# AC – Mine Removal

## 1AC – Toolbox

### FW – Util

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. If you want me to spec further on my standard just tell me.

#### First, the constitutive obligation of the state is to protect citizen interest—individual obligations are not applicable in the public sphere. Goodin 95

Robert E. Goodin. Philosopher of Political Theory, Public Policy, and Applied Ethics. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1995. p. 26-7

The great adventure of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people’s interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one’s duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation on motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is required at all arises from the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain morally desirable ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at the individual level – the same thing that relieves individuals of responsibility – makes it morally incumbent upon individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different circumstances and their conclusions inevitably take very different forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. And those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.

#### Second, only impacts and values that exist in the physical world are relevant. Physical realism is the only meaningful ontological theory of being. Williams,

Donald Williams. “Naturalism and the Nature of Things.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 53, No. 5 (Sep., 1944), pp. 417-443. Duke UP. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181355

Casting up our accounts to this point, we observe that physical realism is in sum a meaningful, consistent, and essentially confirmable hypothesis. We turn accordingly to assess its credibility a posterior, in relation to the actual evidence, as we should that of a scientific theory or a war communique. We can know forthwith that materialism, granted that metaphysics is confirmable at all, is in principle the most thoroughly confirmable of all world hypotheses. It initiates the most conclusive confirmation or disconfirmation. The ideal aim of systematic knowledge is to disclose the fewest primitive elements into which the diversest objects are analyzable, and the fewest primitive facts, singular and general, from which the behavior of things is deducible. Metaphysics is the most 'scientific' of the sciences because it tries the hardest to explain every kind of fact by one simple principle or simple set of principles. It is the most empirical of sciences (as Peirce reminded us) because, by the same token, a metaphysics is relevant to and confirmable by every item of every experience, whereas every other science is concerned with only a few select and abstract aspects of some experiences, Physical realism is the ideal metaphysics, the veritable paradigm of philosophy, because its category of spatio-temporal pattern best permits analysis of diverse complexity to uniform and ordered simplicities, is most thoroughly numerable, and so most exactly and systematically calculable. Socratic purposes, Platonic ideals, Aristotelian qualities, Plotinian hierarchies-these are surds in comparison with a system de la nature, limned in patterns of action in the ordered dimensions of a spatio-temporal hypersphere

#### Third is the act omission distinction, governments are morally responsible for their omissions because they always face choices between different sets of policy options, all of which advantage some while disadvantaging others.

Cass R. **Sunstein and Vermeule** Adrian [“Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs. Copyright (c) 2005 The Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University. Stanford Law Review December,2005 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703]

The critics of capital punishment have been led astray by uncritically applying the act/omission distinction to a regulatory setting. Their position condemns the "active" infliction of death by governments but does not condemn the "inactive" production of death that comes from the refusal to maintain a system [\*720] of capital punishment. The basic problem is that even if this selective condemnation can be justified at the level of individual behavior, it is difficult to defend for governments. [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.737298.6087973779&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1187847773274&returnToKey=20_T1938900223&parent=docview##) A great deal of work has to be done to explain why "inactive," but causal, government decisions should not be part of the moral calculus. Suppose that we endorse the deontological position that it is wrong to take human lives, even if overall welfare is promoted by taking them. Why does the system of capital punishment violate that position, if the failure to impose capital punishment also takes lives? We suggest that the distinction between government acts and omissions, even if conceptually coherent, is not morally relevant to the question of capital punishment. Some governmental actions are morally obligatory, and some governmental omissions are blameworthy. In this setting, we suggest, government is morally obligated to adopt capital punishment and morally at fault if it declines to do so. The most fundamental point is that, unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.737298.6087973779&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1187847773274&returnToKey=20_T1938900223&parent=docview##) Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action - for example, private killing - becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it. To be sure, a system of punishments that only weakly deters homicide, relative to other feasible punishments, does not quite authorize homicide, but that system is not properly characterized as an omission, and little turns on whether it can be so characterized. Suppose, for example, that government fails to characterize certain actions - say, sexual harassment - as tortious or violative of civil rights law and that it therefore permits employers to harass employees as they choose or to discharge employees for failing to submit to sexual harassment. It would be unhelpful to characterize the result as a product of governmental "inaction." If employers are permitted to discharge employees for refusing to submit to sexual harassment, it is because the law is allocating certain entitlements to employers rather than employees. Or consider the context of ordinary torts. When Homeowner B sues Factory A over air pollution, a decision not to rule for Homeowner B is not a form of inaction: it is the allocation to Factory A of a property right to pollute. In such cases, an apparent government omission is an action simply because it is an allocation of legal rights. Any decision that allocates such rights, by creating entitlements [\*722] and prohibitions, is not inaction at all.

#### Fourth, Phenomenal introspection is reliable and proves that util’s true.

Sinhababu Neil (National University of Singapore) “The epistemic argument for hedonism” [http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3 accessed 2-4-16](http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3%20accessed%202-4-16) JW

The Odyssey's treatment of these events demonstrates how dramatically ancient Greek moral intuitions differ from ours. It doesn't dwell on the brutality of Telemachus, who killed twelve women for the trivial reasons he states, making them suffer as they die. While gods and men seek vengeance for other great and small offenses in the Odyssey, no one finds this mass murder worth avenging. It's a minor event in the denouement to a happy ending in which Odysseus (who first proposes killing the women) returns home and Telemachus becomes a man. That the[y] Greeks could so easily regard these murders as part of a happy ending for heroes shows how deeply we disagree with them. It's as if we gave them a trolley problem with the 12 women on the side track and no one on the main track, and they judged it permissible for Telemachus to turn the trolley and kill them all. And this isn't some esoteric text of a despised or short-lived sect, but a central literary work of a long-lived and influential culture. Human history offers similarly striking examples of disagreement on a variety of topics. These include sexual morality; the treatment of animals; the treatment of other ethnicities, families, and social classes; the consumption of intoxicating substances; whether and how one may take vengeance; slavery; whether public celebrations are acceptable; and gender roles.12 Moral obligations to commit genocide were accepted not only by some 20th century Germans, but by much of the ancient world, including the culture that gave us the Old Testament. One can only view the human past and much of the present with horror at the depth of human moral error and the harm that has resulted. One might think to explain away much of this disagreement as the result of differing nonmoral beliefs. Those who disagree about nonmoral issues may disagree on the moral rightness of a particular action despite agreeing on the fundamental moral issues. For example, they may agree that healing the sick is right, but disagree about whether a particular medicine will heal or harm. This disagreement about whether to prescribe the medicine won't be fundamentally about morality, and won't support the argument from disagreement. I don't think the moral disagreements listed above are explained by differences in nonmoral belief. This isn't because sexists, racists, and bigots share the nonmoral views of those enlightened by feminism and other egalitarian doctrines – they don't. Rather, their differing views on nonmoral topics often are rationalizations of moral beliefs that fundamentally disagree with ours.13 Those whose fundamental moral judgments include commitments to the authority of men over women, or of one race over another, will easily accept descriptive psychological views that attribute less intelligence or rationality to women or the subjugated race.14 Moral disagreement supposedly arising from moral views in religious texts is similar. Given how rich and many-stranded most religious texts are, interpretive claims about their moral teachings often tell us more about the antecedent moral beliefs of the interpreter than about the text itself. This is why the same texts are interpreted to support so many different moral views. Similar phenomena occur with most moral beliefs. Environmentalists who value a lovely patch of wilderness will easily believe that its destruction will cause disaster, those who feel justified in eating meat will easily believe that the animals they eat don't suffer greatly, and libertarians who feel that redistributing wealth is unjust will easily believe that it raises unemployment. We shouldn't assume that differing moral beliefs on practical questions are caused by fundamental moral agreement combined with differing nonmoral beliefs. Often the differing nonmoral beliefs are caused by fundamental moral disagreement. As we have no precise way of quantifying the breadth of disagreement or determining its epistemic consequences, it's unclear exactly how much disagreement the argument requires. While this makes the argument difficult to evaluate, it shouldn't stop us from proceeding, as we have to use the unclear notion of widespread disagreement in ordinary epistemic practice. If 99.9% of botanists agree on some issue about plants, non-botanists should defer to their authority and believe as most of them do. But if disagreement between botanists is suitably widespread, non-botanists should remain agnostic. A more precise and systematic account of when disagreement is widespread enough to generate particular epistemic consequences would be very helpful. Until we have one, we must employ the unclear notion of widespread disagreement, or some similar notion, throughout epistemic practice. Against the background of widespread moral disagreement, there may still be universal or near-universal agreement on some moral questions. For example, perhaps all cultures agree that one should provide for one’s elderly parents, even though they generally disagree elsewhere. How do these narrow areas of moral agreement affect the argument? This all depends on whether the narrow agreement is reliably or unreliably caused. If narrow agreement results from a reliable process of belief-formation, it lets us avoid error, defeating the argument from disagreement. But widely accepted moral beliefs may result from widely prevailing unreliable processes leading everyone to the same errors. There's no special pressure to explain agreement in terms of reliable processes when disagreement is widespread. Explaining agreement in terms of reliable processes is preferable when we have some reason to think that the processes involved are generally reliable. Then we would want to understand cases of agreement in line with the general reliability of processes producing moral belief. But if disagreement is widespread, error is too. Since moral beliefs are so often false, invoking unreliable processes to explain them is better than invoking reliable ones. The next two sections discuss this in more detail. We have many plausible explanations of narrow agreement on which moral beliefs are unreliably caused. Evolutionary and sociological explanations of why particular moral beliefs are widely accepted often invoke unreliable mechanisms.15 On these explanations, we agree because some moral beliefs were so important for reproductive fitness that natural selection made them innate in us, or so important to the interests controlling moral education in each culture that they were inculcated in everyone. For example, parents' influence over their children's moral education would explain agreement that one should provide for one's elderly parents. Plausible normative ethical theories won't systematically connect these evolutionary and sociological explanations with moral facts. If disagreement and error are widespread, they'll provide useful ways to reconcile unusual cases of widespread agreement with the general unreliability of the processes producing moral belief. 1.3 If there is widespread error about a topic, we should retain only those beliefs about it formed through reliable processes Now I'll defend 3. First I'll show how the falsity of others' beliefs undermines one's own belief. Then I'll clarify the notion of a reliable process. I'll consider a modification to 3 that epistemic internalists might favor, and show that the argument accommodates it. I'll illustrate 3's plausibility by considering cases where it correctly guides our reasoning. Finally, I'll show how 3 is grounded in the intuitive response to grave moral error. First, a simple objection: “Why should I care whether other people have false beliefs? That's a fact about other people, and not about me. Even if most people are wrong about some topic, I may be one of the few right ones, even if there's no apparent reason to think that my way of forming beliefs is any more reliable.” While widespread error leaves open the possibility that one has true beliefs, it reduces the probability that my beliefs are true. Consider a parallel case. I have no direct evidence that I have an appendix, but I know that previous investigations have revealed appendixes in people. So induction suggests that I have an appendix. Similarly, I know on the basis of 1 and 2 that people's moral beliefs are, in general, rife with error. So even if I have no direct evidence of error in my moral beliefs, induction suggests that they are rife with error as well. 3 invokes the reliability of the processes that produce our beliefs. Assessing processes of belief-formation for reliability is an important part of our epistemic practices. If someone tells me that my belief is entirely produced by wishful thinking, I can't simply accept that and maintain the belief. Knowing that wishful thinking is unreliable, I must either deny that my belief is entirely caused by wishful thinking or abandon the belief. But if someone tells me that my belief is entirely the result of visual perception, I'll maintain it, assuming that it concerns sizable nearby objects or something else about which visual perception is reliable. While providing precise criteria for individuating processes of belief-formation is hard, as the literature on the generality problem for reliabilism attests, individuating them somehow is indispensable to our epistemic practices.16 Following Alvin Goldman's remark that “It is clear that our ordinary thought about process types slices them broadly” (346), I'll treat cognitive process types like wishful thinking and visual perception as appropriately broad.17 Trusting particular people and texts, meanwhile, are too narrow. Cognitive science may eventually help us better individuate cognitive process types for the purposes of reliability assessments and discover which processes produce which beliefs. Epistemic internalists might reject 3 as stated, claiming that it isn't widespread error that would justify giving up our beliefs, but our having reason to believe that there is widespread error. They might also claim that our justification for believing the outputs of some process depends not on its reliability, but on what we have reason to believe about its reliability. The argument will still go forward if 3 is modified to suit internalist tastes, changing its antecedent to “If we have reason to believe that there is widespread error about a topic” or changing its consequent to “we should retain only those beliefs about it that we have reason to believe were formed through reliable processes.” While 3's antecedent might itself seem unnecessary on the original formulation, it's required for 3 to remain plausible on the internalist modification. Requiring us to have reason to believe that any of our belief-formation processes are reliable before retaining their outputs might lead to skepticism. The antecedent limits the scope of the requirement to cases of widespread error, averting general skeptical conclusions. The argument will still attain its conclusion under these modifications. Successfully defending the premises of the argument and deriving widespread error (5) and unreliability (7) gives those of us who have heard the defense and derivation reason to believe 5 and 7. This allows us to derive 8. (Thus the pronoun 'we' in 3, 6, and 8.) 3 describes the right response to widespread error in many actual cases. Someone in the 12th century, especially upon hearing the disagreeing views of many cultures regarding the origins of the universe, would do well to recognize that error on this topic was widespread and retreat to agnosticism about it. Only when modern astrophysics extended reliable empirical methods to cosmology would it be rational to move forward from agnosticism and accept a particular account of how the universe began. Similarly, disagreement about which stocks will perform better than average is widespread among investors, suggesting that one's beliefs on the matter have a high likelihood of error. It's wise to remain agnostic about the stock market without an unusually reliable way of forming beliefs – for example, the sort of secret insider information that it's illegal to trade on. 3 permits us to hold onto our moral beliefs in individual cases of moral disagreement, suggesting skeptical conclusions only when moral disagreement is widespread. When we consider a single culture's abhorrent moral views, like the Greeks' acceptance of Telemachus and Odysseus' murders of the servant women, we don't think that maybe the Greeks were right to see nothing wrong and we should reconsider our outrage. Instead, we're horrified by their grave moral error. I think this is the right response. We're similarly horrified by the moral errors of Hindus who burned widows on their husbands' funeral pyres, American Southerners who supported slavery and segregation, our contemporaries who condemn homosexuality, and countless others. The sheer number of cases like this requires us to regard moral error as a pervasive feature of the human condition. Humans typically form moral beliefs through unreliable processes and have appendixes. We are humans, so this should reduce our confidence in our moral judgments. The prevalence of error in a world full of moral disagreement demonstrates how bad humans are at forming true moral beliefs, undermining our own moral beliefs. Knowing that unreliable processes so often lead humans to their moral beliefs, we'll require our moral beliefs to issue from reliable processes. 1.4 If there is widespread error about morality, there are no reliable processes for forming moral beliefs A reliable process for forming moral beliefs would avert skeptical conclusions. I'll consider several processes and argue that they don't help us escape moral skepticism. Ordinary moral intuition, whether it involves a special rational faculty or our emotional responses, is shown to be unreliable by the existence of widespread error. The argument from disagreement either prevents reflective equilibrium from generating moral conclusions or undermines it. Conceptual analysis is reliable, but delivers the wrong kind of knowledge to avert skepticism. If all our processes for forming moral beliefs are unreliable, moral skepticism looms. 4 is false only because of one process – phenomenal introspection, which lets us know of the goodness of pleasure, as the second half of this paper will discuss. Widespread error guarantees the unreliability of any process by which we form all or almost all of our moral beliefs. While widespread error allows some processes responsible for a small share of our moral beliefs to predominantly create true beliefs, it implies that any process generating a very large share of moral belief must be highly error-prone. Since the process produced so many of our moral beliefs, and so many of them are erroneous, it must be responsible for a large share of the error. If more of people's moral beliefs were true, things would be otherwise. Widespread truth would support the reliability of any process that produced most or all of our moral beliefs, since that process would be responsible for so much true belief. But given widespread error, ordinary moral intuition must be unreliable. This point provides a forceful response to Moorean opponents who insist that we can't give up the reliability of a process by which we form all or nearly all of our beliefs on an important topic, since this would permit counterintuitive skeptical conclusions. Even if this Moorean response helps against external world skeptics who employ counterfactual thought experiments involving brains in vats, it doesn't help against moral skeptics who use 1 and 2 to derive widespread actual error. Once we accept that widespread error actually obtains, a great deal of human moral knowledge has already vanished. Insisting on the reliability of the process then seems implausible and pointless. I'll briefly consider two conceptions of moral intuition – as a special rational faculty by which we grasp non-natural moral facts, and as a process by which our emotions lead us to form moral beliefs – and show how widespread error guarantees their unreliability. Some philosophers regard moral intuition as involving a special rational faculty that lets us know non-natural moral facts.18 They argue that knowledge on many topics including mathematics, logic, and modality involves this rational faculty, so moral knowledge might operate similarly. This suggests a way for them to defend the reliability of moral intuition in the face of widespread error: if intuition is reliable about these other things, its overall reliability across moral and nonmoral areas allows us to reliably form moral beliefs by using it. This defense won't work. When an epistemic process is manifestly unreliable on some topic, as widespread error shows any process responsible for most of our moral beliefs to be, the reliability of that process elsewhere won't save it on that topic. Even if testimony is reliable, this doesn't imply the reliability of compulsive gamblers' testimony about the next spin of the roulette wheel. Even if intuition remains reliable elsewhere, widespread disagreement still renders it unreliable in ethics. I see ordinary moral intuition as a process of emotional perception in which our feelings cause us to form moral beliefs.19 Just as visual experiences of color cause beliefs about the colors of surfaces, emotional experiences cause moral beliefs. Pleasant feelings like approval, admiration, or hope in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are right, virtuous or good. Unpleasant emotions like guilt, disgust, or horror in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are wrong, vicious, or bad. We might have regarded this as a reliable way to know about moral facts, just as visual perception is a reliable way to know about color, if not for widespread error. But because of widespread error, we can only see it as an unreliable process responsible for our dismal epistemic situation. Reflective equilibrium is the prevailing methodology in normative ethics today. It involves modifying our beliefs about particular cases and general principles to make them cohere. Whether or not nonmoral propositions like the premises of the argument from disagreement are admissible in reflective equilibrium, widespread error prevents reflective equilibrium from reliably generating a true moral theory, as I'll explain. If the premises of the argument from disagreement are admitted into reflective equilibrium, the argument can be reconstructed there, and reflective equilibrium will dictate that we give up all of our moral beliefs. To avoid this conclusion, the premises of the argument from disagreement would have to be revised away on moral grounds. These premises are a metaethical claim about the objectivity of morality which seems to be a conceptual truth, an anthropological claim about the existence of disagreement, a very general epistemic claim about when we should revise our beliefs, and a more empirically grounded epistemic claim about our processes of belief-formation and their reliability. While reflective equilibrium may move us to revise substantive moral beliefs in view of other substantive moral beliefs, claims of these other kinds are less amenable to such revision. Unless ambitious arguments for revising these nonmoral claims away succeed, we must follow the argument to its conclusion and accept that reflective equilibrium makes moral skeptics of us.20 If only moral principles and judgments are considered in reflective equilibrium, it won't make moral skeptics of us, but the argument from disagreement will undermine its conclusions. The argument forces us to give up the pre-existing moral beliefs against which we test various moral propositions in reflective equilibrium. While we may be justified in believing something because it coheres with our other beliefs, this justification goes away once we see that those beliefs should be abandoned. Coherence with beliefs that we know we should give up doesn't confer justification. Now I'll consider conceptual analysis. It can produce moral beliefs about conceptual truths – for example, that the moral supervenes on the nonmoral, and that morality is objective. It also may provide judgments about relations between different moral concepts – perhaps, that if the only moral difference between two actions is that one would produce morally better consequences than the other, doing what produces better consequences is right. I regard conceptual analysis as reliable, so that the argument from disagreement does not force us to give up the beliefs about morality it produces. Unfortunately, if analytic naturalism is false, as has been widely held in metaethics since G. E. Moore, conceptual analysis won't provide all the knowledge we need to build a normative ethical theory.21 Even when it relates moral concepts like goodness and rightness to each other, it doesn't tell us that anything is good or right to begin with. That's the knowledge we need to avoid moral skepticism. So far I've argued that our epistemic and anthropological situation, combined with plausible metaethical and epistemic principles, forces us to abandon our moral beliefs. But if a reliable process of moral belief-formation exists, 4 is false, and we can answer the moral skeptic. The rest of this paper discusses the only reliable process I know of. 2.1 Phenomenal introspection reveals pleasure's goodness Phenomenal introspection, a reliable way of forming true beliefs about our experiences, produces the belief that pleasure is good. Even as our other processes of moral belief-formation prove unreliable, it provides reliable access to pleasure's goodness, justifying the positive claims of hedonism. This section clarifies what phenomenal introspection and pleasure are and explains how phenomenal introspection provides reliable access to pleasure's value. Section 2.2 argues that pleasure's goodness is genuine moral value, rather than value of some other kind. In phenomenal introspection we consider our subjective experience, or phenomenology, and determine what it's like. Phenomenal introspection can be reliable while dreaming or hallucinating, as long as we can determine what the dreams or hallucinations are like. By itself, phenomenal introspection doesn't produce beliefs about things outside experience, or about relations between our experiences and non-experiential things. So it doesn't produce judgments about the rightness of actions or the goodness of non-experiential things. It can only tell us about the intrinsic properties of experience itself. Phenomenal introspection is generally reliable, even if mistakes about immediate experience are possible. Experience is rich in detail, so one could get some of the details wrong in belief. Under adverse conditions involving false expectations, misleading evidence about what one's experiences will be, or extreme emotional states that disrupt belief-formation, larger errors are possible. Paradigmatically reliable processes like vision share these failings. Vision sometimes produces false beliefs under adverse conditions, or when we're looking at complex things. Still, it's so reliable as to be indispensible in ordinary life. Regarding phenomenal introspection as unreliable is about as radical as skepticism about the reliability of vision. While contemporary psychologists reject introspection into one's motivations and other psychological causal processes as unreliable, phenomenal introspection fares better. Daniel Kahneman, for example, writes that “experienced utility is best measured by moment-based methods that assess the experience of the present.”22 Even those most skeptical about the reliability of phenomenal introspection, like Eric Schwitzgebel, concede that we can reliably introspect whether we are in serious pain.23 Then we should be able to introspectively determine what pain is like. So I'll assume the reliability of phenomenal introspection. One can form a variety of beliefs using phenomenal introspection. For example, one can believe that one is having sound experiences of particular noises and visual experiences of different shades of color. When looking at a lemon and considering the phenomenal states that are yellow experiences, one can form some beliefs about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're bright experiences. And when considering experiences of pleasure, one can make some judgments about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're good experiences. Just as one can look inward at one's experience of lemon yellow and recognize its brightness, one can look inward at one's experience of pleasure and recognize its goodness.24 When I consider a situation of increasing pleasure, I can form the belief that things are better than they were before, just as I form the belief that there's more brightness in my visual field as lemon yellow replaces black. And when I suddenly experience pain, I can form the belief that things are worse in my experience than they were before. Having pleasure consists in one's experience having a positive hedonic tone. Without descending into metaphor, it's hard to give a further account of what pleasure is like than to say that when one has it, one feels good. As Aaron Smuts writes in defending the view of pleasure as hedonic tone, “to 'feel good' is about as close to an experiential primitive as we get.” 25 Fred Feldman sees pleasure as fundamentally an attitude rather than a hedonic tone.26 But as long as hedonic tones are real components of experience, phenomenal introspection will reveal pleasure's goodness. Opponents of the hedonic tone account of pleasure usually concede that hedonic tones exist, as Feldman seems to in discussing “sensory pleasures,” which he thinks his view helps us understand. Even on his view of pleasure, phenomenal introspection can produce the belief that some hedonic tones are good while others are bad. There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences. There are sensory pleasures, like the pleasure of tasting delicious food, receiving a massage, or resting your tired limbs in a soft bed after a hard day. There are the pleasures of seeing that our desires are satisfied, like the pleasure of winning a game, getting a promotion, or seeing a friend succeed. These experiences differ in many ways, just as the experiences of looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day differ. It's easy to see the appeal of Feldman's view that pleasures “have just about nothing in common phenomenologically” (79). But just as our experiences in looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day have brightness in common, pleasant experiences all have “a certain common quality – feeling good,” as Roger Crisp argues (109).27 As the analogy with brightness suggests, hedonic tone is phenomenologically very thin, and usually mixed with a variety of other experiences.28 Pleasure of any kind feels good, and displeasure of any kind feels bad. These feelings may or may not have bodily location or be combined with other sensory states like warmth or pressure. “Pleasure” and “displeasure” mean these thin phenomenal states of feeling good and feeling bad. As Joseph Mendola writes, “the pleasantness of physical pleasure is a kind of hedonic value, a single homogenous sensory property, differing merely in intensity as well as in extent and duration, which is yet a kind of goodness” (442).29 What if Feldman is right and hedonic states feel good in fundamentally different ways? Then phenomenal introspection suggests a pluralist variety of hedonism. Each fundamental flavor of pleasure will have a fundamentally different kind of goodness, as phenomenal introspection more accurate than mine will reveal. This isn't my view, but I suggest it to those convinced that hedonic tones are fundamentally heterogenous. If phenomenal introspection reliably informs us that pleasure is good, how can anyone believe that their pleasures are bad? Other processes of moral belief-formation are responsible for these beliefs. Someone who feels disgust or guilt about sex may not only regard sex as immoral, but the pleasure it produces as bad. Even if phenomenal introspection on sexual pleasure disposes one to believe that it's good, stronger negative emotional responses to it may more strongly dispose one to believe that it's bad, following the emotional perception model suggested in section 1.4. Explaining disagreement about pleasure's value in terms of other processes lets hedonists maintain that phenomenal introspection univocally supports pleasure's goodness. As long as negative judgments of pleasure come from unreliable processes instead of phenomenal introspection, the argument from disagreement eliminates them. The parallel between yellow’s brightness and pleasure’s goodness demonstrates the objectivity of the value detected in phenomenal introspection. Just as anyone's yellow experiences objectively are bright experiences, anyone's pleasure objectively is a good experience.30 While one's phenomenology is often called one's “subjective experience”, facts about it are still objective. “Subjective” in “subjective experience” means “internal to the mind”, not “ontologically dependent on attitudes towards it.” My yellow-experiences objectively have brightness. Anyone who thought my yellow-experiences lacked brightness would be mistaken. Pleasure similarly is objectively good. It's true that anyone's pleasure is good. Anyone who denies this is mistaken. As Mendola writes, the value detected in phenomenal introspection is “a plausible candidate for objective value” (712). Even though phenomenal introspection only tells me about my own phenomenal states, I can know that others' pleasure is good. Of course, I can't phenomenally introspect their pleasures, just as I can't phenomenally introspect pleasures that I'll experience next year. But if I consider my experiences of lemon yellow and ask what it would be like if others had the same experiences, I must think that they would be having bright experiences. Similarly, if in a pleasant moment I consider what it's like for others to have exactly the experience I'm having, I must think that they're having good experiences. If they have exactly the same experiences I'm having, their experiences will have exactly the same intrinsic properties as mine. This is also how I know that if I have the same experience in the future, it'll have the same intrinsic properties. Even though the only pleasure I can introspect is mine now, I should believe that others' pleasures and my pleasures at other times are good, just as I should believe that yellow experienced by others and myself at other times is bright. My argument thus favors the kind of universal hedonism that supports utilitarianism, not egoistic hedonism.

