack of accommodation enthusiasm for the needs of people with „below‟ species-typical body abilities and the unwillingness to adapt to the needs of “others”—is a form of “adaptation apartheid,” of accommodation apartheid, of adaptation disablism that has been battled by disabled people for a long time. In a 2009 online survey of 2000 British people, 38 per cent believed that most people in British society see disabled people as a “drain on resources” (Scope). A majority of human geneticist concluded in a survey in 1999 that disabled people will never be given the support they need (Nippert and Wolff). Adaptation disablism is visible in the literature and studies around other disasters. The 1988 British Medical Association discussion document, Selection of casualties for treatment after nuclear attack, stated “casualties whose injuries were likely to lead to a permanent disability would receive lower priority than those expected to fully recover” (Sunday Morning Herald). Famine is seen to lead to increased infanticide, increased competitiveness and decreased collaboration (Participants of the Nuclear Winter: The Anthropology of Human Survival Session). Ableism and disablism notions experienced by disabled people can now be extended to include those challenges expected to arise from the need to adapt to climate change. It is reasonable to expect that ableism will prevail, expecting people to cope with certain forms of climate change, and that disablism will be extended, with the ones less affected being unwilling to accommodate the ones more affected beyond a certain point. This ableism/disablism will not only play itself out between high and low income countries, as Desmond Tutu described, but also within high income countries, as not every need will be accommodated. The disaster experience of disabled people is just one example. And there might be climate change consequences that one can only mitigate through high tech bodily adaptations that will not be available to many of the ones who are so far accommodated in high income countries. Desmond Tutu submits that adaptation apartheid might work for the fortunate ones in the short term, but will be destructive for them in the long term (United Nations Development Programme). Disability studies scholar Erik Leipoldt proposed that the disability perspective of interdependence is a practical guide from the margins for making new choices that may lead to a just and sustainable world—a concept that reduces the distance between each other and our environment (Leipoldt). This perspective rejects ableism and disablism as it plays itself out today, including adaptation apartheid. Planned adaptation involves four basic steps: information development and awareness-raising; planning and design; implementation; and monitoring and evaluation (Smit et al). Disabled people have important knowledge to contribute to these four basic steps that goes far beyond their community. Their understanding and acceptance of, for example, the concept of interdependence, is just one major contribution. Including the concept of interdependence within the set of tools that inform the four basic steps of adaptation and other facets of climate discourse has the potential to lead to a decrease of adaptation apartheid, and to increase the utility of the climate discourse for the global community as a whole.

### Giroux

#### Giroux’s concept of a transformative consciousness is not accessible to the disabled subject

Erevelles 2000 (Nirmala Erevelles is a Professor in the Social Foundations of Education and Instructional Department of Education Leadership, Policy, and Technology Studies at the University of Alabama, "Educating Unruly Bodies: Critical Pedagogy, Disability Studies, and the Politics of Schooling", p. 31)

This conceptual shift by critical theorists of education has spawned a slew of studies that explore how the dynamics of class, race, gender, and sexuality find expression in the individual “[c]entral to Giroux’s discussion of ideology is his insistence that ideology also implies **the capacity for critical thinking and a transformative consciousness** [my emphasis].” While I understand the rationale for Giroux’s formulation of ideology on these terms, I would like to point out that his lack of consideration of disability makes his argument problematic, especially when imagining radical possibilities for students with moderate to severe disabilities. Since Giroux has never offered a critical analysis of disability, it is possible to read his silence as continuing to support traditional conceptions of disability as a medical condition - a concep- tion that has contributed to defining disabled people as passive clients dependent on medical and social services, rather than as a minority group with a political agenda. This could be because, unlike the other social categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality, where it has been possible to demonstrate that the deviance associated with their difference is actually a social construction, a similar argument has been very difficult to support when applied to students with multiple to severe disabili- ties. As Philip Ferguson explains,

### Model Minority

#### Asian Americans are applied the qualities the supercrip to construct the Model Minority – able to reach normalization while remaining silent and powerless

