# TOC – Azerbaijan

## 1AC

### FW

The standard is maximizing expected well being

#### *Only* pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27

### Adv – NKR

#### The Nagorno-Karabahk (NKR) conflict is not a proxy war – Azeri aggression is fueling instability in the South Caucus region, and only US withdrawal sends an effective signal. Ter-Oganesyan and Sargsyan 17

Movses Ter-Oganesyan and Suren Sargsyan, 10-30-2017, "Azerbaijani Aggression Shouldn't Be Rewarded With U.S. Aid," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/10/30/azerbaijani-aggression-shouldnt-be-rewarded-with-u-s-aid/#7762060233f5> Ter-Oganesyan is a fellow at the Eurasian Research and Analysis Institute. Sargsyan is cofounder of International and Comparative Law Center, Yerevan Armenia. Both are South Caucus policy experts.

Due to the Soviet Union’s policy of divide and rule, the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. unleashed devastating wars over disputed territories. The longest running territorial dispute in the post-Soviet space has been over Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR or Artsakh) between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict is unique because it is not a proxy war between Russia and the West, and it's fascinating considering America’s posture during its early stages. Nagorno-Karabakh had a 90% Armenian population, but Josef Stalin transferred it to the rule of Soviet Azerbaijan to sow [ethnic unrest](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/nKnmBLt6gmbJh4), making both groups easier to control. In 1991, NKR held a referendum and declared its desire to become an independent state. Unable to stomach the overwhelming support for secession, the Azeri government began the indiscriminate [shelling and blockade](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/1dqzB2snQE1wiK) of the civilian population of the enclave. This episode was preceded by bloody pogroms of Armenians in the Azeri cities of [Baku](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/VALYBNTdpQ7lHY), [Sumgait](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/5J8VB5TWr96lhV), [and Kirovabad](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/g5XMBlF81Mb7In), as well as [state sponsored deportations](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/oX6kBGuaxNK0sY) called Operation Ring. Armenia did not remain idle after witnessing Azerbaijan’s targeting of NKR’s civilian population. Many Armenians feared that the Azerbaijani belligerence was a prelude to yet greater violence akin to the Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by Ottoman Turkey at the turn of the 20th Century. While Karabakh’s Armenians received support from Armenia, Azerbaijan received support from their ethnic kin in [Turkey](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/ANVABMuLJbwNcv), mujahedeen fighters from Afghanistan, and Islamists from [Chechnya](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/3RdZBNUGZM6vIb). Due to Armenia’s victories on the battlefield against Wahhabi and Azerbaijani extremists, the already landlocked, tiny, country of 3 million, is blockaded by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Due to this blockade, U.S. Congress passed [Section 907](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/qO6LBKSvG7W4cv) of the FREEDOM Support Act in 1992, banning direct aid from the U.S. to Azerbaijan unless the president determines that Azerbaijan takes demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other punitive uses of force against Armenia and NKR. Azerbaijan thus became the only country in the post-Soviet space slated to not receive U.S. aid. This policy remained unchanged until just after the 9/11 terror attacks. President Bush requested a [waiver of 907](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/4QDmBbseGO6kue) to allow Azerbaijan to receive aid. Every year since then, the president has waived 907 allowing this oil-rich nation on the Caspian Sea to receive [$20 million](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/dqX8BMf5O87vT0) in American aid. April 2016 saw the biggest explosion of violence along the Line of Contact between NKR and Azerbaijan since the 1994 ceasefire agreement signed by Armenia, NKR, and Azerbaijan. In [launching](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/Dz34BlIekJ4Guk) these attacks, Azerbaijan violated the preconditions set by Section 907. The text of the waiver does not mention that aggression cannot be directed against NKR, a crucial point of the original text which helped ensure cessation of hostilities. Omitting this language has certainly [emboldened](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/8J9GBAT84W6aI1) the political and military leadership of Azerbaijan to see what they can get away with. Coupled with the laissez-faire attitude of the Trump administration toward the region, it is a matter of time before Azerbaijan tests the waters once more. In an obvious violation of the ceasefire terms, Azerbaijani Army officers trained by the U.S. Army as part of the U.S. aid to Azerbaijan were found killed in action in the Armenian village of Talish during the fighting in April. Colonel Vugar Yusifov was trained at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona in 2007. On the night of April 3, 2016, he commanded the Special Forces Unit that attacked the village. Lieutenant Colonel Murad Mirzayev attended the Defense Language Institute in San Antonio, TX in 2005-6. He also completed Marine Corps officer training courses in Quantico, VA and Fort Lejeune, NC. What makes these violations more brazen are the heinous crimes (multiple [beheadings](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/QQxmB0sDq5m6hO), and the [execution and mutilation](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/xN45B6uX91Z8cm) of three elderly civilians) attributed to the regiments commanded by these men. The crimes prompted bipartisan calls for Leahy Law investigations by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA), and Ranking Democrat Eliot Engel (D-NY). Lest the international community wait for Azerbaijan to engage in large scale military adventurism as witnessed in April 2016, America needs to rethink its position of providing aid to an already wealthy aggressor which violates U.S. law.

#### Karabakhi fear of Azeri aggression prevents peace – escalation is possible any time and draws in global powers. Toal and Loughtin 16

Gerard Toal and John O'Loughlin April 6, 2016 “Here are the 5 things you need to know about the deadly fighting in Nagorno Karabakh” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/will-war-erupt-in-nagorny-karabakh-here-are-the-5-things-you-need-to-know/?utm_term=.3621129929dc> [Gerard Toal](http://toal.org/) (Gearóid Ó Tuathail) is the author of “[Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest for Ukraine and the Caucasus”](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/near-abroad-9780190253301?cc=us&lang=en&)(forthcoming, Oxford University Press) and professor of government and international affairs at Virginia Tech’s National Capital Region campus in Old Town Alexandria. [John O’Loughlin](http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/PEC/johno/index.html) is College Professor of Distinction and professor of geography at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

Between Armenia and Azerbaijan lies a contested territory controlled by an unrecognized state called the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). In the early hours of April 2, violence exploded in this Armenian-supported statelet in the southern Caucasus. This festering conflict in former Soviet territory suddenly turned hot. The violence came just hours after the end of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, hosted by President Obama in D.C. Both Armenia’s president, Serzh Sargsyan, and Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, attended. On its margins they [met separately with Vice President Biden](http://www.rferl.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-heavy-fighting-armenia-azerbaijan/27649973.html) to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Earlier Aliyev and Secretary of State John F. Kerry [held a brief news conference](http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/255342.htm) in which Aliyev called for the conflict to be resolved based on the “immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from our territories.” As Aliyev and Sargsyan flew home, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [escalated dramatically](http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2016/04/02/world/europe/02reuters-nagorno-karabakh-fighting.html). In a matter of hours, rules of engagement tacitly developed since a 1994 cease-fire went out the window. For the first time, a mass incursion of tank formations occurred. For the first time, Azerbaijani forces sought to seize and hold territories held by NKR forces. For the first time, GRAD missiles were used and a series of other weapon systems, like armed drones, were thrown into the fight. NKR forces shot down at least one Mi-24 helicopter and destroyed numerous tanks. And, tragically, the death toll in this one eruption is the largest since 1994, with scores dead, possibly more. Here are five things you need to know about this longstanding conflict. **1. After World War I, Nagorno-Karabakh was caught between — and claimed by — two emerging nations, Armenia and Azerbaijan.** The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh [started amid](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.1999.tb00348.x/abstract) the great conflicts of the 20th century. The Ottoman and Russian Empires that had dominated the Caucasus collapsed at the end of World War I. Nationalist parties pitted neighbors — Christian Armenians, Turkic Muslims and others — against each other and tried to define national homelands. Caught in the middle was Karabakh, a multicultural mosaic spread across a largely mountainous terrain. The Soviet Union, the new power in the region, devised a solution. It created [a Nagorno-Karabakh “autonomous oblast” (NKAO)](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668136.2011.642583) — an oblast is an administrative district — as an island within the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. It was not contiguous with Armenia. The NKAO’s majority Armenian population wasn’t happy with this. The oblast remained a bone of contention between the Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. When Gorbachev loosened Soviet power in the mid-1980s, local Armenian nationalist groups fought to change the facts on the ground, polarizing the region. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, Karabakh’s fate became the salient issue in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In September 1991, local Armenians proclaimed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, defining its territory to include the NKAO and other parts of Azerbaijan, including the Shaumian region to the north and territories to the east of Martakert and Martuni — to be governed by local Armenians, independent of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani forces sought to destroy the NKR. Armenian forces, locals and volunteers from Armenia proper sought to secure its existence. The war was ugly. An estimated 750,000 Azerbaijanis were driven from their homes in the fighting, the vast majority not from the NKAO but from surrounding provinces seized by the Armenian forces and from Armenia proper. More than 300,000 ethnic Armenians inside Azerbaijan were forcefully displaced as well. Initially, the local Armenian NKR treated those seized territories as assets to be traded in a final peace deal. Over time these areas were reimagined as “liberated territories,” part of an organic homeland called Artsakh. The current [constitution](http://www.nkrusa.org/country_profile/constitution.shtml) of the NKR does not define the state borders. But its [local maps](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2753/PPC1075-8216600302?journalCode=mppc20) include the historic NKAO (whose borders are not marked) and the seized territories; other outside territories are marked as “under Azerbaijani occupation.” In return, Azerbaijan contends that all of NKR’s territory is actually Azerbaijan but is under Armenian occupation. **2.** Nagorno-Karabakh is not a frozen conflict. It’s a simmering one. The Karabakh conflict is commonly described as “frozen.” Observers often categorize it with other contested post-Soviet territories like Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and, more recently, Crimea and the Donbas (Ukraine). But this is too simplistic, for three reasons. First, the war over Karabakh came to an end in 1994 with a cease-fire but without a peace agreement. A “line of contact” separates the parties in the contested Karabakh area; Armenia and Azerbaijan also share a long border to the north of the NKR. There are no international peacekeepers in the area and only a handful of observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The line of contact features World War I-style trenches on both sides, in some places three rows deep. Second, there has always been shooting across the line of contact. In recent years, that has included particularly nasty long-range sniper fire and incursions by small groups of soldiers. And the conflict has been heating up: Last year, more soldiers died than in any year since 1994 — and this last weekend’s fighting alone appears to have killed more than died in 2015. Finally, no Russian troops are stationed in Karabakh, unlike in the other post-Soviet conflicts. Russia remains the most powerful power broker in the Caucasus, guaranteeing Armenia’s security with a military base in Gyumri, in the west of Armenia facing Turkey, while supplying weapons to both sides. **3.** Karabakhi residents overwhelmingly oppose compromise For a [National Science Foundation project on de facto states](http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0827016), we conducted large representative surveys in 2010-12 in four post-Soviet regions. Karabakh is now ethnically homogeneous — and its [respondents were the most uncompromising](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15387216.2015.1012644) of all those we surveyed. They were all but united in opposing the return of displaced Azerbaijanis or any shifts in territory and in disliking and distrusting their former enemies. The NKR survey results showed that most people strongly distrusted others and were unwilling to forgive past violence. Karabakhis also had the highest levels of ethnic pride among the dozens of ethnicities that we have surveyed in post-Soviet states and the Balkans. In fact, their pride was all but unanimous, with 73 percent of respondents saying they are “very proud” of their identity and another 21 percent describing themselves as (merely!) “proud.” And what’s especially important for any discussion of a [“land for peace” negotiation](http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/intdev/johno/pub/Land_for_Peace.pdf) with Azerbaijan is this: Karabakhis strongly (85 percent) rejected any notion of a return to the borders of the NKAO of Soviet times. They slightly supported, with just over 60 percent, their current expansive territorial limits, which you can see in the blue shaded areas on the map. But nearly 70 percent preferred a vision of their homeland that adds areas, hatched on the map, still under Azerbaijani control as well as an undetermined and large “historic” area across the south Caucasus. **4. Karabakhis aren’t confident that peace negotiations will succeed — and believe they must be ready to fight for themselves** Peace negotiations, with Armenia representing the NKR, have stopped and started over the past two decades, making little real progress. Only half of our Karabakhi respondents believed that the discussions, hosted by the OSCE’s Minsk Group (co-chaired by ambassadors from France, Russia and the United States), will succeed. A bare majority of 53 percent thinks that international peacekeepers can help resolve the conflict. Rather, Karabakhis have a strong sense that they must look out for themselves and mobilize against Azerbaijani threats. Majorities were worried about an Azerbaijani military buildup (63 percent) and about a new war with their neighbor (58 percent). Still, they believed that they would be able to withstand any attack. Just over a quarter (26 percent) of Karabakhis were willing to even consider [ceding land for peace](http://www.c-r.org/resources/forced-displacement-nagorny-karabakh-conflict-return-and-its-alternatives). **5.** The Karabakh conflict seems local, but it could drag in major world powersThe Karabakh conflict seems intensely local, fighting over a few villages and kilometers. But it’s influenced by broader global shifts and regional regime calculations. First, declining oil revenues and recession in Russia have placed Azerbaijan’s Aliyev regime under pressure. In December 2015, the government was forced toward a floating exchange rate for its currency, the manat; in one day, the manat [plunged 32 percent against the U.S. dollar](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/azerbaijan-currency-plummets-oil-price). Living standards are dropping and street protests are rising. The regime may believe a distracting war spectacle in Karabakh has benefits. Armenia’s democracy-challenged ruling clique may also believe a conflict would help its citizens “rally around the flag.” That’s a doubly dangerous situation. Second, the chill in relations between Russia and Turkey has [opened up splits](http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/02/26/the-shifting-dangers-of-nagorno-karabakh/) between Azerbaijan’s pro-Russian and pro-Turkish factions. Armenia is a member of Moscow’s Eurasian Customs Union; Azerbaijan is not, yet. Russia [may want to place peacekeepers in the area](http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/04/03/whats-behind-the-flare-up-in-nagorno-karabakh/) and to underscore its role as the indispensable power in this region, and its “near abroad” more generally. Third, Aliyev’s invitation to D.C., his first visit in a decade, was a symbolic victory in the face of [widespread criticism](http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-ismayilova-clooney-fight-until-shes-free/27615153.html) about media suppression and human rights abuses. Did face time with Kerry, Biden and Obama “free” Aliyev to pursue war? We will not know for some time. **So what’s ahead?** The Karabakh conflict has historically unseated governments in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. [A cease-fire has now been agreed to](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35964213) after four days of fighting. Will this eruption of violence [galvanize international diplomacy](http://www.osce.org/cio/231431), which until now has been small and hasn’t put enough resources on the ground? Nagorno-Karabakh is a conflict with the potential to escalate quickly into something broader, entangling Russia and Turkey (a member of NATO), and galvanizing the Armenian diaspora. We’ve been warned.

#### **Risks an attack to Azeri pipelines that would shift European energy consumption. Coffey 18**

Luke Coffey, 5-29-18, "Why the West Needs Azerbaijan," Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/why-the-west-needs-azerbaijan> Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy

When you factor in Armenia’s occupation of almost one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory, all that is left is a narrow 60-mile-wide chokepoint for trade. We call this trade chokepoint the “Ganja Gap” — named after Azerbaijan’s second largest city, Ganja, which sits in the middle of this narrow passage. And right now, the Russians hold enough influence over Azerbaijan’s rival neighbor Armenia to potentially reignite the bloody Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of the late 1980s and early 1990s — giving them a dangerous opportunity to threaten the “Gap” itself. Washington benefits whenever Europe reduces its dependence on Russia oil and gas. This is particularly important at a time when Nord Stream 2, a proposed Russian gas pipeline to Germany that will increase Europe’s dependency on Moscow for energy, seems to be an ever-closer reality. Europe depends on Russian natural gas for 40 percent of its needs. In total, almost 200 billion cubic meters of natural gas is now imported from Russia annually due to declining European production and rising demand. Russia has a track record of using energy as a tool of aggression, and each barrel of oil and cubic meter of gas that Europe can buy from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, or Turkmenistan is one less that it must depend on from Russia. Currently, there are three major oil and gas pipelines in the region, which bypass Russia and Iran and run through the 60-mile-wide Ganja Gap: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which runs from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey and then to the outside world through the Mediterranean; the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which carries oil from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and then to the outside world; and the South Caucasus pipeline, which runs from Azerbaijan to Turkey, and which will soon link up with the proposed Southern Gas Corridor to deliver gas to Italy and then to the rest of Europe. The Southern Gas Corridor is set to bring vital energy resources from the Caspian region through the Ganja Gap. These supplies will be a boon to southeastern Europe, which is currently almost 100 percent dependent on the Russian pipelines. It is not just oil and gas pipelines that connect Europe with the heart of Asia. Fiber-optic cables linking Western Europe with the Caspian region also pass through the Ganja Gap. The second-longest European motorway, the E60, which connects Brest, France, on the Atlantic coast with Irkeshtam, Kyrgyzstan, on the Chinese border, passes through the city of Ganja, as does the east-west rail link in the South Caucasus, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. These are set to become potentially vital connections.

#### That causes aggression

Jeff D. Colgan 14 [(Jeff D. Colgan, assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, D.C.) Petro-aggression: How Russia’s oil makes war more likely, Washington Post 4-1-2014] SJDI

The third storyline is the most important yet most neglected: Russia’s resource curse. Russia’s energy revenues (from both oil and gas) have ensconced Vladimir Putin as an autocrat and given him a free hand in foreign policy. Russia is so heavily dependent on its energy revenues that it is a classic petrostate, making it more susceptible to corruption, autocracy and violent conflict. Russia’s incursion into Crimea can be seen as a close cousin of petro-aggression. A state is more likely to instigate international conflict when it has a combination of (a) oil income and (b) a leader with aggressive preferences. A lot more likely: 250 percent more military conflict than a typical non-petrostate, on average. Oil income means more military spending, increasing the state’s scope for potential conflicts. Even more importantly, it distorts the domestic politics of the state, reducing the leader’s domestic political risk from military adventurism and aggressive foreign policy. In my book on petro-aggression, I argued that revolutionary leaders are systematically more likely to have aggressive preferences (e.g., Qaddafi, Hussein and Khomeini). Putin is not a revolutionary leader, but that is not a necessary condition for having aggressive preferences. He has repeatedly avowed a hard-nosed, realpolitik view of the world. He has repeatedly asserted his ambition to return Russia to its status as a superpower of the first rank. It seems plausible to view Putin as an aggressive leader. So we ought to be wary when he lines up military forces next to the Ukrainian border. Here lies the real risk of Europe’s energy situation: So long as it continues to buy Russian oil and gas, it is sending massive amounts of cash to a neighboring dictator. By keeping the taps on, Putin consolidates his power as Russian dictator. What does all this imply for European and American energy policy? Any major changes to Ukraine or Europe’s natural gas consumption would involve infrastructure investments that will play out over years or decades. So we should be skeptical that energy policy can be used as a short-term solution to the crisis: Shale gas from the U.S. is not going solve anything in Ukraine just now. But energy policy is important for the long term. America and especially Europe should have a hard look at managing their reliance on fossil fuels. Diversifying away from fossil fuels would bring security benefits (in addition to some obvious environmental ones), in part by reducing the money sent to petrostates like Russia. For Europe, this means more openness to civilian nuclear power as a source of energy that is less bad than the alternatives. At the very least, natural gas could be managed with a better pipeline infrastructure to prevent Russia from embargoing individual European countries. In short, Europeans should get serious about an energy policy that is consistent with their political and environmental values. In doing so, they can help wean Russia off its energy income, and thereby reduce its leader’s scope for autocracy at home and belligerence abroad.

#### Extinction. Majumdar 16

Dave Majumdar, 1-25-2018, "Doomsday: Why a War with Russia Would Go Nuclear (And Kill Billions of People)," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/doomsday-why-war-russia-would-go-nuclear-kill-billions-24214> Dave Majumdar has been covering defense since 2004. He has written for Flight International, Defense News and C4ISR Journal. Majumdar studied Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and is a student of naval history.

While a recent RAND Corporation study concluded that Russia could overrun NATO’s member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics within sixty hours, the war games did not simulate the use of nuclear weapons. If, however, a war were to breakout between NATO and Russia, nuclear weapons would certainly come into play—especially if the conflict were going poorly for Moscow. Unlike the Soviet Union, which had a stated “no first use” policy, modern Russia explicitly rejected that pledge in 1993. In fact, as Moscow’s conventional forces continued to atrophy during the economic and social meltdown of the 1990s, Russia developed a doctrine called de-escalation in 2000 . Simply put, if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons. In 2010, Russia revised the doctrine somewhat as its conventional forces started to recover from the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the current version states Moscow would use nuclear weapons in situations “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” This article originally appeared in 2016 and is being reprinted due to reader interest. While the RAND study shows that Russia would be able to take the Baltics fairly easily, the war game didn’t explore what would happen in the event of a NATO counter offensive. The RAND study simply states: Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics. A NATO counter-offensive would be bloody and fraught with escalatory risk—but it’s one of the probable outcomes of a Russian invasion. In that eventuality, Russian conventional forces—of which only a portion are well trained and well equipped—would likely be severely damaged or even destroyed. Moreover, if NATO forces hit targets inside Russia or crossed over into Russian territory, Moscow might conclude that there is a danger to the existence of the state. After all, Moscow has expressed concerns in the past that regime change by the West is an all too real danger. In that situation, Russia might counter advancing NATO forces with its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is not nearly as large as the Soviet arsenal had once been, but concrete numbers are hard to come by. The Soviet Union was thought to have possessed between 15,000 and 25,000 tactical nuclear weapons of all types ranging from suitcase-sized containers and nuclear mines to short-range aircraft delivered missiles, nuclear gravity bombs and artillery shells—as well as short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads. While Moscow has been slowly eliminating its non-strategic arsenal since the end of the Cold War, Russia many still have as many as 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons , according to the Congressional Research Service. However, other analyses suggest that Russia has as few as 2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons.

#### Article 5 draws in the US – causes extinction. Starr 14

Steven Starr 14, the Senior Scientist for Physicians for Social Responsibility and Director of the Clinical Laboratory Science Program at the University of Missouri, 5/30/14, “The Lethality of Nuclear Weapons,” http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2014/05/30/lethality-nuclear-weapons/

Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with merely 1% of the explosive power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate[i] and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer[ii]. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. [iii] These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race.[iv] In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war”,[v] begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote an article[vi] for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament that summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth[vii]) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. Electromagnetic pulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices[viii], including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost instantly meltdown; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil-off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe uninhabitable. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic.[ix] In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrinex – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads,[xi] which can be launched with only a few minutes warning.[xii] Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase”, which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.” More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National Security Council. It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned – even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running US foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them. This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy”, which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on Foreign Relations.[xiii] By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a rebuttal, which was titled “Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy”.[xiv] Colonel Yarynich, who was on the Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted even a “successful” nuclear first-strike, which destroyed 100% of the opposing sides nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine, just as would the rest of humanity. Although the nuclear primacy article created quite a backlash in Russia, leading to a public speech by the Russian Foreign Minister, the story was essentially not covered in the US press. We were unable to get our rebuttal published by US media. The question remains as to whether the US nuclear primacy asserted in the article has been accepted as a fact by the US political and military establishment. Such acceptance would explain the recklessness of US policy toward Russia and China. Thus we find ourselves in a situation in which those who are in charge of our nuclear arsenal seem not to understand that they can end human history if they choose to push the button. Most of the American public also remains completely unaware of this deadly threat. The uninformed are leading the uninformed toward the abyss of extinction. US public schools have not taught students about nuclear weapons for more than 20 years. The last time nuclear war was discussed or debated in a US Presidential election was sometime in the last century. Thus, most people do not know that a single strategic nuclear weapon can easily ignite a massive firestorm over 100 square miles, and that the US and Russia each have many thousands of these weapons ready for immediate use. Meanwhile, neoconservative ideology has kept the US at war during the entire 21st century. It has led to the expansion of US/NATO forces to the very borders of Russia, a huge mistake that has consequently revived the Cold War. A hallmark of neconservatism is that America is the “indispensable nation”, as evidenced by the neoconservative belief in “American exceptionalism”, which essentially asserts that Americans are superior to all other peoples, that American interests and values should reign supreme in the world. At his West Point speech on May 28, President Obama said, “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being.” Obama stated his bottom line is that “America must always lead on the world stage,” and “the backbone of that leadership always will be the military.” American exceptionalism based on might, not diplomacy, on hard power, not soft, is precisely the hubris and arrogance that could lead to the termination of human life. Washington’s determination to prevent the rise of Russia and China, as set out in the Brzezinski and Wolfowitz doctrines, is a recipe for nuclear war. The need is dire for the president of the US, Russia, or China to state in a highly public forum that the existence of nuclear weapons creates the possibility of their use and that their use in war would likely mean human extinction. As nuclear war has no winners, the weapons should be banned and destroyed before they destroy all of us.

