# 1NC

### 1NC Shell [Long]

#### Power must viewed through the lens of the Empire – a form of sovereignty that exists through globalization. Nation-states no longer have the capacity to regulate capital because capitalism now operates transnationally. The aff’s state centered understanding of power is too simplistic because it fails to meaningfully change control systems.

Hardt and Negri 17 Hardt M, Negri A. Assembly. New York: Oxford University Press; 2017. Michael, American literary theorist and political philosopher, best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio, Italian Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, best known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on Spinoza TJHSSTAD

Faced with a globalizing world out of control, many politicians, analysts, and scholars, on the Right and the Left, claim that the nation-state is back—or, rather, they wish it would come back. Some cite the need for sovereign national control over the economy, especially in light of the continuing crisis, to hold at bay the threat of a “secular stagnation” spreading across the globe or to protect workers and citizens against the depredations of financial markets. Others point to the need for secure national borders to defend the dominant countries against migrations of the poor and thus to preserve national identities. Finally, in the rush to respond to terrorist threats, the national security apparatuses are often posed as the primary or only defense. Given the renewed calls for the nation-state, globalization seems to have for many reaped more disasters than advantages.26 In these terms, however, the problem is poorly posed: arguing about the virtues of globalization versus the control of nation-states will lead only to dead ends. And, furthermore, the faith that national sovereignty can solve any of these contemporary problems is completely illusory. We need to 264 empire today formulate the problem better before we can see clearly the challenges we really face today. Almost twenty years ago we proposed that there was forming an Empire that is reorganizing global political relations and shifting priority away from the sovereignty of nation-states. One guiding hypothesis was that, at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformations of Chinese socialism, the position of the United States as superpower was also changing. US imperialism, we claimed, is being displaced such that the United States can no longer successfully dictate global relations in unilateral fashion. In Giovanni Arrighi’s terms, US global hegemony has suffered a terminal crisis.27 In the formation of Empire, furthermore, no sovereign national power will be able to exert control in the manner of the old imperialisms. Another hypothesis we forwarded was that the increasingly global capitalist markets require a global power to give them order and coherent rules. As the circuits of capitalist production and accumulation achieve properly global reach, nation-states are no longer sufficient to guarantee and regulate the interests of capital. Consequently we foresaw the formation of a mixed imperial constitution, that is, an Empire composed of a changing cast of unequal powers, including nation-states, supranational institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), the dominant corporations, nonstate powers, and others. Empire, one might say, is incomplete. Indeed it is incomplete in the same way that capitalist society is incomplete, containing within itself a diverse array of previously existing social and economic forms. One should never expect either, in fact, to arrive at completion in some pure state. And yet their incompletion or mixed constitution is no obstacle to attacking them right now, in their present form. Numerous authors working along the same lines in recent years have helped us see the problem of Empire even more clearly. Saskia Sassen, for example, puts to rest useless arguments that pose nation-states and globalization as opposed and mutually exclusive. She argues instead that nation-states and the interstate system maintain important roles, but they are being transformed from within by forces of the emerging global political and institutional order. Empire is an assemblage, one might say, of various state and nonstate authorities in concord and conflict.28 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, to give another example, make clear that globalization is not bringing about a borderless world but instead the geographies of Empire are defined by proliferating and fluctuating borders at all levels, empire today 265 which cut across the territory of each city and across continental divides. In fact, they argue that the standpoint of the border, the point of inclusion and exclusion, is the privileged site for bringing into clear view the dynamics of global power.29 Finally, Keller Easterling, as we saw in chapter  10, demonstrates that rather than a homogeneous globe or one divided along national lines, the space of the world market should be understood as a myriad of varied “zones” subject to both state and extrastate governance: industrial zones, free trade zones, export processing zones, and so forth.30 The problem, these authors and many more make clear, is not one of deciding whether to submit to globalization or return to the nation-state, but rather understanding the mixed constitution of this emerging Empire and inventing adequate political means to intervene in and combat its rule. The proclamations of the return of the state, on the Right and the Left, have nonetheless been frequent in recent decades. The most dramatic and hubristic example of the renewed power of the nation-state on the Right was proclaimed by the United States in its “war on terror” and its occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush administration believed it could unilaterally remake the global environment, starting with the Middle East, acting in the style of the old imperialist powers. In 2003, some viewed US forces rolling into Baghdad as evidence of the centrality of nationstates—the dominant nation-states, of course—in global affairs, but only a few years later it was clear to all that the utter failure of US unilateral adventures in military, economic, and political terms proved just the opposite: neither the United States nor any other nation-state can successfully dominate in imperialist terms.31 On the Left, arguments about the “return of the state” and of national sovereignty have been especially prominent in Latin America, where progressive governments came to power as part of political projects to counter the policies of neoliberalism and the rule of global markets.32 These experiences were extremely important and had enormously beneficial effects, in varying degrees and in various ways, for the populations of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere in the continent. The temporary successes of holding neoliberalism at bay were primarily due, however, not to the individual sovereign states but rather to the continental coalitions of states and the interdependence among them. Indeed as that interdependence is now falling apart the incapacity for individual states to achieve a “postneoliberal” economic and political order or to protect against the spread of the global crisis or even to slow the worst misdeeds of capitalist globalization is becoming increasingly clear. 266 empire today The return of the state is an illusion. The dignity of the nation-state today would hinge on its provision of social welfare, the quality of services, education, health, housing, the levels of wages, and the potential for social mobility. But the crisis of social and political reformism goes hand in hand with the economic crisis, and the nation-state has proven unable on its own to reconstruct prospects of social well-being and development. Moreover, even when nation-states lavish spending on military and security apparatuses, these quickly prove unable to provide anything resembling real security to their citizens. We are convinced, in fact, that if the rebirth of the nation-state were not an illusion, if it were to come to pass, it would bring only tragedy, deepening crises, exacerbating poverty, and setting off wars, awakening demons that were thought to have been exorcized. “Those who sneer at history,” declares Henry Kissinger, the brilliant reactionary stalwart of Empire, “obviously do not recall that the legal doctrine of national sovereignty and the principle of noninterference—enshrined, by the way, in the U.N. Charter—emerged at the end of the devastating Thirty Years War,” referring to the two world wars from 1914 to 1945. The new discipline of international law sought, he continues, “to inhibit a repetition of the depredations of the seventeenth century, during which perhaps 40 percent of the population of Central Europe perished in the name of competing versions of universal truth. Once the doctrine of universal intervention spreads and competing truths contest, we risk entering a world in which, in G. K. Chesterton’s phrase, virtue runs amok.”33 We are not saying, of course, that since the return of national sovereignty is illusory and undesirable, we need to content ourselves with neoliberal globalization and the devastating rule of finance capital. That is not the choice. We need, as we said earlier, to pose the problem properly. The first task is to interpret Empire from above, that is, to track its shifting internal hierarchies. The mixed constitution of Empire is a constantly changing composition of numerous unequal powers. In part this still involves the old-fashioned realist analysis of international relations, gauging, for instance, the extent to which Russia has succeeded in shuffling the powers at play in the Middle East or eastern Europe, or evaluating the prospects of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Similarly, one would have to understand if and how significantly the United States’ “pivot to Asia” has shifted the primary axis of imperial power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Imperial analysis, however, also has to consider many nonstate actors. The notion of a clash of civilizations, although purely empire today 267 hollow and false, animates equally those fighting to establish a new caliphate in the Middle East and the conservative ideologues in North America and Europe. Furthermore, material and digital infrastructures, mediascapes, production chains, international and global legal conventions, finance markets, and much more are structures of imperial power that must be illuminated by an analysis from above. The second and crucial task, however, is to interpret Empire from below, that is, to grasp and nurture the existing powers of resistance and revolt. Resistance, of course, is expressed in specific locations, but it can also extend to the national scale and beyond. In part, this perspective carries on the tradition of proletarian internationalism, which seeks to carry class struggle beyond the limits of national capital and the national state. But we must also analyze all the other struggles endowed with the powers of social production and reproduction that we have investigated at different points in this book. Ultimately, against the power of money and the social relation it institutionalizes, against the power of property, stand the struggles for the common in their many diverse forms. In the next chapter we sketch some of the elements of a platform for an effective struggle for the common within and against Empire.

