This was my primary aff on SeptOct and the general idea was embedded tricks through what was basically condo advocacies.

The main framing establishes the hierarchy of good and every time someone responds to a piece of offense you could frame that as further away from the form of good from the others and then defend the ones that are easiest, pretty much reading 3 condo advocacies in the 1AC.

Each offense world is a different Hijack

1st ones rousseau which was a Kant and general ideal world hijack that took care of stuff like pettit.

2nd was a mash of deleuze and hegel but basically was primarily used against Ks, the structural claims of the K are predicated on the way society functions which is attributed to us having not come to the convergence of civil society and the state

3rd is a util preempt about enforcement, this was the jankiest one and I never went for it.

The 3 point in the prefers is meant to be a negating affirm thing against util disads. If they win its bad for us to be able to categorize it as bad we need the affs understanding of the world cuz it defines our concepts of good and bad.

This was not my best work but it was a pretty cool aff I really enjoyed debating.

# 1AC Transcendental Truth

## under view on the bottom

## Framing

#### I affirm resolved: In a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory.

#### I’ll defend any reasonable implementation that they want for the neg to get offense

#### My value is morality

#### The standard is transcendental idealism.

#### There is no true tangible nature or empirical essence to Democracy.

#### The resolution boils down to “if we have a democracy should compulsory voting exist?” my method is using the hierarchy of form to prove that in the best conceivable democracy, according to core philosophical analyses of democracy would they agree?

#### Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory.

#### Forms – they are the essence of the world that transcend space and time. The material world inherently lacks a capability to manifest the form and cannot generate true reality, only the forms themselves understood by reason allow for true moral and epistemic knowledge.

Heyüman 15, [http://ftp.oxfordphilsoc.org/Documents/StudentPrize/2015\_H1b.pdf//Scopa[RC](http://ftp.oxfordphilsoc.org/Documents/StudentPrize/2015_H1b.pdf//Scopa%5bRC) KDandu]

Forms can be thought of as abstract entities or qualities that are the essence of sensible things. Take, for example, an apple: Roundness, color and weight of the apple are all the properties that make up that apple, each of which is a separate form in itself. According to Plato, two apples are “round” because they both partake in the form of “roundness”. This “partaking” in any form is what makes things share similar attributes. **All material objects owe their existence to these forms;** whereas each form exists by itself, independently of the object that exemplifies the particular form. In Phaedo, which is widely agreed to be the first dialogue Plato introduced the forms, forms are “marked as auto kath auto beings, beings that are what they are in virtue of themselves1 .” **Forms are transcendent to our material world in that they exist beyond space and time, whereas material objects occupy a specific place at a specific time**. Atemporal and aspatial features of forms have very important implications. First, this explains why **the form of F does not change**, and remains stable beyond a spatio-temporal world while particulars are subject to continuous change. Second, since F does not exist in space, it can be instantiated in many particulars at once or need not even be instantiated to exist. The forms are also pure. The roundness of an apple is one of its properties and roundness is only “roundness” in its pure and perfect form. Unlike forms, material objects are impure, imperfect, and are complex combinations of several forms. **Being is the ontological relation that ties the form of F to its essence, and each form of F is of one essence** (monoeides). It follows from these principles that each form self-predicates; each form of F is itself F. The form of beauty is itself beautiful, and Helen would not be beautiful if the form of Beauty were not beautiful itself. **The forms are real, sublime entities that belong to an intelligible realm that can only be grasped by reason.** They are not subject to change; are stable and enduring, while particulars/material objects belong to this material world of change, becoming and perishing in a Heraclitean flux. The Idea Behind Platonic Forms As can be seen from his early and middle period dialogues, Plato both explored ethical concepts such as “virtue” and “justice” just like his mentor, Socrates, and he also elaborated upon the essence of the 1 Silverman, A., Fall 2014 Edition, ‘Plato’s Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 10 1 Hilary 2015 Joint 1st Prize: Sinem Hümeydan universe by questioning what there really is in this world of appearances. Plato’s theory of forms, then, can be thought to explicate basically two vital concerns of philosophical inquiry. First, the theory explores the question of how everything seems both to be changing and permanent at the same time. We know that the physical world we perceive through our senses is exposed to continuous change by “becoming” and “ceasing to be2 ”. Nonetheless, there is also permanence beyond what seems to be changing and that can only be grasped by reasoning. Second, the theory of forms is an attempt to find the answer to the question of how people can live a happy and fulfilling life in a world that is ultimately defined with beginnings and endings, and is exposed to change in every possible respect. In the Republic, Plato poses questions about moral concepts in an effort to demonstrate that the life committed to knowledge and virtue will result in happiness and self-fulfillment. To achieve happiness, one should render himself immune to changes in the material world and strive to gain the knowledge of the eternal, immutable forms that reside in the intelligible realm. Indeed, Plato splits the existence into two realms: the visible realm and the transcendent realm (intelligible realm) of forms. **The visible realm is the physical world that is perceived through senses, and is susceptible to “becoming” and “ceasing to be”. On the contrary, the intelligible realm represents the ultimate reality, is enduring, and is accessible only via reasoning** or intellect. Furthermore, Plato believes that this visible world is an imperfect model of the transcendent realm of forms. As is depicted in his famous Allegory of Cave, he thinks that everything perceptible through senses is like the shadows on the Cave Wall, or merely imperfect representations of the reality. Since **what we perceive through our deceptive senses in this world of appearence are merely shadows of reality, one cannot have any genuine knowledge of these things, but can only have beliefs/opinions** about these objects. In other words, Plato thinks that one can only have “knowledge of forms and of Forms one can only have knowledge3 .” Because forms are the only objects of knowledge, individuals should endeavour to reach the intelligible realm and endow themselves with the knowledge of forms in order to achieve a happy and fulfilling life. Plato employs the Sun metaphor, which represents the form of “Good” to compare intelligible and visible realms. As the Sun provides the light to see the physical world, the “Good” provides the power to “know”, and is not only the ultimate cause of knowledge, but it is also the object of truth and knowledge. Being virtuous or pursuing good relies on having the knowledge of the Good, and because forms are the only objects of knowledge, one can only live a fulfilling life and pursue good if one knows the Form of Good. Plato’s Arguments for the Forms and Concluding Remarks According to Plato, reality is very much associated with objectivity. His argument from objectivity asserts that the more objective concepts are of higher reality, and that because what we perceive via our senses is usually deceitful, the objects of experience cannot be real entities. Besides, it is possible to form different subjective views of the same objects; depending on the perceptual or mental states of the observer. However, forms represent a higher objectivity, and thereby reality through a dialectic process, which is illustrated in the hierarchical system of forms and physical objects, “good” being first among others. Plato appeals to mathematical examples to further his arguments and states that the most definite knowledge is the knowledge of mathematics, and that this knowledge cannot be gained via senses or experience, but only by reasoning For example, we know for certain that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is 180 degrees, yet we also acknowledge that no such perfect triangle exists in the world. Then, he concludes, if these abstract entities do not reside in this world, there must a different realm of such perfect forms outside this world of experience that is ultimately real.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Empirics can only prove empirics or else it becomes circular since the empirics would prove the metaphysical which are then used to define empirics once again. And it being circular is bad because we need objective higher truths to appeal to or else we don’t act.

#### 2] Semantics: “in a democracy” plus “ought” means we must come to a objective moral decision and it is not in particulars. Therefore you prefer the form of good since our understanding comes from the top down. To get a true objective understanding you must go to the top of the hierarchy in turn necessitating the question of form.

#### 3] Even if an instance of democracy is proven bad that doesn’t prove in a democracy, we ought not to have compulsory. The aff is only trying to answer, “if we have a democracy should compulsory voting exist”.

#### CPs and PICs affirms because they do not disprove my general thesis

#### I can clarify any part of the framing mechanism in cross.

#### Affirm even if they disprove our standard as long as we win offense to it. We prove compulsory voting in a democracy is good indexed to the functional form of a democracy, which proves the resolution true. Proving that compulsory voting is bad indexed to another standard is not mutually exclusive and does not disprove the aff's thesis.

