# Notes

 *“Always at home—one day we reach our goal—and we point with pride to the long journeys we took to reach it. In truth we did not notice we were traveling. But we got so far because at each point we believed we were at home.” -Nietzsche*

# tocac!

## FW

#### [K] The intrinsic nature of the mind is that of reflection—we uniquely have the ability to reflect on our desires before we act on them, which creates the problem of ethics because reason requires that we endorse one desire over others.

Christine M. Korsgaard. *The Sources of Normativity.* THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University November 16 and 17, 1992 –ilake mw

The human mind is self-conscious. Some philosophers have supposed that this means that our minds are internally luminous, that their contents are completely accessible to us, that we always can be certain what we are thinking and feeling and wanting, and so that introspection yields certain knowledge of the self. Like Kant, and many philosophers nowadays, I do not think that this is true. Our knowledge of our own mental states and activities is no more certain than anything else. But the human mind is self-conscious in the sense that it is essentially reflective. I’m not talking about being thoughtful, which of course is an individual property, but about the structure of our minds that makes thoughtfulness possible. A lower animal’s attention is fixed on the world. Its perceptions are its beliefs and its desires are its will. It is engaged in conscious activities, but it is not conscious of them. That is, they are not the objects of its attention. But we human animals turn our attention on to our perceptions and desires themselves, and we are conscious of them. That is why we can think about them. And this sets us a problem no other animal has. It is the problem of the normative. For our capacity to turn our attention onto our own mental activities is also a capacity to distance ourselves from them and to call them into question. I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse to believe. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I believe? Is this perception really a reason to believe? I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act? The reflective mind cannot settle for perception and desire, not just as such. It needs a reason. Otherwise, at least as long as it reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. If the problem springs from reflection then the solution must do so as well. If the problem is that our perceptions and desires might not withstand reflective scrutiny, then the solution is that they might. We need reasons because our impulses must be able to withstand reflective scrutiny. We have reasons if they do. The normative word “reason” refers to a kind of reflective success. If “good” and “right” are also taken to be intrinsically normative words then they too must refer to reflective success. And they do. Think of what they mean when we use them as exclamations: “Good!” “Right!” There they mean: I’m satisfied, I’m happy, I’m committed, you’ve convinced me, let’s go. They mean the work of reflection is done. “Reason” then means reflective success. So if I decide that my desire is a reason to act, I must decide that on reflection I endorse that desire. And here we find the problem. For how do I decide that? Is the claim that I look at the desire and see that it is intrinsically normative or that its object is? Then all of the arguments against realism await us. Does the desire or its object inherit its normativity from something else? Then we must ask what makes that other thing normative, what makes it the source of a reason. And now of course the usual regress threatens. So what brings reflection to an end? Kant described this same problem in terms of freedom. It is because of the reflective structure of the mind that we must act, as he puts it, under the idea of freedom. He says, “ We cannot conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the outside with respect to its judgments.”1 If the bidding from outside is desire, then his point is that the reflective mind must endorse the desire before it can act on it — it must say to itself that the desire is a reason. We must, as he puts it, make it our maxim to act on the desire. And this is something we must do of our own free will.

#### [A] The purpose of ethics is to direct us to live life rightly, which entails taking desirable actions for reasons that are identical to the reason an action is right. This isn’t always so simple: a grocer who sets fair prices because they are profit-maximizing, not out of a desire not to exploit customers, has only accidentally done something desirable.

Nomy Arpaly. BA from Tel Aviv University (1992) in Philosophy and Linguistics, PhD in Philosophy from Stanford (1998), currently a Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency. 2004. Oxford University Press. ask me for the pdf if needed! –ilake mw