#### **The Empire wields the threat of nuclear destruction to enact a permanent state of exception in which systemic forms of violence are normalized, social hierarchies are maintained, and social life is regulated. Paradoxically, the nuclear threat is empty – mutually assured destruction ensures nuclear war will never happen.**

Hardt and Negri 04 MULTITUDE WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE MICHAEL HARDT ANTONIO NEGRI THE PENGUIN PRESS NEW YORK 2004 THE PENGUIN PRESS a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New York, New York 10014 Copyright © Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 2004 All rights reserved LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBUCATION DATA Hardt, Michael. Multitude : war and democracy in the Age of Empire Michael Hardt and Anconio Negri. p. cm. Sequel to: Empire. Includes index. ISBN 1-59420-024-6 TJHSSTAD

BIOPOWER AND SECURITY At this point we need to go back once again and try to understand this regime of biopower from another, more philosophical, perspective. Although global war, as we said, has become increasingly indistinct from global police action, it also now tends toward the absolute. In modernity war never had an absolute, ontological character. It is true that the moderns considered war a fundamental element of social life. When the great modern military theorists spoke of war, they considered it a destructive but inevitable element of human society. And we should not forget that war often appeared in modern philosophy and politics as a positive element that involved both the search for glory (primarily in aristocratic consciousness and literature) and the construction of social solidarity (often from the standpoint of the subaltern populations). None of this, however, made war absolute. War was an element of social life; it did not rule over life. Modern war was dialectical in that every negative moment of destruction necessarily implied a positive moment of the construction of social order. War really became absolute only with the technological development of weapons that made possible for the first time mass and even global destruction. Weapons of global destruction break the modern dialectic of war. War has always involved the destruction of life, but in the twentieth century this destructive power reached the limits of the pure production of death, represented symbolically by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The capacity of genocide and nuclear destruction touches directly on the very structure of life, corrupting it, perverting it. The sovereign power that controls such means of destruction is a form of biopower in this most negative and horrible sense of the term, a power that rules directly over death-the . 18 . WAR death not simply of an individual or group but of humanity itself and perhaps indeed of all being. When genocide and atomic weapons put life itself on center stage, then war b�comes properly ontological. 28 War thus seems to be heading at once in two opposite directions: it is, on one hand, reduced to police action and, on the other, raised up to an absolute, ontological level by technologies of global destruction. These two movements, however, are not contradictory: the reduction of war to poIic� action does not take away but actuaUy conjirms its ontological dimension. The thinning of the war function and the thickening of the police function maintain the ontological stigmata of absolute annihilation: the war police maintain the threat of genocide and nuclear destruction as their ultimate foundation.29 Biopower wields not just the power of the mass destruction of life (such as that threatened by nuclear weapons) but also individualized violence. When individualized in its extreme form, biopower becomes torture. Such an individualized exercise of power is a central element in the society of control of George Orwell's 1984. " 'How does one man assert his power over another, Winston?' Winston thought. 'By making him suffer,' he said. 'Exactly. By making him suffer. Obedience is not enough.' "30 Torture is today becoming an ever more generalized technique of control, and at the same time it is becoming increasingly banalized. Methods for obtaining confessions and information through physical and psychological torments, techniques to disorient prisoners (such as sleep deprivation), and simple means of humiliation (such as strip searches) are all common weapons in the contemporary arsenal of torture. Torture is one central point of contact between police action and war; the torture techniques used in the name of police prevention take on all the characteristics of military action. This is another face of the state of exception and the tendency for political power to free itself from the rule of law. In fact, there are increasing numbers of cases in which the international conventions against tortUre and the domestic laws against cruel and unusual punishment have little effect,3l Both dictatorships and liberal democracies use torture, the one by vocation and the other by so-called necessity. According to the logic of the state of exception, torture is an essential, unavoidable, and justifiable technique of power . . 