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### Baltics

#### European nukes can’t deter Russia in the Baltics due to troop concentration, lack of escalation dominance, asymmetrically vulnerable infrastructure, and loss of Warsaw proxy targets which means strikes fail and guarantee nuclear escalation. Only conventional forces that nukes detract from create a credible Baltic deterrent.

Peck 19 (Michael Peck is an award-winning writer specializing in defense and national security issues and opinion writer for the National Interest. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers University, 11-23-2019, "NATO Nukes Can’t Save the Baltic States from a Russian Invasion," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nato-nukes-can%E2%80%99t-save-baltic-states-russian-invasion-99222) CCDE

Even if NATO resorts to tactical nuclear weapons, it still can’t save the Baltic States from a Russian invasion.

One reason? The Warsaw Pact—the Eastern European satellites of the Soviet empire—can’t be held hostage anymore.

That’s the conclusion of a wargame by the RAND Corporation. In RAND’s view, NATO’s nukes are not a deterrent to Russia because Europe would have far more to lose from a tactical nuclear exchange than Russia.

“The biggest takeaway from the wargame exercise is that NATO lacks escalation dominance, and Russia has the benefit of it,” the study found. “In contemplating war in the Baltic states, once nuclear attacks commence, NATO would have much stronger military incentives to terminate nuclear operations, if not all of its operations, than Russia would.”

Indeed, the NATO players grappled with the utility of using nukes in the first place. “In our wargame exercise, NATO commanders knew that they would be rapidly overwhelmed by the Russian forces and considered early first use of NSNW [non-strategic nuclear weapons] to prevent that outcome,” noted the report. “But, the commanders wondered, what would NATO target?”

Russian forces would likely conduct a well-dispersed, fast-moving advance into the Baltic States, which would mean NATO tactical nuclear weapons wouldn’t hit concentrated troop formations, but would instead land on the civilian populations the alliance is supposed to be defending. Or, they could attack Russian units forming up in Russia, which would risk a strategic nuclear exchange. The NATO players ultimately chose to send a signal to Russia by dropping five tactical nukes on a Russian mobile air defense missile battery just inside the Latvian border.

Unfortunately, the wargame estimated that the most likely Russian response would be a tit-for-tat that dropped tactical nuclear weapons on five NATO airbases. “NATO’s infrastructure is vulnerable, and damage to it caused by even limited numbers of nuclear attacks can substantially degrade NATO’s military capabilities; meanwhile, Russia is able to withstand comparable levels of nuclear strikes against its forces.”

The study focused on whether non-strategic nuclear weapons, or NSNW, could deter a Russian attack on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It also illustrated how the strategic picture has changed since the Cold War. Back then, NATO could muster fairly large conventional forces, backed by tactical nuclear weapons and ultimately American strategic nuclear forces. But times have changed. “A NATO and U.S. threat to escalate to general nuclear war over a Russian invasion of the Baltic states has doubtful credibility,” RAND notes.

Ironically, while the breakup of the Warsaw Pact was a victory for NATO, it also makes dealing with today’s Russia more complicated. During the Cold War, if NATO wanted to send a signal to Russia to back off, it could—in theory—drop a nuke on a Warsaw Pact nation without attacking Russian territory and thus triggering strategic nuclear war. That bargaining chip is gone. “Targets attacked by NATO using nonstrategic nuclear weapons would, from the outset of the war, be either in Russia proper or in NATO countries (i.e., the Baltic states),” RAND noted. “During the Cold War, NATO could (if it chose) conduct limited nuclear attacks against lucrative military targets in Warsaw Pact countries other than Russia throughout the conflict.”

Ultimately, NATO will need to muster sufficient conventional forces because tactical nuclear weapons are not a credible deterrent, RAND concluded. “Even if it chose not to escalate to general war or conduct a wider attack on targets throughout Europe, Russia could continue limited attacks on lucrative NATO military targets. The problem, then, is that NATO lacks the conventional forces required to slow or stop the rapid Russian advance. NSNW forces alone cannot substitute for NATO’s lack of those conventional forces.”

#### The plan solves – nukes lower the threshold for escalation and drive Russian arms racing but elimination frees up funds for conventional deterrence and drives US conventional fill-in which solve assurances and are less redundant than nukes.

Sokolsky and Adams 16 (Richard Sokolsky is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1990–97, he was the Director of the State Department’s Office of Strategic Policy and Negotiations. Gordon Adams is a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center and professor emeritus at the School of International Service, American University. From 1993–97 he was the senior White House budget official for national security programs, 2-9-2016, "The Problem with NATO's Nukes," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-02-09/problem-natos-nukes) CCDE

It would certainly not be low-hanging fruit, but ridding Europe of its Cold War nuclear legacy would be a good place for the next president to achieve early progress in making the world a safer place. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the continent and NATO’s plans to modernize and increase the capabilities of its nuclear systems may be increasing the risk of nuclear use and undermining NATO’s conventional defense capabilities. The United States needs to take bold action to rethink NATO’s nuclear deterrent in order to reduce the dangers and strengthen the alliance. Such moves could include a freeze on tactical nuclear modernization, a phased withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, and measures to adapt and strengthen NATO’s arrangements for nuclear cooperation and consultations to reassure allies.

The Russian nuclear threat to Europe is not new. Moscow has leaned on nuclear weapons ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union took down the Red Army and Russia’s defense industrial base. Nonetheless, until very recently, the risk of nuclear war in Europe—indeed the risk of any armed conflict between NATO and Russia—has been virtually nonexistent. Since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the spring of 2014, however, what is rightly perceived as increased nuclear-muscle flexing has rattled European nerves. Russian officials have issued nuclear threats against NATO countries; at the same time, Moscow has increased air patrols of nuclear-capable planes, conducted simulated military exercises with nuclear weapons, and continued to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons opposite NATO.

There are signs, too, that Russia is officially changing its war-fighting doctrine in Europe to include the possibility of early use of limited nuclear strikes in order to bring conflicts to a halt on terms more favorable to Russia. This is a dangerous development—not so much because Russia is developing new capabilities, but because the deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations has increased the risk of an accident, mistake, or miscalculation that could trigger a conflict.

The United States' and NATO's tactical nuclear plans are not helping matters. The United States intends to spend billions of dollars over the next decade to upgrade its tactical nuclear bombs stored in Europe—and the United States’ European allies will need to allocate hundreds of millions of euros to improve the infrastructure supporting these weapons and associated dual-capable aircraft. The more modern U.S. nuclear warheads that will replace the estimated 160–200 U.S. nuclear bombs currently in Europe will be smaller and more accurate—and Russia is reportedly making similar improvements to its tactical arsenal. According to U.S. General James Cartwright, former commander of U.S. Strategic Forces and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), these weapons will make limited nuclear strikes more conceivable.

It is unclear, moreover, whether NATO’s modernized tactical nuclear weapons would actually add to the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture. Over the past two decades, the military rationale for maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has all but disappeared. Over five years ago, when Cartwright was the vice-chairman of the JCS, he declared that U.S. tactical nukes in Europe were redundant because they fulfilled no military function that was not already being met by U.S. strategic and conventional forces. Colin Powell, when he was chairman of the JCS in the early 1990s, supported elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and in 2008, U.S. European Command ended its support for maintaining nuclear weapons in Europe. Few today within U.S. and allied militaries would question these judgments.

The more vexing issue for the alliance is whether these weapons have any political and psychological value if they do not possess any military utility. NATO experts including former Pentagon officials Franklin Miller and Kori Schake continue to maintain that the weapons based in Europe are essential for reassuring allies of the United States’ security commitment. They also argue that basing them in several NATO countries is a valuable demonstration of the alliance’s principle of “equal risks, equal responsibilities.” It is important to preserve this principle. But reassurance and burden sharing might be better served if NATO spent more of its precious defense resources buying weapons and capabilities—such as improved C4ISR, strategic airlift, and heavy equipment for defense in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states—that are relevant to the real threats the alliance faces today and will confront in the future. It isn't clear why allies would be reassured by investments in new nuclear warheads and infrastructure that offer no real increase in usable military capabilities and no added deterrence beyond what British, French, and U.S. strategic arms already provide. Nor is it clear why these allies would be reassured by more modern NATO tactical nuclear weapons that could actually lower the threshold of nuclear use on allied territory.

The alliance, after much internal debate, gave an important nod toward revising its nuclear posture earlier in the decade. In NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and its 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, the alliance left the doors open to further nuclear reductions and to other means of providing reassurance and preserving burden sharing that do not require basing U.S. nuclear weapons on NATO soil, such as more rotational deployments of U.S. strategic bombers to NATO bases. Very little has been done in the past few years, however, to move in these directions. In view of Europe’s deteriorating security environment, the United States needs to restore momentum to these efforts or at least prevent backsliding.

The United States and Russia can and should begin a new high-level dialogue on deterrence and security issues writ large, including on the impact of planned developments in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, conventional forces, cyberweapons, and missile defenses. And nothing should be kept off the agenda, as U.S. officials have occasionally tried to do in the past with missile defenses and so-called prompt-strike conventional weapons. The alliance should also take two more immediate and meaningful steps: impose a freeze on its plans to deploy upgraded B61 bombs in Europe and announce its commitment to undertake a phased withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from the continent.

There will be resistance to these measures. Some defense and arms control experts will argue that NATO should only change its nuclear posture if Russia takes reciprocal action through a new treaty. For example, Miller, Schake, and former NATO Secretary General and British Defense Secretary George Robertson have argued for either parity between NATO and Russia (where Moscow agrees to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons to NATO’s level) or equal percentage reductions in a legally binding treaty. This is a recipe, however, for forcing NATO to continue spending money on anachronistic nuclear weapons with little gain in deterrence, while siphoning funds from much-needed conventional defense improvements. Moreover, pressing Russia to negotiate reductions in—and especially the elimination of—its roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is a fool’s errand. Moscow sees these weapons as a counter to what it perceives as NATO’s conventional superiority and China’s growing military capabilities, as well as a symbol of its great power status. Further, the total lack of trust in Russia’s relations with the West makes it very unlikely that Moscow would agree to legally binding transparency and other confidence-building measures for its tactical nuclear weapons programs anytime soon.

There will also be pushback within NATO. Some members of the alliance—Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, and Germany—would conceivably support nuclear risk reduction measures; however, others such as the Baltic countries, Poland, and other Eastern European members would oppose any changes in the alliance’s nuclear plans and posture. The key to bringing recalcitrant members on board is to demonstrate with concrete actions, such as the Pentagon’s new budget proposal to spend $3.4 billion in the fiscal year 2017 to bolster U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic states, that greater and more sustained investments in conventional force improvements will make them safer; that allied strategic nuclear forces are and will remain the backbone of NATO’s strategic deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist; that NATO’s security and nuclear deterrent are not tied to the presence of nuclear bombs on alliance soil; and that both can be maintained through broader and more robust NATO involvement in nuclear cooperation, planning, and consulting arrangements.

To borrow from the Cold War lexicon of the great nuclear strategist Herman Kahn, Russia is re-conceptualizing the ladder of escalation from conventional to nuclear conflict. NATO’s agreement to abandon plans for tactical nuclear weapons’ modernization and to eventually remove its nuclear bombs from Europe could, over time and as part of a broader strategy to re-engage Moscow on all aspects of Euro-Atlantic security, influence Russia to climb back down that ladder. And it could immediately strengthen the alliance’s defense and deterrent posture against the full range of current and emerging threats. To remain a nuclear alliance, NATO does not need to spend billions of dollars to upgrade nuclear weapons and infrastructure that it does not need and that risk lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe. The Strategic Concept and the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review left the doors open to a safer, stronger, and more affordable NATO deterrent posture. It is important for alliance leaders to pry these doors apart a little more—or at least keep them from being shut—when they meet in July at the Warsaw NATO summit.

#### Only bolstering conventional strength and abandoning nuclear posturing deters Russian Baltic invasion – otherwise conflict escalates to nuclear use and decks NATO and global allied cred.

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WASHINGTON – Would the United States fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states in 2004.

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan Rand Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.

There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers. During the Cold War, NATO was outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces, and it would have had great difficulty stopping a Soviet attack with conventional weapons. From the moment it was formed, NATO relied on the threat of nuclear escalation — whether rapid and spasmodic, or gradual and controlled — to maintain deterrence. American thinkers developed elaborate models and theories of deterrence. U.S. and NATO forces regularly carried out exercises simulating the resort to nuclear weapons to make this strategy credible.

After the Cold War ended, the U.S. and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Tensions with Russia receded and nuclear strategy came to seem like a relic of a bygone era. Yet today, with Russia rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear statecraft is returning.

The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have the capability to prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in two to three days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO could respond by mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would require striking targets — such as air defense systems — located within Russia, as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines.

Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. They are particularly alarmed at the possibility of NATO using its unmatched military capabilities to conduct conventional strikes within Russian borders. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the Russians are serious about it.

A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead, through deliberate choice or miscalculation, to a general nuclear war involving intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and apocalyptic destruction?

So, what to do? One option would be for the West to pull back — to conclude that any game that involves risking nuclear war over the Baltic states is not worth the candle. The logic here is superficially compelling. After all, the U.S. could survive and thrive in a world where Russia dominated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, just as it survived and thrived during the Cold War, when those countries were part of the Soviet Union. The problem is that failing to defend the Baltic states would devalue the Article 5 guarantee on which NATO rests: the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. And given that one could raise similar questions about so many U.S. commitments — would declining to meet a Chinese attack on the Philippines really endanger America’s existence? — this failure could undermine the broader alliance system that has delivered peace and stability for so many decades.

A second option, emphasized by the Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, would be to devise new limited nuclear options as a way of strengthening deterrence and dissuading Russia from pursuing a strategy of escalate to de-escalate. For example, the U.S. might develop low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used, in a relatively limited fashion, against a Russian invasion force or the units supporting it.

This approach is probably worthwhile, because it would help fill in missing steps on the escalatory ladder between conventional conflict and general nuclear war. The knowledge that the U.S. has its own “tactical” nuclear options might inject greater caution into the calculations of Russian planners. It is possible, Rand analysts note, that limited nuclear strikes early in a Baltic conflict could convince the Kremlin that the risks of proceeding are unacceptable.

The dangers here are, well, obvious and drastic. There is always some possibility — although informed analysts debate how much of a possibility — that Russia might mistake a limited strike against military targets in the Baltics for part of a larger or more dangerous nuclear strike against Russia itself. And if the plan is to use limited nuclear strikes against Russian military assets involved in an invasion of the Baltic states, the implication is that NATO would be using nuclear weapons on the territory of its own members.

A third, and best, option is to strengthen the weak conventional posture that threatens to bring nuclear options into play. The root of NATO’s nuclear dilemma in the Baltics is that the forces it has stationed there cannot put up a credible defense. Yet as earlier studies have noted, the U.S. and its allies could make a Russian campaign far harder and costlier — with a much-diminished chance of rapid success — by deploying an enhanced NATO force of seven to eight brigade combat teams, some 30,000 troops. That force would include three or four armored brigade combat teams (as opposed to the one NATO periodically deploys to Eastern Europe now), along with enhanced mobile air defenses and other critical capabilities.

Russia couldn’t claim credibly that such troops posed any real offensive threat to its territory. But the force would be large and robust enough that Russian troops couldn’t destroy it in a flash or bypass it at the outset of a conflict. It would therefore obviate many of the nuclear escalation dynamics by making far less likely a situation in which NATO must escalate to avoid a crippling defeat in the Baltics, or one in which Russia can escalate to protect its early victories there.

Developing this stronger conventional deterrent in the Baltics would not be cheap: Estimates run from $8 billion to $14 billion in initial costs, plus $3 billion to $5 billion in annual operating expenses. Yet neither would it be prohibitive for the richest alliance in the world. The best way of reducing the danger of a nuclear war in the Baltics is to ensure that NATO won’t immediately lose a conventional one.

#### Only US-Russia nuclear war causes extinction from nuclear winter – other arsenals are too small.

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The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even **in an all-out nuclear war between the U**nited **S**tates **and Russia**, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation. **The aftermath could be much worse**: the **burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter**.

According to one model, **an** all-out **exchange** of 4,000 weapons **could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years**. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great**. An exchange** on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia **who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons**, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed. Some models suggest that even a **small regional nuclear war** involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation, though this estimate might be pessimistic. Wars on this scale **are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation**. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.

It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan. However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, **the** risk of human extinction **is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future**.

#### Alliances contain allied and adversary aggression – the alternative is great power conflict driven overlapping spheres of influence and loss of conflict dampeners – it’s an impact filter.

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The liberal world order is under assault. Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system. Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric, one in which smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a spheres-of-influence world — which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find intuitively attractive. But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe and Asia, it would only engender insecurity and conflict. In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order, however, is several-fold. Too many spheres overlap in ways that would generate conflict rather than clean lines of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by developing nuclear weapons; India and China would compete vigorously in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would contest the resources and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for hot war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A spheres of influence world would also sharpen great power competition outside of each region. Regional hegemony is a springboard for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United States out-of-area if it had subdued strategic competition in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of “fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II — even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also crack up the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past decades. It would replicate the exclusive economic blocs of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee crisis since 1945 — a stain on the consciousness of human civilization — and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a series of hot wars — in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States as an ally, as well as an intensified cold war with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence. It emboldens American adversaries and leads American allies to take self-help measures that themselves may undercut American security interests. A spheres-of-influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the unprecedented prosperity produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans, or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would collapse, harming the economies of every major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure — since U.S. allies are force-multipliers for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of hot wars that reorder the international balance of power, including by incentivizing aggressive states to push out and assert regional dominion, knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them. The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran — all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order — would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it. It would also be ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself — one ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

### Heg stuff for allies

#### Allies make heg sustainable and eradicate war.

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A BRAVE NEW WORLD

World War II transformed the scope and lethality of conflict. The United States had long benefited from its relatively isolated geographic location, but the spread of long-range airpower, missile technology, and nuclear weapons meant that its security was no longer guaranteed. Newly exposed, the United States sought a strategy that would allow it to secure the international balance of power from afar, averting conflicts on its territory and preventing the only other superpower left standing after the war, the Soviet Union, from dominating Asia and Europe. The United States created a network of alliances precisely with these goals in mind. U.S. policymakers reasoned that by acquiring allies and building overseas bases on those countries’ territory, Washington would be able to confront crises before they reached the homeland. What’s more, with this forceful presence, the United States could practice so-called extended deterrence, dissuading adversaries from starting wars in the first place.

Unlike the alliance systems of the past, the U.S. system was intended to prosecute or deter not a single war but all wars, and to do so indefinitely. The novelty—and the gamble—was that if the new security system worked, the world would see little evidence of its power. This new approach was a radical departure from the pre–Cold War norm, when the United States considered itself largely self-sufficient and pursued few foreign entanglements; it had no formal allies between the Revolutionary War and World War II. Between 1949 and 1955, in contrast, the United States extended security guarantees to 23 countries in Asia and Europe. By the end of the twentieth century, it had alliances with 37.

[picture removed]

The United States’ Cold War alliances were successful in meeting the goals that strategists had set out for them. For the duration of the Cold War, no U.S. treaty ally was ever the victim of a major attack. And until the 9/11 attacks, no NATO member had ever invoked the treaty’s Article 5 guarantee, which obligates the allies to assist any member state that comes under assault. Of course, Washington had intervened at times to support allies in a fix—helping Taiwan manage Chinese aggression during two crises in 1954–55 and 1958, for example—but it did so chiefly when it saw its own interests at risk and often with the explicit aim of preventing war. In addition to maintaining the balance of power in Asia and Europe, the system contributed to the flourishing of the United States’ allies, most notably Japan and West Germany, which became close military partners, consolidated themselves as democracies with vibrant economies, and eventually emerged as leading regional powers.

The alliance system also lowered the cost of U.S. military and political action worldwide. Since the early 1950s, U.S. treaty allies have joined every major war the United States has fought, despite the fact that for almost all these conflicts, they were not required to do so by the terms of their alliances. What’s more, the system ensured that the allies’ foreign policies supported, rather than undermined, Washington’s. The United States used security guarantees to convince South Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany to abandon illicit programs to develop their own nuclear weapons. Other states that, if they had not been included in U.S. alliances, would surely have sought their own military protection—building state-of-the-art armies, navies, and air forces—chose instead to rely on the United States’ military might. And by maintaining close defense relationships with a number of those states, the United States also gained support in international institutions for everything from peacekeeping missions to sanctions—support that would otherwise have been much harder to secure. These contributions were crucial, as they allowed the United States to project its power without becoming overstretched.

LONELY AT THE TOP

The alliance system continued to function smoothly until 1991, when the adversary for which the United States’ entire security posture had been designed suddenly disintegrated. The Soviet Union vanished, and with it, so did the logic of American security guarantees. Notable international relations scholars—primarily those of a realist orientation—believed that in a unipolar world, U.S. alliances had become outmoded. But U.S. policymakers were unpersuaded. The Cold War system had performed so admirably that they decided it should be retained and repurposed for new objectives. Because the United States was now utterly unmatched in its military and political power, however, their alliance reforms did not focus on defense or deterrence as traditionally understood.

#### Heg solves mass violence and extinction – we’ve got statistics.

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M. Barnet, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, 2011 (“The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads, Accessed 07-17-2016, SP)

* live from G25

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably **the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured**, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the **guardian of globalization**, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But the world did not keep sliding down that **path of perpetual war**. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by **ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the **international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a **profound and persistent reduction in** battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw **a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars**. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are **clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity**, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

#### Our impacts are relative, not absolute, claims – heg bad requires a fleshed out alternative.

William Wohlforth 12, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Nuno Monteiro. “’Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful.’ Reviewed by William Wohlforth” October 31st, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR17.pdf

Third, setting up the article as a claim that unipolarity is not peaceful runs into a problem: **Unipolarity is peaceful. The Most Peaceful. Ever. Period**. No one expects any imaginable anarchic inter-state system to be perfectly peaceful, with no war at all. In my 1999 paper, I stressed that “unipolarity **does not imply the end of all conflict**... It simply means the absence of two big problems” — hegemonic rivalry and counter-hegemonic balancing—that were present in all earlier systems. As a result “unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers.” Like any statement about the war-proneness of any international system, **this is a relative claim**. International relations scholarship does not have theories that make anything other than relative predictions about the war-proneness of systems. Monteiro tries but fails to escape this reality. He writes: “Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature (12). The latter portion of this sentence is exactly right, but the former bit is contradicted just a few pages later when Monteiro presents evidence that “Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all systems .. .“ (18). While conflict researchers debate the causes, they are nearly united in agreeing that the post-1990 international system is **the least afflicted by war**.5 **There are many ways to measure** war: the overall number that occur, the number of people killed, the probability that any state will be at war in any year, the size or cost of military forces compared to economic output or population, or, perhaps best, the probability that any individual will die as a result of organized inter-group violence. **By all those measures, we are living in the most peaceful period** since the modern inter-state system took shape in the seventeenth century. Indeed, Stephen Pinker assembles masses of evidence to suggest that **there has never been a less violent time in all of human history**.6 It is hard to think of any way to measure war that does not show the unipolar period as remarkably peaceful— except for the ones Monteiro uses: “the percentage of years that great powers spend at war, and the incidence of war involving great powers,” (18) with the United States defined as the only great power after 1990. That is a very convoluted way to say ‘Iraq and Afghanistan.’ **The fact that the United States ended up in two grinding counter-insurgency operations in no way contradicts the claim that unipolarity is unprecedentedly peaceful.** But that reaction concerns the framing rather than the substance of the article. One can dismiss as America-centric the claim that unipolarity is war-prone and still regard Monteiro’s carefully crafted arguments as promising advances. Further investment in refining and evaluating these arguments is warranted, for even if we agree that unipolarity has been pretty darned peaceful, it surely doesn’t seem that way to anyone in or around the U.S. military. Along with most security scholars, I’ve regarded the post-1991 military interventions as permitted **but not dictated by unipolarity**. That **at least leaves open the possibility of strategic learning**, as happened back in biplolarity. Even though the bipolar structure and U.S. grand strategy remained constant, bloody conflicts in **Korea and Vietnam** prompted Washington to get out of the direct military intervention business in favor of proxy wars and less costly covert operations. Similarly, the new “Iraq syndrome” might **tame interventionist impulses** even as unipolarity endures. But Monteiro’s message is gloomier. “The significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades,” he warns, “will continue as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.” (38). That’s a scary message even if that “significant level” is far lower than in any other known interstate system. So while I hope Monteiro is wrong, there is no doubt that his article has decisively altered the terms of the debate on this crucial issue.

#### Free-riding and entrapment are wrong and link turned by alliances.

Rapp-Hooper 20 (Mira Rapp-Hooper is Stephen A. Schwarzman Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. She is the author of the forthcoming book Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, March/April 2020, "Saving America’s Alliances," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/saving-americas-alliances) CCDE

THE PRICE OF POWER

Both the Trump administration and notable international relations scholars worry that the United States’ alliances lead to chronic free-riding, allowing U.S. allies to benefit from American security guarantees and military cooperation even though they add comparatively little to the relationship. Nearly every U.S. president has wished that the country’s allies would spend more on defense, and there is little doubt that the United States has generally outspent most of its treaty allies in Asia and Europe. The imbalance persists even today: the United States spends over three percent of its GDP on defense; the next-highest spenders among the United States’ allies spend 2.5 percent, and many others spend 1.5–2.0 percent. But these numbers are deceptive. The United States, after all, maintains a global defense posture, whereas its partners generally spend on security in their immediate neighborhoods. What’s more, U.S. military spending in such countries as Germany and Japan is largely devoted to a regional defense strategy, as opposed to the defense of a single host ally. There is no reason to expect those countries’ defense budgets to be comparable to that of the United States.

[picture removed]

U.S. allies also contribute to their alliances with the United States in ways that aren’t captured by their defense expenditures—such as by granting low-cost leases for U.S. bases and constructing facilities for use by U.S. troops. Contrary to common perceptions, alliances themselves cost nothing: it is the spending on deployments and infrastructure that results in high costs. And Washington’s allies often assume part of the burden. Moreover, the price of the American alliance system has, historically, been an acceptable portion of the U.S. national budget. There is little evidence that alliance-related spending has forced other major tradeoffs or has been a drag on economic growth. And the asymmetry between Washington’s spending and that of its allies is a feature of the alliance system, not a bug: it gives the United States more influence over its partners, who depend on American strength for their security.

There is also relatively little evidence that the United States’ alliances have imposed major political costs. International relations scholars often fret about “alliance entrapment,” which would occur if the United States intervened in crises or conflicts that it might have ignored if it did not have obligations to another state. Yet there is almost no proof of that phenomenon. U.S. allies are no more likely to become involved in conflicts than other states, and although the United States has waged some ill-advised wars—such as the Vietnam War and the Iraq war—no ally was responsible for those decisions. Instead, when Washington has backed its allies in crises, it has done so because it has also had a clear national interest at stake. Moreover, the United States has never found itself in an alliance arrangement that it was unable to exit. In the few cases in which alliances became politically inconvenient, as with the underperforming Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Washington was able to disentangle itself easily.

Entrapment is uncommon because the United States designed its alliance system to reduce its exposure to risky commitments. Take Taiwan, for instance. In 1955, the United States allied with Chiang Kai-shek, the brash Taiwanese president who still hoped to retake the Chinese mainland. In their negotiations with Chiang over the alliance, U.S. officials took special care to impress on him that he did not have U.S. backing to attack the People’s Republic of China, and they made clear that the treaty they were to sign with him did not apply to the offshore islands that were still in dispute between Taiwan and China. So in 1958, when the two came to loggerheads over those same islands, the United States had the freedom to support its ally only as it saw fit—in this case, by offering diplomatic support and by helping supply the islands. Washington has also been selective in its choice of partners, rejecting requests for security pacts when the associated commitments were too dangerous. Despite a close relationship, the United States has declined to extend formal security guarantees to Israel, for example, calculating that the risk of an unwanted war is too high.

It is no easier to find examples of U.S. allies that have reneged on their commitments to Washington. From the formation of the alliance system until the 9/11 attacks, neither the United States nor any of its partners had been the victim of an unprovoked assault, so there have ultimately been few opportunities for an ally to jilt Washington on the brink of a conflict. This is not to say that the United States has never faced downsides from its alliance system. Chronic, if modest, allied free-riding on U.S. defense spending is surely an annoyance. On rare occasions, moreover, an ally has reneged on its commitments in costlier ways, as French President Charles de Gaulle did when he pulled France out of NATO’s military structure but not the alliance altogether. And once the alliance system was put in place, it may have encouraged the United States to define its security needs more expansively than it might have without the pacts. Nevertheless, the system’s drawbacks have been far fewer, both in number and in intensity, than some scholars and policymakers would have people believe.