Chen 13 (Mel Y Chen, “Asian American Speech, Civic Place, and Future Nondisabled Bodies”, p. 93-95, http://uclajournals.org/doi/abs/10.17953/amer.39.1.n6t6477372245h46)

Following Piepzna-Samarasinha in her call to envision alternative methods of organizing and activism, I am interested in how contemporary public protest and slogans—many of which are mobilized in community organizing—articulate themselves (sometimes in subtle ways) in terms of race and disability. I consider how these slogans both construct a certain audience of address and, as part of their less apparent consequences, erase or render impossible others. With a focus on Asian American constructs and disability politics, I look at the idealized future bodies implicated in protest slogans dependent on common political appeals to imagined able-bodiedness or nondisability. In particular, I am concerned with the well-known slogan “silent no more,” which is utilized in a host of contexts across the ideological spectrum, from domestic violence awareness campaigns to anti-choice, anti-abortion testimonials. “Silent no more” appeals are arguably constructed on ideals of white liberal civic (speechly) participation and political representation. These ideals have endured throughout decades of formation of what Wendy Brown calls “the collective insurrectionary subject.”7 For the “silent” in the activist engagements of “silent no more” to at once be a metaphor for a condition of disenfranchisement or oppression and to also always have the possibility of being literally interpreted suggests an implicit but generally unacknowledged effect of expelling and banishing all things “silent” to the past, and hence also from a possible future. As Brown writes, “the belief that silence and speech are opposites is a conceit underlying most contemporary discourse about censorship and silencing.”8 The use of “silence” in the context of protest speech also assumes that to speak—to “break the silence”—is to reverse or overcome a dynamic in which speechlessness is equated with powerlessness. In addition, the silence-speech bifurcation enables the assumption, according to Brown, that “when an enforced silence is broken, what emerges is truth borne by the vessel of authenticity or experience.”9 Thus when silence endures, the capacity for truth-telling or “authentic” experience is presumed to be absent, or at least muffled. What is meant by silence and speech, of course, is always an open question. Silence and speech are multiplicitous in meaning, as feminist writers such as Audre Lorde and Adrienne Rich have noted.10 If we begin with perhaps the most literal kind of silence, we assume it means no perceivable, differentiated sound—an absence of detectable frequencies. In linguistics and language studies, silence can certainly be understood as an absence of (meaningful) linguistic production, along the lines of what Brown glosses as negativity. It can also be understood as integral to speech, in the case of the phonetic class of plosives such as “t,” “p,” in which no auditory signal is produced until the short burst which completes the plosive articulation. Silence also operates integrally to speech, in the form of a pause, a demarcation of a turn, or the completion of an idea. Silence can also be understood as a positive linguistic entity in itself, a “communicative device” particular to a given cultural arena and serving a special function. Thus, silence can function as a refusal to participate, or as an observance or show of respect. However, such accounts seem still to focus on the structural significance of silence and hence they do not account for the many incidental silences that fall out of discomfort: the loss for words, the lack of authority to speak, the experience of risk, or the start-up time of making an effort in a new language. When non-English-speaking immigrants or those who have non-normative modes of speaking enter the consideration, silence itself necessarily becomes more complex. For instance, sign language users are frequently depicted as “silent,” but the auditory linguistic criterion of silence only applies to oral speech, not signing. Even the idea that signers are “soundless” is unfounded; the attribution of “silence” derives more from assumptions and audist ideology than from actual practice. There are many examples of both this stereotype and efforts to gainsay it. For instance, Karen Nakamura, in her anthropological study of the cultures and politics of deafness in postwar Japan, observes that “gatherings of deaf people are rarely silent. The deaf parties that I attended were just as raucous as any hearing gathering of Japanese people.”11 Within the context of Asian American Studies, silence has also been taken up because of the interaction between perceived cul- tural norms and the racist stereotyping of Asians as silent within United States cultural imagination. Traise Yamamoto and KingKok Cheung, in particular, have pointed to the protective, strategic, or otherwise purposeful roles that silence can play in the lives of Asian American women in literature.12 Yamamoto distinguishes “oppressed” silence from willed silence: “Nikkei women have long been perceived by dominant culture as either perpetual foreigners or exotic others, both masks of ‘oriental’ difference. In response, they have deployed the very surface whose opacity has denied them particularity and humanity in order to claim and preserve both.”13 I wish to add to this dialogue a sense of a possible reading of silence as not so much one by design, intent, or even strategy, but more one characterized by struggle—neither clearly oppression nor clearly will. Such struggle is characteristic, in my view, of the possibilities offered by racialized uncertainty. Though the threat of erasure as a form of collective silence applies to many racialized groups within the U.S., particularly along the lines of an inverse relationship to labor hierarchies and class, the ontological position of Asian Americanness has a peculiar relationship to the threat of silence-as-erasure: this broad population continues to be constructed and produced as marginally silent, quiet, invisible, to the point that still today it can become part of one’s perceived phenomenological skin. As Asian American Studies scholarship has made clear, the ontological instability of “silence” as a symbolic space or as a linguistic device fits all too neatly with the racial politics surrounding Asian Americans and the multiply duplicitous fiction of the “model minority.”14