As the moral worth of an action involves that kind of "estimation" merited by the agent for performing the action, it is not implausible to think of Mill as allowing motives to be relevant to the moral worth of actions, even if they have nothing to do with the rightness or wrongness of the action. And quite apart from the right interpretation of Mill's text, it is perfectly consistent to view the moral desirability of actions as depending entirely on their expected consequences, and the moral worth of individual actions as depending to some degree on the agent's motives. One can believe that giving to charity is desirable because it promotes happiness, but that an agent giving to charity out of a desire to promote happiness deserves more praise for her action than does her counterpart who is merely concerned with her tax situation or with the impression she makes on her peers; and one can believe so even while holding that we are morally required, for the sake of utility, to lavish indiscriminate praise on all who help the poor. The last point made—that the moral worth of an act need not correspond to the moral desirability of treating an agent as if she were praiseworthy or blameworthy—is worth further elaboration. When I say that an agent is praiseworthy (or blameworthy) for an action, I do not mean to imply that the agent should necessarily be praised (or blamed) for this action: what people deserve is not always what they should be given. If, for example, an armed criminal enters a crowded room and shouts, "Give me some moral praise, or I shall kill everyone," it may be morally imperative to praise her, but that alone does not make her praiseworthy for her action. The praise that we may be required to give her is unwarranted, or undeserved. The moral worth of an action is the extent to which the agent deserves praise or blame for the action, not the extent to which the agent should be morally praised or blamed for it. The purpose of this chapter is to capture the conditions under which such praise or blame is warranted, not those under which it is required.1 Consider again the case of the prudent grocer. One does not need to know the details of Kant's discussion to agree that there is a sense in which the grocer, who is motivated only by a desire for profit, is not particularly praiseworthy for his policy of fair pricing. One is happy, of course, that the grocer does the right thing. But one cannot shake off a sense that this is a mere accident. The grocer aims at increasing his profits. By a lucky accident, it so happens that the action that would most increase his profits is also a morally right action. While this is all well and good, one is not inclined to give the grocer moral credit for this accident. But what, exactly, is this "accidental" quality that we perceive in the grocer's doing of the right thing? It is not simply the fact—if it is a fact—that the profit motive does not reliably produce moral actions. We can, with some difficulty, imagine a world in which some invisible hand or other makes it true that the profit motive reliably produces morally right actions, and we can place Kant's grocer in that world, and still we shall not free ourselves from the sense that there is something accidental in the fact that he does the right thing. It is accidental in the same way as it is accidental that a person who reads Lolita for the love of scandal reads an aesthetically superior book, or the fact that a person who buys cheap beer because he likes it accidentally makes a money-saving choice. The former is attracted to the novel for reasons that are of no interest to the aesthetician who pronounces it beautiful, the latter is attracted to cheap beer for reasons that are of no interest to the thrifty, and Kant's grocer is attracted to fair pricing for reasons that are of no interest to the ethicist. The salient feature of Kant's case, I would like to suggest, is that the grocer's morally right action does not stem from any responsiveness on his part to moral reasons. In pricing fairly, the grocer acts for a reason that has nothing to do with morality or with the features of his action that make it morally right. The reasons for which he acts have to do only with his own welfare; and whatever it is that makes his action morally right, the fact that his action increases his welfare is certainly not what makes it morally right. His reasons for action do not correspond to the action's right-making features. An important truth about moral worth seems to be the following: Praiseworthiness as Responsiveness to Moral Reasons (PRMR): For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for doing the right thing is for her to have done the right thing for the relevant moral reasons—that is, the reasons for which she acts are identical to the reasons for which the action is right.

#### [M1] But we cannot determine the true reasons an action is right without deeper investigation. Our ends, or things that cause us to act, can be contingent or ultimate. Wanting white teeth is contingent because it is part of a regressive chain of desires—I want white teeth to look beautiful and I want to be beautiful to be popular—ad infinitum. This chain begs the question of where it ends: an ultimate end that all rational beings can value

Julia Markovits 1. BA and PhD in philosophy from Oxford, teaches at Cornell. Moral Reason. Oxford University Press, 2014. <http://library1.org/_ads/0a426285f59d823344ace6b302453ab7>. –ilake mw. Brackets/ellipses in source.