### Adv 1 – Food Scarcity

#### Angolan agricultural cultivation is k2 preventing increasing food imports. Campos 16

Campos, Zandre. “Why It's Critical to Cultivate Agriculture in Angola.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 8 Apr. 2016, www.huffingtonpost.com/zandre-campos/why-its-critical-to-culti\_b\_9643300.html. Mr. Campos graduated from Lusiada University, Lisbon, with a degree in Law. Mr. Campos was named one of the Top 25 African business influencers and was a recipient of the Distinguished Business Excellence Award by African Leadership Magazine. He is frequently quoted as an expert on Africa in the media and is a recurring contributor for The Huffington Post and US News & World Report. //nhs-VA

Angola has the resources to become one of the leading agricultural countries in Africa, reports the [US Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agriculture Service](http://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agricultural%20Economic%20Fact%20Sheet_Pretoria_Angola_6-9-2015.pdf). And once upon a time, it was. Look up Angola and agriculture on [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agriculture_in_Angola) and you’ll see that Angola’s history involved a flourishing tradition of family-based farming. The country was self-sufficient in all major food crops except wheat. Angola exported coffee and maize, in addition to other crops including sisal, bananas, sugar cane, cassava and cotton. In fact, coffee was once Angola’s leading export and was considered among the best in the world. Flash forward to today, post-independence and the civil war. Angola has changed from a self-sufficient exporter to a country that needs to bring in most of its food and other key commodities from abroad. The civil war in Angola displaced more than four million people and damaged the local infrastructure. The danger from mines deployed during the war which have not been recovered yet pose another challenge to farming and to the establishment of an agribusiness sector. Currently, Angola imports more than half its food, with some estimates putting the figure as high as 90%, the USDA reports. The annual food bill amounts to some $5 billion, according to a [Reuters](http://www.reuters.com/article/angola-agriculture-idUSL5N0Y620620150519) article. And the impact on the economy of the steep drop in oil prices has led to food shortages in some areas. Angola cultivates just 8% of its available land, according to the USDA, and agriculture accounts for a mere 10% of GDP. While much of the population still depends on agriculture for food, income and employment, about 80% of the farmers throughout the country are smallholders, Wikipedia says. Farmers cultivate very small plots of land, with very low agricultural productivity. However, Agriculture is a real opportunity for Angola. Since people moved to the coast during the war, the center of the country is now open and ready to be cultivated. Angola has more than 2,000 acres of land that are currently unused and lying fallow. If the land mines can be destroyed, this substantial acreage can be used for farming and producing of essential crops that will no longer need to be exported.

#### Mine removal empirically produces agricultural benefits and stability – Ethiopia proves. Litzelman 02

Litzelman, Michael. “Benefit/Cost Analysis of U.S. Demining in Ethiopia and Eritrea.”Benefit/Cost Analysis of U.S. Demining in Ethiopia and Eritrea, James Madison University, Aug. 2002, www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/6.2/focus/michaellitzelman/michaellistzelman.htm. Major Michael F. Litzelman is currently a Civil Affairs Operations Officer, Special Operations Command, Korea. Dr. Litzelman received his Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Mason University in 2001. //nhs-VA

�Ethiopia�s greatest potential to improve their country economically is through the promise of agricultural development because of the fertile soil and rainfall. It accounts for 47 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is the most important sector of the economy.�16 Agricultural development has been potentially expanded to regions that were demined. Mine incidents have significantly decreased with the local herdsmen and farmers, which has contributed to the successes of the nations as a result of the U.S. demining program according to MSG Bartholomew and MSG Johnson.17 However, there is as yet no data to support that assertion by these two individuals who played a large part in setting up the demining program in both countries. Other benefits, in terms of the U.S. demining programs� original goals and objectives are listed below.18 (1) Enabling the United States to make a tangible difference to people struggling to rebuild their lives after long years of war: The DoD has provided U.S. trainers who have trained the Ethiopians and Eritreans in demining, public awareness and historical research. Since 1993, the U.S. demining program has produced more tangible benefits in Ethiopia than in Eritrea, i.e., 325,625 mines eliminated and 15,102 acres cleared in Ethiopia versus 4,750 mines destroyed and 645 acres cleared in Eritrea. In Ethiopia, 285 roadways have been cleared, versus 35 in Eritrea. U.S. trainers also provided humanitarian donations in vehicles (more than 120) for both countries and medical aid packages (medical, equipment-related and ambulatory). They also assisted in creating a demining infrastructure by supporting the construction and renovation of 11 facilities. The United States has helped to conduct emergency medical care in hospitals and implemented new surgical techniques for injuries as a result of landmines, in addition to supplying mine detection devices, public awareness training, historical research and demining training. U.S. demining may also help to redistribute some wealth from the United States to the Ethiopian government. For example, some costs have been inflated for some services to get Ethiopian participation, such as the costs of contracting the transportation for the demining equipment, which totaled $12,000. The U.S. government has also led support including coordination for donations provided by other countries and other organizations.17, 19 In addition, the United States has helped governments such as Ethiopia and Eritrea help themselves by educating civilians on the damages and locations of landmines and by providing badly needed humanitarian support to these war-torn countries. These benefits are manifest, tangible, quantifiable achievements. If implemented, the primary and secondary benefits, as listed in this article, can make a real difference in the lives of the common people of Ethiopia. (2) Promoting stability by enabling countries to better solve their problems, rebuild their economies and build public confidence in their governments by meeting the needs of the people. Demining programs do not produce a panacea. Today, Ethiopia appears to be stable within its own borders, but the U.S. demining program has not directly produced stability between Ethiopia and Eritrea in terms of preventing these countries from fighting one another. From May 1998 to June 2000, fighting broke out along a disputed border area of these two countries. The United States estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 soldiers died, with both countries using valuable resources to buy military hardware to fight each other.20 Some other potential benefits that have been lauded have been regional stability, the promotion of democracy, and economic development.21 With the fighting occurring in the Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Eritrea, regional stability has not been a benefit, although demining has helped to limit the accessibility of mines that were destroyed to these countries� arsenals. In regards to promoting democracy, Ethiopian citizens have been repressed, and some have actually been tortured after being arrested.15, 22 However, some inroads have been made toward democracy. When Ethiopia claimed victory in May of 2000, it came ahead of general elections scheduled on May 14, only the second general election in the country�s history. An estimated 20 million registered voters chose members of the 548-seat federal parliament, nine regional assemblies, and two city councils.23, 24 This study has shown that Ethiopia has misused vehicles for purposes other than demining, their original intended use; in addition, an American renovated headquarters in Ethiopia is being used as a military academy. Agriculture, grazing and forestry development may also be expanded as a result of demining for both countries, although no data exists as to whether this land is being productively used. (3) Strengthening U.S. relations with these governments at a critical time in which the governments are engaged in nation-building. There is no way of knowing whether the access and trust gained from the demining programs directly produced conflict resolution in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea during their recent war. Although the U.S. government was unable to stop both sides from fighting one another in the early part of the conflict, it did help to persuade both sides to negotiate an end to the conflict in June of 2000. Such international organizations as the European Union and the Organization of African Unity as well as UN Secretary Kofi Annan appear to have had little influence in the recent conflict.25 A question remains as to the degree of American influence with Ethiopia and Eritrea. (4) Providing a valuable example to these countries of how a military can promote the public good rather than just wage war and oppress people. As mentioned above, the demining program is promoting public good and has shown its citizens that the military can be used for other purposes than oppressing its own people, although some of the resources, as noted earlier in this article, have been used for other purposes. Some critics are also alarmed that foreign governments, such as the United States, donate hundreds of millions of dollars in aid, despite mounting allegations of human rights violations.26 (5) Providing an invaluable training benefit to U.S. troops, giving them experience in relating to diverse cultures, organizing programs in sparse, foreign environments and honing foreign language skills. Readiness is supposed to be enhanced with units and personnel exercising joint and inter-service operations, and critical wartime skills are practiced. However, some of the military chiefs have questioned whether readiness has actually been enhanced as a result of the numerous deployments, which have resulted in less training for service personnel. Winslow Wheeler, a defense analyst ��found evidence of extremely serious Army-wide personnel and training problems. The Senate Budget Committee appeared primed to join the critics of the administration who say the Pentagon robs readiness accounts to pay for peacekeeping operations. An internal report by the panel�s senior defense analyst has concluded that Army readiness at its two major stateside combat training centers is inadequate and could become even worse�.�27 This study has found that this may be true for peacekeeping operations, but not for the humanitarian demining operations, which consist of Special Operation Forces. Initially, U.S. Special Operation soldiers28 gained access and experience, but this was generally during the period of building its demining infrastructure, while training the Ethiopian soldiers how to train their own personnel. Since then, only a few liaison officers have gained that experience. Special Forces soldiers have continued to train in-country, but on other soldier tasks (i.e., infantry skills) as well. A demining program could only consist of a few months' deployment for these elite personnel, who would train the host nationals. (6) Generally increasing morale among U.S. troops while enabling them to engage in activities with measurable benefits that are greatly appreciated by the host population. Morale among U.S. troops has not been surveyed.

#### Food scarcity causes conflict. Brown 11

Brown 11 – (Lester R. is the President of the Earth Policy Institute, “The New Geopolitics of Food,” May 2011, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/04/25/the_new_geopolitics_of_food?page=full>, Accessed Date: 3-15-13 y2k

The potential for conflict -- and not just over water -- is high. Many of the land deals have been made in secret, and in most cases, the land involved was already in use by villagers when it was sold or leased. Often those already farming the land were neither consulted about nor even informed of the new arrangements. And because there typically are no formal land titles in many developing-country villages, the farmers who lost their land have had little backing to bring their cases to court. Reporter John Vidal, writing in Britain's Observer, quotes Nyikaw Ochalla from Ethiopia's Gambella region: "The foreign companies are arriving in large numbers, depriving people of land they have used for centuries. There is no consultation with the indigenous population. The deals are done secretly. The only thing the local people see is people coming with lots of tractors to invade their lands." Local hostility toward such land grabs is the rule, not the exception. In 2007, as food prices were starting to rise, China signed an agreement with the Philippines to lease 2.5 million acres of land slated for food crops that would be shipped home. Once word leaked, the public outcry -- much of it from Filipino farmers -- forced Manila to suspend the agreement. A similar uproar rocked Madagascar, where a South Korean firm, Daewoo Logistics, had pursued rights to more than 3 million acres of land. Word of the deal helped stoke a political furor that toppled the government and forced cancellation of the agreement. Indeed, few things are more likely to fuel insurgencies than taking land from people. Agricultural equipment is easily sabotaged. If ripe fields of grain are torched, they burn quickly. Not only are these deals risky, but foreign investors producing food in a country full of hungry people face another political question of how to get the grain out. Will villagers permit trucks laden with grain headed for port cities to proceed when they themselves may be on the verge of starvation? The potential for political instability in countries where villagers have lost their land and their livelihoods is high. Conflicts could easily develop between investor and host countries. These acquisitions represent a potential investment in agriculture in developing countries of an estimated $50 billion. But it could take many years to realize any substantial production gains. The public infrastructure for modern market-oriented agriculture does not yet exist in most of Africa. In some countries it will take years just to build the roads and ports needed to bring in agricultural inputs such as fertilizer and to export farm products. Beyond that, modern agriculture requires its own infrastructure: machine sheds, grain-drying equipment, silos, fertilizer storage sheds, fuel storage facilities, equipment repair and maintenance services, well-drilling equipment, irrigation pumps, and energy to power the pumps. Overall, development of the land acquired to date appears to be moving very slowly. So how much will all this expand world food output? We don't know, but the World Bank analysis indicates that only 37 percent of the projects will be devoted to food crops. Most of the land bought up so far will be used to produce biofuels and other industrial crops. Even if some of these projects do eventually boost land productivity, who will benefit? If virtually all the inputs -- the farm equipment, the fertilizer, the pesticides, the seeds -- are brought in from abroad and if all the output is shipped out of the country, it will contribute little to the host country's economy. At best, locals may find work as farm laborers, but in highly mechanized operations, the jobs will be few. At worst, impoverished countries like Mozambique and Sudan will be left with less land and water with which to feed their already hungry populations. Thus far the land grabs have contributed more to stirring unrest than to expanding food production. And this rich country-poor country divide could grow even more pronounced -- and soon. This January, a new stage in the scramble among importing countries to secure food began to unfold when South Korea, which imports 70 percent of its grain, announced that it was creating a new public-private entity that will be responsible for acquiring part of this grain. With an initial office in Chicago, the plan is to bypass the large international trading firms by buying grain directly from U.S. farmers. As the Koreans acquire their own grain elevators, they may well sign multiyear delivery contracts with farmers, agreeing to buy specified quantities of wheat, corn, or soybeans at a fixed price. Other importers will not stand idly by as South Korea tries to tie up a portion of the U.S. grain harvest even before it gets to market. The enterprising Koreans may soon be joined by China, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and other leading importers. Although South Korea's initial focus is the United States, far and away the world's largest grain exporter, it may later consider brokering deals with Canada, Australia, Argentina, and other major exporters. This is happening just as China may be on the verge of entering the U.S. market as a potentially massive importer of grain. With China's 1.4 billion increasingly affluent consumers starting to compete with U.S. consumers for the U.S. grain harvest, cheap food, seen by many as an American birthright, may be coming to an end. No one knows where this intensifying competition for food supplies will go, but the world seems to be moving away from the international cooperation that evolved over several decades following World War II to an every-country-for-itself philosophy. Food nationalism may help secure food supplies for individual affluent countries, but it does little to enhance world food security. Indeed, the low-income countries that host land grabs or import grain will likely see their food situation deteriorate.