### Psychoanalysis

#### Psychoanalysis can’t apply to disability – never able to find its coherence, the disabled subject never emerges into the Symbolic.

Erevelles 2000 (Nirmala Erevelles is a Professor in the Social Foundations of Education and Instructional Department of Education Leadership, Policy, and Technology Studies at the University of Alabama, "Educating Unruly Bodies: Critical Pedagogy, Disability Studies, and the Politics of Schooling", p. 36-37)

The above argument that foregrounds the radical possibilities of desire when enacted through practices of transgression is based on a simple assumption that, notwithstanding its oppressive locations within the social hierarchy, the Other can, in fact, desire and be desired. But **this assumption falls apart when confronted by the disabled subject** and thereby marks once again the theoretical limits of this perspective. For example, unlike Stephen Haymes’s argument that black popular culture has been used to signify an exoticized site of pleasure and desire for the Euro-American subject, the significance of disability in the popular imagination has historically been one of **horror and tragedy** - one that has been dramatically immortalized in the biographical sketch, novel, and film, The Elephant Man.35All three accounts vividly depict John Merrick also know as the Elephant Man via what Paul Darke calls a “menacing motif” that is intimately associated with ”the metaphysical and moral arena of In fact, the film opens with surreal scenes of a woman’s rape by an elephant in the jungles of “‘bad,’ ‘dark,’‘Other,’Africa” - a mythical explanation that is offered as explanation for the birth of a man ”trapped in the ugliest body imaginable.”37In fact, when Frederick Treves, his future benefactor, first spies a painted canvas of Merrick in a storefront advertising this human exhibit, this is how he describes him:

This frightful creature...could only have been possible in a nightmare....This fact- that it was still human - was the most repellant attribute of the creature. There was nothing about it of the pitiableness of the mis-shapened or the deformed,nothing of the grotesqueness of the freak, but merely the loathing insinuation of a man being turned into an animal.

Now, while both the novel and the film go on to portray the humanity of John Merrick in spite of his disability, this realization of humanness is portrayed as being dependent on the benevolence of Treves who almost implicitly becomes the “real” hero in these accounts. Moreover, even though the novel and the biographical account do report the incredibly ordinary circumstances of Merrick’s birth and the onset of his disability, the film version instead prefers to constitute horrifying images of disability that at the same time also invoke the terror of racial and class differences when brought together in the consummation of a “depraved” desire. In fact, it is the discursive representation of The Elephant Man that is so indelibly marked in our unconscious that it serves to mediate in invisible ways almost all our interactions with the “disabled” Other.