19 . MULTITUDE Sovereign political power can never really arrive at the pure production of death because it cannot afford to eliminate the life of its subjects. Weapons of mass destruction must remain a threat or be used in very limited cases, and torture cannot be taken to the point of death, at least not in a generalized way. Sovereign power lives only by preserving the life of its subjects, at the very least their capacities of production and consumption. If any sovereign power were to destroy that, it would necessarily destroy itself. More important than the negative technologies of annihilation and torture, then, is the constructive character of biopower. Global war must not only bring death but also produce and regulate life. One index of the new, active, constituent character of war is the policy shift from "defense" to "security," which the U.S. government has promoted, particularly as an element of the war against terrorism since September 2001 .32 In the context of U.S. foreign policy, the shift from defense to security means the movement from a reactive and conservative attitude to an active and constructive one, both within and outside the national boundaries: from the preservation of the present domestic social and political order to its transformation, and similarly from a reactive war attitude, which responds to external attacks, to an active attitude that aims to preempt attack. We should keep in mind that modern democratic nations uniformly outlawed all forms of military aggression, and their constitutions gave parliaments power only to declare defensive wars. Likewise international law has always resolutely prohibited preventive or preemptive attacks on the basis of the rights of national sovereignty. The contemporary justification of preemptive strikes and preventive wars in the name of security, however, explicitly undermines national sovereignty, making national boundaries increasingly irrelevant.33 Both within and outside the nation, then, the proponents of security require more than simply conserving the present order-if we wait to react to threats, they claim, it will be too late. Security requires rather actively and constantly shaping the environment through military and/or police activity. Only an actively shaped world is a secure world. This notion of security is a form of biopower, then, in the sense that it is charged with the task of producing "and transforming social life at its most general and global level. This active, constituent character of security is, in fact, already implicit " 20 . WAR in the other transformations of war we analyzed earlier. If war is no longer an exceptional condition but the normal state of affairs, if, that is, we have NOW entered a perpetual state of war, then it becomes necessary that war not be a threat to the existing structure of power, not a destabilizing force, but rather, on the contrary, an active mechanism that constantly creates and reinforces the present global order. Furthermore, the notion of security signals a lack of distinction between inside and outside, between the military and the police. Whereas "defense" involves a protective barrier against external threats, "security" justifies a constant martial activity equally in the homeland and abroad. The concept of security only gestures partially and obliquely to the extensive transformative power involved in this passage. At an abstract, schematic arrange level we can see this shift as an inversion of the traditional ment of power. Think of the arrangement of the elements of modem sovereign power like a Russian matrioshka doll, whose largest shell consists of disciplinary administrative power, which contains the power of political control, which in turn contains in the final instance the power to make war. The productive character of security, however, requires that the order and priority of these nested shells be reversed, such that war is now the outermost container in which is nestled the power of control and finally disciplinary power. What is specific to our era, as we claimed earlier, is that war has passed from the final element of the sequences of powerlethal force as a last resort-to the first and primary element, the foundation of politics itself. Imperial sovereignty creates order not by purring an end to "the war of each against all," as Hobbes would have it, but by proposing a regime of disciplinary administration and political control directly based on continuous war action. The constant and coordinated application of violence, in other words, becomes the necessary condition for the functioning of discipline and control. In order for war to occupy this fundamental social and political role, war must be able to accomplish a constituent or regulative function: war must become both a procedural activity and an ordering, regulative activity that creates and maintains social hierarchies, a form of biopower aimed at the promotion and regulation of social life. To define war by biopower and security changes war's entire legal. 21 . M ULTI TUDE framework. In the modern world the old Clausewitz adage that war is a continuation of politics by other means represented a moment of enlightenment insofar as it conceived war as a form of political action and/or sanction and thus implied an international legal framework of modern warfare. It implied both a jus ad bellum (a right to conduct war) and a jus in bello (a legal framework to govern war conduct). In modernity, war was subordinated to international law and thus legalized or, rather, made a legal instrument. When we reverse the terms, however, and war comes to be considered the basis of the internal politics of the global order, the politics of Empire, then the modern model of civilization that was the basis of legalized war collapses. The modern legal framework for declaring and conducting war no longer holds. We are still nonetheless not dealing with a pure and unregulated exercise of violence. War as the foundation of politics must itself contain legal forms, indeed must construct new procedural forms of law. As cruel and bizarre as these new legal forms may be, war must nonetheless be legally regulative and ordering. Whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework. 34

#### Nuclear disarmament provides moral cover for the Empire under the guise of liberal, humanitarian intervention. The elimination of specific weaponry sanctifies certain forms of violence which legitimates overarching structures of militarism.