### Solvency

#### Resolved: The United States ought not provide any border security aid to authoritarian regimes in the Republic of Azerbaijan.

Check interps in CX

#### New Armenian PM wants peace but is turned off by Azeri aggression and asymmetric expectations. Only the plan forces de-escalation. Gurbanov 1/14

Ilgar Gurbanov, 1-14-2019, "Ice is melting for Nagorno-Karabakh," euractiv, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/opinion/ice-is-melting-for-nagorno-karabakh/> Ilgar Gurbanov is a Research Fellow in the Centre for Strategic Studies (SAM) under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and a Deputy Editor-in-Chief for Caucasus International Journal. He is a co-author of “Gas Diversification Policy of Georgia: Role of External Actors — Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran” published by SAM. He has previously worked for Khazar University (Lecturer; Azerbaijan); Centre for Strategic Studies (Consultant; Azerbaijan); Strategic Outlook (Research Fellow/Editor-in-Chief; Turkey); Azerbaijan State Economic University (Teaching Assistant); and UNDP-Azerbaijan (Project-Consultant). He received his MA from the College of Europe (Belgium), and BA/MSc from the Azerbaijan State Economic University; and he is an alumnus of Riga Graduate School of Law. His research area covers the EU-Azerbaijan relations, energy security (Azerbaijan), and Azerbaijan’s military/defence policy. He speaks Azerbaijani, Turkish, English, Russian, French. At the STG, he will make a research on the topic of “Understanding Azerbaijan’s foreign policy behaviour towards the EU”.

Following the government change in Armenia with the overthrow of previous regime composed of so-called “Karabakh Clan”, there are fresh hopes for a result-oriented dialogue to achieve peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which is one of the longest protracted conflicts in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. In last December, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev tweeted that “The year 2019 will give a new impetus to the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement process”, and “the only way for the new Armenian leadership to carry out all their plans on transforming the country is to resolve the conflict with Azerbaijan”. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan tweeted in parallel that “Peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains top priority for us”. The optimistic narrative of the head of states was followed by Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov’s statement anticipating “certain progress” to be made in 2019 “for withdrawal” of Armenian armed forces from Azerbaijan’s occupied territories and “the normalization of relations”. He expressed Azerbaijan’s readiness to assure security of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians by granting them the highest self-determination right within Azerbaijan’s “internationally-recognized borders”. The recent statement of Tural Ganjaliyev, Chairman of Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh region, “to carry out a constructive dialogue” for peaceful reconciliation with the Armenian community, is another sign of will for resumption of inter-community confidence-building. The previous Armenian government under Serzh Sargsyan’s rule, in contrast, did not encourage establishing such a dialogue. Furthermore, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution put forward by Azerbaijan titled “Missing Persons” urging to take necessary measures to search for missing persons in the armed conflict. Armenia, whereas, hitherto has rejected the releasing of prisoners of war and hostages according to the “all-to-all” principle, so this development could be a first positive stage in terms of generating a bilateral trust. At the CIS’s meeting of Heads of States in Dushanbe in September 2018, President Aliyev and PM Pashinyan agreed to create the necessary conditions for communication between two sides to be conducted at lower working levels when necessary. At the latest OSCE’s Ministerial Council meeting in Milan, Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers agreed to work for peaceful conflict settlement including preparing the population for peace. Afterwards, FM Mammadyarov said that “with my Armenian counterpart, we reached a mutual understanding for the first time after a long time”. The general positive trend was endorsed, albeit in declaration, by the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chairing states too. Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mikhail Bocharnikov stated that a more favourable atmosphere for the conflict settlement will be created in 2019. During his visit to Armenia, the US’s national security adviser John Bolton highlighted the importance of finding an agreement for the conflict conditioning that “once that happens, then the Armenian-Azerbaijani border would open”. Former US Ambassador to Armenia Richard Mills at the end of his tenure said that “any settlement is going to require the return of some portion of the [Azerbaijan’s] occupied territories.” That sends a clear message to new Armenia government that the latter will not be able to delay indefinitely the de-occupation of Azerbaijani territories. Moreover, the protection of the northern frontier posts of Azerbaijan-Armenia state border has been handed over to Azerbaijan’s State Border Service, while the opposite side of the borderline is guarded by Armenia’s police detachment. Although Azerbaijan’s decision was reportedly aimed at further improving the Defence Ministry’s military units’ combat capability, the partial deployment of paramilitary forces from both states implies a reciprocal confidence-building attempt to reduce the ceasefire violations at the borderline. Azerbaijan, however, does not disregard the security considerations. President Aliyev had noted his country’s will to settle the conflict peacefully, based on international norms including the territorial integrity principle and the UN Security Council’s resolutions. However, he also pledged to boost Azerbaijan’s “military power” justifying that the military potential “plays a special role” for the conflict resolution. In 2018, Azerbaijan and Armenia conducted large-scale military trainings aimed at boosting their troop’s readiness for real war situation, and both Baku and Yerevan ramped up their military budgets for 2019. Apart from investing in domestic military industry, Azerbaijan continued supplying its military with cutting-edge and advanced arsenal. While Azerbaijan shifted away its reliance from a single arm-supplier toward multiple defence partners, Armenia retained its overwhelming dependence on Russia’s military/arms support. Azerbaijan’s ambition to boost its military capability is associated with scepticism regarding Armenia’s voluntary withdrawal from the former’s occupied territories through diplomatic negotiations. During the first Karabakh war, the then Armenian authorities procrastinated with so-called “diplomatic negotiations” while the country’s troops were advancing the area of occupation in Azerbaijan’s territories. Moreover, Armenia’s evolving military doctrine from “static defence” to more “active deterrence” strategy is fuelling mistrust in Baku on the true nature of Yerevan’s intentions. Therefore, Azerbaijan prioritizes the constant readiness of the armed forces for possible counter-operations and maintains vigilance by consolidating its military positions prior to any possible Armenian provocation. In April 2016, Armenia’s military provocation resulted in four-day fights, leaving a significant victory for the Azerbaijani side, with the latter’s counter-attack liberating from Armenian military control some strategic portions of its occupied territories. The protraction of the status quo in the conflict zone and the lack of efficient international mechanisms to force Armenia into substantive negotiations embolden the conflicting parties to bolster their military capabilities. But the status quo is not on the side of the peace process. Therefore, the “diplomatic optimism” should be translated into the constructive engagement for a genuine settlement process to spawn a sustainable peace. Azerbaijan patiently waited for the completion of domestic political turbulence in Armenia in order to negotiate with a legitimate government and achieve concrete results. Before the parliamentary elections in Armenia, Pashinyan prioritized consolidating his power by crushing domestic opponents, and did not focus much on Karabakh topic which is a delicate issue within Armenia since any settlement would imply certain compromises from their side. To what extent the Pashinyan-led government would change Armenia’s traditional stance radically toward compromise is an open question. To start with, the new leadership in Yerevan must acknowledge that the “Karabakh” card played by the previous Armenian government led them to nowhere.

#### Demilitarization on the border is key. Ohanyan 3/20

Anna Ohanyan, March 20, 2019. “At long last, peace might be possible between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Here’s what’s needed. “ <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/20/long-last-peace-might-be-possible-between-armenia-azerbaijan-heres-whats-needed/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.eee0c6d3aa21> Anna Ohanyan is Richard B. Finnegan Distinguished Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Stonehill College, editor of “[Russia Abroad: Driving Regional Fracture in Post-Communist Eurasia and Beyond](http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/russia-abroad)” (Georgetown University Press, 2018), and author of “[Networked Regionalism as Conflict Management](https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=24630)” (Stanford University Press, 2015).

After decades of ethnic conflict, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan are [preparing to meet](https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/413813) [to try to resolve](https://eurasianet.org/armenia-and-azerbaijan-agree-to-prepare-populations-for-peace) their long-term clash over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh. Observers have many reasons to be skeptical that yet another one-off meeting will lead to a thaw at long last. However, something significant has changed since the last such push. A year ago, Armenian protesters brought down a prime [minister](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/07/armenias-democratic-dreams/), leading to free elections last December. Some evidence suggests that democratic societies are more likely to seek peace with their neighbors — and are most likely to achieve it if civil society groups are allowed to reach out and form contacts across borders before the formal negotiations. Here’s what you need to know about what has happened, and what comes next. **1.** **A brief history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict** Between Armenia and Azerbaijan lies a contested territory controlled by an unrecognized state called the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), which is supported, but not recognized, by the Armenian government — and is claimed by Azerbaijan. In 1921, the Soviet Union joined this Armenian-majority highland enclave with Soviet-controlled [Azerbaijan](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/08/opinion/solve-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-before-it-explodes.html), separating the Armenians as part of Stalin’s [divide-and-conquer](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/armenia/2016-04-12/unfrozen-conflict-nagorno-karabakh) strategies. In the late 1980s, as Moscow loosened its controls over the Soviet empire under [perestroika](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/russias-empires-9780199924394?cc=us&lang=en&), ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh began campaigning to rejoin Armenia, agitating for [democracy](http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=20858), human rights and self-rule — one of the early cracks that brought [down](https://www.amazon.com/Future-History-Totalitarianism-Reclaimed-Russia/dp/159463453X/ref%3Dsr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1550163759&sr=8-1&keywords=masha+gessen) the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh formally voted to secede from [Azerbaijan](https://www.amazon.com/Black-Garden-Armenia-Azerbaijan-Anniversary/dp/0814760325/ref%3Dsr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1550163883&sr=8-2&keywords=thomas+de+waal) — prompting armed conflict between Armenia and the Armenian-majority population on one hand and Azerbaijan on the other. In 1994, after 30,000 people on both sides had died and more than 1 million refugees fled the violence, the two countries signed a shaky [cease-fire agreement](https://www.amazon.com/Post-Soviet-Armenia-National-Narrative-Routledge/dp/1138240710). Observers consider the standoff to be neither war nor [peace](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00471.x), and it simmers with low but persistent levels of violence at the border. **2.** **The democratic wave in Armenia** Last April, Armenia’s parliamentary opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan led a mass [nonviolent](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/07/armenias-democratic-dreams/) civil [disobedience](https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/potent-protest-movement-emerging-armenia-180419135116999.html) campaign that forced the prime minister to resign. For decades, Armenia had been “a soft authoritarian state in which the ruling elite ... closely controlled political and economic opportunities,” as political scientists Mariam Matevosyan and Graeme Robertson [explained here](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/04/30/armenian-protesters-brought-down-a-prime-minister-heres-why-theyre-in-the-streets) at TMC a year ago. By December, the protesters had forced free elections that put Pashinyan and his pro-democracy party in power. As I’ll explain below, that gave observers some hope that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be resolved. In recent months, the [OSCE Minsk Group](https://armenpress.am/eng/news/960935.html), co-chaired by the United States, Russia and France, has [mediated](https://www.osce.org/mg) diplomatic efforts between the two sides. Armenia and Azerbaijan had been accusing each other of frequently [violating](https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-armenia-karabak-cease-fire-violation/27664152.html) the [cease-fire](https://www.rferl.org/a/azerbaijan-armenia-nagorno-karabakh-osce-minsk-group/28597943.html) with shootings, mortar attacks and use of other heavy [weaponry](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/23761199.2014.11417295) that [kills and wound](https://www.rferl.org/a/osce-mediators-condemn-cease-fire-violations-nagorno-karabakh/28498870.html)s soldiers and civilians alike. Such attacks have ceased since Armenia’s democratic transition last year. The global track record of this type of single-shot peace agreement sought by the OSCE Minsk Group has been [mixed](https://www.wiley.com/en-us/Comparative%2BPeace%2BProcesses-p-9780745642895), as has the [efficacy](https://brill.com/view/journals/gg/24/3/article-p411_7.xml) of external peace negotiators. [Russia](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/12/russia-has-a-lot-of-conflicts-along-its-borders-thats-by-design/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.315426164136), one of the mediating parties, has continued to sell weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has [continued](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2010.506830) to [threaten war](https://www.rferl.org/a/baku-starts-military-exercise-ahead-of-planned-talks-between-azerbaijani-armenian-presidents/29815397.html) and economic isolation to try to force negotiating concessions. And Armenia has [continued to insist](https://eurasianet.org/for-armenians-theyre-not-occupied-territories-theyre-the-homeland) that it will not withdraw from the seven disputed districts it controls around [Nagorno-Karabakh](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/31/nagorno-karabakhs-frozen-conflict-has-two-big-obstacles-to-a-peaceful-solution/?utm_term=.6765752d55ae). Past diplomatic rounds were followed by only temporary thaws. Many analysts and peace advocates remain skeptical about this most recent diplomatic opening, too. **3. Here’s what may now be different** Armenia’s democratic breakthrough may have shifted leaders’ incentives on both sides. Now two countries in the region, Armenia and Georgia, its neighbor to the north, embrace democracy. [Recent studies](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2015.1069292) suggest that when a region has more democracies, the probability of conflict and aggression tends to go down. Democratic societies favor peaceful interactions with their neighbors. They tend to advance cooperation and compromise in their regions. And democratic societies are more likely to support one another’s shared goals of human rights and economic interests in bigger markets. That weakens support for [military](https://www.rferl.org/a/aliyev-baku-wants-peaceful-resolution-on-nagorno-karabakh-but-war-not-over-/29321183.html) “solutions” to conflicts. But that’s not enough by itself. [Research](https://www.amazon.com/Comparative-Peace-Processes-Jonathan-Tonge/dp/074564290X) also [suggests](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/quality-peace-9780190215552?cc=us&lang=en&) that peace agreements are more likely to be implemented if all parties involved in a conflict are included in the peace process. What’s needed now are ways to engage the groups most [affected](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1045482) by the conflict: rural communities near the conflict [lines](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029908?src=recsys&journalCode=ctwq20), women, refugees and [Nagorno-Karabakh](https://www.amazon.com/Preparing-Peace-Conflict-Transformation-Resolution/dp/0815627254) itself, all of which have been left out of negotiations over the years. Studies have shown that single-shot, top-down peace deals often fail — unless the parties simultaneously build broad-based connections among [societies](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2015.1029908?src=recsys&journalCode=ctwq20). Of course, calling for contacts between people while militaries continue patrolling the borders, and without regionwide security guarantees, is unrealistic. All affected parties in the region — including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh itself, nongovernmental organizations, civil-society groups and others need to be involved in crafting broader regional security agreements and institutions. Regional security structures that incorporate all such interests are necessary to support and enable a sustainable peace agreement. Otherwise, connections across conflict lines will remain shallow and limited, and formal peace agreements between governments short-lived. Such regional security can take the form of regionwide rules, treaties, pacts or issue-focused organizations. They can enable community leaders to work together on shared problems — such as drug trafficking, rural poverty, distorted trade routes, water cooperation or preserving cultural heritage sites — across conflict lines. Building such connections in the region can help shift diplomacy away from short-term concessions and focus it instead on longer-term, regionwide issues of bread-and-butter governance. Such multilateral forums can dilute the rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan, helping various social groups build trust and connections across conflict lines — before international mediators and governing elites ask their people for concessions. Regionwide security guarantees can clarify and affirm nonviolence as a foundational principle for the region, and create the political stability needed to enable deeper diplomacy around the conflict itself.

#### Making aid contingent on democratization solves. Kotoyan 17

Tamara Kotoyan, 7-22-2017, "Rethinking U.S. Foreign Aid Toward Azerbaijan," International Policy Digest, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/07/22/rethinking-u-s-foreign-aid-toward-azerbaijan/> Tamara Kotoyan is a third year student of Commerce/Arts at the University of Sydney, majoring in Government and International Relations and Commercial Law.

Azerbaijan has emerged as an important asset for the US and its allies in a turbulent region; it is a key oil exporter, a NATO partner for peace, and is located at a geopolitically advantageous position between Russia, Iran and Turkey. However, Azerbaijan requires more attention by the US government due to growing concerns regarding human rights violations and its rapid increase in defense spending. The US must pay more attention to how Azerbaijan’s military escalation may threaten peace and stability in the Southern Caucus, especially since US energy security is at stake. To address democratic backsliding in Azerbaijan and prevent regional security instability, the US should reevaluate its military aid policy by applying strict conditions and monitoring mechanisms on aid recipients. Azerbaijan has been a key ally of the US since 2001 due to its geostrategic significance and a recipient of US foreign aid. As an emerging supplier of oil to Europe and Asia, the Azerbaijanis have been a priority for US energy security and national interests and they have also enjoyed the benefits of US business investments. US oil interests in Azerbaijan are primarily demonstrated through its share in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which has Russian leverage over energy supply to America’s European allies. However, the current state of Azerbaijan poses a concern for US policy to the region, as the exponential buildup of the Azeri military threatens peace and stability in the South Caucus. The US has utilized military aid as a tool to exert its interests concerning cooperative threat reduction and the security of oil trade in the Caspian and South Caucuses. It is important to analyze whether this tool has been genuinely effective in these states’ objectives, which calls into question the outbreak of war in 2016 between the Armenian separatist forces in the Azerbaijani region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The failure of Washington to prioritize conflict prevention between Azerbaijan and Armenia has allowed for a self-seeking Russia to exert its influence in the region at the cost of US energy and regional security interests (vis-a-vis its military agreements and arms deals with both Armenia and Azerbaijan). US should be concerned about how Russia has wielded its influence over Azerbaijan and Armenia in order to benefit from the regional resources and geostrategic positions to strengthen itself and bolster its sphere of influence. As a state that has directly challenged international norms (by the annexation of Crimea), Russian influence in this region threatens US interests, as the South Caucus region has been vital in reducing the European energy dependence on Russia. The outbreak of war between Armenia and Azerbaijan risks a spill over into Georgia (a potential NATO member), as well as spill over into Turkey (another NATO member), and could reignite separatist intentions in Georgia and Turkey. Moscow holds leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, because Azerbaijan is a signatory to a $4 billion arms deal with Russia, and Armenia is a signatory to the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The current US military aid program to Azerbaijan requires re-evaluation as developments in Azerbaijan in terms of press freedom, economic liberty, democratization and human rights indicate troubling signs of democratic backsliding. Moreover, asserting US interests and national security concerns can yield strategic benefit, by disrupting Russia’s influence in the region. US oil interests in the Caspian are at risk by the growing tensions in the security climate between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. This is especially significant given that the OSCE Minsk group recently identified Azerbaijan as responsible for a ceasefire violation- the first instance of the OSCE Minsk group labelling one of the sides as the aggressor. In 2015 alone, the US assigned 35.33 million dollars in aid to Azerbaijan, 44% of which was for military aid and 56% for economic development. However, in 2015, Azerbaijan was recorded to have spent 5.5% of its GDP on its military budget, almost doubling since 2010 (by an increase in 2.79%), as opposed to the world average of 2.2%. If spending occurred for the sake of border security against Armenian separatist forces, these increases were still unwarranted; as Azerbaijan’s military expenditure of 1931.8 USD million in 2016 outpaced Armenian spending by a margin of 1508.8 USD million. *Pre-existing Policies* **Section 907 of FREEDOM Support Act** Under section 907 of the FREDOM Support Act, the US was prevented from providing Azerbaijan with any form of governmental aid, “until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.” Reorientation of Policy (2002 onwards) Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, US policy reoriented due to counterterrorism concerns. In 2002, the FREEDOM Support Act was amended to extend the presidential waiver for US national security concerns. However, Public Law 107-115 posed a serious concern with policy orientation, within section 2c and 2d of the amendment as to whether the ambiguous wording of the act calls into question consistency between US action and objectives. The law states that in section 2C of the waiver the president can waive the section 907 of FREEDOM Support Act, if it “is important to Azerbaijan’s border security.” The lack of specificity within the amendment has given Azerbaijan a license to further militarize and escalate tensions on the border with Armenia. The Department of State has reaffirmed its commitment to the US aid program for Azerbaijan, especially regarding Azerbaijan’s border security, stating that “U.S. security assistance aims to increase Azerbaijan’s ability to contribute more effectively to international efforts on peacekeeping, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” as well as bolstering “Azerbaijan’s border security.” This is particularly problematic when America’s role in the OSCE Minsk group is accounted for. The US has been a co-chair for peace resolution in the Nagorno Karabakh dispute in the Minsk Group, however, the US must account for the relative stagnation in steps to achieve this objective. For the US to properly assert peace and democratic principles in the region, it must reconsider the standards it holds to its military aid recipients. *Policy Options* **1.** Conditional Military Aid: This would involve restricting the provision of aid to only the purchase of US arms, along with greater presence of OSCE monitors on the border. One of the conditions is that there is a reduction in military expenditure, which in turn is used for efforts to democratize Azerbaijan and contribute to domestic reforms. Moreover, another condition of military aid would be the monitoring of elections by the Department of State and investments in social reforms. *Advantages* The significant advantage of a conditional military aid program toward Azerbaijan would be to incentivize the Azeri military’s de-escalation and democratization, which would act as a deterrent to developing tensions in the region. Whilst this option holds a risk of Azerbaijan falling further into Russia’s sphere, this risk is low. If Azerbaijan adheres to the conditions the US poses, they can leverage their compliance for the endorsement of a favorable solution to negotiations regarding Nagorno Karabakh. Unlike the pre-existing military aid policy, this policy would address the serious issues regarding anti-democratic practices in Azerbaijan. As it stands, Freedom House categorizes Azerbaijan similar to Russia and Iran when it comes to civil freedoms, and the Transparency International’s Corruption perception ranked Azerbaijan as equal to Kazakhstan and Pakistan at 126. In addition to this, Azerbaijan also recognizes the value of economic and security opportunities by allying with the US rather than Russia, as Russia’s growing isolation from the international community (after Crimea) has affected its economic growth. Their decision to not join the EAEU highlights their rejection of Russia’s integrationist security alliances. *Disadvantages* The disadvantage associated with conditional military aid policy would be the costs and resources required for implementation. In addition to this, ensuring compliance of Azerbaijan on issues of de-militarization and compliance with democratic rubrics risks signaling offensive intentions by the US. For example, the EU’s attempt to enforce Azeri compliance towards democratic values has failed completely, due in part to Europe’s desire to free themselves from Russian dependency on oil supply, as well as the low level of interest in the Azerbaijani government. **2. Cessation of Military Aid:** The second policy option is to coerce Azerbaijan through the temporary suspension of military aid, until certain pre-requisites are met. Re-launching military aid will require the agreement by the Azerbaijani government to meet the necessary pre-requisites. These requirements involve de-escalation tensions on the line of contact with Armenian separatist forces in Karabakh, a reduction in military aid, and the monitory fulfilment of the OSCE Minsk conditions. *Advantages* The second policy would be placing a temporary halt on military aid to Azerbaijan, to compel it to take measures to move towards transparency. While Azerbaijan is not dependent on military aid from the US, the cessation of aid would send an important signal about the benefits Azerbaijan gains from foreign investment and cooperation with the West, and therefore Azerbaijan would seriously consider compliance. Military aid is an important signal that symbolizes the intentions of the sender and the state of relations between said sender and the recipient. With the US taking strides to condemn instances of democratic back-sliding, Azerbaijan will be compelled to pay attention for the sake of safeguarding an alliance with the US and its foreign investors that has been vital to its economic growth. This argument was articulated by President Obama, who remarked in 2014 that: “In places like Azerbaijan, laws make it incredibly difficult for NGOs even to operate.” *Disadvantages* The main disadvantage of suspending military aid to Azerbaijan is the risk of Azerbaijan falling into Russia’s orbit. This risk was evident through the domestic outcry in Azerbaijan that occurred in the Zurich protocols (that aimed to open border between Armenia and Turkey), as a string of anti-Turkish, pro-Russian sentiment emerged from the public and opposition parties. Moreover, this option may be unfavorable domestically, as Congress would prefer not to cease giving military aid to a strategic partner. Ultimately, economically coercive diplomacy will only encourage further democratic back sliding by motivating the government to undertake further repressive activities against civilians to consolidate its power. **3. Multilateral Enforcement:** The third option would involve the US endorsement of Azerbaijan’s integration into Europe’s political and economic order. Through multilateral enforcement from European institutions such as the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe, issues concerning democracy, human rights and economic reform can be addressed, while also enforcing responsibilities concerning counter-terrorism objectives. *Advantages* Policy option three allows the US to promote interests of democratic reform without engaging in direct coercive action that may undermine the bilateral relationship. Azerbaijan has been a key actor that has allowed for the reduction of Europe’s dependence on oil, and further ‘Europeanization’ of Azerbaijan could further objectives in this region. Azerbaijan demonstrated willingness to cooperate with EU democracy demands in 2008 at the Joint Program election project, which succeeded in implementing legislation on election conduct. This will limit US direct action against Azerbaijan while allowing for multilateral enforcement of democratization requirements, subsequently safeguarding the US-Azeri relationship. Moreover, while Europe is reliant on the Caspian for oil, in 2015 statistics showed that $6.37 billion out of $11.1 billion worth of imports to Azerbaijan were from Europe. This indicates that Europe has sufficient leverage over Azerbaijan to engage in a multilateral effort to work towards democratization. *Disadvantages* The problem with this approach is that it is not direct enough for the US to work towards democratic objectives and standards in Azerbaijan. As a multinational institution, the European Union is ineffective in implementing a unified policy due to diverging member interests and a lack of a unified regional foreign policy. In addition to this, leaning on the EU cooperation of Azerbaijan to impose democratic standards and obligations is highly flawed due to a lack of laws within the EU for this specific purpose. The treaties that the EU does have for imposing compliance to democratic values are also flawed, as the provisions are purely political rather than legal and therefore they lack the proper pressure to achieve US objectives for Azerbaijan. Moreover, while the EU and Azerbaijan’s current relationship has been rooted in mutual strategic gains, this has proved ineffective, as human rights, democracy and rule of law requirements of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe agreements are consistently ignored by Baku. In the bilateral relationship Azerbaijan has had with the EU, compliance requirements about bottom up democratization are consistently neglected due to lack of regulation and monitoring of the EU. **Conclusion** Ultimately, in the context of instability in the South Caucasus, the US aid program has been ineffective in promoting democratization, human development and positive progress towards conflict de-escalation. The US should view Azerbaijan as an important ally and the failure to hold Azerbaijan accountable for their failings on democratic principles calls into question the credibility of the partnership. To distract its own population from its government’s failures, especially the suppression of dissident voices, freedom of the press, crackdowns on non-government organizations, persecution of human rights lawyers (through disbarment) and concerns with nepotism (the appointment of Mehriban Aliyeva as Vice President) the government has engaged in militarization.