#### Heg is sustainable – data.

Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth 12 (G. John Ikenberry - Princeton University Professor of International Affairs, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth - Dartmouth University IR Professors. "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment.", 2012, Date Accessed: 7/1/17, <http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC_a_00107>, accessed 7/22/17, DL)

The main link between hegemonic grand strategy and decline that figures in Gilpin, as well as in the works of Calleo and Kennedy, is diversion of resources away from productive investment toward system maintenance and protection.49 Simply paying the costs of protecting clients and maintaining the system—military expenditures, subsidies to allies, and so on—exacerbates the larger, growth-sapping trend toward consumption and away from investment. This amounts to a claim that the opportunity cost of its grand strategy will cause a hegemon’s rate of growth to slow more markedly than a nonhegemonic state as it proceeds along Solow’s path from poor and rapidly growing to rich and slowly growing. Conversely, other states whose security and prosperity are underwritten by the hegemon will be spared these opportunity costs and will perform relatively better. Always present in realist arguments for strategic retrenchment, this proposition began to figure even more prominently as U.S. defense expenditures began to climb after 2001.50 The problem with the claim that pursuing leadership imposes growth-sapping opportunity costs is that subsequent research has found virtually no evidence for it. Research in economics has yielded no consensus theory or accepted empirical finding to support the assumption that reduced U.S. military spending would improve the country’s economic growth. As one review summed it up, the “literature in economics has not found military expenditure to be a significant determinant of growth.”51 This finding is robust to all three major growth models in economics, a huge array of identification strategies, various country groupings (e.g., developed vs. developing), and concerning the United States itself. Indeed, when considered in the aggregate, the most common finding is a positive relationship between military spending and growth.52 In a departure from the broader research in economics, political scientists Karen Rasler and William Thompson conducted a study tailored to the specific claims about the costs of hegemonic grand strategies. Their findings “do not support the argument that consumption-driven investment tradeoffs are critical to an understanding of the relative decline of system leaders.”53 Obviously, there are some limits to this overall claim: if the United States were a dramatic outlier among the advanced economies, spending Soviet Union–type levels on defense (20 to 25 percent) over decades, this would surely complicate its growth trajectory and relative competitiveness. But even when fully engaged in the Afghan war and with many of the expensive militarized responses to the September 11 attacks still in place, the United States is not spending a historically high proportion of its GDP on the military (4.5 percent in 2012) either in absolute terms or in relation to its primary economic competitors. The flip side of this finding is that the economic performance of U.S. allies is unrelated to any security subsidy they receive from Washington. The contention that lower military expenditures facilitated the economic rise of Japan, West Germany, and other U.S. allies seemed plausible when Gilpin, Calleo, and Kennedy were publishing their signature books in the 1980s. Their relative position vis-à-vis the United States essentially stopped improving subsequently, however, as their per capita wealth approached U.S. levels—just as standard growth models would expect. Over the past twenty years, the United States’ total and per capita GDP relative to key European allies and Japan has either held steady or improved despite a growing gap in respective military efforts. In sum, there is scant theoretical or empirical reason to link rates of growth to either the distribution of power or the specific policies the United States pursues to sustain its leadership. As Thompson notes, it is unclear “why uneven growth should be viewed as a function of unbalanced power.”54 No scholarly theory or empirical findings clearly link the 2007–09 financial collapse, great recession, and consequent ballooning of the U.S. budget deficit to the international system (at least, as scholars of international security construe it). Nor does any established research finding show a connection between any U.S. security commitment and the causes of the economic downturn. Nor is there reason to expect that resources freed up from global commitments would necessarily be diverted to uses more advantageous for long-term U.S. growth. The downturn might affect the United States’ willingness to sustain defense spending at 3 to 4 percent of GDP and may even prompt Washington to reevaluate some of its security commitments, but that does not mean that defense spending or security commitments or any other policy associated with U.S. hegemony caused the downturn in the first place.

### Terror

#### Shared nukes are vulnerable to resurgent terrorism – proven interest in nukes and bases are insecure.

Andreasen et al 18 (Steve Andreasen is a national security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Nuclear Security Project in Washington, D.C., and teaches courses on National Security Policy and Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. He served as director for defense policy and arms control on the U.S. National Security Council at the White House from February 1993 to January 2001. He was the principal advisor on strategic policy, nuclear arms control and missile defense to the National Security Advisor and the President. During the Bush Sr. and Reagan Administrations, Andreasen served in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, dealing with a wide-range of defense policy, arms control, nuclear weapons and intelligence issues, he also looks like the dad from Good Luck Charlie, Isabelle Williams joined NTI in 2007 and serves as senior adviser to the Global Nuclear Policy Program. As part of this work she helps coordinate the international strategy of the program, managing the work of NTI’s global partners who conduct various activities in their countries and regions to promote reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and reducing global nuclear risks. Her areas of focus also include NATO nuclear policy, UK nuclear policy, nuclear disarmament, and U.S.-Russia relations. Williams came to NTI from the Partnership for Global Security, where she managed their next generation nonproliferation program and was previously a research associate at the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute where she focused on research relating to chemical weapons, biosecurity and bioterrorism preparedness and response. She also held successive positions at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Williams holds a bachelor's degree and master's degree (Hons) in International Studies both from the University of Leeds, Brian Rose joined NTI in 2016 as a program officer with the Global Nuclear Policy Program, where he works on issues pertaining to deterrence and strategic stability, European security, emerging and disruptive technologies, and U.S. nuclear policy. Prior to joining NTI, Rose served in analytical, program management, and outreach positions at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the United States Institute of Peace, the U.S. Department of State, and George Washington University. Rose holds a BA in political science from St. Mary’s College of Maryland and an MA in International Science and Technology Policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, “Chapter 2: Challenges for Maintaining NATO’s Nuclear Posture: Risks, Credibility, and Cost,” from *Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear Posture*, NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative), https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI\_NATO\_RPT\_Web.pdf) CCDE

SECURITY RISKS OF THE POSTURE

At each of the U.S. and NATO air bases that are thought to store U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, a combined force of U.S. and European NATO personnel is assigned to retain custody and provide security of U.S. nuclear weapons. The weapons are stored in underground, hardened storage vaults inside protective aircraft shelters at each storage base. Custody, repair, and improvements to the weapons and the storage vaults are the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force. Perimeter security (fences, monitors, and motion detectors) and controlling access to the storage sites are the responsibility of the host nation.

These sites present targets and opportunities for both insiders and outside groups to disrupt or gain access to the facilities and, potentially, the weapons themselves. In 2009 and 2010, an incident occurred that underlines this point. A group of activists entered a suspected NATO storage site in Belgium and walked freely for more than an hour before being detained by base security.18

More recent events have led to increasing concerns regarding the security of NATO bases and European nuclear facilities. The aftermath of the Brussels terrorist attacks in March 2016 revealed what appears to have been a credible threat to Belgian nuclear power plants.19

At about the same time as the Brussels attacks, the Pentagon ordered military families out of southern Turkey, including the Incirlik Air Base, because of ISIS related security concerns.20 Then, in July 2016, following an attempted coup to topple the Turkish government, the Turkish commanding officer at Incirlik was arrested for his alleged role in the plot. If reports are accurate—that Incirlik is a major NATO installation hosting U.S. forces that control one of the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons in Europe (see Chapter 5)—this event shows just how quickly assumptions about the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons stored abroad can change.21 Continued political instability over the past year, including mass arrests within Turkey and tensions between Turkey and the United States and NATO, are less than reassuring.

Even before these events, deficiencies in the security of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Europe were cited in a 2008 study by the U.S. Air Force, which concluded that most sites in Europe “require additional resources to meet [U.S. Department of Defense] standards,” and found “inconsistencies in personnel facilities and equipment provided to the security mission by the host nation.”22 A former senior NATO official, retired U.S. Air Force Major General Robertus Remkes, who commanded the 39th Wing at Incirlik Air Base and later J5 United States European Command, wrote in 2011 of the ongoing security risks associated with storing U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and the severity of the political and security consequences for NATO of any infiltration of a site, whether or not the attackers gained access to the weapons themselves.23

Although the United States and NATO have undertaken considerable efforts to improve the physical security of nuclear weapons stored in Europe since the U.S. Air Force study, it should be assumed that those weapons remain potential targets for terrorist attacks. Storing nuclear weapons at locations throughout Europe to reassure some allies or as leverage in a future arms control deal with Russia, therefore, comes with the increasing risk of vulnerability to an evolving and deadlier terrorist threat (in contrast, nuclear weapons in the continental United States are secured in central storage facilities that are easier to protect than dispersed underground vaults inside aircraft shelters across multiple bases in Europe). Russia, too, may be vulnerable, with an estimated 1,850 non-strategic nuclear weapons reportedly kept in central storage facilities throughout the country.2

#### Yes attacks – demonstrated motive, previous plans, and easily available info prove sharing drives terror.

Remkes 11 (Major General Robertus C.N. Remkes, Former Director, Air Component Coordination Element, Air Force Central Command, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 17, 2011 “The Security of NATO Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Implications,” NTI, https://media.nti.org/pdfs/NTI\_Framework\_Chpt3.pdf) CCDE

An Imaginative and Deadly Adversary

Several publicly documented incidents associated with the security of NATO bases have rightly led to questions regarding the potential threat of a terrorist attack on NATO nuclear storage sites. A brief review of several terror plots and successful attacks over the past two decades underscores the terrorist threat, and may provide insights as to the “who, what, when, where, and how” of a future terror plot.

Before September 11, 2001, there were several terror plots and successful attacks that illuminate the new threat. The first attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) occurred in February 1993. This attack, where a truck bomb was driven into the parking garage of Tower One, was designed to take Tower One down and have it crash into Tower Two, killing thousands. The template for this attack came from the barracks bombings in Beirut in 1983 and plans for an attack on New York skyscrapers that were revealed in 1990 after an FBI raid of the New Jersey home of El Sayyid Nosair, the man ultimately convicted in connection with the WTC bombing and the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane. The Beirut bombings (two separate barracks bombings just two minutes apart) also served as a template for the U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (two separate embassy bombings just 10 minutes apart). The attack on 9-11 followed this same pattern.

The 1994 hijacking of Air France Flight 8969 (by the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA) also served as a template for the 9-11 attack in that the airliner in this hijacking was intended to be flown over the Eiffel Tower and then to explode, killing hundreds on the ground in Paris. The Bojinka Plot of 1995 provided even more insight into the planning for the 9-11 attack and the 2006 transatlantic airline plot that followed. The Bojinka plot was designed to bring down a dozen airliners returning to the United States from the Far East over a period of a few hours after bombs placed on board these aircraft were detonated. This plot required suicidal terrorists on board for the plan to succeed.

Between March and September 2001, several separate intelligence warnings from overseas were passed to U.S. intelligence agencies regarding a “massive strike involving airplanes.” These included that 20 Al Qaeda jihadists were in the United States, that four of them were receiving flight training, and that a massive attack was imminent.6 In fact, the President’s Daily Brief of August 6, 2001, prepared by the CIA, included this prescient statement: “Although bin Laden has not succeeded, his attacks against the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrates that he prepares operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks.”

Taken together, these examples underscore that we are facing adversaries that are clever, committed, and not deterred by failure. Moreover, they have a track record of planning and conducting high profile attacks with a high prospective payoff. It is certain that these adversaries will continue planning these attacks despite (or even emboldened by) Osama bin Laden’s death. Although many plots have been foiled before their execution, the most common methods to combating terror have been largely reactive and not proactive; an attack takes place and is followed by actions to prevent a similar attack from happening again.

Connecting the Dots: Terrorist Interest in NATO Nuclear Storage Sites

In summer and early fall 2001, U.S. intelligence monitored calls between an Al Qaeda hub in Yemen and an operative in Europe. These communications revealed several operatives were involved in a plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Paris. Two days after 9-11, Nizar Trabelsi was apprehended and questioned regarding this plot. Trabelsi was eventually linked to two “shoe bombers,” Richard Reid and Saajit Badat. Reid’s suicide attack on December 22, 2001, on American Airlines Flight 63 was foiled and he was arrested, tried, and sentenced to life in a federal prison in Colorado; Badat failed to go through with his attack and was arrested in November 2003 and subsequently sentenced to 13 years in jail in England.

During Trabelsi’s questioning and subsequent trial, he revealed that he was to be the first suicide bomber in a plot to attack a U.S. Air Force dining facility at an air base in Europe. In May 2003, Trabelsi revealed the details of the bomb plot at the air base. Trabelsi told the court that he was sent by Osama bin Laden to conduct a truck-bomb attack at the base (Trabelsi met with bin Laden during a trip to Afghanistan in 2001). Trabelsi also revealed that he was helped by an American service member stationed at the base who sold him pictures of the facility. It was also publicly asserted during the trial that the air base housed nuclear weapons. Trabelsi was convicted on September 30, 2003, and sentenced to 10 years in prison.

In 2009, Naima Trabelsi, Trabelsi’s wife, claimed on an Islamic web-based TV broadcast that her husband “had plotted to carry out an attack on the U.S. military base after he returned from Afghanistan to destroy the weapons arsenal located on the base.”7

For exhibiting such great interest in the air base, it can be hypothesized, if not assumed, that the weapons of interest to Al Qaeda were the B-61 nuclear bombs publicly asserted during the Trabelsi trial to be stored there. Thus, in this instance, one could plausibly connect Trabelsi, who was aided by an American service member, to Osama bin Laden, to other Al Qaeda operatives, to publicly available information on the supposed locations of the weapons, to weaknesses in security at the sites publicly disclosed by the U.S. Air Force, and ultimately to an attack against the weapons. Moreover, even if in this case all the dots did not connect and there were no nuclear weapons stored at the air base, it should underscore that there are credible scenarios relating to terrorism and NSNW in Europe that require the highest possible standards of security at all NATO nuclear storage sites.

Security arrangements at NATO bases have been challenged on several occasions since 9-11. The most significant recent event occurred in January 2010 when a handful of nuclear activists breached the perimeter fence at an air base. They were arrested after nearly an hour on the base and had their cameras confiscated; nonetheless, they had removed the memory cards and smuggled them out of the base. These videos and photos contained on the memory cards are available on line on YouTube and at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website.

Indeed, information on NATO bases in Europe is available on several websites, including detailed satellite images.8 We must then presume that terrorists already have access to plenty of information to plan and conduct an attack at NATO bases in Europe—and with their recent history of high profile, high consequence attacks, may already be planning to do so.

#### Nuclear terror causes global war.

Irma Arguello & Emiliano J. Buis 18. Arguello is founder and chair of the NPSGlobal Foundation, and head of the secretariat of the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network; Buis is researcher and professor at the NPSGlobal Foundation. 03/04/2018. “The Global Impacts of a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: What Would Happen? What Should We Do?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 114–119.

Making matters worse, there is evidence of an illicit market for nuclear weapons-usable materials. There are sellers in search of potential buyers, as shown by the dismantlement of a nuclear smuggling network in Moldova in 2015. There certainly are plenty of sites from which to obtain nuclear material. According to the 2016 Nuclear Security Index by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 24 countries still host inventories of nuclear weapons-usable materials, stored in facilities with different degrees of security. And in terms of risk, it is not necessary for a given country to possess nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, or nuclear facilities for it to be useful to nuclear terrorists: Structural and institutional weaknesses in a country may make it favorable for the illicit trade of materials. Permeable boundaries, high levels of corruption, weaknesses in judicial systems, and consequent impunity may give rise to a series of transactions and other events, which could end in a nuclear attack. The truth is that, at this stage, no country in possession of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials can guarantee their full protection against nuclear terrorism or nuclear smuggling. Because we live in a world of growing insecurity, where explicit and tacit agreements between the relevant powers – which upheld global stability during the post- Cold War – are giving way to increasing mistrust and hostility, a question arises: How would our lives be affected if a current terrorist group such as the Islamic State (ISIS), or new terrorist groups in the future, succeed in evolving from today’s Manchester style “low-tech” attacks to a “high-tech” one, involving a nuclear bomb, detonated in a capital city, anywhere in the world? We attempted to answer this question in a report developed by a high-level multidisciplinary expert group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network. We found that there would be multiple harmful effects that would spread promptly around the globe (Arguello and Buis 2016); a more detailed analysis is below, which highlights the need for the creation of a comprehensive nuclear security system. The consequences of a terrorist nuclear attack A small and primitive 1-kiloton fission bomb (with a yield of about one-fifteenth of the one dropped on Hiroshima, and certainly much less sophisticated; cf. Figure 1), detonated in any large capital city of the developed world, would cause an unprecedented catastrophic scenario. An estimate of direct effects in the attack’s location includes a death toll of 7,300-to-23,000 people and 12,600-to-57,000 people injured, depending on the target’s geography and population density. Total physical destruction of the city’s infrastructure, due to the blast (shock wave) and thermal radiation, would cover a radius of about 500 meters from the point of detonation (also known as ground zero), while ionizing radiation greater than 5 Sieverts – compatible with the deadly acute radiation syndrome – would expand within an 850-meter radius. From the environmental point of view, such an area would be unusable for years. In addition, radioactive fallout would expand in an area of about 300 square kilometers, depending on meteorological conditions (cf. Figure 2). But the consequences would go far beyond the effects in the target country, however, and promptly propagate worldwide. Global and national security, economy and finance, international governance and its framework, national political systems, and the behavior of governments and individuals would all be put under severe trial. The severity of the effects at a national level, however, would depend on the countries’ level of development, geopolitical location, and resilience. Global security and regional/national defense schemes would be strongly affected. An increase in global distrust would spark rising tensions among countries and blocs, that could even lead to the brink of nuclear weapons use by states (if, for instance, a sponsor country is identified). The consequences of such a shocking scenario would include a decrease in states’ self-control, an escalation of present conflicts and the emergence of new ones, accompanied by an increase in military unilateralism and military expenditures. Regarding the economic and financial impacts, a severe global economic depression would rise from the attack, likely lasting for years. Its duration would be strongly dependent on the course of the crisis. The main results of such a crisis would include a 2 percent fall of growth in global Gross Domestic Product, and a 4 percent decline of international trade in the two years following the attack (cf. Figure 3). In the case of developing and less-developed countries, the economic impacts would also include a shortage of high-technology products such as medicines, as well as a fall in foreign direct investment and a severe decline of international humanitarian aid toward low-income countries. We expect an increase of unemployment and poverty in all countries. Global poverty would raise about 4 percent after the attack, which implies that at least 30 million more people would be living in extreme poverty, in addition to the current estimated 767 million. In the area of international relations, we would expect a breakdown of key doctrines involving politics, security, and relations among states. These international tensions could lead to a collapse of the nuclear order as we know it today, with a consequent setback of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation commitments. In other words, the whole system based on the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty would be put under severe trial. After the attack, there would be a reassessment of existing security doctrines, and a deep review of concepts such as nuclear deterrence, no-firstuse, proportionality, and negative security assurances. Finally, the behavior of governments and individuals would also change radically. Internal chaos fueled by the media and social networks would threaten governance at all levels, with greater impact on those countries with weak institutional frameworks. Social turbulence would emerge in most countries, with consequent attempts by governments to impose restrictions on personal freedoms to preserve order – possibly by declaring a state of siege or state of emergency – and legislation would surely become tougher on human rights. There would also be a significant increase in social fragmentation – with a deepening of antagonistic views, mistrust, and intolerance, both within countries and towards others – and a resurgence of large-scale social movements fostered by ideological interests and easily mobilized through social media.

#### OR

#### Extinction – nuke terror guarantees retaliation – their impact defense is dated and wrong.

Peter Hayes 18, PhD from Berkeley, Director of the Nautilus Institute and Honorary Professor at the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney, "NON-STATE TERRORISM AND INADVERTENT NUCLEAR WAR", NAPSNet Special Reports, January 18, 2018, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/non-state-terrorism-and-inadvertent-nuclear-war/