What then happens to the disabled subject when it arrives at Lacan’s Mirror Stage? It is because of these hegemonic images of disability that unlike subjects marked by race, class, gender, and sexuality, the disabled subject is **unable to sustain even the illusion of being an autonomous and coherent entity since its reflection during the Lacanaian Mirror Stage continues to mirror its own lack**. As a result, the disabled subject does not experience that moment of self-alienation that is crucial to its emergence into the symbolic order as the desiring subject. At the same time, already constituted as the subject-of-lack, the disabled Other cannot be recognized as the lost complement that will complete the subject/self, since rather than promising some form of coherent stability, the disabled Other represents a constant threat to the autonomy and coherency of the subject/self and therefore does not even enjoy the dubious privilege of being an object of desire. Given this context, even though poststructural pedagogies exhort students to think beyond the limits of normative thought (in other words, to look behind the Mirror) and propose methods of “imagining difference on its own terms: as eros, as desire, as the grounds of politicality,” disabled subjects continue to be excluded from participating“in[this] erotics of power, in the power of the erotic, in economies of transgression.’’ This is because behind the Mirror lies Terror, not Desire. And this Terror is the Disabled Subject.

### Queer pic

1. key to author integrity- cant bracket out their discourse
2. reject the pic on face- it uses a static notion of words that prefers linearity over the everchanging identity of queerness. The 1nc is trying to pin us down to how we should exist, and that’s an independent voter

### Queer k

1. You use a genealogical study of the word queer, and that is what we critique. Your positioning towards language is linear and ignores the revolutionary potential for such language- means th K is a prior question. We cannot talk about activism without the ac. Also k2 how we exist in spaces like debate, means it comes first.
2. Ac is disclosed- you could have messaged me asking for me not to read this aff if it made you uncomfortable
3. It is up to the individual to choose their identity. I identify as queer, and you should NOT be policing my identity so that it makes you feel mre comfortable.
4. No academy link- 1. Non verifiable 2. Good to put it in academics unless we will always be in the dark sie of the library thatyou chose to ignore
5. Perm do the alt in the aff’s mindset- shields the link th netben is the linearity DA
	1. perm solves, prefer changing views of language and fluidity- only the perm can confront static notions of time and identity. Also not severance, we advocate for confronting static notions.
	2. Your link is a link of omission. Accounting for it in the 1ac’s advocacy solves

### Cap

Independent voter- the K hides disability in order to further the communist agenda against capitalism. But, they don’t do anything to actually help disabled folx, they just code us and ignore our individual experiences becaue its easier to control. Means Mitchel and Snyder turns the K- we must FOREFRONT queer/crip experiences in order to make any positive change.

#### Alt alone fails- The communist party strives to hide disability in order to promote their façade of total equality which only perpetrates the stigma and Otheriation of disabled folx. Only the aff’s re-orientation disability identity can solve

Mladenov 17 [Teodor Mladenov (2017) “Postsocialist disability matrix”, Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research, 19:2, 104-117, DOI: 10.1080/15017419.2016.1202860//bwskr]