#### Pressure solves – Azerbaijan wants the US for diversification. Kucera 17

Kucera, Joshua, 9-12-17 - ("Azerbaijan Threatens to Cut Off Military Cooperation With US, NATO," LobeLog, xx-xx-xxxx, [https://lobelog.com/azerbaijan-threatens-to-cut-off-military-cooperation-with-us-nato/)](https://lobelog.com/azerbaijan-threatens-to-cut-off-military-cooperation-with-us-nato/%29//nhs-kk/) Josh is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul. He is Turkey/Caucasus editor at EurasiaNet and his articles also have appeared in Slate, The New York Times,, The Wilson Quarterly, The Atlantic, Al Jazeera America, Roads & Kingdoms, and Jane's Defence Weekly. He blogs on Eurasian defense and security at [The Bug Pit](http://www.eurasianet.org/voices/thebugpit).

Azerbaijan has threatened to cut off its military cooperation with the West in response to escalating pressure on Baku for its human rights violations. But that threat may ring hollow in light of Azerbaijan’s declining importance for Western militaries. United States Senator Richard Durbin on September 7 [proposed sanctions](https://twitter.com/RobBerschinski/status/905816750838644736) against Azerbaijan. The move would bar entry into the U.S. of officials deemed connected to the [imprisonment of Mehman Aliyev](http://www.eurasianet.org/node/84846), the director of Turan, Azerbaijan’s only independent news agency. An [article](http://www.today.az/news/politics/164809.html) in the official newspaper Azerbaycan tied that proposal to a recent big [investigative report](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/04/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-azerbaijani-laundromat) showing the scale of Azerbaijani corruption in Europe; the article blamed “Soros-backed forces and the Armenian lobby” for “rush[ing] to make efforts to spoil the US-Azerbaijani relations and strategic partnership.” What recourse might Azerbaijan have? The article suggests that Baku could suspend its military efforts on behalf of the West: It is a well-known fact that the Azerbaijani peacekeepers were part of the peacekeeping missions in Kosovo from 1999-2008 and Iraq in 2003-2008. Having joined the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan in 2002, the Azerbaijani soldiers continue to perform their duties decently. By opening its air space and allowing the use of the existing air transport infrastructure, Azerbaijan is making an outstanding contribution to NATO`s military contingent in Afghanistan. But Azerbaijan can end its military and geostrategic cooperation with the West, cease participation in anti-terror operations and peacekeeping mission and refuse any logistical support to the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. According to the [most recent data](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_05/20160518_2016-05-RSM-placemat.pdf), Azerbaijan has a contingent of 94 troops in Afghanistan, part of the 12,813-strong NATO Resolute Support mission. That’s less than one percent, and would be at most a minor inconvenience to NATO. The logistical support has been in the past a significant aid to NATO and the U.S., but it’s not clear to what extent that’s still the case. The Azerbaijani press [regularly cites the statistic](https://www.azernews.az/nation/103569.html) that “[a]bout 40 percent of all cargo destined for the NATO mission in Afghanistan pass through Baku.” But that only represents air cargo, which is a relatively small part of the logistics train into Afghanistan, most of which is carried out overland. And more importantly, the numbers are from 2011 and it’s not clear what the new numbers are, but they appear to have declined substantially. Zaur Shiriyev, an expert on Azerbaijan at Chatham House (and a regular EurasiaNet.org contributor), [wrote in August](https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/examining-how-south-caucasus-responding-trump): Baku’s significance as a route for humanitarian supplies to Afghanistan for NATO and US forces no longer holds the same importance. Although the Trump administration has announced the deployment of several thousand additional US troops to Afghanistan, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Joseph Dunford has [confirmed](https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2767167.html) that the US doesn’t see a “necessity to increase the access through Azerbaijan.” Azerbaijan’s state-run Silk Way Airlines still does carry out flights on behalf of the US military to Afghanistan, as was revealed in the trove of documents leaked as part of a [strange scandal](http://www.eurasianet.org/node/85006) connecting the airline to weapons shipments for Syrian rebels. But Azerbaijan’s token contributions to Western military efforts ultimately benefit Baku more than they do the West, as they signal Azerbaijan’s desire to maintain a multivectored policy balancing out their reliance on Russia. That aura of strategic partnership, in turn, gets Azerbaijan’s government a little more space to continue its crackdown on independent media and any other threats it perceives to its rule. Just last week, in fact, Azerbaijan was [showing off](http://www.eurasianet.org/node/85041) its friendly ties with NATO and the US as evidence of its strategic importance. A high-level military meeting between NATO and Russian generals, “demonstrated that Azerbaijan is a geopolitical link between Russia and the United States, having strategic relations with both countries,” wrote news agency Trend in a [commentary](https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2793883.html). “[T]he country has deservedly won the spot as one of the most important geopolitical centers of the region. Azerbaijan is a reliable and long-standing partner of NATO…” Suspending that military cooperation, therefore, would probably backfire against Baku. The threat, more likely, is aimed at showing an internal audience that Azerbaijani is able to stand up to Western pressure. Whether or not that’s true is another question.

#### dMoscow’s losing influence with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Kucera 1/21

Joshua Kucera, 1-21-2019, "Azerbaijan and Russia in escalating dispute over ban on Armenians," No Publication, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-and-russia-in-escalating-dispute-over-ban-on-armenians> Josh is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul. He is Turkey/Caucasus editor at EurasiaNet and his articles also have appeared in Slate, The New York Times,, The Wilson Quarterly, The Atlantic, Al Jazeera America, Roads & Kingdoms, and Jane's Defence Weekly. He blogs on Eurasian defense and security at [The Bug Pit](http://www.eurasianet.org/voices/thebugpit).

Azerbaijan and Russia are in an escalating diplomatic battle over the former’s policy of denying ethnic Armenians of any citizenship entrance to the country. Disputes over the longstanding, informal ban – in which Azerbaijani border guards turn away any visitor with an Armenian-sounding name – pop up occasionally, often when Moscow needs a cudgel to use against Baku. The [last big flare-up was in 2017](https://eurasianet.org/russia-complains-to-azerbaijan-about-discrimination-against-armenians) when the two countries were feuding over Azerbaijan’s prosecution of a travel blogger and Russian citizen who had visited Nagorno-Karabakh, the territory at the center of the dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The current dispute, however, seems to have come out of nowhere, during a period of relatively cozy relations between Azerbaijan and Russia. It has nevertheless smoldered for more than a week, with the two sides exchanging increasingly snippy statements with one another. The current blow-up seems to have its origins in a December 29 [Facebook post](https://www.facebook.com/kristina.gevorkyan.3/posts/10157117513833699?__tn__=K-R) by a Russian woman of Armenian descent who detailed her experiences of trying to fly to Azerbaijan for a New Year’s holiday only to be detained at the Baku airport for several hours, along with several other Russian-Armenians, before being put on a plane back to Moscow. The post was widely shared and on January 11, the spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, was asked about it at a [press briefing](http://www.mid.ru/en_GB/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-/asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/3470895). Zakharova said that Moscow had “regularly raised this question with Azerbaijan and said that such cases were unfortunately becoming a bad and wrong tradition.” She said that the ministry had counted at least 16 similar cases in 2018. “The Russian Foreign Ministry repeatedly emphasized in conversations with the Azerbaijani side that the present situation is unacceptable and demanded the end of the practice of detention and expulsion as incompatible with the friendly relations between the two countries,” she added. The same day, Azerbaijan’s ministry of foreign affairs [responded with its rhetorical guns blazing](http://www.mfa.gov.az/news/909/5989) in a statement detailing Azerbaijan’s many grievances with Armenia, centered around the unresolved conflict in Karabakh, the territory internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but which has been controlled since 1994 by Armenian forces. The Azerbaijani note also pointed out that some Armenians of Russian origin, for example members of sports teams, are regularly admitted into Azerbaijan. About 880,000 Russians had visited Azerbaijan in 2018 and “the overwhelming majority of them were satisfied with their visit and expressed their appreciation for the hospitality,” the MFA said. The statement went on to accuse “certain people in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs” of trying to sabotage the warming relations between Moscow and Baku as the Kremlin’s dissatisfaction with Armenia’s new government continues to fester. “Against the backdrop of developing Azerbaijani-Russian relations this statement and attempts to blow up some isolated incident, taking it out of context, is yet another manifestation of a tendency we have noticed,” the statement read. “Clearly, the recent emergence of serious problems in Armenia-Russia relations and, by contrast, successful development of Azerbaijan-Russia relations (just in the past year the presidents of the two countries have met six times) seriously worries certain people in the Russian MFA.” This appears to be a reference to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, whose father was Armenian, leading many in Baku to believe as a result that he [takes Armenia’s side](https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-increasingly-airing-grievances-russia) in the dispute with Azerbaijan. And indeed, the conflict is taking place against the backdrop of cooling Armenia-Russia ties. Moscow is [increasingly showing its dissatisfaction](https://eurasianet.org/russia-raises-gas-prices-for-armenia-in-the-new-year) with the new regime of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and many in Baku – believing that Moscow has many strings to pull in the conflict – are hoping to take advantage of this chill to their advantage. But that makes Baku’s pugilistic approach to the criticism all the more inexplicable. While Azerbaijan’s statement did not address the presence of the informal ban on Armenians, behind the scenes Baku reportedly agreed with Moscow to do something about the policy. According to a January 15 [report](https://ria.ru/20190115/1549385405.html) by the Russian news agency RIA Novosti, the Russian MFA sent a letter to the Azerbaijani embassy in Moscow “in connection with the policy of discrimination against Russian citizens on the basis of ethnicity in the airports of Azerbaijan,” an unnamed source told the agency. “The Azerbaijani side has again assured its Russian colleagues that steps toward resolving the problem will be taken.” But then Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Moscow, Polad Bulbuloglu, denied that was the case. And he elaborated a bit on the Armenian ban, saying in an [interview](https://haqqin.az/news/143288) with the Azerbaijani news website Haqqin that it was “connected with the continuing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory and primarily for the purposes of their own safety.” It took a week, but Russia eventually publicly responded with an [icy missive](http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/az/-/asset_publisher/0TeVwfjLGJmg/content/id/3477958), complaining on January 18 that the “tone” of Azerbaijan’s statement was “outside the bounds of diplomatic decency.” It took issue with Azerbaijan’s contention that Moscow was “blowing up” the incidents. “Among what the Azerbaijani MFA calls ‘isolated incidents’ include such blatant cases as the refusal in May 2018 of an 81-year-old World War II veteran and survivor of the siege of Leningrad or the denial in February 2017 of a woman who together with her four-year-old child was detained for several hours in a special detention area.” Again, Azerbaijan responded the same day. Its statement argued that the previous statement’s tone “was entirely consistent” with the Russian statement to which it had responded. And it accused the Russian MFA of using a “unacceptable tone of ultimatum” with them. And it again tried to drive a wedge between the MFA and Russian President Vladimir Putin: “The inexplicable stubbornness of the Russian MFA press service on this issue is difficult to understand, it goes against the foundation of the strategic relationship between Azerbaijan and Russia. At the same time, this approach is in no way consistent with the will demonstrated by the presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia and the efforts they have made toward developing relations between the two states.” And it concluded by signaling its intention to keep fighting: “We would again like to note that the Azerbaijani side will undertake appropriate actions in relation to further steps by the Russian MFA press service.” As of the time this piece was posted, Russia had not responded. Stay tuned.

#### Armenia’s looking to NATO – Russian guarantees of peace are what prevent it. Goble 7/31

Paul Goble, 7-31-2018, "Armenia’s Involvement With NATO Helps It Strengthen Relations With Georgia," Jamestown, <https://jamestown.org/program/armenias-involvement-with-nato-helps-it-strengthen-relations-with-georgia/> P aul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the University of Tartu in Estonia. While there, he launched the “Window on Eurasia” series. Prior to joining the faculty there in 2004, he served in various capacities in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He writes frequently on ethnic and religious issues and has edited five volumes on ethnicity and religion in the former Soviet space. Trained at Miami University in Ohio and the University of Chicago, he has been decorated by the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania for his work in promoting Baltic independence and the withdrawal of Russian forces from those formerly occupied lands.

\*Brackets in original

Russian and Western analysts often view the pursuit of contacts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by countries between Russia and the Alliance as a zero-sum game—particularly, as far as Moscow is concerned. Consequently, such reorientations tend to be discussed exclusively in terms of East-West relations: choosing to move closer to NATO is liable to be seen as the country rebuffing its links to and/or rejecting dominance by Russia. But Nikol Pashinyan, the new prime minister of Armenia, has made clear that for his country, pursuing close relations with NATO may be less about positioning itself with regard to Moscow. Rather, the aim is to maintain ties with nearby countries that have chosen to pursue NATO membership—a goal that, the Armenian leader stressed, is not currently part of Yerevan’s agenda. In an interview with Aleksei Venediktov of Ekho Moskvy, Pashinyan said that relations between Moscow and Yerevan must be “relations without dark corners.” This “does not mean that we will always agree on everything,” he explained, but that “we will be sincere with one another.” The Russian government has made it abundantly clear that it opposes Armenia’s cooperation with NATO. Nevertheless, Armenia has been working with the Western alliance for some time, “not against anyone” as full membership might imply, but in order to make a contribution to some common cause, such as, as for example, peacekeeping missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo ([Ekho Moskvy](https://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/2246298-echo/), July 25). “We [NATO and Armenia],” he continued, “have certain common programs […] we are cooperating with NATO not for the first year. This has lasted quite a long time, and it will persist.” That does not mean, however, that Armenia is interested in pursuing NATO membership; it is not. Armenia remains a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Indeed, the government in Yerevan, Pashinyan contended, is convinced that only Russia is in a position to ensure Armenia’s security and to prevent tensions with Azerbaijan over Karabakh from exploding into a new major war. But at the same time—and here is the crux of the innovative nature of the Armenian prime minister’s remarks—cooperation with various NATO projects is, for Armenia, a key means for pursuing “regional cooperation.” In such projects, he told Ekho Moskvy, “we cooperate also with Georgia.” Since Armenia and Georgia “have different foreign policies [with regard to NATO],” with Tbilisi actively pursuing full membership in the Alliance, while Yerevan is not, “we need to balance this situation. And for us, in the NATO framework, our relations with Georgia are very important,” the Armenian leader asserted It may be tempting to dismiss what Pashinyan is saying as little more than an effort on his part to sound more accommodating to a Russian audience given the rising tide of hostility in Moscow toward his government’s position and especially his attendance at the recent NATO summit in Brussels, on July 11–12 ([Kommersant](https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3695361), July 25). Alternatively, his explanation may represent an Armenian counterpart to Azerbaijan’s “balanced foreign policy,” which President Ilham Aliyev had long made the centerpiece of Baku’s international relations strategy (see EDM, [December 5, 2017](https://jamestown.org/program/russian-overreach-calls-question-bakus-balanced-foreign-policy/); [May 8, 2018](https://jamestown.org/program/azerbaijani-diplomacy-and-the-bridging-of-security-alliances/)). It is, in fact, likely that both of these factors play into Pashinyan’s thinking. But there may be even more to it, with important implications for NATO’s potential future security role in the region. By focusing on the centrality of NATO as a forum for interacting with the Republic of Georgia and thus for being an essential feature of regional security for Armenia, Pashinyan is pointing to something all too often overlooked by both those who advocate NATO enlargement eastward and those who oppose it. Every time another country joins the Alliance and every time NATO develops new partnership programs with neighboring non-members, the Euro-Atlantic political-military bloc ends up casting a “penumbra of security” over an increasingly wider region. Armenia, for understandable reasons, is unlikely to ever pursue NATO membership. A Russian base is located on its territory, Russian troops guard its border with Turkey, and Moscow will remain, at least for now, Yerevan’s main ally given the latter’s fraught history with Baku and Ankara. But as Pashinyan has pointed out—and in a Russian publication to underline that fact—Armenia benefits from its involvement in NATO projects both directly as a participant and indirectly as a country that can expand its ties with others in the region. The logic of his position means that once Georgia is taken in as a NATO member—an outcome that the last Alliance summit reiterated is a question of when not if—Yerevan will have even more reason to interact with Tbilisi via the venues NATO provides. Thus, Armenia will grow ever more cooperatively involved with the Western alliance, even assuming it retains its position of not seeking membership. It seems clear from his remarks that Pashinyan understands all of this. In turn, that means his approach may open the way for NATO’s influence to expand even further to the east than its modestly growing membership might suggest.

#### Azeri gas pipelines makes Moscow dependent on Armenia as a buffer – they won’t reignite NKR post-plan. Boyajain 2/7

David Boyajain, 2/7/19, "Why Russia Needs Armenia and Vice Versa," https://mirrorspectator.com/2019/02/07/why-russia-needs-armenia-and-vice-versa/

Astute observers know that Russia needs Armenia as much as Armenia needs Russia. Russia’s dependence on Armenia explains the Kremlin’s extra pressure on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his reformist My Step Alliance following Armenia’s democratic Velvet Revolution in 2018. Armenia is Russia’s only ally in the strategically-crucial Caucasus. Russia would, consequently, lose the entire Caucasus (which includes Georgia and Azerbaijan), if Armenia joined the Western Bloc — defined as America/Europe/NATO (sometimes including Turkey and Israel). Here’s why. Georgia has favored the Western Bloc since independence, desires NATO membership, and no longer depends on Russian natural gas. Azeris feel hemmed in by Russia and would like to join NATO. Azerbaijan sends its Caspian Sea oil and gas westward through Georgia, Turkey, and beyond. Another major gas pipeline is planned. Significantly, at Israel’s behest top Jewish American organizations quietly support Azerbaijan. **Russia’s underbelly** Russia’s sees its left flank, consisting mainly of NATO and pro-NATO nations, as a major threat. An even more ominous threat is Russia’s Central Asian underbelly: the five Muslim and largely Turkic countries of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. If Russia loses Armenia, and thus the Caucasus, sooner or later the Western Bloc would penetrate via Turkey straight to the Caspian and create a powerful NATO fleet. Just 150 miles farther lay the vast energy resources of Russia’s Turkic/Muslim underbelly, ripe for NATO’s picking. This is essentially pan-Turkism. Russia dreads it while the Western Bloc tacitly supports it. This explains Russia’s acute anxiety over what happens in Armenia. **Military allies** Russia has two military bases in Armenia, sells it weapons, and guards its border with Turkey. Armenians rightly welcome this as defense against genocidal Turkey. But — again — Russia’s primary motive is thwarting Western Bloc/Turkish domination of the entire Caucasus and, from there, the Caspian, and Russia’s Central Asian underbelly. Armenia must, nevertheless, remain militarily (though not always economically) tied to Russia because for the foreseeable future Armenia cannot find security in the pro-Turkish Western Bloc. **The Pro-Turkic Western Bloc** Even if Yerevan and Ankara normalized relations, and the former joined NATO — huge ‘ifs’ — Turkey’s belligerence and greater weight would still threaten Armenia. NATO has, after all, long tolerated Turkish aggression in Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, the Middle East, and against its own minorities. The Western Bloc has, moreover, never offered Armenia any real security, and has implicitly consented to Turkey’s ongoing closure of its border with Armenia. Had Turkey, as planned, invaded Armenia in 1993 during a failed coup in Moscow, the Western Bloc would likely not have stopped the invasion. The Western Bloc even supports blatantly corrupt Azerbaijan and tolerates its aggression against Artsakh/Armenia. And, of course, Europe and America provided no significant military aid to Armenians during the 19th and 20th century genocides. Moreover, Russia has substantial ‘soft power’ to prevent Armenia’s leaving the former’s orbit. **More Russian leverage** Russia supplies nearly all Armenia’s natural gas and oil and has a significant position in its energy infrastructure. Russia also limits the amount of natural gas that Iran supplies to Armenia. Armenia’s Soviet-era Metsamor nuclear power plant is also controlled by Russia. It generates about 40% of the nation’s electricity. Moscow irrationally worries that its only democratic ally, Armenia, could be a model for unseating Russia’s own leaders. The Kremlin apparently prefers autocratic, corrupt foreign leaders whom it can intimidate because they don’t answer to the people in free elections. Added Russian pressure against post-Velvet Revolution Armenia has been particularly unhelpful. **Recent Russian pressure** The Kremlin did not congratulate Pashinyan on his party’s smashing parliamentary victory in December 2018. It did, however, phone ex-president Robert Kocharyan, sitting in jail on various charges, on his birthday. The Kremlin has also unfairly sided with corrupt Belarus and Kazakhstan in not allowing an Armenian to complete Armenia’s remaining term for the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CTSO) ex-secretary-general, Yuri Khachaturov. Pashinyan’s government had indicted Khachaturov over the March 2008 killings of Armenian demonstrators. Russia apparently will also raise the price of the natural gas it supplies Armenia by 10%. Now the Kremlin is pushing Armenia to sign a long-term agreement prohibiting the latter from hosting troops from third countries, though Yerevan plans no such deployments. To alarm Armenia and make it ever more dependent, it’s foreseeable — indeed, may have happened in the past — that Moscow would give Baku the green light for a major attack on Artsakh/Armenia. Russia would then use some pretext to refuse to defend Armenia despite their mutual defense treaty. Armenia would be unable to ask another country for military support if it signs the Kremlin’s proposed agreement. PM Pashinyan has promised that Armenia’s pro-Russian orientation will not change. He has even vowed allegiance to the CSTO, the ineffectual, Russian-led defense alliance, even though members Belarus and Kazakhstan are hostile to Armenia. Armenia will also stay in the EEU, the Russian-led economic bloc of debatable benefit to Armenia. Armenians don’t want to break away from Russia — unless Russia betrays Armenians first. They simply want to eradicate corruption, benefit from the political/economic freedoms people have in democracies, trade with the West and others (as Russia does in the hundreds of billions), and build a stronger Armenia. Diasporan Armenians feel similarly. A stronger Armenia whose citizens stay in the country is in Russia’s own interests. But non-too-subtle Russian threats are no way to treat an ally. No country should be bullied into being undemocratic, corrupt, poor, and dependent. Unfortunately, the two countries often misunderstand the other’s perspectives. **Different perspectives** Russia believes that Armenia lacks gratitude for “defending” it and is too distrustful. Though Armenians actually are grateful, they remember Russian betrayals that include giveaways of Armenian territory to Turkey and Azerbaijan in the 20th century. Russia is alarmed by Armenian interaction with the Western Bloc and China. Armenia feels similarly about massive Russian arms sales to Azerbaijan and military and energy deals with Turkey, the latter two countries being genocidal enemies of Armenians. Russia feels that Armenia should have a more positive view of Russians. Armenia generally does regard Russians well. But polls reveal that many Russians view Armenians negatively. Moreover, Armenians rarely hear Russian leaders tell their citizens about Armenia’s importance and the two peoples’ commonalities. Due to geography and its history of empire, Moscow has often manipulated other ethno-national groups or set them against each other. While Russia sees this as natural, Armenians wonder whether Russia can distinguish between its proven enemies and a friend and ally such as Armenia. Russia controls and limits the natural gas that Armenia imports from Iran in order to profit from selling Russian gas to Armenia (via hostile Georgia) and to make Armenia more dependent and compliant. Armenia correctly believes this endangers its national security. Perhaps because it’s far larger and brawnier, Russia too often looks down on Armenia. Armenians regard this as overbearing and ill-mannered. With effort, though, every contrasting perspective can probably be reconciled. Armenia should always remember, however, its vital importance to Russia. There is no turning back from the path of self-reliance that Armenia is walking. This must be voiced in the most friendly way to Russia. And the two countries must always fully and publicly air their differing perspectives for both their sakes.