At this point it is useful to take a much closer look at what Kant has in mind when he is speaking of ends. Kant’s account of ends is somewhat ambiguous. At 4:427 he defines an end as that which “serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination.” This can perhaps be loosely translated like this: an end is the motive from which we perform a certain action. Kant adds that ends, “if given by reason alone, must hold equally for all rational beings.”42 In other words, if the motive from which we perform an action is purely rational (i.e., is given to us by the requirements of rationality alone, and so is in no way based on individual inclination), then it is a valid reason for every rational being to perform the same action. The standard conception of ends is as effects of actions—the things at which our actions aim. But Kant has already hinted to us that the end that is to support the categorical imperative does not take the form of a desired effect of a possible action. So one question that our investigation of Kant’s understanding of ends should answer is this: what does an end look like that is not the desired effect of an action? Another confusing aspect of Kant’s discussion of ends in 4:428 is that he seems to waver between searching for an end that is necessarily shared by all rational beings (that is, a universal end) and searching for something he calls an “end in itself.” So another question our discussion of Kant’s conception of ends should answer is how these two could amount to the same thing. As I say, we are used to thinking of ends as the effects of our actions, or as things at which we aim. For example, in the case of the instrumental imperative I mentioned earlier—if you want white teeth, brush them regularly—having white teeth is the end at which we aim, and of which the action of regular brushing is to be the cause. Similarly, in the case of the prudential imperative, we see our happiness as our end because it is the thing at which we aim and which we hope our actions will bring into effect. Kant’s conception of ends is somewhat different, and, though it can account for the kinds of things we generally see as ends, it allows for a larger variety of candidates. Allen Wood usefully explains Kant’s broader conception of an end as “anything for the sake of which we act.”43 This understanding of ends sits nicely with the version of internalism about reasons I have explored and defended. It is worth noting that it comes very close to Bernard Williams’ own conception. Williams, remember, allows for the possibility that we have reason to perform actions that serve our ends in ways that are not straightforwardly instrumental (perhaps, for example, the action in question is constitutive of some end or commitment, or expresses that commitment),44 and thus argues that the kinds of things that can occupy an agent’s motivational set go beyond mere possible desired effects of actions. He thinks that principles, commitments, values, indeed (to borrow again from Wood), anything for the sake of which we act may belong in a motivational set.45 The Wood interpretation gives a good general account of how Kant thinks of ends. But the function Kant’s concept of ends plays in his argument is a more specific one. Kant thinks of ends as worth-bestowers—as things that bring value to our actions, or, as I will argue, to our other ends.46 The Kantian conception of ends as worth-bestowers will identify as ends all the things we usually think of as ends. Look, for example, at how this works in the case of the instrumental imperative just mentioned: if you want white teeth, brush them regularly. Now having white teeth is the end at work in the imperative because it is what gives value to my act of regular brushing. Without the end of having white teeth (or some other end), to which regular brushing is the means, such brushing would have no value for me at all. Again, the prudential imperative follows a similar course: if happiness were not valuable to me, my actions towards achieving happiness would have no value.47 But this conception will also allow for other kinds of things to be ends, and this suggests an answer to the first question about ends that I posed: how an end may be something other than the effect of an action. If an end is understood as a worth-bestower—as something that gives value to our actions or less fundamental ends, by being the thing for the sake of which we pursue those actions and ends—then there is no reason to think that only the effect of an action can be an end. Moreover, as my earlier worries about utilitarianism suggested, in the case of conditional ends-to-be-affected (such as white teeth or happiness) we will soon want (as I will argue) to go beyond seeing how they bestow worth on our actions and ask what it is that gives them (that is, the ends themselves) their worth. And this will not be the effect of an action; we often—perhaps usually—act for the sake of ourselves, and other people. We value happiness not as some kind of abstract good, for which people are a necessary carrier, but because people value it, and we value them. That is the sense in which humanity itself can be an end. These thoughts in turn suggest an answer to the second question I posed: how the “universal end” and the “end in itself ” can be one and the same. For they suggest that one thing that could be a universal end—that is, a worth-bestower for all rational beings—is something to which the worth of all actions and conditional ends may be traced back, but whose own worth is conditional on nothing. In other words: the thing that is of value in itself, and not just because it is desired, or, the end in itself. The internalist structure Kant’s argument for the formula of humanity will take is now clear. Its central idea is this: if there is one end whose value to us can be inferred from the value of all our contingently chosen ends—an end which is valuable to each of us to the extent that we are rational, because its value is a condition of the value of those other ends—then this end can perhaps serve as the basis of a moral law that each of us has internal reasons to uphold.

#### [M2] The ultimate end is that of humanity—our rational natures. Our contingent ends only have value because we rationally choose them, which proves that rationality is an end in itself. so my framework hijacks consequentialism because a) even if we contingently value certain consequences, the reasons we care about any consequence collapse to respect for humanity and b) if we didn’t have rational choice, we’d have no rational basis for why we value consequences.