Stavrianakis 16 [Anna Stavrianakis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at University of Sussex, MScEcon in Security Studies from University of Wales, Aberystwyth and PhD in Politics from University of Bristol, author of Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, “Legitimizing liberal militarism: politics, law and war in the Arms Trade Treaty”. Third World Quarterly, 37 (5), pp. 840-865, 2016, <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/57545/1/TWQ%20Legitimizing%20liberal%20militarism%20-%20accepted%20clean%20version.pdf>] \*\*\*Note: the ATT is the Arms Trade Treaty, a previous attempt at restricting arms sales led by the US and the UK recut TJHSSTAD

In this article I argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the ATT is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. It is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the ATT will bring no new responsibilities for them. The same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as Russia and, increasingly, China. There is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. There is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. Arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and IHL are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and IHL. This legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the ATT in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. With the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the ATT takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism. In what follows, I first situate the treaty empirically, set out the emerging scholarly assessment of it based on human security norms, and advance as an alternative the concept of liberal militarism. Second, I analyse the similarities and differences in forms of justification by the USA and the UK. As an ambivalent sceptic-turned-supporter of the treaty, the US engaged in more unilateralist forms of justification than the UK, which was a major champion of the treaty. However, both states’ engagements with the treaty share a framing based on a universalising moral responsibility. Two cases – arms transfers to Egypt during the Arab Spring, and intrawestern transfers – are then used to illustrate the ways in which the US and UK governments justify their arms transfers by reference to regulatory regimes that include explicit reference to IHRL and IHL: regimes that are deemed to already exceed the standards of the ATT. Whilst transfers to the Middle East during the Arab Spring were used by proponent non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as an illustration of why an ATT is needed, intra-western transfers are generally not on the arms transfer control agenda. More broadly, claims around the need for tighter arms trade regulation revolve around an armed violence agenda, primarily in Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America. Analysing a Middle Eastern and an intra-western case helps us think harder about the broader purposes of arms transfer regulation. The existence of transfer regimes that already exceed the standards of the ATT creates a paradox in which contemporary risk transfer militarism is justified by reference to arms export licensing processes that are themselves based on risk assessment. Rather than signalling the success of human security norms then, the effort to use criteria- and risk-based assessments of arms transfers – the core of the ATT – is better understood as having been mobilised as part of the legitimation of contemporary liberal forms of militarism. There is, as yet, no negotiating history of the ATT. This article combines analysis of states’ official statements and expert commentary from observers of the process with off-the-record discussions with US-UK state and civil society participants in the treaty negotiations as a contribution to understanding the dynamics of the treaty negotiation process and early implementation phase. Theorising the ATT: from human security norms to liberal militarism The ATT brings together states’ existing obligations under international law in the form of express prohibitions that are binding on importers and exporters (Article 6), and sets standards for regulatory practice in the form of national risk assessments to bind exporters (Article 7). Its goal is to address “the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arm” whilst protecting the “legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States” 4 As with other arms transfer control regimes, the “illicit” trade is simultaneously an organising term of the ATT and never defined in the treaty text.5 The combination of existing obligations under international law with human rights standards to be enshrined in national regulatory systems is envisaged by proponents to render irresponsible transfers illegal.6 This was resisted by some southern states who saw it as a political move to delegitimise their practices whilst facilitating western ones.7 The idea for the treaty originated in the 1990s with NGO campaigners and a group of