#### Aliyev is susceptible to international pressure – human rights pardons in the last month prove that all it takes is an external force. Safarova 3/18

Durna Safarova, 3-18-2019, "Azerbaijan releases more than 50 political prisoners," Eurasianet, <https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-releases-more-than-50-political-prisoners> Durna Safarova is a freelance journalist who covers Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev has pardoned over 50 people widely considered to be political prisoners, an unprecedented move that observers are struggling to interpret. As has become a tradition to celebrate the Nowruz holiday, Aliyev pardoned [more than 400 people](https://president.az/articles/32416). But unlike previous pardons, this one included a large portion of those considered by human rights groups and international watchdog organizations to be political prisoners.Among those released March 17 included two deputy chairpersons of the opposition People’s Front Party of Azerbaijan; members of a youth group who had been sentenced to 10-year terms for spraying graffiti on a statue of former president Heydar Aliyev; [religious activists](https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-show-trial-ends-harsh-sentences-islamic-activists) from the Shia stronghold of Nardaran; journalists; and a former minister of health who has been in prison for 12 years. The journalist Fikret Faramazoglu was among the political prisoners released from Prison No. 2 in Baku on March 17**.** The mass pardon was interpreted variously. Some saw it as a sign that internal and international [pressure](https://eurasianet.org/merkel-visit-with-azerbaijani-civil-society-sparks-controversy-among-civil-society) on the government was working; others as a sign of Aliyev’s genuine intent to reform his deeply repressive government.“I think that the Azerbaijani people have shown their strong will and the organizers of this struggle have achieved their goal because they have shown a consistent and principled position,” one of the released prisoners, Gozal Bayramli, told Eurasianet.Bayramli, a deputy chairwoman of the People’s Front, was arrested in May 2017 and accused of smuggling $12,000 in undeclared cash across the border. She denied the charges and said she was being targeted because of her political views. “As long as the government does not tolerate people's political views, there will be strong conflict in society,” she said.Azerbaijan’s continuing [economic crisis](https://eurasianet.org/turkish-lira-casts-pall-over-caucasus-and-central-asia), international isolation, and [growing public discontent](https://eurasianet.org/as-social-media-criticism-grows-azerbaijan-weighs-carrots-vs-sticks) have forced the government’s hand, said Arastun Orujlu, a political commentator and former counterintelligence officer. “The systemic crisis in Azerbaijan and social and economic tensions in the country have reached a peak,” he told Eurasianet, adding that the government is ready to make “compromises.” “This is actually a message from the government. But can they be trusted? This will be made clear as time passes.”One ongoing source of pressure is [negotiations](https://www.governmenteuropa.eu/2019-eu-azerbaijan-agreement/92595/) with the European Union over a new comprehensive bilateral agreement; the next round of negotiations on the deal is scheduled to be held on April 4. The EU has consistently pressed Baku for human rights reforms, including for the release of political prisoners, as part of a deal. The EU called the pardon decree a “welcome step,” but added in a [statement](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/59751/statement-spokesperson-pardoning-prisoners-azerbaijan-mark-novruz-holiday_en) that it “expects that further similar steps will follow in future in line with Azerbaijan's international commitments.”Similarly, Amnesty International welcomed the move but with caveats. “It does little to change the overall landscape of repression in Azerbaijan,” Levan Asatiani, the group’s senior campaigner for South Caucasus, told Eurasianet.“Local human rights groups say that at least 74 more unjustly jailed activists, journalists and opposition politicians continue to remain behind bars. Azerbaijan still has repressive legislation in place which makes it almost impossible for civil society groups to operate, including burdensome NGO registration and funding requirements. Azerbaijan remains closed to human rights scrutiny,” Asatiani said.

### Underview

#### Independent of considerations of future happiness or life, death is ontologically the worst possible evil since it destroys the subject iself

Paterson, 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, http://sce.sagepub.com)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – it enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the creation of positive alternative futures. Barma 16

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, ~Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15~, Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "'Imagine a World in Which': Using Scenarios in Political Science," International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using\_scenarios\_in\_political\_science\_isp\_2015.pdf).

Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision-making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policy- making tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects. As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking. Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic atten- tion, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance. The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the trans- formation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with de- tails about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases. An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are tradi- tionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might ex- pand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### No root cause claims

Levy & Thompson 13 (Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, 15, pp. 396-419)

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether **different kinds of organized warfare**—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether **different kinds of interstate wars** can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time

#### Reps K bad – there’s no causal relationship.

Shim ‘14(David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

## 1AC – Unbroken

### Adv – Short Version

#### The Nagorno-Karabahk (NKR) conflict is not a proxy war – Azeri aggression is fueling instability in the South Caucus region, and only US withdrawal sends an effective signal. Ter-Oganesyan and Sargsyan 17

Movses Ter-Oganesyan and Suren Sargsyan, 10-30-2017, "Azerbaijani Aggression Shouldn't Be Rewarded With U.S. Aid," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/10/30/azerbaijani-aggression-shouldnt-be-rewarded-with-u-s-aid/#7762060233f5> Ter-Oganesyan is a fellow at the Eurasian Research and Analysis Institute. Sargsyan is cofounder of International and Comparative Law Center, Yerevan Armenia. Both are South Caucus policy experts.

Due to the Soviet Union’s policy of divide and rule, the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. unleashed devastating wars over disputed territories. The longest running territorial dispute in the post-Soviet space has been over Nagorno-Karabakh (NKR or Artsakh) between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict is unique because it is not a proxy war between Russia and the West, and it's fascinating considering America’s posture during its early stages. Nagorno-Karabakh had a 90% Armenian population, but Josef Stalin transferred it to the rule of Soviet Azerbaijan to sow [ethnic unrest](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/nKnmBLt6gmbJh4), making both groups easier to control. In 1991, NKR held a referendum and declared its desire to become an independent state. Unable to stomach the overwhelming support for secession, the Azeri government began the indiscriminate [shelling and blockade](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/1dqzB2snQE1wiK) of the civilian population of the enclave. This episode was preceded by bloody pogroms of Armenians in the Azeri cities of [Baku](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/VALYBNTdpQ7lHY), [Sumgait](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/5J8VB5TWr96lhV), [and Kirovabad](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/g5XMBlF81Mb7In), as well as [state sponsored deportations](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/oX6kBGuaxNK0sY) called Operation Ring. Armenia did not remain idle after witnessing Azerbaijan’s targeting of NKR’s civilian population. Many Armenians feared that the Azerbaijani belligerence was a prelude to yet greater violence akin to the Armenian Genocide, perpetrated by Ottoman Turkey at the turn of the 20th Century. While Karabakh’s Armenians received support from Armenia, Azerbaijan received support from their ethnic kin in [Turkey](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/ANVABMuLJbwNcv), mujahedeen fighters from Afghanistan, and Islamists from [Chechnya](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/3RdZBNUGZM6vIb). Due to Armenia’s victories on the battlefield against Wahhabi and Azerbaijani extremists, the already landlocked, tiny, country of 3 million, is blockaded by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Due to this blockade, U.S. Congress passed [Section 907](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/qO6LBKSvG7W4cv) of the FREEDOM Support Act in 1992, banning direct aid from the U.S. to Azerbaijan unless the president determines that Azerbaijan takes demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other punitive uses of force against Armenia and NKR. Azerbaijan thus became the only country in the post-Soviet space slated to not receive U.S. aid. This policy remained unchanged until just after the 9/11 terror attacks. President Bush requested a [waiver of 907](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/4QDmBbseGO6kue) to allow Azerbaijan to receive aid. Every year since then, the president has waived 907 allowing this oil-rich nation on the Caspian Sea to receive [$20 million](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/dqX8BMf5O87vT0) in American aid. April 2016 saw the biggest explosion of violence along the Line of Contact between NKR and Azerbaijan since the 1994 ceasefire agreement signed by Armenia, NKR, and Azerbaijan. In [launching](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/Dz34BlIekJ4Guk) these attacks, Azerbaijan violated the preconditions set by Section 907. The text of the waiver does not mention that aggression cannot be directed against NKR, a crucial point of the original text which helped ensure cessation of hostilities. Omitting this language has certainly [emboldened](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/8J9GBAT84W6aI1) the political and military leadership of Azerbaijan to see what they can get away with. Coupled with the laissez-faire attitude of the Trump administration toward the region, it is a matter of time before Azerbaijan tests the waters once more. In an obvious violation of the ceasefire terms, Azerbaijani Army officers trained by the U.S. Army as part of the U.S. aid to Azerbaijan were found killed in action in the Armenian village of Talish during the fighting in April. Colonel Vugar Yusifov was trained at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona in 2007. On the night of April 3, 2016, he commanded the Special Forces Unit that attacked the village. Lieutenant Colonel Murad Mirzayev attended the Defense Language Institute in San Antonio, TX in 2005-6. He also completed Marine Corps officer training courses in Quantico, VA and Fort Lejeune, NC. What makes these violations more brazen are the heinous crimes (multiple [beheadings](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/QQxmB0sDq5m6hO), and the [execution and mutilation](https://protect-us.mimecast.com/s/xN45B6uX91Z8cm) of three elderly civilians) attributed to the regiments commanded by these men. The crimes prompted bipartisan calls for Leahy Law investigations by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce (R-CA), and Ranking Democrat Eliot Engel (D-NY). Lest the international community wait for Azerbaijan to engage in large scale military adventurism as witnessed in April 2016, America needs to rethink its position of providing aid to an already wealthy aggressor which violates U.S. law.

#### Karabakhi fear of Azeri aggression prevents peace – escalation is possible any time and draws in global powers. Toal and Loughtin 16

Gerard Toal and John O'Loughlin April 6, 2016 “Here are the 5 things you need to know about the deadly fighting in Nagorno Karabakh” <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/will-war-erupt-in-nagorny-karabakh-here-are-the-5-things-you-need-to-know/?utm_term=.3621129929dc> [Gerard Toal](http://toal.org/) (Gearóid Ó Tuathail) is the author of “[Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest for Ukraine and the Caucasus”](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/near-abroad-9780190253301?cc=us&lang=en&)(forthcoming, Oxford University Press) and professor of government and international affairs at Virginia Tech’s National Capital Region campus in Old Town Alexandria. [John O’Loughlin](http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/PEC/johno/index.html) is College Professor of Distinction and professor of geography at the University of Colorado, Boulder.

Between Armenia and Azerbaijan lies a contested territory controlled by an unrecognized state called the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). In the early hours of April 2, violence exploded in this Armenian-supported statelet in the southern Caucasus. This festering conflict in former Soviet territory suddenly turned hot. The violence came just hours after the end of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, hosted by President Obama in D.C. Both Armenia’s president, Serzh Sargsyan, and Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, attended. On its margins they [met separately with Vice President Biden](http://www.rferl.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-heavy-fighting-armenia-azerbaijan/27649973.html) to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Earlier Aliyev and Secretary of State John F. Kerry [held a brief news conference](http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/255342.htm) in which Aliyev called for the conflict to be resolved based on the “immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from our territories.” As Aliyev and Sargsyan flew home, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [escalated dramatically](http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2016/04/02/world/europe/02reuters-nagorno-karabakh-fighting.html). In a matter of hours, rules of engagement tacitly developed since a 1994 cease-fire went out the window. For the first time, a mass incursion of tank formations occurred. For the first time, Azerbaijani forces sought to seize and hold territories held by NKR forces. For the first time, GRAD missiles were used and a series of other weapon systems, like armed drones, were thrown into the fight. NKR forces shot down at least one Mi-24 helicopter and destroyed numerous tanks. And, tragically, the death toll in this one eruption is the largest since 1994, with scores dead, possibly more. Here are five things you need to know about this longstanding conflict. **1. After World War I, Nagorno-Karabakh was caught between — and claimed by — two emerging nations, Armenia and Azerbaijan.** The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh [started amid](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-4967.1999.tb00348.x/abstract) the great conflicts of the 20th century. The Ottoman and Russian Empires that had dominated the Caucasus collapsed at the end of World War I. Nationalist parties pitted neighbors — Christian Armenians, Turkic Muslims and others — against each other and tried to define national homelands. Caught in the middle was Karabakh, a multicultural mosaic spread across a largely mountainous terrain. The Soviet Union, the new power in the region, devised a solution. It created [a Nagorno-Karabakh “autonomous oblast” (NKAO)](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668136.2011.642583) — an oblast is an administrative district — as an island within the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. It was not contiguous with Armenia. The NKAO’s majority Armenian population wasn’t happy with this. The oblast remained a bone of contention between the Soviet republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. When Gorbachev loosened Soviet power in the mid-1980s, local Armenian nationalist groups fought to change the facts on the ground, polarizing the region. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, Karabakh’s fate became the salient issue in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In September 1991, local Armenians proclaimed the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, defining its territory to include the NKAO and other parts of Azerbaijan, including the Shaumian region to the north and territories to the east of Martakert and Martuni — to be governed by local Armenians, independent of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani forces sought to destroy the NKR. Armenian forces, locals and volunteers from Armenia proper sought to secure its existence. The war was ugly. An estimated 750,000 Azerbaijanis were driven from their homes in the fighting, the vast majority not from the NKAO but from surrounding provinces seized by the Armenian forces and from Armenia proper. More than 300,000 ethnic Armenians inside Azerbaijan were forcefully displaced as well. Initially, the local Armenian NKR treated those seized territories as assets to be traded in a final peace deal. Over time these areas were reimagined as “liberated territories,” part of an organic homeland called Artsakh. The current [constitution](http://www.nkrusa.org/country_profile/constitution.shtml) of the NKR does not define the state borders. But its [local maps](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2753/PPC1075-8216600302?journalCode=mppc20) include the historic NKAO (whose borders are not marked) and the seized territories; other outside territories are marked as “under Azerbaijani occupation.” In return, Azerbaijan contends that all of NKR’s territory is actually Azerbaijan but is under Armenian occupation. **2.** Nagorno-Karabakh is not a frozen conflict. It’s a simmering one. The Karabakh conflict is commonly described as “frozen.” Observers often categorize it with other contested post-Soviet territories like Transnistria (Moldova), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia), and, more recently, Crimea and the Donbas (Ukraine). But this is too simplistic, for three reasons. First, the war over Karabakh came to an end in 1994 with a cease-fire but without a peace agreement. A “line of contact” separates the parties in the contested Karabakh area; Armenia and Azerbaijan also share a long border to the north of the NKR. There are no international peacekeepers in the area and only a handful of observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The line of contact features World War I-style trenches on both sides, in some places three rows deep. Second, there has always been shooting across the line of contact. In recent years, that has included particularly nasty long-range sniper fire and incursions by small groups of soldiers. And the conflict has been heating up: Last year, more soldiers died than in any year since 1994 — and this last weekend’s fighting alone appears to have killed more than died in 2015. Finally, no Russian troops are stationed in Karabakh, unlike in the other post-Soviet conflicts. Russia remains the most powerful power broker in the Caucasus, guaranteeing Armenia’s security with a military base in Gyumri, in the west of Armenia facing Turkey, while supplying weapons to both sides. **3.** Karabakhi residents overwhelmingly oppose compromise For a [National Science Foundation project on de facto states](http://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0827016), we conducted large representative surveys in 2010-12 in four post-Soviet regions. Karabakh is now ethnically homogeneous — and its [respondents were the most uncompromising](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15387216.2015.1012644) of all those we surveyed. They were all but united in opposing the return of displaced Azerbaijanis or any shifts in territory and in disliking and distrusting their former enemies. The NKR survey results showed that most people strongly distrusted others and were unwilling to forgive past violence. Karabakhis also had the highest levels of ethnic pride among the dozens of ethnicities that we have surveyed in post-Soviet states and the Balkans. In fact, their pride was all but unanimous, with 73 percent of respondents saying they are “very proud” of their identity and another 21 percent describing themselves as (merely!) “proud.” And what’s especially important for any discussion of a [“land for peace” negotiation](http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/intdev/johno/pub/Land_for_Peace.pdf) with Azerbaijan is this: Karabakhis strongly (85 percent) rejected any notion of a return to the borders of the NKAO of Soviet times. They slightly supported, with just over 60 percent, their current expansive territorial limits, which you can see in the blue shaded areas on the map. But nearly 70 percent preferred a vision of their homeland that adds areas, hatched on the map, still under Azerbaijani control as well as an undetermined and large “historic” area across the south Caucasus. **4. Karabakhis aren’t confident that peace negotiations will succeed — and believe they must be ready to fight for themselves** Peace negotiations, with Armenia representing the NKR, have stopped and started over the past two decades, making little real progress. Only half of our Karabakhi respondents believed that the discussions, hosted by the OSCE’s Minsk Group (co-chaired by ambassadors from France, Russia and the United States), will succeed. A bare majority of 53 percent thinks that international peacekeepers can help resolve the conflict. Rather, Karabakhis have a strong sense that they must look out for themselves and mobilize against Azerbaijani threats. Majorities were worried about an Azerbaijani military buildup (63 percent) and about a new war with their neighbor (58 percent). Still, they believed that they would be able to withstand any attack. Just over a quarter (26 percent) of Karabakhis were willing to even consider [ceding land for peace](http://www.c-r.org/resources/forced-displacement-nagorny-karabakh-conflict-return-and-its-alternatives). **5.** The Karabakh conflict seems local, but it could drag in major world powersThe Karabakh conflict seems intensely local, fighting over a few villages and kilometers. But it’s influenced by broader global shifts and regional regime calculations. First, declining oil revenues and recession in Russia have placed Azerbaijan’s Aliyev regime under pressure. In December 2015, the government was forced toward a floating exchange rate for its currency, the manat; in one day, the manat [plunged 32 percent against the U.S. dollar](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/22/azerbaijan-currency-plummets-oil-price). Living standards are dropping and street protests are rising. The regime may believe a distracting war spectacle in Karabakh has benefits. Armenia’s democracy-challenged ruling clique may also believe a conflict would help its citizens “rally around the flag.” That’s a doubly dangerous situation. Second, the chill in relations between Russia and Turkey has [opened up splits](http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/02/26/the-shifting-dangers-of-nagorno-karabakh/) between Azerbaijan’s pro-Russian and pro-Turkish factions. Armenia is a member of Moscow’s Eurasian Customs Union; Azerbaijan is not, yet. Russia [may want to place peacekeepers in the area](http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/04/03/whats-behind-the-flare-up-in-nagorno-karabakh/) and to underscore its role as the indispensable power in this region, and its “near abroad” more generally. Third, Aliyev’s invitation to D.C., his first visit in a decade, was a symbolic victory in the face of [widespread criticism](http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-ismayilova-clooney-fight-until-shes-free/27615153.html) about media suppression and human rights abuses. Did face time with Kerry, Biden and Obama “free” Aliyev to pursue war? We will not know for some time. **So what’s ahead?** The Karabakh conflict has historically unseated governments in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. [A cease-fire has now been agreed to](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35964213) after four days of fighting. Will this eruption of violence [galvanize international diplomacy](http://www.osce.org/cio/231431), which until now has been small and hasn’t put enough resources on the ground? Nagorno-Karabakh is a conflict with the potential to escalate quickly into something broader, entangling Russia and Turkey (a member of NATO), and galvanizing the Armenian diaspora. We’ve been warned.

#### Russia-NATO conflict escalates and goes nuclear. Majumdar 16

Dave Majumdar, 1-25-2018, "Doomsday: Why a War with Russia Would Go Nuclear (And Kill Billions of People)," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/doomsday-why-war-russia-would-go-nuclear-kill-billions-24214> Dave Majumdar has been covering defense since 2004. He has written for Flight International, Defense News and C4ISR Journal. Majumdar studied Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and is a student of naval history.

While a recent RAND Corporation study concluded that Russia could overrun NATO’s member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics within sixty hours, the war games did not simulate the use of nuclear weapons. If, however, a war were to breakout between NATO and Russia, nuclear weapons would certainly come into play—especially if the conflict were going poorly for Moscow. Unlike the Soviet Union, which had a stated “no first use” policy, modern Russia explicitly rejected that pledge in 1993. In fact, as Moscow’s conventional forces continued to atrophy during the economic and social meltdown of the 1990s, Russia developed a doctrine called de-escalation in 2000 . Simply put, if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons. In 2010, Russia revised the doctrine somewhat as its conventional forces started to recover from the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the current version states Moscow would use nuclear weapons in situations “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” This article originally appeared in 2016 and is being reprinted due to reader interest. While the RAND study shows that Russia would be able to take the Baltics fairly easily, the war game didn’t explore what would happen in the event of a NATO counter offensive. The RAND study simply states: Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics. A NATO counter-offensive would be bloody and fraught with escalatory risk—but it’s one of the probable outcomes of a Russian invasion. In that eventuality, Russian conventional forces—of which only a portion are well trained and well equipped—would likely be severely damaged or even destroyed. Moreover, if NATO forces hit targets inside Russia or crossed over into Russian territory, Moscow might conclude that there is a danger to the existence of the state. After all, Moscow has expressed concerns in the past that regime change by the West is an all too real danger. In that situation, Russia might counter advancing NATO forces with its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is not nearly as large as the Soviet arsenal had once been, but concrete numbers are hard to come by. The Soviet Union was thought to have possessed between 15,000 and 25,000 tactical nuclear weapons of all types ranging from suitcase-sized containers and nuclear mines to short-range aircraft delivered missiles, nuclear gravity bombs and artillery shells—as well as short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads. While Moscow has been slowly eliminating its non-strategic arsenal since the end of the Cold War, Russia many still have as many as 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons , according to the Congressional Research Service. However, other analyses suggest that Russia has as few as 2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons.