Julia Markovits 2. BA and PhD in philosophy from Oxford, teaches at Cornell. Moral Reason. Oxford University Press, 2014. <http://library1.org/_ads/0a426285f59d823344ace6b302453ab7>. –ilake mw. Brackets/ellipses in source.

Kant’s claim here seems too strong: it’s certainly not true that it’s the wish of every rational being to be free of inclinations. But it is true that we don’t see our inclination for something to be a sufficient condition for its worth. We have some inclinations—like cravings or addictions—we would rather be rid of. Our being inclined towards an end does not make it good. Even if it did, it would not follow that our inclinations have absolute worth: something may be valuable because of my need for it, but that doesn’t make my need valuable. Even if my craving for a cigarette gives the cigarette some value, surely the craving itself has no value.57 The passage also suggests that the process Kant goes through to identify the end in itself is the one of tracing value-dependency indicated by my earlier discussion of his understanding of ends. The worth of our actions is based on the worth of the ends or objects at which they aim. The worth of those objects is in turn (in part) dependent on inclinations to them themselves, or, ultimately, on our tendency to have those inclinations, that is, on our neediness. And Kant points out (it seems to me rightly, although he puts the case too strongly) that neediness is not something to which we would attribute some sort of absolute worth, but is rather something we tend to regret. The conclusion that therefore “the worth of any object to be acquired by our action is always conditional” is, however, somewhat premature. Because we are rational beings, some of the ends we set ourselves and the actions they demand are picked out not just by inclination but by our capacity for rational choice. Willing is, after all, an act of reason (although it is in some cases triggered by inclination). So the line of argument Kant follows in the case of inclinations should also be followed for the case of rational choice. This is the argument Kant fails to make explicit in this passage. But it would run roughly as follows: All objects of rational choice have only conditional worth; for if there were not our rational choices, or rather, our capacity for rational choice, their object would be without worth. That is, our actions gain their worth from the rationally chosen ends at which they aim, and these ends, in turn, gain their worth from the rational natures that set them. The worth of a rational nature is not based on any outside source, but rather such a nature is an end in itself, with absolute worth, and the source of worth of all of our ends and actions. Therefore, Kant states, it is the rational nature of persons that marks them out as ends in themselves. Why must we believe that our rational nature is an end in itself, on pain of irrationality? Kant says, towards the bottom of the paragraph I have been examining, that if we failed to attribute absolute worth to rational nature, “nothing of absolute worth would be found anywhere; but if all worth were conditional and therefore contingent, then no supreme practical principle for reason [i.e., no moral law] could be found anywhere.”58 But this formulation is surely somewhat question-begging. Kant cannot demonstrate the truth of the formula of humanity by maintaining that if his formulation is not true, then morality itself (or at least any kind of realist, objective conception of morality) is a fiction. Kant’s argument, as he himself admits, is not sufficient to show that the moral law is real, but, at best, what it would look like if it did exist—namely, that it would be a categorical imperative based on the (conjectural) universal end in itself: rational nature. Kant’s argument aims to identify the conditions under which a moral law is possible—the existence of an end that can serve as the unconditioned condition of value—but he as yet provides no reason why we should suppose that the conditions for morality obtain. As yet, that is, he has not provided a response to the skeptical Humean view that rationality does not demand that we be moral. Kant’s argument, if it works, would, however, achieve something else that is of great importance to my project: it links the conditions for morality to the conditions for practical reason itself. It thereby ties the fate of the view that we all have reason to be moral to the fates of other less robust forms of faith in practical reason: indeed, to the very possibility of rational action. Kant argues that if we failed to attribute absolute worth to rational nature, then there would be nothing on which to support the worth of the contingent ends which we all value. If the ends that we set ourselves are valuable—if, that is, it is the case that we have reasons to act on them—then this can only be because the absolute worth of humanity can serve as a foundation for the worth of those ends. We must assume the worth of humanity if we are to defensibly claim that we value our own contingent ends with reason. A question arises: let’s grant for the time being that, since I value the ends I set myself, I must, if I am rational, also value myself as an absolute end. But I don’t need to value the ends you set yourself, so why need I value you as an absolute end? In other words, how is the end picked out by this argument any more universal than the end of happiness we considered earlier? Kant might respond: I have a distinctive kind of value not because my name is Julia Markovits, or because I’m my exact height, or because I was born on a Sunday, but because my capacity for rational choice gives me a worth-bestowing status. That this is so is clear from that fact that not just any end I set myself is valuable as a result, but only those ends I choose rationally. So Kant’s argument implies that all rational beings must attribute value to their own persons insofar as they exercise their capacity for rational choice. But this capacity is, of course, not unique to me. It is also what makes every other rational being valuable in their own eyes. As Kant puts it: rational nature exists as an end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me; thus it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will.59 So it is a characteristic inherent in rational nature as such, and not just my own rational nature, that it exists as an end in itself (or at least we must assume it to be an inherent quality of rational nature if we want to rationally act on the basis of our ends). This means, Kant says, that if I rationally value my own ends, then I must view rational nature as such, and therefore any rational nature, as an end in itself, including, for example, yours. Kant concludes: The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.60 This, then, is how the Kantian argument is supposed to work. It begins from an optimism about what we have reason to do: (1) I value the ends I rationally set myself, and take myself to have reason to pursue them. It then appeals to an internalist-flavored premise: (2) But I recognize that their value is only conditional: if I did not set them as my ends, I would have no reason to pursue them. But, Kant asks, why think that we can generate reasons to promote some end just by adopting it? We must, he says, think that we have the power to confer value on our ends by rationally choosing them: (3) So I must see myself as having a worth-bestowing status. From this Kant seems to infer that we must accord ourselves unconditional worth: (4) So I must see myself as having an unconditional value—as being an end in myself and the condition of the value of my chosen ends—in virtue of my capacity to bestow worth on my ends by rationally choosing them. But I recognize that the same argument holds from your perspective, and for your rational nature, and so consistency requires that I attribute the same worth-bestowing status, and so the same unconditional value, to you, and to any other rational being: (5) I must similarly accord any other rational being the same unconditional value I accord myself. Hence the formula of humanity: (6) So I should act in a manner that respects this unconditional value: I should use humanity, whether in my own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as means. What this imperative demands is that one never behave towards another person in a way that fails to respect the capacity for rational choice in which her humanity consists. For to neglect in one’s actions to treat humanity (that is, the capacity for rational choice) as an end would be to disregard the very thing that gave those actions, and the personal ends at which they aim, their value.61