#### DRC is a hotspot for conflict – new Angolan leadership gets pulled in. Kassongo 10/9

Kassongo, Jean. “Africa: Blazing DR Congo Conflicts Threaten Entire Continent.”AllAfrica.com, CAJ News Agency, 9 Oct. 2017, allafrica.com/stories/201710090044.html.//nhs-VA

Kinshasa — The Democratic Republic of Congo's borders have degenerated into hot spots for local and foreign armed groups threatening peace in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. Neighboring Burundi, Central African Republic and South Sudan, which are also besieged by conflicts of their own, have borne the brunt of the militancy while stable countries such as Angola and Uganda are equally in tribulation for sharing the border with DRC. The United Nations Security Council noted there have been cases of security breaches along the border between the DRC and Central African Republic as a result of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army. The Christian radical group has intensified its militancy due to the withdrawal of troops from the United States Forces Command in Africa and the gradual reduction of the activities of the African Union's regional cooperation initiative for the elimination of the group. In addition, the conflict in South Sudan has exacerbated insecurity along the border with the two countries. About 600 members of the opposition Sudanese Liberation Movement are still in UN premises near Goma. In Uganda, inter-communal tensions in Kasese district, near the border with DRC, are cause concern. The tensions have intensified along the border between Uganda and South Sudan as a result of the continuous influx of refugees. Angola has meanwhile strengthened the presence of its security forces in the border areas with DRC following the mass arrival of Congolese refugees. DRC is characerised by multifaceted conflict, which has escalated since President Joseph Kabila prolonged his stay in power despite the lapse of his term in 2016. About 3.5 million people are displaced, making DRC the country with the highest number of internal displacement globally.

### Adv 2 – Human Development

#### Angolan HDI is among the lowest but increasing infrastructure can change that. Hukeri 16

Hukeri, Varun. “Why Does Angola Rank Lowest in the Human Development Index?”Quora.com, 28 Jan. 2016, www.quora.com/Why-does-Angola-rank-lowest-in-the-Human-Development-Index. Undergraduate Research Assistant at The University of Texas at Austin //nhs-VA

While Angola is actually not the lowest in the Human Development Index, ranking 149th out of 188th with a score of 0.532, that value still categorizes Angola as a low HDI country. To understand why Angola ranks so low, we should first look to the metrics of the HDI and apply them to the current situation in Angola. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and income per capita indicators. A country scores higher HDI when the life expectancy at birth is longer, the education period is longer, and the income per capita is higher. So to understand why Angola has such a low HDI, we have to look at the current situation in regards to the country's life expectancy, education, and income. On the matter of life expectancy, Angola consistently ranks among the lowest in the world\* with an average life expectancy at birth of 55.63 years. Among males, the number is 54.49 years, and among females, it's 56.84. So currently, life expectancy remains very low in the country, and can be attributed to a lack of investment in healthcare, sanitation, and infrastructure. In 2013, Angola spent 3.8% of its GDP on healthcare, and continues to have low accessibility of healthcare and treatment. Angola only has 0.17 doctors per 1,000 people and 0.8 hospital beds per 1,000 people. In addition, only around half of the country has access to clean drinking water and improved sanitation conditions, and the risk of infectious disease remains high. All these factors contribute to Angola's low life expectancy, and thus a low HDI. On the matter of education, Angola's total literacy rate is 71.1%, with males over 15 having an 82% literacy rate but only 60.7% with women. When it comes to schooling, the average number of years of education is 11, with 14 for males and 9 for females. While Angola's education rates are higher than other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, it still isn't indicative of higher development in the country. Angola will have to prioritize increasing educational opportunities, especially for women, as well as building education infrastructure like schools. On the matter of income, Angola ranks 152 in terms of GDP per capita (PPP), with per capita incomes averaging around $7,300. Angola's economy is heavily based upon oil production, and corruption and income inequality has led to a lack of economic opportunities for Angolans. By rebuilding infrastructure, reducing income inequality, and increasing foreign investment, incomes will rise across the board, increasing per capita income, and thus increasing HDI. All in all, Angola's low HDI can be contributed to a low life expectancy, relatively low education rates, and relatively low incomes. However, if Angola is able to recover from its past, including a brutal civil war, and increase infrastructure funding for hospitals, schools, and economic sectors, the country's HDI can increase as the nation develops.

#### Mine removal clears the way for infrastructure – literally. Cameron et al 05

Cameron, Michael, et al. "Value of Life and Measuring the Benefits of Landmine Clearance in Cambodia." Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society 49th Annual Conference.< http://www. agric. uwa. edu. au/ARE/AARES/Conf2005/PapersPDF/CameronAARES. 2005. Michael Cameron – Dept of Economics @ U Waikato //nhs-VA

With over 100 million laid and active land mines globally — and that’s not to mention millions of tons of other UXO, such as rockets and improvised explosive devices — this still happens at an all too alarming rate. For instance, today, 56 states and four other areas (Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland and Western Sahara) are known to have hazardous antipersonnel land mine-contaminated areas. To compound the issue, those who are injured by mines often struggle to find employment or health facilities to simply assist with mobility, such as prosthetics, crutches or wheelchairs. The presence of explosive remnants of war can also hamper freedom of movement, including the safe and voluntary return of displaced people, as well as the obstruction of delivery of aid or necessary goods by blocking routes and roads. Collectively, the indiscriminate residual threat posed by land mines post-conflict leaves a legacy far greater than the individual suffering and personal injury inflicted upon those unfortunate enough step on a pressure plate. Land mines and other UXO also hamper future development and the ability for local communities to rebuild lives often shattered by the preceding chaos and instability wrought by war. For example, land mines and UXO put a costly and time-intensive brake on the ability to develop affected land for agriculture, construction, excavation or infrastructure. One of the most frequent examples is that of farmers returning to their homes to suddenly find they may not be able to access many parts of their land due to the threat of injury or death. Some find the hindrance too much and take the risk — all too often paying the price with a limb or their lives. Worldwide in 2014, it was estimated that 3,308 people were injured or killed by land mines, roughly nine per day. However, this number is slowly decreasing. With the help of funded programs and commercial mine action companies, like [The Development Initiative](https://www.devex.com/en/organizations/development-initiative), which remove these explosive hazards, the number of injuries has decreased by over a quarter from 2013, indicating that many lives are being saved when compared to the 25 each day reported in 1999. Emergency mine action is often undertaken in settings where the security situation is changing or uncertain and is usually undertaken by the United Nations as part of a broader peacekeeping mission — this can be categorized as the emergency and humanitarian stage. Activities often support the role of the overall peacekeeping mission, such as clearing mines or explosive remnants of war to allow border patrols, monitoring and facilitating elections or weapons collection activities, enabling refugee movement, delivering relief supplies and so on. Often the initial efforts to clear mines and ERW builds support for the peace process through the direct impact on the community’s daily lives by eliminating risks, reopening transport routes and freeing up scarce resources, such as land and water sources. A recent example of this is in South Sudan, where TDI has teams working in Malakal to keep the airfield — the only route in for people and supplies — clear of unexploded ordnance so planes can land and take off safely. As humanitarian emergencies end and the security situation improves in a mine and UXO-affected country, priorities adjust to support reconstruction of key infrastructure and restoration of basic public amenities. For example, I have spent much of my time in post-conflict zones, particularly in Africa, helping to clear the threat posed by land mines and ERW to allow the construction of much-needed infrastructure, like roads, to make regions accessible and reachable by machinery, business and investment alike. This included the construction of a 220-kilometer road from the Ugandan border to Juba: a vital route in the absence of a rail link that has helped facilitate greater trade via the easier movement of goods. As part of the [U.S. Agency for International Development](http://www.devex.com/en/organizations/usaid)-funded Sudan Infrastructure Support Program in Southern Sudan, TDI deployed a mechanical flail and tiller machine, two manual clearance teams and a dog team, leapfrogging up and down the road, ensuring that the road construction contractor has sufficient clear ground to work on. Over 30 land mines, including minimum metal mines, and 300 items of unexploded ordnance were removed from within the corridor in which the construction crews were working. Undertaking such work helps ensure that regions, countries and communities once plagued by the legacy of war can move from phase one of crisis to phase two of development. Ultimately, by overcoming the immediate obstacle posed by land mines and ERW, we hope to empower local communities by clearing the way and giving them a foundation from which to develop and prosper long into the future.

#### This human development drastically reduces the risk war—even rational actors have an incentive to go to war

Kim and Conceicao 10 - United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA),United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição. “THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT” International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2010) LADI

Not only the economic performance variables (level of income or growth rate), but other components of human development, such as education attainment, may also affect the risk of conflict. Stylzed facts suggest that education outcomes are closely linked with the outbreak of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find strong evidence that higher levels of secondary school attainment are associated with a lower risk of civil war. If the enrollment rate is 10 percentage points higher than the average in their sample, the risk of war is reduced by about three percentage points (a decline in the risk from 11.5 percent to 8.6 percent). This draws on date that refers to the period between 1960 and 1999 for developing countries. Very few countries with low human development could achieve high levels of political stability. We use the Human Development Index (HDI) to measure the human development (UNDP, 2008b), and the Political Stability and Absence of Violence reported in Kaufmann et al. (2009, p.6) to capture perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Figure 3 plots the political stability indicator and HDI for 178 countries. High values of the political stability indicator imply that the country suffers less violence, and the high HDI represents high levels of human development. The figure suggests that high HDI (say, above 0.5) does not guarantee high political stability. However, low HDI (below 0.5) is clearly associated with political instability (below zero). Going now to the theory behind the outbreak of conflict, a great number of potential channels and mechanisms have been studied through which social, political and economic factors can cause conflict. Following Blattman and Miguel (2009), four distinctive models are briefly reviewed in this section: 1) Contest model; 2) Rational behavior with asymmetric information or imperfect bargaining; 3) Collective action and selective incentives; 4) Feasibility hypothesis. The most well-known framework is the contest model where two competing parties allocate resources to production and appropriation (Garfinkel, 1990; Skaperdas, 1992). The chance of winning the contest depends on the relative efficiency of the technology to allocate resources, and the model has been supported by some empirical findings. Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) employ conventional optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation of resources among competing activities - productive and otherwise appropriative, such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one's own product and wealth. The prediction of the contest model is consistent with the human development and conflict nexus. If the human development is low, then resources might not be allocated efficiently by the government because of weak institutions and low human capital. The ineffective resource mobilization by the government can be exploited by skillful revolutionary leaders, and the odds of overtaking the political power increases. Therefore, the low human development can increase the incentive to organize the rebel, and in turn, increase the risk of political instability. When the conflict is regarded as a deviation from equilibrium between players, it could occur when the players either act irrationally, or act rationally with asymmetric information or incomplete bargaining (Fearon, 1995). Especially, rational wars can occur if: (i) there is private and exclusive information about military strength, or there is an incentive to misrepresent the information; (ii) two parties cannot commit a cease-fire in the absence of a third-party enforcer (Blattman and Miguel, 2009, p.11). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium in a bargaining process between the rich and the poor. A number of studies, including Powell (2007), Esteban and Ray (2008), Chassang and Pedro-i-Miquel (2008), and Dal Bó and Powell (2007), show how conflict is sometimes unavoidable with asymmetric information or in multi player settings. Conflict can also occur when the bargaining process is incomplete, that is, credible commitment to maintain peace cannot be made (Powell, 2006; Walter, 2006; Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000). The relationship between low human development and conflict might support various theoretical works on conflicts between rational players with incomplete information or bargaining.

#### The best data proves a causal relation human development and conflict

Kim and Conceicao 10 — United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA),United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Namsuk Kim and Pedro Conceição. “THE ECONOMIC CRISIS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT” International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume 15, Number 1, Spring/Summer 2010) LADI

While there are a number of factors that could cause conflict, empirical studies find that poor economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict. Being a poor country is correlated with most forms of violence (UNDP, 2008a). Growth rates are also strongly associated with risks of conflict in developing countries. If the growth rate in developing countries is increased by 1 percentage point from the mean, the risk of conflict decreases by 0.6 percentage points to 4.0 percent (Collier et al., 2009). Kang and Meernik (2005) show that the growth rate in conflict countries in the five years prior to conflict, including cases of conflict recurrence, was on average 0.5 percent compared to 2 percent in the countries that remained peaceful. Figure 2 shows that economic development and conflicts are observed to be clearly related. The level of GDP is negatively correlated with observing a new conflict. Collier et al. (2009) finds that the predicted risk for a hypothetical country with characteristics set at the study‟s sample mean was 4.6 percent. If the level of per capita income were to be halved from this level, the risk would be increased to 5.3 percent. Empirical analysis of growth and conflict has inherent data limitations, but some recent studies using more careful methodology shows a strong causal link running from poor economic performance to conflict.

### Plan

#### Thus, the plan: Wealthy nations that are signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty have an obligation to increase funding to Angola’s demining program as per Angola’s Extension Request. Loughran summarizing the request 5/9

Loughran, Chris. “Land Mines in Angola.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 9 May 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/opinion/land-mines-in-angola.html. Director of policy at the Mines Advisory Group. //nhs-VA

“[In an Angolan Town, Land Mines Still Lurk ‘Behind Every Bush’](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/world/africa/angola-land-mines.html?_r=0) ” (Cuito Cuanavale Journal, April 27) is right to highlight the risk of waning funding for Angola’s mission to clear its land mines. Funding has fallen by 86 percent in the last decade, leading to a proportionate reduction in de-mining staff. This means not only that fewer mines are being cleared, but also that locals who were working to support their communities are losing their jobs. Like any country, Angola’s land-mine contamination is a finite problem, and the national authority has developed a sound plan that, if carried out and funded, would see Angola free of land mines by 2025. An estimated $275 million is needed to clear the remaining roughly 38 square miles of contaminated land. Current funding is less than 20 percent of that. As it stands, the United States is the only major funder of clearance. Other governments need to step up and do their bit so [Angola can join Mozambique in becoming free of land mines](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/africa/after-22-years-of-work-mozambique-is-free-of-land-mine-peril.html?action=click&contentCollection=Africa&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article).

#### The treaty demands that countries destroy all anti-personnel mines and increase assistance for mine clearance for “recipient nations” who request it. Good 11

Rachel Good, Yes We Should: Why the U.S. Should Change Its Policy Toward the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, 9 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 209 (2011). <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol9/iss2/4>. J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., International Studies, American University//nhs-VA

Article 5 requires States Parties to destroy all anti-personnel mines in affected areas within ten years of joining the Treaty.128 Included in this article is the requirement that States Parties identify mined areas in their jurisdiction, mark them, and protect civilians from entering through fences and other security measures.129 Given the large number of mined areas in some States Parties’ territories and the time it may take some States Parties to generate resources, Article 5 allows States Parties to apply for an extension to their demining deadlines.130 In 2010, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania applied for extensions for the first time, and Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe applied for extensions for the second time.131 During the 2009 Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, four states—Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Uganda—requested and were granted extensions for clearing mined areas.132 At the 2009 Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, fifteen states requested extensions.133 However, as more states approach their clearance deadlines, more requests for extensions are expected. ¶28 The Mine Ban Treaty articles on use, production, demining, transfer, and stockpile destruction are considered general core obligations that States Parties must comply with to avoid violating the Treaty.134 Article 1 mandates that States Parties may not use, develop or produce, or stockpile anti-personnel mines “under any circumstances.” Likewise, Articles 4 and 5 require states to comply with their specific provisions. On the other hand, the Treaty’s international cooperation and victim assistance provisions are soft requirements for which it would be difficult to hold any state party in violation. For example, Article 6 on international cooperation and assistance is a soft obligation that encourages states to support other parties in complying with their general obligations to the Treaty.135 Under Article 6 States Parties “in a position to do so” should provide assistance and care for mine victims and mine awareness, or education programs.136 Those States Parties “in a position to do so” should also provide assistance for mine clearance.137 The goal of these provisions is not only for States Parties to provide these services domestically, but also for wealthier States Parties to assist those with fewer resources in providing services to their populations. The soft provisions of the Treaty, however, are nevertheless a focus for States Parties and are routinely advanced through the Treaty standing committee on victim assistance.

#### These conflicts draw in great powers and cause extinction

Blank 99 [(Stephen Blank, Director of Strategic Studies Institute at US Army War College) 1999 Central Asian Survey (18; 2), “Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy Wars”] LADI

Thus many structural conditions for conventional war or protracted ethnic conflict where third parties intervene now exist in the Transcaucasus. And similarly many conditions exist for internal domestic strife if the leadership of any of these governments changes or if one of the many disaffected minority groups revolts. Many Third World conflicts generated by local structural factors have a great potential for unintended escalation. Big powers often feel obliged to rescue their proxies and protégés . One or another big power may fail to grasp the stakes for the other side since interests here are not as clear as in Europe. Hence commitments involving the use of nuclear weapons or perhaps even conventional war to prevent defeat of a client are not well established or clear as in Europe. For instance, in 1993 Turkish noises about intervening on behalf of Azerbaijan induced Russian leaders to threaten a nuclear war in that case. This episode tends to confirm the notion that `future wars involving Europe and America as allies will be fought either over resources in chaotic Third World locations or in ethnic upheavals on the southern fringe of Europe and Russia’ . 95 Sadly, many such causes for conflict prevail across the Transcaspian. Precisely because Turkey is a Nato members but probably could not prevail in a long war against Russia or if it could, would conceivably trigger a potential nuclear blow (not a small possibility given the erratic nature of Russia’ s declared nuclear strategies), the danger of major war is higher here than almost every-where else in the CIS or the so-called arc of crisis from the Balkans to China.

## 1AC – Modules

### FW – SV

#### The standard is mitigating structural violence.

#### Structural violence is based in moral exclusion, it pervades our cognitive processes and encourages us to ignore differences in identity.

Winter and Leighton 99 [Deborah DuNann Winter and Dana C. Leighton. Winter|[Psychologist that specializes in Social Psych, Counseling Psych, Historical and Contemporary Issues, Peace Psychology. Leighton: PhD graduate student in the Psychology Department at the University of Arkansas. Knowledgable in the fields of social psychology, peace psychology, and justice and intergroup responses to transgressions of justice] “Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology in the 21st century.” Pg 4-5]

She argues that our normal perceptual cognitive processes divide people into in-groups and out-groups. Those outside our group lie outside our scope of justice. Injustice that would be instantaneously confronted if it occurred to someone we love or know is barely noticed if it occurs to strangers or those who are invisible or irrelevant. We do not seem to be able to open our minds and our hearts to everyone, so we draw conceptual lines between those who are in and out of our moral circle. Those who fall outside are morally excluded, and become either invisible, or demeaned in some way so that we do not have to acknowledge the injustice they suffer. Moral exclusion is a human failing, but Opotow argues convincingly that it is an outcome of everyday social cognition. To reduce its nefarious effects, we must be vigilant in noticing and listening to oppressed, invisible, outsiders. Inclusionary thinking can be fostered by relationships, communication, and appreciation of diversity. Like Opotow, all the authors in this section point out that structural violence is not inevitable if we become aware of its operation, and build systematic ways to mitigate its effects.Learning about structural violence may be discouraging, overwhelming, or maddening, but these papers encourage us to step beyond guilt and anger, and begin to think about how to reduce structural violence. All the authors in this section note that the same structures (such as global communication and normal social cognition) which feed structural violence, can also be used to empower citizens to reduce it. In the long run, reducing structural violence by reclaiming neighborhoods, demanding social justice and living wages, providing prenatal care, alleviating sexism, and celebrating local cultures, will be our most surefooted path to building lasting peace.