Nuclear terrorism post-cold war: trigger for inadvertent nuclear war? The possible catalytic effect of nuclear terrorism on the risk of state-based nuclear war is not a simple linkage. The multiple types and scales of nuclear terrorism may affect state-nuclear use decisions along multiple pathways that lead to inadvertent nuclear war. These include: Early warning systems fail or are “tripped” in ways that lead to launch-on-warning Accidental nuclear detonation, including sub-critical explosions. Strategic miscalculation in crisis, show of force Decision-making failure (such as irrational, misperception, bias, degraded, group, and time-compressed decision-making) Allied or enemy choices (to seek revenge, to exploit nuclear risk, to act out of desperation) Organizational cybernetics whereby a nuclear command-control-and communications (NC3) system generates error, including the interplay of national NC3 systems in what may be termed the meta-NC3 system. Synchronous and coincident combinations of above.[4] Exactly how, where, and when nuclear terrorism may “ambush” nuclear armed states already heading for or on such a path to inadvertent nuclear war depends on who is targeting whom at a given time, either immediately due to high tension, or generally due to a structural conflict between states. Nuclear armed states today form a complex set of global threat relationships that are not distributed uniformly across the face of Earth. Rather, based on sheer firepower and reach, the nine nuclear weapons states form a global hierarchy with at least four tiers, viz: Tier 1: United States, clear technological supremacy and qualitative edge. Tier 2: Russia, China, global nuclear powers and peers with the United States due to the unique destructive power of even relatively small nuclear arsenals, combined with global reach of missile and bomber delivery systems, thereby constituting a two-tiered global “nuclear triangle” with the United States. Tier 3: France, UK, NATO nuclear sharing and delivery NATO members (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey) and the NATO and Pacific nuclear umbrella states (Japan, South Korea, Australia) that depend on American nuclear extended deterrence and directly and indirectly support US and US-allied nuclear operations even though they do not host nor deliver nuclear weapons themselves. Tier 4: India, Pakistan, Israel, DPRK. The first two tiers constitute the global nuclear threat triangle that exists between the United States, Russia, and China, forming a global nuclear “truel.” Each of these states targets the others; each represents an existential threat to the other; and each has a long history of mutual nuclear threat that is now a core element of their strategic identity. Tier three consists of states with their own nuclear force but integrated with that of the United States (even France!) that expand the zone of mutual nuclear threat over much of the northern and even parts of the southern hemisphere; and states that host American nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence systems that support US nuclear operations and to whom nuclear deterrence is “extended” (if, for example, Australia’s claim to having an American nuclear umbrella is believed). The fourth tier is composed of smaller nuclear forces with a primarily regional reach and focus. Between most of these nuclear armed states and across the tiers, there are few shared “rules of the road.” The more of these states that are engaged in a specific conflict and location, the more unpredictable and unstable this global nuclear threat system becomes, with the potential for cascading and concatenating effects. Indeed, as the number of nuclear states projecting nuclear threat against each other increases, the notion of strategic stability may lose all meaning. The emergence of a fifth tier—of non-state actors with the capacity to project nuclear threat against nuclear-armed and nuclear umbrella states (although not only these states)—is a critically important possible catalytic actor in the new conditions of nuclear threat complexity that already exist today. Such a layer represents an “edge of chaos” where the attempts by nuclear armed states to exert absolute “vertical” control over the use of nuclear weapons confront the potential of non-state entities and even individuals (insiders) to engage in “horizontal” nuclear terrorism, presenting radically different control imperatives to the standard paradigm of organizational procedures, technical measures, and safeguards of various kinds. This tier is like the waves and tides on a beach that quickly surrounds and then causes sand castles to collapse. In 2010, Robert Ayson reviewed the potential linkages between inter-state nuclear war and non-state terrorism. He concluded: “…[T]hese two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them.”[5] How this linkage might unfold is the subject of the next sections of this essay. Are non-state actors motivated and able to attempt nuclear terrorism? A diverse set of non-state actors have engaged in terrorist activities—for which there is no simple or consensual definition. In 2011, there were more than 6,900 known extremist, terrorist and other organizations associated with guerrilla warfare, political violence, protest, organized crime and cyber-crime. Of these, about 120 terrorist and extremist groups had been blacklisted by the United Nations, the European Union and six major countries.[6] Some have argued that the technical, organizational, and funding demanded for a successful nuclear attack, especially involving nuclear weapons, exceeds the capacity of most of the non-state actors with terrorist proclivities. Unfortunately, this assertion is not true, especially at lower levels of impact as shown in Figure 1; but even at the highest levels of obtaining authentic nuclear weapons capabilities, a small number of non-state actors already exhibit the motivation and possible capacity to become nuclear-armed. Ellingsen suggests a useful distinction that nuclear terrorists may be impelled by two divergent motivations, as shown in Figure 2, creating “opportunistic” and “patient” profiles.[7] The requirements for an opportunist non-state nuclear terrorist tend towards immediate use and the search for short-term payoffs with only tactical levels of commitment; whereas the patient non-state nuclear terrorist is able and willing to sustain a long-term acquisition effort to deal a strategic blow to an adversary in a manner that could be achieved only with nuclear weapons. In turn, many factors will drive how a potential nuclear terrorist non-state organization that obtains nuclear weapons or materials may seek to employ them, especially in its nuclear command-and-control orientations. Blair and Ackerman suggest that the goals, conditions, and capacity limitations that shape a possible nuclear terrorist’s posture lead logically to three types of nuclear terrorist nuclear command-and-control postures, viz: pre-determined (in which the leadership sends a fire order to a nuclear-armed subordinate and no change is entertained and no capacity to effect change is established in the field, that is, the order is fire-and-forget); assertive (in which only the central command can issue a nuclear fire order, central control is maintained at all times, with resulting demanding communications systems to support such control); and delegative (in which lower level commanders control nuclear weapons and have pre-delegated authority to use them in defined circumstances, for example, evidence of nuclear explosions combined with loss-of-connectivity with their central command).[8] An example of such delegative control system was the November 26, 2008 attack on Mumbai that used social media reporting to enable the attacking terrorists to respond to distant controller direction and to adapt to counter-terrorist attacks—a connectivity tactic that the authorities were too slow to shut down before mayhem was achieved.[9] Logically, one might expect nuclear terrorists oriented toward short-term, tactical goals to employ pre-determined nuclear command-and-control strategies in the hope that the speed of attack and minimum field communications avoids discovery and interdiction before the attack is complete; whereas nuclear terrorists oriented toward long-term, strategic goals might employ more pre-delegative command-and-control systems that would support a bargaining use and therefore a field capacity to deploy nuclear weapons or materials that can calibrate actual attack based on communications with the central leadership with the risk of interdiction through surveillance and counter-attack. These differing strategic motivations, timelines, and strategies in many respects invert those of nuclear weapons states that rely on large organizations, procedures, and technical controls, to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authorization; and if they are used, to minimize needless civilian casualties (at least some nuclear armed states aspire to this outcome). The repertoire of state-based practices that presents other states with credible nuclear threat and reassures them that nuclear weapons are secure and controlled is likely to be completely mismatched with the strengths and strategies of non-state nuclear terrorists that may seek to maximize civilian terror, are not always concerned about their own survival or even that of their families and communities-of-origin, and may be willing to take extraordinary risk combined with creativity to exploit the opportunities for attack presented by nuclear weapons, umbrella, and non-nuclear states, or their private adversaries. For non-state actors to succeed at complex engineering project such as acquiring a nuclear weapons or nuclear threat capacity demands substantial effort. Gary Ackerman specifies that to have a chance of succeeding, non-state actors with nuclear weapons aspirations must be able to demonstrate that they control substantial resources, have a safe haven in which to conduct research and development, have their own or procured expertise, are able to learn from failing and have the stamina and strategic commitment to do so, and manifest long-term planning and ability to make rational choices on decadal timelines. He identified five such violent non-state actors who already conducted such engineering projects (see Figure 3), and also noted the important facilitating condition of a global network of expertize and hardware. Thus, although the skill, financial, and materiel requirements of a non-state nuclear weapons project present a high bar, they are certainly reachable. Figure 3: Complex engineering projects by five violent non-state actors & Khan network Source: G. Ackerman, “Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts,” Journal of Strategic Security, 9:1, 2016, at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol9/iss1/10/ Along similar lines, James Forest examined the extent to which non-state actors can pose a threat of nuclear terrorism.[10] He notes that such entities face practical constraints, including expense, the obstacles to stealing many essential elements for nuclear weapons, the risk of discovery, and the difficulties of constructing and concealing such weapons. He also recognizes the strategic constraints that work against obtaining nuclear weapons, including a cost-benefit analysis, possible de-legitimation that might follow from perceived genocidal intent or use, and the primacy of political-ideological objectives over long-term projects that might lead to the group’s elimination, the availability of cheaper and more effective alternatives that would be foregone by pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the risk of failure and/or discovery before successful acquisition and use occurs. In the past, almost all—but not all—non-state terrorist groups appeared to be restrained by a combination of high practical and strategic constraints, plus their own cost-benefit analysis of the opportunity costs of pursuing nuclear weapons. However, should some or all of these constraints diminish, a rapid non-state nuclear proliferation is possible. Although only a few non-state actors such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State have exhibited such underlying stamina and organizational capacities and actually attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related skills, hardware, and materials, the past is not prologue. An incredibly diverse set of variously motivated terrorist groups exist already, including politico-ideological, apocalyptic-millenarian, politico-religious, nationalist-separatist, ecological, and political-insurgency entities, some of which converge with criminal-military and criminal-scientist (profit based) networks; but also pyscho-pathological mass killing cults, lone wolves, and ephemeral copy-cat non-state actors. The social, economic, and deculturating conditions that generate such entities are likely to persist and even expand. In particular, rapidly growing coastal mega-cities as part of rapid global urbanization offer such actors the ability to sustain themselves as “flow gatekeepers,” possibly in alliance with global criminal networks, thereby supplanting the highland origins of many of today’s non-state violent actors with global reach.[11] Other contributing factors contributing to the supply of possible non-state actors seeking nuclear weapons include new entries such as city states in search of new security strategies, megacities creating their own transnationally active security forces, non-states with partial or complete territorial control such as Taiwan and various micro-states, failing states, provinces in dissociating, failing states that fall victim to internal chaos and the displacement effects of untrammeled globalization, and altogether failed states resulting in ungoverned spaces. To this must be added domestic terrorist entities in the advanced industrial states as they hollow out their economies due to economic globalization and restructuring, adjust to cross-border migration, and adapt to cultural and political dislocation. In short, the prognosis is for the fifth tier of non-state actors to beset the other four tiers with intense turbulence just as waves on a beach swirl around sandcastles, washing away their foundations, causing grains of sand to cascade, and eventually collapsing the whole structure. Observed non-state nuclear threats and attacks In light of the constraints faced by non-state terrorist actors in past decades, it is not surprising that the constellation of actual nuclear terrorist attacks and threats has been relatively limited during and since the end of the Cold War. As Martha Crenshaw noted in a comment on the draft of this paper: We still don’t know why terrorists (in the sense of non-state actors) have not moved into the CBRN [chemical,biological, radiological or nuclear ] domain. (Many people think biosecurity is more critical, for that matter.) Such a move would be extremely risky for the terrorist actor, even if the group possessed both capability (resources, secure space, time, patience) and motivation (willingness to expend the effort, considering opportunity costs). So far it appears that “conventional” terrorism serves their purposes well enough. Most of what we have seen is rhetoric, with some scattered and not always energetic initiatives.[12] Nonetheless, those that have occurred demonstrate unambiguously that such threats and attacks are not merely hypothetical, in spite of the limiting conditions outlined above. One survey documented eighty actual, planned attacks on nuclear facilities containing nuclear materials between 1961-2016[13] as follows: 80 attacks in 3 waves (1970s armed assaults, 1990s thefts, post-2010, breaches) High threat attacks: 32/80 attacks posed substantial, verified threat of which 44 percent involved insiders. All types of targets were found in the data set—on reactors, other nuclear facilities, military bases leading Gary Ackerman and to conclude: “Overall, empirical evidence suggests that there are sufficient cases in each of the listed categories that no type of threat can be ignored.”[14] No region was immune; no year was without such a threat or attack. Thus, there is a likely to be a coincidence of future non-state threats and attacks with inter-state nuclear-prone conflicts, as in the past, and possibly more so given the current trend in and the generative conditions for global terrorist activity that will likely pertain in the coming decades. Of these attacks, about a quarter each were ethno-nationalist, secular utopian, or unknown in motivation; and the remaining quarter were a motley mix of religious (11 percent), “other” (5 percent), personal-idiosyncratic (4 percent), single issue (2 percent) and state sponsored (1 percent) in motivation. The conclusion is unavoidable that there a non-state nuclear terrorist attack in the Northeast Asia region is possible. The following sections outline the possible situations in which nuclear terrorist attacks might be implicated as a trigger to interstate conflict, and even nuclear war. Particular attention is paid to the how nuclear command, control and communications systems may play an independent and unanticipated role in leading to inadvertent nuclear war, separate to the contributors to inadvertency normally included such as degradation of decision-making due to time and other pressures; accident; “wetware” (human failures), software or hardware failures; and misinterpretation of intended or unintended signals from an adversary. Regional pathways to interstate nuclear war At least five distinct nuclear-prone axes of conflict are evident in Northeast Asia. These are: US-DPRK conflict (including with United States, US allies Japan, South Korea and Australia; and all other UNC command allies. Many permutations possible ranging from non-violent collapse to implosion and civil war, inter-Korean war, slow humanitarian crisis. Of these implosion-civil war in the DPRK may be the most dangerous, followed closely by an altercation at the Joint Security Area at Panmunjon where US, ROK, and DPRK soldiers interact constantly. China-Taiwan conflict, whereby China may use nuclear weapons to overcome US forces operating in the West Pacific, either at sea, or based on US (Guam, Alaska) or US allied territory in the ROK, Japan, the Philippines, or Australia); or US uses nuclear weapons in response to Chinese attack on Taiwan. China-Japan conflict escalates via attacks on early warning systems, for example, underwater hydrophone systems (Ayson-Ball, 2011). China-Russia conflict, possibly in context of loss-of-control of Chinese nuclear forces in a regional conflict involving Taiwan or North Korea. Russia-US conflict, involving horizontal escalation from a head-on collision with Russian nuclear forces in Europe or the Middle East; or somehow starts at sea (mostly likely seems ASW) or over North Korea (some have cited risk of US missile defenses against North Korean attack as risking Russian immediate response). Combinations of or simultaneous eruption of the above conflicts that culminate in nuclear war are also possible. Other unanticipated nuclear-prone conflict axes (such as Russia-Japan) could also emerge with little warning. Precursors of such nuclear-laden conflicts in this region also exist that could lead states to the brink of nuclear war and demonstrate that nuclear war is all too possible between states in this region. Examples include the August 1958 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, in which the United States deployed nuclear weapons to Taiwan, and the US Air Force has only a nuclear defense strategy in place to defend Taiwan should China have escalated its shelling campaign to an actual attack; the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when a US nuclear armed missile was nearly fired from Okinawa due to a false fire order; the March 1969 Chinese-Soviet military clash and resulting consideration of nuclear attacks by both sides; and the August 1976 poplar tree crisis at Panmunjon in Korea, when the United States moved nuclear weapons back to the DMZ and the White House issued pre-delegated orders to the US commander in Korea to attack North Korea if the tree cutting task force was attacked by North Korean forces. Loss-of-control of Nuclear Weapons As is well known, nuclear armed states must routinely—and in the midst of a crisis—ensure that their nuclear weapons are never used without legitimate authority, but also ensure at the same time that they are always available for immediate use with legitimate authority. This “always-never” paradox is managed in part by a set of negative and positive controls, reliant upon procedural and technical measures, to maintain legitimate state-based command-and-control (see Figure Four). Figure Four: Controls and Measures on Nuclear Weapons Use Source: Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation, Nuclear Command, Control, and Stability Framework, December 29, 2016, at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/48707/Nuclear%20Command%20Control%20and%20Stability%20Assessment\_Final%20report\_29Dec15%20rev2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y In this framework, Jerry Conley has produced a taxonomy of nuclear command-and-control structures that embody varying notional national “command-and-control” orientations (also referred to as stability points or biases). Each nuclear armed state exhibits a distinct preference for technical and procedural measures to achieve negative and positive control of nuclear weapons. The way that a state constructs its control system varies depending on its size, wealth, technology, leadership, and strategic orientation, lending each state a unique use propensity affected by the information processing and transmission functions of the nuclear command-and-control system, that in part determines the use or non-use decisions made by the leaders of nuclear armed states. The resulting ideal nuclear command-and-control state structures are shown in Table 1. Table 1: Ideal Nuclear command-and-control structures Wealthy A nuclear program that has economic resources to research, expand, and bolster itself with both experienced people and technical innovations. Poor A nuclear program that does not have sufficient economic resources to properly research, expand, and bolster itself and relies on procedures instead of technology and experience. Complex A nuclear program that has the material resources and personnel to support a wide range of controls and redundancies. Simple A nuclear program that has minimal material resources or personnel to adequately support a robust and redundant C2 structure. Centralized A nuclear program that maintains authority and control of its nuclear armament as a singular capability through a defined chain of command. Decentralized A nuclear program that distributes authority of its nuclear armament to a network of commanders or individuals who operate as independent decision makers with minimal oversight. Civilian A nuclear program that is governed by an elected, non-military government that maintains authority and control over the nuclear arsenal through a defined chain of authority. Military A nuclear program that is governed by a weak civilian government and/or the military maintains control and authority over the nuclear arsenal. Source: Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation, Nuclear Command, Control, and Stability Framework, December 29, 2016, at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/48707/Nuclear%20Command%20Control%20and%20Stability%20Assessment\_Final%20report\_29Dec15%20rev2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y These ideal types are summarized with respect to the defining axes of control measure in Figure Five. Figure Five: State nuclear weapons control biases by NC3 type Note: according to dominant characteristic shown in orange circle; also, real states may exhibit more than one characteristic Source: Virginia Tech Applied Research Corporation, Nuclear Command, Control, and Stability Framework, December 29, 2016, at: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/48707/Nuclear%20Command%20Control%20and%20Stability%20Assessment\_Final%20report\_29Dec15%20rev2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y In Northeast Asia, a four-way nuclear threat system exists that has a three world-class nuclear armed states, the United States, Russia and China, interacting with a fourth tier, barely nuclear armed state, the DPRK. In this quadrilateral nuclear standoff, the DPRK’s simple NC3 system likely is an amalgam of a poorly resourced, militarized, and personalized leadership—which may lead it to oscillate between procedural and technical measures as the basis of control, with a primary emphasis on positive use control, not negative control to avoid unauthorized use. China’s large, centralized NC3 system co-mingles nuclear and conventional communications between national commanders and deployed nuclear forces and may emphasize negative more than positive use controls to ensure Party control. Russia’s highly centralized, complex NC3 system relies on legacy technology and limited economic base for modernization. It too may be more oriented towards negative controls in peacetime, but have the capacity to spring almost instantly to primary reliance on positive controls in times of crisis or tension. The US NC3 system is large, complex and based on wealth and technological prowess. It is under civilian, not military control, at least in principle and in peacetime, and is redundant, diverse, and relatively resilient. Non-state nuclear attack as trigger of inter-state nuclear war in Northeast Asia The critical issue is how a nuclear terrorist attack may “catalyze” inter-state nuclear war, especially the NC3 systems that inform and partly determine how leaders respond to nuclear threat. Current conditions in Northeast Asia suggest that multiple precursory conditions for nuclear terrorism already exist or exist in nascent form. In Japan, for example, low-level, individual, terroristic violence with nuclear materials, against nuclear facilities, is real. In all countries of the region, the risk of diversion of nuclear material is real, although the risk is likely higher due to volume and laxity of security in some countries of the region than in others. In all countries, the risk of an insider “sleeper” threat is real in security and nuclear agencies, and such insiders already operated in actual terrorist organizations. Insider corruption is also observable in nuclear fuel cycle agencies in all countries of the region. The threat of extortion to induce insider cooperation is also real in all countries. The possibility of a cult attempting to build and buy nuclear weapons is real and has already occurred in the region.[15] Cyber-terrorism against nuclear reactors is real and such attacks have already taken place in South Korea (although it remains difficult to attribute the source of the attacks with certainty). The stand-off ballistic and drone threat to nuclear weapons and fuel cycle facilities is real in the region, including from non-state actors, some of whom have already adopted and used such technology almost instantly from when it becomes accessible (for example, drones).[16] Two other broad risk factors are also present in the region. The social and political conditions for extreme ethnic and xenophobic nationalism are emerging in China, Korea, Japan, and Russia. Although there has been no risk of attack on or loss of control over nuclear weapons since their removal from Japan in 1972 and from South Korea in 1991, this risk continues to exist in North Korea, China, and Russia, and to the extent that they are deployed on aircraft and ships of these and other nuclear weapons states (including submarines) deployed in the region’s high seas, also outside their territorial borders. The most conducive circumstance for catalysis to occur due to a nuclear terrorist attack might involve the following nexi of timing and conditions: Low-level, tactical, or random individual terrorist attacks for whatever reasons, even assassination of national leaders, up to and including dirty radiological bomb attacks, that overlap with inter-state crisis dynamics in ways that affect state decisions to threaten with or to use nuclear weapons. This might be undertaken by an opportunist nuclear terrorist entity in search of rapid and high political impact. Attacks on major national or international events in each country to maximize terror and to de-legitimate national leaders and whole governments. In Japan, for example, more than ten heads of state and senior ministerial international meetings are held each year. For the strategic nuclear terrorist, patiently acquiring higher level nuclear threat capabilities for such attacks and then staging them to maximum effect could accrue strategic gains. Attacks or threatened attacks, including deception and disguised attacks, will have maximum leverage when nuclear-armed states are near or on the brink of war or during a national crisis (such as Fukushima), when intelligence agencies, national leaders, facility operators, surveillance and policing agencies, and first responders are already maximally committed and over-extended. At this point, we note an important caveat to the original concept of catalytic nuclear war as it might pertain to nuclear terrorist threats or attacks. Although an attack might be disguised so that it is attributed to a nuclear-armed state, or a ruse might be undertaken to threaten such attacks by deception, in reality a catalytic strike by a nuclear weapons state in conditions of mutual vulnerability to nuclear retaliation for such a strike from other nuclear armed states would be highly irrational. Accordingly, the effect of nuclear terrorism involving a nuclear detonation or major radiological release may not of itself be catalytic of nuclear war—at least not intentionally–because it will not lead directly to the destruction of a targeted nuclear-armed state. Rather, it may be catalytic of non-nuclear war between states, especially if the non-state actor turns out to be aligned with or sponsored by a state (in many Japanese minds, the natural candidate for the perpetrator of such an attack is the pro-North Korean General Association of Korean Residents, often called Chosen Soren, which represents many of the otherwise stateless Koreans who were born and live in Japan) and a further sequence of coincident events is necessary to drive escalation to the point of nuclear first use by a state. Also, the catalyst—the non-state actor–is almost assured of discovery and destruction either during the attack itself (if it takes the form of a nuclear suicide attack then self-immolation is assured) or as a result of a search-and-destroy campaign from the targeted state (unless the targeted government is annihilated by the initial terrorist nuclear attack). It follows that the effects of a non-state nuclear attack may be characterized better as a trigger effect, bringing about a cascade of nuclear use decisions within NC3 systems that shift each state increasingly away from nuclear non-use and increasingly towards nuclear use by releasing negative controls and enhancing positive controls in multiple action-reaction escalation spirals (depending on how many nuclear armed states are party to an inter-state conflict that is already underway at the time of the non-state nuclear attack); and/or by inducing concatenating nuclear attacks across geographically proximate nuclear weapons forces of states already caught in the crossfire of nuclear threat or attacks of their own making before a nuclear terrorist attack.[17] An example of a cascading effect would be a non-state attack on a key node of linked early warning systems that is unique to and critical for strategic nuclear forces to be employable, or the effect of multiple, coincident and erroneous sensor alerts of incoming attacks (as occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis with radar in Florida monitoring Soviet missiles in Cuba that mistakenly fused an erroneous reading of a missile trajectory with a real observation of a Soviet satellite that happened to be passing overhead). An example of a concatenating effect would an attack that leads a nuclear weapons state to target two other states forces because it cannot determine whose forces attacked its own. This circumstance might arise if key anti-submarine forces or an aircraft carrier battle group were attacked and it was impossible to determine in a given waterway or area of ocean whose submarines were present or responsible for the attack, leading the attacked state to destroy all the submarines presenting on-going threat to its strategic forces. As we noted above, a terrorist nuclear shock may take various forms and appear in different places. Ever since an extortion attempt in Boston in 1974 based on the threat of nuclear detonation, the threat of an improvised nuclear device has been credible. For such a threat to be credible, a non-state terrorist entity must release a plausible precursor such as nuclear material or warhead design information, or stage an actual demonstration attack that makes it plausible that the attacker controls a significant quantity of fissile material (most likely plutonium, or simply radioactive materials suitable for a radiological device that might be used to draw in first responders and then detonate a warhead to maximize damage and terror). Such an attack might be combined with a separate attack on critical infrastructure such as a cyberattack. The attacker might retain sufficient material for bargaining and insurance should the initial attack fail. Given the need to adapt to circumstances, such an attacker is likely to be patient and strategic, in the terms defined earlier, and to have extensive organizational and communication capacities; and to be able to operate at multiple targeted sites, possibly in multiple countries. Given its patience and stamina, such an attacker would select a highly symbolic target such as a high level meeting. Such a case would present the targeted state with an exquisite dilemma: bargaining and negotiation with the non-state actor threatening such an attack may be justified given the explicit and plausible nature of the threat, which may be politically impossible while making counter-terrorism operations very risky and only possible with extreme caution. And, such an attacker might well issue a false statement about state-sponsorship to invoke third parties in ways that vastly complicate the response to the threat. If the attacker is less capable and driven for immediate political or other returns, then it may be satisfied with highly delegated delivery with no recall option, and no use of communications to minimize the risk of discovery or interdiction. Such an attacker is also less likely to wait for the circumstances in which inter-state nuclear war is more likely due to inter-state tension; and also less likely to seek third party effects beyond the damage to the immediate target and resulting terror. Should surveillance indicate that an improvised nuclear device is in motion, then an all-out search to interdict the attackers and to retrieve the device or materials would likely ensue. In these two instances of credible threat of non-state nuclear attack, the insider versus outsider perpetrator factor will affect significantly how the attack affects possible inter-state conflicts. In Kobe’s terms, if the perpetrator is confirmed to be an outsider, then a country-of-origin suspicion matrix may cast suspicion onto another state as possible sponsor. For an attack threatened in China, the linkage might be back to Russia, the United States, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in Russia, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or North Korea. For an attack threatened in North Korea, the linkage might be back to the United States, China, or Russia. And for an attack threatened in one of the umbrella states in the region, South Korea and Japan, such an attack might be linked to each other, as well as to China, North Korea, or Russia. In each case, the shadow of suspicion and possible accusations could tilt decision-making processes in one or more of these states and ways that could worsen pre-existing views about the nuclear use propensity of an opposing nuclear armed state. Should an actual nuclear attack occur, the situation is even more complex and problematic. Such an attack might be purely accidental, due to hardware, software, or human error while nuclear materials or weapons are in transit. In principle, this limits the site of such an event to the nuclear weapons states or their ships and aircraft as neither South Korea nor Japan host nuclear weapons today. If an insider is involved, then the perpetrator may be identified quickly, and whether there is a linkage with another state may become evident (depending on nuclear forensics as well as insight obtained from surviving attackers). If an outsider is the perpetrator, then the suspicion matrix will come into play again, with possibly severe effects on inter-state tension due to accusation, suspicion, and fear of follow-on attacks. During the attack, especially if it is a hostage-taking type of attack, the identity of the perpetrator may be unknown or ambiguous, and maintaining this ambiguity or even opacity as to the attacker may be deliberate—as was the case with the 2008 Mumbai attack in which the controller tried to ensure that all the attackers were killed in the course of the twelve separate but coordinated attacks across the city over four days. Although much progress has been made in establishing local nuclear forensics capability in Japan,[18] China, and South Korea, there is no certainty that it is sufficiently developed to identify the perpetrator of an act of nuclear terrorism, especially if there is a state sponsor and deception involved. Conclusion We now move to our conclusion. Nuclear-armed states can place themselves on the edge of nuclear war by a combination of threatening force deployments and threat rhetoric. Statements by US and North Korea’s leaders and supporting amplification by state and private media to present just such a lethal combination. Many observers have observed that the risk of war and nuclear war, in Korea and globally, have increased in the last few years—although no-one can say with authority by how much and exactly for what reasons. However, states are restrained in their actual decisions to escalate to conflict and/or nuclear war by conventional deterrence, vital national interests, and other institutional and political restraints, both domestic and international. It is not easy, in the real world, or even in fiction, to start nuclear wars.[19] Rhetorical threats are standard fare in realist and constructivist accounts of inter-state nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance, and are not cause for alarm per se. States will manage the risk in each of the threat relationships with other nuclear armed states to stay back from the brink, let alone go over it, as they have in the past. This argument was powerful and to many, persuasive during the Cold War although it does not deny the hair-raising risks taken by nuclear armed states during this period. Today, the multi-polarity of nine nuclear weapons states interacting in a four-tiered nuclear threat system means that the practice of sustaining nuclear threat and preparing for nuclear war is no longer merely complicated, but is now enormously complex in ways that may exceed the capacity of some and perhaps all states to manage, even without the emergence of a fifth tier of non-state actors to add further unpredictability to how this system works in practice. The possibility that non-state actors may attack without advance warning as to the time, place, and angle of attack presents another layer of uncertainty to this complexity as to how inter-state nuclear war may break out. That is, non-state actors with nuclear weapons or threat goals and capacities do not seek the same goals, will not use the same control systems, and will use radically different organizational procedures and systems to deliver on their threats compared with nuclear armed states. If used tactically for immediate terrorist effect, a non-state nuclear terrorist could violently attack nuclear facilities, exploiting any number of vulnerabilities in fuel cycle facility security, or use actual nuclear materials and even warheads against military or civilian targets. If a persistent, strategically oriented nuclear terrorist succeed in gaining credible nuclear threat capacities, it might take hostage one or more states or cities. If such an event coincides with already high levels of tension and even military collisions between the non-nuclear forces of nuclear armed states, then a non-state nuclear terrorist attack could impel a nuclear armed state to escalate its threat or even military actions against other states, in the belief that this targeted state may have sponsored the non-state attack, or was simply the source of the attack, whatever the declared identity of the attacking non-state entity. This outcome could trigger these states to go onto one or more of the pathways to inadvertent nuclear war, especially if the terrorist attack was on a high value and high risk nuclear facility or involved the seizure and/or use of fissile material. Some experts dismiss this possibility as so remote as to be not worth worrying about. Yet the history of nuclear terrorism globally and in the Northeast Asian region suggests otherwise. Using the sand castle metaphor, once built on the high tide line, sand castles may withstand the wind but eventually succumb to the tide once it reaches the castle—at least once, usually twice a day. Also, theories of organizational and technological failure point to the coincidence of multiple, relatively insignificant driving events that interact or accumulate in ways that lead the “metasystem” to fail, even if each individual component of a system works perfectly. Thus, the potential catalytic effect of a nuclear terrorist incident is not that it would of itself lead to a sudden inter-state nuclear war; but that at a time of crisis when alert levels are already high, when control systems on nuclear forces have already shifted from primary emphasis on negative to positive control, when decision making is already stressed, when the potential for miscalculation is already high due to shows of force indicating that first-use is nigh, when rhetorical threats promising annihilation on the one hand, or collapse of morale and weakness on the other invite counter-vailing threats by nuclear adversaries or their allies to gain the upper hand in the “contest of resolve,” and when organizational cybernetics may be in play such that purposeful actions are implemented differently than intended, then a terrorist nuclear attack may shift a coincident combination of some or all of these factors to a threshold level where they collectively lead to a first-use decision by one or more nuclear-armed states. If the terrorist attack is timed or happens to coincide with high levels of inter-state tension involving nuclear-armed states, then some or all of these tendencies will likely be in play anyway—precisely the concern of those who posit pathways to inadvertent nuclear war as outlined in section 2 above.

#### OR

#### Nuclear terrorists use spoofing to trigger US-Russia nuke war – extinction!

Barrett et al 13 (Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, AND \*\*Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University, and Department of Geography, Pennsylvania State University, AND \*\*\*Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Center for Research on Environmental Decisions, Columbia University (Anthony, Seth D. Baum, Kelly R. Hostetler, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” 6/28/3013, http://sethbaum.com/ac/2013\_NuclearWar.pdf )

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years,1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide and even the extinction of humanity.2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack.3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches.4) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, though numerous measures were also taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter- attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side’s forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack.5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced.6 However, it has also been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk.7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack.8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time.9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb,10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia.11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible.12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States.13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security.14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.-Russian crisis conditions,15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.-Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks.16

#### Any attack triggers NATO kickout – thumps every disad worse than the aff.

Remkes 11 (Major General Robertus C.N. Remkes, Former Director, Air Component Coordination Element, Air Force Central Command, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 17, 2011 “The Security of NATO Nuclear Weapons: Issues and Implications,” NTI, https://media.nti.org/pdfs/NTI\_Framework\_Chpt3.pdf) CCDE

The Consequences of an Attack

It should be assumed that any attempt to attack a nuclear site in Europe storing U.S. B-61 bombs will have operational and political consequences, whether or not terrorists were to gain access to a nuclear bomb. For example, the operational consequences of an event involving the actual theft of a nuclear weapon would likely include the immediate withdrawal of all B-61s stored in Europe. One could also surmise that the political consequences might go so far as the outright rejection of U.S. military forces— not just nuclear weapons—in some or all NATO countries.

The consequences of an event involving the destruction of or damage to a nuclear weapon most immediately would be cordoning a nuclear radiation leak and consequence management by local authorities; most countries in Europe are not equipped to address this type of disaster and it would take hours, or perhaps days, to handle such an event. Here too, the political consequences could lead to a partial or full withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe.

Even in a less severe event involving damage to facilities with no compromise of a weapon, political pressure could be brought to bear against the continued storage of weapons in Europe, leading to a partial or full withdrawal.

#### Kickout crushes US-EU relations.

Daalder 18 (Ivo Daalder is a former US ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013 and now the president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Why you should give a shit about NATO,” Vox Interview, https://www.vox.com/world/2018/7/10/17474972/trump-nato-summit-germany-speech) \*\*colons after questions/responses inserted by DE

Sean Illing: So is that the argument you’d make to a typical US taxpayer who wants to know why he or she should care about what Russia does in the Balkans, or about what is happening in Western Europe? Ivo Daalder: Well, the European Union is our No. 1 trading partner and the No. 1 military partner of the US. Our European allies are with us in the Middle East where we’re dealing with ISIS and other threats. They’re with us in Afghanistan and Iraq. They’re the largest investor in our country and therefore they help create jobs. Europe is also the largest market for our goods. As a result of all this, we have a fundamental interest in peace and prosperity in Europe. Sean Illing: Does Trump have a point when he criticizes other NATO nations for not paying their fair share? Does NATO have a free-rider problem? Ivo Daalder: Yes, he has a point. NATO does have a free-rider problem that is becoming less of a problem but is still there. For a whole host of historical reasons, Europeans invest less in defense than the US, in part because we have a global security role and the US is seen as a country that is committed to the defense of Europe. That doesn’t mean Europe doesn’t spend money on defense. It does, and in fact the Europeans are currently spending more than any other combination of countries around the world. Sean Illing: What would happen if NATO was dissolved over night? How different would the world look in the short and medium term? Ivo Daalder Individual nations in Europe, along with the US, would turn inward and try to figure out a way to provide for their own security without cooperating with other countries. And in a world in which everyone is looking out for themselves and no longer cooperating, suspicions, and fears will go up, which will lead to more defensive measures and perhaps even conflict. So it would create a much more unstable situation overall. Sean Illing: Could the US sustain its relationships with European powers if it led the effort to scrap NATO? Ivo Daalder: NATO, without the US, is not a viable alliance. The reality is that the US, both politically and militarily, forms the fundamental core of the alliance. If you take the US military out of NATO, you’re left with a shell of an infrastructure and a shell of a command structure. And if you take the US politically out of NATO, it’s highly unlikely that you’d be able to sustain the alliance given the massive role the US plays in it. So it’s hard to see how scrapping NATO wouldn’t severely damage our partnerships with European nations.

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### Arms Control

### Euro-deterrent

Trump structurally dooms extended deterrence/etc, plan causes euro-deterrent, that’s good

### BMD

### Plan

#### Resolved: The United States ought to eliminate its nuclear arsenals shared with NATO member countries.

### Merica’ Fuck Yeah!

#### Contention 1 is *Team America: World Peace*

#### European nukes can’t deter Russia in the Baltics which means strikes fail and guarantee nuclear escalation. Only conventional forces that nukes detract from create a credible Baltic deterrent.