### Adv – Repression

#### **Azeri courts repress journalism and state criticism. Achmer 11/10**

Dorothy Achmer, 11-10-2018, "Azerbaijan: journalists and human rights activists left defenceless ," Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Azerbaijan/Azerbaijan-journalists-and-human-rights-activists-left-defenceless-190307>

In recent months, several lawyers defending political activists and journalists have been facing disciplinary action by the Bar Association of Azerbaijan. At the Board meeting of September 6th, 2018, administrative prosecution was imposed to seven lawyers for violating professional ethics: one lawyer was rebutted, two were reprimanded, and four suspended. According to the Bar Association of Azerbaijan, the four lawyers were suspended for providing legal assistance without contract, violating the defence law, and preventing the proper exercise of justice. The Bar Association of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as stated on its website, should be a non-profit, non-governmental, independent, self-regulating organisation that includes all lawyers. Its mission is to defend the rights and freedoms under the law, provide citizens with professional legal representation, and enhance the prestige of the legal profession. Over the last 9 months, the Bar Association has suspended the activities of many other lawyers, including Yalchin Imanov, Irada Cavadova, Asabali Mustafayev, Nemet Kerimli, and Faxraddin Mehdiyev – all known for defending human rights activists and journalists. Before being disbarred, Yalchin Imanov had defended journalist Aynur Elgunash, both in interviews with police and in court. Aynur Elgunash is involved in an investigation into journalists from Meydan TV. Now, she has been left without a lawyer. Elgunash said that the Bar Association offered her another lawyer. "I refused", she said, "because I don’t trust any other lawyer. In today’s situation, unfortunately, very few lawyers accept these political trials". Moreover, the decisions on lawyers were mainly made on the basis of the appeals of the law enforcement agencies - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Penitentiary Service of the Ministry of Justice, and the General Prosecutor's Office. “The legal profession, regarded as one of the most effective mechanisms for the protection of human rights in the world, in Azerbaijan is simply a decoration”, remarks Intigam Aliyev, Head of the Legal Enlightenment Society and human rights activist. “Best case scenario, the Bar Association operates like a department of the Ministry of Justice or the presidential apparatus”. The lawyers involved defined the suspension a "biased move", linked to their defence of those who they consider “political prisoners”. The Bar Association has rejected these accusations. According to a report by OSCE, the Bar Association is directly linked to authorities of Azerbaijan and has been used to repress lawyers willing to represent and speak up on behalf of victims of grave human rights violations. Elchin Sadigov, lawyer of human rights defender Giyas Ibrahimov, reported “constant pressure” by the Bar Association and law enforcement agencies. He reported repeated harassment by authorities in retaliation for representing human rights activists. Prior to November 2017, if a lawyer was disbarred in Azerbaijan, they could still legally represent clients in court with the exception of criminal cases. However, new amendments made to the Law on Representation on October 31st, 2017 prevented them to do that. Intigam Aliyev told [OC Media](http://oc-media.org/) that authoritarian governments are not interested in strengthening the legal system, as this would hinder the development of arbitrariness, lawlessness, and corruption in the judicial and legal bodies. Aliyev has brought several cases against Azerbaijan to the ECHR (The European Court of Human Rights). "Authorities of Azerbaijan understand that such massive violations of human rights are impossible with a strong, independent judiciary; abuse of power and corruption in courts would not be at the current level. In other words, the government has always viewed advocacy as a strategic area of ​​political interest", Aliyev said.

#### Repression is the most significant internal link to terrorist mobilization. Bedford 09

Sophie Bedford, 2009 “Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan: Repression and Mobilization in a Post-Soviet Context” Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm Studies in Politics. Dr. Sofie Bedford is an affiliated researcher at Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES) at Uppsala University (UCRS). She has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stockholm University and an MA in Peace and Conflict Research from Uppsala University. The title of her 2009 PhD thesis is Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan: Repression and Mobilization in a Post-Soviet Context. Dr. Bedford is working on two research projects further described below.

Soft repression, as defined by Ferree, relates only to informal restrictions inflicted on social movements by the larger society, yet findings from the Azerbaijani cases indicate that state repression can also be soft. In Azerbaijan repression rarely includes the use of direct force or threat of state violence, with some exceptions. Instead repression is to a certain extent built into the political system in terms of the restrictions and regulations on religion and opposition described above. While this type of soft repression could be considered formal there is also a certain amount of informal soft repression, comparable to Ferree’s meso-level stigma, as expressed by name calling — aiming to discredit a whole group on the basis of its affiliation with a certain movement. Through this type of soft repression the state sets out who its opponents are and unwittingly contributes to the mobilization of the opposition by enhancing the feeling of we and they for a movement and its participants. In other words, repression helps to effect the consolidation of the movement and forces the community to take action in one way or another so as to establish its position in society. However, soft repression is characterized by the fact that it still leaves some room for maneuvering, that is, for choosing a non-violent course of response. This seems to be the main difference between the Azerbaijani context and other post-Soviet cases where hard state repression eliminates alternatives. Repression as a catalyst to soft and hard mobilization Comparatively speaking, the Azerbaijani political context was related to North Caucasus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, areas where Islamic movements did face virulent repression such as the use of direct force against challengers as well as mass arrests or kidnappings. The rather brief analysis seemed in any case to show that much of the violence produced by the movements themselves was a response to a context where hard repression finished off all other options. The choice then becomes either not acting at all or taking radical action! When hard repression is targeting all members of a movement indiscriminately (radical and moderate) as well as those outside a movement (innocent bystanders, non-active sympathizers, and members of the public) the likelihood of violent behavior grows. If you are, so to speak, punished for a crime you are not guilty of, next time you might as well commit the crime. In this way the strategy of the authorities in North Caucasus and Uzbekistan, namely to label all “suspicious” religious behavior “Wahhabism”, thereby legitimizing the harsh repression of all believers, can be said to fuel hatred and violence. Even if the current regime in Tajikistan (the only former Soviet country that has an Islamic party in government) appears to act a little less aggressive towards the faithful, violent repression of Islamic activism occurred both before and during the civil war. This discussion could also provide some more general insights about the state as an actor and the role played by the state in the mobilization of social movements. The role of the state, in terms of the political opportunities the state presents to challengers, is often acknowledged in social movement literature. In general this is done without particular emphasis and rather as one more aspect, among others, of the development of a social movement. It seems however that the role of the state in the mobilization process must receive greater emphasis in a nondemocratic context, inasmuch as most authoritarian regimes which try to prevent opposition are in fact, in many cases, themselves the catalyst to mobilization. A multifaceted picture of Islamic activism The ghost of a Global Jihad and Wahhabism A final purpose of this thesis was to enhance the understanding of what Islamic activism is all about in order to contribute to a more nuanced view of the phenomenon. Even though the mobilization of Islamic movements I have studied do share many similarities, the differences I have shown between the Juma and Abu Bakr mosque communities alert us to the danger in assuming that all Islamic activism can be understood from one and only one all-encompassing viewpoint. The comparative (regional) approach also emphasized the need to take multiple aspects of the context into account when analyzing Islamic mobilization. When reading some, although by no means all, previous research in the field it is easy to get the impression that a great deal of Islamic activism is generated by the movements’ wish to support a “Global Jihad” against the West. Because of this I find it of the utmost importance to point out that in the cases I have studied here, both individually (Azerbaijan) and comparatively (other regional post-Soviet Muslim states), the disappointment with how post-independence leaders have handled the political, economical, social and moral situation in the own countries is at the root of virtually all strife. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the aftermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror have contributed to spread ideas of Muslim solidarity and “a war between civilizations” among the Muslims in Azerbaijan. The “9/11 effect” on state strategies is far more evident than its impact on the activities of the various movements studied, since many authoritarian regimes, including the ones analyzed in this study, were quick to jump on the bandwagon, initiating or intensifying the suppression of secular and religious opposition. In general, extrinsic influences have been shown to be important for the mobilization of Islamic activism, mainly in relation to the formulation of national religious policy, in itself a response by the authorities to what they experience as domestic meddling by radical foreign actors. National policy towards the different movements, as a result of the way governments perceive foreign threats, has become more restrictive and the attitudes of the authorities towards Islamic activism in general more ruthless. In all of the contexts studied, a fear of imported religious radicalism is clearly noticeable among the authorities. It is perhaps instructive, then, to remind the reader of how the expression “Wahhabi” became the symbol of this fear and a catchall-phrase to describe unwanted religious activity originating abroad. As its usage became widespread among policy makers and other authorities, it also came to serve as a “weapon” to denigrate all Islamic activists seen as oppositional, whether they had connections to foreign religious activists or not. In Azerbaijan, where the suspicion that a certain movement is affiliated with other countries strongly influences the people’s perceptions of that particular movement, fear and hearsay have also influenced the attitudes of movements towards each other. These attitudes have contributed to a confrontational situation and, as far as I am concerned, have definitely been one more factor impinging on the mobilization process. Again, regardless of whether or not the community in question was in fact affiliated with the particular country. To conclude, the mobilization of Islamic activism in Azerbaijan is more dependent on the national than the international context in which it takes place. The post-Soviet Azerbaijani republic, in a sort of transition, still suffers from social, economical as well as political problems. Furthermore, the Soviet past still casts a shadow over social and political developments in Azerbaijan. In this context the popularity of the Juma and Abu Bakr mosque communities appeared threatening to the authorities, and, indeed, repressive actions failed to reduce their popularity or to put an end to their mobilization. On the contrary, the pressure on the mosque communities has brought community members closer together and strengthened their certainty that there is a need for change in Azerbaijan. In the Abu Bakr and Juma mosque communities young people looking for something new have found what they were looking for, and as a result religious opposition has become an interesting social force in Azerbaijan, the “bridgehead of secularism”.

#### Radicalization destabilizes Azerbaijan. Souleimanov and Ehrmann 17

Emil Souleimanov, Maya Ehrmann, Fall-2017, "The Rise of Militant Salafism in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications," No Publication, https://www.mepc.org/rise-militant-salafism-azerbaijan-and-its-regional-implications

In the face of Soviet-imposed rule, as well as a national identity shaped by local intellectuals with anti-clerical sentiments, Islam has taken a secondary role to nationalism in Azerbaijani society. While the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not instigate political Islam in Azerbaijan, it did provide an ideological vacuum for religious groups to fill, a growing propensity for devoutness, and an interest in Islam among the population. The Salafi movement, spurred by missionary activities using external funds and the establishment of mosques, has been able to use disillusionment with the current Azerbaijani regime and the desire for a return to more traditionalist values in order to gain followers. Growing concern by the authorities over the influence of this movement has led to repression of Salafi Muslims, a factor that has contributed to radicalization. This radicalization of Salafism in Azerbaijan can further be attributed to the presence of Dagestani minorities in the north of Azerbaijan, many of whom are followers of Salafism and are greatly influenced by their Dagestani counterparts. Indeed, there is a rising trend among Dagestani minorities in the north of Azerbaijan to engage in insurgent activities. As it lacks substantial support or external sources and relies on very limited popular support among either highly secularized or Shiite Azerbaijanis — who generally distance themselves from what they call "radical Islam" — Salafism or its militant form, jihadism, seems to be an easy task for the authorities to cope with. Yet the potential growth of jihadist ideology presents a danger for the security and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani state due to the intersection of religious and ethnic loyalties in the northern areas, home to Dagestani ethnic groups possessing latent irredentist sentiments. Should the Azerbaijani authorities continue to carry out fierce and indiscriminate "anti-Wahhabi" policies, fueled by nationalism in the borderland areas with Dagestan, Salafism might turn into a transnational ideology of resistance among the Avars, Lezgis and Tsakhurs, linking them even closer to the Dagestani cause and possibly ensuring support from Dagestan-based insurgents. In this case, Baku might face another territorial conflict with unpredictable consequences.

#### Azeri stability key k2 divert Russian energy revenues. Reuters 8/5

Reuters Editorial, 8-5-2018, "Assassination attempt and protest send warning to Azerbaijan's rulers," U.K., https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-azerbaijan-protests-insight/assassination-attempt-and-protest-send-warning-to-azerbaijans-rulers-idUKKBN1KR0EW

Azerbaijan, a majority Muslim country of about 10 million, has grown wealthy from oil and natural gas since it declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Protests are rare and are put down quickly. But while money has flowed into sprucing up Baku, opponents of President Ilham Aliyev say few have seen major benefits from the oil wealth, especially people outside the capital, and accuse his government of suppressing human rights and stifling democracy. Drawing parallels with Aliyev, they accuse Veliyev, 57, of treating Gyanja like a personal fief, showing no regard for the city’s poor and being high-handed with anyone who stands in his way. “Veliyev has been behaving exactly the same way as Aliyev does,” Jakhangir Amirkhanly, a 74-year-old member of the opposition Musavat Party, told Reuters in Gyanja. The unrest was brief and there is no sign of it spreading. Aliyev, who succeeded his father Heydar Aliyev as president in 2003, brooks little dissent and the opposition is weak. The municipal authorities in Gyanja said in an emailed response to Reuters’ questions that criticism of Veliyev was “groundless and biased.” But the events in the city show that, with the economy heavily dependent on the energy sector and the wealth gap now huge, Azerbaijan’s leaders could face a growing challenge to retain power in the long term if oil prices fall. Deeply entrenched elites and long-term rulers in other countries in the region are watching closely — Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan all have economies that are reliant on energy and leaders who are nervous about any signs of unrest. Europe is also watching. Because of its energy reserves and strategic location along the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is seen by Europe as an important alternative to Russian energy supplies, and BP is a major investor in the country.

#### That causes aggression

Jeff D. Colgan 14 [(Jeff D. Colgan, assistant professor in the School of International Service at American University in Washington, D.C.) Petro-aggression: How Russia’s oil makes war more likely, Washington Post 4-1-2014] SJDI

The third storyline is the most important yet most neglected: Russia’s resource curse. Russia’s energy revenues (from both oil and gas) have ensconced Vladimir Putin as an autocrat and given him a free hand in foreign policy. Russia is so heavily dependent on its energy revenues that it is a classic petrostate, making it more susceptible to corruption, autocracy and violent conflict. Russia’s incursion into Crimea can be seen as a close cousin of petro-aggression. A state is more likely to instigate international conflict when it has a combination of (a) oil income and (b) a leader with aggressive preferences. A lot more likely: 250 percent more military conflict than a typical non-petrostate, on average. Oil income means more military spending, increasing the state’s scope for potential conflicts. Even more importantly, it distorts the domestic politics of the state, reducing the leader’s domestic political risk from military adventurism and aggressive foreign policy. In my book on petro-aggression, I argued that revolutionary leaders are systematically more likely to have aggressive preferences (e.g., Qaddafi, Hussein and Khomeini). Putin is not a revolutionary leader, but that is not a necessary condition for having aggressive preferences. He has repeatedly avowed a hard-nosed, realpolitik view of the world. He has repeatedly asserted his ambition to return Russia to its status as a superpower of the first rank. It seems plausible to view Putin as an aggressive leader. So we ought to be wary when he lines up military forces next to the Ukrainian border. Here lies the real risk of Europe’s energy situation: So long as it continues to buy Russian oil and gas, it is sending massive amounts of cash to a neighboring dictator. By keeping the taps on, Putin consolidates his power as Russian dictator. What does all this imply for European and American energy policy? Any major changes to Ukraine or Europe’s natural gas consumption would involve infrastructure investments that will play out over years or decades. So we should be skeptical that energy policy can be used as a short-term solution to the crisis: Shale gas from the U.S. is not going solve anything in Ukraine just now. But energy policy is important for the long term. America and especially Europe should have a hard look at managing their reliance on fossil fuels. Diversifying away from fossil fuels would bring security benefits (in addition to some obvious environmental ones), in part by reducing the money sent to petrostates like Russia. For Europe, this means more openness to civilian nuclear power as a source of energy that is less bad than the alternatives. At the very least, natural gas could be managed with a better pipeline infrastructure to prevent Russia from embargoing individual European countries. In short, Europeans should get serious about an energy policy that is consistent with their political and environmental values. In doing so, they can help wean Russia off its energy income, and thereby reduce its leader’s scope for autocracy at home and belligerence abroad.

#### Extinction. Majumdar 16

Dave Majumdar, 1-25-2018, "Doomsday: Why a War with Russia Would Go Nuclear (And Kill Billions of People)," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/doomsday-why-war-russia-would-go-nuclear-kill-billions-24214> Dave Majumdar has been covering defense since 2004. He has written for Flight International, Defense News and C4ISR Journal. Majumdar studied Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary and is a student of naval history.

While a recent RAND Corporation study concluded that Russia could overrun NATO’s member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics within sixty hours, the war games did not simulate the use of nuclear weapons. If, however, a war were to breakout between NATO and Russia, nuclear weapons would certainly come into play—especially if the conflict were going poorly for Moscow. Unlike the Soviet Union, which had a stated “no first use” policy, modern Russia explicitly rejected that pledge in 1993. In fact, as Moscow’s conventional forces continued to atrophy during the economic and social meltdown of the 1990s, Russia developed a doctrine called de-escalation in 2000 . Simply put, if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons. In 2010, Russia revised the doctrine somewhat as its conventional forces started to recover from the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the current version states Moscow would use nuclear weapons in situations “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” This article originally appeared in 2016 and is being reprinted due to reader interest. While the RAND study shows that Russia would be able to take the Baltics fairly easily, the war game didn’t explore what would happen in the event of a NATO counter offensive. The RAND study simply states: Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics. A NATO counter-offensive would be bloody and fraught with escalatory risk—but it’s one of the probable outcomes of a Russian invasion. In that eventuality, Russian conventional forces—of which only a portion are well trained and well equipped—would likely be severely damaged or even destroyed. Moreover, if NATO forces hit targets inside Russia or crossed over into Russian territory, Moscow might conclude that there is a danger to the existence of the state. After all, Moscow has expressed concerns in the past that regime change by the West is an all too real danger. In that situation, Russia might counter advancing NATO forces with its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is not nearly as large as the Soviet arsenal had once been, but concrete numbers are hard to come by. The Soviet Union was thought to have possessed between 15,000 and 25,000 tactical nuclear weapons of all types ranging from suitcase-sized containers and nuclear mines to short-range aircraft delivered missiles, nuclear gravity bombs and artillery shells—as well as short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads. While Moscow has been slowly eliminating its non-strategic arsenal since the end of the Cold War, Russia many still have as many as 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons , according to the Congressional Research Service. However, other analyses suggest that Russia has as few as 2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons.

### Adv – Soft Left

#### **Azeri courts repress journalism and state criticism. Achmer 11/10**

Dorothy Achmer, 11-10-2018, "Azerbaijan: journalists and human rights activists left defenceless ," Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Azerbaijan/Azerbaijan-journalists-and-human-rights-activists-left-defenceless-190307>

In recent months, several lawyers defending political activists and journalists have been facing disciplinary action by the Bar Association of Azerbaijan. At the Board meeting of September 6th, 2018, administrative prosecution was imposed to seven lawyers for violating professional ethics: one lawyer was rebutted, two were reprimanded, and four suspended. According to the Bar Association of Azerbaijan, the four lawyers were suspended for providing legal assistance without contract, violating the defence law, and preventing the proper exercise of justice. The Bar Association of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as stated on its website, should be a non-profit, non-governmental, independent, self-regulating organisation that includes all lawyers. Its mission is to defend the rights and freedoms under the law, provide citizens with professional legal representation, and enhance the prestige of the legal profession. Over the last 9 months, the Bar Association has suspended the activities of many other lawyers, including Yalchin Imanov, Irada Cavadova, Asabali Mustafayev, Nemet Kerimli, and Faxraddin Mehdiyev – all known for defending human rights activists and journalists. Before being disbarred, Yalchin Imanov had defended journalist Aynur Elgunash, both in interviews with police and in court. Aynur Elgunash is involved in an investigation into journalists from Meydan TV. Now, she has been left without a lawyer. Elgunash said that the Bar Association offered her another lawyer. "I refused", she said, "because I don’t trust any other lawyer. In today’s situation, unfortunately, very few lawyers accept these political trials". Moreover, the decisions on lawyers were mainly made on the basis of the appeals of the law enforcement agencies - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Penitentiary Service of the Ministry of Justice, and the General Prosecutor's Office. “The legal profession, regarded as one of the most effective mechanisms for the protection of human rights in the world, in Azerbaijan is simply a decoration”, remarks Intigam Aliyev, Head of the Legal Enlightenment Society and human rights activist. “Best case scenario, the Bar Association operates like a department of the Ministry of Justice or the presidential apparatus”. The lawyers involved defined the suspension a "biased move", linked to their defence of those who they consider “political prisoners”. The Bar Association has rejected these accusations. According to a report by OSCE, the Bar Association is directly linked to authorities of Azerbaijan and has been used to repress lawyers willing to represent and speak up on behalf of victims of grave human rights violations. Elchin Sadigov, lawyer of human rights defender Giyas Ibrahimov, reported “constant pressure” by the Bar Association and law enforcement agencies. He reported repeated harassment by authorities in retaliation for representing human rights activists. Prior to November 2017, if a lawyer was disbarred in Azerbaijan, they could still legally represent clients in court with the exception of criminal cases. However, new amendments made to the Law on Representation on October 31st, 2017 prevented them to do that. Intigam Aliyev told [OC Media](http://oc-media.org/) that authoritarian governments are not interested in strengthening the legal system, as this would hinder the development of arbitrariness, lawlessness, and corruption in the judicial and legal bodies. Aliyev has brought several cases against Azerbaijan to the ECHR (The European Court of Human Rights). "Authorities of Azerbaijan understand that such massive violations of human rights are impossible with a strong, independent judiciary; abuse of power and corruption in courts would not be at the current level. In other words, the government has always viewed advocacy as a strategic area of ​​political interest", Aliyev said.