#### Global justice requires a reduction in inequality and a focus on material rights. Okereke 07

Okereke 07 [Chukwumerije Okereke (Senior Research Associate at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research at the University of East Anglia). Global Justice and Neoliberal Environmental Governance. Routledge 2007] LADI

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, these scholars provide very compelling arguments against mainstream conceptions of justice. In this approach, the obli- gation of justice is derived from the moral equality of human beings irrespective of their race, creed and nationality (O'Neill 1991; Brown 1992: 169; Beitz 1979; Sen 1999). The emphasis is on the positive rights of citizens - that is the kinds of rights that require state authorities to do something in order to provide citizens with the opportunities and abilities to act to fulfil their own potential - as opposed to negative rights/liberty, which refers to freedom from coercion and non-interfer- ence. The notion of justice as meeting needs, as seen in Chapter 2, figures very prominently in quite a number of the influencing materials that form the starting point for the discourse on global sustainable development. It has been suggested, in general, that this idea of justice is 'increasingly influential on non-governmen- tal organizations and the community of international policy makers' (Brighouse 2004: 67). In general, proponents of justice as need criticize liberal ideas of justice for concentrating on political equality (equal right to speech, vote, etc.) without addressing the problem of material equality - especially in the form of equal access to resources. They also claim that the ability to own property as well as the ability to exercise political rights (say the right to vote) depends first and foremost on the ability of citizens to function effectively. When the basic human needs of citizens, for example food, are not being met, other rights become merely 'hypothetical and empty' (Sen 1999: 75). Following on from this basic reasoning, the rights approach to justice is rejected and, in its place, human basic need is seen as the correct basis of political morality and the right benchmark for the determination of political judgment (Plant 1991: 185). In previous sections we saw that libertarian notions of justice sanction unlimited material inequality between citizens, provided that each person has obtained their possessions through legitimate means. All that matters is that the state should ensure fair rules of transitions and equality before the law. We saw also that liberal accounts of justice, especially Rawls' liberal egalitarianism, reject this formula- tion of justice because it does not secure the welfare of the less able in society. On the contrary, Rawls recommends that political institutions should be structured in ways that protect the interests of the least advantaged individuals in society. Accordingly, he sanctions societal inequities provided that such inequities work to the advantage of the least well-off. On closer reading, however, it turns out that Rawls difference principle (that inequities should work in favour of the least well- off) does not contain any explicit demand relating to the basic needs of the poor. As such, it is possible for Rawls' proviso to be met even when the least well-off in the society are denied their basic needs. For example, a distribution that changes from 20:10:2 to 100:30:4 satisfies Rawls difference principle but tells us noth- ing about the actual well-being of the least well-off. So, whereas some (mainly libertarians) criticize Rawls for not specifying the extent to which other people's liberty can be sacrificed for the sake of the least well-off, others (proponents of justice as meeting need) criticize Rawls for leaving the fate of the least well-off unprotected. Many scholars in the latter group sometimes argue along Marxian lines that as long as the means of production remain in the hands of the 'haves' there is no guarantee that inequities will benefit the least well-off. Maslow (1968), Bradshaw (1972) and Forder (1974) have all consequently argued that only the theory of need provides, as Maslow (1968: 4) puts it, 'the ultimate appeal for the determination of the good, bad, right and wrong' in a po- litical community. Without the theory of need, they say, it would be impossible to justify the welfare state in capitalist Western democracies. On the other hand, the co-existence of welfare and capitalism confirms the place of need as the criterion of moral political judgment. O'Neill (1991), Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2000) have all extended versions of this argument to the international domain. O'Neill (1980, 1991) argues that adherence to the Kantian categorical imperative entails that the global community must act to remove the aching poverty and famine that threaten the existence of millions of people in developing countries. Sen (1999), for his part, calls for the strengthening of international institutions to make them able to assist the least well in the global society to achieve the measure of actual living that is required for the basic function and well-being of citizens. For Sen, as for O'Neill, all forms of liberty and rights are meaningful only when people have the substantive 'freedom to achieve actual living' (Sen 1999: 73; cf. O'Neill 1989: 288; 1986). Thomas Pogge also places emphasis on human basic need and starts his well-known book World Poverty and Human Rights with the rhetorical ques- tion: 'How can severe poverty of half of humankind continue despite enormous economic and technological progress and despite the enlightened moral norms and values of our heavily dominant Western civilization?' (Pogge 2002: 3). Many environmentalists believe that this is the conception of justice most con- sistent with the Bnmdtland version of sustainable development (Dobson 1998; Benton 1999: 201; Langhelle 2000: 299). This assertion is not difficult to sustain because the Bnmdtland Report contains several explicit arguments that firmly link the concept of sustainability with meeting the needs of the global population. It says, for example: The satisfaction of human needs and aspirations is the major objective of sustainable development. The essential needs of vast numbers in the develop- ing countries - for food, clothing, shelter, jobs - are not being met, and be- yond their basic needs, these people have legitimate aspirations for improved quality of life .... Sustainable development requires meeting basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to satisfy their aspirations for a better life. (WCED 1987: 43).

#### Their frameworks start from the position of equal access which is not actually met, obligating us to correct injustice. Bruenig 14

Bruenig 14 [(Matt, cites political theorist Charles Mills) “Charles Mills on White Liberalism”] LADI

One such methodological assumption, Mills argues, is the assumption that the proper way to philosophize about political justice is through the use of "ideal theory." Under an ideal theory approach to theorizing about politics, the requirements of justice are derived by imagining how best to construct a system from scratch at the beginning of history. You see this ideal theory approach present in theorizing about the "state of nature," the "veil of ignorance", and the "original position" more generally. In all cases, you essentially construct an ideal society at the beginning of time and then use that ideal society to determine the justness of institutions in actually-existing societies and to prescribe ways to make those societies more just. The decision to use ideal theory to ferret out the requirements of justice is not, according to Mills, a neutral one. Instead, it is one that tracks the justice concerns of the white philosophers who comprise the tradition that continues to this day to rely on this method. For white philosophers, expository devices that operationally exclude all of history pose no particular problem. History is largely irrelevant to the kinds of justice concerns that press upon white populations. To the extent that it is relevant, it's only marginally so and therefore easily relegated to an after-the-fact special consideration that is separate from the core theories. This is not the case for non-whites as the ghosts of historical injustices heavily factor into their present justice needs. For these populations, the issues of rectificatory and reparative justice are not secondary issues best treated as footnoted exceptions. Rather, they are center stage. Whereas white philosophers operating in the racially-exclusionary liberal tradition find it most fitting to start with ideal theory and then move on to non-ideal historical problems as a side issue, a less racially-biased philosophical tradition would go in the reverse order. Abstract thought experiments that walled off history (as in ideal theory) would at minimum be replaced with ones that fully included history into their considerations. Instead of asking, as in Rawls, what kind of political institutions people would select at the beginning of time if they didn't know who in that society they'd wind up being, you would ask what kind of institutions those same people would select if they knew the society they would blindly enter into has a legacy of racist oppression that has set the stage for lasting racial disparities. That the liberal tradition continues to select the ideal theory approach to contemplating justice, even as it marginalizes the justice concerns of non-white people, is, according to Mill, a legacy of its racist origins and the philosophical methodologies those origins set in place.

### Adv – Soft Power

#### Soft power is under threat. Betley 10/6

Betley, Alexander. “The Decline of American Soft Power - Will It Persist after Trump?”MinnPost, 6 Oct. 2017, www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2017/10/decline-american-soft-power-will-it-persist-after-trump. Alexander M. Betley studied philosophy, politics, and economics at St. Olaf College. In addition to his formal academic pursuits, he has blogged and published opinions in the Star Tribune. //nhs-VA

But today, as noted by Mattis, the turmoil associated with domestic political discord, as well as a disengagement with the international community on key issues, puts U.S. soft power severely at risk. Domestically, [the president’s DACA debacle](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/deal-or-no-deal-on-daca-republicans-say-no-democrats-say-not-yet/2017/10/03/ed9c7abc-a857-11e7-92d1-58c702d2d975_story.html?utm_term=.5db53f3ec9fa), as well as [his failure to unequivocally denounce the violence instigated and perpetrated by neo-Nazis and white supremacists](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html) in Charlottesville, have left much of the world reeling. In the instance of Charlottesville, where President Donald Trump resorted to proclaiming that there was “blame on both sides,” it took [a foreign leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to rightfully condemn the events](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/world/europe/charlottesville-far-right-trump-merkel.html) as “horrifying,” “racist,” and “evil.” Though [Global Trumpism](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-11-15/global-trumpism) (to use Mark Blyth’s aptly entitled phrase) seems to be sweeping the Western world, basic liberal democratic values remain a fundamental linchpin of global order. Trump’s antics, glaringly hypocritical to professed American values, repel foreign actors and damage our image abroad — ultimately undermining our soft power. Additionally, blunders over the support of NATO, withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, and bellicose threats of meeting the North Korean challenge with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” further weaken our international standing. Paris has been, more than anything, an acknowledgment of the grave threat climate change poses to human society. Though the accord doesn’t contain binding agreements upon signatory states, the concerted will of the international community to hold strong to Paris leaves the United States isolated from international political consensus on perhaps the most sensitive issue of our time. Taking a serious toll Recent polling data from the [Pew Research Center](http://www.pewresearch.org/) suggests these occurrences are having a serious toll on our power of attraction. Whereas only 25 to 30 percent of Europeans polled during Barack Obama's administration felt the U.S. was “on the decline,” recent surveys taken during the Trump administration show this number has spiked to 52 percent. Fewer countries than ever before view the United States as the world’s leading economic power (many replacing it with China). Nearly 75 percent of the world has given Trump a vote of no confidence in his ability “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.” This is in stark contradistinction to Obama’s time in office, where at any given moment the world population believed he would “do the right thing regarding world affairs” over 75 percent of the time. These trends and numbers, however, only confirm what many of us had already feared — President Trump’s unwillingness or inability to protect and advance fundamental U.S. interests due to the political necessity of maintaining his base at home. And although Mattis and Nye are both optimistic of the United States' ability to retain or recover many of her soft power resources in the future, such assurances in an age of pressing political challenges and revisionist international powers are surely no guarantee. Rather, it is much more likely this cascade begun by the Trump administration, indicative of the deeper and systemic pathologies of American political institutions, will persist far beyond a single presidency. As the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides, once warned, the delusional self-aggrandizement and egoism of a declining power accelerates its demise. Cleon-like, Trump is accelerating ours, ushering in the tragic and untimely decline of American soft power.

#### The plan is k2 revitalizing other countries’ perceptions of the US, increasing soft power and directly causing global follow-on. Leahy 14

“Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy On A Step Toward A Landmine Ban | U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont.” Press Release | U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, 8 July 2014, www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statement-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-a-step-toward-a-landmine-ban. Patrick Joseph Leahy is a Democratic politician who serves as the senior United States Senator from Vermont since 1975. //nhs-VA

Mr. President, everyone knows the old adage “a picture is worth a thousand words”. As a life-long photographer I have a strong sense of that, and I want to provide a few examples today because sometimes words are not enough. I have often spoken about the horrific toll on civilians from landmines. These tiny explosives, about the size of a hockey puck or can of soup, can kill a child or blow the legs or arms off an adult. They are triggered by the victim – in other words, unlike a gun that a soldier aims and fires, or a bomb that is dropped and explodes on a target, landmines wait for their victims. It can be a few hours, days, weeks, or years. But however long it is after they are scattered and hidden beneath a layer of sand or dirt, they explode when an unsuspecting person, whether a combatant or an innocent civilian, steps on it or triggers it with a plow or a wheelbarrow or a bicycle. Suddenly, that person’s life is changed forever. In many countries where there are few doctors, mine victims can quickly bleed to death. Those who survive, with a leg or both legs gone, are the lucky ones. This girl is an example of who I am talking about. I don’t know her nationality, but the picture tells us a lot. Her life, already difficult has been made immeasurably harder because of a landmine that probably cost less than two dollars. These photographs tells a similar story. None of them were combatants. Each facing lives of pain and stigmatization because of weapons that are designed – designed – to be indiscriminate. The Leahy War Victims Fund has helped some of them, as this photograph shows. But I wish there were no need for it. Over the years, as people around the world became aware of the landmine problem, they took action. The United States Senate was the first legislative body to ban exports of antipersonnel landmines. Other countries soon followed our example. Thanks to Canada’s former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, an international treaty outlawing the weapons has been joined by 161 countries. I regret that the United States is not among them, even though the U.S. military has not used antipersonnel mines for 22 years despite two long wars. On June 27, the Obama Administration finally took a step – an incremental step but a significant one – to put the United States on a path to join the treaty. Although the U.S. has not produced or purchased antipersonnel mines since the 1990s, the White House announced that as a matter of official policy it will no longer produce or otherwise acquire antipersonnel mines. Nor will the Pentagon replenish its stockpile of mines as they become obsolete. Our closest allies and many others around the world welcomed this step, even though it falls far short of what supporters of the treaty have called for. But one senior Member of the House of Representatives immediately accused President Obama of ignoring U.S. military commanders, some of whom have defended the use of landmines just as the military defended poison gas a century ago. He said the President, quote “owes our military an explanation for ignoring their advice”, and that this decision represents a quote “expensive solution in search of a nonexistent problem.” A member of this body called the announcement a “brazen attempt by the President to circumvent the constitutional responsibility of the Senate to provide advice and consent to international treaties that bind the United States.” Those are strong words, but the truth lies elsewhere. Over the years the White House consulted closely with the Pentagon, including about this decision, and the policy it just announced simply makes official what has been an informal fact for at least 17 years. It also ignores that the U.S. has neither joined the treaty nor has the President sent it to the Senate for ratification. The President has obviously not circumvented the Senate’s advice and consent role. And it ignores that every one of our NATO allies and most of our coalition partners have renounced antipersonnel mines, as have dozens of countries that could never dream of having a powerful, modern army like ours. The naysayers’ argument is simple. It goes like this: The United States is no longer causing the misery captured in these photographs, so why should we join the treaty? Do they also oppose the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, like the crippled people in these photographs; the Chemical Weapons Treaty; and every other treaty dealing with international relations that the United States has joined since the time of George Washington? Does the fact that we are not causing a problem – that we do not use landmines or chemical weapons – absolve us from having a responsibility to be part of an international treaty to stop it? Of course not. The world looks to the United States for leadership. If the U.S. Senate had accepted that argument in 1992 we would never have voted, 100 to 0, to ban U.S. exports of antipersonnel mines. Our mines were not causing the problem, so I suppose those in the House who criticize President Obama today would say the entire Senate was wrong 22 years ago. Those 100 Democrats and Republicans who voted back then to ban U.S. exports of antipersonnel mines understood that while the U.S. may not have been causing the problem, we needed to be part of the solution. The same holds true today. In 1996, President Clinton called on the Pentagon to develop alternatives to antipersonnel mines, whether they are technological or doctrinal alternatives. He was Commander in Chief, but they largely ignored him. Eighteen years later, it needs to be done. Not at some unspecified time in the future, but by a reasonable deadline. It can be done. I am not so naïve to think that a treaty will prevent every last person on Earth from using landmines. Bashar Assad used poison gas, but look at the political price he paid. Are those who oppose the landmine treaty so dismissive of the benefit of outlawing and stigmatizing a weapon, like IEDs, that poses a danger to our own troops? Rather than opposing a treaty that will make it a war crime to use landmines against our troops, why not support the mine breaching technology they need to protect themselves? Mr. President, I always come back to the photographs. I have met many people like these. They may not be Americans, but what happened to them happens to thousands of others like them each year. We can help stop it.

#### Soft power is an impact filter. Rieffel 05

Rieffel 05 –Brookings Institution, writing fellow [“REACHING OUT: AMERICANS SERVING OVERSEAS By Lex Rieffel Visiting Fellow The Brookings Institution” 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036-2103 December 2005] LADI

The devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 was another blow to American self-confidence as well as to its image in the rest of the world. It cracked the veneer of the society reflected in the American movies and TV programs that flood the world. It exposed weaknesses in government institutions that had been promoted for decades as models for other countries. Internal pressure to turn America’s back on the rest of the world is likely to intensify as the country focuses attention on domestic problems such as the growing number of Americans without health insurance, educational performance that is declining relative to other countries, deteriorating infrastructure, and increased dependence on foreign supplies of oil and gas. A more isolationist sentiment would reduce the ability of the USA to use its overwhelming military power to promote peaceful change in the developing countries that hold two-thirds of the world’s population and pose the gravest threats to global stability. Isolationism might heighten the sense of security in the short run, but it would put the USA at the mercy of external forces in the long run. Accordingly, one of the great challenges for the USA today is to build a broad coalition of like-minded nations and a set of international institutions capable of maintaining order and addressing global problems such as nuclear proliferation, epidemics like HIV/AIDS and avian flu, failed states like Somalia and Myanmar, and environmental degradation. The costs of acting alone or in small coalitions are now more clearly seen to be unsustainable. The limitations of “hard” instruments of foreign policy have been amply demonstrated in Iraq. Military power can dislodge a tyrant with great efficiency but cannot build stable and prosperous nations. Appropriately, the appointment of Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs suggests that the Bush Administration is gearing up to rely more on “soft” instruments.2 The soft instruments of power can be thought of as including a vast array of public sector and private sector activities. They range from the government’s position in the international debate about global warming to the Fulbright program of academic exchanges to the behavior of American tourists overseas. For the purposes of this paper they are defined as the residual set of instruments after excluding hard instruments, with hard instruments being defined as all instruments involving any kind of armed military or police force.

### Plan – United States

#### Thus, the plan: The USFG should join the Mine-Ban Treaty. Good 11

Rachel Good, Yes We Should: Why the U.S. Should Change Its Policy Toward the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, 9 Nw. J. Int'l Hum. Rts. 209 (2011). <http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol9/iss2/4>. J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2011; B.A., International Studies, American University//nhs-VA

\*Bracketed for clarity

After leaving office, President Clinton admitted that one of his biggest regrets in office was his administration’s failure to sign the MBT.226 Why? Seemingly, Clinton realized that landmines’ limited military utility does not outweigh their humanitarian effect. This understanding reflects U.S. policy before and since the formulation of the MBT. The U.S. does not use, produce, or trade landmines. It reserves the right to, but does not use landmines with self-destruct or deactivation mechanisms. Landmines are not necessary for the protection of South Korea, nor can they be used in Iraq or Afghanistan without those countries violating the MBT. Finally, the U.S. has provided more humanitarian funding for mine action programs than any other nation. President Obama also has enough political support to join the Treaty. In May 2010, sixty-eight U.S. Senators sent President Obama a letter in support of the U.S. joining the MBT.227 The U.S. refusal to join the Treaty rests solely on the U.S. military’s desire to keep its stockpile of landmines, which it does not even use. The Obama administration should back the Mine Ban Treaty because it is in the best interest of the United States. ¶53 The United State’s failure to join the Mine Ban Treaty illustrates American exceptionalism at its worst. Whereas the majority of states understood that the humanitarian situation caused by landmines warranted the strongest possible treaty, the United States refused to join unless other states accommodated its continued use and stockpile of landmines. When its demands were rejected, chose to United States bow of the process rather than concede to middle-power states.228 Since then, the U.S. has consistently developed policies in an attempt stay in line with the international norm developed by the MBT.229 As long as the U.S. stays outside of the MBT, its landmine policies will be regarded as inadequate. ¶54 In the years since the U.S. refusal to join the Treaty, it has acted in an increasingly unilateral manner. The Bush administration’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and its rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Mine Ban Treaty were regarded by the international community as acts of an isolationist nation.230 Along with the U.S.’s actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. established a clear doctrine of global domination and exceptionalism.231 President Obama has articulated a plan of global reintegration and has worked to restore the U.S.’s reputation as a cooperationist nation.232 Joining the MBT would signal to the world that [the US] the Obama administration is serious about working with the international community. Since the U.S. has long opposed the MBT, the international community may regard U.S. ratification of the Treaty as an apology for its recent exceptionalist policies. Finally, the U.S. landmine policy is so close to the requirements of the MBT that joining the Treaty would not require a drastic shift in practice. The Obama administration should correct a lasting mistake of the Clinton administration by joining the MBT, and in doing so, indicate to the world community its desire to reengage and repair relationships.