Cultural recognition means respect for difference and provision of equal opportunities for achieving esteem. Respect and esteem are systematically denied by institutionalized patterns of interpretation and communication that generate injustices like cultural domination, nonrecognition and disrespect (Fraser 1996 Fraser, N. 1996. “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and Participation.” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford University, April 30–June 2. http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/\_documents/a-to-z/f/Fraser98.pdf . [Google Scholar] , 7). With regard to gender, such patterns have been criticized under the general heading of ‘androcentrism’ (Fraser 2013 Fraser, N. 2013. Fortunes of Feminism: From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis. London: Verso. [Google Scholar] , 162); with regard to disability, patterns of misrecognition have been critically approached by using the category of ‘ableism’ (Campbell 2009 Campbell, F. K. 2009. Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ). An ableist society privileges individual features associated with able-bodiedness. Historically, ableist misrecognition has meant systematic denial of respect and esteem to disabled people on the grounds of perceived bodily, psycho-emotional, or cognitive ‘flaws’.2 2. Notably, ableism and androcentrism intersect to enhance misrecognition of disabled women – for a discussion of this issue in a postsocialist context, see Mladenov (2015a Mladenov, T. 2015a. Critical Theory and Disability: A Phenomenological Approach. New York: Bloomsbury. [Google Scholar] , 163–166). View all notes Capitalism institutionalized ableist patterns of interpretation and communication by establishing systems for medical-productivist assessment of disability – for social policy purposes, the capitalist welfare state reduced disability to a medically identifiable condition that decreases one’s ability to engage in productive labour (Stone 1984 Stone, D. 1984. The Disabled State. London: Macmillan. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] ). This medical-productivist understanding of disability inflected representations of disability in the media and on the level of everyday life by subjecting personal experiences of disabled people to externally imposed and alienating interpretations and by enhancing stereotypical representations of disabled people as incapable and inferior. It was resolutely challenged in the 1970s with the emergence of the disabled people’s movement in ‘advanced’ capitalist societies such as the US and the UK. Ever since, the movement has been promoting the social model of disability and the Independent Living philosophy as alternatives to discourses and practices that individualize and medicalize disability (Oliver and Barnes 2012 Oliver, M., and C. Barnes. 2012. The New Politics of Disablement. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. [Crossref], , [Google Scholar] , Chap. 8). Similar to their capitalist rivals, Soviet-style societies privileged those individual bodily and mental features that were associated with the ability of people to participate in industrial production (Hartblay 2014 Hartblay, C. 2014. “A Genealogy of (Post-)Soviet Dependency: Disabling Productivity.” Disability Studies Quarterly 34 (1), n.p. [Google Scholar] ). As already pointed out in the preceding section, both capitalist and socialist industrialization required standardized labour, which left little room for tolerating difference (Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova 2014 Rasell, M., and E. Iarskaia-Smirnova. 2014. “Conceptualising Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” In Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: History, Policy and Everyday Life, edited by M. Rasell and E. Iarskaia-Smirnova, 1–17. London: Routledge. [Google Scholar] , 5). In her historical overview of disability in the Soviet Union, Phillips (2009 Phillips, S. D. 2009. “‘There Are No Invalids in the USSR!’: A Missing Soviet Chapter in the New Disability History.” Disability Studies Quarterly 29 (3), n.p. [Google Scholar] , n.p.) emphasizes that in the Soviet society, the ‘citizen’s social utility was measured in terms of one’s potential role in production’ – accordingly, Soviet social policy defined disability as ‘loss of labor capacity’. Replicating this approach in the early stages of their institution-building, many state socialist countries created centralized systems for disability assessment that rendered disability exclusively in terms of inability to work due to medically certified individual ‘deficiencies’. These systems were heavily informed by the regime’s ‘rationalistic philosophy’ and ‘cult of science’ (Tamás 2011 Tamás, G. M. 2011. “Marx on 1989.” In First the Transition, Then the Crash: Eastern Europe in the 2000s, edited by G. Dale, 21–45. London: Pluto Press. [Google Scholar] , 33). Disabled people seeking social support were required to attend medical commissions comprising physicians who evaluated the claimant’s capacity to engage in wage labour on the basis of purely medical criteria (Mladenov 2011 Mladenov, T. 2011. “Deficient Bodies and Inefficient Resources: The Case of Disability Assessment in Bulgaria.” Disability and Society 26 (4): 477–490. doi: 10.1080/09687599.2011.567799 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Phillips 2009 Phillips, S. D. 2009. “‘There Are No Invalids in the USSR!’: A Missing Soviet Chapter in the New Disability History.” Disability Studies Quarterly 29 (3), n.p. [Google Scholar] ). The resultant disability certification regime regulated the access of disabled people to public support in cash and in kind. The suppression of civil society and dissent by state socialism (discussed in the next section) meant that challenges to this institutionalized misrecognition of disabled people, comparable to the ones that have been voiced by the disabled people’s movement in the West since the 1970s, emerged only after the fall of the regime. Such challenges notwithstanding, the medical-productivist system of classifying and assessing disability has proved as resistant to change after 1989 as segregated service provision. The system survived almost intact the demise of state socialism and has continued to dominate disability policy in a number of postsocialist countries including Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Russia, and Ukraine (International Disability Network 2007 International Disability Network. 2007. International Disability Rights Monitor (IDRM): Regional Report of Europe, 2007. Chicago: International Disability Network. http://www.disabilityinformationzone.co.uk/pdfs/IDRM/IDRM\_Europe\_2007.pdf . [Google Scholar] ; Mladenov 2011 Mladenov, T. 2011. “Deficient Bodies and Inefficient Resources: The Case of Disability Assessment in Bulgaria.” Disability and Society 26 (4): 477–490. doi: 10.1080/09687599.2011.567799 [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], , [Google Scholar] ; Phillips 2009 Phillips, S. D. 2009. “‘There Are No Invalids in the USSR!’: A Missing Soviet Chapter in the New Disability History.” Disability Studies Quarterly 29 (3), n.p. [Google Scholar] ). There, disability is still assessed by medical professionals, in medical settings and according to medical criteria, while the outcome of the assessment is rendered in strictly productivist terms, as inability (or decreased ability) to work. Reflecting on this state of affairs, Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova (2014 Rasell, M., and E. Iarskaia-Smirnova. 2014. “Conceptualising Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” In Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: History, Policy and Everyday Life, edited by M. Rasell and E. Iarskaia-Smirnova, 1–17. London: Routledge. [Google Scholar] , 6–7) recently pointed out that ‘[i]ndividualistic medical approaches to disability are still widespread in the region and the pressure of stigma weighs on disabled people, their relatives and friends’. On the everyday level, the state socialist ‘championing and near fetishization of bodily strength, functioning and ability’ (Rasell and Iarskaia-Smirnova 2014 Rasell, M., and E. Iarskaia-Smirnova. 2014. “Conceptualising Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union.” In Disability in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: History, Policy and Everyday Life, edited by M. Rasell and E. Iarskaia-Smirnova, 1–17. London: Routledge. [Google Scholar] , 5) manifested itself as denial of disability. A Soviet official (in)famously declared in 1980: ‘There are no invalids in the USSR!’ (Fefelov 1986, quoted in Phillips 2009 Phillips, S. D. 2009. “‘There Are No Invalids in the USSR!’: A Missing Soviet Chapter in the New Disability History.” Disability Studies Quarterly 29 (3), n.p. [Google Scholar] ) Segregated provision, inaccessible built environment and the absence of personal assistance services contributed to hiding disabled people from the public view by keeping them confined to residential institutions or to their homes. Thus, maldistribution conspired with misrecognition to produce exclusion from social life – materially conditioned invisibility facilitated and was legitimized by ableist denial. As a result, disabled people were virtually forgotten by their societies (Phillips 2009 Phillips, S. D. 2009. “‘There Are No Invalids in the USSR!’: A Missing Soviet Chapter in the New Disability History.” Disability Studies Quarterly 29 (3), n.p. [Google Scholar] ).