Peck 19 (Michael Peck is an award-winning writer specializing in defense and national security issues and opinion writer for the National Interest. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers University, 11-23-2019, "NATO Nukes Can’t Save the Baltic States from a Russian Invasion," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/nato-nukes-can%E2%80%99t-save-baltic-states-russian-invasion-99222) CCDE

Even if NATO resorts to tactical nuclear weapons, it still can’t save the Baltic States from a Russian invasion.

One reason? The Warsaw Pact—the Eastern European satellites of the Soviet empire—can’t be held hostage anymore.

That’s the conclusion of a wargame by the RAND Corporation. In RAND’s view, NATO’s nukes are not a deterrent to Russia because Europe would have far more to lose from a tactical nuclear exchange than Russia.

“The biggest takeaway from the wargame exercise is that NATO lacks escalation dominance, and Russia has the benefit of it,” the study found. “In contemplating war in the Baltic states, once nuclear attacks commence, NATO would have much stronger military incentives to terminate nuclear operations, if not all of its operations, than Russia would.”

Indeed, the NATO players grappled with the utility of using nukes in the first place. “In our wargame exercise, NATO commanders knew that they would be rapidly overwhelmed by the Russian forces and considered early first use of NSNW [non-strategic nuclear weapons] to prevent that outcome,” noted the report. “But, the commanders wondered, what would NATO target?”

Russian forces would likely conduct a well-dispersed, fast-moving advance into the Baltic States, which would mean NATO tactical nuclear weapons wouldn’t hit concentrated troop formations, but would instead land on the civilian populations the alliance is supposed to be defending. Or, they could attack Russian units forming up in Russia, which would risk a strategic nuclear exchange. The NATO players ultimately chose to send a signal to Russia by dropping five tactical nukes on a Russian mobile air defense missile battery just inside the Latvian border.

Unfortunately, the wargame estimated that the most likely Russian response would be a tit-for-tat that dropped tactical nuclear weapons on five NATO airbases. “NATO’s infrastructure is vulnerable, and damage to it caused by even limited numbers of nuclear attacks can substantially degrade NATO’s military capabilities; meanwhile, Russia is able to withstand comparable levels of nuclear strikes against its forces.”

The study focused on whether non-strategic nuclear weapons, or NSNW, could deter a Russian attack on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It also illustrated how the strategic picture has changed since the Cold War. Back then, NATO could muster fairly large conventional forces, backed by tactical nuclear weapons and ultimately American strategic nuclear forces. But times have changed. “A NATO and U.S. threat to escalate to general nuclear war over a Russian invasion of the Baltic states has doubtful credibility,” RAND notes.

Ironically, while the breakup of the Warsaw Pact was a victory for NATO, it also makes dealing with today’s Russia more complicated. During the Cold War, if NATO wanted to send a signal to Russia to back off, it could—in theory—drop a nuke on a Warsaw Pact nation without attacking Russian territory and thus triggering strategic nuclear war. That bargaining chip is gone. “Targets attacked by NATO using nonstrategic nuclear weapons would, from the outset of the war, be either in Russia proper or in NATO countries (i.e., the Baltic states),” RAND noted. “During the Cold War, NATO could (if it chose) conduct limited nuclear attacks against lucrative military targets in Warsaw Pact countries other than Russia throughout the conflict.”

Ultimately, NATO will need to muster sufficient conventional forces because tactical nuclear weapons are not a credible deterrent, RAND concluded. “Even if it chose not to escalate to general war or conduct a wider attack on targets throughout Europe, Russia could continue limited attacks on lucrative NATO military targets. The problem, then, is that NATO lacks the conventional forces required to slow or stop the rapid Russian advance. NSNW forces alone cannot substitute for NATO’s lack of those conventional forces.”

#### The plan solves – nukes lower the threshold for escalation and drive Russian arms racing but elimination frees up funds for conventional deterrence and drives US conventional fill-in which solve assurances and are less redundant than nukes.

Sokolsky and Adams 16 (Richard Sokolsky is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. From 1990–97, he was the Director of the State Department’s Office of Strategic Policy and Negotiations. Gordon Adams is a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center and professor emeritus at the School of International Service, American University. From 1993–97 he was the senior White House budget official for national security programs, 2-9-2016, "The Problem with NATO's Nukes," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2016-02-09/problem-natos-nukes) CCDE

It would certainly not be low-hanging fruit, but ridding Europe of its Cold War nuclear legacy would be a good place for the next president to achieve early progress in making the world a safer place. U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the continent and NATO’s plans to modernize and increase the capabilities of its nuclear systems may be increasing the risk of nuclear use and undermining NATO’s conventional defense capabilities. The United States needs to take bold action to rethink NATO’s nuclear deterrent in order to reduce the dangers and strengthen the alliance. Such moves could include a freeze on tactical nuclear modernization, a phased withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, and measures to adapt and strengthen NATO’s arrangements for nuclear cooperation and consultations to reassure allies.

The Russian nuclear threat to Europe is not new. Moscow has leaned on nuclear weapons ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union took down the Red Army and Russia’s defense industrial base. Nonetheless, until very recently, the risk of nuclear war in Europe—indeed the risk of any armed conflict between NATO and Russia—has been virtually nonexistent. Since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the spring of 2014, however, what is rightly perceived as increased nuclear-muscle flexing has rattled European nerves. Russian officials have issued nuclear threats against NATO countries; at the same time, Moscow has increased air patrols of nuclear-capable planes, conducted simulated military exercises with nuclear weapons, and continued to modernize its tactical nuclear weapons opposite NATO.

There are signs, too, that Russia is officially changing its war-fighting doctrine in Europe to include the possibility of early use of limited nuclear strikes in order to bring conflicts to a halt on terms more favorable to Russia. This is a dangerous development—not so much because Russia is developing new capabilities, but because the deterioration in U.S.-Russian relations has increased the risk of an accident, mistake, or miscalculation that could trigger a conflict.

The United States' and NATO's tactical nuclear plans are not helping matters. The United States intends to spend billions of dollars over the next decade to upgrade its tactical nuclear bombs stored in Europe—and the United States’ European allies will need to allocate hundreds of millions of euros to improve the infrastructure supporting these weapons and associated dual-capable aircraft. The more modern U.S. nuclear warheads that will replace the estimated 160–200 U.S. nuclear bombs currently in Europe will be smaller and more accurate—and Russia is reportedly making similar improvements to its tactical arsenal. According to U.S. General James Cartwright, former commander of U.S. Strategic Forces and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), these weapons will make limited nuclear strikes more conceivable.

It is unclear, moreover, whether NATO’s modernized tactical nuclear weapons would actually add to the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture. Over the past two decades, the military rationale for maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe has all but disappeared. Over five years ago, when Cartwright was the vice-chairman of the JCS, he declared that U.S. tactical nukes in Europe were redundant because they fulfilled no military function that was not already being met by U.S. strategic and conventional forces. Colin Powell, when he was chairman of the JCS in the early 1990s, supported elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, and in 2008, U.S. European Command ended its support for maintaining nuclear weapons in Europe. Few today within U.S. and allied militaries would question these judgments.

The more vexing issue for the alliance is whether these weapons have any political and psychological value if they do not possess any military utility. NATO experts including former Pentagon officials Franklin Miller and Kori Schake continue to maintain that the weapons based in Europe are essential for reassuring allies of the United States’ security commitment. They also argue that basing them in several NATO countries is a valuable demonstration of the alliance’s principle of “equal risks, equal responsibilities.” It is important to preserve this principle. But reassurance and burden sharing might be better served if NATO spent more of its precious defense resources buying weapons and capabilities—such as improved C4ISR, strategic airlift, and heavy equipment for defense in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states—that are relevant to the real threats the alliance faces today and will confront in the future. It isn't clear why allies would be reassured by investments in new nuclear warheads and infrastructure that offer no real increase in usable military capabilities and no added deterrence beyond what British, French, and U.S. strategic arms already provide. Nor is it clear why these allies would be reassured by more modern NATO tactical nuclear weapons that could actually lower the threshold of nuclear use on allied territory.

The alliance, after much internal debate, gave an important nod toward revising its nuclear posture earlier in the decade. In NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept and its 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review, the alliance left the doors open to further nuclear reductions and to other means of providing reassurance and preserving burden sharing that do not require basing U.S. nuclear weapons on NATO soil, such as more rotational deployments of U.S. strategic bombers to NATO bases. Very little has been done in the past few years, however, to move in these directions. In view of Europe’s deteriorating security environment, the United States needs to restore momentum to these efforts or at least prevent backsliding.

The United States and Russia can and should begin a new high-level dialogue on deterrence and security issues writ large, including on the impact of planned developments in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, conventional forces, cyberweapons, and missile defenses. And nothing should be kept off the agenda, as U.S. officials have occasionally tried to do in the past with missile defenses and so-called prompt-strike conventional weapons. The alliance should also take two more immediate and meaningful steps: impose a freeze on its plans to deploy upgraded B61 bombs in Europe and announce its commitment to undertake a phased withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from the continent.

There will be resistance to these measures. Some defense and arms control experts will argue that NATO should only change its nuclear posture if Russia takes reciprocal action through a new treaty. For example, Miller, Schake, and former NATO Secretary General and British Defense Secretary George Robertson have argued for either parity between NATO and Russia (where Moscow agrees to reduce its tactical nuclear weapons to NATO’s level) or equal percentage reductions in a legally binding treaty. This is a recipe, however, for forcing NATO to continue spending money on anachronistic nuclear weapons with little gain in deterrence, while siphoning funds from much-needed conventional defense improvements. Moreover, pressing Russia to negotiate reductions in—and especially the elimination of—its roughly 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons is a fool’s errand. Moscow sees these weapons as a counter to what it perceives as NATO’s conventional superiority and China’s growing military capabilities, as well as a symbol of its great power status. Further, the total lack of trust in Russia’s relations with the West makes it very unlikely that Moscow would agree to legally binding transparency and other confidence-building measures for its tactical nuclear weapons programs anytime soon.

There will also be pushback within NATO. Some members of the alliance—Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, and Germany—would conceivably support nuclear risk reduction measures; however, others such as the Baltic countries, Poland, and other Eastern European members would oppose any changes in the alliance’s nuclear plans and posture. The key to bringing recalcitrant members on board is to demonstrate with concrete actions, such as the Pentagon’s new budget proposal to spend $3.4 billion in the fiscal year 2017 to bolster U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic states, that greater and more sustained investments in conventional force improvements will make them safer; that allied strategic nuclear forces are and will remain the backbone of NATO’s strategic deterrent for as long as nuclear weapons exist; that NATO’s security and nuclear deterrent are not tied to the presence of nuclear bombs on alliance soil; and that both can be maintained through broader and more robust NATO involvement in nuclear cooperation, planning, and consulting arrangements.

To borrow from the Cold War lexicon of the great nuclear strategist Herman Kahn, Russia is re-conceptualizing the ladder of escalation from conventional to nuclear conflict. NATO’s agreement to abandon plans for tactical nuclear weapons’ modernization and to eventually remove its nuclear bombs from Europe could, over time and as part of a broader strategy to re-engage Moscow on all aspects of Euro-Atlantic security, influence Russia to climb back down that ladder. And it could immediately strengthen the alliance’s defense and deterrent posture against the full range of current and emerging threats. To remain a nuclear alliance, NATO does not need to spend billions of dollars to upgrade nuclear weapons and infrastructure that it does not need and that risk lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe. The Strategic Concept and the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review left the doors open to a safer, stronger, and more affordable NATO deterrent posture. It is important for alliance leaders to pry these doors apart a little more—or at least keep them from being shut—when they meet in July at the Warsaw NATO summit.

#### Only bolstering conventional strength deters Russian Baltic invasion – otherwise conflict escalates to nuclear use and decks NATO and global allied cred.

Brands 19 (Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). Hal served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning from 2015 to 2016, and has been a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow. He has also consulted with a range of government offices and agencies in the intelligence and national security communities and served as lead writer for the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States. Hal received his BA from Stanford University (2005) and his PhD from Yale University (2009). He previously worked at Duke University’s Sanford School of Public Policy and the Institute for Defense Analyses, 11-12-2019, "How Russia could force a nuclear war in the Baltics," Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/11/12/commentary/world-commentary/russia-force-nuclear-war-baltics/#.XoAgKpNKjUo) CCDE

WASHINGTON – Would the United States fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states in 2004.

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan Rand Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.

There was a time when it seemed quite normal to risk nuclear war over the sanctity of European frontiers. During the Cold War, NATO was outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces, and it would have had great difficulty stopping a Soviet attack with conventional weapons. From the moment it was formed, NATO relied on the threat of nuclear escalation — whether rapid and spasmodic, or gradual and controlled — to maintain deterrence. American thinkers developed elaborate models and theories of deterrence. U.S. and NATO forces regularly carried out exercises simulating the resort to nuclear weapons to make this strategy credible.

After the Cold War ended, the U.S. and its allies had the luxury of thinking less about nuclear deterrence and war-fighting. Tensions with Russia receded and nuclear strategy came to seem like a relic of a bygone era. Yet today, with Russia rising again as a military threat, the grim logic of nuclear statecraft is returning.

The spike in tensions between Russia and the West over the past half-decade has revealed a basic problem: NATO doesn’t have the capability to prevent Russian forces from quickly overrunning Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian invaders would be at the gates of the Baltic capitals in two to three days; existing NATO forces in the region would be destroyed or swept aside. NATO could respond by mobilizing for a longer war to liberate the Baltic countries, but this would require a bloody, dangerous military campaign. Critically, that campaign would require striking targets — such as air defense systems — located within Russia, as well as suppressing Russian artillery, short-range missiles and other capabilities within the Kaliningrad enclave, which is situated behind NATO’s front lines.

Moreover, this sort of NATO counteroffensive is precisely the situation Russian nuclear doctrine seems meant to avert. Russian officials understand that their country would lose a long war against NATO. They are particularly alarmed at the possibility of NATO using its unmatched military capabilities to conduct conventional strikes within Russian borders. So the Kremlin has signaled that it might carry out limited nuclear strikes — perhaps a “demonstration strike” somewhere in the Atlantic, or against NATO forces in the theater — to force the alliance to make peace on Moscow’s terms. This concept is known as “escalate to de-escalate,” and there is a growing body of evidence that the Russians are serious about it.

A NATO-Russia war could thus go nuclear if Russia “escalates” to preserve the gains it has won early in the conflict. It could also go nuclear in a second, if somewhat less likely, way: If the U.S. and NATO initiate their own limited nuclear strikes against Russian forces to prevent Moscow from overrunning the Baltic allies in the first place. And even the limited use of nuclear weapons raises the question of further escalation: Would crossing the nuclear threshold lead, through deliberate choice or miscalculation, to a general nuclear war involving intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and apocalyptic destruction?

So, what to do? One option would be for the West to pull back — to conclude that any game that involves risking nuclear war over the Baltic states is not worth the candle. The logic here is superficially compelling. After all, the U.S. could survive and thrive in a world where Russia dominated Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, just as it survived and thrived during the Cold War, when those countries were part of the Soviet Union. The problem is that failing to defend the Baltic states would devalue the Article 5 guarantee on which NATO rests: the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. And given that one could raise similar questions about so many U.S. commitments — would declining to meet a Chinese attack on the Philippines really endanger America’s existence? — this failure could undermine the broader alliance system that has delivered peace and stability for so many decades.

A second option, emphasized by the Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, would be to devise new limited nuclear options as a way of strengthening deterrence and dissuading Russia from pursuing a strategy of escalate to de-escalate. For example, the U.S. might develop low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used, in a relatively limited fashion, against a Russian invasion force or the units supporting it.

This approach is probably worthwhile, because it would help fill in missing steps on the escalatory ladder between conventional conflict and general nuclear war. The knowledge that the U.S. has its own “tactical” nuclear options might inject greater caution into the calculations of Russian planners. It is possible, Rand analysts note, that limited nuclear strikes early in a Baltic conflict could convince the Kremlin that the risks of proceeding are unacceptable.

The dangers here are, well, obvious and drastic. There is always some possibility — although informed analysts debate how much of a possibility — that Russia might mistake a limited strike against military targets in the Baltics for part of a larger or more dangerous nuclear strike against Russia itself. And if the plan is to use limited nuclear strikes against Russian military assets involved in an invasion of the Baltic states, the implication is that NATO would be using nuclear weapons on the territory of its own members.

A third, and best, option is to strengthen the weak conventional posture that threatens to bring nuclear options into play. The root of NATO’s nuclear dilemma in the Baltics is that the forces it has stationed there cannot put up a credible defense. Yet as earlier studies have noted, the U.S. and its allies could make a Russian campaign far harder and costlier — with a much-diminished chance of rapid success — by deploying an enhanced NATO force of seven to eight brigade combat teams, some 30,000 troops. That force would include three or four armored brigade combat teams (as opposed to the one NATO periodically deploys to Eastern Europe now), along with enhanced mobile air defenses and other critical capabilities.

Russia couldn’t claim credibly that such troops posed any real offensive threat to its territory. But the force would be large and robust enough that Russian troops couldn’t destroy it in a flash or bypass it at the outset of a conflict. It would therefore obviate many of the nuclear escalation dynamics by making far less likely a situation in which NATO must escalate to avoid a crippling defeat in the Baltics, or one in which Russia can escalate to protect its early victories there.

Developing this stronger conventional deterrent in the Baltics would not be cheap: Estimates run from $8 billion to $14 billion in initial costs, plus $3 billion to $5 billion in annual operating expenses. Yet neither would it be prohibitive for the richest alliance in the world. The best way of reducing the danger of a nuclear war in the Baltics is to ensure that NATO won’t immediately lose a conventional one.

#### Only US-Russia nuclear war causes extinction from nuclear winter – other arsenals are too small.

Farquhar et al 17 (Sebastian Farquhar [Machine learning DPhil student at University of Oxford, formerly led the Global Priorities Project at the Centre for Effective Altruism and the Future of Humanity Institute], John Halstead [policy and charity researcher with expertise across a broad range of fields including climate change, geoengineering, global catastrophic risk, road safety, and immigration; has a DPhil from Oxford], Owen Cotton-Barratt [PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute], Stefan Schubert [multidisciplinary background, with a PhD in philosophy and an MA in political science; did a postdoc at London School of Economics, where he combined his research with outreach work in the field of political rationality. He set up the Swedish Network for Evidence-Based Policy], Haydn Belfield [background in policy and politics, including as a Policy Associate to the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Project, as a Senior Parliamentary Researcher to a British Shadow Cabinet Minister, and a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oriel College, University of Oxford], Andrew Snyder-Beattie [Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, holds an MS in biomathematics, and is simultaneously pursuing a doctorate in zoology at the University of Oxford, fellow in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security], 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf)

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even **in an all-out nuclear war between the U**nited **S**tates **and Russia**, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation. **The aftermath could be much worse**: the **burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter**.

According to one model, **an** all-out **exchange** of 4,000 weapons **could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years**. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great**. An exchange** on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia **who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons**, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed. Some models suggest that even a **small regional nuclear war** involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation, though this estimate might be pessimistic. Wars on this scale **are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation**. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.

It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan. However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, **the** risk of human extinction **is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future**.

#### Alliances contain allied and adversary aggression – the alternative is great power conflict driven overlapping spheres of influence – it’s an impact filter.

Twining 17 - director of the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States, based in Washington, DC, MPhil & PhD degrees from Oxford University (Daniel, "Abandoning the Liberal International Order for a Spheres-of-Influence World is a Trap for America…," Medium, 3-21-2017, https://medium.com/out-of-order/abandoning-the-liberal-international-order-for-a-spheres-of-influence-world-is-a-trap-for-america-7bfcdbb83df4)

The liberal world order is under assault. Polls suggest an American ambivalence about upholding the rules-based global system. Populists are besieging governing elites in the West while Russia works strategically to destabilize European and American governments through propaganda and proxies. A rising China wants to create a global system that is not U.S.-centric, one in which smaller powers defer to bigger ones and norms of democracy and rule of law do not prevail. Meanwhile, the U.S. alliance system looks adrift while competitors in China and Russia appear to be on the march. If it holds, this trend could produce a spheres-of-influence world — which many, including the current presidents of the United States, China, and Russia, find intuitively attractive. But were such an order to replace one based on global integration and American leadership in the geopolitical cockpits of Europe and Asia, it would only engender insecurity and conflict. In a spheres-of-influence world, great powers order their regions. The United States would go back to a “Monroe Doctrine” version of grand strategy; Russia would dominate the former Soviet space; China would govern East Asia, and India South Asia. The problem with this kind of order, however, is several-fold. Too many spheres overlap in ways that would generate conflict rather than clean lines of responsibility. Japan would oppose Chinese suzerainty in East Asia, including by developing nuclear weapons; India and China would compete vigorously in Southeast Asia; Russia and China would contest the resources and loyalties of Central Asia; Europe and Russia would clash over primacy of Central and Eastern Europe. The Middle East would be an even more likely arena for hot war between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and Turkey would contest regions also claimed by Russia, Europe, and possibly China. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. A spheres of influence world would also sharpen great power competition outside of each region. Regional hegemony is a springboard for global contestation. China would be more likely to challenge the United States out-of-area if it had subdued strategic competition in its own region. Russia, like the Soviet Empire before it, would keep pushing west until it met enough hard power to stop it. (The fact that Russian troops marched through Paris during the Napoleonic Wars demonstrates that the limits of Russian power need not be confined to the former Warsaw Pact). American leaders have long understood that a “Fortress America” approach is a source of national insecurity. Franklin Roosevelt made this case in a series of “fireside chats” in the run-up to America’s participation in World War II — even before the advent of the far more sophisticated power-projection technologies that exist today. Roosevelt and his generals well understood that the United States could not be safe if hostile powers controlled Europe and Asia, despite the wide oceans separating North America from both theaters. A spheres-of-influence world would also crack up the integrated global economy that underlies the miracle in human welfare that has lifted billions out of poverty in past decades. It would replicate the exclusive economic blocs of the 1930s, including an East Asia “co-prosperity sphere,” seeding conflict and undercutting prosperity. A real-world and real-time example of what happens when American power retreats in an effort to encourage regional powers to solve their own problems is the mess in Syria. It has produced the greatest refugee crisis since 1945 — a stain on the consciousness of human civilization — and has led many to conclude that the Middle Eastern order of states dating to the end of World War 1 is collapsing. President Obama pursued an express policy of retracting American military power from the Middle East, including withdrawing all troops from Iraq and refusing to intervene militarily when President Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, despite a red-line injunction from the United States not to do so. Obama and his White House political advisors believed that American withdrawal from the Arab Middle East (if not from the ironclad U.S. commitment to Israel) would lead a new balance of power to form, one policed by regional powers rather than by America. This flawed, amoral, and un-strategic approach has led to a series of hot wars — in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — the collapse of Arab allies’ confidence in the United States as an ally, as well as an intensified cold war with Iran. Despite the international agreement freezing Iran’s nuclear program, Iran’s support for terrorism and hostile insurgencies targeting American allies across its region actually intensified during this period. A spheres-of-influence world leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence This experience underlines a core problem with a spheres-of-influence world. It leaves weaker states to become the victims of stronger or more aggressive ones, and it seeds insecurity by removing the reassuring variable of American military guarantees and presence. It emboldens American adversaries and leads American allies to take self-help measures that themselves may undercut American security interests. A spheres-of-influence world would also produce contestation of the open global commons that are the basis for the unprecedented prosperity produced by the liberal international economic order. Should the Indian and Pacific Oceans, or the Arctic and Mediterranean Seas, become arenas of great-power conflict (like the South China Sea already has thanks to China’s militarization and unilateral assertion of sovereignty over it) as leading states seek to incorporate them into their privileged zones of control, economic globalization would collapse, harming the economies of every major power. The United States, because of its sheer power and resource base as well as its relative geographical isolation, might do OK in a spheres-of-influence world. Most of America’s friends and allies would not. Their weakening and insecurity would in turn render the United States weaker and more insecure — since U.S. allies are force-multipliers for American hard and soft power, and since norms like freedom of the global commons are in fact underwritten by that power. More broadly, such a transition would also likely lead to the kind of hot wars that reorder the international balance of power, including by incentivizing aggressive states to push out and assert regional dominion, knowing that America does not have the will or interest to oppose them. The fact that U.S. competitors such as Russia, China, and Iran — all of whom want to weaken the American-led world order — would welcome a spheres-of-influence world is another reason for Americans to oppose it. It would also be ironic if the United States were to back away from its historic commitment to shaping a world that is an idealized vision of America itself — one ruled by laws, norms, institutions, markets, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

#### Allies make heg sustainable and eradicate war.

Rapp-Hooper 20 (Mira Rapp-Hooper is Stephen A. Schwarzman Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. She is the author of the forthcoming book Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, March/April 2020, "Saving America’s Alliances," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/saving-americas-alliances) CCDE

A BRAVE NEW WORLD

World War II transformed the scope and lethality of conflict. The United States had long benefited from its relatively isolated geographic location, but the spread of long-range airpower, missile technology, and nuclear weapons meant that its security was no longer guaranteed. Newly exposed, the United States sought a strategy that would allow it to secure the international balance of power from afar, averting conflicts on its territory and preventing the only other superpower left standing after the war, the Soviet Union, from dominating Asia and Europe. The United States created a network of alliances precisely with these goals in mind. U.S. policymakers reasoned that by acquiring allies and building overseas bases on those countries’ territory, Washington would be able to confront crises before they reached the homeland. What’s more, with this forceful presence, the United States could practice so-called extended deterrence, dissuading adversaries from starting wars in the first place.

Unlike the alliance systems of the past, the U.S. system was intended to prosecute or deter not a single war but all wars, and to do so indefinitely. The novelty—and the gamble—was that if the new security system worked, the world would see little evidence of its power. This new approach was a radical departure from the pre–Cold War norm, when the United States considered itself largely self-sufficient and pursued few foreign entanglements; it had no formal allies between the Revolutionary War and World War II. Between 1949 and 1955, in contrast, the United States extended security guarantees to 23 countries in Asia and Europe. By the end of the twentieth century, it had alliances with 37.

[picture removed]

The United States’ Cold War alliances were successful in meeting the goals that strategists had set out for them. For the duration of the Cold War, no U.S. treaty ally was ever the victim of a major attack. And until the 9/11 attacks, no NATO member had ever invoked the treaty’s Article 5 guarantee, which obligates the allies to assist any member state that comes under assault. Of course, Washington had intervened at times to support allies in a fix—helping Taiwan manage Chinese aggression during two crises in 1954–55 and 1958, for example—but it did so chiefly when it saw its own interests at risk and often with the explicit aim of preventing war. In addition to maintaining the balance of power in Asia and Europe, the system contributed to the flourishing of the United States’ allies, most notably Japan and West Germany, which became close military partners, consolidated themselves as democracies with vibrant economies, and eventually emerged as leading regional powers.

The alliance system also lowered the cost of U.S. military and political action worldwide. Since the early 1950s, U.S. treaty allies have joined every major war the United States has fought, despite the fact that for almost all these conflicts, they were not required to do so by the terms of their alliances. What’s more, the system ensured that the allies’ foreign policies supported, rather than undermined, Washington’s. The United States used security guarantees to convince South Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany to abandon illicit programs to develop their own nuclear weapons. Other states that, if they had not been included in U.S. alliances, would surely have sought their own military protection—building state-of-the-art armies, navies, and air forces—chose instead to rely on the United States’ military might. And by maintaining close defense relationships with a number of those states, the United States also gained support in international institutions for everything from peacekeeping missions to sanctions—support that would otherwise have been much harder to secure. These contributions were crucial, as they allowed the United States to project its power without becoming overstretched.

LONELY AT THE TOP

The alliance system continued to function smoothly until 1991, when the adversary for which the United States’ entire security posture had been designed suddenly disintegrated. The Soviet Union vanished, and with it, so did the logic of American security guarantees. Notable international relations scholars—primarily those of a realist orientation—believed that in a unipolar world, U.S. alliances had become outmoded. But U.S. policymakers were unpersuaded. The Cold War system had performed so admirably that they decided it should be retained and repurposed for new objectives. Because the United States was now utterly unmatched in its military and political power, however, their alliance reforms did not focus on defense or deterrence as traditionally understood.