#### The treaty demands that the US destroy all anti-personnel mines and increase assistance for mine clearance for “recipient nations” who request it. Good 11

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#### This means aid will go to countries who request assistance. ICBL 17

“The Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties.” 16th Meeting of States Parties, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2017, www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-meetings/meetings-of-states-parties/16msp.aspx. //nhs-VA

The Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties (16MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty will take place from 18 to 21 December 2017 at the UN Office at Vienna, Austria. 2017 marks 20 years since the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted, when the international community agreed to end the scourge of landmines once and for all. Following the adoption, on 3 December 1997 the treaty was signed by 122 States; it entered into force on 1 March 1999. To date, 162 nations have formally joined the treaty. The 16MSP provides a good opportunity for the international community to take stock of what have been achieved so far and to reaffirm commitments for a mine-free world by 2025. His Excellency Thomas Hajnoczi, Ambassador of Austria to the United Nations in Geneva is the President of the 16MSP. Ambssador Hajnoczi will focus on Universalization, Victim Assistance and Mine Clearance of the Mine Ban Treaty. Click [here](http://www.icbl.org/media/2392493/Priorities-Austrian-Presidency.pdf) to read Ambassador Hajnoczi's priorities for the 16MSP. Official documents [Note verbale](https://unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8DBA851E583C699EC12571C0003D56CC?OpenDocument) by the UN Secretary-General 16MSP [provisional agenda](https://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/16msp/16msp-documents/) in Arabic, Chines, English, French, Russian and Spanish 16MSP [provisional programme of work](http://www.icbl.org/Arabic,%20Chines,%20English,%20French,%20Russian%20and%20Spanish.%20) Arabic, Chines, English, French, Russian and Spanish [Requests for extensions](https://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/16msp/what-will-be-considered-at-the-16msp/) on mine clearance deadlines by Angola, Ecuador, Iraq, Thailand, Ukraine and Zimbabwe For other formal documents including information for participants, preparatory meetings and registration click [here](https://www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/16msp/how-can-delegations-prepare-for-the-16msp/)

#### Foreign aid k2 mine clearance – Canada and Jordan prove. Westhead 12

Westhead, Rick. “In Jordan, Rare Landmine Success.” Thestar.com, Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd, 23 Sept. 2012, www.thestar.com/news/world/2012/09/23/in\_jordan\_rare\_landmine\_success.html. Rick Westhead is a foreign affairs writer with the Toronto Star. A former South Asia bureau chief for The Star, he focuses on foreign aid and international development. //nhs-VA

Today, 30,000 tourists per month travel to this spot, about 45 minutes west of Amman. It shows what is possible with a comprehensive commitment to clear the deadly vestiges of war. In March, Jordan announced the clearance of its last minefield along its northern border with Syria. In all, 270,000 landmines were removed from 126 minefields. One minefield alone that ran adjacent to the Syrian border stretched for 104 kilometres. The accomplishment, spearheaded by Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, a cousin to Jordan’s King Abdullah, makes this nation of 6.5 million people one of the few countries to completely remove its landmine fields. And Canada has played a prominent role in the effort, Jordanian government officials say, giving $2.7 million in landmine action assistance over the past eight years. “You can’t imagine how hard it was to do this,” says Basam Kasabeh, an official with Jordan’s National Commission on Demining and Rehabilitation. “For years we had smugglers coming across the border and a military commander’s answer would be to lay more mines. “We would have flood waters come each year and pick up the mines and sweep them away to new locations. You didn’t know whether mines had been moved, blown up or even cleared already. “Then you had the problem of fences disappearing around minefields. We had farmers stealing it to put around their cattle. We had to spend $250,000 a year on fence alone.” The success is tremendous news for Jordan’s farmers. The desert covers 92 per cent of the country while some of Jordan’s scarce arable land had been blanketed in landmines. In the early 1950s, agriculture accounted for nearly 40 per cent of Jordan’s gross national product. In 1967, as the area covered by landmines grew, it slipped to 17 per cent. Today, it is about 4 per cent. Now that the mines have been cleared, the land is being returned to farming. In one case, land near the Israeli border has been converted into a massive palm plantation producing palm oil. Along the Syrian border, farmers are planning new crops of wheat, tomatoes, cucumber and olives. Ahmed Miqbel, 70, grows tomatoes and peppers on about 14 hectares of land in Jabir, a town of 4,000 adjacent to the Syrian border. Last month, authorities told him he was free to use two hectares that had been contaminated for years by landmines. “These mines have stopped us from using our fields,” he said on a recent afternoon. “I know two neighbours who have lost legs because of mines.” Since the 1950s, when tensions began to peak between Jordan and Israel, landmines have killed at least 120 people here and injured 810 others. But perhaps the best news for locals is the potential impact on tourism. Unlike many of its regional neighbours, Jordan does not have vast reserves of oil and gas. Tourism is the economy’s fastest-growing sector, thanks to attractions such as Petra and Wadi Rum, the windswept desert made famous by Lawrence of Arabia. Tourism accounts for at least 14 per cent, or $2 billion, of Jordan’s economy. By contrast, tourism in Canada is worth about 3 per cent of GDP. Now that Jordan has completed its demining, Mired, 47, said he’s shifting his attention to other nations, trying to coax the likes of Mongolia, Laos, Tonga and Bahrain to sign the Ottawa Treaty — the 1997 anti-landmine initiative. “I’d really like to get the U.S. on board,” he said. “I’ve met with a few of President Obama’s advisers so we’ll see. Having the U.S. would bring a new energy.”

#### The plan causes global follow-on. Leahy 14

“Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy On A Step Toward A Landmine Ban | U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont.” Press Release | U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, 8 July 2014, www.leahy.senate.gov/press/statement-of-senator-patrick-leahy-on-a-step-toward-a-landmine-ban. Patrick Joseph Leahy is a Democratic politician who serves as the senior United States Senator from Vermont since 1975. //nhs-VA

Mr. President, everyone knows the old adage “a picture is worth a thousand words”. As a life-long photographer I have a strong sense of that, and I want to provide a few examples today because sometimes words are not enough. I have often spoken about the horrific toll on civilians from landmines. These tiny explosives, about the size of a hockey puck or can of soup, can kill a child or blow the legs or arms off an adult. They are triggered by the victim – in other words, unlike a gun that a soldier aims and fires, or a bomb that is dropped and explodes on a target, landmines wait for their victims. It can be a few hours, days, weeks, or years. But however long it is after they are scattered and hidden beneath a layer of sand or dirt, they explode when an unsuspecting person, whether a combatant or an innocent civilian, steps on it or triggers it with a plow or a wheelbarrow or a bicycle. Suddenly, that person’s life is changed forever. In many countries where there are few doctors, mine victims can quickly bleed to death. Those who survive, with a leg or both legs gone, are the lucky ones. This girl is an example of who I am talking about. I don’t know her nationality, but the picture tells us a lot. Her life, already difficult has been made immeasurably harder because of a landmine that probably cost less than two dollars. These photographs tells a similar story. None of them were combatants. Each facing lives of pain and stigmatization because of weapons that are designed – designed – to be indiscriminate. The Leahy War Victims Fund has helped some of them, as this photograph shows. But I wish there were no need for it. Over the years, as people around the world became aware of the landmine problem, they took action. The United States Senate was the first legislative body to ban exports of antipersonnel landmines. Other countries soon followed our example. Thanks to Canada’s former Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, an international treaty outlawing the weapons has been joined by 161 countries. I regret that the United States is not among them, even though the U.S. military has not used antipersonnel mines for 22 years despite two long wars. On June 27, the Obama Administration finally took a step – an incremental step but a significant one – to put the United States on a path to join the treaty. Although the U.S. has not produced or purchased antipersonnel mines since the 1990s, the White House announced that as a matter of official policy it will no longer produce or otherwise acquire antipersonnel mines. Nor will the Pentagon replenish its stockpile of mines as they become obsolete. Our closest allies and many others around the world welcomed this step, even though it falls far short of what supporters of the treaty have called for. But one senior Member of the House of Representatives immediately accused President Obama of ignoring U.S. military commanders, some of whom have defended the use of landmines just as the military defended poison gas a century ago. He said the President, quote “owes our military an explanation for ignoring their advice”, and that this decision represents a quote “expensive solution in search of a nonexistent problem.” A member of this body called the announcement a “brazen attempt by the President to circumvent the constitutional responsibility of the Senate to provide advice and consent to international treaties that bind the United States.” Those are strong words, but the truth lies elsewhere. Over the years the White House consulted closely with the Pentagon, including about this decision, and the policy it just announced simply makes official what has been an informal fact for at least 17 years. It also ignores that the U.S. has neither joined the treaty nor has the President sent it to the Senate for ratification. The President has obviously not circumvented the Senate’s advice and consent role. And it ignores that every one of our NATO allies and most of our coalition partners have renounced antipersonnel mines, as have dozens of countries that could never dream of having a powerful, modern army like ours. The naysayers’ argument is simple. It goes like this: The United States is no longer causing the misery captured in these photographs, so why should we join the treaty? Do they also oppose the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, like the crippled people in these photographs; the Chemical Weapons Treaty; and every other treaty dealing with international relations that the United States has joined since the time of George Washington? Does the fact that we are not causing a problem – that we do not use landmines or chemical weapons – absolve us from having a responsibility to be part of an international treaty to stop it? Of course not. The world looks to the United States for leadership. If the U.S. Senate had accepted that argument in 1992 we would never have voted, 100 to 0, to ban U.S. exports of antipersonnel mines. Our mines were not causing the problem, so I suppose those in the House who criticize President Obama today would say the entire Senate was wrong 22 years ago. Those 100 Democrats and Republicans who voted back then to ban U.S. exports of antipersonnel mines understood that while the U.S. may not have been causing the problem, we needed to be part of the solution. The same holds true today. In 1996, President Clinton called on the Pentagon to develop alternatives to antipersonnel mines, whether they are technological or doctrinal alternatives. He was Commander in Chief, but they largely ignored him. Eighteen years later, it needs to be done. Not at some unspecified time in the future, but by a reasonable deadline. It can be done. I am not so naïve to think that a treaty will prevent every last person on Earth from using landmines. Bashar Assad used poison gas, but look at the political price he paid. Are those who oppose the landmine treaty so dismissive of the benefit of outlawing and stigmatizing a weapon, like IEDs, that poses a danger to our own troops? Rather than opposing a treaty that will make it a war crime to use landmines against our troops, why not support the mine breaching technology they need to protect themselves? Mr. President, I always come back to the photographs. I have met many people like these. They may not be Americans, but what happened to them happens to thousands of others like them each year. We can help stop it.

### UV – FW (:45)

#### Psychological evidence proves we don’t identify with our future selves. Continuous personal identity doesn’t exist.

Opar 14 [(Alisa Opar is the articles editor at Audubon magazine; cites Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business; and Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton) “Why We Procrastinate” Nautilus January 2014] AT

The British philosopher Derek Parfit espoused a severely reductionist view of personal identity in his seminal book, Reasons and Persons: It does not exist, at least not in the way we usually consider it. We humans, Parfit argued, are not a consistent identity moving through time, but a chain of successive selves, each tangentially linked to, and yet distinct from, the previous and subsequent ones. The boy who begins to smoke despite knowing that he may suffer from the habit decades later should not be judged harshly: “This boy does not identify with his future self,” Parfit wrote. “His attitude towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude to other people.” Parfit’s view was controversial even among philosophers. But psychologists are beginning to understand that it may accurately describe our attitudes towards our own decision-making: It turns out that we see our future selves as strangers. Though we will inevitably share their fates, the people we will become in a decade, quarter century, or more, are unknown to us. This impedes our ability to make good choices on their—which of course is our own—behalf. That bright, shiny New Year’s resolution? If you feel perfectly justified in breaking it, it may be because it feels like it was a promise someone else made. “It’s kind of a weird notion,” says Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “On a psychological and emotional level we really consider that future self as if it’s another person.” Using fMRI, Hershfield and colleagues studied brain activity changes when people imagine their future and consider their present. They homed in on two areas of the brain called the medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, which are more active when a subject thinks about himself than when he thinks of someone else. They found these same areas were more strongly activated when subjects thought of themselves today, than of themselves in the future. Their future self “felt” like somebody else. In fact, their neural activity when they described themselves in a decade was similar to that when they described Matt Damon or Natalie Portman. And subjects whose brain activity changed the most when they spoke about their future selves were the least likely to favor large long-term financial gains over small immediate ones. Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton, has come to similar conclusions in her research. In a 2008 study, Pronin and her team told college students that they were taking part in an experiment on disgust that required drinking a concoction made of ketchup and soy sauce. The more they, their future selves, or other students consumed, they were told, the greater the benefit to science. Students who were told they’d have to down the distasteful quaff that day committed to consuming two tablespoons. But those that were committing their future selves (the following semester) or other students to participate agreed to guzzle an average of half a cup. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. The disconnect between our present and time-shifted selves has real implications for how we make decisions. We might choose to procrastinate, and let some other version of our self deal with problems or chores. Or, as in the case of Parfit’s smoking boy, we can focus on that version of our self that derives pleasure, and ignore the one that pays the price. But if procrastination or irresponsibility can derive from a poor connection to your future self, strengthening this connection may prove to be an effective remedy. This is exactly the tactic that some researchers are taking. Anne Wilson, a psychologist at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada, has manipulated people’s perception of time by presenting participants with timelines scaled to make an upcoming event, such as a paper due date, seem either very close or far off. “Using a longer timeline makes people feel more connected to their future selves,” says Wilson. That, in turn, spurred students to finish their assignment earlier, saving their end-of-semester self the stress of banging it out at the last minute. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. Hershfield has taken a more high-tech approach. Inspired by the use of images to spur charitable donations, he and colleagues took subjects into a virtual reality room and asked them to look into a mirror. The subjects saw either their current self, or a digitally aged image of themselves (see the figure, Digital Old Age). When they exited the room, they were asked how they’d spend $1,000. Those exposed to the aged photo said they’d put twice as much into a retirement account as those who saw themselves unaged. This might be important news for parts of the finance industry. Insurance giant Allianz is funding a pilot project in the midwest in which Hershfield’s team will show state employees their aged faces when they make pension allocations. Merrill Edge, the online discount unit of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, has taken this approach online, with a service called Face Retirement. Each decade-jumping image is accompanied by startling cost-of-living projections and suggestions to invest in your golden years. Hershfield is currently investigating whether morphed images can help people lose weight. Of course, the way we treat our future self is not necessarily negative: Since we think of our future self as someone else, our own decision making reflects how we treat other people. Where Parfit’s smoking boy endangers the health of his future self with nary a thought, others might act differently. “The thing is, we make sacrifices for people all the time,” says Hershfield. “In relationships, in marriages.” The silver lining of our dissociation from our future self, then, is that it is another reason to practice being good to others. One of them might be you.

This proves util –

a. If a person isn’t a continuous unit, it doesn’t matter how goods are distributed among people, which supports util since util only maximizes benefits, ignoring distribution across people.

b. Other theories assume identity matters. Util’s the only possible theory if identity is irrelevant.

#### All standards must have link turn ground for both sides. Libertarianism violates because in order to turn it with positive obligations, I have to win util offense.

1. reciprocity – the negative can either win fwk or turn the aff, while I have to do both in order to win. Even if you don’t turn case, it still allows you to skew my time by eliminating 4 minutes of aff offense.
2. topic education – if standards can’t be turned we never talk about them in the context of the topic, which o/w because topical education is more diverse.

### UV – Theory

### UV – Kritiks (1:45)

#### Understanding the intricacies of politics and the state is a prerequisite to addressing oppression – this comes prior to the alt. Bryant 12

Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/).

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you ~~guys~~ behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – it enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the creation of positive alternative futures. Barma 16

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, ~Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15~, Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "'Imagine a World in Which': Using Scenarios in Political Science," International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using\_scenarios\_in\_political\_science\_isp\_2015.pdf).

Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision-making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policy- making tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects. As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking. Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic atten- tion, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance. The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the trans- formation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with de- tails about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases. An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are tradi- tionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might ex- pand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### No root cause claims

Levy & Thompson 13 (Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, 15, pp. 396-419)

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether **different kinds of organized warfare**—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether **different kinds of interstate wars** can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time

**Survival is a prerequisite to other values**

**Fassin 10** - James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, as well as directeur d’études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. (Didier, Fall, “Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics of Life” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Vol 1 No 1, Project Muse)

Conclusion

Survival, in the sense Jacques Derrida attributed to the concept in his last interview, not only shifts lines that are too often hardened between biological and political lives: it **opens an ethical space for** **reflection and action**. Critical thinking in the past decade has often taken biopolitics and the politics of life as its objects. It has thus unveiled the way in which individuals and groups, even entire nations, have been treated by powers, the market, or the state, during the colonial period as well as in the contemporary era. However, through indiscriminate extension, this powerful instrument has lost some of its analytical sharpness and heuristic potentiality. On the one hand, the binary reduction of life to the opposition between nature and history, bare life and qualified life, when systematically applied from philosophical inquiry in sociological or anthropological study, erases much of the complexity and richness of life in society as it is in fact observed. On the other hand, the normative prejudices which underlie the evaluation of the forms of life and of the politics of life, when generalized to an undifferentiated collection of social facts, end up by depriving social agents of legitimacy, voice, and action. The risk is therefore both scholarly and political. It calls for ethical attention. In fact, the genealogy of this intellectual lineage reminds us that the main founders of these theories expressed tensions and hesitations in their work, which was often more complex, if even sometimes more obscure, than in its reduced and translated form in the humanities and social sciences today. And also biographies, here limited to fragments from South African lives that I have described and analyzed in more detail elsewhere, suggest the necessity of complicating the dualistic models that oppose biological and political lives. Certainly, powers like the market and the state do act sometimes as if human beings could be reduced to “mere life,” but democratic forces, including from within the structure of power, tend to produce alternative strategies that escape this reduction. And people themselves, even under conditions of domination, [End Page 93] manage subtle tactics that transform their physical life into a political instrument or a moral resource or an affective expression.

#### Reps Ks assumes *Representational Determinism*. Prefer the *particularized* and *surrounding context* of HOW our reps were deployed.

Shim ‘14(David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

# Frontlines

## Case

### Solvency

#### The plan solves by 2025, but NGOs at their current rate will take until 2040. Onishi 4/26

Onishi, Norimitsu. “In Angolan Town, Land Mines Still Lurk ‘Behind Every Bush.’” The New York Times, The New York Times, 26 Apr. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/world/africa/angola-land-mines.html. Norimitsu Onishi, the Johannesburg bureau chief, has been a foreign correspondent for The Times since 1998. He has covered South Africa and neighboring countries since 2014. Mr. Onishi was part of a team that won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. He is a graduate of Princeton University. //nhs-VA

Nationwide, about [32,000 acres of confirmed minefields](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/angola/mine-action.aspx) need to be cleared, and 88,000 acres of suspected areas need to be verified as safe, according to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. Angola was required to clear all such mines from its territory by 2018 under a global treaty banning antipersonnel land mines. But Angolan officials say they will be unable to complete the work before 2025. At its current rate of demining, Angola won’t be free of land mines until “beyond the year 2040,” said Constance Arvis, the deputy chief of mission at the United States Embassy in Angola. The United States, which has been the biggest donor for demining efforts in Angola, has earmarked $4 million this year. Decreases in international funding have also affected nongovernmental groups, forcing private demining organizations like Halo to slash their work force. Officials at the government’s Commission for Demining said that funding was also a problem for the government. Because of a drop in the global price of oil, Angola’s main export, the government’s demining budget has been cut by 60 percent, they said. The Angolan government has focused its demining efforts exclusively on areas of public works, leaving other areas to foreign donors and private demining organizations. Critics say that the government — which enjoyed an oil boom for most of the last decade — did not have to rely on outsiders to fund demining work. “They could have done much more themselves,” said Alcides Sakala, a senior official at Unita, now the main opposition political party. Clearing one mine costs Halo more than $1,500, Mr. Zank said. It is painstaking work, requiring deminers to work on a small patch of ground for hours, moving slowly forward on their knees.

#### New rats that are being used to sniff out landmines are less expensive and more efficient. Wolcott 5/14

Wolcott, Stephanie. “Demining in Colombia: Rats to the Rescue.” The City Paper Bogotá, 14 May 2017, thecitypaperbogota.com/features/demining-in-colombia-rats-to-the-rescue/17098. Associate Director, Kellogg Innovation Network //nhs-VA

One non-profit, Apopo, has a unique solution: rats. Apopo trains what they call, HeroRATs, to detect landmines and has used them successfully in Cambodia, Mozambique and Angola, and soon in Zimbabwe. If they can obtain funding from the government, Apopo will gear up to bring their gang of highly-trained HeroRATs to Colombia. So far, rats have proven to be a very efficient form of mine removal. In comparison to the full excavation technique, a rat can check an area the size of a tennis court in just 30 minutes, and greatly increases the safety of their human handlers who stand at the side of the zone being checked. While both dogs and rats have a keen sense of smell, rats far outpace dogs in efficiency. It takes about nine months to train and certify a rat to detect landmines. It takes two years to train a mine detecting dog and costs ten times as much. Of course, rats are also much smaller than mine detecting dogs and lucky for them, they are too light to detonate a mine if they get close. Apopo and their flour-legged team aim to positively contribute to the peace process in Colombia by ensuring that the risk from landmines is quickly reduced to a level where communities can live safely, and sustainable development can thrive. The NGO is currently working alongsid the Colombian Mine Action Authority (DAICMA) to establish a program to increase productivity of the demining efforts. Local Colombians will be trained as rat handlers and search methods will be refined and adapted for Colombia’s conditions. Once the local teams have been trained and have achieved sufficient proficiency, they will be tested and accredited in accordance with the Colombian National Mine Action Standards. These teams will work in coordination with manual demining teams to detect and clear mines. Rats have a surprising potential to save human life, and it isn’t only by detecting landmines. Apopo also trains rats to diagnose tuberculosis far more efficiently than traditional methods. This is possible because rats have more genetic material allocated to their sense of smell than any other mammal species and are extremely fast detectors. One rat can check 100 lab samples in 20 minutes, something that would take a lab technician using standard microscopy up to four days. The potential is immense. In the near future, rats might be used for an array of detection purposes, from uncovering environmental pollutants or halting illegal wildlife trade to search and rescue missions following natural disasters. After all, rats can crawl into some seriously tight spaces. HeroRATs work for bananas, literally. The peace process is a remarkable opportunity to build a more unified and prosperous country for all Colombians. An important step is to get rid of the landmines and ensure there are no more victims. If you would like to support the lifesaving work of Apopo by donating or even adopting a HeroRAT, visit their website at [www.apopo.org](http://www.apopo.org/)

#### New drone tech is 20x faster and 200x cheaper. Vincent 16

Vincent, James. “This Drone Can Detect and Detonate Land Mines.” The Verge, The Verge, 19 July 2016, www.theverge.com/2016/7/19/12222104/landmine-detecting-drone-mine-kafon-drone. On The Verge since Dec 01, 2014 //nhs-VA

The creators of a drone that can autonomously [map, detect, and detonate](https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/massoudhassani/mine-kafon-drone?ref=dfg&token=4a3c87bf) land mines say their technology could potentially clear the world of these deadly devices in less than 10 years' time. It's an ambitious goal, but one well worth pursuing. Worldwide, there are thought to be some 100 million land mines, many of which are leftover from conflicts long since finished. Every year these mines kill thousands of people, the vast majority of which are innocent civilians. The Mine Kafon Drone (MKD) wants to help change this. The MKD is designed to make clearing land mines easier, cheaper, and safer. The drone has six rotors and a trio of different attachments. The first is used to map the desired area, while the second, a metal detector, is used to detect mines, flagging them with GPS markers. After this, the drone returns to its operator and swaps its metal detector for a robot arm, which is used to place small detonators the size of tennis balls over the mines' locations. The drone then retreats to safety an MKD's designers claim that this method is up to 20 times faster than traditional de-mining techniques, and up to 200 times cheaper. The team, led by designer Massoud Hassani, previously created the [Mine Kafon](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120503-blowing-in-the-wind) — a cheap, disposable wind-blown device that looks like a tumbleweed made out of toilet plunger, that rolls around fields, blowing up mines as it goes. Hassani himself knows from experience the damage these devices can do: he grew up in northern Kabul in Afghanistan, a country which is riven with land mines, with some [10 million](http://www.afghan-network.net/Landmines/) concentrated in an area of around 500 square kilometers.