#### Thus the standard is respecting humanity. This entails treating humanity as an end in itself—never a mere means.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [M3] 1] illogical not to—the standard is binding because we would never logically value a contingent end over humanity. Proves even if they win their framework we’d still be motivated to respect humanity so their framework collapses to mine.

Julia Markovits 3. BA and PhD in philosophy from Oxford, teaches at Cornell. Moral Reason. Oxford University Press, 2014. <http://library1.org/_ads/0a426285f59d823344ace6b302453ab7>. –ilake mw. Brackets/ellipses in source.

The argument from systematic justifiability explains why there is rational pressure on all of us to value humanity as an end, regardless of our contingent ends and commitments, and so provides the first necessary component of a successful internalist defense of the thesis that rationality requires us to be moral. But the argument also provides the second necessary component of such a defense: it explains why the rationally required end of humanity is not just one end among others, but trumps those others in cases of conflict, and so can be a source of moral requirements. Because the value of humanity is, on the view I’ve defended, a condition of the value of any other end whatsoever, it is always procedurally irrational to fail to treat it as an end for the sake of promoting some particular (even prudential) end-to-be-effected. This is because such an end could have no value (and thus could generate no reasons for acting) independent of the value of humanity itself. Consider a miser, who values money because of the good things it can get him, but then sacrifices those good things for the sake of accumulating more money. The person who violates the moral imperative for the sake of promoting some conditionally valuable end—who, say, uses and manipulates others for personal gain, without regard to their interests—is guilty of precisely the same sort of procedural irrationality. Thus Kant’s moral imperative can never be overridden by instrumental or prudential concerns. Even on an internalist view of practical reason, we always have most reason to do as morality requires. In brief, if I’m procedurally rational, I will try to restructure what I care about in such a way as to make my ends more systematically justifiable without ruling out the value of your ends from the start. Assuming that we matter—that is, adopting humanity as an end and recognizing it as the source of value for the ends we set—is ideally suited to the purpose. We might well be more procedurally rational if we came to treat humanity as an end in itself, and as a source of value for our other ends, as well as the ends of other people; if we learned to give up our contingent ends when their pursuit is incompatible with respecting the value of others as ends in themselves; if we learned to recognize that what matters to us isn’t all that matters; and if we learned to recognize that some of what matters to us doesn’t really matter, after all.

