# NC

#### Permissibility and Presumption flow neg: A) If I know nothing about P, under a world where presumption flowed aff, I would presume both P and not P true without positive justification causing a contradiction B) Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### There are two kinds of sentences, dispositional ones which describe that X has the hypothetical capability to do Y, and Episodic ones which proscribe X and obligation to Y. The word “know” is a qualified postulate which makes the resolution dispositional an unable to prescribe any normative action.

Gilbert Ryle, English Philosopher, The Concept of Mind 1949 ///AHS PB

I have already had occasion to argue that a number of the words which we commonly use to describe and explain people’s behaviour signify dispositions and not episodes. To say that a person knows something, or aspires to be something, is not to say that [t]he[y] [are] is at a particular moment in process of doing or undergoing anything, but that [t]he[y] [are] is able to do certain things, when the need arises, or that he is prone to do and feel certain things in situations of certain sorts. This is, in itself, hardly more than a dull fact (almost) of ordinary grammar. The verbs ‘know’, ‘possess’ and ‘aspire’ do[es] not behave like the verbs ‘run’, ‘wake up’ or ‘tingle’; we cannot say ‘[t]he[y] knew so and so for two minutes, then stopped and started again after a breather’, ‘he grad- ually aspired to be a bishop’, or ‘he is now engaged in possessing a bicycle’. Nor is it a peculiarity of people that we describe them in dispositional terms. We use such terms just as much for describing animals, insects, crystals and atoms. We are constantly wanting to talk about what can be relied on to happen as well as to talk about what is actually happen- ing; we are constantly wanting to give explanations of incidents as well as to report them; and we are constantly wanting to tell how things can be managed as well as to tell what is now going on in them. Moreover, merely to classify a word as signifying a disposition is not yet to say much more about it than to say that it is not used for an episode. There are lots of different kinds of dispositional words. Hobbies are not the same sort of thing as habits, and both are different from skills, from mannerisms, from fashions, from phobias and from trades. Nest-building is a different sort of property from being feathered, and being a conductor of electricity is a different sort of property from being elastic.

#### That Negates: dispositional terms are linguistically incoherent

#### [1] Interpretability: Dispositional words are unable to isolate specific truth capable states of affairs.

**Ryle 2**

Dispositional words like ‘know’, ‘believe’, ‘aspire’, ‘clever’ and ‘humor- ous’ are determinable dispositional words. They signify abilities, tenden- cies or pronenesses to do, not things of one unique kind, but things of lots of different kinds. Theorists who recognise that ‘know’ and ‘believe’ are commonly used as dispositional verbs are apt not to notice this point, but to assume that there must be corresponding acts of knowing or apprehending and states of believing; and the fact that one person can never find another person executing such wrongly postulated acts, or being in such states is apt to be accounted for by locating these acts and states inside the agent’s secret grotto.

#### [2] In order for sentence to be episodic it requires a clear set of boundaries in which such an obligation takes place, the resolution fails to provide this. Oxford, <http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0107.xml> No agreed definition of “democracy” is found in political theory or political science. Nor is there any agreed understanding of the term in international law.

#### [3] The resolution proscribes the public the right to have a dispositionally descriptive property which is illogical because it cannot be acted on. In the same way I cannot have a right to be happy, “knowing” is an end state not an excersible principle. Further rights are negative side constraints so its impossible to value one over another.

#### [4] Even if the AC proves a prescriptive obligation it collapses to the NC. Episodic and Indicative sentences regress to descriptive properties

**Ryle 3**

Naturally, the addicts of the superstition that all true indicative sentences either describe existents or report occurrences will demand that sentences such as ‘this wire conducts electricity’, or ‘John Doe knows French’, shall be construed as conveying factual information of the same type as that conveyed by ‘this wire is conducting electricity’ and ‘John Doe is speaking French’. How could the statements be true unless there were something now going on, even though going on, unfortunately, behind the scenes? Yet they have to agree that we do often know that a wire conducts electricity and that individuals know French, without having first discovered any undiscoverable goings on. They have to concede, too, that the theoretical utility of discovering these hidden goings on would consist only in its entitling us to do just that predicting, explaining and modifying which we already do and often know that we are entitled to do. They would have to admit, finally, that these postulated processes are themselves, at the best, things the existence of which they themselves infer from the fact that we can predict, explain and modify the observable actions and reactions of individuals. But if [and] they demand [the] actual ‘rails’ where ordinary inferences are made, they will have to provide some further actual ‘rails’ to justify their own peculiar inference from the legitimacy of ordinary inferences to the ‘rails’ which they postulate to carry them. The postulation[g] of such an endless hierarchy of ‘rails’ could hardly be attractive even to those who are attracted by its first step.