#### New Angolan leadership (and our solvency advocates) are optimistic about change now and want to fix the economy; prefer this ev on recency. Candido 9/26

Mendes, Candido. “Angola Gets New Leader After 38 Years as Lourenco Sworn In.”Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 26 Sept. 2017, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-26/angola-gets-new-leader-after-38-years-as-lourenco-sworn-in. //nhs-VA

Joao Lourenco was sworn in as president of Angola in a ceremony marking the first leadership change in almost four decades in sub-Saharan Africa’s second-biggest oil producer. The 63-year-old former defense minister takes over from Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who steps down after 38 years in office but will continue to lead the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola until next year. The MPLA won 61 percent of votes in elections last month, securing 150 seats in the 220-member parliament. “Joao Manuel Goncalves has been named president of the republic following general elections that expressed the will of the people,” Rui Ferreira, chairman of Angola’s Constitutional Court, said at the swearing-in ceremony. Among heads of state attending were President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa of Portugal, Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo and Jacob Zuma of South Africa. During his campaign, Lourenco pledged to tackle corruption and bring in foreign investment to reverse an economic slump caused by the drop in the price of oil, Angola’s main export. After expanding for 14 consecutive years, the economy posted zero growth last year and foreign exchange inflows have dried up. Lourenco told the Washington Post earlier this year that the government should invest in agriculture, cattle raising and fisheries to reduce its reliance on oil. A new government will probably be appointed within days. Finance Minister Archer Mangueira and central bank Governor Valter Filipe Duarte are likely to retain their positions, the newspaper Valor Economico reported on Sept. 18, without saying where it got the information.

### OV – Food Scarcity

### OV – HDI

### Extra Cards

#### Landmine removal differs by country – Egypt proves. Khamis 13

Khamis, Alaa. “Facts about Landmines.” Home, Minesweepers, 2013, www.landminefree.org/2017/index.php/support/facts-about-landmines. //nhs-VA

Egypt has been listed as the country most contaminated by landmines in the world with an estimate of approximately 23,000,000 landmines. Egypt is also considered as the fifth country with the most antipersonnel landmine per square mile. This serious problem hinders economic development of rich areas in the north coast and red sea. The area of north coast was contaminated as a result of hostilities between 1940 and 1943 involving Britain and its allies (including Egyptian forces) fighting German and Italian forces for control of North Africa. The areas to the east, including the Sinai Peninsula were contaminated between 1956 and 1973 due to hostilities between Egypt and Israel. These rich areas represent 22% of the total surface of Egypt. Development projects in these areas are significantly constrained by mine and UXO contamination and the civilian casualty rate seems high in proportion to the populations in these areas. The contaminated areas enjoy great oil and mineral wealth such as petroleum and Natural Gas. The problems of landmines lead to the contribution of the North Coast to 14% only of the total oil and natural gas production in Egypt. Moreover, in Egypt agriculture is one of the mainstays of the economy. Landmines are planted in fields, around wells, water sources, and hydroelectric installations, making these lands unusable or usable only at great risk. Egypt could increment its agricultural production if landmines were eliminated from the contaminated regions. The mines in a wide coastal strip, all the way to the Libyan border (and beyond), nearby coastal regions of Suez Canal Zone such as salt lakes and Red Sea coast prevent use of hundreds of thousands of sq. km. of agricultural land, prevent travel on thousands of km. of roads and deny access to potable water. These facts reflect the level of seriousness of landmines in Egypt. The contaminated areas in the North Coast, Gulf of Suez and Red Sea coasts are now being reclaimed for economic development making mine clearance an urgent priority for the Egyptian government. The landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) problems in Egypt are unique due to the following facts: Egypt suffers alone from more than 20% of the total number of the landmines in the world. A huge area of land is affected - some estimates put the total at about 25,000 sq kilometres. The age of much of the material is up to 60 years. Much of the mines and UXO is covered by thick deposits of mud or sand so that conventional detection techniques are often of little value.

#### Angola Request for Extension. UNDP in Angola 3/31

“Angola Request for Extension.” www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/clearing-mined-areas/art5\_extensions/Angola\_Request\_for\_Extension\_Submitted\_11\_May.pdf.//nhs-VA

This document is the formal request for an extension of the deadline for compliance with Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention - Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, which states that "if a State Party believes that it will not be able to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines within a given period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or to the Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completion of the destruction of such ordnances for a period of up to ten years”. Therefore, this document lists the progresses achieved in the period between 2012 and 2016, where 393 areas were cleared by different national and international operators; A non-technical survey that is still ongoing, already completed in 12 of the 18 provinces, in combination with the work of resolving the discrepancies in the Database, already allows a deeper understanding of the remaining challenge. In addition to the 12 provinces already mentioned, the survey is under way in three, and is about to start in the last three provinces. The delay in completing the survey was due to financial unavailability. This plan was designed for a period of eight years, to eliminate 1461 areas. Out of the 1461 areas, 387 are considered as Suspect Hazard Areas (SHA) and should be resurveyed throughout 2017 and cleared in the years to come. The experience of the operators in the field indicates that in the non-technical survey process a significant reduction in the initial area at CNIDAH’s Database resulting from the LIS was observed. For example, The HALO Trust, through the ongoing survey, has reduced by approximately 90% the initial size of the areas reflected in the database. NPA’s numbers indicate that 65% of the total confirmed area for example (CHA) has been reduced by technical survey, leaving only 35% for clearance. Historically the NPA cancels 90% of the total suspected hazard areas. On the other hand, MAG's experience proves that through the non-technical survey it is possible to cancel up to 90% of the suspected hazard areas. Therefore, a total area of 141,057,978 m 2 referring to suspect hazard areas should reduce, whenever an ongoing non-technical survey is completed to about eighty and ninety percent. Of these (yearly) only 35 percent should be effectively cleared. There are currently 1461 areas in the Database, of which 1074 are confirmed (CHA), equivalent to 103,970,384 m 2 , and 387 suspected areas (SHA) corresponding to 141,057,978 m 2 . This plan was designed in such way, so as to enable the mobilization of the necessary resources for its implementation. Failure to implement this premise is the main risk of fiasco. The total amount required for its implementation is usd 295,898,911,6 million. The criterion to find this amount was as follows: 6 The value of 387 SHA, equals to 141,057,978 m 2 , reduced by 90%, represents 14,105,790 m 2 , subsequently reduced by thirty percent 4,231,739 m 2 which multiplied by usd 3.58, which is considered an acceptable amount by most operators, considering all technical, operational and administrative assumptions reaches a total amount of usd 15,149,625.6. In the case of the 1074 confirmed areas (CHA) which equals to 103,970,384 m 2 , it is then reduced by 30%, which represents 72,779,269, making a total in US dollars 260,549,782. Regarding funding, while there are some commitments from major donors such as the US State Department, the Government of Japan, Norway, the European Union, etc., there are no funds secured for the post-2018 period to date. The plan of activities contained in this Extension Request will only be fully realized if the capacity and resources of operators are increased to cover the planned tasks. The Angolan State through CNIDAH is working with its partners and with international donors in mobilizing public and private resources to carry out the tasks of the plan attached to this Request. The Executive Demining Commission through its operators, in addition to its task of supporting national reconstruction, should firmly engage in the elimination of the areas contained in the plan of activities enshrined in this Request.

#### Funding for demining in Angola has tanked. Onishi 4/26

Onishi, Norimitsu. “In Angolan Town, Land Mines Still Lurk ‘Behind Every Bush.’” The New York Times, The New York Times, 26 Apr. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/world/africa/angola-land-mines.html. Norimitsu Onishi, the Johannesburg bureau chief, has been a foreign correspondent for The Times since 1998. He has covered South Africa and neighboring countries since 2014. Mr. Onishi was part of a team that won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. He is a graduate of Princeton University. //nhs-VA

Nationwide, about [32,000 acres of confirmed minefields](http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/angola/mine-action.aspx) need to be cleared, and 88,000 acres of suspected areas need to be verified as safe, according to the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. Angola was required to clear all such mines from its territory by 2018 under a global treaty banning antipersonnel land mines. But Angolan officials say they will be unable to complete the work before 2025. At its current rate of demining, Angola won’t be free of land mines until “beyond the year 2040,” said Constance Arvis, the deputy chief of mission at the United States Embassy in Angola. The United States, which has been the biggest donor for demining efforts in Angola, has earmarked $4 million this year. Decreases in international funding have also affected nongovernmental groups, forcing private demining organizations like Halo to slash their work force. Officials at the government’s Commission for Demining said that funding was also a problem for the government. Because of a drop in the global price of oil, Angola’s main export, the government’s demining budget has been cut by 60 percent, they said. The Angolan government has focused its demining efforts exclusively on areas of public works, leaving other areas to foreign donors and private demining organizations. Critics say that the government — which enjoyed an oil boom for most of the last decade — did not have to rely on outsiders to fund demining work. “They could have done much more themselves,” said Alcides Sakala, a senior official at Unita, now the main opposition political party. Clearing one mine costs Halo more than $1,500, Mr. Zank said. It is painstaking work, requiring deminers to work on a small patch of ground for hours, moving slowly forward on their knees.

#### Mines have a laundry list of impacts – agriculture, refugee displacement, environmental degradation. Gebrehiwot and Kara 09

Gebrehiwot, Etsay, and Hamdi Kara. "Economics of landmines and demining." (June 2009). Advisors: David R Henderson and Francois Melese. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. //nhs-VA

Sometimes mines are laid by rebels to obstruct the development activity of a government. Landmines are also laid in vast agricultural lands along riverbanks, dams and irrigation canals. As most mine-affected countries are developing countries, unlike industrialized nations their economies rely heavily on agriculture. Right after cessation of hostilities, farmers look for settlements to support their families by planting and harvesting. The country requires agricultural production to recover. A presence of mines in farmland therefore hampers agricultural productivity. A few mines are enough to block agricultural activity. Agricultural activity is thus obstructed regardless of the number of mines located throughout the farmland. Farmers will not attempt to harvest as they do not know the whereabouts of the mines and are afraid of death or injury. Therefore, farmers choose not to go to the farmland. Thus, the presence of mines in a country cripples the productivity of agriculture, which is the backbone of the economy. As more agricultural land becomes unusable for production by the existence of mines, self-sufficient nations become dependent for their food on outside help. According to Kakar, “Without mines, agricultural production could increase 88-200 percent in Afghanistan, 11 percent in Bosnia, 135 percent in Cambodia. Impede the Repatriation of Refugees and Settlement of IDP During a conflict, civilians flee to a safer place within or outside their countries. They live as refugees in safer neighboring countries and in camps in a reliable region of their own countries as internally displaced people (IDP). With ceasefires and conflict settlement, people want to go back to their homes to resume their lives, and the government seeks to recover from the destruction. The return of refugees and IDP to their home countries and regions is important for individuals as well as for the country. People who were far from home after leaving their properties, family and culture are better off back home, particularly if peace is granted. Returnees are also crucial in the post-conflict recovery as human capital for reconstruction. However, in the presence of mines the return of refugees and IDP is extremely dangerous and difficult. Landmines continue to hurt those who are unaware of their whereabouts and block the return of refugees and IDP otherwise. According to the United Nations and the Human Rights Watch, “after the civil unrest in Mozambique, all 28 major road ways were unusable due to an estimated 1 million mines which have already killed at least 10,000 people.”81 According to Anderson and Palha da Sousa, “the fear of the unknown whereabouts of the hidden killers caused 3.4 million Afghan Refugees (7 percent of Afghan householders) to remain in neighboring Pakistan and Iran in the 1980s. Also approximately 300,000 Angolan, 800,000 Mozambican and 400,000 Somali refugees remain in neighboring countries in Africa.”82 Based on the report of the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED), 364,000 people were internally displaced during the 1999 Ethiopia-Eritrea war and were unable to return for a long period of time.83 According to Green, there were one million Bosnian refugees throughout their neighboring regions.84 The inability of such a large number of people to return home makes life miserable and affects their respective country’s economy by draining its human power, which was supposed to work in the rebuilding of the war-torn nation. Moreover, the refugees and internally displaced people impose an unimaginable economic burden on their host countries as well as the world. In most cases, it is the United Nations (UN), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Save the Children, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNCIEF), the World Food Program, and others which carry the burden of the refugees’ subsistence and health. Affect the Environment by Destroying the Ecological System Landmines are found everywhere. They have been laid in forests, swamps, deserts, mountains, grasslands, agricultural land, dams, irrigation canals, riverbanks, residential areas, heritage sites, and many other places. All that matters is what the strategy was when they were laid. However, mostly no one knows the strategies utilized by those who placed the mines. When landmines are laid in forests, they kill wild animals. “Landmines have taken a deadly toll on biodiversity in Africa and other places of the planet.”85 According to Lt. Col. Martin Rupiya, in Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe, elephants and buffaloes have needed to be killed after they were injured by landmines. In neighboring Mozambique, mines reportedly have killed more than 100 elephants.86 People also use landmines for poaching protected wildlife. Landmine-poaching has been used against endangered species such as tigers in Burma and other animals in Southeast Asia. “People of the village Mulondo in Southern Angola took mines from mine-belt surrounding their villages and planted them in to the traditional elephant migration path of the Mupa National Park. As elephants flee strictly straight ahead the whole herd was massacred.”87 As animals continue to be killed, the ecological system is disturbed. Animals, especially endemic ones, are sources of tourist attractions in Africa. If animals of such type are devastated, it is not only the ecology but also the economy which is endangered. Some argue that if there are mines laid in a forest or any place near a forest, humans will not persistently disturb the environment and forests will flourish. However, environmental science is not about removing humans from the landscape, but about repairing damage and creating sustainable use of the environment. Besides, human beings are part of the ecosystem too. During landmine clearance, brushes and grasses are destroyed to allow passage and visibility for the clearing asset. The machines that may be used in destroying mines also destroy the trees and topsoil, which results in erosion. Such phenomena have a devastating impact on the environment and the ecological system. The longer landmines stay in the ground, the more toxic substances leak into the soil. This can be from the chemical composition as well as from the metal or plastic cover decomposition of the landmines. These toxic substances may cause soil disturbances. When crops are planted and harvested such toxins can enter the human body through the food chain. In general, landmines greatly degrade the environment and the ecological system.

#### Landmines are the obstacle to a working economy. 4 warrants – investment, tourism, access to infrastructure, and trade disruption. Gebrehiwot and Kara 09

Gebrehiwot, Etsay, and Hamdi Kara. "Economics of landmines and demining." (June 2009). Advisors: David R Henderson and Francois Melese. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. //nhs-VA

Discourage Potential Investment and Tourism Landmines discourage potential investment and tourism. When landmines kill endemic animals and block access to cultural heritage sites, tourism is obstructed. When places are abandoned because of the fear of landmines, tourist attractions are no longer maintained. Facilities such as transportation, hotels, and restaurants do not exist. A single accident to a tourist can destroy tourism. A decline in tourism hurts the host nation’s economy. Local and international investors look for potential places to invest. For developing nations, labor-intensive investments are priorities to provide jobs to people. Agro-industries such as food processing, textiles, and tanneries are among the more labor-intensive investments. When livestock are killed, farmlands are blocked and human capital is lost because of landmines, which makes investments almost impossible. Oil and archeological exploration, hiking, sightseeing, and other similar activities are more dangerous to attempt in mine-affected countries unless a guarantee of safety against mines is provided. As most minefields are not marked and people hardly know their whereabouts, it is unlikely that such explorations or recreational activities will take place. Oil exploration in the eastern part of Ethiopia was hampered by the existence of landmines until the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) assigned a team of experts to assist the explorers.91 As most mine-affected countries are developing nations, in rebuilding themselves and seeking foreign currency they intend to attract tourists and investors. However, as people from developed nations (or rich people in general) are the potential tourists and investors, they are not willing to risk their lives to visit or invest in a country with landmines. Rich people and landmines do not mix. Therefore, when tourism and investment are hampered by landmines, the economy of the host nation is greatly affected. 7. Prolong or Hinder Reconstruction A prolonged conflict in a country causes the deterioration of its infrastructure. As the extent of the damage to the infrastructure dictates the country’s speed of recovery for its economy, the existence of landmines limits the possibility and speed of reconstruction. Economic development is crucial in an effort to raise income per capita. Economic development is in turn dependent on reconstruction of infrastructure. However, in a wartorn country, infrastructure is damaged badly. Thus, in a country that pursues reconstruction, landmines add to the problem and create obstacles to economic development. In underdeveloped nations, infrastructure is already limited. There are fewer roads that connect villages to towns and many of those contain mines as they allow military movement. When such roads are unusable and the countries have been in a state of conflict, it can be concluded that the roads have not been maintained for years and hence their condition limits transportation, which reduces trade and productive exchange. As reconstruction of infrastructure promotes long-term development, it also provides massive job opportunities. When such opportunities are denied, people will be impoverished, which ultimately leads to another round of civil unrest and conflicts. Therefore, mines impact the economic well-being of a country by prolonging or prohibiting post-war reconstruction, which is required for sustainable development. In turn, this can lead to more conflict. 8. Deny Access to Infrastructure There is a high probability of landmines being placed on roads, in residential areas, and around schools, dams, energy supply areas, and water sources, Also, mines are often placed in agricultural and grazing places as well as many other infrastructures. Landmines can be laid to deny access to resources or infrastructures by opposing forces or civilians. After a ceasefire, these landmines become impediments to economic recovery. During war, the transportation network, power lines, water sources, health facilities, schools, and social networks are usually at least partially destroyed. In an attempt to reconstruct these in peace-time, landmines become obstacles. The remaining infrastructures are either insufficient or not accessible due to land mines. In some cases, in order to avoid the landmines, people may have to travel long distances in search of supplies for reconstruction. When infrastructure is incapacitated by landmines it is difficult to rebuild. It is difficult to utilize the infrastructures for the repatriation. The economic base of the country will be crippled by such a blockage. In early 1996 it was difficult to move logistics around the former Yugoslavia due to the significant mine-laying effort made by all three warring parties. According to the Associated Press, former Bosnian warlords have done an enterprising business by helping humanitarian groups move supplies around the extensive network of mines (which they employed). With no safe means of transportation it is difficult for governments, doctors, healthcare workers, teachers, utility repairmen, construction crews, and non-governmental organizations to make their 47 reconstruction presence felt in outlying areas of the country. This makes reconstruction difficult, thereby increasing the opportunity for renewed civil unrest.92 Therefore, landmines complicate economic development by denying access to infrastructure. 9. Disrupt Market and Trade People, especially in rural areas, are denied the use of their land because millions of hectares are infested with mines. As rural area land is mostly used for farming and grazing, people will not be able to produce crops and graze their livestock. Basically, crops and livestock are their means of survival, and if denied access to land they are not only unproductive but in danger of starving. Therefore, they will not have products to sell. This phenomenon affects supply and demand which in turn affects the market. When roads are mined, producers or consumers have to change their routes to go to the market or perhaps rely on subsistence crops. If roads are rerouted, for some the new route will be longer than the previous one, which wastes time and energy. If changing routes is not cost-effective, the result is that some people may decide to quit going to the market. Thus, in the event of a road blockage producers or consumers are not selling or buying, and the transporters are not earning either. Therefore, the markets will be affected drastically. The more widely landmines are dispersed and the more people they injure, the more they affect investors, tourists and traders, not only by their physical presence but also by the fear they create. Developing nations are the most affected by landmines and a lot of them are in Africa. A landmine threat in Africa causes difficulty in the exploration of resources such as oil and minerals. The United States Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Susan E. Rice, stated in November of 1999 that Africa supplies over 16% of our imported crude oil. Within the next decade, 20% of our imported crude oil could come from Africa, surpassing the Persian Gulf region. It is no surprise that the USA has a keen interest in the economic development of Africa.93 In such cases the presence of mines will definitely reduce market trading. Cheap labor and raw materials are also available in Africa. However, with a landmine presence, such activity may also be obstructed. In a speech, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State at the time, said “It is no surprise that the USA has a keen interest in the economic development of Africa. This requires an investment in post-conflict free enterprise and reconstruction that the USA is making.”94 In another speech Rice went on to support the USA's commercial investment in Africa: “from Enron's $2.5B contract to build a steel plant in Mozambique to Southwestern Bell Corporation's $700M stake in dSouth Africa/Telkom. Caterpillar now has dealerships in 15 African countries.”95 In the event of the presence of landmines, such important intervention of investments and markets can be endangered. Therefore, landmines disrupt markets by prohibiting production and interfering with supply and demand, as well as by blocking the utilization and delivery of available resources to the market for exchange.