#### T and theory interps must be checked in cross to deter meaningless theory debate and clarify confusion.

#### In the case they win consequentialism: [A] They only judge actions after they occur, which fails action guidance and theres no implication since every consequence can cause another consequence. [B] Every action is infinitely divisible, only intents unify action because we intend the end point of an action – but consequences cannot determine what step of action is moral or not. [C] If you’re held responsible for things other than an intention ethics aren’t binding because there are infinite events occurring over which you have no control, so you can never be moral as you are permitting just action. [D] There’s no objective arbiter to evaluate consequences [E] You can’t aggregate consequences, happiness and sadness are immutable – ten headaches don’t make a migraine. Makes us go to presumption.

## Offense

#### The aff proves that universal participation in voting upholds the form of good for a democracy. Empirics are not offense since they are particulars and will always be flawed since they are subject to all sorts of changes due to being in the empirical world.

#### The aff gains offense in three ways:

#### 1] Democracy is a set of rules determining collective decision-making procedure – individual autonomy as a constitutive feature of democracy requires participation from all members because otherwise the resulting decision does not express the general will – it coercively presumes the will of non-voters

Coleman & Ferejohn 86 [(Jules Leslie, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence and Professor of Philosophy at Yale Law School, & John A., Samuel Tilden Professor of Law at New York University) “Democracy and Social Choice” Ethics , Oct., 1986, Vol. 97, No. 1 (Oct., 1986), pp. 6-25 http://www.jstor.com/stable/2381403 DOA 8/23/20] CW [ Cut KDandu]

Social choice theory structures collective-decision problems by imposing a set of constraints on collective-decision procedures. The question in each case is whether there exists a procedure or mechanism that satisfies those constraints. Social choice theorists tend, therefore, to be proceduralists about the justification of democracy. In social choice theory, democracy itself is analyzed as a subset of institutions for aggregating individual preferences into social choices; that is, democracy is a kind or set of voting rules. In aggregation problems, social choice theory treats individual preferences as basic and as given. Voting, in this view, expresses "tastes" or preferences; it does not consist in the formation of a collective judgment. In Riker's view, what distinguishes *democratic* voting procedures from alternatives is their commitment to the ideals of equality, liberty, and participation. Commitment to these ideals gives rise to more particular constraints on collective-decision rules. Satisfaction of the derivative con- straints justifies a collective-decision procedure because the constraints are deducible from or otherwise justificationally connected to the more fundamental commitments to equality, liberty, and participation. What do participation, liberty, and equality mean for the social choice theorist, and how do these ideals give rise to concrete procedural constraints on voting? "**The crucial attribute of democracy**," Riker writes, "**is popular participation in government**."4 Participation, in turn, is analyzed in terms of voting. "Although the institutions of participation have been many and varied, they have always revolved around the simple act of voting."5 Democracy requires participation. Participation entails voting. But, "voting is not equivalent to democracy, only voting that facilitates popular choice is democratic.... Or, voting is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition of democracy. To render them equivalent, voting must be surrounded with numerous institutions like political parties and free speech, which organize voting into genuine choice."6 Of the connection between liberty and collective decision, Riker writes, "The historic purpose of a fundamental democratic liberties has been not to provide freedom as an end in itself, but to render effective both political participation and the process oft choice in voting."7 In the same connection, citing Rousseau, he writes that "liberty resides in participation in government, not in rights distinct from government."8 Equality, Riker writes, "originated in some rough sense as an in- strument of voting. Voting would not mean much if each person's vote were not counted in the same way.... Its logical base lies in the instrumental value of making voting work."9 According to Riker, democratic rules are the only collective-decision rules that satisfy these three abstract criteria, satisfaction of which is both necessary and sufficient to justify them. "In a society characterized by democratic justice, people are free (by reason of democratic liberty) and have the chance (by reason of democratic equality) to seek self-respect and self-control (through some kind of dem- ocratic participation). The democratic method that is supposed to achieve this idea . . . is the process of participation, specifically through voting, in the management of society, where voting is understood to include all the ancillary institutions (like parties and pressure groups) and social principles (like freedom and equality) that are necessary to render it significant. 10 Riker argues that the essence of the commitment to democratic choice is captured by its commitment to the abstract ideals of participation, liberty, and equality. The problem is to work from these abstract com- mitments to specific constraints on possible social choice rules necessary and sufficient to justify them. These more particular constraints appear to be of two distinct sorts: normative and semantic. On the one hand, justified social choice (or voting) procedures must be fair, provide for full and equal participation, and allow for autonomy in the Rousseauean/Kantian sense, according to which an autonomous agent complies with dictates or constraints of his own choosing. On the other hand, autonomy in this sense presupposes full participation because full participation is necessary to guarantee that the voting rule produces outcomes that express the collective or general will. This line of analysis brings us to the cognitive or meaningfulness criterion. In order to be meaningful, the social choice must be unambiguously interpretable in terms of individual wills, preferences, or voter profiles.

#### 2] It flips the control society on it’s head. Affirming stops the state from extending its control.

#### True democracy through voting represents the convergence of civil society and the state – this demands universal participating through voting – otherwise the state arbitrarily exerts political power over non-political spheres of society.

Springborg 84 [(Patricia, professor of British Studies at Humboldt University, Berlin; she has taught political science in New Zealand; at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of California, Berkeley; and at the University of Sydney, where she held a personal chair in Political Theory in the Department of Government before being appointed professor ordinario in the School of Economics of the Free University of Bolzano) “Karl Marx on Democracy, Participation, Voting, and Equality” Political Theory , Nov., 1984, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Nov., 1984), pp. 537-556 http://www.jstor.com/stable/191498 DOA 8/23/20] CW [ Cut KDandu]

Third, Marx argues that political participation turns not on the function of deputies or representatives but rather on political suffrage. **Voting**, "considered philosophically ... is the immediate, the direct, the existing and not simply imagined relation of civil society to the political state," he maintains, and the unity of the social and the political is symbolized by universal suffrage. Indeed it is the struggle for universal suffrage that brings about the dissolution of the dualism of civil society and the state. To take each of these arguments in turn, Marx's case for democracy as the authentic expression of the political is at once startling and conventional. It is startling because Marx makes a case for democracy in terms almost identical to those made for communism as a privileged social form in the 1844 Manuscripts one year later. In the latter work communism is the resolution of the antitheses between essence and existence, form and content, individual and species; it is the riddle of history solved and knows itself to be that solution, whereas in the Critique of Hegel's "Philosophy of Right, "democracy is all of these.2 Democracy is the "generic constitution" to which monarchy stands as species; "democracy is content and form" **because the state is essentially the demos and democracy is the government of the people; democracy is the coincidence of essence and existence, the state in and for itself**: Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here the constitution not only in itself, according to essence, but according to existence and actuality is returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people, and established as its own work. The constitution appears as what it is, the free product of men.3 Marx draws a parallel between democracy and Christianity. "In a certain respect," he says, "democracy is to all other forms of the state what Christianity is to all other religions. Christianity is the religion kat' exochein, the essence of religion, deified man under the form of a particular religion. In the same way democracy is the essence of every political constitution, socialized man under the form of a particular constitution of the state." 4 This comparison may cast doubt on the seriousness of Marx's defense of democracy. Is not democracy, like religion, yet another epiphenom- enon or ideological form under which reality masquerades? This we know is not Marx's view of religion (although that of some Marxists), which he sees as a genuine expression of the human condition and a crucial objectification of the human essence at a given historical stage. Democracy is a similar expression, also to be transcended when the unity of individual and species, private and political, form and content, of which it is expressive, is finally achieved. Thus Marx continues: [Democracy] stands related to other constitutions as the genus to its species; only here the genus itself appears as an existent, and therefore opposed as a particular species to those existents which do not conform to the essence. Democracy relates to all other forms of the state as their Old Testament. Man does not exist because of the law but rather the law exists for the good of man. Democracy is human existence, while in the other political forms man has only legal existence. That is the fundamental difference of democracy.5 Marx's defense of democracy is in the context of Hegel's case for constitutional monarchy as the ultimate development of the state and "achievement of the modern world."6 Hegel rejected democracy as a candidate for this honor, even the "beautiful democracy of Athens,"7 on the grounds that none of the pure forms of regime, monarchy, aristocracy or democracy exhibited the capacity for differentiation, durability and self-consciousness exhibited by constitutional monarchy as a complex political form.8 Democracy is based on the principle of virtue, Hegel maintained, following Montesquieu. It depends, therefore, on sentiment and a sense of duty, a fragile relationship that constitutes the formal weakness of democracy such that its extreme form, sovereignty of people, is a formal absurdity: The sovereignty of the people is one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the "people." Taken without its monarch and the articulation of the whole which is the indispensable and direct concomitant of monarchy, the people is a formless mass and no longer a state.9 Consistent with the Parmenidean aphorism "the rational is the real (wirklich)," which Hegel adopts as the foundation of his logic, he maintains that the state as an idea and a formal principle has a greater reality (wirklichkeit) than the people, its content. In some respects this view accords with that of the great defenders of absolute monarchy, Hobbes and Bodin, of whom Hegel's language in his discussion of the persona of the monarch is evocative: "It is only as a person, the monarch, that the personality of the state is actual [ i.e., actualized]," he points out, "and that a people ceases to be that indeterminate abstraction which, when represented in a quite general way, is called the people."10 In other words, the state as a corporation or juridical entity exists formally by virtue of empowering a representative, and the sovereign, more particularly the monarch, embodies that function. It is this very formalism of which Marx is critical, and his rebuttal of Hegel's case for monarchy is in the terms of classical theories of popular sovereignty. The logical form of the state as a juristic expression is that in which the formal and material principles coincide and the people rule and are ruled. " Under the aegis of democracy, first the abstract distinction between civil society and the state and second the state itself as an abstraction are surpassed. Thus "in true democracy the political state disappears."''2 This is because democracy as unity of particular and universal, part and whole, is no mere constitutional form but a system whose principles actually govern. It follows therefore that in all states distinct from democracy the state, the law, the constitution is dominant without really governing, that is, materially permeating the content of the remaining non-political spheres. In democracy the constitution, the law, the state, so far as it is political constitution, is itself only a self-determination of the people, and a determinate content of the people. Furthermore it is evident that all forms of the state have democracy for their truth, and for that reason are false to the extent that they are not democracy.13