#### Heg solves mass violence and extinction – we’ve got statistics.

Barnett 11 (Thomas P.M. Barnet, Former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College American military geostrategist and Chief Analyst at Wikistrat., worked as the Assistant for Strategic Futures in the Office of Force Transformation in the Department of Defense, 2011 (“The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” March 7, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8099/the-new-rules-leadership-fatigue-puts-u-s-and-globalization-at-crossroads, Accessed 07-17-2016, SP)

* live from G25

It is worth first examining the larger picture: We live in a time of arguably **the greatest structural change in the global order yet endured**, with this historical moment's most amazing feature being its relative and absolute lack of mass violence. That is something to consider when Americans contemplate military intervention in Libya, because if we do take the step to prevent larger-scale killing by engaging in some killing of our own, we will not be adding to some fantastically imagined global death count stemming from the ongoing "megalomania" and "evil" of American "empire." We'll be engaging in the same sort of system-administering activity that has marked our stunningly successful stewardship of global order since World War II. Let me be more blunt: As the **guardian of globalization**, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the **mass murder never would have ended**. Indeed, it's entirely conceivable **there would now be** no identifiable human civilization left**, once** nuclear weapons **entered the killing equation.**  But the world did not keep sliding down that **path of perpetual war**. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by **ushering in our now-**perpetual great-power peace. We introduced the **international liberal trade order known as** globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a **profound and persistent reduction in** battle deaths from state-based conflicts. That is what American "hubris" actually delivered. Please remember that the next time some TV pundit sells you the image of "unbridled" American military power as the cause of global disorder instead of its cure. With self-deprecation bordering on self-loathing, we now imagine a post-American world that is anything but. Just watch who scatters and who steps up as the Facebook revolutions erupt across the Arab world. While we might imagine ourselves the status quo power, we remain the world's most vigorously revisionist force. As for the sheer "evil" that is our military-industrial complex, again, let's examine what the world looked like before that establishment reared its ugly head. The last great period of global structural change was the first half of the 20th century, a period that saw **a death toll of about 100 million across two world wars**. That comes to an average of 2 million deaths a year in a world of approximately 2 billion souls. Today, with far more comprehensive worldwide reporting, researchers report an average of less than 100,000 battle deaths annually in a world fast approaching 7 billion people. Though admittedly crude, these calculations suggest a 90 percent absolute drop and a 99 percent relative drop in deaths due to war. We are **clearly headed for a world order characterized by multipolarity**, something the American-birthed system was designed to both encourage and accommodate. But given how things turned out the last time we collectively faced such a fluid structure, we would do well to keep U.S. power, in all of its forms, deeply embedded in the geometry to come.

#### Our impacts are relative, not absolute, claims – heg bad requires a fleshed out alternative not just an epistemology disad.

William Wohlforth 12, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Nuno Monteiro. “’Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful.’ Reviewed by William Wohlforth” October 31st, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR17.pdf

Third, setting up the article as a claim that unipolarity is not peaceful runs into a problem: **Unipolarity is peaceful. The Most Peaceful. Ever. Period**. No one expects any imaginable anarchic inter-state system to be perfectly peaceful, with no war at all. In my 1999 paper, I stressed that “unipolarity **does not imply the end of all conflict**... It simply means the absence of two big problems” — hegemonic rivalry and counter-hegemonic balancing—that were present in all earlier systems. As a result “unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers.” Like any statement about the war-proneness of any international system, **this is a relative claim**. International relations scholarship does not have theories that make anything other than relative predictions about the war-proneness of systems. Monteiro tries but fails to escape this reality. He writes: “Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature (12). The latter portion of this sentence is exactly right, but the former bit is contradicted just a few pages later when Monteiro presents evidence that “Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all systems .. .“ (18). While conflict researchers debate the causes, they are nearly united in agreeing that the post-1990 international system is **the least afflicted by war**.5 **There are many ways to measure** war: the overall number that occur, the number of people killed, the probability that any state will be at war in any year, the size or cost of military forces compared to economic output or population, or, perhaps best, the probability that any individual will die as a result of organized inter-group violence. **By all those measures, we are living in the most peaceful period** since the modern inter-state system took shape in the seventeenth century. Indeed, Stephen Pinker assembles masses of evidence to suggest that **there has never been a less violent time in all of human history**.6 It is hard to think of any way to measure war that does not show the unipolar period as remarkably peaceful— except for the ones Monteiro uses: “the percentage of years that great powers spend at war, and the incidence of war involving great powers,” (18) with the United States defined as the only great power after 1990. That is a very convoluted way to say ‘Iraq and Afghanistan.’ **The fact that the United States ended up in two grinding counter-insurgency operations in no way contradicts the claim that unipolarity is unprecedentedly peaceful.** But that reaction concerns the framing rather than the substance of the article. One can dismiss as America-centric the claim that unipolarity is war-prone and still regard Monteiro’s carefully crafted arguments as promising advances. Further investment in refining and evaluating these arguments is warranted, for even if we agree that unipolarity has been pretty darned peaceful, it surely doesn’t seem that way to anyone in or around the U.S. military. Along with most security scholars, I’ve regarded the post-1991 military interventions as permitted **but not dictated by unipolarity**. That **at least leaves open the possibility of strategic learning**, as happened back in biplolarity. Even though the bipolar structure and U.S. grand strategy remained constant, bloody conflicts in **Korea and Vietnam** prompted Washington to get out of the direct military intervention business in favor of proxy wars and less costly covert operations. Similarly, the new “Iraq syndrome” might **tame interventionist impulses** even as unipolarity endures. But Monteiro’s message is gloomier. “The significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades,” he warns, “will continue as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.” (38). That’s a scary message even if that “significant level” is far lower than in any other known interstate system. So while I hope Monteiro is wrong, there is no doubt that his article has decisively altered the terms of the debate on this crucial issue.

#### The liberal order’s institutional adaptability and legal restraints are an essential bulwark against racism, violence, and inequality---the solution to problems of liberalism is more liberalism, not system destruction.

G. John Ikenberry 18, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University; Daniel Deudney, Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, August 2018, “Liberal World The Resilient Order,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-06-14/liberal-world

Modern liberalism holds that world politics requires new levels of political integration in response to relentlessly rising interdependence. But political orders do not arise spontaneously, and liberals argue that a world with more liberal democratic capitalist states will be more peaceful, prosperous, and respectful of human rights. It is not inevitable that history will end with the triumph of liberalism, but it is inevitable that a decent world order will be liberal.

The recent rise of illiberal forces and the apparent recession of the liberal international order may seem to call this school of thought into question. But despite some notable exceptions, states still mostly interact through well-worn institutions and in the spirit of self-interested, pragmatic accommodation.

Moreover, part of the reason liberalism may look unsuited to the times is that many of its critics assail a strawman version of the theory. Liberals are often portrayed as having overly optimistic—even utopian—assumptions about the path of human history. In reality, they have a much more conditional and tempered optimism that recognizes tragic tradeoffs, and they are keenly attentive to the possibilities for large-scale catastrophes. Like realists, they recognize that it is often human nature to seek power, which is why they advocate constitutional and legal restraints. But unlike realists, who see history as cyclical, liberals are heirs to the Enlightenment project of technological innovation, which opens new possibilities both for human progress and for disaster.

Liberalism is essentially pragmatic. Modern liberals embrace democratic governments, market-based economic systems, and international institutions not out of idealism but because they believe these arrangements are better suited to realizing human interests in the modern world than any alternatives. Indeed, in thinking about world order, the variable that matters most for liberal thinkers is interdependence. For the first time in history, global institutions are now necessary to realize basic human interests; intense forms of interdependence that were once present only on a smaller scale are now present on a global scale. For example, whereas environmental problems used to be contained largely within countries or regions, the cumulative effect of human activities on the planet’s biospheric life-support system has now been so great as to require a new geologic name for the current time period—the Anthropocene. Unlike its backward-looking nationalist and realist rivals, liberalism has a pragmatic adaptability and a penchant for institutional innovations that are vital for responding to such emerging challenges as artificial intelligence, cyberwarfare, and genetic engineering.

Overall, liberalism remains perennially and universally appealing because it rests on a commitment to the dignity and freedom of individuals. It enshrines the idea of tolerance, which will be needed in spades as the world becomes increasingly interactive and diverse. Although the ideology emerged in the West, its values have become universal, and its champions have extended to encompass Mahatma Gandhi, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. And even though imperialism, slavery, and racism have marred Western history, liberalism has always been at the forefront of efforts—both peaceful and militant—to reform and end these practices. To the extent that the long arc of history does bend toward justice, it does so thanks to the activism and moral commitment of liberals and their allies.

DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE

In many respects, today’s liberal democratic malaise is a byproduct of the liberal world order’s success. After the Cold War, that order became a global system, expanding beyond its birthplace in the West. But as free markets spread, problems began to crop up: economic inequality grew, old political bargains between capital and labor broke down, and social supports eroded. The benefits of globalization and economic expansion were distributed disproportionately to elites. Oligarchic power bloomed. A modulated form of capitalism morphed into winner-take-all casino capitalism. Many new democracies turned out to lack the traditions and habits necessary to sustain democratic institutions. And large flows of immigrants triggered a xenophobic backlash. Together, these developments have called into question the legitimacy of liberal democratic life and created openings for opportunistic demagogues.

Just as the causes of this malaise are clear, so is its solution: a return to the fundamentals of liberal democracy. Rather than deeply challenging the first principles of liberal democracy, the current problems call for reforms to better realize them. To reduce inequality, political leaders will need to return to the social democratic policies embodied in the New Deal, pass more progressive taxation, and invest in education and infrastructure. To foster a sense of liberal democratic identity, they will need to emphasize education as a catalyst for assimilation and promote national and public service. In other words, the remedy for the problems of liberal democracy is more liberal democracy; liberalism contains the seeds of its own salvation.

Indeed, liberal democracies have repeatedly recovered from crises resulting from their own excesses. In the 1930s, overproduction and the integration of financial markets brought about an economic depression, which triggered the rise of fascism. But it also triggered the New Deal and social democracy, leading to a more stable form of capitalism. In the 1950s, the success of the Manhattan Project, combined with the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, created the novel threat of a worldwide nuclear holocaust. That threat gave rise to arms control pacts and agreements concerning the governance of global spaces, deals forged by the United States in collaboration with the Soviet Union. In the 1970s, rising middle-class consumption led to oil shortages, economic stagnation, and environmental decay. In response, the advanced industrial democracies established oil coordination agreements, invested in clean energy, and struck numerous international environmental accords aimed at reducing pollutants. The problems that liberal democracies face today, while great, are certainly not more challenging than those that they have faced and overcome in these historically recent decades. Of course, there is no guarantee that liberal democracies will successfully rise to the occasion, but to count them out would fly in the face of repeated historical experiences.

# ---1AR---

### To do

* AT NATO Cap K/NATO Bad(Liberal) K
* AT increase conventional support CP
* AT Turkey PIC
* AT Assurance/Allies DA
* AT Deterrence DA
* AT Ptx?
* Look for more to block out
* Probably cut answer to first strike Russia good and f/l generic impact turns

# Topicality

## Eliminate = Physical

### Eliminate

#### Elimination is the physical destruction of a specified weapon by a country.

Koplow 17 (David A. Koplow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “Eve of Destruction: Implementing Arms Control Treaty Obligations to Dismantle Weaponry,” Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 8, 2017, HeinOnline, file:///Users/davidedwards/Downloads/8HarvNatlSecJ158.pdf) CCDE

1. Substantive definition of "elimination"

The first question is whether the treaty identifies the overall standards, or specifies the particular steps that must be taken, to accomplish the destruction, elimination, disassembly, or conversion of the regulated items. The general notion is that the physical processes should be so complete that any subsequent effort to restore the scrapped item to weapons capability would be so expensive, difficult, time-consuming, and visible that the country contemplating such a reversal would elect instead to start the manufacturing process from scratch with other materials, rather than recycling the older items.88 In the Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, the destruction of a chemical weapon is defined as "a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons."89

## Nebel

### 1AR Nebel DON’T READ

#### Top-level – i-meet – only one country actually shares nukes, the US, the plan just made that clear, so the aff is functionally consistent with nebel.

#### Counter interp – specific instances prove generics which also means I meet

Cimpian et al 10 (PhDs – Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true. Four experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or “Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and are likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman, 2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1. 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Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977) writes that “there are many cases where […] less than half of the individuals under consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50% of books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic form.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Topic lit – core aff literature focuses on specific nuclear dyads like IndoPak, US Russia, US China, etc because different arsenals and security situations interact with things like deterrence or CBW shift differently which is why authors write about nations in isolation – topic lit outweighs – it shapes the predictable bounds of the topic when we do our research and is how most of debate’s education is garnered.

#### 2] Ground – there’s one aff under their interp – kills quality and quantity of aff ground— neg gets more and better arguments since they have generics and specifics while aff has one position, which answers TVA and turns limits since it gives neg an unreciprocal prep advantage. Outweighs on reversibility: neg can still use generics to engage spec affs but there’s no check to 2NR scripts and neg monopolization of strategy with only one aff.

### AT semantics first

#### 1] No impact to semantics:

#### A] the aff is 99% close to the resolution so pragmatics outweigh on strength of link – brightline is eliminating some nukes.

#### B] no jurisdiction impact – judges vote on non-t affs all the time.

#### C] no predictability internal link – the wiki determines prep not the resolution.

### AT limits

#### 2] No limits disad:

#### A] Turn – cross-apply ground from the counter interp – neg will just read tons of subsidy specific disads/pics which nq limits since you’ll just have to prep on aff and o/w bc aff can’t use generics

#### B] Functional limits check – inherency, good evidence, impacts sufficient to o/w generics, an actual solvency advocate, authors who say more nukes are merrier no matter the context like Waltz and Kroenig, all check an infinite proliferation of affs – ask yourself how many affs in their caselist are viable

### AT ground

#### 3] No ground disad:

#### A] Turn – over limiting the aff causes worse ground loss bc the neg always has generics unlike the aff v spec offs

#### B] Strategic case writing and preempts mean some nc positions will always be worse/less strategic, their interp would justify “cutting good cards bad” since it makes negating harder which means reject it on face

### TVA

#### 4] TVA:

#### Doesn’t solve over limiting, still only one aff

#### Strategic incentives to avoid reading positions the aff can leverage case against mean it also doesn’t solve depth

### Reasonability

#### 5] Reasonability – debatability outweighs precision – perfection isn’t necessary and competing interp causes a race to theory since the neg has reactivity, bi-directional interps, there’s always something we could have done marginally better which crowds out substance – that outweighs since it contributes to portable skills. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates so intervene on the side of substance.

### 1AR Nebel Short

#### Top-level – i-meet – only the US actually shares nukes, the plan just made that clear, so the aff is functionally consistent with nebel.

#### Counter interp – specific instances prove generics which also means I meet

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Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g., what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but “Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial. This loose, almost negligible relationship between the prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, & Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. 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#### 1] Topic lit – their interp excludes every strain of deterrence lit except wholesale disarm which shreds topic coherence, caps TOC innovation, and turns predictability since topic lit is the primary basis for prep.

#### 2] Ground – one plan makes the aff a sitting duck for prepouts which results in an infinite proliferation of neg arguments with no reciprocal aff prolif which turns and outweighs their limits since generics check small affs but 1AR restart has nothing.

#### 3] Limits: A] there’s 9 countries, grow up, B] functional limits solve – random advantages have no nukes key warrant, solvency advocate, or answer to adv cps, ks, deterrence, etc

#### 4] Ground: A] generics listed above check, B] turn – no advantage answers every pic since states have different geopolitics so aff ground outweighs which also turns limits since spec is inevitable they just make it worse and we have no reactivity

#### 5] No semantics: A] wiki checks, B] no jurisdiction mpx

#### 6] Reasonability – debatability outweighs precision – perfection isn’t necessary and competing interp causes a race to theory since there’s always something we could have done marginally better which crowds out substance

## Plural

### 1AR Plural

#### Top-level – i-meet – only the US actually shares nukes, the plan just made that clear, so the aff is functionally consistent with plural.

#### Counter interp – specific instances prove plural generics which also means I meet.

Cimpian et al 10 (PhDs – Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

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#### 1] Topic coherence --- they cause random country combos that make no sense, France NoKo or Russia Israel. Turns and hijacks their predictable limits offense --- even if the interp is slightly more semantic, an arbitrary resolution instead of reflecting the topic lit is far worse than the NATO Aff

#### 2] Functional limits --- inherency, answers to generics, solvency advocate, authors who say more nukes are merrier no matter what like Waltz and Kroenig all check an infinite proliferation of affs – ask yourself how many affs in their caselist are viable

#### 3] Turn: forcing multiple countries lets the neg to PIC out of any one in plan --- no offense will be intrinsic to multiple countries

#### 4] They don’t solve --- there’s no distinction between specifying 1 or 2— no one’s more prepared for UK and China than just the UK

#### 5] Over limiting --- Pepsi challenge to name 5+ affs with 2 countries, a single solvency advocate and a joint advantage. Artificially bracketing the topic prevents pre-TOC innovation.

#### 6] Semantics first is infinitely regressive --- justifies being stuck with atrociously worded resolutions --- it’s better to let debaters justify what norms are better --- if our interp is bad, they can win that it’s pragmatically wrong

#### 7] Reasonability – debatability outweighs precision – perfection isn’t necessary and competing interp causes a race to theory since the there’s always something we could have done marginally better which crowds out substance

## Eliminate

### 1AR T-Eliminate DON’T READ

#### Counter interp: eliminate can reduce quantity or eliminate categories of weapons.

NATO 20 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I hope you know what NATO is, 3-16-2020, "Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in NATO," NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_48895.htm) CCDE

Definitions

While often used together, the terms arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation do not mean the same thing. In fact, experts usually consider them to reflect associated, but different areas in the same discipline or subject.

Arms control

Arms control is the broadest of the three terms and generally refers to mutually agreed upon restraints or controls (usually between states) on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, deployment and use of troops, small arms, conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Arms control includes agreements that increase the transparency of military capabilities and activities, with the intention of reducing the risk of misinterpretation or miscalculation.

Disarmament

Disarmament, often inaccurately used as a synonym for arms control, refers to the act of eliminating or abolishing weapons (particularly offensive arms) either unilaterally (in the hope that one’s example will be followed) or reciprocally. It may refer either to reducing the number of arms, or to eliminating entire categories of weapons.

#### Eliminate doesn’t have to be complete – prefer legal interpretation over mis-applied dictionaries – pragmatics outweigh.

8th Circuit Court of Appeals 11

Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, BUETOW v. ALS ENTERPRISES, INC., 2011

The district court took a simple approach in determining that all ads claiming that Defendants' garments "eliminate odor" or use "odor eliminating technology" were literally false. Citing two dictionary definitions of the word "eliminate," the court concluded that "[t]he word `eliminate' is subject to only one reasonable interpretation — complete elimination." The court rejected Defendants' reliance on dictionary definitions equating "eliminate" with "remove" because "use of the word `remove' would also be literally false if used in Defendants' advertisements." The court disregarded the fact that other hunting products used the word "eliminate" because "such advertisements may also be literally false." 713 F. Supp. 2d at 839, 840, & n.10. Because even Defendants' expert conceded that their garments were incapable of adsorbing every single molecule of odor, the court permanently enjoined all use of the term "eliminate" as literally false.

We disagree with the district court's decision to base its determination of literal falsity on the most absolute of competing dictionary definitions of the word "eliminate." The Lanham Act doctrine of literal falsity is reserved for an ad that is unambiguously false and misleading — "the patently false statement that means what it says to any linguistically competent person." Schering-Plough, 586 F.3d at 513. We doubt there are many hunters so scientifically unsophisticated as to believe that any product can "eliminate" every molecule of human odor. As Judge Henry Friendly explained in reversing a district court's literal falsity finding and directing dismissal of the competitor's Lanham Act false advertising complaint, a district court errs when it ignores "the principle that text must yield to context" and "**make[s] a fortress out of the dictionary**." Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1986). Here, we conclude it was error to enjoin all uses of the term "odor eliminating" as literally false. It may be that some of Defendants' ads over the course of this twelve-year period so exaggerated the basic claim as to be literally false, rather than nonactionable "puffery," such as claims that the garments work on "100% of your scent 100% of the time," render the wearer "completely scent-free," or "create an impervious shield to odor." But it is unclear the extent to which these ads were ever published, whether they have long since been discontinued, and whether consumers were deceived.

#### Counter interp and we meet: arsenals don’t mean all of a country or group’s weapons, just a large collection.

Collins Dictionary, "Arsenal definition and meaning," Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/arsenal

arsenal

(ɑrsənəl)

Word forms: arsenals

1. COUNTABLE NOUN

An arsenal is a large collection of weapons and military equipment held by a country, group, or person.

Russia is committed to destroying most of its nuclear arsenals.

#### 1] Topic lit and depth – nuke lit is more than just full disarm, the only full elimination affs with real solvency advocates are IndoPak and whole res – specific arsenals like sharing, subs, etc have deeper lit and allow debates that go beyond just deterrence, NFU, and CBWs which are not bad but artificially cut out lit bases and are too small for 5-months.

#### Topic lit turns limits and ground because it proves they’re unpredictable – limiting for limits’ sake just randomly cuts out swathes of aff literature which makes them arbitrary and useless.

#### 2] Ground – full elimination leaves two viable plans and lets negs specialize in arsenal specific disads and pics while affs are sitting ducks to prepouts – spec is key to aff flex which outweighs on reversibility – negs have generics and varied positions with spec affs but the 1AR doesn’t mirror 1NC reactivity and can’t generic nuanced offense against specific negs.

#### 3] No limits disad – A] functional limits check, there’s not a solvency advocate, good advantage evidence, and answers to generics for every possible type of weapon, their apocalyptic case list should be viable affs not every nuke ever built.

ICBMs, TNWs, subs, and shared nukes are the only real spec affs that don’t suck (INF exists but is mostly bad)

#### B] over limiting outweighs – it’s a 5-month topic and the TOC, flex is key to TOC innovation and affs that don’t get dunked on by prep outs.

#### 4] No ground loss: prep smarter generics than deterrence and CBW you goon – Ks, arsenal shift, advantage counterplans, alliances, process counters, authors like Waltz and Kroenig who say more nukes are merrier, and second-strike survivability all apply to most arsenal specific affs.

#### 5] Reasonability – debatability outweighs precision – perfection isn’t necessary and competing interp causes a race to theory since the neg has reactivity, bi-directional interps, there’s always something we could have done marginally better which crowds out substance – that outweighs since it contributes to portable skills. Intervention is inevitable in blippy theory debates so intervene on the side of substance.

#### 6] RVIs – A] recip – B] incent t – C] ci/ no rvi if only one shell

### 1AR Eliminate

#### Counter interp: eliminate can reduce quantity or eliminate categories of weapons.

NATO 20 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I hope you know what NATO is, 3-16-2020, "Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in NATO," NATO, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\_48895.htm) CCDE

Definitions

While often used together, the terms arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation do not mean the same thing. In fact, experts usually consider them to reflect associated, but different areas in the same discipline or subject.

Arms control

Arms control is the broadest of the three terms and generally refers to mutually agreed upon restraints or controls (usually between states) on the development, production, stockpiling, proliferation, deployment and use of troops, small arms, conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Arms control includes agreements that increase the transparency of military capabilities and activities, with the intention of reducing the risk of misinterpretation or miscalculation.

Disarmament

Disarmament, often inaccurately used as a synonym for arms control, refers to the act of eliminating or abolishing weapons (particularly offensive arms) either unilaterally (in the hope that one’s example will be followed) or reciprocally. It may refer either to reducing the number of arms, or to eliminating entire categories of weapons.

#### Eliminate doesn’t have to be complete – prefer legal interpretation over mis-applied dictionaries – pragmatics outweigh.

8th Circuit Court of Appeals 11

Court of Appeals, 8th Circuit, BUETOW v. ALS ENTERPRISES, INC., 2011

The district court took a simple approach in determining that all ads claiming that Defendants' garments "eliminate odor" or use "odor eliminating technology" were literally false. Citing two dictionary definitions of the word "eliminate," the court concluded that "[t]he word `eliminate' is subject to only one reasonable interpretation — complete elimination." The court rejected Defendants' reliance on dictionary definitions equating "eliminate" with "remove" because "use of the word `remove' would also be literally false if used in Defendants' advertisements." The court disregarded the fact that other hunting products used the word "eliminate" because "such advertisements may also be literally false." 713 F. Supp. 2d at 839, 840, & n.10. Because even Defendants' expert conceded that their garments were incapable of adsorbing every single molecule of odor, the court permanently enjoined all use of the term "eliminate" as literally false.

We disagree with the district court's decision to base its determination of literal falsity on the most absolute of competing dictionary definitions of the word "eliminate." The Lanham Act doctrine of literal falsity is reserved for an ad that is unambiguously false and misleading — "the patently false statement that means what it says to any linguistically competent person." Schering-Plough, 586 F.3d at 513. We doubt there are many hunters so scientifically unsophisticated as to believe that any product can "eliminate" every molecule of human odor. As Judge Henry Friendly explained in reversing a district court's literal falsity finding and directing dismissal of the competitor's Lanham Act false advertising complaint, a district court errs when it ignores "the principle that text must yield to context" and "**make[s] a fortress out of the dictionary**." Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 782 F.2d 381, 385 (2d Cir. 1986). Here, we conclude it was error to enjoin all uses of the term "odor eliminating" as literally false. It may be that some of Defendants' ads over the course of this twelve-year period so exaggerated the basic claim as to be literally false, rather than nonactionable "puffery," such as claims that the garments work on "100% of your scent 100% of the time," render the wearer "completely scent-free," or "create an impervious shield to odor." But it is unclear the extent to which these ads were ever published, whether they have long since been discontinued, and whether consumers were deceived.

####  1] Topic lit – arsenal spec key to nuanced debates over radically different weapons systems that has distinct elimination lit – their interp is just IndoPak and whole res – topic lit turns their offense since it shapes the topic’s predictable limits and ground

#### 2] Spec inevitable – negs will just prep arsenal specific pics and disads which is worse since the 1AR doesn’t have generics or reactivity like the neg and few advantages have every type of nuke key warrants – they allow like two affs

#### 3] Functional limits – there’s not a solvency advocate, good advantage evidence, and answers to generics for every possible type of weapon, their apocalyptic case list should be viable affs not every nuke ever built.

ICBMs, TNWs, subs, and shared nukes are the only real spec affs that don’t suck (INF exists but is mostly bad)

#### 4] No ground loss – prep smarter generics than deterrence and CBW – Ks, arsenal shift, advantage counterplans, alliances, process counterplans, authors like Waltz and Kroenig who say more nukes are merrier, and second-strike all check random affs

#### 5] Reasonability – debatability outweighs precision – perfection isn’t necessary and competing interp causes a race to theory since the there’s always something we could have done marginally better which crowds out substance

## Extras

### States

#### International law defines states.

Duhaime “State.” Duhaime's Law Dictionary, <http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/S/State.aspx>. [Premier]

The 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (aka Montevideo Convention) specifically defines statehood, at 1 as: "The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states." In Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Authority, Justice Lagueux of the United States District Court (Rhode Island) wrote: "Only States enjoy sovereign immunity.... International law determines statehood. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States sets forth the legal standard for evaluating an entity's claim to statehood. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (entered into force Dec. 26, 1934, hereinafter "Montevideo Convention"). Under the Montevideo Convention, an entity is a State when it possesses: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) a government and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The United States adopted these criteria ... Federal courts consistently apply the four criteria to determine whether or not an entity is a State and thus qualifies for the protections of sovereign immunity."

### Ought

#### “Ought to” implies normative obligation

Cambridge Dictionary, “ought to” https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ought-to

used to show when it is necessary or would be a good thing to perform the activity referred to by the following verb:

#### Definitely normative

Oxford Dictionary, “ought,” https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ought

ought

MODAL VERB

1with infinitive Used to indicate duty or correctness, typically when criticizing someone's actions.

### Eliminate

#### Elimination is the physical destruction of a specified weapon by a country.

Koplow 17 (David A. Koplow, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, “Eve of Destruction: Implementing Arms Control Treaty Obligations to Dismantle Weaponry,” Harvard National Security Journal Vol. 8, 2017, HeinOnline, file:///Users/davidedwards/Downloads/8HarvNatlSecJ158.pdf) CCDE

1. Substantive definition of "elimination"

The first question is whether the treaty identifies the overall standards, or specifies the particular steps that must be taken, to accomplish the destruction, elimination, disassembly, or conversion of the regulated items. The general notion is that the physical processes should be so complete that any subsequent effort to restore the scrapped item to weapons capability would be so expensive, difficult, time-consuming, and visible that the country contemplating such a reversal would elect instead to start the manufacturing process from scratch with other materials, rather than recycling the older items.88 In the Chemical Weapons Convention, for example, the destruction of a chemical weapon is defined as "a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons."89

### Arsenals

#### Arsenals are stockpiles of nukes.

Los Alamos 09 http://www.lanl.gov/natlsecurity/nuclear/stockpile/ WHAT'S IN A STOCKPILE?

The stockpile, also called the nuclear arsenal, refers to a country's supply of readily available nuclear weapons. The term nuclear weapons refers to the explosive warheads and the bombs and missiles that can deliver them to enemy targets.