#### Aliyev uses pretrial detention to silence dissenters and journalists. Washington Post Editorial Board 15

Editorial board, 3/1/15, “Jailed without trial in Azerbaijan” The Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/jailed-without-trial-in-azerbaijan/2015/03/01/34a1d342-bea1-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.921d1222ee8d>

THE PRESIDENT of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, is showing signs of a frantic despotism. Journalists, bloggers, lawyers, human rights activists and others who speak out for individual liberty are arbitrarily being swept up in a wave of arrests and detentions. Mr. Aliyev, suffering a decline in the oil revenue that has propped up his regime for years, seems to be striking out at anyone who opposes him. One of Mr. Aliyev’s favorite tools for silencing people is pretrial detention. Azeri law states that it is to be used only in limited cases, and Azerbaijan’s criminal procedure code put this power in the hands of the courts, not prosecutors, more than a decade ago. In practice, though, the courts have become servants of the prosecution. The European Court for Human Rights [noted](https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CommDH%282015%295&amp;Language=lanEnglish&amp;Ver=original&amp;BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&amp;BackColorIntranet=EDB021&amp;BackColorLogged=F5D383) in a case last year that Azeri courts have frequently endorsed prosecution requests for detention automatically. [Leyla Yunus](http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/05/azerbaijan-leading-rights-defender-arrested-0), a prominent human rights activist, has been in pretrial detention since July 30 on arbitary and trumped-up charges of treason and tax evasion. She is suffering from a liver condition and diabetes. On Feb. 18, an appeals court [dismissed](http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-extends-rights-activists-pretrial-detention/26856212.html) her appeal and gave her another five months in pretrial detention, at the end of which she will have been behind bars for nearly a year without trial. Her husband, Arif Yunus, a historian who suffers from cardiovascular disease, was detained on Aug. 5. His appeal was [dismissed](http://www.rferl.org/content/yunus-pretrial-deteio-extension-arif-leyla/26864422.html) Feb. 23, and he, too, was given another five months in pretrial detention. Meanwhile, the campaign against critical journalists continues. The investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova, who described her situation [in a letter from prison](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/letter-from-an-azerbaijani-prison/2015/02/17/2a2d6cb0-b3d3-11e4-886b-c22184f27c35_story.html) that ran as a recent Post op-ed, remains behind bars in pretrial detention. A closed-door trial was held Feb. 23, three days after her letter appeared, and she was [found guilty](http://www.rferl.org/content/release-update-azeri-authorities-renew-attacks-against-rferl-journalists-ismayilova-bakirov/26865003.html) of criminal libel and fined. The libel charge stemmed from accusations made in 2014 by a man who claimed she defamed him on Facebook, which she denied. In the twisted, Orwellian nature of the Azeri justice system, she was first arrested in December on a charge of inciting a former colleague to attempt suicide and since has been slapped with new charges, including embezzlement, tax evasion, illegal entrepreneurship and abuse of power. Mr. Aliyev seems particularly uncomfortable with the work of the Azerbaijani service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, to which Ms. Ismayilova had contributed. On the same day as her snap trial, a former chief of the service’s Baku bureau was stopped at the airport, prevented from boarding a plane and told he was under a travel ban at the request of the prosecutor’s office. More than 26 journalists and staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have been interrogated by Azeri authorities since a Dec. 26 raid on the Baku bureau. The news organization is funded by the United States through the Broadcasting Board of Governors. In a recent magazine advertisement, Mr. Aliyev said he wanted to make Azerbaijan “one of the most developed and competitive countries in the world.” It certainly won’t become that if he continues to rule like a despot.

### Adv – Diversionary War

#### Azerbaijan uses supposed terrorist threats to justify crackdown and repression. Jardine 18

Bradley Jardine, 8-1-2018, "Crackdown widens in Azerbaijan’s second city as police kill assassination suspects," No Publication, <https://eurasianet.org/crackdown-widens-in-azerbaijans-second-city-as-police-kill-assassination-suspects> Bradley Jardine is a freelance journalist who covers the Caucasus.

\*Brackets in original

In the wake of the attempted assassination of the mayor of Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, four suspects have been killed and dozens of others have been detained in what human rights activists have said is an attempt to stoke fear of Islamic terror and stifle dissent in the country. The crackdown follows a series of still-murky events in Ganja. On July 3, there was an [assassination attempt](https://eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-suffers-blackout-and-political-blame-game-begins) on Ganja mayor Elmar Valiyev. A week later, the [authorities reported](https://eurasianet.org/s/attacks-in-azerbaijan-raise-accusations-of-islamist-extremism-government-skullduggery) that two senior police officers were killed in demonstrations in support of the assassination suspect. The next day, two people were placed on a wanted list, Azerbaijani law enforcement [announced](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323490/). One of them, Farrukh Gasimov, was immediately detained and the second, Rashad Boyukkishiyev, was killed in detention, [according](https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/29608/) to Azerbaijan’s [Interior Ministry](https://www.mia.gov.az/?/az/news/view/1217/). Fifteen more alleged participants were detained on July 17. On July 21, another suspect, Anar Bagirov, was killed and another eight people were detained, according to a [statement](https://www.azernews.az/nation/135165.html) by the Interior Ministry. Then, on July 25, the alleged mastermind of the attack, Agha Sarhani, was killed by police, law enforcement agencies [said](http://www.turan.az/ext/news/2018/7/free/Social/en/73821.htm). The last suspect pronounced dead was Fuad Samedov, who police say was hiding in a neighboring town, security forces [told](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323662/) Trend News. In total, 61 people have been arrested so far and a further 13 have been placed on a wanted list. “The July terrorist attack against the mayor of Ganja and the killing of two police officers created a need for the state to intervene to maintain political stability,” said Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General Zakir Garalov, the regional news website Caucasian Knot [reported](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323662/). According to Garalov, the case is being investigated by working groups formed under the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service. But activists in Azerbaijan say the government is using the unrest as a pretext to clamp down on political opposition. Members of Muslim Unity, a religious movement that been [pushed underground since 2015](https://eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-show-trial-ends-with-harsh-sentences-for-islamic-activists), told Caucasian Knot that Agha Sarhani was innocent and that his murder was an attempt to smear the group. Muslim Unity says Sarhani was an active member and participated in numerous peaceful protests with the group. “The murder of suspects in the ‘Ganja case,’ including Sarhani, are a consequence of the government’s desire to foment fear in society,” the group said in a statement. The group drew parallels with the events of 2015, when members of Muslim Unity were arrested and convicted of [organizing](https://eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-examining-the-source-of-discontent-in-nardaran) riots that began in Nardaran. Seven people died during the unrest, including two policemen. Authorities say the group’s leader is connected with Yunis Safarov, the prime suspect in the Ganja assassination attempt and an accused Islamist radical. On July 6, the government issued a statement claiming that “Safarov’s main purpose in committing a terrorist act was to establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Azerbaijan, killing a number of well-known civil servants in the country, creating scandal, chaos, panic and, ultimately, the forced seizure of power.” But the official account leaves many questions unanswered, some analysts note. “In the official narrative, contradictory [pieces of information] were threaded together, [saying Safarov] studied in Qom in Iran [a Shia city] and then joined ISIS [a Sunni terrorist outfit that is hostile to Shia Muslims],” Leyla Aliyeva, a political analyst, [told](http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg634390.html) Ekho Kavkaza, RFE/RL’s Caucasus news service. “In other words, these were completely contradictory versions.” Other activists have noted the opaque nature of the investigation and potential for human rights abuse. “We cannot say whether [those detained] committed crimes or not, but the fact that their relatives are not provided with information about the place of their detention, and many are not allowed lawyers, is very alarming,” Ogtay Gulaliyev, a representative of the Center for the Protection of Political Prisoners (CPPP) [told](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323662/) Caucasian Knot. “Their relatives are so scared they do not want to make official statements.” According to CPPP’s January 2018 data, Azerbaijan has over 161 political prisoners. Activists from Muslim Unity [constitute](https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/politics/26917/) the largest group.

#### Current aid policy fails at holding the Azeris accountable – causes militarization. Kotoyan 17

Tamara Kotoyan, 7-22-2017, "Rethinking U.S. Foreign Aid Toward Azerbaijan," International Policy Digest, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/07/22/rethinking-u-s-foreign-aid-toward-azerbaijan/> Tamara Kotoyan is a third year student of Commerce/Arts at the University of Sydney, majoring in Government and International Relations and Commercial Law.

**Conclusion** Ultimately, in the context of instability in the South Caucasus, the US aid program has been ineffective in promoting democratization, human development and positive progress towards conflict de-escalation. The US should view Azerbaijan as an important ally and the failure to hold Azerbaijan accountable for their failings on democratic principles calls into question the credibility of the partnership. To distract its own population from its government’s failures, especially the suppression of dissident voices, freedom of the press, crackdowns on non-government organizations, persecution of human rights lawyers (through disbarment) and concerns with nepotism (the appointment of Mehriban Aliyeva as Vice President) the government has engaged in militarization.

#### Internal instability causes diversionary war, nuclear arms races, and massive imports of Russian weapons – non-uniques and turns any disad. Babayan 16

Nelli Babayan, 4/7/16, “Here’s what the research reveals about the violence in Nagorno Karabakh — and how ‘freezing’ conflicts can backfire” Washington Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/07/here-what-the-research-reveals-about-the-violence-in-nagorno-karabakh/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.05368281da0a> Nelli Babayan is a fellow at the Transatlantic Academy (based at the German Marshall Fund U.S.), associate fellow at the Freie Universität Berlin and author of [“Democratic Transformation and Obstruction: EU, US, Russia in the South Caucasus.”](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415748667/) Find her on Twitter [@nellibabayan](https://twitter.com/NelliBabayan). Nelli Babayan is not related to David Babayan, spokesperson for the NKR administration, or Samvel Babayan, its former defense minister.

1. War can get citizens to rally around an otherwise unpopular government Political scientists [Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9297187&fileId=S1537592714000851) show that autocratic leaders who struggle to establish domestic legitimacy are more likely to start an international conflict to whip up support at home. [That includes diversionary wars](http://www.amazon.com/Diversionary-War-Domestic-International-Conflict/dp/0804782466), in which leaders incite an international conflict to distract from domestic troubles. Think of Russia, where Vladimir Putin’s [approval rating](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/24/putins-approval-ratings-hit-89-percent-the-highest-theyve-ever-been/) jumped about 20 percent after annexing Crimea. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan are truly democracies. However, Armenia ranks higher on various [democracy indices](https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/armenia) than Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan often appears in reports pointing to its [poor record of human rights](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/azerbaijan) or [consolidated authoritarianism](https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/azerbaijan). Low levels of democracy, including rigged elections, prosecution of opposition, including human rights activists and journalists, result in lack of domestic legitimacy and often lead to anti-regime protests. [Harald Hagemann and Vladimir Kufenko](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecot.12084/full) show that economic and social factors, including income inequality, make anti-regime protests more likely. Moreover, as [Erik Voeten](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/28/heres-how-tumbling-oil-prices-could-make-the-world-a-more-peaceful-and-cooperative-place/) recently argued here in the Monkey Cage, volatile oil prices are likely to produce domestic unrest in oil-producing countries, which tend to be more bellicose than other nations. **Armenia** has seen its share of socioeconomic unrest. In 2013 many Armenians protested the government’s decision to snub the agreement with the [European Union](http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm) in favor of joining Russia’s Customs Union. In 2014 they protested against mandatory [pension contributions](https://iwpr.net/global-voices/mass-protest-movement-against-armenian-pension-reform). In 2015 they protested against another [electricity price hike](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/armenia-yerevan-protests-electric-prices-russia) by the Russian-owned utility. The government has regularly sent [police to break up the protests.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/thousands-in-armenia-protest-steep-hikes-in-electricity-rates/2015/06/23/51377fa0-19bb-11e5-bed8-1093ee58dad0_story.html) However, it seems the government continues to tolerate dissent, as it wants to keep friendly relations with the European Union and the United States, both of which support and expect democracy. In tightly controlled Azerbaijan, by contrast, and despite often [rigged voting](https://freedomhouse.org/article/aliyevs-rigged-election-azerbaijan-lacks-credibility), popular protests are rare also due to [active repression of human rights and media freedom](https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/16/azerbaijan-rights-defender-convicted). In the past, oil and gas income has helped the Azerbaijani government pay for social supports that kept popular grievances at bay. But with the slump in oil prices, the Azerbaijan government now faces unhappy citizens, as the social safety net decreases and consumer prices increase. Amid the [government’s worry about a possible coup](http://www.eurasianet.org/node/75786), the Azerbaijani currency has since December 2015 lost about one-third of its value against the U.S. dollar. To economize, the government even [turned off the lights](http://www.rferl.org/media/video/azerbaijan-baku-lightsout/27555956.html) at night in the capital, Baku. Tight finances also hit mortgage owners; after one mortgage owner self-immolated in January in protest, there were countrywide demonstrations against worsening economic conditions and price hikes, followed by [police intervention](http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-protests-arrests-rising-prices/27487867.html). Since these have been rare until now, the leadership will be concerned — and perhaps tempted to divert popular attention with a war. What’s more, there is new evidence of corruption. Recent [Panama Papers leak](http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-aliyev-corruption-panama/27652121.html)s suggest that Azerbaijan’s first family is linked to offshore companies – news that’s likely to antagonize citizens still further. **2**. Uncertainty leads to a security dilemma**, which leads to an arms race, which increases tensions, which …** When countries don’t exchange information and don’t have an effective negotiations platform, they remain uncertain about each other’s intentions. This creates a [security dilemma](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents): A state’s actions to increase security trigger others to respond similarly, producing further tensions. Frozen conflicts are the perfect incubator for such security dilemmas. Given constant animosity and distrust, opponents can easily make [“worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions,”](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) as political scientist Alexander Wendt suggested in his research into security dilemmas. And security dilemmas result in arms races, as we learned during the Cold War. The South Caucasus arms race has been troubling for two decades. In 2005, Azerbaijan announced a [70 percent increase](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/azerbaijan/dont-allow-a-new-arms-race-in-the-southern-caucasus.aspx) in military spending; Armenia quickly promised to match that pledge. The Global Militarization Index measures the relative weight and [importance of the military apparatus](https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/141209_GMI_ENG.pdf) of one state in relation to its society as a whole. Its 2014 edition ranked Armenia the third and Azerbaijan the tenth most militarized country in the world. Armenia’s 2014 military expenditures constituted 4 percent of GDP, compared to 4.8 percent in Azerbaijan. Compare that with the United States, where the military consumed [3.5 percent of GDP](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc). Armenia has 17.9 soldiers and paramilitary forces per 1,000 inhabitants, double Azerbaijan’s 8.9 ratio. The United States has only five soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. Both of these South Caucasus neighbors are spending a lot on arms, much of it from Russia. Azerbaijan has used its petrodollars to enrich its arsenal, buying [heavy weapons](http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/35532) from Russia, while Armenia is beefing up its arsenal with weapons from Russia at discounted prices, including a recent [$200 million Russian loan](http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/27560789.html) for rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons.

## 2AC – T

### Border Security = Aid

#### I meet: Military aid is bilateral military loans and grants as defined by the USAID Greenbook

Sullivan et al 11 - Patricia L. Sullivan (UGA), Brock F. Tessman (UGA), Xiaojun Li (Stanford), “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation”, *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2011) 7, 275–294 WJ

We define military aid as ‘‘total bilateral military assistance loans and grants’’ as reported by USAID through its Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook). The ‘‘Greenbook’’ measure of military assistance includes aid for several programs, including International Military Education and Training, Military Assistance Program Grants, Foreign Military Credit Financing, and Transfers of Excess Defense Articles.4 The measure excludes military assistance that is given for economic development purposes (which is captured in a separate measure of economic aid) and assistance given for counternarcotics and counterproliferation efforts, as well commercial military sales (USAID).5 We use the natural log of total US military aid delivered to a country in constant 2002 US dollars in our models. We also create a variable (milaiddep) that measures the relative dependence of the recipient country on US military aid. This variable is generated by dividing the amount of military aid by the GDP of the recipient country.6

#### Includes border security. Rolandsen 18

Øystein H. Rolandsen, Peace Pesearch Institute Oslo (Prio), Jan-Dec 2018, "The Impact of Military Aid on Conflict Resolution, Prevention and Stability in the Sahel and Horn of Africa," No Publication, <https://www.prio.org/Projects/Project/?x=1795>, Co-director PRIO Centre for Culture and Violent Conflict, Editorial Board member of the Centre for Peace and Development (CPDS) Journal, University of Juba, South Sudan and received Ph. D. in History from University of Oslo in 2010

​The provision of military aid is the most common policy tool used by Western states attempting to influence conflict and security in recipient countries. The aid includes donation of training, weapons, other military equipment, non-military stores (e.g. fuel), and other services (e.g. intelligence), to the armed forces as well as coast guards and border guards. Compared to other forms of intervention, military aid is considered economical, sustainable and easy to adapt to the local context. In addition, these programs are usually popular with recipient governments.

#### Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act specifically indicates border security is a part of US military aid to Azerbaijan – that’s Kotoyan

Tamara Kotoyan, 7-22-2017, "Rethinking U.S. Foreign Aid Toward Azerbaijan," International Policy Digest, <https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/07/22/rethinking-u-s-foreign-aid-toward-azerbaijan/> Tamara Kotoyan is a third year student of Commerce/Arts at the University of Sydney, majoring in Government and International Relations and Commercial Law.

\*green highlight was read in the 1AC

*Pre-existing Policies* **Section 907 of FREEDOM Support Act** Under section 907 of the FREDOM Support Act, the US was prevented from providing Azerbaijan with any form of governmental aid, “until the President determines, and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.” Reorientation of Policy (2002 onwards) Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre, US policy reoriented due to counterterrorism concerns. In 2002, the FREEDOM Support Act was amended to extend the presidential waiver for US national security concerns. However, Public Law 107-115 posed a serious concern with policy orientation, within section 2c and 2d of the amendment as to whether the ambiguous wording of the act calls into question consistency between US action and objectives. The law states that in section 2C of the waiver the president can waive the section 907 of FREEDOM Support Act, if it “is important to Azerbaijan’s border security.” The lack of specificity within the amendment has given Azerbaijan a license to further militarize and escalate tensions on the border with Armenia. The Department of State has reaffirmed its commitment to the US aid program for Azerbaijan, especially regarding Azerbaijan’s border security, stating that “U.S. security assistance aims to increase Azerbaijan’s ability to contribute more effectively to international efforts on peacekeeping, counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” as well as bolstering “Azerbaijan’s border security.” This is particularly problematic when America’s role in the OSCE Minsk group is accounted for. The US has been a co-chair for peace resolution in the Nagorno Karabakh dispute in the Minsk Group, however, the US must account for the relative stagnation in steps to achieve this objective. For the US to properly assert peace and democratic principles in the region, it must reconsider the standards it holds to its military aid recipients.

#### Border security aid is Section 333 military aid -

Security Assistance Monitor, "Section 333 Building Partner Capacity," No Publication, https://securityassistance.org/content/section-333-building-partner-capacity

Section 333 Building Partner Capacity is a new program created under the provisions of the FY 2017 NDAA that sought to expand the Global Train and Equip (Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority) scope for the purpose of building the capacity of foreign national security forces to conduct one or more of the following: Counterterrorism operations; Counter-weapons of mass destruction operations; Counter-illicit drug trafficking operations; Counter-transnational organized crime operations; Maritime and border security operations; Military intelligence operations; Operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation.

#### Azerbaijan gets almost $43 million in Section 333 aid – it’s substantial

**Security Assistance Monitor 19 (**http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Azerbaijan/2012/2019/all/Global//



### Nebel

### Military Aid Spec

####

### Plural

### AT: CX Checks Bad

### 2AR – PICs

### 2AR – Aid Spec

### 2AR – Aid Spec - PICs

### 2AR – Reasonability

## 2AC – Case

### OV – NKR

The NKR conflict is destabilizing – de-escalation on the border is all that prevents shifting European energy consumption from new Azeri pipelines to Russia; that fuels Russian aggression in the Baltics and draws in NATO. Outweighs

1. Magnitude: NATO war would kill at least billions of people and has nuclear weapons, that causes nuclear winter - that’s Majumdar and Starr.
2. Reversibility: we can always solve for their impacts, but we can’t reverse the effects of extinction.

### OV – Solvency

Energy demand is inelastic AND our scenario doesn’t increase oil prices

Literally all of our cards post-date theirs – the 2016 NKR conflict proves border flare-up and we actually give them border security aid now, not just radar equipment.

Extend Kucera – Azerbaijan wants the US for economic diversification away from Russia but we don’t need their aerial routes and troops anymore; they’ll listen to the US

Even if – Russia sells weapons, which doesn’t replace $40 million in free aid

* Also a question of the strategic alliance - Kucera

### Demand Inelastic

#### Oil demand is inelastic.

Konrad 12 [(Tom, manages portfolios for individual clients and am co-manager of the JPS Green Economy Fund, a hedge fund open to accredited investors looking for exposure to Peak Oil and Climate related themes) “The End Of Elastic Oil” Forbes, Jan 26, 2012] SJDI

Unfortunately, there is something to worry about, at least if we want a healthy economy. The new oil reserves we're now exploiting are not only more expensive to develop, but they also take much longer between the time the first well is drilled and the when the first oil is produced. That means it takes longer for oil supply to respond to changes in price. In economic terms, the oil supply is becoming less elastic as new oil supplies come increasingly from unconventional oil. Elasticity is the term economists use to describe how much supply or demand responds to changes in price. If a small change in price produces a large change in demand, demand is said to be elastic. If a large change in price produces a small change in supply, then supply is said to be inelastic. Elasticity of Demand On the demand side, the elasticity of our demand for oil reflects the options we have to using oil for our daily needs. At a personal level, we can quickly cut our demand for oil a little bit by combining car trips, keeping our tires properly inflated, etc. But the ability to make such reductions is often limited, and even such simple measures come at a cost of time or convenience, which is why we're not doing them already. If we live in an area without good public transport (as most of us do) we can't stop driving to work without losing our job, so we keep driving to work, and paying more for the gas to get there. Over the longer term, our personal options to cut oil consumption increase. We can move closer to work, or to somewhere where we can walk or use public transport to get to our job. This is why the most fuel-efficient vehicle is a moving van. Replacing a car with a more fuel efficient vehicle is an option for those who have money or credit, but the people who are under the most pressure from high fuel prices are unlikely to be able to afford such options. If they can't resort to ride sharing or public transport, they may simply lose their jobs because they can't afford to get there. The reduction in fuel use that comes from people losing their jobs and no longer commuting to work also contributes to the elasticity of demand, and I mention it to highlight the point that while reductions in fuel use can be benign (properly inflated tires, for instance), they can also be harmful to the economy. Reductions in demand due to high prices are often called demand destruction, and it's just as unpleasant as it sounds.