#### 3] For the sovereign to maintain sovereignty it needs the principle of universal suffrage.

Malkopoulou 11, A. (2011). Democracy’s Duty: The History of Political Debates On Compulsory Voting. Phd Thesis, Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä. <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/dd7b/3bfeb7f0fedad5c59d00c99458ecae876624.pdf> (Later, Published By Routledge Titled History of Compulsory Voting In Europe: Democracy's Duty In 2014)[KDandu]

A central argument in favour of **compulsory voting** was that it **enhanced the constitutional principle of universal suffrage. The idea of voting being a natural right had laid the ground for extending suffrage**, which since 1864 had been an inherent part of Greek constitutional law. But abstention and voluntary voting undermined the realisation of universal suffrage and thus contravened the very scope of the Constitution.23 Conversely, obligatory voting had the effect of ‘validating’ and highlighting universal suffrage. In this sense, **it ‘reaffirmed popular sovereignty’ and disciplined the people with regard to exercising their political rights** In general, the enforcement of universal suffrage was not foreign to Venizelos’ efforts to stabilise parliamentary institutions and to establish political and civil rights, with checks against the misappropriation of these rights.25 **For universal suffrage to be truly ‘dynamic’, all voters had to vote,** and that was achieved through obligatory voting. Another type of argument dealt with the concept of representation. Fears were voiced that ‘true’, ‘real’ or ‘full’ representation was at risk if participation in elections were to remain optional. If voting was only a right sensu strictu, “everyone could decide not to vote, and then we would not have representation”.26 In other words, representation itself was at stake, since voluntary voting could potentially transform it to an empty letter. It was assumed that the representative system relied on a tacit agreement between citizen and state, which the former had to validate by participating in elections. In this sense, abstention constituted the greatest threat to parliamentarism. Consequently, the state's right of self-defense justified its means of forcing the vote through the threat of punishment on citizens who would break this ‘representation contract’. Moreover, despite of the imposition of a legal obligation to vote, citizens still retained freedom of conscience and individual sovereignty, argued MP Andreou. Precisely because they exercised ‘their most sacred right’, citizens preserved their status as free persons. In fact, it was on the very basis of their individual sovereignty that they could be held responsible for breaking the ‘representation contract’.

#### The number of examples doesn’t matter it’s a matter of what they say.

#### And none of these are empirics, none of the things I use are real life examples but what a democracy ought to be.

## Underview

#### **1] Presumption and permissibility affirm**

[A] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.

[B] Presuming statements false is impossible since we can’t operate in a world where we don’t trust anything.

[C] To negate means to deny the truth of, which means if there isn’t offense to deny the truth of you should affirm.

[D] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.

#### 2] Aff gets 1AR theory and RVIs – otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this – meta theory also precedes the evaluation of initial theory shells because it determines whether or not I could engage in theory in the first place. 1AR theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer of the round. No 2NR theoretically issues, the 1AR already cements a strategy and I cant change that, so there is no way I can beat It. Grant me 2ar weighing, key to fighting the up layering of the 2nr.

#### **3]** The neg must concede to the aff paradigmatic approach in the round. To clarify, the neg may not read K’s that don’t have a policy alt or change the role of the ballot. Changing the role of the ballot moots 6 minutes of AC offense because I’m forced to either a) concede to the neg role of the ballot and lose the entirety of the 1AC or b) defend my role of the ballot through the rest of the debate in which case I still lose the AC- I have no coherent strategic options. Key to fairness, an effective strategy creates our road the ballot. This exacerbates Aff Time skew, which controls strongest link to fairness – time skew means I structurally can’t engage while other fairness claims can be solved with more prep or drills

#### 4] More than one conditional route to the ballot is a voting issue, the 1ar has no means of constructing a coherent 1ar since, I have to split the ar to cover more than one route and they can go for whatever is under covered and I need to extend as well.

#### 5] If this statement is true, vote aff – denying the statement is true denies the antecedent but that merely proves whole statement true – proves the conclusion. The only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

**Stanford** <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> Abbreviated Dictionary of Philosophical Terminology An introduction to philosophy Stanford University //Massa

[In a] Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent [condition], and q is the consequent. **A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true**; **any** conditional **[statement] with a true [condition] antecedent and a false consequent must be false.** **For** any other combination of true and **false [conditions]** antecedents and consequents, **the** conditional **statement is true.**

#### 6] If I win one layer, vote aff a) they have 7 minutes to uplayer and nullify my offense b) forces engagement with the aff since they have to defend all arguments which means they read better ones.

#### 7] No new responses to spikes, it screws the 2ar since they close off routes that I access in the 1ar, making affirming impossible since I have already gone all in for some strategy.