#### The following nations are not signatories to the MBT:



The only wealthy nation based on the nations in the development assistance committee on this list is the US – you lose no ground

## T

### C/I – Nations

#### Merriam-Webster defines nation as

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nations>. 17 November 2017 //nhs-VA

a community of people composed of one or more [nationalities](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalities) and possessing a more or less defined territory and government

#### Even if “nations” has cultural connotations

### C/I – Wealthy Nations

#### A country that is intent on influencing and has the resources to do is a wealthy nation – using one quantitative metric to determine a wealthy nation leads to silly arguments about which metric.

Griffin and Enos 70

Griffin, K. B., and J. L. Enos. (Griffin is the former president of Magdalen College and Enos was a tutorial fellow at Magdalen College as well) “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, vol. 18, no. 3, 1970, pp. 313–327. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1152061. [Premier]

If we were to try to identify a single characteristic which distinguishes those countries which provide assistance from those which receive, we would not choose the relatively precise measures of the economist but the imprecise measures of the politician. It is not richness or poverty that distinguishes China, a lender, from Brazil, a receiver; it is the 'desire of the country for power. China is intent on influencing, and does influence, events in other countries; Brazil, in general, is not and does not. China wishes, by means of the granting of assistance, to influence the behavior of those countries to which [it] she gives it; Brazil has no such wish. Thus, in general, it is the powerful countries, and those seeking power, which provide assistance to the relatively less powerful, and it is the motives of the former in granting aid and the consequences of this aid upon the weak which interest us.

### C/I – Other Nations

#### Angola is on the list of ODA recipients in the least developed countries column

http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/DAC%20List%20of%20ODA%20Recipients%202014%20final.pdf. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 22 October 2017 //nhs-VA



### C/I – (Plural) Other Nations

#### C/I: The affirmative may defend that a single government be the recipient of development assistance in the form of mine removal.

#### The topic of the resolution denotes individuals; anything within that scope affirms the resolution. Bare Plural statements don’t create truths, they set boundaries for statements that can be true or false.

Cohen 7 [Ariel; Senior Lecturer of Linguistics at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, BA, Computer Science, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Ph.D., Computational Linguistics, Carnegie Mellon University; Semantics Archive; “Between Kinds and Properties: Bare Plurals across Languages”; <http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/TkxY2YzN/BPs.pdf>; JLB (10/14/16)]

I believe this argument succeeds with the existential reading. However,¶ **type-shifting is motivated in the case of characterizing generics,** for reasons of information¶ structure.¶ I take the view that **the topic is what the sentence is about** (Reinhart 1981,¶ Erteschik-Shir 1997, **and** many others). From this, two properties of topics follow.¶ One is that topics are obligatory—every predicative sentence must have a topic.8¶ Another is that topicsmust be specific: they must **denote individuals** (singular,¶ plural, kinds, or whatever).¶ As both Chierchia and Krifka (and many others) agree, the generic quantifier¶ is phonologically null. The full implications of this fact, however, are not always¶ appreciated. If the generic quantifier is phonologically null, this means that it is not¶ originally “there”, in the sentence. Hence, the “initial” logical form of a generic¶ like (21) is predicative, not quantificational.¶ (21) Dogs are intelligent.¶ Such a sentence must therefore have a topic. Properties are not specific,¶ hence they cannot serve as topics. In contrast, kinds are specific. Hence, the¶ property DOGS is type-shifted to the kind ∩DOGS, so that the initial logical form¶ of (21) is:¶ (22) intelligent(¶ ∩DOGS).¶ Only at this stage may the generic quantifier be introduced, and the kind¶ type-shifted back to a property. The resulting logical form is:¶ (23) genx[¶ ∪∩DOGS(x)][intelligent(x)].¶ Crucially, the topic requirement had to be satisfied already at the predicational¶ stage, hence the motivation for the type-shift. Thus, the application of the ∩¶ type-shifting operator to BPs in characterizing generics is motivated.¶ 8¶ cf. Krifka (2004): “As a general rule of discourse coherence, every sentence must have a topic”¶ (p. 129).¶ 4. A Synthesis¶ 4.1. The Theory¶ Let us take stock. The arguments for kinds appear to succeed only for characterizing¶ readings (and, of course, direct kind predication), and the argument for properties—¶ only for existential readings.¶ This situation calls for a synthesis of the views of Chierchia and Krifka. I¶ suggest such a synthesis: I accept their six points of agreement, but, following Cohen¶ and Erteschik-Shir (2002, cf. Van Geenhoven 1996, McNally 1998, DobrovieSorin¶ and Laca 1996, Doron 2003), I suggest that characterizing BPs, like Chierchia¶ claims, denote kinds, but existential BPs, like Krifka argues, denote properties.¶ Thus, the BP dogs in (24a) denotes the kind ∩DOGS = λs ιDOGSs¶ , while in (24b)¶ it denotes the property DOGS.¶ 9¶ (24) a. **Dogs are intelligent.**¶ b. John saw dogs.¶ **The initial logical form** of (24a) **is:**¶ (25) **intelligent**(DOGS)¶ **This creates a type mismatch, since the predicate intelligent requires an individual.**¶ We cannot “wait” until the eventual introduction of the generic quantifier to resolve¶ this mismatch, since this is a predicative sentence, hence requires a topic already at¶ the predicative stage. Therefore, the BP must be specific, hence it is type-shifted to¶ the kind ∩DOGS, and we get:¶ (26) intelligent(¶ ∩DOGS)¶ This logical form is semantically well formed, but pragmatically odd: **it**¶ **is not the kind** ∩**DOGS that is intelligent; only individual dogs can be intelligent.**

#### Their interpretation assumes truth testing; the affirmatives only obligation is to prove an instance of the resolution true.

Overing 14 [Bob Overing (TOC Finalist 2012). “TOPICALITY AND PLANS IN LD: A REPLY TO NEBEL BY BOB OVERING.” Premier Debate Today, 12/11/14] AJ

As Nebel has pointed out, it’s hard to come up with many plans that affirm LD topics on his view of topicality that “whether a plan is topical is whether its being a good idea entails the resolution” (“T in Policy,” para. 10). However, we have good reasons to reject that view of topicality as too stringent. Nebel finds this definition from Lichtman, Rohrer, and Corsi (1979) and leans on it heavily: [T1] affirmative teams are required to formulate proposals whose affirmation logically entails affirmation of the resolution (p. 375) The fact that Nebel bolds this definition does not grant it authority. It is not, in fact, the “only uniform test” (“T in Policy,” para. 10). It’s also unclear that Lichtman et al. have a strong intent to define, given that their article is not about topicality whatsoever. They do not discuss various alternative definitions. Why should we hold their idea of T above any of the following definitions? [T2] The plan and case ought to justify the conclusion the resolution asks to be drawn (Allen & Burrell, 1985, p. 857) [T3] The plan and case must provide evidence in favor of the resolution [T4] The plan and case must be an example or instance of the resolution [T5] The plan and case must fall within the bounds of the resolution [T6] All plan provisions must bear a rational relationship to a topical scheme of action (Unger, 1979 cited in Hingstman, 1985, p. 850) Nebel omits the plethora of alternative views on topicality he is no doubt aware of. In particular, definitions like T4 and T5 that stress the “bounds” of the topic are common **in debate theory** (Dolley, 1984; Hingstman, 1985; Parson, 1987; Bauschard, 2009). On these views, the plan must **only** be an example or a subset of the topic, a smaller burden than defending the resolution as a whole. Without defending any particular definition of topicality, we can say that Nebel’s T1 is mistaken. It seems to be extremely difficult to meet with any plan, even on policy topics. For instance, consider the 1993-94 NDT topic, “Resolved: That the Commander-in-Chief power of the President of the United States should be substantially curtailed.” A specific plan to substantially curtail the Commander-in-Chief power in a very specific way may not entail the truth of this proposition generally. For instance, it may be that the power to deploy armed forces should be curtailed, but every other Commander-in-Chief should be augmented! One might bite the bullet on examples such as these, but that would render many plans consistently deemed topical in NDT and NDT-CEDA debate non-topical, narrowing the potential breadth of these topics and stifling creativity. Many such plans, especially on resolutions that are not disjunctions, are and should be allowed. Reasons A) through E) above are additional justifications for this loosening of topicality from T1 to T2-T6 to allow more policy debate on quasi-policy topics.

### C/I – Development Assistance

#### I meet. Mine removal is a long-term process; it literally ends in 2025.

#### I meet. The plan is development assistance – best definition. OECD 08

OECD. “Is It ODA? .” Nov. 2008, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/34086975.pdf. //nhs-VA

This is often the decisive criterion for determining ODA eligibility. In the final analysis it is a matter of intention. But in order to reduce the scope for subjective interpretations and promote comparable reporting, Members have agreed to limits on ODA reporting, e.g.: Exclusion of military aid - The supply of military equipment and services, and the forgiveness of debts incurred for military purposes, are not reportable as ODA. On the other hand, additional costs incurred for the use of the donor’s military forces to deliver humanitarian aid or perform development services are ODA-eligible. Peacekeeping - The enforcement aspects of peacekeeping are not reportable as ODA. However, ODA does include the net bilateral costs to donors of carrying out the following activities within UN-administered or UN-approved peace operations: human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers and of national infrastructure, monitoring and training of administrators, including customs and police officers, advice on economic stabilisation, repatriation and demobilisation of soldiers, weapons disposal and mine removal. (Net bilateral costs means the extra costs of assigning personnel to these activities, net of the costs of stationing them at home, and of any compensation received from the UN.) Similar activities conducted for developmental reasons outside UN peace operations are also reportable as ODA, but not recorded against the peacekeeping code. Activities carried out for non-developmental reasons, e.g. mine clearance to allow military training, are not reportable as ODA. Civil police work - Expenditure on police training is reportable as ODA, unless the training relates to paramilitary functions such as counter-insurgency work or intelligence gathering on terrorism. The supply of the donor’s police services to control civil disobedience is not reportable. Social and cultural programmes - As with police work, a distinction is drawn between building developing countries’ capacity (ODA-eligible) and one-off interventions (not ODA-eligible). Thus, the promotion of museums, libraries, art and music schools, and sports training facilities and venues counts as ODA, whereas sponsoring concert tours or athletes’ travel costs does not. Cultural programmes in developing countries whose main purpose is to promote the culture or values of the donor are not reportable as ODA. Assistance to refugees - Assistance to refugees in developing countries is reportable as ODA. Temporary assistance to refugees from developing countries arriving in donor countries is reportable as ODA during the first 12 months of stay, and all costs associated with eventual repatriation to the developing country of origin are also reportable. Nuclear energy - The peaceful use of nuclear energy, including construction of nuclear power plants, nuclear safety and the medical use of radioisotopes, is ODA-eligible. Military applications of nuclear energy and nuclear non-proliferation activities are not. Research - Only research directly and primarily relevant to the problems of developing countries may be counted as ODA. This includes research into tropical diseases and developing crops designed for developing country conditions. The costs may still be counted as ODA if the research is carried out in a developed country. Anti-Terrorism - Activities combatting terrorism are not reportable as ODA, as they generally target perceived threats to donor, as much as to recipient countries, rather than focusing on the economic and social development of the recipient.

#### OECD defines development assistance as

<http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm>. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 22 October 2017 //nhs-VA

The DAC defines ODA as “those flows to countries and territories on the [DAC List of ODA Recipients](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm) and [to multilateral institutions](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/annex2-procedure.htm) which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).”

#### Mine removal is a critical part of countries’ development budgets – the aff is predictable. Xinhua 04

Xinhua. “Landmine Removal Key to Development: UNDP.” ReliefWeb, 2 Dec. 2004, reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/landmine-removal-key-development-undp. //nhs-VA

NAIROBI, Dec 2, 2004 (Xinhua via COMTEX) -- Countries contaminated by landmines will never develop without the removal of these deadly weapons, a high-ranking UN Development Program (UNDP) official said Thursday on the sidelines of a landmine conference in Kenyan capital Nairobi. "The landmine problem is a *critical development issue*. The terrible human toll taken by these indiscriminate weapons is compounded by deep and lasting economic damage," Julia Taft, the UN Assistant Secretary General and Director of the UNDP Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery told a news conference on the sidelines of the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World. "Landmines restrict access to water and keep schools and hospitals and roads from being built. They prevent the safe return of refugees and the internally displaced. They breed instability in fragile post-conflict environment and terrorize entire populations," Taft noted. "Millions of mines still in the ground mean that there are hundreds of roads that cannot be traveled, thousands of acres of farmlands that cannot be tilled, and entire communities that are deprived of health care and education and essential investment," she told reporters. The UN official said eradication of landmines and assistance to victims should be considered both a humanitarian imperative and an investment in the future. "These are indiscriminate weapons that do not distinguish between enemy, combatants, farmers at work, or children at play," Taft, whose bureau promotes and supports extensive mine action programs in 27 countries around world, said. She said more than 80 countries around the globe suffer from landmine contamination, and 35 are considered severely affected. Taft urged heavily-mined countries and the international community to mainstream mine action into their own development assistance programs. "Many more people have suffered and died because of the indirect but equally lethal impact of landmines as an obstacle to development," the UNDP official stressed. She cited Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique as heavily affected by landmines, but they have made mine action an integral part of their development plans and budgets. The Nairobi summit is reviewing progress made toward a mine- free world over the past five years and preparing an action plan for the future. The Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Convention, entered into force in March 1999 and prohibits the manufacture, trade and use of antipersonnel landmines. It also obliges countries to destroy stockpiles and clear their own mined territory. The summit is expected to come up with two documents. One of them is a program of action on how the goals of the convention are to be achieved, while the second one will be a political declaration by parties reaffirming their commitments to the convention.

### Overlimiting

#### Stale debates – Debating the same aff over and over has diminishing marginal returns. Even if each debate is in depth, we don’t learn anything new. Also key to Research Skills because their interpretation of the topic requires no new research from either side after the first week of the topic.

#### Topic ed – Arguments for *\_\_spec\_\_* are completely different from *\_\_alt spec\_\_.* Absent specification the neg will never have to engage specific policies, they’ll just read generics. Turns field context; depth key to policy discussion means aff is prior

#### Aff Flex – the aff needs the ability to strategically exclude neg arguments, otherwise the neg just wins every debate by exploiting the 1ar time disadvantage. Your interp means the aff must defend all wealthy nations and all recipient nations through a communal fund, but the lit never addresses blanket policies so there’s no ground.

#### PICs – their interp creates multiple cheap shot PICs to moot the aff. takes out limits and turns all their offense. Outweighs – plenty of generics mean that the neg can come back but being aff is near impossible in your world which takes out ground.

### RVI

### AT: Only One Spec

### AT: Textuality

### AT: Underlimiting

### AT: Ground

### AT: FX-T

### 2AR – PICs

#### Overview

#### AT: C/I Plank

#### AT: 1AR Theory

#### AT: Plans force PICs

#### AT: Potential Abuse

#### AT: Allows Truisms

## Kritiks

### Framework (1:00)

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater that presents the most desirable policy option

#### Fairness—alternate frameworks moot 6 minutes of the 1ac – it’s the only basis for aff offense – that means we should get to weigh our impacts. Turns the K because it means we can’t properly engage.

#### The alt is vague – it’s a voting issue--Spikes out of our offense – no way for aff to win and skews 1AR time--Damage is done – 2NR clarification rewards them because we’ll always be behind.

#### If the alt solves it’s utopian – that’s a voter – impossible to research, not reciprocal, and skews side bias neg

#### // Floating PIKs are a voter, steal the aff and kill clash, which is the key internal link to both fairness and education

#### b) Decision-making – debate should develop our ability to weigh the consequences of our actions – it’s the only portable skill

#### c) Considering policy implications is key to effective theory

Feaver 01 (Peter, Asst. Prof of Political Science at Duke University, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p 178)

At the same time, virtually all good theory has implications for policy. Indeed, if no conceivable extension of the theory leads to insights that would aid those working in the ‘real world’, what can be ‘good’ about good theory? Ignoring the policy implications of theory is often a sign of intellectual laziness on the part of the theorist. It is hard work to learn about the policy world and to make the connections from theory to policy. Often, the skill sets do not transfer easily from one domain to another, so a formidable theorist can show embarrassing naivete when it comes to the policy domain he or she putatively studies. Often, when the policy implications are considered, flaws in the theory (or at least in the presentation of the theory) are uncovered. Thus, focusing attention on policy implications should lead to better theorizing. The gap between theory and policy is more rhetoric than reality. But rhetoric can create a reality–or at least create an undesirable kind of reality–where policy makers make policy though ignorant of the problems that good theory would expose, while theorists spin arcana without a view to producing something that matters. It is therefore incumbent on those of us who study proliferation–a topic that raises interesting and important questions for both policy and theory–to bring the communities together. Happily, the best work in the proliferation field already does so.

#### The government has flawed components but challenging our understanding of government is important and valuable through discussion of federal policies--- learning the language of that allows us to confront and challenge those institutions outside of this round and resolves a lot of the impacts at the root of their explanation

**Hoppe 99** Robert Hoppe is Professor of Policy and knowledge in the Faculty of Management and Governance at Twente University, the Netherlands. "Argumentative Turn" Science and Public Policy, volume 26, number 3, June 1999, pages 201–210 works.bepress.com

ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy. There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making. For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge. Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics. Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251). National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts. In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences. The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality. Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray. For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

### AT: Capitalism

#### Perm do both – clear land to decrease dependence of farmers on large corporations and oil reliance in Angola. Double-bind: if the alt can’t overcome the aff then it can’t beat cap, but if it can beat cap it should overcome the aff.

#### Link turn – agriculture k2 break down elite control over the economy via oil and solving food insecurity gets ppl out of poverty and able to engage the alt; the aff is a prereq. Vieira 16

Vieira, Arnaldo. “580,000 People Risk Starving in Angola.” UN: 580,000 People At Risk of Starvation in Angola | World Affairs Journal, Africa Review, 2 June 2016, www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/un-580000-people-risk-starvation-angola. Arnaldo Vieira is a Nation Media Group's correspondent in Angola. //nhs-VA

At least 580,000 people were food insecure in Angola, the UN says. According to a UN report, some 120,000 children were among the affected. The UN representative in Angola, Mr Pier Paolo Balladelli, told DW Radio Wednesday that: “the situation deteriorates every day and the harvests were only enough to feed people for three months”. “The government requested a financial aid from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help the people,” Mr Balladelli was further quoted as saying. **Severe malnutrition** The UN has further reported that UN 40,000 people in Angola were suffering from severe malnutrition. The affected people are residents in Namibe, Huíla, Cunene and Cuando Cubango southern provinces. Malawi and Mozambique, also in southern Africa, in April sounded the alarm bells over worsening food shortages caused by a severe drought. **Supply problems** Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Zambia and South Africa were also suffering food supply problems. Namibia, which shares a 1,100-kilometre border with Angola, has also declared 42 per cent of its 2.2 million population food insecure. Meanwhile, an IMF team arrived in Luanda on Wednesday to discuss a loan with the government. The team which is headed by Mr Ricardo Vellos will remain in the southern African country until June 14. **Economic crisis** Since the beginning of 2015, Angola has faced a serious economic crisis occasioned by the oil price depression on international market. Angola is the second-largest producer of crude in Africa and was regularly cited as one of the continent’s fastest growing economies. The country relies on crude exports for two-thirds of tax revenue, and 95 per cent of its foreign currency receipts. Critics, however, say the billions of oil dollars flowing in had not benefited the ordinary people, and had only succeeded in creating an elite few. **Local currency** The UN notes that while the economy has been growing at more than 7 per cent annually, 38 per cent of Angola's 26 million people lived in poverty. Angola relies on imports and the kwanza, the local currency, weakened by about 25 per cent to the dollar last year. The IMF said inflation in Angola grew from 7.3 per cent in 2014 to 8.4 per cent in 2015 and 8.5 per cent 2016.