### Sultanova – Circumvention

### AT: NATO

### AT: Low Demand

#### There’s low demand for *oil*, not natural gas – Azeri production is particularly key; that’s Coffey.

#### The EU is about to sign a new natural gas deal with Azerbaijan – prisoner pardons indicate that Azerbaijan is susceptible to pressure on democratic norms. JF 4/12

Jamestown Foundation, 4-12-2019, "Azerbaijan and the EU Prepare to Finalize a New Partnership Agreement," No Publication, http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/Azerbaijan-and-the-EU-Prepare-to-Finalize-a-New-Partnership-Agreement.html

In February 2019, the two sides launched a high-level “Transport Dialogue” to discuss trans-regional logistics-infrastructure opportunities involving Azerbaijan, including the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, Port Baku facilities, as well as the North-South and South-West transport corridors ([**Mfa.gov.az**](http://mfa.gov.az/en/news/909/6019), February 19). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted the BTK’s importance to the Alliance’s transit activities to/from Afghanistan, via Azerbaijan ([**Nato.int,**](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_165234.htm) April 4). Similarly, signing the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreement (the first round of negotiations began in 2013—[**Trend**](https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2111295.html), January 23, 2013) would present many new opportunities for Azerbaijan in terms of economic diversification and expanding its role as a strategic regional transport/logistics hub ([**Vocaleurope.eu**](https://www.vocaleurope.eu/outcomes-of-the-eastern-partnership-brussels-summit-for-azerbaijan/), December 20, 2017). Azerbaijan’s unique geographical location makes it an important node for the growing number of air transportation links between Europe and Asia ([**Trend**](https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/business/3021780.html), February 19, 2019). With the timely finalization of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), the strategic backbone of EU-Azerbaijani relations, Europe will begin receiving natural gas from an entirely new source—Azerbaijan. The SGC’s final, westernmost leg, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), recently approved by the Italian government (see [**EDM**](https://jamestown.org/program/for-italys-ruling-nationalists-energy-security-more-important-than-putins-friendship/), March 6), will also supply Bulgaria through its northeastern bifurcation from Greece via Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria. Italy will not be the SGCs’ final destination, as most Balkan countries are themselves interested in connecting to this pipeline network (EurActiv, [**February 26**](https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/news/commission-eager-to-see-the-capacity-of-southern-gas-corridor-doubled/), [**April 4**](https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/news/mogherini-inshallah-eu-and-azerbaijan-will-soon-finalise-their-agreement/)). The SGC’s possible future expansion will reinforce Azerbaijan’s role both as a supplier and a potential transit country to Europe for other Caspian-basin energy producers ([**Eur-lex.europa.eu**](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018JC0024), July 24, 2018). The EP recently adopted a resolution on the internal gas market concerning competition rules for pipelines from non-EU countries ([**Europarl.europa.eu**](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190402IPR34673/natural-gas-parliament-extends-eu-rules-to-pipelines-from-non-eu-countries), April 4). Although derogations can be applied to existing pipelines (and indeed, TAP received a temporary “third party exemption”), the SGC’s future performance will have to consider this European legislation—particularly given Azerbaijan’s potential future gas streams and the BP’s possible dissociation from the EU’s gas market rules after Brexit. BP operates the offshore Shah Deniz II field in Azerbaijan’s Caspian waters, which will fill the SGC. During his talks with High Representative Mogherini last week, Foreign Minsiter Mammadyarov stressed that European partners could do more “to make the EU market[’s regulatory environment] more attractive to more gas from Azerbaijan” ([**Mfa.gov.az,**](http://www.mfa.gov.az/en/news/909/6113) April 4). On March 16, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev pardoned over 400 prisoners, including some individuals who had previously complicated EU-Azerbaijan relations (see [**EDM**](https://jamestown.org/program/foreign-policy-context-of-azerbaijans-major-pardoning-act/), March 26). Moreover, Aliyev signed another decree on reforming the judicial system, in view of making it more effective and transparent ([**Eeas.europa.eu**](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/59751/Statement%20by%20the%20Spokesperson%20on%20the%20pardoning%20of%20prisoners%20in%20Azerbaijan%20to%20mark%20Novruz%20Holiday), March 17; President.az, [**March 16**](https://president.az/articles/32416), [**April 3**](https://ru.president.az/articles/32587)). Finally, Azerbaijan has implemented a number of reforms pertaining to trade regulations, customs tariffs, and trade-logistics infrastructure, since the country expects to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a developing country. Membership in the WTO would allow for more ambitious economic provisions in the new partnership agreement with the EU, thus boosting mutual trade turnover ([**Trend.az**](https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2993540.html), December 14, 2018; [**Ednews.net**](http://ednews.net/az/news/specialist-view/361287-avropaya-geden-yolda-son-10), April 5, 2019). According to Mammadyarov, Azerbaijan demonstrated flexibility on some “technical issues” (reportedly on trade), and now expects the same from the EU, to be able to move the talks forward ([**EurActiv**](https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/news/mogherini-inshallah-eu-and-azerbaijan-will-soon-finalise-their-agreement/), April 4). Until 2020, EU-Azerbaijan cooperation will be guided by “Partnership Priorities” (PP), which will replace the 2006 European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan (ENP AP) and manage the EU’s financial assistance to Azerbaijan for the latter’s economic resilience ([**Eeas.europa.eu**](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/48244/partnership-priorities-between-eu-and-azerbaijan-reinforce-bilateral-agenda_en), July 11, 2018). The PP, backed by the ENP Review’s differentiation principle, is a balanced and legally non-binding document, reflecting the interests of both sides. The PP expresses respect for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and international borders; but unlike the ENP AP, it does not specify Brussels’ role regarding the Karabakh conflict ([**Eur-lex.europa.eu**](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:dfa86d92-8f21-11e8-8bc1-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_2&format=PDF), July 24, 2018).

## 2AC – Politics

### Exec Key

### Normal Means – Countries

#### Exec action is normal means –

#### Syria –

Crawford ’18 [Jamie Crawford, 5-19-2018, "US withdrawing aid from northwest Syria," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/19/politics/donald-trump-syria-aid/index.html] KD

The United States is withdrawing assistance from northwest Syria as the Trump administration reviews hundreds of millions of dollars in stabilization aid to Syria, a State Department official has told CNN.

#### Pakistan –

Sullivan ’18 [Emily Sullivan, 9-2-2018, "U.S. Cuts $300 Million In Aid To Pakistan; Says It's Failing To Fight Militants," NPR.org, https://www.npr.org/2018/09/02/644117490/u-s-cuts-300-million-in-aid-to-pakistan-says-its-failing-to-fight-militants] KD

In the latest blow to already fragile ties between the United States and Pakistan, the Defense Department said on Saturday it has suspended $300 million in funding to Islamabad over what it calls the government's failure to take action against terrorists.

The suspension is part of a broader pullback in military aid for Pakistan announced by the Trump administration in January. The administration says Pakistan is not taking strong enough steps to combat the Taliban and other groups. Pakistan, which serves as a key route for transporting supplies to U.S. forces in Afghanistan, has repeatedly denied harboring terrorists.

### Thumpers

#### Other cuts thump the link

#### A. Previous Egypt cutoff- we withheld aid to Egypt in the past, before resuming it- that’s the Al-Arian evidence.

#### B. Pakistan- AND more cuts coming

Ward, 18 – Vox international security reporter

[Alex, "Why Trump cut millions in military aid to Pakistan," Vox, 9-4-18, https://www.vox.com/2018/9/4/17818396/pakistan-aid-military-trump-pompeo-afghanistan, accessed 12-17-18]

The Trump administration just announced it has cut $300 million in military aid to Pakistan, increasing pressure on the country to crack down on militant groups that have complicated the ongoing US war in Afghanistan. The Pentagon noted the decrease in military financial assistance to its South Asian ally in a Saturday statement, although the move had been planned since January. Still, it means the Trump administration has now withheld around $800 million in aid to Pakistan this year — and it’s possible more cuts will happen, if Islamabad doesn’t start doing what Washington wants.

#### C. Myanmar

Ware, 17 – ABC News

[Gabrielle, "Myanmar Loses US Military Aid For Failing To Fix Rohingya Crisis," ABC News, 10-24-17, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kmcVYhGizS4J:https://www.abc15.com/newsy/myanmar-loses-us-military-aid-for-failing-to-fix-rohingya-crisis+&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us, accessed 12-16-18]

Myanmar Loses US Military Aid For Failing To Fix Rohingya Crisis

The U.S. is cracking down on Myanmar for failing to sufficiently address its humanitarian crisis involving Rohingya Muslims. State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert said Monday that any military officers or units operating in northern Rakhine State, where most Rohingya reside, will be ineligible to receive or participate in U.S. assistance programs. The U.S. gave Myanmar more than $50 million for humanitarian needs in fiscal year 2015. Now, the State Department is considering economic sanctions against it. The U.S. ended travel waivers for Burmese military officials back in August. Rohingya Muslims are a minority group that are largely shunned by Myanmar's mostly Buddhist population. The country doesn't consider them citizens, and rights groups say they're often targets of police brutality and other forms of discrimination. More than 600,000 refugees have fled Myanmar, largely to Bangladesh, since August. Myanmar's de facto leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been mostly silent on the issue. The State Department announcement shouldn't come as a complete shock. Last week, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said the U.S. was "extraordinarily concerned" about the situation and that "the world can't just stand idly by and be witness to the atrocities" in Myanmar. In September, the United Nations said Myanmar had one "last chance" to essentially get its act together before it had an irreversible tragedy on its hands. Earlier that same month, a top U.N. official called the events in Myanmar "textbook ... ethnic cleansing." The U.S. is also considering officially declaring the violence in Myanmar ethnic cleansing.

#### Cameroon thumps and proves exec is normal means. Tantoh 3/26

Michael Tantoh, 3-26-2019, "Cameroon: U.S. Govt Sanctions Biya Regime," allAfrica, https://allafrica.com/stories/201903260559.html

Reports from Cameroon say the U.S. has placed sanctions on President Paul [Biya's regime](https://allafrica.com/stories/201903140502.html). These sanctions affect over 20 military personnel, civilians, and ministers. They have been banned from entering the U.S, according to [Cameroon Info.net.](http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroun-cooperation-le-regime-biya-frappe-par-les-etats-unis-336882.html) The names of those affected were not released, but is said to include top civil administrators and ministers. Washington is accusing Yaounde of committing attrocities in the ongoing Anglophone crisis, and also for the arrest and detention of opposition leader Maurice Kamto. According to the reports, relations between Cameroon and the Donald Trump administration have not improved despite the visit of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [Tibor Nagy Jnr.](https://allafrica.com/stories/201903190175.html) In addition, many other aid and security programes promised by Washington have been withdrawn, including an offer to provide training to the Cameroonian military. The total aid package from the White House to the Unity Palace amounts to U.S.$17 million annually. The high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherinihad also voiced concern about abuses by the military in the restive English-speaking regions of the country and the detention of opposition leader [Kamto](https://allafrica.com/stories/201903140502.html).

#### Honduras thumps infighting – Trump cut all foreign aid. Malkin 4/1

Elisabeth Malkin, “Where Does Aid to Central America Go? Police Officers, Farmers and NGOs” <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/world/americas/trump-central-america-aid.html>. Journalist, New York Times

President Trump said last week that [he would cut off aid](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/us/politics/trump-mexico-illegal-immigration.html?module=inline) to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, the home countries of most of the migrants arriving at the United States’ southern border to seek asylum. The Trump administration has already taken the first step to act on the president’s directive, notifying Congress that it wanted to divert the $450 million allocated to the region. By Monday, though, the administration had not offered details about whether any aid — such as military aid or support to combat drug trafficking — might be exempt from the order. If the aid withdrawal does go ahead, aid advocates say, it would [probably affect the region’s most vulnerable people](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/world/americas/trump-turns-us-policy-in-central-america-on-its-head.html?module=inline), including small farmers struggling to adapt to climate change and teenagers pressured to join gangs in a region that is a major drug transit route, [according to State Department estimates](https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/278759.pdf). Advocates say that, should these threats to lives and livelihoods grow, many more people will take their chances on the road and leave for the United States. The decision to end aid is likely to provoke anger in Congress, where lawmakers in both parties have supported efforts to address the root causes of migration. If the money is ultimately withheld, it would affect a wide range of programs designed to improve citizen security, promote economic development and encourage accountable government. Security and justice Mr. Trump has complained that the governments of the three countries have done too little to halt immigration, and portrayed the withdrawal of aid as punishment for their leaders. A vast majority of the aid, however, goes to nongovernmental organizations, churches, charities and private contractors that carry out projects for the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development. According to the Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights research group, [the largest portion of aid](https://www.wola.org/monitoring-assistance-central-america/) has gone to improving security and justice systems, and to preventing violence. Aid varies from country to country to address their different needs. In El Salvador, where the United States has helped support a broad antiviolence program, 57 percent of the $149 million in aid allocated in 2017 went to projects intended to prevent violence, improve security and community policing, and train judges, prosecutors and public defenders. In Honduras, where aid reached almost $182 million in 2017, the highest percentage of funds — some 44 percent — went to support programs that improved justice and security, with an additional 30 percent allocated for antipoverty programs among the country’s rural poor. The aid also supports anticorruption measures by providing funds for international prosecutors who have been investigating graft in Honduras and Guatemala, and a special anticorruption unit in the Salvadoran attorney general’s office. In advance of Guatemala’s elections in June, the United States has also helped finance the country’s electoral agency. The United States also supported border security and efforts to combat drug trafficking, though those funds accounted for a smaller percentage of the overall aid. The Pentagon set aside millions to improve drug interdiction and to supply equipment and training to counter trafficking in Honduras.

### AT: Base

#### Base sticks with Trump regardless – party leaders get blame even on immigration. Easley and Fabian 17

Easley, Jonathan, and Jordan Fabian. “Trump Bets Base Will Stick with Him on Immigration.”TheHill, 18 Sept. 2017, thehill.com/homenews/administration/350947-trump-bets-base-will-stick-with-him-on-immigration. //nhs-VA

The budding alliance with Democrats on immigration is emerging as a test of whether Trump’s personality or his policies are what put him over the top in last year’s presidential election. Trump enjoys strong backing from his core supporters: 98 percent of Republicans who voted for him in the 2016 primary still support him, according to a recent NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll. That support is unlikely to wane if Trump eventually signs legislation protecting young immigrants, several allies say. “I think ultimately they stay with him,” said a former campaign aide. “Ultimately, his base isn’t predicated on repealing DACA. It’s predicated on giving communities in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan a voice.” Trump’s voters have stuck with him through controversies that could have ended the careers of other politicians, including his response to the violence at a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Va., and the “Access Hollywood” tape, in which he is heard bragging about groping women without their consent. But if Trump does go back on key campaign promises, it could present a different kind of challenge for him. As a candidate, Trump energized his supporters with his pledges to scrap DACA, deport the roughly 11 million immigrants living illegally in the U.S. and build a wall along the southern border to stop them from entering. Immigration, in short, was perhaps the biggest animating force of his candidacy. King tweeted that if reports of the president’s dealings are correct, “Trump base is blown up, destroyed, irreparable, and disillusioned beyond repair. No promise is credible.” But the president expressed confidence Republicans would stick with him even if he helps DACA recipients, telling reporters Thursday many are “very, very happy with what we’re doing.” The former campaign adviser endorsed Trump’s view, saying his support is “not tied to a specific policy, it’s tied to disrupting, it’s tied to shaking up the status quo.” “That’s what the base likes, bringing disruption to a city that has been mired in gridlock,” the aide said. On Friday, Trump tacitly acknowledged his newfound love for bipartisanship carries political risk. The president rallied supporters with a string of tough-talking early morning tweets on the terror attack at London subway station and an ESPN host who called him a white supremacist. He also reassured his backers that “CHAIN MIGRATION cannot be allowed to be part of any legislation on Immigration!” The term refers to the practice of immigrants with legal status sponsoring certain family members so that they can come to the U.S. Yet some of Trump’s allies continue to question why he seems to be prioritizing a top issue for Democrats, the status of immigrants in the U.S. illegally, over his campaign promise to build a border wall. By not demanding wall funding be attached to a DACA bill, Trump supporters say he is giving away his most valuable bargaining chip in exchange for vague promises of stronger border security from Schumer and Pelosi. Trump once bragged that his supporters are so loyal, he could shoot someone in the street and he would not lose support. Dan Stein, president of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, said Trump’s proposed DACA deal would put that notion to the test. “Donald Trump would have been better off going onto Fifth Avenue and shooting someone,” said Stein, whose group favors lower levels of both legal and illegal immigration. “He said his base wouldn’t care if he did that. The base cares about this.” Stein speculated the president might be “convinced that dealing on DACA will win him new supporters” who could help him win in 2020. The former campaign aide said Trump’s supporters wouldn’t have a better option in 2020, regardless of what he does on immigration. “It’s not 2016 Trump against 2020 Trump,” the aide said. “It’s Trump running against [Sens.] [Elizabeth Warren](http://thehill.com/people/elizabeth-warren) or [Bernie Sanders](http://thehill.com/people/bernie-sanders), and it’s not like these voters would run to vote for the other side.” In the short term, conservatives' anger at Senate Majority Leader [Mitch McConnell](http://thehill.com/people/mitch-mcconnell) (R-Ky.) and Speaker [Paul Ryan](http://thehill.com/people/paul-ryan) (R-Wis.) has provided a buffer for Trump against the backlash from his base. Frustration with the GOP leaders gave Trump room to break with them and strike an agreement with Democrats on a deal to extend the nation’s borrowing limit and fund the government. That dynamic could persist until Republicans begin notching legislative victories of their own. “He has such a diverse coalition and his base elected him knowing that he isn’t overly ideological,” said a GOP consultant who requested anonymity. “Poll after poll shows that Republicans will blame Ryan and McConnell every single time, so he has leeway here.”

### AT: Congress

### AT: Rider

#### Voting issue – bad model since they can claim any other part of the must-pass bill is bad too and avoids debates about the aff

#### Trump won’t veto – wants better relations with Armenia and conflict resolution. Elamiryan 4/25

Ruben Elamiryan, 4-25-2019, "Reaching a Durable Peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/reaching-durable-peace-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-54237> Ruben Elamiryan is a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. He is a lecturer at Russian-Armenian University and Public Administration Academy of Armenia. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science.

Furthermore, in a congratulatory message to Pashinyan on his appointment as prime minister of Armenia, Trump [stated](https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2019/01/19/Donald-Trump-congratulates-Nikol-Pashinyan/2061212) that The United States supports a prosperous, democratic Armenia at peace with its neighbors. Together, we can make progress on deepening trade between our countries, strengthening global security, and combating corruption. A peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will help these efforts. A month later, Lavrov [emphasized](http://newsarmenia.am/news/nagorno_karabakh/lavrov-nazval-uslovie-dlya-progressa-v-karabakhskom-uregulirovanii-v-2019-godu/?sphrase_id=93487) that “the declarations about readiness to search for resolutions, which are coming from Baku, should be fully supported.” Furthermore, he expressed a hope to see reciprocity from the Armenian side.

#### Double-bind:

#### Congress doesn’t know it’s must-pass legislation, so there’s no rider OR

#### The rider gets attached to [x] legislation anyway

### AT: 2020

## 2AC – DA

### AT: Russia (short)

#### Short – Kucera says Azerbaijan cares about US for economic purposes so they’ll listen, and Russia won’t fill in to cause conflict: Boyajain ev accounts for Armenian revolution and change in PM mindset and indicates Russia is now dependent on Armenia, so they won’t risk escalation.

Georgia has favored the Western Bloc since independence, desires NATO membership, and no longer depends on Russian natural gas. Azeris feel hemmed in by Russia and would like to join NATO. Azerbaijan sends its Caspian Sea oil and gas westward through Georgia, Turkey, and beyond. Another major gas pipeline is planned

Russia controls and limits the natural gas that Armenia imports from Iran in order to profit from selling Russian gas to Armenia (via hostile Georgia) and to make Armenia more dependent and compliant

#### Gas pipelines in Azerbaijan make the Russia-Armenia relationship one-sided

### AT: Russia (long)

#### US key: Azerbaijan wants to diversify away from Russia, but there’s no external push to do so. Withdrawing aid results in compliance since Russia doesn’t provide $20 million in border security aid – that’s Kucera in 2017.

#### New Armenian PM wants peace: Azeri aggression on the border is what causes escalation – that’s Gurbanov AND Ohanyan separately.

#### No Russian aggression or instigation of conflict:

#### Armenia looking to shift to NATO now but needs some incentive; Russian guarantees of peace are what prevent them from switching – that’s Goble.

#### Russia is heavily dependent on Armenia for a buffer against NATO member states, so greenlighting Azeri aggression will never be a part of their foreign policy, even if the US withdraws aid – that’s Boyajain.

#### All aff evidence on the 2 and 3 point post-dates theirs by an important few months; the Armenian revolution took place from April to May of 2018 and made Russia fill-in far more unlikely.

### AT: Terror

#### No link to their scenario – Kucera in 17 says Azerbaijan isn’t k2 aerial routes anymore

#### No link – their ev says Azerbaijan k2 the US, but not the other way around. Aliyev will fight terror anyway to stay in power. 1NC Ramnani recut

Samuel Ramani, St. Anthony’s College, University of Oxford (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/20/3-reasons-the-u-s-wont-break-with-azerbaijan-over-its-violations-of-human-rights-and-democratic-freedoms/?noredirect=on&utm\_term=.a0dfc85ec4bb) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/20/3-reasons-the-u-s-wont-break-with-azerbaijan-over-its-violations-of-human-rights-and-democratic-freedoms/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ddb7b2540be7> //recut

Aliyev helps out against terrorism in part because he wants to weaken Islamist movements that could undermine his power. In particular, the Aliyev regime has targeted pro-Iranian Shiites, who have opposed the Azerbaijan’s increasingly cordial ties with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait- making it a natural partner for the U.S.’s efforts along the same lines. Azerbaijan is also working against the Islamic State

#### Azerbaijan uses supposed terrorist threats to justify crackdown and repression. Jardine 18

Bradley Jardine, 8-1-2018, "Crackdown widens in Azerbaijan’s second city as police kill assassination suspects," No Publication, <https://eurasianet.org/crackdown-widens-in-azerbaijans-second-city-as-police-kill-assassination-suspects> Bradley Jardine is a freelance journalist who covers the Caucasus.

\*Brackets in original

In the wake of the attempted assassination of the mayor of Ganja, Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, four suspects have been killed and dozens of others have been detained in what human rights activists have said is an attempt to stoke fear of Islamic terror and stifle dissent in the country. The crackdown follows a series of still-murky events in Ganja. On July 3, there was an [assassination attempt](https://eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-suffers-blackout-and-political-blame-game-begins) on Ganja mayor Elmar Valiyev. A week later, the [authorities reported](https://eurasianet.org/s/attacks-in-azerbaijan-raise-accusations-of-islamist-extremism-government-skullduggery) that two senior police officers were killed in demonstrations in support of the assassination suspect. The next day, two people were placed on a wanted list, Azerbaijani law enforcement [announced](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323490/). One of them, Farrukh Gasimov, was immediately detained and the second, Rashad Boyukkishiyev, was killed in detention, [according](https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/news/29608/) to Azerbaijan’s [Interior Ministry](https://www.mia.gov.az/?/az/news/view/1217/). Fifteen more alleged participants were detained on July 17. On July 21, another suspect, Anar Bagirov, was killed and another eight people were detained, according to a [statement](https://www.azernews.az/nation/135165.html) by the Interior Ministry. Then, on July 25, the alleged mastermind of the attack, Agha Sarhani, was killed by police, law enforcement agencies [said](http://www.turan.az/ext/news/2018/7/free/Social/en/73821.htm). The last suspect pronounced dead was Fuad Samedov, who police say was hiding in a neighboring town, security forces [told](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323662/) Trend News. In total, 61 people have been arrested so far and a further 13 have been placed on a wanted list. “The July terrorist attack against the mayor of Ganja and the killing of two police officers created a need for the state to intervene to maintain political stability,” said Azerbaijan’s Prosecutor General Zakir Garalov, the regional news website Caucasian Knot [reported](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323662/). According to Garalov, the case is being investigated by working groups formed under the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service. But activists in Azerbaijan say the government is using the unrest as a pretext to clamp down on political opposition. Members of Muslim Unity, a religious movement that been [pushed underground since 2015](https://eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-show-trial-ends-with-harsh-sentences-for-islamic-activists), told Caucasian Knot that Agha Sarhani was innocent and that his murder was an attempt to smear the group. Muslim Unity says Sarhani was an active member and participated in numerous peaceful protests with the group. “The murder of suspects in the ‘Ganja case,’ including Sarhani, are a consequence of the government’s desire to foment fear in society,” the group said in a statement. The group drew parallels with the events of 2015, when members of Muslim Unity were arrested and convicted of [organizing](https://eurasianet.org/s/azerbaijan-examining-the-source-of-discontent-in-nardaran) riots that began in Nardaran. Seven people died during the unrest, including two policemen. Authorities say the group’s leader is connected with Yunis Safarov, the prime suspect in the Ganja assassination attempt and an accused Islamist radical. On July 6, the government issued a statement claiming that “Safarov’s main purpose in committing a terrorist act was to establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Azerbaijan, killing a number of well-known civil servants in the country, creating scandal, chaos, panic and, ultimately, the forced seizure of power.” But the official account leaves many questions unanswered, some analysts note. “In the official narrative, contradictory [pieces of information] were threaded together, [saying Safarov] studied in Qom in Iran [a Shia city] and then joined ISIS [a Sunni terrorist outfit that is hostile to Shia Muslims],” Leyla Aliyeva, a political analyst, [told](http://groong.usc.edu/news/msg634390.html) Ekho Kavkaza, RFE/RL’s Caucasus news service. “In other words, these were completely contradictory versions.” Other activists have noted the opaque nature of the investigation and potential for human rights abuse. “We cannot say whether [those detained] committed crimes or not, but the fact that their relatives are not provided with information about the place of their detention, and many are not allowed lawyers, is very alarming,” Ogtay Gulaliyev, a representative of the Center for the Protection of Political Prisoners (CPPP) [told](http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/323662/) Caucasian Knot. “Their relatives are so scared they do not want to make official statements.” According to CPPP’s January 2018 data, Azerbaijan has over 161 political prisoners. Activists from Muslim Unity [constitute](https://www.meydan.tv/en/site/politics/26917/) the largest group.