# 1AR

### Overview and extensions for each argument

### Generic a2 cp/pics

### A2 larp generics on solvency

### A2 coronavirus da

### A2 Kant

### A2 too ideal

### A2 offshoots can be bad

### A2 Race K

### A2 Identity k top layer

#### Permutation do the aff in the alt mindset solves better:

#### The framing built on Plato’s theory best accounts for marginalization in the context of a democracy.

**Habib, 1998** (Rafey Habib, Professor of EnglishD. Phil., University of OxfordLiterary Theory and Criticism, Islamic Studies, World Literature, Postcolonial Studies7-14-1998, accessed on 9-4-2020, Habib.camden.rutgers, "Identity and Difference: Plato and Aristotle on Democracy | M.A.R. Habib | Rutgers University", https://habib.camden.rutgers.edu/talks/plato-and-aristotle/)[KDandu]

Democracy comes about as a popular revolution against the rich oligarchs; in the new constitution the people are granted an equal share in citizenship and political office (VIII, 556E-557B). What is worshipped here is individual liberty, leading to a number of undesirable consequences. Firstly, “every man has license to do as he likes” and “would arrange a plan for leading his own life in the way that pleases him.” Secondly, this constitution would generate all “sorts and conditions of men,” a greater variety than any other form of government. A democracy is thus “diversified with every type of character” and, shopping through the “bazaar of [individual] constitutions,” each person could “establish his own.” Thirdly, the government would be “anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike” (VIII, 557B-558C). Moreover, the disorder of a democratic society extends into private life: the relation of authority is undermined between parents and children, teachers and pupils, freemen and slaves, men and women. The spirit of liberty waxes so strong that eventually even the laws are disregarded and a condition of lawlessness prevails (VIII, 562E-563E). And what kind of citizen, what kind of soul, would such a democracy foster? To begin with, the distinction between “necessary” and “unnecessary” appetites which constrained the desires of the oligarchic man is now abrogated. The “brood of desires” now “seize the citadel of the young man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits…” (VIII, 560B-561A). The democratic man fosters all parts of the soul equally and “avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed.” His life will be run by “indulging the appetite of the day”, and “he says and does whatever enters his head.” In other words, “there is no order or compulsion in his existence” (VIII, 561D). Most tellingly, **Plato affirms that the democratic** man **“is a manifold man stuffed with most excellent differences**,…containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities” (VIII, 561E). **Hence democracy fosters genuine individuals, who resist the reduction of their social function**, or indeed their natural potential, into one exclusive dimension. Also, democracy nurtures all parts of the soul equally, refusing obeisance to the law of reason. Above all,the “greed” for liberty is the hallmark of a democratic society. Such a constitution is the archetype of social disorder, individuality, emphasis rather than suppression of difference, and insubordination to reason. Its nature is rooted in self-will and physical pleasure, in a refusal to acknowledge the hierarchy either within the soul or that between the soul and body.

### A2 Liberal Democracy Ks

### A2 Ideal justifies slavery

### A2 Cap

### A2 Weheliye

### A2 Afropess

### A2 Baudi

### A2 Psycho

### A2 Setcol

# Extra thingys

#### A2 Athenian Democracies justifies slavery and can’t use a framing that justifies framing

#### A2 How do I determine the amount of things you need to prove the aff

#### Explanation of the framing

#### 2] Athenian Democracy proves the aff

**Brown, 19** (Tyson Brown, Director of the National Geographic Society3-15-2019, accessed on 8-24-2020, National Geographic Society, "Democracy (Ancient Greece)", https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/democracy-ancient-greece/)[KDandu]

National Geographic Headquarters 1145 17th Street NW Washington, DC 20036 National Geographic Society is a 501 (c)(3) organization. © 1996 - 2020 National Geographic Society. All rights reserved. Privacy Notice | Sustainability Policy | Terms of Service | Code of Ethics Democracy in ancient Greece served as one of the first forms of self-rule government in the ancient world. The system and ideas employed by the ancient Greeks had profound influences on how democracy developed, and its impact on the formation of the U.S. government. Grades 5 - 8 Subjects Social Studies, Ancient Civilizations Contents 2 Images **The ancient Greeks were the first to create a democracy.** The word “democracy” comes from two Greek words that mean people (demos) and rule (kratos). **Democracy is the idea that the citizens of a country should take an active role in the government of their country and manage it directly** or through elected representatives. In addition, it supports the idea that the people can replace their government through peaceful transfers of power rather than violent uprising or revolution. **Thus, a key part of democracy is that the people have a voice. The first known democracy in the world was in Athens.** Athenian democracy developed around the fifth century B.C.E. The Greek idea of democracy was different from present-day democracy because, in Athens, **all adult citizens were required to take an active part in the government**. If they did not fulfill their duty they would be fined and sometimes marked with red paint. The Athenian definition of “citizens” was also different from modern-day citizens: only free men were considered citizens in Athens. Women, children, and slaves were not considered citizens and therefore could not vote. Each year 500 names were chosen from all the citizens of ancient Athens. Those 500 citizens had to actively serve in the government for one year. During that year, they were responsible for making new laws and controlled all parts of the political process. **When a new law was proposed, all the citizens of Athens had the opportunity to vote on it.** To vote, citizens had to attend the assembly on the day the vote took place. **This form of government is called direct democracy**. The United States has a representative democracy. Representative democracy is a government in which citizens vote for representatives who create and change laws that govern the people rather than getting to vote directly on the laws themselves. Ostraka are shards of pottery that were used as a voting ballot in ancient Greece. These artifacts were found at the Acropolis of Athens and date to around 482 B.C.E. They are on display at the Agora Museum, in Athens Greece. 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Use the videos, media, reference materials, and other resources in this collection to teach about ancient Greece, its role in modern-day democracy, and civic engagement. Learn how democracy in the United States is different from that of the ancient Greeks. The United States has a complex government system. One important tenet of this system is democracy, in which the ultimate power rests with the people. In the case of the United States, that power is exercised indirectly, through elected representatives. Although the U.S. has been a strong proponent of democracy, it did not invent democracy. The Greeks are often credited with pioneering a democratic government that went on to influence the structure of the United States. Read this article that describes how elements of ancient Greek democracy heavily influenced the figures that designed the United States government. Citizenship is the status of being a citizen, belonging to a nation, and having the associated rights and responsibilities. Ancient Greek politics, philosophy, art and scientific achievements greatly influenced Western civilizations today. One example of their legacy is the Olympic Games. Use the videos, media, reference materials, and other resources in this collection to teach about ancient Greece, its role in modern-day democracy, and civic engagement. Learn how democracy in the United States is different from that of the ancient Greeks. The United States has a complex government system. One important tenet of this system is democracy, in which the ultimate power rests with the people. In the case of the United States, that power is exercised indirectly, through elected representatives. Although the U.S. has been a strong proponent of democracy, it did not invent democracy. 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#### 2] Humes proves the aff

#### Under Hume’s construction of a democracy the constitution is a second thought when it comes to compulsory voting

**Orr, 11** (Graeme D. Orr, 8-30-2011, accessed on 8-24-2020, unknown, "Compulsory Voting: Elections, Not Referendums", https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228156502\_Compulsory\_Voting\_Elections\_Not\_Referendums#read)[KDandu]