#### Arsenals are a large collection of weapons.

Collins Dictionary, "Arsenal definition and meaning," Collins Dictionary, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/arsenal

arsenal

(ɑrsənəl)

Word forms: arsenals

1. COUNTABLE NOUN

An arsenal is a large collection of weapons and military equipment held by a country, group, or person.

Russia is committed to destroying most of its nuclear arsenals.

# Silly Theory

## New Affs

### New Affs 1AR

#### Counterinterp: debaters can break new affirmatives without disclosing them prior to the round

#### 1] Innovation – new affs give a strategic advantage since the neg can’t prep beforehand – disclosure neutralizes the benefit to breaking new – that outweighs: A] all their education offense will be nq after one tournament if people never branch out, B] some aff adv is key to offset neg reactivity, time skew, and flex.

#### 2] Strategic thinking – forces negs to think on their feet which boosts critical thinking and quick information processing rather than regurgitating coach-designed strategies. Their generics will still apply which solves clash – new affs just force debaters, not coaches, to do the thinking in round.

#### 3] Real world – no one tells you what they’re going to say in an argument if they haven’t said it yet, quick thinking skills are key to dealing with surprises – that o/w because debate education is useless if we can’t apply it outside of round.

#### 4] Use reasonability – voting on theory necessitates abandoning the rest of the round for it which means theory needs to outweigh the value of the substantive round it trades off with, and they definitely can’t set any norms – people have been reading new affs bad for years and nobody stopped breaking new.

## Spec shit

### 1AR Spec

#### Counter interpretation: the aff does not have to specify past the resolution or do anything else.

#### 1. Arbitrariness – their interp is not grounded in the words of the topic which makes it completely unpredictable and causes infinite regress – even we spec timeframe and verification this debate, they can just as easily force spec who votes for the bill in congress, what color ink its printed in, etc. – turns the aff into a 6-minute plan text instead of the core controversy which kills topic education – outweighs since that’s the only portable impact and the topic changes every two months

#### 2. Neg ground – the aff would just specify the things that skirt the most links to DAs – our interp is better for neg ground since they can read definitions of what the words in the plan mean which fit their purposes best. No neg ground loss under your interp -

#### 3. CX checks – solves their offense since they have to have DAs for each mechanism already written so it doesn’t eliminate any pre-round prep

#### 4. No ground loss – topic literature centers around whether a world without nuclear weapons is better than the status quo – questions of exact implementation are irrelevant for the deterrence or assurances disads.

#### 5. No presumption – durable fiat and normal means solves all their evidence about policymakers being bad at their jobs —our solvency advocate outlines a process which proves we meet

# Case

## Extensions

### Ext – NATO – Russia

#### US Russia war outweighs – only they have enough nukes to create a long enough nuclear winter to threaten all life on earth by blocking sunlight for years, other wars have fewer nukes and create shorter winters.

#### Nukes divert resources from conventional deterrence and can’t defend the Baltics – causes Russian invasion that triggers escalate to deescalate to preserve their gains which breaks the nuclear taboo and causes retal and full strategic exchange. Withdrawal increases conventional investment to deter Russia and caps half the nuclear escalation ladder.

OR

#### Shared nukes force Russia into an escalate-to-deescalate posture over the Baltics, which provokes rapid full-scale nuke war over them. Withdraw reverse-causally de-escalates and triggers more effective conventional fill-in which deters invasion and solves all turns.

### Ext – NATO – Alliances

#### Alliances are an impact filter and turn all their offense – they restrain allies and deter adversaries – their collapse causes overlapping spheres of influence where each country acts for its own interests which triggers escalating great power conflict in every major hotspot and erases conflict dampeners like interdependence by encouraging economic blocing. That’s Twining.

#### Russian invasion of the Baltics will collapse global assurances by discrediting the US’s ability to defend allies – only the plan’s forced shift to enhanced conventional posture deters Russia and solves all turns.

### Ext – Terror – Nuke Terror

### Ext – Terror – EU Relations

## AT First Strike Russia

### Russia goes first

#### Their ev concedes Russia’s more likely to go first – here’s the top of the article – the US isn’t afraid of losing its nuclear deterrent but Russia is terrified – they’d misinterpret functionally anything and launch a first strike then disperse assets which means US counter forcing can’t take their nukes out.

(Tong Zhao et al 18, fellow @ Carnegie, PhD in Science, Technology, and International Affairs @ Georgia Institute of Technology, MA in International Relations @ Tsinghua University, “Reducing the Risks of Nuclear Entanglement”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/09/12/reducing-risks-of-nuclear-entanglement-pub-77236) CCDE

CRISIS INSTABILITY

China and Russia long have been concerned about the possibility that, in a conflict, the United States might launch a nuclear first strike against their nuclear forces. Today, they are increasingly concerned that they might not be able to deter a U.S. non-nuclear first strike, not least because they worry that a nuclear response might lack credibility. In fact, they even worry that a nuclear response might be infeasible because of the possibility that those nuclear weapons that survived the initial attack could be intercepted by U.S. missile defenses. By contrast, for the time being, Washington is unlikely to be concerned about the possibility of being disarmed by China or Russia. As a result, non-nuclear strikes on U.S. targets are unlikely to cause crisis instability (though this could change in the future, most likely if U.S. capabilities for communicating with nuclear forces were to become vulnerable).

For at least three reasons, Chinese or Russian concerns about force survivability could be further exacerbated, in a non-nuclear conflict, by U.S. attacks against entangled assets.

First, the United States might attack dual-use C3I assets, such as communication systems or early-warning radars, to influence the outcome of a conventional war. (For example, given that Russian early-warning radars are used to track space objects and hence could enable anti-satellite operations, the United States might attack those radars to protect its satellites.) The targeted country, however, could mistake U.S. strikes against dual-use C3I assets as the precursor to nuclear or non-nuclear attacks against their nuclear forces.

Cyber operations against dual-use C3I systems might be especially risky; China, in particular, seems to be concerned about this possibility. As with kinetic attacks, there would be the danger that the targeted country might misinterpret cyber operations intended to help win a conventional war as an attempt to undermine its nuclear deterrent. With cyber attacks, there is the added risk that computer code designed solely to collect intelligence might be misidentified as a weapon designed to damage the target system.

Second, U.S. operations to hold non-nuclear forces at risk could be indistinguishable from operations directed against nuclear forces. It may be impossible, for example, for an adversary to determine whether U.S. anti-submarine operations were directed against its attack submarines or its ballistic missile submarines (or both). This risk could be particularly acute with uninhabited underwater vehicles (which are expected to be used more heavily in the future), not least because—without the lives of a crew at risk—these vehicles could be employed in more aggressive ways than inhabited vessels.

Third, the United States might accidentally attack nuclear forces or C3I assets when trying to attack non-nuclear capabilities. For example, the United States might attack nuclear-armed Chinese ballistic missiles after misidentifying them as superficially similar, conventionally armed weapons. Similarly, the United States might attack Russian nuclear-armed bombers placed on airborne alert to enhance their survivability if these aircraft were misidentified as conventionally armed aircraft tasked with attacks on U.S. or allied targets. Nuclear C3I assets co-located with non-nuclear C3I assets could also become, in effect, collateral damage in strikes against the latter.

By creating real fear in Beijing or Moscow that their nuclear deterrents were in serious danger, U.S. non-nuclear attacks could generate an escalation risk known as crisis instability—although there would be some differences between the escalation dynamics in a U.S.-Russian and a U.S.-Chinese conflict.

If Russia perceived a growing threat to its nuclear forces, it might respond by enhancing their survivability by, for instance, dispersing mobile ICBMs or placing bombers on alert. Alternatively, or additionally, Russia might issue nuclear threats to try to coerce the United States into stopping whatever operations the former found so threatening. Either of these steps could catalyze further escalation by generating concerns in Washington that Moscow was planning to use nuclear weapons first, even if that were not the case. More seriously, if the United States attacked Russian early-warning satellites (which could, especially in the future, have a role in detecting and enabling defenses against U.S. non-nuclear strikes), Moscow might initiate the sequence to launch ICBMs so it could fire them at very short notice if Russian land-based radars were destroyed or detected an incoming U.S. nuclear strike.

In extreme circumstances, Russia might even use nuclear weapons first. It might respond to non-nuclear attacks on its nuclear forces with limited nuclear strikes (using either tactical or strategic weapons) to try to terrify the United States into backing down. In a prolonged exchange of conventional weapons involving U.S. attacks against conventional forces and urban-industrial infrastructure, Moscow might even launch preemptive, limited strategic strikes if it became seriously concerned that the United States was preparing to launch non-nuclear attacks on its nuclear forces.

#### Russia will first-use nuclear weapons – it views them fundamentally differently than the West.

Payne and Foster 17 (Keith Payne, PhD in IR @ USC, Professor of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Mo State, and John Foster, PhD, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense; Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 3-17-2017, “Russian strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict,” Comparative Strategy, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495933.2017.1277121?journalCode=ucst20) //BB recut

For example, the many official Russian statements claiming Russia’s right to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea reflects efforts to intimidate the West from acting against Moscow and to convey Moscow’s determination to retain Crimea, and thus to deter any action against its overall policies in Ukraine. Russian nuclear weapons and multiplying nuclear threats—including long-range bomber patrols against the United States and Europe—aim to deter any Western action against Russia, and to intimidate the West into accepting Russian conquests as irrevocable faits accompli. This political use of nuclear weapons is not confined to the present crisis. Similar moves reportedly occurred during the 2008 Georgian war,49 affirming Moscow’s belief that if it lacked nuclear weapons, the West might intervene against Russian aggression in the CIS. Russia sees its nuclear arsenal, in part, as the instrument that can prevent robust Western responses to its aggression and occupation of neighboring territories. This is a new and fundamentally coercive role for Russian nuclear weapons and does not reflect Western mutual nuclear deterrence notions of the Cold War. Russian statements about nuclear weapons have moved beyond the clear desire to deter and intimidate the West to include potential operational employment. As the British analyst Roger McDermott has written, The Russian military understanding of these weapons and reliance on them in certain scenarios suggests that they play a significant role in security thinking, which has grown and may continue to grow until Russia can successfully redress its conventional weaknesses. This is borne out in official statements, as well as in the role assigned to them in operational-strategic exercises …. It is therefore important to understand that Russia regards these weapons differently than the West: for Moscow they do not simply have political value, they play a role in military planning that compensates for conventional weakness, and in certain scenarios are considered to be operational systems.50 Thus, Russian nuclear weapons, whether they be strategic or tactical nuclear weapons could, in severe circumstances, be used in combat operations. The apparent Russian willingness to employ nuclear weapons likely contributes to their coercive effect.

#### Russia’s more likely to go first, precisely because they expect US strategists to think like the aff – flips their argument.

Arbatov, et al 17 (Dr. Alexey Arbatov, PhD, full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Center for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and scholar in residence at the Carnegie Moscow Center; Maj.Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin (retired), chief researcher at the Center for International Security at the Institute of Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, former director of the Russian Defense Ministry’s Fourth Central Research Institute; and Dr. Petr Topychkanov, Senior Researcher in the SIPRI Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme, former Senior Researcher at the Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences; “Entanglement as a New Security Threat: A Russian Perspective,” 11-8-2017, https://carnegie.ru/2017/11/08/entanglement-as-new-security-threat-russian-perspective-pub-73163)//KMM

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-NUCLEAR DISARMING STRIKES This threat of a non-nuclear disarming strike is a central topic of discussion among Russian experts and government officials. The key bone of contention is whether the United States might attempt a massive conventional counterforce attack against Russia (which would inevitably be less effective than a nuclear counterforce strike), assuming that Moscow would be reluctant to respond with nuclear weapons given the certainty of follow-on nuclear retaliation by the United States. A particular issue of concern is that Russia’s emphasis on the threat of a conventional disarming strike could be perceived in the United States as evidence of Moscow’s unwillingness to use nuclear arms to counter such a strike, prompting the United States to start precisely this kind of conventional air campaign to attain escalation dominance in a local or regional conflict. In reality, however, and in contrast to such strategic calculations, Moscow might retaliate early with a limited strategic nuclear strike in the event that the United States launched a conventional counterforce operation against Russia’s nuclear forces (in accordance with Russia’s launch-under-attack doctrine). Alternatively, Moscow might even preempt the United States with selective strategic nuclear strikes to thwart U.S. naval and air forces that were engaged in a conventional conflict and perceived as conducting a conventional counterforce offensive by launching attacks against airfields, naval bases, and their C3I facilities. In the latter case, Moscow would count on the United States’ responding selectively with “tailored strategic options” even after nuclear explosions had occurred on its territory. In reality, the U.S. response might be a large-scale nuclear attack against Russia, provoking a massive nuclear exchange. In any case, the more concerned that Moscow is about the survivability of its nuclear forces, the more likely escalation becomes. Targets for a non-nuclear disarming strike might include super-hardened command centers at various echelons, ICBM silos, light shelters for land-based mobile missiles, exposed mobile ICBM launchers in the field, ballistic missile submarines at their bases, heavy bombers at main and reserve airfields, communication sites on land, early-warning radars, command centers for the missile early-warning system, and storage depots for nuclear weapons. The vulnerability of these targets depends on how well they are defended and concealed, and on the effectiveness of countermeasures against incoming weapons. Early-warning radars, light shelters for mobile ICBM launchers, missile submarines at their bases, and heavy bombers at airfields, as well as C3I centers and sites that are not deeply buried, can be incapacitated relatively easily if the attacking weapons have sufficient range and good targeting. In the event of a local or regional conventional conflict between Russia and NATO in Eastern Europe or the Arctic, airstrikes and cruise missile attacks against these sites would most likely cause rapid escalation to a nuclear war. In particular, early U.S. strikes against such targets might not be deliberate since Russian strategic submarines and bombers are kept at the same bases as general-purpose naval vessels and aircraft, and strikes designed to target the latter might inadvertently destroy the former. Unlike the logic that may be behind Chinese policies, the co-location of nuclear and general-purpose forces in the USSR and now in Russia was and is prompted by economic and administrative considerations, not by the strategic goal of trying to deter U.S. non-nuclear strikes against Russian general-purpose forces through the threat of nuclear escalation. The interception of heavy and medium dual-use bombers in flight during a conventional conflict also makes entanglement virtually inevitable. These bombers might take part in conventional missions, but might also be sent out on patrol with nuclear weapons to decrease their vulnerability in case the conflict escalates. If these aircraft were destroyed while carrying nuclear weapons, there would be a real risk of escalation. A similar risk could arise from conventional threats to Russian nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missile submarines in the Arctic, North Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans.

### Can’t solve

#### Even if a U.S. first-strike destroys an adversary’s ICBMs, they’ll retaliate later with improvised weapons or unconventional delivery vehicles.

Dallas Boyd 16, Program Analyst, National Nuclear Security Administration, Spring 2016, “Revealed Preference and the Minimum Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 43-73

Central to the question of the minimum requirements of nuclear deterrence are the criteria for a deterrent force to be considered “credible.” Conventional wisdom holds that several characteristics are necessary to apply this label, among them survivable second-strike weapons and command and control facilities. However, the definition of a secondstrike weapon is somewhat nebulous. At the most basic level, a state is “nuclear capable” if it has sufficient fissile material and expertise to build a nuclear explosive device. The next level is achieved when a state actually builds said device. More credible still is a confirmation to that effect in the form of an explosive test, along with a demonstrated means of delivery such as a ballistic missile.41 Finally, a state may take measures to place its weapons beyond the reach of an enemy attack, usually by deploying them on mobile launchers or submarines or within hardened missile silos. Victor Cha, who served as a policy adviser on the National Security Council during the George W. Bush administration, presents two additional criteria in an analysis of North Korea’s deterrent: a proven missile reentry capability and evidence of warhead miniaturization. Without these capabilities, he writes, Pyongyang’s small arsenal “does not come close to a credible nuclear deterrent,” and the regime “gets no added security from these weapons.”42

If the United States’ anxiety over nuclear terrorism is any guide, these requirements vastly overstate the threshold for credibility. After all, the fear that North Korea might transfer a nuclear weapon to terrorists has been central to the case for reversing its nuclear program. If these weapons pose a catastrophic threat in the hands of extremists, on what basis should they be considered less threatening when deployed by their original owners? In truth, Pyongyang can have confidence in its minimalist posture for two reasons. First, contrary to the emphasis placed on strategic delivery vehicles, such platforms are not necessary for nuclear retaliation. In extreme circumstances, a variety of unconventional delivery means can be used. As the late political scientist Kenneth Waltz observed, “Everybody seems to believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs. Why should states be unable to do what terrorist gangs are thought to be capable of?”43 Second, no arbitrary deadline exists for a state to respond to a nuclear attack. Retaliation may come weeks or even months after a first strike, providing ample time to prepare nondeployed warheads or even construct a makeshift weapon from available nuclear material. Together these concepts call into question the key assumption on which nuclear primacy rests: that a nuclear counterstrike must come immediately and in the form of ballistic missile attacks, or not at all. This questionable premise permits US leaders to entertain first strike scenarios that are wildly at odds with their apparent tolerance for risk.

#### Successful unconventional retaliation targets U.S. cities---prompts massive U.S. counter-value retaliation.

Dallas Boyd 16, Program Analyst, National Nuclear Security Administration, Spring 2016, “Revealed Preference and the Minimum Requirements of Nuclear Deterrence,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 43-73

In considering unconventional delivery means, most discussion of credibility centers on technical matters, such as whether shipborne weapons can escape interdiction. However, the deterrent value of this attack mode also hinges on credibility of a different sort—whether a decision to retaliate in this manner would really be made. The credibility of countervalue targeting has long troubled nuclear strategists who fear that threats to murder large numbers of noncombatants are simply not believable. This apprehension contributed in part to the adoption of counterforce targeting in US nuclear doctrine.

Whether this concern would apply to countervalue retaliation is unclear. China’s nuclear strategy implicitly involves city destruction, given the limited quantity and accuracy of its long-range weapons. However, qualitative differences between missile attacks and unconventional delivery modes suggest that a discrete use calculation might apply. Not least, an indiscriminate attack against civilians weeks or even months after a provocation would seem particularly cold-blooded. Nonetheless, the credibility threshold for retaliation is presumably far lower than for initiating nuclear war, and one line of thinking in particular may permit recourse to countervalue strikes despite moral qualms about them.

Counterforce capabilities are the luxury of states that spend lavishly on offensive arms, whereas a minimalist posture is the strategy of a more restrained nuclear power. In the event of a nuclear attack, members of the latter group cannot in fairness be expected to refrain from their only available means of retaliating. This would amount to penalizing the victim for adopting a more stable and responsible nuclear posture than its aggressor. Thus, any civilian deaths that result from such a state’s retaliation can be laid squarely at the feet of the initiator of the nuclear exchange.

There are at least two scenarios where the justification for countervalue retaliation would be difficult to deny: a preemptive nuclear attack on a state’s strategic forces or a conventional invasion.55 In these scenarios, nuclear retaliation might be permissible for the reason outlined above: the more powerful side cannot dictate the terms under which its aggression can legitimately be answered. Nonetheless, no amount of sophistry can obscure the barbarism of nuclear strikes on population centers. A state retaliated against in this manner may very well escalate, especially if its leaders viewed the precipitating attack as having had limited aims. Their reaction may take the form of a grossly disproportionate counterretaliation—the fear of which constitutes a second potential source of self-deterrence.

### India A/O

#### India models US nuclear doctrine – our posture gets interpreted as “acceptable.”

Nicola Leveringhaus 18, PhD, Professor in Department of War Studies, School of Security Studies, King's College London, March 2018, “Between conformity and innovation: China’s and India’s quest for status as responsible nuclear powers,” https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/between-conformity-and-innovation-chinas-and-indias-quest-for-status-as-responsible-nuclear-powers/914CFDA6E8557196DF88CDE26D3A4682

A rising power’s efforts at conformity centre upon seeking recognition on the basis of a given standard of an elite club.13 As rising powers seek to live up to this standard, they emulate ‘the values and practices of the higher-status group.’14 In doing so, they reinforce the normative structures that underpin the standard. To the extent that China and India seek recognition of their responsible nuclear status through conformity, we see their efforts as aimed primarily at key stakeholder nuclear powers within the global nuclear order: historically the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, where the role of the United States is paramount. The standard that China and India seek to meet is nuclear responsibility, a multidimensional concept whose norms and practices we expand upon below. Broadly speaking, a responsible nuclear sovereign is ‘respectful of certain widely accepted norms of behaviour.’15 The norms that regulate such responsible nuclear behaviors underpin the very fabric of the global nuclear order, where that order both seeks to ensure strategic stability 16 and to regulate social relations between states by constituting role identities (as responsibles or irresponsibles, among others) and conditioning what political actions are deemed legitimate.17

International norms and practices of nuclear responsibility are not static, but in flux: ‘responsibility, like all social norms, change over time, and these structural changes are the product of social contestation, of actors challenging and revising prevailing norms.’18 It is within this space of contestation that opportunities for innovation may emerge. Rising power innovation in the domain of nuclear responsibility has the potential to offer alternative models of nuclear deterrence and restraint that suit the specific security needs of rising powers and that can contribute in new ways to the overall stability of the global nuclear order. Where status is concerned, innovation provides a pathway by which states can seek to ‘achieve preeminence on a different ranking system’ and thereby be ranked more highly, according to innovative standards, than members of elite clubs.19

Moreover, rising powers may also choose to pursue innovation as a strategy because they ‘want to maintain distinctive identities’. 20 As we will show, China and India have both emphasised the non-coercive role of their nuclear weapons programmes, and have made claims that they practice greater restraint than Western nuclear weapons states. Doing so invokes wider discourses of solidarity with non-Western states that serve ‘as a means of persuading, symbolising and euphemising claims to particular identities and social relations.’21 Thus, beyond efforts to appeal to dominant states in the global nuclear order, China and India target their nuclear behaviour and discourse at a larger constituency of nonWestern, developing states, with whom they have historically shared a post-colonial and/or anti-hegemonic normative agenda.

Seeking responsible nuclear status though conformity

In this section, we evaluate Chinese and Indian efforts to attain recognition as responsible nuclear powers through conformity with dominant norms and practices of responsible nuclear behaviour. In order to do so, we need to be clear about what nuclear responsibility means. Unsurprisingly, given that nuclear restraint has been at the heart of ‘the problem and project of nuclear order,’ dominant norms and practices of nuclear responsibility centre on varying conceptions of nuclear restraint.

The NPT, opened for signature in 1968 and in force from 1970, remains the key legal institution within the global nuclear order that lays out the expected responsibilities of its signatories. Following its indefinite extension in 1995, the Treaty enjoys widespread adherence.22 The NPT demands different types of responsible behaviours of nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states. For nuclear weapon states, responsible behaviour entails restraint through undefined progress towards arms control and disarmament as well as restraint in the export of sensitive nuclear technologies to non-nuclear states. For non-nuclear weapon states, responsibility rests on restraint in not developing a nuclear weapons capacity, although these states possess the ‘inalienable right’ to utilise nuclear energy for civilian purposes. In essence, dominant understandings of responsible behaviours based on NPT membership relate to legal obligations not to spread nuclear technology and test nuclear weapons, as well as norms of non-proliferation and non-use. These four NPT based benchmarks of nuclear responsibility offer the strongest and clearest measures for conformist responsible nuclear behaviour. Beyond the NPT, inter-subjective ideas of nuclear responsibility may include the extent to which actors are invested in a ‘duty of care’ of their nuclear arsenal and/or civilian facilities.23 Specifically, a duty of care relates to the robustness of national safety and security measures, such as liability provisions in the event of a nuclear accident as well as the global nuclear security agenda, promoted by former US President Obama from 2010 to 2015. 24

Declaratory nuclear doctrines and operational nuclear postures also play into assessments of how far a nuclear state can be judged as responsible. Indeed, even nuclear deterrence can contain elements of restraint, as Nina Tannenwald has shown. 25 Conceptions of nuclear deterrence vary from narrow national self-defence to an extended nuclear guarantee. The extent to which nuclear deterrence reflects restraint will depend on the strategies adopted by nuclear armed states.

# Disads

## Deterrence DA

### 1AR Deterrence S/T

#### The NATO advantage straight turns deterrence:

#### 1] No link – nukes don’t deter Russia in the Baltics – they can’t hit mobile troops, NATO has more to lose from escalation because their infrastructure is more vulnerable to nukes, they’d have to nuke civilians and their allies, and Russia has escalation dominance, wargames prove Russia conquers the Baltics in 60 hours. That’s Peck and Brands.

#### 2] Nonunique and turn – conventional deterrence is better – Russia invades the Baltics easily now which means uniqueness flips aff since they’re conventionally superior, conventional investment deters Russia by offsetting conventional asymmetry and de-escalates conflict. That’s Sokolsky and Adams and Brands.

#### 3] Nonunique and turn – they dropped NATO kickout on the terror page – even failed theft attempts supercharge anti-US backlash and get nukes and conventional forces kicked out – that’s Remkes. Thumps and outweighs – nukes get removed but so do way more forces which also deter Russia.

## Assurances DA

### 1AR Assurance S/T

#### The NATO advantage straight turns assurances:

#### 1] No link – withdrawal of redundant systems doesn’t threaten broader nuclear umbrella cred since allies don’t view strategically useless nukes as assuring, especially when they offset more effective deterrence like conventional investment. That’s Adams and Sokolsky.

#### Strategic nukes solve and are more credible – Japan and South Korea prove. Also answers deterrence.

Sauer and van der Zwaan 11 (**Tom Sauer** is Assistant Professor in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen (Belgium). He is also a visiting professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, CERIS (Brussels), and ISODARCO. He held research positions at Harvard University (1997–99) and the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris (April 2001). Previously, he was trainee at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva and at the European Commission (DGI) in Brussels. He received a NATO Individual Research Grant (1994–96) and a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship (1997–98). He was trained in politics and international relations at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (MA, 1991; Ph.D., 2001), University of Hull (MA, 1992) and the Bologna Center of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University (Gr.Dipl., 1993). His research interests cover arms control, proliferation, disarmament, and missile defense. **Bob van der Zwaan** is a senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) in Amsterdam and at Columbia University’s Lenfest Center for Sustainable Energy (Earth Institute) in New York, and is Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Bologna. He is co-director of the International Energy Workshop (IEW), member of the Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and lead author for Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 4th and 5th Assessment Reports). He has been visiting professor at several universities, most recently at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH, Stockholm, 2010), and held research positions at Harvard University (2002–05), the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (1999-2001), Stanford University (1999-2000), and the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (1997–99). He was trained in economics (MPhil, 1997, University of Cambridge, King’s College), physics (PhD, 1995, CERN and University of Nijmegen; MSc, 1991, University of Utrecht) and international relations (Certificate, 1994, IUHEI, University of Geneva), “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible,” Belfer Center Discussion Paper, No. 2011-05, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2011 Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf) CCDE

If one had to choose between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, the military would probably opt for the former as the best pick in terms of credibility. Strategic nuclear weapons are generally considered more accurate, and therefore more reliable. As a result, NATO’s extended nuclear deterrent is basically left unaltered if the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons are removed from Europe. The strategic nuclear weapons located in the United States, in combination with those of the United Kingdom and France, continue to fulfill NATO’s deterrent role. As former State Department and Pentagon official Wayne Merry pointed out, “If Japan and South Korea, in a much more challenging security environment, accept so-called “over the horizon’ American nuclear guarantees as sufficient for their security, why cannot Europeans?”55

#### 2] Nonunique and turn – Baltic invasion will crush Article 5 guarantees due to lack of conventional deterrence, that undermines broader trust in US security guarantees since they didn’t defend key allies. That’s Brands.

#### 3] Nonunique and turn – they dropped NATO kickout on the terror page – even failed theft attempts supercharge anti-US backlash and gets us kicked out – that’s Remkes. Thumps and outweighs – it wrecks assurances since they couldn’t defend nukes and got kicked out by major allied backlash. Plus, kickout would cause Trump lash out at allies in retaliation and justify more isolationism than just nuke withdrawal.

### 1AR Nuclear Umbrella !/T

#### The nuclear umbrella incentivizes crisis-initiation AND adversary testing – conventional guarantees solve their offense.