#### 2] Systematic justifiability—in determining what the ultimate end in itself is, we should seek systematic unity in justifying our ends because it’s more rational to have belief in value that converges towards a single, fundamental source of value, rather than independently justifying many unrelated values.

#### Impact Calc:

#### [M4] 1] Humanity doesn’t have value because it’s what causes us to value our ends—that’s still infinitely regressive. Humanity has value because it’s a prerequisite to valuing ends at all—our ability to confer value by choosing between reasons enables human ability to value contingent ends.

Julia Markovits 4 BA and PhD in philosophy from Oxford, teaches at Cornell. Moral Reason. Oxford University Press, 2014. <http://library1.org/_ads/0a426285f59d823344ace6b302453ab7>. –ilake mw. Brackets/ellipses in source.

I have been trying to fill in the gaps in Kant’s argument, to make clear why there is rational pressure on us—even on an internalist, procedural conception of rationality—to comply with Kant’s formula of humanity. Along the way, I hope it has also become clear why Kant is not, in fact, guilty of the mistaken inference that he is sometimes accused of making: from the claim that X is the source of, or condition for, the value of Y to the claim that X must therefore be valuable, perhaps even intrinsically valuable. Kant recognizes, as I’ve noted, that not all conditions of value are themselves valuable—he thinks inclinations, though conditions of value of our chosen ends, are not valuable in themselves. Kant’s idea is not that, because we’re the source of value of our chosen ends, we must therefore be valuable in ourselves. Rather, it’s the way we bestow value on our ends that matters: we do this by being the more fundamental ends for whose sake we pursue our contingent ends. By contrast, we don’t value or pursue or create penicillin for the sake of the infection that is a condition of its value. We do these things for the sake of health, not illness—health is the more fundamental end that makes the development of antibiotics a valuable end. And ultimately, Kant might add, our health is valuable because we are valuable. This point goes a considerable way towards defusing Langton’s other worry, about the value of Maria von Herbert.59 Langton, remember, restates the view of value she attributes to “Korsgaard’s Kant” this way: The ability of choosers to confer value on their choices—the ability of agents to be value-conferrers—is. . .the very source of the intrinsic value . . .of persons. We have intrinsic value because we value things as ends, conferring (extrinsic) value on them.60 This comes close, I believe, to characterizing the Kantian position. But it’s not quite right, and the mischaracterization is what leads to the most pressing version of the problem of Maria von Herbert. In one sense, I believe, it is in virtue of our ability to confer value on our choices that we have a special value. But we don’t have this special value because we make things valuable. Our value is not like the (instrumental) value of the cubic press, which turns ordinary carbon into diamond. We have the special value we have, I have suggested, because we aren’t just beings that matter to someone, but rather we’re beings to whom things matter. We are centers of subjectivity. This was Taurek’s point about the crucial difference between a person and the Pietà. For all its priceless beauty, if the Pietà survived the nuclear holocaust but no sentient beings did, it would lose its value. But my value does not depend on my being of value to anyone—I am, as Kant says, valuable in myself.

#### [M5] 2] Just because we value humanity doesn’t mean that we should create more of it. Valuing money doesn’t generate an obligation to produce more dollars and hyperinflate the economy. That a) disproves aggregation because if happiness has intrinsic value, more happiness is not better—value is yes-no, and b) means a consequentialist focus is wrong because acting to reflect a value in the state of affairs is completely different than acting in a way that respects that value.

Julia Markovits 5. BA and PhD in philosophy from Oxford, teaches at Cornell. Moral Reason. Oxford University Press, 2014. <http://library1.org/_ads/0a426285f59d823344ace6b302453ab7>. –ilake mw. Brackets/ellipses in source.