In their study of the history and nature of referendums in Australia, **Williams and Hume comment that: [B]ecause constitutional changes can alter** Australia’s **democratic structure**, it can be argued that the duty to vote in referendums is greater than the duty to vote in ordinary elections.19 My thesis is the reverse: **it is reasonable to compel voting at elections, but not to compel electors to vote on the rewording of an essentially legal document such as a constitution.** There are three ways to argue this. One relates to pragmatics, one to principle, and one to participation. First, to pragmatics. It is often pointed out that Australia was founded as a nation through the peaceable means of the ballot box. Whilst the British authorities maintained a strong oversight over colonial affairs, and nothing could happen lawfully without Westminster’s statutory authority, the Australian Constitution was adopted after a set of plebiscites in each colony.20 These of course were by voluntary voting (indeed in most colonies by white, manhood rather than universal suffrage). Even more so, the State constitutions have not been adopted at a compulsory ballot, but have evolved through parliamentary amendment. It thus cannot be reasoned from arguments about symmetry that the manner of adoption of our constitutions requires ongoing compulsory voting for their reform. It is sometimes pointed out that compulsory voting for national referendums predated compulsion for national elections.21 It is fairer to note that compulsory voting was adopted first for Queensland elections (in 1914, by a Liberal administration) and then was to be trialled federally by the federal Labor government in 1915. That federal government was disappointed with the loss of eight referendum proposals in 1911 and 1913, for which it felt inclined to blame low turnout.22 The irony is that, if anything, the higher turnout generated by compulsion makes referendums harder to pass. The simplest way to scuttle reform by referendum is to appeal to uncertainty or apathy. This was neatly captured in two key slogans of the ‘no’ case in the 1999 Republic referendum: ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ and ‘When in doubt, throw it out’.23 As Craven argues, ‘confusion’ is the ‘napalm’ of constitutional nay-sayers.24 Of course the nature of law is that an onus lies on proponents of reform to make the case for change: but this does not mean voting on law reform should be compulsory. After all, subject only to minimal requirements of parliamentary quorums, even legislators are entitled to abstain from voting on a bill. Mandating voting at referendums gives a free kick to opponents of reform, when conservatives and progressives alike agree on one thing: the Constitution is not perfect.25 What of arguments from principle? Earlier we noted **the observation of Williams and Hume that the Constitution is a fundamental document to governance**. Sir Isaac Issaacs said as much when, in writing about the utility of holding referendums on the same day as elections, he claimed that ‘[t]he election of members of parliament is important, but infinitely less important than the questions with which [a] referendum is concerned’.26 Less prosaically, but echoing the same sentiment, Craven has dismissed the idea of voluntary voting at referendums whilst we have compulsory voting at elections as ‘like dressing up for take-away, but wearing thongs to the Savoy’.27 The fashion and food metaphors are inapt. In truth, the idea that a constitution is the Savoy, infinitely more important than representative government itself, is a view that perhaps only a lawyer could hold. We can have a democracy without a written constitution or a system where electors directly shape the constitution. Indeed that was the Westminster way, and it is still reflected in practice in England and the Australian states.28 But we cannot have a democracy without regular elections for representative governments and parliaments. As Chief Justice Barwick argued, **in his defence of compulsory voting at elections, compulsion does not require electors to find a candidate that they ‘prefer’ in the sense of genuinely liking. Rather, each elector ‘is asked to express a preference amongst those who are available for election, that is, to state which of them he prefers, if he must have one or more of them as Parliamentary representatives, as he must.**’29 Government, as much as taxes and death, is not just inescapable: it affects each of us in our daily lives. To require citizens to attend the polling booth or to lodge a postal ballot, with a view to counting each citizen’s view about which party, candidate or leader should be their representative for the nextthree years, is **not to require some Herculean task, either physically or intellectually.** In particular—and contrary to the elitist view summed up in the ‘scum and dregs’ rhetoric—**it is to recognise a fundamental principle of democratic equality**. One does not have to be a political aficionado or a policy analyst to have a valid say on electoral questions. As I noted earlier, there is no single metric which electors should employ in determining how to allocate their electoral preferences—and it is a good thing too. Because societies are plural and government a broad and complex activity, representative electoral politics is too rich an endeavour for there ever to be a ‘rational’ metric. This is not to say that electoral outcomes are random. As many commentators have observed, **election outcomes often appear to approximate a collective response to broad heuristics**, such as ‘are people better or worse off than three years ago?’, ‘is the country heading in the right direction?’ and ‘which leader/party is more trusted?’ These are questions of everyday political opinion, questions on which every citizen’s say is of equal worth. It is this insight that justifies electoral compulsion. In addition, elections serve a ritual purpose. **They are** seasonal **events**, the one day of the year (or every three years) **when a secular community is brought together**.30 Compulsion maps well onto that sense that elections bind the polity together and are not merely moments of partisan jostling. Referendums to amend the Constitution—unless they go to questions of secession or devolution—are not such moments. The Australian experience is that they have been specific questions, which assume electors are interested in weighing arguments about particularistic amendments to institutional structures. In one sense, to echo Barwick CJ’s reasoning, a constitutional referendum does of course deal with an unavoidable question. Short of emigrating, **every elector must live under the constitution, amended or not. But the type of question asked in a referendum is categorically different from the choice presented at an election. This difference justifies referendums being by voluntary voting, but elections by compulsory voting**. **A constitution is a basic law, but it is a law nonetheless.** This is especially so with Australian constitutions, which overwhelmingly deal with questions of institutional structure (the division of powers in a federation, the judicial role and hierarchy) rather than questions of social rights (which dominate bill of rights debates). The history of Australian national referendums demonstrates that the great majority of questions have indeed been fairly technical ones:31 Should the Commonwealth have greater power over industrial relations, monopolies or aspects of transportation or commerce? When should judges retire? Even the handful of rights questions (such as those presented in 1988) could only be understood with a reasonable knowledge of institutional form and legal powers. Only rarely have questions captured a public mood (as in the 1967 question on indigenous affairs) or spoken at a symbolic level (as in the 1999 Republic and preamble questions, although even then, the head of state question was as much a technical one about defining powers and selection processes as it was one about national identity).32 The national votes that have come closest to being earth-shattering or symbolically significant have, ironically, been voluntary plebiscites, not compulsory constitutional referendums. These were the 1915 and 1917 votes on conscription for overseas service (which rent the Labor Party in two) and the 1977 vote on a national song (which sowed the seed for ‘Advance Australia Fair’ to become the ubiquitous anthem it is today). This is not to say that electors ought to pass some kind of education or intelligence test to vote in a referendum, any more than candidates must pass such a test before they can become law-makers. An educated electorate should be positively encouraged, especially for referendums. Indeed deliberative democratic procedures and better voter education are keys to constitutional reform.33 Participation, the third consideration after pragmatics and principle, is important. **We should encourage high turnout at referendums,** but not demand it of electors who do not wish to be constitutionalists. Amending a constitution in a piecemeal, issue by issue fashion, is not the same as voting a new constitution up or down. Indeed when we hold referendums in conjunction with elections, if only for reasons of cost, turnout will be inflated compared to holding referendums as stand-alone events. Some might object that a law compelling electors to collect and deposit an election ballot, but making the referendum ballot voluntary, would be a muddy one in practice. But polling officials could simply say to each elector, ‘Here are the ballots for the election, you need to complete and deposit them. Do you also wish to vote in the referendum as well? It is not compulsory.’

#### 4] An Expressivist stance on democracy proves that voting is integral.

#### Voting is the constitutive form of democratic participation – other forms of participation are necessarily dependent on voting

Hill 10 [(Lisa, Professor of Politics at the University of Adelaide, Australia) “On the Justifiability of Compulsory Voting: Reply to Lever” British Journal of Political Science , October 2010, Vol. 40, No. 4 (October 2010), pp. 917-923 http://www.jstor.com/stable/40930592 DOA 8/23/20] CW [Cut KDandu]