Dr. George Perkovich 15. Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 02-25-15. “Hearing to Receive Testimony on Regional Nuclear Dynamics.” Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Senate Armed Services Committee. https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/15-17%20-%202-25-15.pdf

* not a double turn bc it only impact turns the umbrella which at most the 1AR reads impact defense on, we just link turn conventional assurance which this says is good

Now, extended deterrence is often conflated with extended nuclear deterrence. They are related, but they are not necessarily the same thing. It is tempting to believe that the potential use of nuclear weapons always strengthens extended deterrence, but the issue is actually problematic, and that is true in Asia as well as in Europe. Potential use of nuclear weapons in an escalating conflict can indeed strengthen the potency of our guarantee to the countries that we protect. But the very destructiveness that the specter of nuclear weapons portends also can weaken the resolve of our own society and the protégé's society. So the classic line, should we trade Los Angeles for Okinawa? Or if you are in Japan, if the U.S. uses a nuclear weapon against China, China is going to nuke us. And so this can be divisive and can be exploited by a potential aggressor, and I think we have been seeing this with what Russia has been doing in Ukraine. That you make a nuclear threat to see if you can split either the guarantor from the protégé or weaken the resolve of the protégé. So it is not an automatically positive deterrent effect. It can, in fact, be divisive and a weakening one. But there is also an opposite problem in extended deterrence. And that is if the guarantor's resolve is unquestioned -- our resolve in this case -- in the face of a countervailing nuclear threat, a nuclear moral hazard may be created. It is like a finance company whose managers believe that the government will bail them out if they get into ruinous losses. The protégé may take risks in its policies towards the adversary, feeling that the nuclear threat that we offer to defend them will bail them out from any crisis. That is a moral hazard. The other moral hazard, which we also see in finance, is that relying on the magic of nuclear deterrence, our allies may under invest in conventional capabilities. We can save a little money here because we are counting on the nukes to do the trick. And that is like banks that do not keep adequate reserves to cover their commitments. And we have seen that historically in NATO, and we have seen it historically with Japan. So all of this comes together, I believe, in the situation in the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands, where Japan and China are in a sovereignty dispute over these uninhabited islands, and where there is a potential of crisis or escalation either on purpose or by accident. In 2010, they had two ships collide accidentally. Now, you have got two highly nationalistic, kind of strongmen leaders in both countries, and if you have one of these collisions, it is easy to imagine a potential escalation. Obviously, you want to do deal with that by diplomacy, but it is worth thinking through the implications of a potential conflict and having the conventional capability to prevent China from being able to change the facts on the ground. It is a conventional issue that they not be able to set foot on one of those islands and hold it. Because if you have to fight to take it back, and you get into that kind of potentially escalating conflict and we are not prevailing, someone in this town or someplace else is going to say we ought to make a nuclear threat. That is what nuclear deterrence is for. But then it raises the issue, is it credible or advisable for the U.S. to think about first use of nuclear weapons, because that is what we are talking about here, over some islands that 99 percent of the U.S. population has never heard of and could not find on a map? It seems to me that is an invitation for a real disaster in terms of U.S. credibility and extended deterrence. And the way to prevent it is with conventional capabilities, both ours and the Japanese, and through exercising those capabilities. And the current U.S. nuclear posture, in terms of the numbers envisioned in New START, is totally sufficient to deal with that kind of scenario. It is not a nuclear problem.

### 1AR No Prolif

#### No Prolif:

#### South Korea

Troy Stangarone 16, the Senior Director for Congressional Affairs and Trade at the Korea Economic Institute of America, 2/29/16, “Going Nuclear Wouldn’t Be Easy for South Korea”, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/going-nuclear-wouldnt-be-easy-south-korea-15345?page=0%2C1

However, South Koreans are rarely asked if they would be willing to bear the costs of a domestic nuclear weapon. Those cost would likely come in the form of diminished international standing, economic hardship, and uncertain strategic benefits.

For South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons program it would have to join North Korea as the only country to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an ignominious club for sure. Withdrawal would dent Seoul’s growing international standing and make it the only member of MIKTA, an emerging club of middle powers, to have a nuclear weapon, something which would not enhance South Korea’s middle power prestige.

While a loss of international stature to ensure domestic security might be an acceptable trade off, there would likely be economic costs as well. Developing a nuclear weapon would have consequences for South Korea’s own nuclear industry. Nuclear power provides a third of South Korea’s electricity and represents 13 percent of its primary energy consumption. Lacking adequate domestic reserves of nuclear fuel, South Korea is dependent upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which conditions supply on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pursuing a nuclear option would put the fuel supply for South Korea’s domestic reactors at risk .

South Korea also has designs on becoming a major exporter of nuclear power plants. In 2009, it won a $40 billion contract to construct and manage four nuclear power plants in the UAE and in 2013 a bid for a research reactor in Jordan. Those deals and any future potential exports would be put risk.

South Korea would also face potential economic sanctions. Iran and North Korea have both faced significant financial and economic sanctions for their pursuit of nuclear weapons, while India and Pakistan faced sanctions as well. Because South Korea is perhaps one of the world’s most trade dependent nations it would be especially vulnerable to external economic pressure.

Given the clear and present danger that North Korea’s nuclear program presents to South Korea, it is hard to know what the consequences might be if Seoul chose the nuclear option. Perhaps the international community would look upon South Korea’s choice with a greater degree of understanding and acceptance than other nations, limiting any economic consequences. However, there are no assurances that will be the case.

From a strategic perspective the decision to go nuclear could focus minds in Beijing, but in ways that Seoul might not want. China has been vigorous in its objections to South Korean consideration of deploying the THAAD missile defense system. Beijing would likely object even more strenuously to a South Korean nuclear weapons program, especially if it opened the door to a Japanese nuclear weapon.

#### Japan

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Although Japan has long had the technical ability to develop nuclear weapons — its “nuclear hedge” — it has refrained from doing so. Japan instead remains firmly committed to its 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not developing, not possessing and not introducing nuclear weapons.

This is not the first time that Japan has reexamined those principles. Similar debates transpired after China’s hydrogen bomb test in 1967, the Soviet Union’s deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Siberia during the 1980s and North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006.

Is this time different? Reacting to North Korea’s threatening behavior, former Japanese defense minister Shigeru Ishiba stated in September that Japan should at least debate the decision not to permit the introduction of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. Ishiba implied that Tokyo should consider asking Washington to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Japan.

This latest debate is likely to end in the same way as previous debates, however. Japan will continue to adhere to its Three Non-Nuclear Principles and forswear nuclear weapons. Here are three reasons for that:

1) Staying non-nuclear is part of Japan’s national identity

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are a clear part of Japan’s national identity, not simply a policy preference. Repeated polls indicate overwhelming popular support for the three principles in Japan. A 2014 Asahi newspaper poll revealed that support for the principles had risen to 82 percent, compared with 78 percent in a 1988 poll. Despite growing concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program and China’s military power during this period, Japanese support for remaining non-nuclear actually increased.Even after the provocative North Korean missile launches over Japan in August and September, a Fuji News Network poll showed that nearly 80 percent of the Japanese population remained opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapons state. And nearly 69 percent opposed having the United States bring nuclear weapons into Japan.

The legacy of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings leave many Japanese convinced that their country has a moral responsibility to promote global nuclear disarmament — as well as to forgo nuclear weapons of its own. The 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant disaster has reinforced this view.

In fact, increasing numbers of Japanese believe that the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” is unnecessary for Japanese security. A June 2010 NHK survey revealed that 20.8 percent felt that U.S. nuclear deterrence is necessary for Japan’s security in both the present and future, while 34.8 percent believed it unnecessary. The June 2015 NHK poll showed that only 10.3 percent thought the U.S. nuclear umbrella is necessary for both the present and the future — 48.9 percent responded that it is unnecessary now and later.

2) Powerful players in Japanese politics can block nuclear acquisition

In addition to public opposition to nuclear weapons, Japan has significant “veto players” — crucial political or economic actors that are likely to block efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

Japan has a robust nuclear energy industry. But public acceptance of nuclear energy in the 1950s resulted from a fundamental political bargain: nuclear energy, but no nuclear weapons.

## Ptx

### 1AR Ptx Generic

#### 1] No link – normal means is the exec – unilateral withdrawal doesn’t need legislative approval.

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This brings us to the option of unilateral withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, in the hope that the Russians reciprocate with a subsequent gesture. For example, this could occur in the form of moving its tactical nuclear weapons deeper into Russian territory. By consolidating the tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. territory, bilateral negotiations about the remaining tactical nuclear weapons may become less complicated, because at least one asymmetrical problem will have been solved. Withdrawing weapons unilaterally has the advantage that it does not have to be approved by the U.S. Senate. Even NATO’s Expert Group did not recommend formal negotiations with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. A face-saving solution may be a unilateral withdrawal without calling it as such, just like the "reciprocal" Presidential Initiatives of 1990–1991. Interestingly, the Obama Nuclear Posture Review called for “formal agreements and/or parallel voluntary measures.”102 Similarly, Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski proposed in a common op-ed “substantial unilateral confidence building efforts”’ in this regard.103

#### 2] Explain how stupid the disad definitely is

#### 3] Theory tricks

# Counterplans

## Turkey PIC

### 1AR Turkey PIC

Stuff, perm, can’t solve the adv, assurance turns solve/turn it, no ev about the pic in broader context – ie other countries also losing nukes and conventional posture shift etc

No native turkey prolif

They’ll steal ours

#### TNW theft causes Turkish prolif.

Pappalardo 19 (Joe Pappalardo, contributing editor at Popular Mechanics citing work from Vipin Narang, an associate professor of Political Science at MIT, 10/23/19, “Could Someone Actually Steal a U.S. Nuke?” popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a29576180/us-nuke-theft/)

Some people don’t have faith that PALs are enough to completely render a rogue nuclear weapon useless from a nation-state with a nuclear agenda. “You could slow down a determined state actor with probably the most sophisticated PALs, but it's only designed to delay,” says Vipin Narang, an associate professor of Political Science at MIT and author of the book Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era. “And that still wouldn't stop a state actor from being able to reverse engineer it… You're going to use that particular weapon, but you can take certain parts of it apart and be able to re-engineer it without the PAL.” Much of the security designed into a nuclear bomb makes it inoperable when tampered with. But a nation state interested in reverse engineering the system is not interested in setting off the weapon, and more willing to ruin it while cracking it open to glean any tips or secrets. So the one to gain biggest from a stolen nuke, even if disabled, appears to be Turkey. “The incremental risk if a U.S. nuclear weapon is compromised by another nuclear power is comparatively small,” writes Columbia’s Bellovin. “But a non-nuclear power—or group—would benefit greatly from anything that improved their odds of using someone else's bombs.” His words predate this crisis, but they ring true today. It just so happens that Turkey is such a non-nuclear power, and one with an expressed interest in having nuclear weapons.2

## Conventional CP

### 1AR US Conventional CP

#### 1] Perm do both

#### Probably throw some cheaty perms in there too

#### 2] Can’t solve:

#### A] NATO won’t buy in if nukes are still shared since they heavily shape overall posture and use up resources of host countries – only full withdrawal frees up funds and prompts allied follow through and broader posture shift necessary to deter Russia which the US can’t do alone – that’s Sokolsky and Adams.

#### B] Tactical nukes independently lower the threshold for nuclear use since they create a façade of “limited damage” but really just break the nuclear taboo and cause escalating retaliation and full exchange – that’s Brands. Only fully removing them caps half the escalation ladder and de-escalates Russian arms racing which solves nuclear use – that’s Sokolsky and Adams.

#### C] Can’t solve nuke terror since vulnerable shared nukes are still in Europe – that’s Andreasen and Remkes.

#### 3] Unilateral commitment causes Trump backlash over unequal burden sharing which shreds assurances – can’t solve case and links to the net benefit.

Davis 18 (Julie Hirschfeld Davis is a White House correspondent at The New York Times. She has covered politics from Washington for 19 years, writing on Congress, three presidential campaigns and three presidents. She joined the Times in 2014 after stints at Bloomberg News, the Associated Press, The Baltimore Sun and Congressional Quarterly. Julie is the 2009 winner of the Everett McKinley Dirksen Award for Distinguished Reporting of Congress for her coverage of the federal response to the 2008 financial meltdown. She grew up in New York City and attended Yale University, 7-2-2018, "Trump Warns NATO Allies to Spend More on Defense, or Else," NYT, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/trump-nato.html) CCDE

WASHINGTON — President Trump has written sharply worded letters to the leaders of several NATO allies — including Germany, Belgium, Norway and Canada — taking them to task for spending too little on their own defense and warning that the United States is losing patience with what he said was their failure to meet security obligations shared by the alliance.

The letters, sent in June, are the latest sign of acrimony between Mr. Trump and American allies as he heads to a NATO summit meeting next week in Brussels that will be a closely watched test of the president’s commitment to the alliance. Mr. Trump has repeatedly questioned its value and has claimed that its members are taking advantage of the United States.

Mr. Trump’s criticism raised the prospect of another confrontation involving the president and American allies after a blowup by Mr. Trump at the Group of 7 gathering last month in Quebec, and increased concerns that far from projecting solidarity in the face of threats from Russia, the meeting will highlight divisions within the alliance. Such a result could play into the hands of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who is to meet with Mr. Trump in Helsinki, Finland, after the NATO meeting, and whose primary goal is sowing divisions within the alliance.

In his letters, the president hinted that after more than a year of public and private complaints that allies have not done enough to share the burden of collective defense, he may be considering a response, including adjusting the United States’ military presence around the world.

“As we discussed during your visit in April, there is growing frustration in the United States that some allies have not stepped up as promised,” Mr. Trump wrote to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany in a particularly pointed letter, according to someone who saw it and shared excerpts with The New York Times. “The United States continues to devote more resources to the defense of Europe when the Continent’s economy, including Germany’s, are doing well and security challenges abound. This is no longer sustainable for us.”

“Growing frustration,” Mr. Trump wrote, “is not confined to our executive branch. The United States Congress is concerned, as well.”

The president’s complaint is that many NATO allies are not living up to the commitment they made at their Wales summit meeting in 2014 to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on national defense. American presidents have long complained about the lack of burden-sharing by NATO member countries, but Mr. Trump has taken that criticism much further, claiming that some of the United States’ closest allies are essentially deadbeats who have failed to pay debts to the organization, a fundamental misunderstanding of how it functions.

The Trump administration has already reportedly been analyzing a large-scale withdrawal of American forces from Germany, after Mr. Trump expressed surprise that 35,000 active-duty troops are stationed there and complained that NATO countries were not contributing enough to the alliance.

In the letter, Mr. Trump told Ms. Merkel that Germany also deserves blame for the failure of other NATO countries to spend enough: “Continued German underspending on defense undermines the security of the alliance and provides validation for other allies that also do not plan to meet their military spending commitments, because others see you as a role model.”

In language that is echoed in his letters to the leaders of other countries — including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, Prime Minister Erna Solberg of Norway and Prime Minister Charles Michel of Belgium — Mr. Trump said he understands the “domestic political pressure” brought to bear by opponents of boosting military expenditures, noting that he has expended “considerable political capital to increase our own military spending.”

“It will, however, become increasingly difficult to justify to American citizens why some countries do not share NATO’s collective security burden while American soldiers continue to sacrifice their lives overseas or come home gravely wounded,” Mr. Trump wrote to Ms. Merkel.

### 1AR NATO Conventional CP

Obviously cheating and not a relevant opportunity cost

## Russia Conditions CP

### 1AR Russia Conditions CP

Theory, perm, etc

#### They say no – quantitative and geographic asymmetry. Plan has to happen before they’ll negotiate.

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Withdraw through Negotiations with Russia, or Unilaterally?

Tactical nuclear weapons are the only nuclear weapons for which there is no formal arms control agreement. This is why the Obama administration wants to include tactical nuclear weapons in the next round of arms control negotiations, after the New START has entered into force. The question now is whether the last remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe should be withdrawn before the start of these talks. From a Western point of view, it may seem logical to wait to withdrawing the tactical weapons and to include them in the discussions with Russia, as suggested by the New Strategic Concept, and earlier, even more strongly by the Group of Experts that prepared NATO’s New Strategic Concept.97 Domestic politics in the United States is another important factor: the Republicans want a clear linkage between the withdrawal of the U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons.98

The asymmetrical numbers, however, are a major difficulty. Russia has many more tactical nuclear weapons and will not agree to exchange them for the much lower numbers on the NATO side. In contrast to Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev regards the era of making deeper cuts than the United States as over. Russia may link the tactical nuclear weapons to the strategic nuclear weapons in reserve, a revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, missile defense, or some combination of these. Russia may also want to bring the British and French nuclear weapons into the discussions. Furthermore, there will be more counting issues with the weapons, because such a treaty would not only have to deal with the delivery vehicles but also with the weapons themselves. This means elaborating other verification procedures, including control of storage sites, for the first time. In short, negotiations for a treaty on tactical nuclear weapons will not be easy.

Yet another asymmetry exists: the United States has nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of other states, which is not the case for Russia. Different Russian officials, including Duma International Affairs Committee Chairman Konstantin Kosachgov,99 Chief Nikolai Makarov,100 and Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin101—have already taken the position that the U.S. nuclear weapons should be withdrawn before talks about tactical nuclear weapons can be held.

#### Unilat is better.

Sauer and van der Zwaan 11 (**Tom Sauer** is Assistant Professor in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen (Belgium). He is also a visiting professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, CERIS (Brussels), and ISODARCO. He held research positions at Harvard University (1997–99) and the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris (April 2001). Previously, he was trainee at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva and at the European Commission (DGI) in Brussels. He received a NATO Individual Research Grant (1994–96) and a Rotary International Ambassadorial Scholarship (1997–98). He was trained in politics and international relations at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (MA, 1991; Ph.D., 2001), University of Hull (MA, 1992) and the Bologna Center of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University (Gr.Dipl., 1993). His research interests cover arms control, proliferation, disarmament, and missile defense. **Bob van der Zwaan** is a senior scientist at the Policy Studies Department of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) in Amsterdam and at Columbia University’s Lenfest Center for Sustainable Energy (Earth Institute) in New York, and is Adjunct Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Bologna. He is co-director of the International Energy Workshop (IEW), member of the Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and lead author for Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 4th and 5th Assessment Reports). He has been visiting professor at several universities, most recently at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH, Stockholm, 2010), and held research positions at Harvard University (2002–05), the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (1999-2001), Stanford University (1999-2000), and the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (1997–99). He was trained in economics (MPhil, 1997, University of Cambridge, King’s College), physics (PhD, 1995, CERN and University of Nijmegen; MSc, 1991, University of Utrecht) and international relations (Certificate, 1994, IUHEI, University of Geneva), “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why Their Withdrawal Is Desirable and Feasible,” Belfer Center Discussion Paper, No. 2011-05, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2011 Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/us-tactical-nuclearweapons-in-europe.pdf) CCDE

This brings us to the option of unilateral withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, in the hope that the Russians reciprocate with a subsequent gesture. For example, this could occur in the form of moving its tactical nuclear weapons deeper into Russian territory. By consolidating the tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. territory, bilateral negotiations about the remaining tactical nuclear weapons may become less complicated, because at least one asymmetrical problem will have been solved. Withdrawing weapons unilaterally has the advantage that it does not have to be approved by the U.S. Senate. Even NATO’s Expert Group did not recommend formal negotiations with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. A face-saving solution may be a unilateral withdrawal without calling it as such, just like the "reciprocal" Presidential Initiatives of 1990–1991. Interestingly, the Obama Nuclear Posture Review called for “formal agreements and/or parallel voluntary measures.”102 Similarly, Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski proposed in a common op-ed “substantial unilateral confidence building efforts”’ in this regard.103

## Consult NATO CP

### 1AR Consult NATO CP

#### 1] Perm do the cp – Merriam Webster defines resolve as to consult or deliberate.

Merriam Webster, No Date, “Resolve”, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve

: CONSULT, DELIBERATE

#### 2] Perm do the plan and consult with them about method/conventional fill in etc – limited intrinsicness good to test net benefit

#### 3] Theory

#### 4] NATO consultation causes infinite delays, only unilateral action solves, and conventional fill-in solves the net benefit.

Andreasen and Williams 16 (Steve Andreasen is a national security consultant to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Global Nuclear Policy Program in Washington, DC, and teaches courses on National Security Policy and Crisis Management in Foreign Affairs at the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota. Isabelle Williams is the senior adviser to the Global Nuclear Policy Program at the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 11-15-2016, "Bring Home US Tactical Nuclear Weapons from Europe," Ploughshares Fund, https://www.ploughshares.org/issues-analysis/article/bring-home-us-tactical-nuclear-weapons-europe) CCDE

Changing the Status Quo

One thing is certain: any change in NATO’s nuclear status quo will begin in the White House, and not at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The next president of the United States will need to take charge of this issue if he or she wants to move NATO towards a safer, more secure and more credible nuclear posture — without the expense, opportunity cost and risk of basing US nuclear weapons in Europe.

Easier said than done? Of course. But it is also true that the next president can, and should, get this done by carefully leading — and working with — NATO. The trick is knowing when and how to lead — and when and who to work with.

First, it will be important for the next president to take the first step with allies months before the next NATO summit in 2017. Springing a new initiative on NATO days before, or even at, the summit is counter to how NATO works, and counterproductive to getting change done.

Second, the first step taken by the administration should be comprehensive, and not incremental. The president needs to lay out a vision and rationale for moving towards a safer, more secure, and more credible nuclear deterrent — and explain in broad terms why and how this can be done to improve the security of all NATO members. In brief, the president would say something along these lines:

I am committed to maintaining a safe, secure and credible NATO nuclear deterrent for as long as one is needed; and I am committed to sustaining conventional reassurance initiatives to meet any challenge to NATO’s security.

Both of these crucial objectives can be better achieved without the expense, opportunity cost and risk of basing US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. I will therefore consolidate all US tactical nuclear weapons now stored in Europe in the United States.

At the same time, the United States will work closely with NATO allies to strengthen NATO’s overall deterrent and defense capabilities, both nuclear and conventional.

With respect to nuclear deterrence, the United States will work closely with NATO to restructure NATO’s nuclear deterrent so that it is safer, more secure, more credible and more affordable. This will include: maintaining the strategic nuclear forces of the alliance, along with a more visible demonstration of the security guarantee provided by these forces to European allies; and enhancing information sharing, consultations and planning.

With respect to conventional deterrence, the United States will devote a portion of the savings associated with consolidating US tactical nuclear weapons back to the United States, and scale back the US B61 modernization program to conventional reassurance over the next five years.

Third, the “NATO process” should then be used not to “review,” but rather to “implement” the president’s vision. No new NATO strategic concept or deterrence and defense posture review is needed. Indeed, these NATO-led reviews are often the graveyard for initiatives, large and small.

This is not to say that NATO does not, or will not, have an important role to play. NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group should be given a clear mandate in 2017 to develop and recommend to ministers and leaders how existing nuclear sharing, consultations and planning can be enhanced across NATO, and how NATO can visibly and more credibly demonstrate that it remains a nuclear alliance.

# NATO Ks

## Heg/LIO

### Silence Liberal

**The four waves of empire building and dismantlement are intrinsically US driven – we have a chart.**

Daniel Deudney & John Ikenberry 15. Deudney, Johns Hopkins University; Ikenberry, Princeton University “America’s Impact: The End of Empire and the Globalization of the Westphalian System”, August 2015, http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf

In contemporary debates, this argument undercuts, modifies, and qualifies characterizations held by so many of the **U**nited **S**tates as **essentially imperial**, and the American order as an empire. In our rendering, the **U**nited **S**tate is not the last Western empire, but **the first anti-imperial and post-imperial great power in the global system.** Our argument is thus focused on the consequences of American foreign policy for the evolution of the international system, and we do not in this confined treatment offer an explanation for the origins of U.S. foreign policy. In short, we offer an argument about impacts rather than the sources of America’s antiimperial and pro-Westphalian role. Against the backdrop of this evolution of the international system and the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, it becomes possible to see more clearly the many ways in which the **U**nited **S**tates played important **anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and pro-Westphalian roles**. 16 The Pattern of American Anti-Imperial, Anti-Colonial, and Pro-Westphalian Impacts In each of the four waves of empire building and dismantlement, the **U**nited **S**tates had an impact. The **U**nited **S**tates was the first “new nation” to emerge from a rebellion against European imperial rule during the first wave of modern empire. The **U**nited **S**tates also supported the independence of other European settler colonies throughout the Americas and, with the Monroe Doctrine, helped sustain their independence against European efforts to recolonize parts of the Americas. In the second wave of late 19th century empire-building, the **U**nited **S**tates, despite its great relative power, **did not establish an empire of its own of any significance or duration**. And during the latter part of the 20th century, the **U**nited **S**tates pushed European decolonization, thus **facilitating the breakup of second wave empires**. In the great world wars in the 20th century, the **U**nited **S**tates played an important role in thwarting a third wave of imperial projects of **Germany, Japan, and Italy**. In the second half of the 20th century, the **U**nited **S**tates played **decisive roles, both ideological and military**, in thwarting the fourth wave of empire building, the expansion of the communist great power, the Soviet Union, **as well as communist coups and revolutions in many weak and small independent states.**



The **U**nited **S**tates also played a variety of important roles in **building and strengthening Westphalian institutions**, **moderating inter-state anarchy**, and **facilitating** the ability of states to survive **as independent members of international society**. From its inception, the **U**nited **S**tates was precocious in its support for the **law of nations**, the **institutions of the society of states**, particularly **the laws of war** and neutrality, and public **international law**, as a means of **restraining war and aggression**. In both the 19th and 20th centuries, the **U**nited **S**tates, first regionally and then globally, inspired and helped **legitimate anti-colonial and anti-imperial independence movements** and national liberation struggles among peoples struggling **against empires all over the world**. In the 20th century, the **U**nited **S**tates led the efforts to institutionalize Westphalian norms of non-aggression and sovereign independence, first with the League of Nations and then with the United Nations Charter. In the second half of the 20th century, the American-led liberal international order institutionalized free trade and multilateral cooperation, thus providing the **infrastructure for a global economic system**, thus enabling smaller and weaker states to **sustain their sovereign**. Also in the second half of the 20th century, the American system of military alliances contribute**d to the dampening of violent conflicts among allied states**, particularly in Europe and East Asia, thus **protecting the Westphalian system from the return of violent conflict and empire-building.**

 Taken together, these varied American activities in the world clearly provide strong preliminary evidence for our claim that the United States has **significantly contributed to the dismantlement of empires**, the **thwarting of further empire-building, and to the universalization, institutionalization, and stabilization of the Westphalian state-system.**

**Heg is key to restraint – transition causes more entanglement and Lashout.**

Michael **Beckley 15**, research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, <http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904_pp007-048.pdf>

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare **has important implications for international relations scholarship** and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, **it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch** in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that **great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.** For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. **military restraint**. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, **have stemmed not from entangling** alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders **to define national interests expansively**, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the **U**nited **S**tates **to intervene recklessly** abroad while **leaving it without partners** to share the burden **when those interventions go awry**.

**Even if they win an epistemology DA—explaining the absence of war among great powers means making *relative* not *absolutist claims*—winning heg bad requires them to *defend an alternative*.**

William **Wohlforth 12**, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Nuno Monteiro. “’Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is not Peaceful.’ Reviewed by William Wohlforth” October 31st, http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR17.pdf

Third, setting up the article as a claim that unipolarity is not peaceful runs into a problem: **Unipolarity is peaceful. The Most Peaceful. Ever. Period**. No one expects any imaginable anarchic inter-state system to be perfectly peaceful, with no war at all. In my 1999 paper, I stressed that “unipolarity **does not imply the end of all conflict**... It simply means the absence of two big problems” — hegemonic rivalry and counter-hegemonic balancing—that were present in all earlier systems. As a result “unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers.” Like any statement about the war-proneness of any international system, **this is a relative claim**. International relations scholarship does not have theories that make anything other than relative predictions about the war-proneness of systems. Monteiro tries but fails to escape this reality. He writes: “Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature (12). The latter portion of this sentence is exactly right, but the former bit is contradicted just a few pages later when Monteiro presents evidence that “Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all systems .. .“ (18). While conflict researchers debate the causes, they are nearly united in agreeing that the post-1990 international system is **the least afflicted by war**.5 **There are many ways to measure** war: the overall number that occur, the number of people killed, the probability that any state will be at war in any year, the size or cost of military forces compared to economic output or population, or, perhaps best, the probability that any individual will die as a result of organized inter-group violence. **By all those measures, we are living in the most peaceful period** since the modern inter-state system took shape in the seventeenth century. Indeed, Stephen Pinker assembles masses of evidence to suggest that **there has never been a less violent time in all of human history**.6 It is hard to think of any way to measure war that does not show the unipolar period as remarkably peaceful— except for the ones Monteiro uses: “the percentage of years that great powers spend at war, and the incidence of war involving great powers,” (18) with the United States defined as the only great power after 1990. That is a very convoluted way to say ‘Iraq and Afghanistan.’ **The fact that the United States ended up in two grinding counter-insurgency operations in no way contradicts the claim that unipolarity is unprecedentedly peaceful.** But that reaction concerns the framing rather than the substance of the article. One can dismiss as America-centric the claim that unipolarity is war-prone and still regard Monteiro’s carefully crafted arguments as promising advances. Further investment in refining and evaluating these arguments is warranted, for even if we agree that unipolarity has been pretty darned peaceful, it surely doesn’t seem that way to anyone in or around the U.S. military. Along with most security scholars, I’ve regarded the post-1991 military interventions as permitted **but not dictated by unipolarity**. That **at least leaves open the possibility of strategic learning**, as happened back in biplolarity. Even though the bipolar structure and U.S. grand strategy remained constant, bloody conflicts in **Korea and Vietnam** prompted Washington to get out of the direct military intervention business in favor of proxy wars and less costly covert operations. Similarly, the new “Iraq syndrome” might **tame interventionist impulses** even as unipolarity endures. But Monteiro’s message is gloomier. “The significant level of conflict the world has experienced over the last two decades,” he warns, “will continue as long as U.S. power remains preponderant.” (38). That’s a scary message even if that “significant level” is far lower than in any other known interstate system. So while I hope Monteiro is wrong, there is no doubt that his article has decisively altered the terms of the debate on this crucial issue.