#### Repression is the most significant internal link to terrorist mobilization. Bedford 09

Sophie Bedford, 2009 “Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan: Repression and Mobilization in a Post-Soviet Context” Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm Studies in Politics. Dr. Sofie Bedford is an affiliated researcher at Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES) at Uppsala University (UCRS). She has a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stockholm University and an MA in Peace and Conflict Research from Uppsala University. The title of her 2009 PhD thesis is Islamic Activism in Azerbaijan: Repression and Mobilization in a Post-Soviet Context. Dr. Bedford is working on two research projects further described below.

Soft repression, as defined by Ferree, relates only to informal restrictions inflicted on social movements by the larger society, yet findings from the Azerbaijani cases indicate that state repression can also be soft. In Azerbaijan repression rarely includes the use of direct force or threat of state violence, with some exceptions. Instead repression is to a certain extent built into the political system in terms of the restrictions and regulations on religion and opposition described above. While this type of soft repression could be considered formal there is also a certain amount of informal soft repression, comparable to Ferree’s meso-level stigma, as expressed by name calling — aiming to discredit a whole group on the basis of its affiliation with a certain movement. Through this type of soft repression the state sets out who its opponents are and unwittingly contributes to the mobilization of the opposition by enhancing the feeling of we and they for a movement and its participants. In other words, repression helps to effect the consolidation of the movement and forces the community to take action in one way or another so as to establish its position in society. However, soft repression is characterized by the fact that it still leaves some room for maneuvering, that is, for choosing a non-violent course of response. This seems to be the main difference between the Azerbaijani context and other post-Soviet cases where hard state repression eliminates alternatives. Repression as a catalyst to soft and hard mobilization Comparatively speaking, the Azerbaijani political context was related to North Caucasus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, areas where Islamic movements did face virulent repression such as the use of direct force against challengers as well as mass arrests or kidnappings. The rather brief analysis seemed in any case to show that much of the violence produced by the movements themselves was a response to a context where hard repression finished off all other options. The choice then becomes either not acting at all or taking radical action! When hard repression is targeting all members of a movement indiscriminately (radical and moderate) as well as those outside a movement (innocent bystanders, non-active sympathizers, and members of the public) the likelihood of violent behavior grows. If you are, so to speak, punished for a crime you are not guilty of, next time you might as well commit the crime. In this way the strategy of the authorities in North Caucasus and Uzbekistan, namely to label all “suspicious” religious behavior “Wahhabism”, thereby legitimizing the harsh repression of all believers, can be said to fuel hatred and violence. Even if the current regime in Tajikistan (the only former Soviet country that has an Islamic party in government) appears to act a little less aggressive towards the faithful, violent repression of Islamic activism occurred both before and during the civil war. This discussion could also provide some more general insights about the state as an actor and the role played by the state in the mobilization of social movements. The role of the state, in terms of the political opportunities the state presents to challengers, is often acknowledged in social movement literature. In general this is done without particular emphasis and rather as one more aspect, among others, of the development of a social movement. It seems however that the role of the state in the mobilization process must receive greater emphasis in a nondemocratic context, inasmuch as most authoritarian regimes which try to prevent opposition are in fact, in many cases, themselves the catalyst to mobilization. A multifaceted picture of Islamic activism The ghost of a Global Jihad and Wahhabism A final purpose of this thesis was to enhance the understanding of what Islamic activism is all about in order to contribute to a more nuanced view of the phenomenon. Even though the mobilization of Islamic movements I have studied do share many similarities, the differences I have shown between the Juma and Abu Bakr mosque communities alert us to the danger in assuming that all Islamic activism can be understood from one and only one all-encompassing viewpoint. The comparative (regional) approach also emphasized the need to take multiple aspects of the context into account when analyzing Islamic mobilization. When reading some, although by no means all, previous research in the field it is easy to get the impression that a great deal of Islamic activism is generated by the movements’ wish to support a “Global Jihad” against the West. Because of this I find it of the utmost importance to point out that in the cases I have studied here, both individually (Azerbaijan) and comparatively (other regional post-Soviet Muslim states), the disappointment with how post-independence leaders have handled the political, economical, social and moral situation in the own countries is at the root of virtually all strife. Nevertheless, to a certain extent the aftermath of 9/11 and the War on Terror have contributed to spread ideas of Muslim solidarity and “a war between civilizations” among the Muslims in Azerbaijan. The “9/11 effect” on state strategies is far more evident than its impact on the activities of the various movements studied, since many authoritarian regimes, including the ones analyzed in this study, were quick to jump on the bandwagon, initiating or intensifying the suppression of secular and religious opposition. In general, extrinsic influences have been shown to be important for the mobilization of Islamic activism, mainly in relation to the formulation of national religious policy, in itself a response by the authorities to what they experience as domestic meddling by radical foreign actors. National policy towards the different movements, as a result of the way governments perceive foreign threats, has become more restrictive and the attitudes of the authorities towards Islamic activism in general more ruthless. In all of the contexts studied, a fear of imported religious radicalism is clearly noticeable among the authorities. It is perhaps instructive, then, to remind the reader of how the expression “Wahhabi” became the symbol of this fear and a catchall-phrase to describe unwanted religious activity originating abroad. As its usage became widespread among policy makers and other authorities, it also came to serve as a “weapon” to denigrate all Islamic activists seen as oppositional, whether they had connections to foreign religious activists or not. In Azerbaijan, where the suspicion that a certain movement is affiliated with other countries strongly influences the people’s perceptions of that particular movement, fear and hearsay have also influenced the attitudes of movements towards each other. These attitudes have contributed to a confrontational situation and, as far as I am concerned, have definitely been one more factor impinging on the mobilization process. Again, regardless of whether or not the community in question was in fact affiliated with the particular country. To conclude, the mobilization of Islamic activism in Azerbaijan is more dependent on the national than the international context in which it takes place. The post-Soviet Azerbaijani republic, in a sort of transition, still suffers from social, economical as well as political problems. Furthermore, the Soviet past still casts a shadow over social and political developments in Azerbaijan. In this context the popularity of the Juma and Abu Bakr mosque communities appeared threatening to the authorities, and, indeed, repressive actions failed to reduce their popularity or to put an end to their mobilization. On the contrary, the pressure on the mosque communities has brought community members closer together and strengthened their certainty that there is a need for change in Azerbaijan. In the Abu Bakr and Juma mosque communities young people looking for something new have found what they were looking for, and as a result religious opposition has become an interesting social force in Azerbaijan, the “bridgehead of secularism”.

#### Radicalization destabilizes Azerbaijan now – uniqueness flows aff. Souleimanov and Ehrmann 17

Emil Souleimanov, Maya Ehrmann, Fall-2017, "The Rise of Militant Salafism in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications," No Publication, https://www.mepc.org/rise-militant-salafism-azerbaijan-and-its-regional-implications

In the face of Soviet-imposed rule, as well as a national identity shaped by local intellectuals with anti-clerical sentiments, Islam has taken a secondary role to nationalism in Azerbaijani society. While the dissolution of the Soviet Union did not instigate political Islam in Azerbaijan, it did provide an ideological vacuum for religious groups to fill, a growing propensity for devoutness, and an interest in Islam among the population. The Salafi movement, spurred by missionary activities using external funds and the establishment of mosques, has been able to use disillusionment with the current Azerbaijani regime and the desire for a return to more traditionalist values in order to gain followers. Growing concern by the authorities over the influence of this movement has led to repression of Salafi Muslims, a factor that has contributed to radicalization. This radicalization of Salafism in Azerbaijan can further be attributed to the presence of Dagestani minorities in the north of Azerbaijan, many of whom are followers of Salafism and are greatly influenced by their Dagestani counterparts. Indeed, there is a rising trend among Dagestani minorities in the north of Azerbaijan to engage in insurgent activities. As it lacks substantial support or external sources and relies on very limited popular support among either highly secularized or Shiite Azerbaijanis — who generally distance themselves from what they call "radical Islam" — Salafism or its militant form, jihadism, seems to be an easy task for the authorities to cope with. Yet the potential growth of jihadist ideology presents a danger for the security and territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani state due to the intersection of religious and ethnic loyalties in the northern areas, home to Dagestani ethnic groups possessing latent irredentist sentiments. Should the Azerbaijani authorities continue to carry out fierce and indiscriminate "anti-Wahhabi" policies, fueled by nationalism in the borderland areas with Dagestan, Salafism might turn into a transnational ideology of resistance among the Avars, Lezgis and Tsakhurs, linking them even closer to the Dagestani cause and possibly ensuring support from Dagestan-based insurgents. In this case, Baku might face another territorial conflict with unpredictable consequences.

#### Internal instability causes diversionary war, nuclear arms races, and massive imports of Russian weapons – turns any disad and is another internal link to the advantage. Babayan 16

Nelli Babayan, 4/7/16, “Here’s what the research reveals about the violence in Nagorno Karabakh — and how ‘freezing’ conflicts can backfire” Washington Post <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/07/here-what-the-research-reveals-about-the-violence-in-nagorno-karabakh/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.05368281da0a> Nelli Babayan is a fellow at the Transatlantic Academy (based at the German Marshall Fund U.S.), associate fellow at the Freie Universität Berlin and author of [“Democratic Transformation and Obstruction: EU, US, Russia in the South Caucasus.”](http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415748667/) Find her on Twitter [@nellibabayan](https://twitter.com/NelliBabayan). Nelli Babayan is not related to David Babayan, spokesperson for the NKR administration, or Samvel Babayan, its former defense minister.

1. War can get citizens to rally around an otherwise unpopular government Political scientists [Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=9297187&fileId=S1537592714000851) show that autocratic leaders who struggle to establish domestic legitimacy are more likely to start an international conflict to whip up support at home. [That includes diversionary wars](http://www.amazon.com/Diversionary-War-Domestic-International-Conflict/dp/0804782466), in which leaders incite an international conflict to distract from domestic troubles. Think of Russia, where Vladimir Putin’s [approval rating](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/06/24/putins-approval-ratings-hit-89-percent-the-highest-theyve-ever-been/) jumped about 20 percent after annexing Crimea. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan are truly democracies. However, Armenia ranks higher on various [democracy indices](https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/armenia) than Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan often appears in reports pointing to its [poor record of human rights](https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/azerbaijan) or [consolidated authoritarianism](https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2015/azerbaijan). Low levels of democracy, including rigged elections, prosecution of opposition, including human rights activists and journalists, result in lack of domestic legitimacy and often lead to anti-regime protests. [Harald Hagemann and Vladimir Kufenko](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecot.12084/full) show that economic and social factors, including income inequality, make anti-regime protests more likely. Moreover, as [Erik Voeten](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/28/heres-how-tumbling-oil-prices-could-make-the-world-a-more-peaceful-and-cooperative-place/) recently argued here in the Monkey Cage, volatile oil prices are likely to produce domestic unrest in oil-producing countries, which tend to be more bellicose than other nations. **Armenia** has seen its share of socioeconomic unrest. In 2013 many Armenians protested the government’s decision to snub the agreement with the [European Union](http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm) in favor of joining Russia’s Customs Union. In 2014 they protested against mandatory [pension contributions](https://iwpr.net/global-voices/mass-protest-movement-against-armenian-pension-reform). In 2015 they protested against another [electricity price hike](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/24/armenia-yerevan-protests-electric-prices-russia) by the Russian-owned utility. The government has regularly sent [police to break up the protests.](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/thousands-in-armenia-protest-steep-hikes-in-electricity-rates/2015/06/23/51377fa0-19bb-11e5-bed8-1093ee58dad0_story.html) However, it seems the government continues to tolerate dissent, as it wants to keep friendly relations with the European Union and the United States, both of which support and expect democracy. In tightly controlled Azerbaijan, by contrast, and despite often [rigged voting](https://freedomhouse.org/article/aliyevs-rigged-election-azerbaijan-lacks-credibility), popular protests are rare also due to [active repression of human rights and media freedom](https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/16/azerbaijan-rights-defender-convicted). In the past, oil and gas income has helped the Azerbaijani government pay for social supports that kept popular grievances at bay. But with the slump in oil prices, the Azerbaijan government now faces unhappy citizens, as the social safety net decreases and consumer prices increase. Amid the [government’s worry about a possible coup](http://www.eurasianet.org/node/75786), the Azerbaijani currency has since December 2015 lost about one-third of its value against the U.S. dollar. To economize, the government even [turned off the lights](http://www.rferl.org/media/video/azerbaijan-baku-lightsout/27555956.html) at night in the capital, Baku. Tight finances also hit mortgage owners; after one mortgage owner self-immolated in January in protest, there were countrywide demonstrations against worsening economic conditions and price hikes, followed by [police intervention](http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-protests-arrests-rising-prices/27487867.html). Since these have been rare until now, the leadership will be concerned — and perhaps tempted to divert popular attention with a war. What’s more, there is new evidence of corruption. Recent [Panama Papers leak](http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-aliyev-corruption-panama/27652121.html)s suggest that Azerbaijan’s first family is linked to offshore companies – news that’s likely to antagonize citizens still further. **2**. Uncertainty leads to a security dilemma**, which leads to an arms race, which increases tensions, which …** When countries don’t exchange information and don’t have an effective negotiations platform, they remain uncertain about each other’s intentions. This creates a [security dilemma](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009958?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents): A state’s actions to increase security trigger others to respond similarly, producing further tensions. Frozen conflicts are the perfect incubator for such security dilemmas. Given constant animosity and distrust, opponents can easily make [“worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions,”](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) as political scientist Alexander Wendt suggested in his research into security dilemmas. And security dilemmas result in arms races, as we learned during the Cold War. The South Caucasus arms race has been troubling for two decades. In 2005, Azerbaijan announced a [70 percent increase](http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/azerbaijan/dont-allow-a-new-arms-race-in-the-southern-caucasus.aspx) in military spending; Armenia quickly promised to match that pledge. The Global Militarization Index measures the relative weight and [importance of the military apparatus](https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/141209_GMI_ENG.pdf) of one state in relation to its society as a whole. Its 2014 edition ranked Armenia the third and Azerbaijan the tenth most militarized country in the world. Armenia’s 2014 military expenditures constituted 4 percent of GDP, compared to 4.8 percent in Azerbaijan. Compare that with the United States, where the military consumed [3.5 percent of GDP](http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2014+wbapi_data_value+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc). Armenia has 17.9 soldiers and paramilitary forces per 1,000 inhabitants, double Azerbaijan’s 8.9 ratio. The United States has only five soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. Both of these South Caucasus neighbors are spending a lot on arms, much of it from Russia. Azerbaijan has used its petrodollars to enrich its arsenal, buying [heavy weapons](http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/politics/view/35532) from Russia, while Armenia is beefing up its arsenal with weapons from Russia at discounted prices, including a recent [$200 million Russian loan](http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/27560789.html) for rocket launchers and anti-tank weapons.

### AT: Demining

#### Azerbaijan only gets Section 333 aid

**Security Assistance Monitor 19 (**http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Azerbaijan/2012/2019/all/Global//



#### Doesn’t have demining -

Security Assistance Monitor, "Section 333 Building Partner Capacity," No Publication, https://securityassistance.org/content/section-333-building-partner-capacity

Section 333 Building Partner Capacity is a new program created under the provisions of the FY 2017 NDAA that sought to expand the Global Train and Equip (Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority) scope for the purpose of building the capacity of foreign national security forces to conduct one or more of the following: Counterterrorism operations; Counter-weapons of mass destruction operations; Counter-illicit drug trafficking operations; Counter-transnational organized crime operations; Maritime and border security operations; Military intelligence operations; Operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation

#### Demining isn’t military aid- it’s humanitarian

**DOS no date**

**(U.S. department of state, Overview of U.S. Humanitarian Demining Program,**[**https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2002/14867.htm**](https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/walkearth/2002/14867.htm)**, JKS)**

**The U.S. Government has now approved programs to assist 43 landmine-affected countries and northwest Somalia. Through its Humanitarian Demining Program and Emergency Demining Initiative,** the list of recipients is expected to expand as the United States approves more applicant countries each year. To Walk the Earth in Safety describes the extensive history of the U.S. commitment to humanitarian demining in these 44 locations. The following table depicts all U.S.-funded humanitarian demining support since FY93, support intended to promote our interests in peace, prosperity, and regional stability

## 2AC – Russia Econ

### 1AR – Short

#### Extend Colgan – he’s a professor of Political Science and Public Affairs at Brown and has done actual research to conclude an increase in oil income translates into a 250% increased likelihood of conflict. The methodology reports over a thousand leaders and data for 170 countries over a 60-year period. Colgan also applied this to Russia – it’s not just our analysis; prefer statistical models over their Vox reporters.

Jeff D. Colgan “Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict” <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/BF3770367C144D2339FA321859DDE3F2/S002081831000024Xa.pdf/oil_and_revolutionary_governments_fuel_for_international_conflict.pdf>, Jeff D. Colgan is the Richard Holbrooke Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs at Brown University. His research focuses on international order, especially as related to energy and the environment.

The data set contains 1,076 governments0leaders, containing data for 170 countries from 1945–2001, for a total of 6,407 state-years+56 As indicated earlier, each observation was coded twice, by different coders, and reconciled so as to improve the accuracy and concept validity of the data+ Of this total set, eighty-four governments0leaders or about 7 percent are coded as revolutionary+57 The hypotheses are tested using a random-effects Poisson regression model adjusted for time-series panel data+ Poisson regression is used because the dependent variable is a count variable, in which the variance is proportional to the mean; this follows the practice of previous work+58 The unit of analysis is the state-year+ The base models use random effects for greater statistical efficiency in estimating the coefficients, but fixed effects models are also used in order to control for state- specific variables that do not vary over time+ Table 2 shows the results of the analysis+ The results show significant support for the theory+ States with revolutionary governments are associated with considerably more militarized interstate disputes than states without revolutionary governments, especially when they occur in petrostates+ The dependent variable for all models in Table 2 is aggressor-mids+ Model 1 is a basic model without the new data set on revolutionary governments, used as a baseline for comparability to other scholarly studies+ Model 2 shows the changes when the new data are added; Model 3 is specified with panel fixed effects instead of random effects+59 As expected by H1, the coefficient for revolution- ary government is positive and strongly significant, with confidence levels above 99 percent+ This is true in all models, regardless of the specification used, suggest- ing a very strong relationship between revolutionary governments and MIDs+

#### They conceded Boyajain – this warrant is not about the economy but about buffer states; losing Georgia means Russia needs Armenia, so they won’t risk conflict post-plan. Even if we concede all your revenue arguments, buffer state defense mitigates this 100% and prevents Russian aggression.

#### Shrinking economy causes military spending to fall – best indicator of Russian aggression AND accounts for the last few years of abnormal military activity during a downturn. Dickson 18

Daniel Dickson, 5-2-2018, "Russian military spending falls, could affect operations: think-tank," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-military-spending/russian-military-spending-falls-could-affect-operations-think-tank-idUSKBN1I24H8>. Reporter, Reuters.

STOCKHOLM (Reuters) - Russian military spending fell by a fifth last year, its first decline in nearly two decades, with tighter purse-strings likely to affect Moscow’s military activity ahead, a report by defense think-tank SIPRI showed on Wednesday. Russia has flexed its military muscles during the last few years with its 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea and deep involvement in the Syrian conflict serving as examples of its more belligerent stance. But while global military spending rose one percent to $1,739 billion last year, Russia’s fell 20 percent in real terms to $66.3 billion, the report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) showed. It was the first fall since 1998, a year of a major crisis when Russia’s economy collapsed and it defaulted on domestic debt. The following year Vladimir Putin took power as prime minister and, on New Year’s Eve, president. Based on the government’s spending plan until 2020, defense costs are expected to stay flat from 2017 or possibly even fall somewhat adjusted for inflation, said Siemon Wezeman, senior researcher in the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure Programme. “Very clearly that has a direct impact on procurement and on operations. Those are the quickest things to cut,” Wezeman told Reuters. Russia dropped to fourth place in the ranking of the world’s biggest military spenders, overtaken by Saudi Arabia. “Russia definitely has a very clear feeling it has to show that it is still a major power, and you show that by undertaking operations in for example Syria, by showing up on the Atlantic Ocean with your navy,” Wezeman said. “But I am sure that there will be serious cost cuts to those.” Russia’s finances are still fragile following a two-year economic downturn brought on by Western sanctions and a collapse in global oil prices. Higher crude prices helped the economy return to growth of 1.5 percent last year, short of a government target of 2 percent. The export-dependent economy has now got accustomed to lower commodity prices than before 2014, and the budget is likely to post a small deficit or even a surplus in 2018. President Vladimir Putin has also called for higher living standards and higher spending on social infrastructure, such as healthcare and education. Some government officials have called for lower military spending to free up funds for such initiatives. The Kremlin said in March Russia would cut its defense budget to less than 3 percent of gross domestic product within the next five years. The United States remains the world’s biggest military spender by far, accounting for 35 percent of global expenditures, more than the next seven highest-spending countries combined. Its defense budget was unchanged in 2016 and 2017 but a significant rise is expected this year. China’s spending as a share of world military expenditure rose to 13 percent last year from 5.8 percent in 2008.

#### The aff is the sweet spot – we don’t tank Russia’s economy, just allow it to continue on the trajectory it’s on as if the NKR conflict just didn’t happen.

### Jaffe – Escalating Crises

### Fisher – NoKo 2.0

### Micallef – More Dangerous

### Perkovich - Cyberattacks

### Fisher – 2012 Recession

### Mauldin – Didn’t Cut Defense

### Fisher – Russian Politics

### Kim – Diplomacy Impossible

### Friedman – Banks/Protests/Purges

### Felgenhauer – Fragmentation

### Chung

## 2AC – Russia Strike

### 1AR – Short

### AT: Super Soldiers

### Consumption Switches

#### European consumption shifts – Azeri stability key. Reuters 8/5

Reuters Editorial, 8-5-2018, "Assassination attempt and protest send warning to Azerbaijan's rulers," U.K., https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-azerbaijan-protests-insight/assassination-attempt-and-protest-send-warning-to-azerbaijans-rulers-idUKKBN1KR0EW

Azerbaijan, a majority Muslim country of about 10 million, has grown wealthy from oil and natural gas since it declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Protests are rare and are put down quickly. But while money has flowed into sprucing up Baku, opponents of President Ilham Aliyev say few have seen major benefits from the oil wealth, especially people outside the capital, and accuse his government of suppressing human rights and stifling democracy. Drawing parallels with Aliyev, they accuse Veliyev, 57, of treating Gyanja like a personal fief, showing no regard for the city’s poor and being high-handed with anyone who stands in his way. “Veliyev has been behaving exactly the same way as Aliyev does,” Jakhangir Amirkhanly, a 74-year-old member of the opposition Musavat Party, told Reuters in Gyanja. The unrest was brief and there is no sign of it spreading. Aliyev, who succeeded his father Heydar Aliyev as president in 2003, brooks little dissent and the opposition is weak. The municipal authorities in Gyanja said in an emailed response to Reuters’ questions that criticism of Veliyev was “groundless and biased.” But the events in the city show that, with the economy heavily dependent on the energy sector and the wealth gap now huge, Azerbaijan’s leaders could face a growing challenge to retain power in the long term if oil prices fall. Deeply entrenched elites and long-term rulers in other countries in the region are watching closely — Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan all have economies that are reliant on energy and leaders who are nervous about any signs of unrest. Europe is also watching. Because of its energy reserves and strategic location along the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan is seen by Europe as an important alternative to Russian energy supplies, and BP is a major investor in the country.

### Micallef – War not inevitable

### 2AR – Micallef

### Strikes Fail

### NATO Sucks

### US Loses

### 2AR – Not Inevitable

## 2AC – K – Security

### Predictions – Cede the Political

### IR = Science

### Threats Real

## 2AC – K – Set Col