Lever writes as though elections are just one other form of self-governing activity. While she concedes that '[fjailure to vote' may result in 'serious losses', she also insists that voting is not 'more important than other forms of collective choice and action'.11 This assumption seems to me to be faulty given the centrality of representative parliaments in determining the breadth and legality of democratic activity. **The idea that we can participate in self-governing activities in spheres** other than (or **instead of) legislative politics is problematic because it is the legislature that generally determines the democratic framework, that is, whether these other spheres 'of collective choice and action' will be allowed to exist. It can**, for example, limit free speech and the right to protest; it can outlaw certain interest groups; it can make striking illegal. There is little point in celebrating the voluntary aspects of democracy when **there are no democratic spheres left within which to participate voluntarily;** and so what if I participate in other kinds of self-governing activity? It needs to be shown that such activities actually provide me with better and more effective kinds of representation than legislative ones, particularly if I am disadvantaged. Further, it is rather idealistic to assume that those who fail to vote are otherwise engaged in potentially more consequential forms of civic activity. Failure to vote is, in fact, part of a generalized trend of political demobilization in industrialized democracies worldwide. The fact is that more and more electors are increasingly time-poor, and voting is often the only democratic activity for which they have time. Furthermore, it is probably the most efficient means for participating democratically given the amount of time it takes relative to the impact. Even if people only turn up to vote for 'none of the above', this is still a meaningful activity. According to Lever, the latter denotes nothing more than that voters 'preferred this option to the others'.12 I disagree: ticking a 'none of the above' option conveys vitally important information to politicians, potential politicians and other voters; it proclaims that there is a constituency of citizens whose votes are up for grabs and that an as-yet unavailable electoral alternative needs to be framed. For those who fail to vote because they find none of the existing candidates acceptable, this option could eliminate at least one ground for alienation from politics. This is particularly true of young abstainers; aside from the deprivation thesis, one major reason for youth disengagement is that conventional, and increasingly centrist, political agendas no longer resonate with young people.13 Parties are failing to respond to this message because they do not have to; after all, young people do not vote. Instead, parties quite rationally cater to the older members of the community who do vote. But if the young were compelled to turn up, this would have to change and democracy would be enriched and deepened. Lever argues that non-voters can express their 'capacities for self-government' in other spheres of life besides legislative politics. One example given is the family, which, if it is 'just', is 'both a school and model of democracy' capable of providing 'some of our most compelling experiences of mutuality, solidarity and responsibility, as well as some of the greatest challenges to our ideals of freedom, equality and deliberation'.14 This is controversial for a number of reasons. First, few families are 'just'; whereas elections explicitly seek to guarantee formal equality of rights and power, families are notoriously bad at doing this. Of course, as Lever notes, the effect of votes on outcomes is not always certain, but their effect is far more certain at the polling booth than it is in the family. Furthermore, it is debatable whether families are the ideal site for democracy. While we would certainly want more democratic relations between adult members, the same does not always apply to children. Without advocating authoritarianism, if I were to let my children vote in elections about whether they should be allowed to subsist on a diet of Smarties, I would be rather a negligent parent. In any case, it is highly unlikely that democratic participation in local, less formal forums like the family will ever be a satisfactory self-protective and self-governing substitute for legislative politics. The 'right to abstain', says Lever, enables 'the weak, timid and unpopular to protest in ways that feel safe' and 'prevent[s] coercion by neighbours, family, employers or the state'.15 This spin on abstention seems disingenuous, considering that Lever has in mind 'long-established, stable and . . . functional democracies'. Moreover, anyone this vulnerable to electoral coercion is unlikely to be participating in other forms of self-governing activity apart from voting. **Voting is perhaps the only form of political activity where a vulnerable person's privacy can be guaranteed absolutely**. It is hard to see how the 'weak, timid and unpopular' could benefit from more disempowerment, especially where the disconnection involves such a relatively safe form of political engagement. Can democracy really do without voters? And can we, as individuals, do without voting? Lever suggests that '[democratic voting rights protect our interests as individuals even when we do not exercise them'.16 I disagree. Unlike the 'right to marry', which Lever posits as analogous, voting is one of those rights that, when it goes unexercised too often and for too long, causes other rights (such as the right to equal treatment before the law; the right to equality of opportunity) to be undermined. If this were not true, port-barrelling would not be a cliché of politics documented, for example, that states tend to be more attentive to the demands of voting groups such as senior citizens and the middle classes, at the great expense of those who abstain. Political science has long known that voting 'helps those who are already better off17 and that 'if you don't vote, you don't count'.18 By contrast, complete and socially even voting can have the opposite effect: Chong and Olivera' s cross-country analysis of ninety-one countries over the period 1960-2000 'shows that compulsory voting, when enforced strictly, improves income distribution'.19 Therefore, although it is certainly true that governments 'we did not choose' should 'nonetheless protect our interests', this is not always what happens and it should not surprise us when it does not. The consequences of voting may sometimes be uncertain, but the consequences of abstention are not. Democracy, such as it exists, will go on without the participation of abstainers, governing them without their interests in mind and without their consent. Voting not only protects our material interests; it also protects our rights. John Stuart Mill regarded the vote as a kind of insurance policy against state and domestic abuses of power and many have agreed with him. The US Supreme Court has asserted that the right to vote is fundamental because it is the 'preservative of all rights'.20 It has also affirmed the right to vote 'as the citizen's link to his laws and government' and that it 'is protective of all fundamental rights and privileges'.21 Were people to fail persistently and ubiquitously to express this right, there would be no check against the potential tyranny of those in power. Democratic participation preserves rights; **failure to exercise our voting rights imperils all of our rights including the right to vote itself**. In principle, one should not have to exercise a right in order to remain entitled to it; in practice, things may be different, particularly where this right is concerned.

#### Extinction first framing has no place in the scope of the rez since it does not necessitate a policy action, on top of that it relies on lack of moral certainty but in the context of the aff it is objective giving 100% certainty.

#### Act omission distinctions/aggregation all necessitates a “good government.” The aff is a prereq since democracies would inherently need compulsory voting to be good governments which means all of these fall through anyways.

#### On top of that the act of using the particulars to get to a good form which works against self-predication causes ontological violence.

**Stanford, 3** (publication of philosophy, Stanford, 6-9-2003, accessed on 7-9-2020, Plato.stanford, "Plato’s Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy )", <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-metaphysics/#2)[KDandu>]

The debate over **self-predication involves both statements and what the statements are about**, i.e., **the ontological correlates** of those statements. (Thus at times it may be important to distinguish linguistic predication from ontological predication.) In investigating self-predication statements, perhaps it is again easiest to **distinguish three factors, the subject** or subject term, **‘The Just’**, the linking verb, ‘is’, **and** the predicate adjective ‘**just**’. Apparently **both the subject and the predicate adjective**, ‘The Just’ and ‘just’, **refer to** the same thing, namely **the Form** of Justice. One question then concerns the copula, or linking verb: in what manner is the predicate related to the subject, or how is the Form related to itself? There are three basic approaches to consider. In his seminal discussion of self-predication, Vlastos maintained that we should understand the relation between the Form and itself to be the same as that between a particular and the Form (Vlastos 1981d). This is to say that Justice is just in the same was as Socrates is just, or that Beauty is beautiful in the same way as Helen is beautiful, or that the Circle Itself is circular in the same way as my basketball: both are round. Let us label this way of understanding the copula in self-predication statements ‘characterization’. Then Beauty is a beautiful thing, an item to be included in an inventory of beautiful things right along with Helen. Some scholars, e.g., John Malcolm (1981), while accepting this characterizing reading of the ‘is’, deny that the property predicated of the Form and the particular are exactly the same. According to the Approximationist, the Form is the perfect instance of the property it stands for.  **A particular that participates in the Form is an imperfect or deficient instance in that it has a property that approximates the perfect nature of the Form.** For instance, the Circle Itself is perfectly circular. A drawn circle, or a round ball, is deficient in that it is not perfectly circular, not exactly 360 degrees in circumference. It follows that the very properties particulars possess will differ from the property ‘of the same name’ possessed by the Form. If Beauty Itself is characterized by perfect beauty, then Helen has imperfect beauty and she does not have perfect beauty. Since nothing rules out that there are numerous kinds of imperfect beauty, perhaps as many as there are beautiful participants, it seems either that there is no one kind of beauty that particulars have in common, or that there are one or more (commonly shared) imperfect kinds of beauty. In the former case, there will be no need to posit a ‘one’ over the many beauties. In the latter case, there is every reason to posit a Form(s) of Imperfect Beauty in which the commonly qualified imperfect particulars participate. Neither alternative is a happy one. While the appeal to the perfection of the mathematical properties is great, even in these cases it is doubtful that Plato adopts an approximationist strategy (see Nehamas 1999b; 1999c). An alternative is to allow that while both Beauty Itself and other items are characterized by beauty, Beauty Itself is simply and solely beautiful. This characterizing variant emphasizes the Phaedo's claims that a Form is monoeides and one (Phaedo 78b4ff). Beauty is nothing but beautiful and thus is completely beautiful, differing from other beautiful things in that they are much else besides beautiful. Helen is a woman and unfaithful and beautiful.[4] According to the second approach (see Cherniss 1977a; Allen 1965), self-predication statements assert identity between the Form and its essence. The ‘is’ is an ‘is’ of identity. We should not then understand ‘Beauty Itself is beautiful’ to assert that (the Form) Beauty is characterized by beauty. (Indeed, typically backers of this approach exclude the possibility that a Form is characterized by the property it is, thus, e.g., eliminating Beauty from a list of beautiful objects.[5]) Since Identity accounts treat self-predications as asserting that a Form and its essence are identical, with respect to Forms, Being and Identity can be viewed as the same relation in the middle period dialogues.[6] The third approach, the Predicationalist (see Nehamas 1999c; Code 1986; Silverman 2002), joins with the Identity approach in denying that self-predication statements signal that the Form is characterized by the property it constitutes. And while ultimately it allows that a Form and its essence are identical, it does not regard the self-predication statement itself as an identity claim (see Code 1986; Silverman 2002 Ch. 3). Rather**, a self-predication claim asserts that there is a special primitive kind of ontological relation between a Form (subject) and its essence (predicate). This approach begins from the two relations of Partaking and Being** introduced in the last argument of the Phaedo. An intuitive first approximation of their respective functions is to treat Partaking as a relation between material particulars and Forms, the result of which is that the particular is characterized by the Form of which it partakes. So, Helen, by partaking of Beauty, is characterized by beauty; Helen, in virtue of partaking, is (or, as we might say, becomes) beautiful. All particulars are characterized by the Forms in which each participates, and whatever each is, it is by partaking in the appropriate Form. On this account, then, there can be Forms for each and every property had by particulars (Phaedo 100–101, esp. 100c6). In contrast to the characterizing relation of Partaking, the relation of Being is always non-characterizing. Each Form, F, is its essence (ousia), which is to say that the relation of Being links the essence of beauty to the subject, Beauty Itself.[7] **Being, then, is a primitive ontological relation designed exclusively to capture the special tie between that which possesses an essence and the essence possessed**. Put differently, whenever essence is predicated of something, the relation of Being is at work. (By ‘primitive’ I do not mean to suggest that Plato does not study (what) Being (is). Nor do I mean to suggest that everything else in the metaphysics can somehow be deduced from it. Rather, I mean to indicate that the relation of Being is not explained by appeal to another more basic relation or principle. Its nature, and the nature of other primitives in the theory, such as Participating, is displayed in the ways in which the theory attempts to save various phenomena.) 4. The Simplicity of Forms Throughout the dialogues, Forms are said to be one, hen, or monoeides. (See especially the Affinity Argument in the Phaedo, 78b-84b.) These passages suggest that the self-predicational nature of Forms implies that the only property predicable of a Form is itself: i.e., Justice is just and the only thing Justice is is just. (**There are epistemological reasons that support this** reading: See §11 infra.) **But other passages suggest that Forms** cannot be simple in this strict sense. From the Republic we know that all Forms are related to the Good. While it is difficult to be certain, Plato seems committed to the claim that each Form is good, that is, that each Form **is a good thing or is characterized by goodness**.[8] More doubts about the strict simplicity of Forms emerge from reflection on the nature of definition in Plato's middle period. Ontologically, all definitions predicate the essence of the Form whose essence it is. Plato is attempting to discover through scientific investigation, or (inclusive or) through an analysis of what words mean, or through any other method, what the nature of, say, Justice is—compare the ways in which philosophers and scientists work to discover what, e.g., gold, or red, or justice, is. Ultimately, then, the answer to any ‘what is X?’ question will be some specific formula unearthed at the end of much study. According to this line of reasoning, the self-predication statements in the texts are promissory notes, shorthand for what will turn out to be the fully articulated definition. Plato is thus committed to there being Forms whose nature or essence will ultimately be discovered. To say that ‘Justice is just’ is then to stake a claim to the ultimate discovery of the nature of Justice. The problem is that the fully articulated linguistic definition, when it is ultimately discovered, will turn out to be complex.