# ---Extra---

## NATO Adv

### Conventional Good

#### Conventional deterrence is the new black.

Breitenbauch 14 (Henrik Ø Breitenbauch is a senior researcher at the Center for Military Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, and a nonresident fellow at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations. He advises Danish authorities on issues related to defense and security policy, including NATO, transatlantic relations, Nordic-Baltic security, and defense planning. Breitenbauch has worked for and advised NATO’s Allied Command Transformation on long-term defense planning and strategic foresight analyses, April 2014, "Conventional Deterrence Is the New Black," Joint Air Power Competence Centre, https://www.japcc.org/conventional-deterrence-is-the-new-black/)

After Ukraine, conventional deterrence will be the main purpose of NATO’s armed forces. NATO contingency planning, operational training and defence planning will all revolve around conventional deterrence. Russia’s ready use of force in Ukraine, Georgia and beyond shows that its non-NATO neighbours are very much at risk for military intervention. President Putin challenges the post-Cold War order by breaking the rules underlying its stability. His means include the use of covert agents to stage unrest and create excuses for Russia to intervene in the supposed name of Russian-speaking minorities. Could Moscow apply the same measures in a NATO country with a significant Russian minority population, such as Latvia? This question should keep NATO leaders up at night and by the morning they should realize that the solution is conventional deterrence.

Why conventional deterrence? A superficial structural balance of power analysis suggests that Russia will be deterred by NATO’s nuclear arsenal and will therefore not launch Ukraine-style operations against NATO members. But NATO never relied on nuclear deterrence alone. For deterrence to work, a convincing part of it must exist in time and in place. Simply put, as the ability to project power declines with distance, so does the ability to deter. An American carrier group in the Pacific is not a carrier group in the Baltic or Black Seas. Some – credible – conventional deterrence is necessary in the region. Russia is less likely to overreach if its forces cannot cross the border unharmed.

When it comes to risk perceptions, geography matters and the relevant comparison may not be between Russia’s defence budget (around USD 68 billion according to the Military Balance) and the US budget (around 600 billion), but between Russia and the aggregate defence budgets of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (around 1.2 billion). While Russia is unlikely to commit the bulk of its armed forces in an incursion against a Baltic state, Russia’s conventional advantage in the region is still decisive. Only conventional deterrence can make sure that Russian decision-makers do not come to think that they could invade NATO territory without major military costs.

The credibility of deterrence rests on the actual ability to interdict and punish any challenger. The insurance premium has to be paid for insurance to work, and the lock on the door has to be locked to be effective. NATO’s contingency plans for the Baltic countries and beyond should be backed up by a corresponding change in the Level of Ambition (NATO’s agreed force posture) as well as in extended training and exercises and a repurposing of the NATO Response Force.

In order to size and evaluate these initiatives, NATO and the wider security and defense community would do well to rediscover the tenets of conventional deterrence. In the 1980s, the strategic debate was all about the necessary force-to-space ratios on German soil. Given Russia’s recent actions, these debates will be revived in a more complicated form because of the new geography of NATO, which now includes the Baltic and Black Seas.

But conventional deterrence is not straightforward, either in practice or in theory. Some questions are linear: How to size capabilities for deterrence? How much is enough? Others are non-linear: What about political feedback loops? Can wrongly timed or sized deterrence or even the contemplation of deterrence lead to counter-reactions from Russia? Will the deployment or projected deployment of force meant to deter aggravate rather than mitigate the likelihood of a conventional conflict across a NATO border? It is important to know whether a given amount of military capability actually deters attacks – and which factors may affect it and how. Are these factors limited to the quality and quantity of military capacities? Or do they also include perceptions and psychology among the responsible leaders? The precise meanings of general, nuclear and conventional deterrence, the relationship between the different parts, and the question of predictability have all been the subjects of extensive academic, strategic and political discussions since the aftermath of Hiroshima. Developed by Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn and more early in the Cold War, the deterrence and conventional deterrence literature blossomed in the 1980s with John J. Mearsheimer and Richard K. Betts.

Conventional deterrence in particular ties together military and political strategy. The Cold War debate about deterrence was not abstract or academic, but in fact deeply political, in ways that should be instructive to policymakers today. In Europe, the shift from the doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’ was met with serious reservations exactly because it was tied to the balance between nuclear and conventional deterrence and because it was seen to increase the risk of conventional conflict. ‘Massive retaliation’ was based on a preference for nuclear over conventional deterrence and on the premise (or threat) that any aggression would be met with an overwhelming nuclear response. ‘Flexible response’, in contrast, emphasized deterrence at all levels, including the conventional. By introducing more steps on the escalation ladder it would reduce the risk of an unwanted and automatic global escalation of a conflict.

Yet critics pointed out that having more steps on the escalation ladder also increased the risk that the ladder would actually be climbed. While mutual nuclear deterrence between the US and the USSR. would avert a nuclear Armageddon, a ‘limited’ nuclear war in Europe or a conventional war, limited geographically to Europe could be made possible in this way. On the other hand, they argued, if Soviet and American leaders expected an automatic escalation to nuclear weapons, then Europe’s territory would be less likely to become the scene of a proxy conflict between the two superpowers. The transition from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘flexible response’ was therefore controversial. In the same vein, military strategy options for NATO in Germany were limited by political concerns to forward defence as neither defence in depth nor offensive strategies were found politically palatable. Whatever the potential military strategic merits of defence in depth, political leaders could not accept the prospect of war across their territory. Inside NATO, conventional deterrence was therefore both a necessary part of the overall force mix and a politically contested mechanism.

In 2014 and beyond, conventional deterrence will similarly be bound and shaped as much by political as by military concerns. How will contingency planning and concomitant military preparations address the new political and military geography of the Alliance, especially in the Baltics? Will the Alliance now plan for significant, permanently deployed forces, or for residual forces and quick response forces? Does the Baltic space call for new amphibious capabilities? Will there be political consensus to develop and manage the implementation of such plans? Will NATO and its member nations be able to comprehend, communicate and coordinate such a military move within a larger grand strategy framework that both deters and engages with Russia in the long term? Will NATO and EU nations be able to coordinate such a framework? No matter how the broader strategy plays out, issues of conventional deterrence are sure to be at the heart of the discussions – both in terms of the theory and practice, and the political and military strategy, of conventional deterrence.

For the United States, the centrality of conventional deterrence means a triple challenge. The first part is getting conventional deterrence right, through US and Allied armed forces, in a way that fits with a (still to come) broader strategic response to Russia. This is difficult in itself but also compounded by the second part: the transatlantic relationship. As before, conventional deterrence in Europe will be as much about the political level – dialogues as well as behind-the-scenes arm-twisting with Germany and all the other nations – as it will be about the direct military implementation. Last but certainly not least, conventional deterrence as a main focus in NATO means that America’s global alliance relationships are at stake. Taipei and Tokyo will watch closely how the US and NATO deals with Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. As the American security establishment returns to the intricacies of conventional deterrence it will also remember the painful predicaments of making policy for the sake of credibility while having to solve the problems at hand.

### Escalation

#### Baltics invasion goes nuclear and shreds broader NATO cred.

Thompson 16 (Loren B. Thompson – Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, taught at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government; “Why the Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely to Begin," *National Interest*, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044?page=2)

However, the possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not only still exists, but is probably growing. And the place where it is most likely to begin is in a future military confrontation over three small Baltic states -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2004, the United States has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the expansion of a nuclear country -- Russia -- a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies. The formal name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated, the United States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-armed Russia by threatening to use atomic weapons. The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that extended deterrence remains a pillar of U.S. global strategy. Although the credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-range bombers and missiles, the posture review explicitly stated that the U.S. would preserve the ability to deploy nuclear weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe. According to Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by American or allied forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow their use for decades to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number of so-called "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or locations. While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons. First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance. Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland. Third, there is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain in a future war. Russia has massive local superiority in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to respond. Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly. Fifth, any counter-attack by NATO in the Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes against attacking forces would occur on Russian territory, and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance system would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war. Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional conflict along the Russian periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments. Sixth, both sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine potentially justifying the use of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly that it needs non-strategic nuclear weapons to cope with the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would use such weapons in order to protect its core assets and values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict. Successive U.S. administrations have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments. Seventh, both sides have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater ready for quick use if tactical circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict. Nuclear-capable NATO jets could reach the area within hours. Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35 fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers. The bottom line is that all the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use. Neither side understands what actions might provoke nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides would likely have a tenuous grasp of what was happening. The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in a context where either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for catastrophe.

#### Tactical exchange rapidly escalates – causes global nuclear fallout and instability.

Ioanes and Mosher 20 (Ellen Ioanes is the Military & Defense Editorial Fellow at INSIDER. She is a graduate of Columbia Journalism School and Davidson College. Her work appears in the Guardian, the Center for Public Integrity, the Daily Dot, HuffPost India, and more, and Dave Mosher is a journalist with more than a decade of experience reporting and writing stories about space, science, and technology, citing Princeton Science and Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 1-23-2020, "A terrifying new animation shows how 1 'tactical' nuclear weapon could trigger a US-Russia war that kills 34 million people in 5 hours," Business Insider, https://www.businessinsider.com/tactical-nuclear-weapons-escalation-us-russia-war-animated-strike-map-2019-9) CCDE \*\*removed photo file names that got pasted and their captions that were below\*\*

This is how a NATO-Russian confrontation could quickly escalate into nuclear war.

Conventional warfare — namely all conflict short of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons — escalates into nuclear warfare when Russia launches a nuclear "warning shot" from a base near Kaliningrad to stop NATO advancement. Russia doesn't have a "no first use" policy — it dropped it in 1993. NATO forces respond by launching a tactical nuclear strike.

The US already has tactical nuclear weapons, such as B61-12 gravity bombs, and more planned under US President Donald Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Included in the plan is a low-yield warhead intended for use in a submarine-launched ballistic missile, as well as a sea-launched cruise missile.

These kinds of weapons are designed for targets on the battlefield, like troops or munitions supplies, as opposed to long- or intermediate-range nuclear missiles that are fired from one country to another, for example, targeting an enemy's bombers and ICBM silos — or even cities.

In the simulation, both Russia and NATO up the ante with tactical strikes.

If the nuclear threshold is crossed, the simulation finds, then both the US and Russia would respond with tactical nuclear weapons. Russia would send 300 warheads to NATO targets, including advancing troops, in both aircraft and short-range missiles — overwhelming force that would obliterate tanks, fortified positions and soldiers unlike anything ever seen in battle before. Supporting forces and civilians not immediately killed would be susceptible to painful and even fatal radiation exposure.

NATO would respond by sending about 180 tactical nuclear weapons to Russia via aircraft in equally devastating retaliation.

The simulation was constructed using independent analysis of nuclear force postures in NATO countries and Russia, including the availability of nuclear weapons, their yields, and possible targets, according to the Science and Global Security lab.

The tactical phase of the simulation shows about 2.6 million casualties over three hours.

Instead of the tactical weapons de-escalating the conflict, as proponents claim they would, the simulation shows conflict spiraling out of control after the use of tactical weapons.

Russia's tactical weapons would destroy much of Europe, the simulation posits. In response, NATO would launch submarine- and US-based strategic nuclear weapons toward Russia's nuclear arsenals — 600 warheads in total.

Strategic nuclear weapons have a longer range, so Russia, knowing that NATO nukes are headed for its weapons cache, would throw all its weight behind missiles launched from silos, mobile launchers, and submarines.

The casualties during this phase would be 3.4 million in 45 minutes.

This leads to 85.3 million additional casualties in the final phase of the nuclear war simulation.

In the wake of previous attacks, both Russia and NATO would launch warheads toward each other's 30 most populous cities in the final stage of the scenario, using five to 10 warheads for each city depending on its size.

This phase would cause 85.3 million casualties — both deaths and injuries. But the total casualty count from the entire battle (of less than 5 hours) would be 34.1 million deaths and 57.4 million injuries, or a combined 91.3 million casualties overall.

But that's just the immediate conflict: The entire world would be affected by nuclear disaster in the months, years, and decades to come.

The radioactive fallout from the nuclear disaster would cause additional deaths and injuries. Studies also suggest that, even with a limited nuclear engagement, Earth's atmosphere would cool dramatically, driving famine, refugee crises, additional conflicts, and more deaths.

### Alliances good

#### Alliances make heg sustainable, eradicate war, and prevent prolif.

Rapp-Hooper 20 (Mira Rapp-Hooper is Stephen A. Schwarzman Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. She is the author of the forthcoming book Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances, March/April 2020, "Saving America’s Alliances," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-02-10/saving-americas-alliances) CCDE

A BRAVE NEW WORLD

World War II transformed the scope and lethality of conflict. The United States had long benefited from its relatively isolated geographic location, but the spread of long-range airpower, missile technology, and nuclear weapons meant that its security was no longer guaranteed. Newly exposed, the United States sought a strategy that would allow it to secure the international balance of power from afar, averting conflicts on its territory and preventing the only other superpower left standing after the war, the Soviet Union, from dominating Asia and Europe. The United States created a network of alliances precisely with these goals in mind. U.S. policymakers reasoned that by acquiring allies and building overseas bases on those countries’ territory, Washington would be able to confront crises before they reached the homeland. What’s more, with this forceful presence, the United States could practice so-called extended deterrence, dissuading adversaries from starting wars in the first place.

Unlike the alliance systems of the past, the U.S. system was intended to prosecute or deter not a single war but all wars, and to do so indefinitely. The novelty—and the gamble—was that if the new security system worked, the world would see little evidence of its power. This new approach was a radical departure from the pre–Cold War norm, when the United States considered itself largely self-sufficient and pursued few foreign entanglements; it had no formal allies between the Revolutionary War and World War II. Between 1949 and 1955, in contrast, the United States extended security guarantees to 23 countries in Asia and Europe. By the end of the twentieth century, it had alliances with 37.

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The United States’ Cold War alliances were successful in meeting the goals that strategists had set out for them. For the duration of the Cold War, no U.S. treaty ally was ever the victim of a major attack. And until the 9/11 attacks, no NATO member had ever invoked the treaty’s Article 5 guarantee, which obligates the allies to assist any member state that comes under assault. Of course, Washington had intervened at times to support allies in a fix—helping Taiwan manage Chinese aggression during two crises in 1954–55 and 1958, for example—but it did so chiefly when it saw its own interests at risk and often with the explicit aim of preventing war. In addition to maintaining the balance of power in Asia and Europe, the system contributed to the flourishing of the United States’ allies, most notably Japan and West Germany, which became close military partners, consolidated themselves as democracies with vibrant economies, and eventually emerged as leading regional powers.

The alliance system also lowered the cost of U.S. military and political action worldwide. Since the early 1950s, U.S. treaty allies have joined every major war the United States has fought, despite the fact that for almost all these conflicts, they were not required to do so by the terms of their alliances. What’s more, the system ensured that the allies’ foreign policies supported, rather than undermined, Washington’s. The United States used security guarantees to convince South Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany to abandon illicit programs to develop their own nuclear weapons. Other states that, if they had not been included in U.S. alliances, would surely have sought their own military protection—building state-of-the-art armies, navies, and air forces—chose instead to rely on the United States’ military might. And by maintaining close defense relationships with a number of those states, the United States also gained support in international institutions for everything from peacekeeping missions to sanctions—support that would otherwise have been much harder to secure. These contributions were crucial, as they allowed the United States to project its power without becoming overstretched.

LONELY AT THE TOP

The alliance system continued to function smoothly until 1991, when the adversary for which the United States’ entire security posture had been designed suddenly disintegrated. The Soviet Union vanished, and with it, so did the logic of American security guarantees. Notable international relations scholars—primarily those of a realist orientation—believed that in a unipolar world, U.S. alliances had become outmoded. But U.S. policymakers were unpersuaded. The Cold War system had performed so admirably that they decided it should be retained and repurposed for new objectives. Because the United States was now utterly unmatched in its military and political power, however, their alliance reforms did not focus on defense or deterrence as traditionally understood.

U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration supported the entry of former Eastern-bloc states (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) into NATO in the belief that an expanded Atlantic alliance would help spread democracy and promote stability in post-Soviet eastern Europe—an urgent task given the humanitarian crisis that seized the Balkans with the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992. In other words, Clinton decided to expand the alliance in the aftermath of the Cold War rather than dismantle it. Far from treating Russia as a vanquished adversary, his administration sought to gain Moscow’s acquiescence to NATO enlargement. And through the Partnership for Peace—a NATO-backed military-cooperation program designed to build trust with post-Soviet states without officially including them in the alliance—Clinton sought to give eastern European countries ways to associate with NATO without spooking the Russians. For most of the 1990s, as the alliance pushed eastward, this approach appeared to be working: in private, Russian officials even floated the idea that their country might someday join NATO.

But by extending NATO to the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—in 2004, U.S. military planners inadvertently made the alliance much harder to defend. Russia still sought a buffer zone that would keep it safe from western Europe and the United States and saw the countries on its western border as its first line of defense. The United States’ old rival, preoccupied by its failing economy, was not deeply troubled by the earlier rounds of NATO expansion. But the situation quickly changed after the Baltic states entered the alliance. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 to ensure that neither country would join NATO. Along the way, it developed a military strategy designed to demonstrate the United States’ inability to defend the Baltics, relying on the prospect of a rapid invasion that would leave Washington with the painful choice between escalation and surrender.

Trump’s alliance shakedown is almost certain to backfire.

In the meantime, an ascendant China has sought to corrode U.S. alliances in the Pacific. Beginning in the early 1990s, Beijing has invested in missiles and other military technology that would deter the United States from intervening in a conflict close to China’s shores—namely, one over Taiwan. By making it costlier for Washington to enter a war, China’s leaders have attempted to undermine U.S. security guarantees and demonstrate to U.S. allies in the Pacific that the United States’ ability to protect them is waning. After years of dizzying growth that fueled huge increases in military spending, Chinese President Xi Jinping has set his sights higher than his predecessors, seeking to reestablish China as a great power.

Beijing and Moscow have also developed nonmilitary means—economic coercion, cyberwarfare, and political interference—to advance their objectives. China and Russia use these tactics in very different ways, but the underlying logic is the same: to achieve their goals without activating U.S. security guarantees or violating laws against the use of force. In 2007, for instance, Russian cyberattacks paralyzed Estonia, taking down bank and government websites. And between 2014 and 2016, China initiated a massive island-building campaign in the South China Sea, transforming former reefs and rocks into military bases, upending the balance of power, and threatening U.S. allies—namely, the Philippines. In both cases, the transgressions undermined the security of U.S. treaty partners and demonstrated that the pacts were powerless to stop nonmilitary aggression.

To make matters worse, the Trump administration is deeply critical of NATO members and other U.S. allies, a hostility that acts as an accelerant to the geopolitical forces that were already weakening the system of pacts. Unlike previous presidents, who privately pressed U.S. allies to contribute more to the security relationship, Trump engages in the public and arbitrary coercion of U.S. allies, making extravagant spending demands and stating that the United States will abandon them if they do not pay up. (Asked if the United States would defend the Baltics against a Russian attack, for example, Trump replied, “If they fulfill their obligations to us.”) In general, Trump views the protection of the American homeland as his near-exclusive national security objective and places little value on the U.S. military presence abroad, instead fixating on border security. This view is at odds with the United States’ long-standing reliance on forward defense and deterrence, which was based on the belief that the homeland is best protected through a network of alliances and overseas bases that keep war from starting.

Trump’s alliance shakedown is almost certain to backfire. Some of the costs are already on display: South Korea, for instance, has tilted toward China by using diplomacy to mend previously strained ties and to establish military hotlines. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron has bemoaned the “brain death” of NATO, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel has questioned whether U.S. allies can trust the United States. If U.S. allies do eventually devote more to defense because of slackened American leadership, they are likely to do so in ways disadvantageous to the United States, spending more on independent forces and strategies rather than assuming protection from and partnership with the United States. U.S. interests may fall by the wayside as a result. For instance, the Trump administration has declared competition with China to be the United States’ highest national security priority, and leaders in both political parties agree that the challenge is momentous. To date, however, Washington has found little support among its allies for its campaign against Beijing. The United States can steady the shifting twenty-first-century balance of power only in tandem with its allies in Asia and Europe. Otherwise, it will be a feeble and lonely competition, indeed.

#### Free-riding and entrapment are wrong.

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THE PRICE OF POWER

Both the Trump administration and notable international relations scholars worry that the United States’ alliances lead to chronic free-riding, allowing U.S. allies to benefit from American security guarantees and military cooperation even though they add comparatively little to the relationship. Nearly every U.S. president has wished that the country’s allies would spend more on defense, and there is little doubt that the United States has generally outspent most of its treaty allies in Asia and Europe. The imbalance persists even today: the United States spends over three percent of its GDP on defense; the next-highest spenders among the United States’ allies spend 2.5 percent, and many others spend 1.5–2.0 percent. But these numbers are deceptive. The United States, after all, maintains a global defense posture, whereas its partners generally spend on security in their immediate neighborhoods. What’s more, U.S. military spending in such countries as Germany and Japan is largely devoted to a regional defense strategy, as opposed to the defense of a single host ally. There is no reason to expect those countries’ defense budgets to be comparable to that of the United States.

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U.S. allies also contribute to their alliances with the United States in ways that aren’t captured by their defense expenditures—such as by granting low-cost leases for U.S. bases and constructing facilities for use by U.S. troops. Contrary to common perceptions, alliances themselves cost nothing: it is the spending on deployments and infrastructure that results in high costs. And Washington’s allies often assume part of the burden. Moreover, the price of the American alliance system has, historically, been an acceptable portion of the U.S. national budget. There is little evidence that alliance-related spending has forced other major tradeoffs or has been a drag on economic growth. And the asymmetry between Washington’s spending and that of its allies is a feature of the alliance system, not a bug: it gives the United States more influence over its partners, who depend on American strength for their security.

There is also relatively little evidence that the United States’ alliances have imposed major political costs. International relations scholars often fret about “alliance entrapment,” which would occur if the United States intervened in crises or conflicts that it might have ignored if it did not have obligations to another state. Yet there is almost no proof of that phenomenon. U.S. allies are no more likely to become involved in conflicts than other states, and although the United States has waged some ill-advised wars—such as the Vietnam War and the Iraq war—no ally was responsible for those decisions. Instead, when Washington has backed its allies in crises, it has done so because it has also had a clear national interest at stake. Moreover, the United States has never found itself in an alliance arrangement that it was unable to exit. In the few cases in which alliances became politically inconvenient, as with the underperforming Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Washington was able to disentangle itself easily.

Entrapment is uncommon because the United States designed its alliance system to reduce its exposure to risky commitments. Take Taiwan, for instance. In 1955, the United States allied with Chiang Kai-shek, the brash Taiwanese president who still hoped to retake the Chinese mainland. In their negotiations with Chiang over the alliance, U.S. officials took special care to impress on him that he did not have U.S. backing to attack the People’s Republic of China, and they made clear that the treaty they were to sign with him did not apply to the offshore islands that were still in dispute between Taiwan and China. So in 1958, when the two came to loggerheads over those same islands, the United States had the freedom to support its ally only as it saw fit—in this case, by offering diplomatic support and by helping supply the islands. Washington has also been selective in its choice of partners, rejecting requests for security pacts when the associated commitments were too dangerous. Despite a close relationship, the United States has declined to extend formal security guarantees to Israel, for example, calculating that the risk of an unwanted war is too high.

It is no easier to find examples of U.S. allies that have reneged on their commitments to Washington. From the formation of the alliance system until the 9/11 attacks, neither the United States nor any of its partners had been the victim of an unprovoked assault, so there have ultimately been few opportunities for an ally to jilt Washington on the brink of a conflict. This is not to say that the United States has never faced downsides from its alliance system. Chronic, if modest, allied free-riding on U.S. defense spending is surely an annoyance. On rare occasions, moreover, an ally has reneged on its commitments in costlier ways, as French President Charles de Gaulle did when he pulled France out of NATO’s military structure but not the alliance altogether. And once the alliance system was put in place, it may have encouraged the United States to define its security needs more expansively than it might have without the pacts. Nevertheless, the system’s drawbacks have been far fewer, both in number and in intensity, than some scholars and policymakers would have people believe.

RECALIBRATING ALLIANCES

Despite the U.S. alliance system’s manageable cost and incredible success, the United States’ ties to its allies are under more scrutiny now than at any time in recent memory. The American public remains broadly supportive of international coalitions, yet for the first time since World War II, U.S. alliances have become deeply politicized. Although foreign policy experts from both political parties defend the system, the Trump administration’s core supporters abhor it. With Congress and the public polarized on all manner of issues, the country’s alliances could remain objects of controversy even under new leadership.

International forces have not been any kinder to the postwar alliance system. In Asia, relative power is shifting in China’s favor. Russia is stagnant but remains a force to be reckoned with. And overall, the United States and its allies together hold a smaller share of global GDP and military spending than they did at the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, they also have highly developed, technologically sophisticated economies, and their combined defense spending dwarfs that of their rivals. This all suggests that the United States can salvage its wildly successful but badly bruised alliance system, so long as it does so on entirely new terms.

Over the second half of the twentieth century, the nature of conflict changed dramatically. The spread of nuclear weapons and the growth of economic interdependence raised the cost of great-power war to such heights that challengers now seek to avoid it. Although it remains possible that U.S. allies will face major military attacks, this is not terribly likely. China and Russia prefer nonmilitary coercion that will not trigger NATO’s Article 5 guarantee. But the United States and its allies need not wait for the United Nations or any other international body to sanction new forms of collective self-defense. International law already allows them to fashion joint responses to actions deemed threatening to their political independence—the very sorts of injuries that result from cyberattacks, election meddling, and extreme economic pressure. Washington and its partners have all the power they need to reform the system, but to succeed, they will have to focus on the challenges to security and prosperity that stop just short of the military threshold.

The United States and its allies must start by rebalancing their respective responsibilities. Although Washington’s alliance strategy was affordable during the Cold War, the Trump administration’s heavy-handed demand that U.S. allies assume greater costs does contain a kernel of sanity. When the treaty system was formed, the United States’ main allies were war-torn states teetering on the brink of collapse. They are now thriving democracies with developed economies capable of contributing to a more symmetric defense effort. Many U.S. allies have trouble increasing their defense budgets for domestic political reasons—their citizens are accustomed to relatively low defense spending and resist budget hikes. The allies can, however, contribute to nonmilitary defense and deterrence, as most of this spending does not show up in military budgets; rather, it appears on foreign affairs, intelligence, and homeland security ledgers. Moreover, compared with the United States’ rivals, American treaty allies are leaders in covert information gathering, public diplomacy, and technological research and development. They can also spend more easily in these areas. Like them, the United States will need to reorganize its security expenditures, spending less on the military in favor of the nondefense national security tools necessary to lead alliances.

Even so, the United States will need to keep primary responsibility for high-end military defense, as its allies focus on other missions. Now that the Baltic states are firmly ensconced in NATO, Washington will have to guide its partners toward their credible defense. In particular, NATO allies must improve their military readiness and deter Russian aggression by demonstrating their ability to quickly reach and secure NATO’s eastern flank. The military picture in Asia is far more urgent: U.S. partners will have no chance of countering China’s growing power without American assistance. Asia must therefore be the United States’ primary military theater, with Europe an important but clear second. U.S. spending and presence should reflect those priorities, with more dollars spent on platforms that are intended to deter China and more deployments directed toward the western Pacific.