cap

On alvares

1. NO IMPACT we argue that linear time does not adhere to disabled people, so even if campaigns in general can fail, we cannot have goals bc queer and disabled people are not meant to exist in the future
2. TURN- No briteline for what is ‘good for us’. you also make a good for us argument, thats your T shell.You argue that it would be good for u and more fair.

On daniel 97

supercharges aff impacts- disabled people are always seen as a-political because we can never be in politics.

no impact- we are in a debate round. Their cede the political impact fails

the AC does not adhere to linear time so the possibility of conservative takeover wouldn’t matter.

the AC says that we must center our discourse around who we are as individuals. This conservative takeover won’t happen after the round. The second you press aff on tab there won’t be a red dot on my head from the alt right trying to coopt my discourse.

This makes no sense. We aren’t even in educative spaces anyways thats mitchell and Synder 14.

On Monbiot 9/13-

no impact to extincton

its inevitable

doesn’t make sense within the prognosis of time.

On Saczkowski 11

TURN- ableism is not material. it is psychological violence that i experience through this use of binaries

This makes no sense. even if balesm was historically connected to capitalism, that is not how it currently manifests

no root cause- tis historical analysis is bad and forces str8 time which is bad

alt- do both under the aff’s mindset- only after we endorse queer ripping can we ever have any type of politic that is accessible. Net ben is the poems and the ac contention on prognosis of time that they can never adhere to because they use a historical analysis