#### 3] A marx socialist democracy proves the aff

#### 4] Principles of certainty affirm

If definitionally democracy exists as a government that wants to use the voice of the people to govern the people. By being silent we would not give the government anything to govern us with. Therefore it would not be democratic since it does not do the integral part of hearing our voice. So to be the most democratic it needs the maximum voter turnout which is what the aff says is good.

#### The metaphysical aspect to “a democracy” means that you can not buy into a paradigm built on any form of transcendental REALISM. Realism relies on the existence of a certain time and location. Democracy fulfills neither. The form of a democracy never dies and it doesn’t physically exist. The death of democratic nations are a matter of particulars not the good form so anything about a democracy that has or does exist would not matter in the context of the res.

### Thick preempt to cut later if it feels useful modular affs cool

#### Relating it back to a certain state fails.

#### The nation-state is a malleable tool we can use to advance ethical goals – it’s not a Platonic entity the effects of which are always pre-determined

Rogers **Brubaker** 20**04** "In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism" Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, [www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf](http://www.sailorstraining.eu/admin/download/b28.pdf) Brubaker is an American sociologist, and professor at University of California, Los Angeles.

This, then, is the basic work done by the category ‘nation’ in the context of nationalist movements—movements to create a polity for a putative nation. In other contexts, the category ‘nation’ is used in a very different way. It is used not to challenge the existing territorial and political order, but to create a sense of national unity for a given polity. This is the sort of work that is often called nation-building, of which we have heard much of late. It is this sort of work that was evoked by the Italian statesman Massimo D’Azeglio, when he famously said, ‘we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’. It is this sort of work that was (and still is) undertaken—with varying but on the whole not particularly impressive degrees of success—by leaders of post-colonial states, who had won independence, but whose populations were and remain deeply divided along regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious lines. It is this sort of work that the categOn ory ‘nation’ could, in principle, be mobilized to do in contemporary Iraq—to cultivate solidarity and appeal to loyalty in a way that cuts across divisions between Shi’ites and Sunnis, Kurds and Arabs, North and South.2 In contexts like this, the category ‘nation’ can also be used in another way, not to appeal to a ‘national’ identity transcending ethnolinguistic, ethnoreligious, or ethnoregional distinctions, but rather to assert ‘ownership’ of the polity on behalf of a ‘core’ ethnocultural ‘nation’ distinct from the citizenry of the state as a whole, and thereby to define or redefine the state as the state of and for that core ‘nation’ (Brubaker, 1996, p. 83ff). This is the way ‘nation’ is used, for example, by Hindu nationalists in India, who seek to redefine India as a state founded on Hindutva or Hinduness, a state of and for the Hindu ethnoreligious ‘nation’ (Van der Veer, 1994). Needless to say, this use of ‘nation’ excludes Muslims from membership of the nation, just as similar claims to ‘ownership’ of the state in the name of an ethnocultural core nation exclude other ethnoreligious, ethnolinguistic, or ethnoracial groups in other settings. In the United States and other relatively settled, longstanding nation-states, ‘nation’ can work in this exclusionary way, as in nativist movements in America or in the rhetoric of the contemporary European far right (‘la France oux Franc¸ais’, ‘Deutschland den Deutshchen’). Yet it can also work in a very different and fundamentally inclusive way.3 It can work to mobilize mutual solidarity among members of ‘the nation’, inclusively defined to include all citizens—and perhaps all long-term residents—of the state. To invoke nationhood, in this sense, is to attempt to transcend or at least relativize internal differences and distinctions. It is an attempt to get people to think of themselves— to formulate their identities and their interests—as members of that nation, rather than as members of some other collectivity. To appeal to the nation can be a powerful rhetorical resource, though it is not automatically so. Academics in the social sciences and humanities in the United States are generally skeptical of or even hostile to such invocations of nationhood. They are often seen as de´passe´, parochial, naive, regressive, or even dangerous. For many scholars in the social sciences and humanities, ‘nation’ is a suspect category. Few American scholars wave flags, and many of us are suspicious of those who do. And often with good reason, since flag-waving has been associated with intolerance, xenophobia, and militarism, with exaggerated national pride and aggressive foreign policy. Unspeakable horrors—and a wide range of lesser evils—have been perpetrated in the name of the nation, and not just in the name of ‘ethnic’ nations, but in the name of putatively ‘civic’ nations as well (Mann, 2004). But this is not sufficient to account for the prevailingly negative stance towards the nation. Unspeakable horrors, and an equally wide range of lesser evils, have been committed in the name of many other sorts of imagined communities as well—in the name of the state, the race, the ethnic group, the class, the party, the faith. In addition to the sense that nationalism is dangerous, and closely connected to some of the great evils of our time—the sense that, as John Dunn (1979, p. 55) put it, nationalism is ‘the starkest political shame of the 20th-century’— there is a much broader suspicion of invocations of nationhood. This derives from the widespread diagnosis that we live in a post-national age. It comes from the sense that, however well fitted the category ‘nation’ was to economic, political, and cultural realities in the nineteenth century, it is increasingly ill-fitted to those realities today. On this account, nation is fundamentally an anachronistic category, and invocations of nationhood, even if not dangerous, are out of sync with the basic principles that structure social life today.4 The post-nationalist stance combines an empirical claim, a methodological critique, and a normative argument. I will say a few words about each in turn. The empirical claim asserts the declining capacity and diminishing relevance of the nation-state. Buffeted by the unprecedented circulation of people, goods, messages, images, ideas, and cultural products, the nation-state is said to have progressively lost its ability to ‘cage’ (Mann, 1993, p. 61), frame, and govern social, economic, cultural, and political life. It is said to have lost its ability to control its borders, regulate its economy, shape its culture, address a variety of border-spanning problems, and engage the hearts and minds of its citizens. I believe this thesis is greatly overstated, and not just because the September 11 attacks have prompted an aggressively resurgent statism.5 Even the European Union, central to a good deal of writing on post-nationalism, does not represent a linear or unambiguous move ‘beyond the nation-state’. As Milward (1992) has argued, the initially limited moves toward supranational authority in Europe worked—and were intended—to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. And the massive reconfiguration of political space along national lines in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War suggests that far from moving beyond the nation-state, large parts of Europe were moving back to the nation-state.6 The ‘short twentieth century’ concluded much as it had begun, with Central and Eastern Europe entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era through the large-scale nationalization of previously multinational political space. Certainly nationhood remains the universal formula for legitimating statehood. Can one speak of an ‘unprecedented porosity’ of borders, as one recent book has put it (Sheffer, 2003, p. 22)? In some respects, perhaps; but in other respects—especially with regard to the movement of people—social technologies of border control have continued to develop. One cannot speak of a generalized loss of control by states over their borders; in fact, during the last century, the opposite trend has