#### They ignore massive violence caused by totalitarian governments and the alt supercharges the ivory tower DA - empirically proven by Angolan communism. Pawson 14

Pawson, Lara. “Angola's Brutal History, and the MPLA's Role in It, Is a Truth That We Must Tell | Lara Pawson.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 5 May 2014, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/05/angola-brutal-history-mpla-leftwing-discipline-betrayal. Lara Pawson is a freelance writer who lives in east London. She is the author of In the Name of the People: Angola's Forgotten Massacre. //nhs-VA

That said, I also knew that after the fall of the Berlin Wall the MPLA had made a political U-turn. Abandoning Marxism and Leninism, it had adopted a market-driven economics that morphed rapidly into crony capitalism. The power of the one-party state, which had endured since 1975 until flawed elections in 1992, was now concentrated in [President José Eduardo dos Santos](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/30/angola-jose-eduardo-dos-santos). Nevertheless, like many on the left my loathing was focused so intensely on Unita that it was easy to view the MPLA as little more than a cold war victim of US foreign policy. When I arrived in Luanda, the MPLA had long been – and still is – a member of the Socialist International, an organisation that claims to pursue "progressive politics for a fairer world". I remember my pleasure on hearing politicians and other members of the urban elite calling each other camarada (comrade). Even the party rhetoric sounded remarkably similar to that of the revolutionary years of the 1970s. But a few months into my new job, when the country's "fourth war" finally erupted, I could no longer hide from the blindingly obvious: if revolutionary politicians were what I was after, I was at least 20 years too late. In fact, this was also wrong. I began to discover that the idea of a 1970s MPLA heyday was just as misguided. An Angolan colleague told me about [27 May 1977, the day an MPLA faction rose up](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/03/nito-alves-teenage-resistance-angola) against the leadership, and the honeymoon of revolution crashed to a halt. Some called it an attempted coup, but my colleague insisted it was a demonstration that was met with a brutal overreaction. Whichever story you believe, six senior members of the MPLA were killed that day by supporters of the uprising. In response, President Neto, the politburo and the state media made many highly inflammatory statements that incited extraordinary revenge. In the weeks and months that followed, thousands of people – possibly tens of thousands – were killed. Some of the executions were overseen by Cuban troops sent to [Angola](https://www.theguardian.com/world/angola) by Fidel Castro to repel a South African invasion. I found this knowledge profoundly challenging. It turned everything I thought I knew on its head, especially when I began to understand that the 1977 purge cemented a culture of fear that has shaped a generation. How, I asked myself, had this appalling event remained so little known outside Angola? The question began to obsess me. Back in London several years later, I started searching through my book collection for references to what Angolans refer to as the vinte e sete (the 27th). I found the odd sentence here and there; in one book, a few paragraphs. But what rattled me was that Angola-watchers on the left – intellectuals whom I admired – all seemed to have turned a blind eye to the thousands of killings. It was as if their commitment to the party was so deep that, in the end, they heard only the voices of its leaders and fell deaf to the calls from below. Often I felt torn between my socialist beliefs and the search for truth. At one stage I became so disillusioned with the politics of revolution that I came close to giving up – on everything. But the words of an old friend, a man who was imprisoned and tortured by the MPLA in the 1970s, kept me going. "We cannot be afraid," he said. "We must write what we see and what we feel. Don't worry about what people will say … just get it down." The dilemma of whether to tell the truth or keep stumm is hardly new. The European left has a history of toeing the party line – it is called discipline and unity – in the pursuit of freedom, equality and justice. The Spanish civil war is an obvious reference here, exemplified by George Orwell's account of his personal experiences with the Spanish communists in [Homage to Catalonia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homage_to_Catalonia). Let's not forget that Victor Gollancz, Orwell's publisher, refused to print it, "believing, as did many people on the left, that [everything should be sacrificed in order to preserve a common front against the rise of fascism](https://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/feb/17/historybooks.featuresreviews)". Over the course of the past century the "sacrificed" range from the millions of victims of Stalin's brutality, via Cuban writers tiring of dictatorship, to female comrades in the Socialist Workers party seeking justice for alleged sexual abuse. I know there will be some people who will insist, as the French philosopher [Gilles Deleuze](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/deleuze/) has, that "arguments from one's own privileged experience are bad and reactionary arguments". But in considering the case of Angola and the MPLA's record of brutality, it seems to me that privileging ideological theory over people's lived experiences, which are almost always contradictory, complicated and fuzzy, is far more dangerous. What many of us on the left have failed to see in Angola is that, for the majority, politics has always been about far more than merely a battle with the right.

### AT: Neocol

### AT: Anthro

#### Perm do both – use mine removal as a way to prevent ecological collapse and killing of endangered species. Double-bind: if the alt can’t overcome plan, it can’t solve anthro; if the alt can solve anthro, then it should overcome the aff

#### Link turn – the aff is a prerequisite to animal survival. Roberts and Kevin 99

Roberts, Adam M. and Stewart, Kevin (1999) "Animal Casualties of the Underground War,"*Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3 , Article 14. Available at: <http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol3/iss3/14> //nhs-VA

The placement of land mines also poses an indirect threat to wildlife. In many regions of the world, arable farmland is rendered useless when mines are placed in fields. This causes farmers to move into marginal adjoining regions otherwise inhabited by wildlife. As poverty increases because of farmland restrictions, hunting may increase to feed hungry families. Similarly, poaching wild animals may increase to fund arms purchases. 1n 1995, Nick Rufford reported in the London Sunday Times that the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia used tiger skins and bones to purchase anti-tank landmines and guns. Just as wildlife habitat and farmland are put in conflict as a result of landmine placement, livestock animals are specifically harmed by mine explosions. Since herds are usually large, an explosion set off by one animal may kill many others. A study of the social and economic costs of mines in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique concluded that more than 54,000 animals were lost to land mine detonations. Mines deployed during World War II eventually killed more than 3,000 animals per year in Libya between 1940 and 1980.

## Policy

### AT: CP - China

### AT: CP – FDI

### AT: DA – Insurgencies

#### No link – the aff isn’t humanitarian aid, so there’s no insurgency violence

#### No link – the aff removes mines; that is what causes infrastructure growth, not active assistance

#### Turn – road blockages because of landmines make it easier for insurgencies to circumvent the aid process

#### Case solves the DA – conflict emerges because of food scarcity; their ev:

insurgents resort to violence in an effort to secure the resources provided by humanitarian aid for themselves

### AT: DA – Corruption

#### Democracy is in decline – my ev takes their warrants into account. Zelenko 12

Zelenko, Michael. “Democracy in Decline?” World Policy Institute, Sept. 2012, www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2012/democracy-decline. Michael Zelenko is a World Policy Journal editorial assistant. //nhs-VA

In May and June 2012, Greece held elections that promised to radically resculpt the European landscape. Britain’s *Guardian* called the ballot the “most important election for decades.” *Business Insider* labeled it “the most anticipated Greek election in history.” Yet despite the gravitas attributed to the decision, just under 63 percent of voters cast a ballot. In the birthplace of democracy, for one of the most important elections in that nation’s history, voter turnout was the lowest it has been in at least 70 years. In his essay “Viva Democracy!” in the summer 2012 issue of *World Policy Journal*, author and veteran correspondent for *Le Monde* Patrice de Beer laments: “Too many potential voters take Democracy for granted, treating it like a habit that has hung around for ages.” Indeed, statistics show that the last 60 years have witnessed a worldwide decline in voter turnout. In Portugal, the 2011 elections saw just 59 percent and 46.5 percent of eligible voters head to the polls for, respectively, parliamentary and presidential elections—by far the lowest turnout since the founding of the third republic in 1974. In Morocco, only 45 percent of the population came out to vote in the parliamentary elections of 2011—significantly down from a high of 85 percent in 1970. In Paraguay, voter participation in parliamentary and presidential elections has dropped nearly 25 percent in the last 40 years. Even in new democracies, voter participation has fallen, as in Serbia, where turnout in the presidential election plunged 22 percent from 2008 to 2012. In the United States, voter turnout for congressional elections has dropped by roughly 30 percent in the last half century. Regional patterns also paint a pessimistic picture. Western Europe has seen a decline from the mid-80s to the high 70s since 1941. North America’s average turnout has fallen from the mid-70s to the mid-60s.The Middle East has seen voter turnout fall from almost 90 percent to the mid-60s in the last half century. Even the Arab Spring—that resounding call for democracy—evoked lackluster participation. The recent presidential election in Egypt saw a 51 percent voter turnout. So how do we reconcile these numbers with the international march—and apparent success—of democracy in South America, Eastern Europe, and Africa in the last half century? Voter turnout, at least in the developed world, is the result of four factors, says Andrew Ellis, the director for the Asia-Pacific region for the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). The first is access to voting—availability of polling stations, work or rest day voting, and alternate voting practices such as e-voting or vote by mail. The second is political impact, or the effect voters feel their participation will have on the results of the election. The third hinges on the political and electoral structure of the government—a proportionate parliament versus a first past the post system that we see in countries like the United States—along with variables of compulsory voting, and voting age (with evidence suggesting a younger voting age actually leads to weaker voter turnout in the developed world). The last factor deals with demographic issues such as gender and youth balance within electorates. With so many endlessly complicated factors at play, “voter turnout cannot be correlated with the level of democracy,” says Abdurashid Solikono, Program Officer of Electoral Processes at IDEA. “It is somewhat incorrect to assume that only democratic movements can be the cause of higher voter turnout. In order to see the impact of democratic movements on voter turnout, one has to control for all other variables that affect the level of voter turnout.” Beyond the factors outlined by Ellis, such variables as propaganda, population size, and campaign budgets can have substantial effects. The Central African Republic (61 percent turnout for the 2011 parliamentary elections) hardly boasts a healthier democracy than Switzerland (49 percent turnout for the 2011 parliamentary election). Measuring a democracy solely by voter participation can be deceptive and yield false results. Low election turnouts can signal a lack of confidence in the electoral system—but may also signify apathy or satisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, strong voter turn out may hint at a vibrant democracy, but it could also indicate intense propaganda, authoritarian rule, and false reports**—**as seen in Turkmenistan, where voter turnout topped an unbelievable 96 percent for the 2012 presidential election. All of which doesn’t mean high voter turnout doesn’t have a place in a healthy democracy. On the contrary, as a basic tenant of the system, free and fair elections should be supported even as a legitimate high voter turnout should be encouraged. Solikono cites a 2006 study titled “Explaining Voter Turnout” from a 2006 issue of the journal *Electoral Studies* identifying four factors that typically encourage higher voter turn—the type of electoral system, high campaign expenditures, concurrent elections (municipal and federal elections on the same day), and the elimination of restrictive registration procedures such as literacy tests and poll taxes. Solikono also suggests five additional measures that can improve voter turnout: Administering elections on non-working days or designating the election day a holiday. Locating the voting stations in populated places and increasing their number. Using optional e-voting or e-registration procedures. Allowing and promoting voting from abroad. Eliminating all other obstacles that make it difficult to vote. Instituting compulsory voting is another option that can promote higher voter turn out. From Singapore (93 percent in the 2011 parliamentary election), to Australia (93 percent in the 2010 parliamentary election), to Turkey (87 percent in the 2011 parliamentary election), compulsory elections can yield higher voter turnout rates than non-compulsory electoral systems, but only when coupled with a strong enforcement system. Yet even with a long history of democracy, unrestricted voter rights and compulsory voting, some elections still don’t produce a strong turnout. Such was the case with the 2012 Greek elections. Andrew Ellis suggests yet another reason for the relatively poor voting rate: A segment of the population may have been grossly dissatisfied with either alternative. This certainly seems to be a possible explanation for the Greek results. Does that mean democracy is dying in Greece, or Switzerland, or anywhere else? Certainly not. Democracy is a tangled, messy, sometimes disappointing, and unpredictable system—and all for the better. Even negative shifts in voter participation are likely to be symptoms of a dynamic society where voter participation vacillates as a result of demographic, political, and social reasons. That proportionately fewer people are voting today is eclipsed by the positive trend of more people voting for their leaders and representatives now than at any time in history. Meanwhile, taking simple steps like creating national voting holidays, consolidating election days, and eliminating stringent ID requirements can go a long way to restoring turnout, promoting vibrant democracies, and addressing fears of global democracy in decline.

#### Link turn – agriculture k2 break down elite control over the economy via oil – that increases democratization. Vieira 16

Vieira, Arnaldo. “580,000 People Risk Starving in Angola.” UN: 580,000 People At Risk of Starvation in Angola | World Affairs Journal, Africa Review, 2 June 2016, www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/un-580000-people-risk-starvation-angola. Arnaldo Vieira is a Nation Media Group's correspondent in Angola. //nhs-VA

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### AT: DA – Spending

#### Tiny link means no impact – the economy will only be devastated if the case is significant enough to push us over the brink

#### Global econ decline is non-uq; the only way to solve is by relieving dependency on oil, so case solves the DA

Rutherford, Jonathan. “What's Really Driving the Global Economic Crisis Is Net Energy Decline.” Resilience, 3 Aug. 2017, www.resilience.org/stories/2017-08-03/whats-really-driving-global-economic-crisis-net-energy-decline/. Jonathan Andrew Rutherford, is an academic who was formerly a Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Middlesex

//nhs-VA

In the fifth contribution to our symposium, [‘Pathways to the Post-Carbon Economy’](https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/postcarbonfuture/home), Jonathan Rutherford explores the fundamental driver of global economic malaise: not debt; not banks; but a protracted, slow-burn crisis of ‘net energy decline.’ Cutting through the somewhat stale debate between advocates and critics of ‘peak oil’, Rutherford highlights some of the most interesting and yet little-known scientific literature on the intimate relationship between the global economy and energy. Whatever happens with the shift to renewables, he argues, we are moving into an era in which fossil fuels will become increasingly defunct, especially after mid-century. The implications for the future of the global economy will not be pretty — but if we face up to it, the transition to more sustainable societies will be all the better for facing reality, rather than continuing with our heads in the sand. As argued [in more detail by Ted Trainer](https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/the-transition-process-the-simpler-way-perspective-f2a64a0a1d6a) in this symposium the best hope for transition to a ‘post carbon’ — or, better, a sustainable society (a much broader goal) — lies in a process of radical societal reconstruction, focused on the building, in the here and now, of self-governing and self-reliant settlements, starting at the micro-local level. The [‘Simpler Way’](http://www.thesimplerway.info/) vision we promote, in my view, is an inspiring alternative that we can and should work for. The hope is that these local movements — which have already begun to emerge — will network, educate and scale up, as the global crisis intensifies. In what follows, I want to complement this view, by sketching why I think the global economy will inevitably face a terminal crisis of net energy in coming years. In making this prediction, I am assuming that global transnational elites (i.e. G7 elites), as well as subordinate national elites — [who manage the globalised neoliberal economy](http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/vol10/vol10_no1-2_The_Myths_About_the_New_World_Order.html) — will pursue economic growth at all costs, as elites have done since the [birth of the capitalist system in Britain](http://www.brill.com/products/book/origin-capitalism-england-1400-1600) 300+ years ago. That is, they will not voluntarily pursue a process of organised ‘degrowth’. In my view, at best, they will vigorously pursue ‘green’ growth, i.e. via the rapid scaling up of renewable energy and promoting efficiency etc., but with no intention of actively reducing the overall level of energy consumption — indeed, most of the mainstream ‘green growth’ scenarios assume a doubling of global energy demand by 2050 (for a critical review of one report, [see here](http://www.resilience.org/stories/2017-02-08/the-csiros-case-for-green-growth-is-flawed/)). I am focusing on energy but, of course we can, and should, add to this picture the wider [multidimensional ecological crisis](http://churchandstate.org.uk/2017/07/our-civilisation-is-unsustainable/) (climate change impacts, soil depletion, water stress, biodiversity loss etc) which, among other things, means that an ever increasing proportion GDP growth takes the form of “compensatory and defensive costs” (See i.e Sarkar, [The Crisis of Capitalism](https://www.amazon.com.au/Crises-Capitalism-Different-Political-ebook/dp/B008V725HA), p.267–275) to deal with past and expected future ecological damage. **Energy and GDP Growth** Axiom 1: As the biophysical economists have shown global economic growth is closely correlated with growth in energy consumption. Professor Minqi Li of Utah University’s Department of Economics, for example, [shows](http://peakoilbarrel.com/world-energy-2017-2050-annual-report/) that between 2005 and 2016: ‘an increase in economic growth rate by one percentage point is associated with an increase in primary energy consumption by 0.96 percent.’ GDP growth also depends on improvements in energy efficiency — Li reports that over the last decade energy efficiency improved by an average of 1.7% per annum. One of the future uncertainties is how rapidly we are likely to improve energy efficiency — future supply constraints are likely to incentivise this strongly, and there will be scope for significant efficiency improvements, but there is also to be diminishing returns once the low hanging fruit has been picked. Axiom 2: Economic growth depends not just on increases in gross energy consumption and energy efficiency, but the availability of net energy. Net energy can be defined as the energy left over after subtracting the energy used to attain energy — i.e. the energy used during the process of extraction, harvesting and transportation of energy. Net energy is critical because it alone powers the non-energy sectors of the global economy.Without net energy all non-energy related economic activity would cease to function. Insight: An important implication is that net energy can be in decline, even while gross primary energy supply is constant or even increasing. Below I will make my case for a probably intensifying global net energy contraction by discussing, first, broad factors shaping the probable trajectory of global primary energy growth, followed by a discussion of overall net energy. Most of the statistics are drawn from [Minqi Li’s latest report](http://peakoilbarrel.com/world-energy-2017-2050-annual-report/) which, in turn, draws on the latest BP’s Statistical Review of World Energy. **Prospects for Gross Energy Consumption** Over the last decade, world primary energy consumption grew at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent. It’s important to note, however, [as Jean- Jancovici shows](https://jancovici.com/en/energy-transition/societal-choices/a-couple-of-thoughts-on-the-energy-transition/), that in per-capita terms the rate of energy growth has significantly slowed since the 1980s, increasing at an average annual rate of 0.4% since that time, compared to 1.2% in the century prior. This is mainly due to the slowing growth in world oil supply, since the two oil shocks in the 1970s. There are strong reasons for thinking that the rate of increase in gross energy availability will slow further in coming decades. Recently [a peer reviewed paper](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016236114010254) estimated the maximum rate at which humanity could exploit all ultimately recoverable fossil fuel resources. It found that depending on assumptions, the peak in all fossil fuels would be reached somewhere between 2025–2050 (a finding that aligns with several other studies see i.e Maggio and Cacciola 2012; Laherrere, 2015). This is highly significant because today fossil fuels make up about 86% of global primary energy use — a figure that, notwithstanding all global efforts to date, [has barely changed in three decades](http://peakoilbarrel.com/world-energy-2017-2050-annual-report/). This surprising early peak estimate is substantially associated with the recent [radical down-scaling of estimated economically and technically recoverable coal reserves](http://richardheinberg.com/museletter-301-coal-dinosaur-growth-economy). The situation for oil is particularly critical, especially given that it is by far the world’s major source of liquid fuel, powering 95% of all transport. A recent [HSBC report](https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9wSgViWVAfzUEgzMlBfR3UxNDg/view) found that, already today, somewhere between 60–80% of conventional oil fields are in terminal decline. It estimated that by 2040 the world would need to find four Saudi Arabia’s (the largest oil supplier) worth of additional oil just to maintain current rates of supply and more than double that to meet 2040 projected demand. And yet, as the same report showed, new oil discoveries have been in long term decline — lately reaching record lows notwithstanding record investments between 2001–2014. Moreover, new discoveries are invariably smaller fields with more rapid peak and decline rates. The recent boom in US tight oil — a bubble fueled by low interest rates and record oil industry debts — has been responsible for most additional supply since the peak in conventional oil in 2005, but [is likely to be in terminal decline within the next 5–10 years, if it has not already peaked.](http://www.artberman.com/permian-reserves-may-much-smaller-think/)

#### Decline doesn’t cause war. Clary 15

Clary 15 – Christopher Clary, former International Affairs Fellow in India at the Council on Foreign Relations, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Watson Institute at Brown University, Adjunct Staff Member @ RAND Corporation, Security Studies Program @ MIT, country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, former Research Fellow @ the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, former research associate in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, BA from Wichita State University and an MA from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 2015 (“Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-­‐8, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2597712>)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles.∂ Defining and Measuring Rivalry and Rivalry Termination∂ I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically.∂ This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further:∂ The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3∂ Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and∂ Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry.5∂ Why Might Economic Crisis Cause Rivalry Termination?∂ Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.