Sidgwick seems, here, to be assuming that the only reasons for action provided by values are reasons to preserve or make more of what’s valuable. But, as T. M. Scanlon has pointed out, many of our values give us reasons that are not reasons to create more of that value. The value of friendship, for example, does not primarily give us reasons to bring about and prolong states of affairs that involve friendship, but rather gives us reasons to structure our interactions with our friends in ways that express loyalty, attention, concern, and so on.54 We might even, for the sake of the value of friendship, perform an action that we know will bring a friendship to an end. If my friend is in an abusive relationship, the value of our friendship may give me conclusive reason to report the abuse to the police, because I know that my friend’s life depends on my doing so. I may be required to do so even if the inevitable result of my doing so is that she feels betrayed, and no longer wants to be my friend. Kant’s broader conception of ends, which I explored in §4.3, and in particular, his claim that humanity is an end, provides us, of course, with another example of a value that is not a source of reasons to make more of what is valuable. The value of humanity as an end in itself does not provide a reason to have as many children as we can, or to encourage population growth. It may not even (despite Kant’s own expressed views on suicide) provide us with reasons to extend an existing human life as long as possible. On the Kantian picture, the value of humanity is not an end to be produced or effected but rather an “independently existing end,”55 whose existence as a value must inform our actions if we are to act fully rationally. Thus it gives us reason not to act in ways that conflict with the recognition of and respect for that value. How exactly that constrains our actions is not at all clear. I will set this difficult question aside for now. I will take some initial steps towards investigating it in the final chapter of this book.

## Contention

#### I contend that the US ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.

Coyne, Christopher J. and Ryan, Matt, *With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies? Aiding the World's Worst Dictators* (August 25, 2008). The Independent Review: The Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: [https://ssrn.com/abstract=1257942](https://ssrn.com/abstract%3D1257942) –ilake mw

Mugabe is not the only dictator to receive significant aid from the governments of developed countries. Indeed, a consideration of the world’s worst dictators indicates that world leaders, even while publicly condemning these dictators’ gross violations of basic civil, human, and political rights, have been generous with foreign aid to the most brutal dictators. As in the case of Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the aid allows these dictators to consolidate their positions, remain in power, and sustain their brutal and corrupt methods. This assistance ultimately imposes significant costs on ordinary citizens in the countries these dictators rule. As Mugabe’s case illustrates, dictators tend to rule through brute force. They also make few, if any, investments in their citizens and their countries. Therefore, citizens suffer not only through the constant threat of physical violence, but also through continued economic stagnation and underdevelopment. In this article, we review and analyze the foreign aid delivered to the world’s top living dictators. Also considered is why aid to these dictators fails to generate change for the better. At least rhetorically, the governments of developed countries provide aid to poor countries to facilitate development and movement toward liberal institutions that protect basic rights. Despite these good intentions, aid has failed to generate sustainable change in the countries that the world’s worst dictators rule. The tyrants we consider are the worst of the worst. They are corrupt and engage in gross violations of basic civil, property, and political rights. They rule through violence and are subject to few, if any, constraints on their behavior. As such, they impose significant costs on the citizens of the countries they rule and provide few, if any, benefits. Further, even though leaders of developed countries around the world are very aware of these regimes’ brutal and oppressive nature and speak out strongly against their actions, they continue to send development assistance and military aid to them. This aid not only rewards the dictators’ behavior, but freezes the status quo and prevents change. If the governments of developed countries are truly committed to spreading liberal values and institutions (that is, economic, social, and political institutions), an important step in doing so is to stop providing aid to the world’s worst dictators.

#### Affirm:

#### 1] Aid enables forms of repression like torture and it’s used by authoritarian regimes to coerce members of the population and other countries in the region. That violates humanity because by exerting coercive force, aid treats the other as a mere means to the regime’s end rather than as an end in themselves.

#### 2] Authoritarian regimes are structurally illegitimate because its citizens cannot consent to state coercion and political control. No rational agent can consent to being coerced—it’s impossible to conceptualize because coercion is when an agent’s ability to set and pursue ends is overrode—consenting to coercion would make it not even coercion.

#### 3] The US uses the threat of removing aid as leverage to coerce authoritarian regimes into doing what the US wants. Even if what the US wants is a good thing, aid should not be provided because it violates the formula of humanity for the US to direct the actions of other countries: A) it’s paternalistic and disrespects the rationality of foreign rulers to assume that the US knows what is best for other countries B) Using aid as leverage disrespects humanity because the threat of removing aid impedes on agency--it allows the US to constrain the ends that regimes can set and pursue.

## UV