prevailed, as states have deployed increasingly sophisticated technologies of identification, surveillance, and control, from passports and visas through integrated databases and biometric devices. The world’s poor who seek to better their estate through international migration face a tighter mesh of state regulation than they did a century ago (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, pp. 30–1, 267). Is migration today unprecedented in volume and velocity, as is often asserted? Actually, it is not: on a per capita basis, the overseas flows of a century ago to the United States were considerably larger than those of recent decades, while global migration flows are today ‘on balance slightly less intensive’ than those of the later nineteenth and early twentieth century (Held et al., 1999, p. 326). Do migrants today sustain ties with their countries of origin? Of course they do; but they managed to do so without e-mail and inexpensive telephone connections a century ago, and it is not clear—contrary to what theorists of post-nationalism suggest—that the manner in which they do so today represents a basic transcendence of the nation-state.7 Has a globalizing capitalism reduced the capacity of the state to regulate the economy? Undoubtedly. Yet in other domains—such as the regulation of what had previously been considered private behavior—the regulatory grip of the state has become tighter rather than looser (Mann, 1997, pp. 491–2). The methodological critique is that the social sciences have long suffered from ‘methodological nationalism’ (Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 2002; Wimmer and Glick-Schiller, 2002)—the tendency to take the ‘nation-state’ as equivalent to ‘society’, and to focus on internal structures and processes at the expense of global or otherwise border-transcending processes and structures. There is obviously a good deal of truth in this critique, even if it tends to be overstated, and neglects the work that some historians and social scientists have long been doing on border-spanning flows and networks. But what follows from this critique? If it serves to encourage the study of social processes organized on multiple levels in addition to the level of the nation-state, so much the better. But if the methodological critique is coupled— as it often is—with the empirical claim about the diminishing relevance of the nation-state, and if it serves therefore to channel attention away from state-level processes and structures, there is a risk that academic fashion will lead us to neglect what remains, for better or worse, a fundamental level of organization and fundamental locus of power. The normative critique of the nation-state comes from two directions. From above, the cosmopolitan argument is that humanity as a whole, not the nation- state, should define the primary horizon of our moral imagination and political engagement (Nussbaum, 1996). From below, muticulturalism and identity politics celebrate group identities and privilege them over wider, more encompassing affiliations. One can distinguish stronger and weaker versions of the cosmopolitan argument. The strong cosmopolitan argument is that there is no good reason to privilege the nation-state as a focus of solidarity, a domain of mutual responsibility, and a locus of citizenship.8 The nation-state is a morally arbitrary community, since membership in it is determined, for the most part, by the lottery of birth, by morally arbitrary facts of birthplace or parentage. The weaker version of the cosmopolitan argument is that the boundaries of the nation-state should not set limits to our moral responsibility and political commitments. It is hard to disagree with this point. No matter how open and ‘joinable’ a nation is—a point to which I will return below—it is always imagined, as Benedict Anderson (1991) observed, as a limited community. It is intrinsically parochial and irredeemably particular. Even the most adamant critics of universalism will surely agree that those beyond the boundaries of the nation-state have some claim, as fellow human beings, on our moral imagination, our political energy, even perhaps our economic resources.9 The second strand of the normative critique of the nation-state—the multiculturalist critique—itself takes various forms. Some criticize the nation-state for a homogenizing logic that inexorably suppresses cultural differences. Others claim that most putative nation-states (including the United States) are not in fact nation-states at all, but multinational states whose citizens may share a common loyalty to the state, but not a common national identity (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 11). But the main challenge to the nation-state from multiculturalism and identity politics comes less from specific arguments than from a general disposition to cultivate and celebrate group identities and loyalties at the expense of state-wide identities and loyalties. In the face of this twofold cosmopolitan and multiculturalist critique, I would like to sketch a qualified defense of nationalism and patriotism in the contemporary American context.10 Observers have long noted the Janus-faced character of nationalism and patriotism, and I am well aware of their dark side. As someone who has studied nationalism in Eastern Europe, I am perhaps especially aware of that dark side, and I am aware that nationalism and patriotism have a dark side not only there but here. Yet the prevailing anti-national, post-national, and trans-national stances in the social sciences and humanities risk obscuring the good reasons—at least in the American context—for cultivating solidarity, mutual responsibility, and citizenship at the level of the nation-state. Some of those who defend patriotism do so by distinguishing it from nationalism.11 I do not want to take this tack, for I think that attempts to distinguish good patriotism from bad nationalism neglect the intrinsic ambivalence and polymorphism of both. Patriotism and nationalism are not things with fixed natures; they are highly flexible political languages, ways of framing political arguments by appealing to the patria, the fatherland, the country, the nation. These terms have somewhat different connotations and resonances, and the political languages of patriotism and nationalism are therefore not fully overlapping. But they do overlap a great deal, and an enormous variety of work can be done with both languages. I therefore want to consider them together here. I want to suggest that patriotism and nationalism can be valuable in four respects. They can help develop more robust forms of citizenship, provide support for redistributive social policies, foster the integration of immigrants, and even serve as a check on the development of an aggressively unilateralist foreign policy. First, nationalism and patriotism can motivate and sustain civic engagement. It is sometimes argued that liberal democratic states need committed and active citizens, and therefore need patriotism to generate and motivate such citizens. This argument shares the general weakness of functionalist arguments about what states or societies allegedly ‘need’; in fact, liberal democratic states seem to be able to muddle through with largely passive and uncommitted citizenries. But the argument need not be cast in functionalist form. A committed and engaged citizenry may not be necessary, but that does not make it any less desirable. And patriotism can help nourish civic engagement. It can help generate feelings of solidarity and mutual responsibility across the boundaries of identity groups. As Benedict Anderson (1991, p. 7) put it, the nation is conceived as a ‘deep horizontal comradeship’. Identification with fellow members of this imagined community can nourish the sense that their problems are on some level my problems, for which I have a special responsibility.12 Patriotic identification with one’s country—the feeling that this is my country, and my government—can help ground a sense of responsibility for, rather than disengagement from, actions taken by the national government. A feeling of responsibility for such actions does not, of course, imply agreement with them; it may even generate powerful emotions such as shame, outrage, and anger that underlie and motivate opposition to government policies. Patriotic commitments are likely to intensify rather than attenuate such emotions. As Richard Rorty (1994) observed, ‘you can feel shame over your country’s behavior only to the extent to which you feel it is your country’.13 Patriotic commitments can furnish the energies and passions that motivate and sustain civic engagement.