Nobel Peace Laureates and was taken up by states via the UN system. A loose coalition of European and Southern states, most notably in Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa, working in alliance with the Control Arms NGO campaign, took on the role of “regional champions” of the treaty and worked together as a “like-minded” group,8 building on the regional “minilateralism” of initiatives such as the Nairobi Protocol9 and existing national and international regimes such as the EU Common Position on Arms Exports. A series of technical criticisms have been levelled at the scope,10 clarity and force of the final treaty text,11 including the absence of an enforcement mechanism.12 And diplomatic obstacles to the implementation of the treaty remain: key exporting and importing states such as Russia, China and India have not signed it; the US has signed but is unlikely to ratify any time soon. However, other states’ widespread enthusiasm for the treaty vote translated into rapid entry into force twenty one months after being agreed at the General Assembly. The emerging scholarly assessment of the ATT is clear that international action to regulate the arms trade is an “unprecedented effort” at norm creation 13 and “one of the most ambitious and difficult goals to achieve in global governance.” 14 It grows out of existing arms control, disarmament and arms transfer control regimes. Extant arms control or disarmament regimes that ban specific technologies such as landmines, cluster munitions, chemical and nuclear weapons, have all relied on their being framed as indiscriminate, inhumane, unacceptable or pariah in some way, thus challenging states’ abilities to produce, use or transfer them as part of legitimate military need and state security practice.15 The difficulty with regulating the conventional arms trade as a whole, as the ATT attempts to do, is that it does not lend itself to such framing due to the centrality of the arms trade to state security and sovereignty, and hence widespread legitimacy.16 Any multilateral action on the trade in conventional weapons as a whole thus has to take the form of regulation rather than abolition or a ban. The ATT is both emblematic of, and distinct from, the post-Cold War nonproliferation paradigm.17 For example, there is specific mention of terrorism as an ill to be combated, and a framing around the “illicit and unregulated” trade; yet it applies to a broad range of military equipment, and does not generate a taboo or ban on particular types of technologies. As such, it may be able to serve to draw attention to the patterns of civilian death and injury “associated with technologies considered ‘normal’ or the use of which is somehow seen as ‘inevitable’.”18 One way this is envisaged is through inclusion not only of the laws of war under existing IHL, but also the inclusion of human rights provisions. This human security content of the treaty secured widespread agreement, with the reduction of human suffering explicitly named as a goal of the treaty. The treaty means different things to the various constituencies involved in the campaign and negotiating processes; indeed, this was a necessary condition for its agreement. It is as much about trade regulation (according to supportive government and industry representatives) as arms transfer control (as most proponent NGOs would have it), with only minority voices ȋsuch as the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, WILPF) articulating a disarmament agenda. And this is quite aside from the vocal hostility of US-based campaign groups and think-tanks such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Heritage Foundation on unilateralist and Second Amendment grounds, and the scepticism (e.g. China, India and Russia) and opposition (e.g. Iran, North Korea and Syria) of some non-western states on substantive and/or procedural grounds.19 Overall, the treaty represents the “confluence of arms control, security, human rights, trade, armed violence, sovereignty, development, self-defence, technology, and other issues” 20 and its widely-drawn provisions “must be applied in an innumerable number of different factual contexts … which take shape as the treaty is applied in practice.”21 As experience from international action on small arms has shown, the problems posed by the arms trade are of a different character in different parts of the world: small arms are an issue of recirculation post-conflict in West Africa, of excessive stocks in southeast Europe, and of criminal activity and drug trafficking in Latin America and the CARICOM region.22 And notes of caution have been sounded by more radical campaign groups: to ensure the ATT makes a difference, states, civil society and UN “must avoid legitimising further the international arms trade and irresponsible transfers.”23 But limits of the treaty aside, most agree that “we have to start somewhere” and push for “robust interpretation and effective implementation.” 24 The ATT is seen by proponents as a step forward in the development of norms around the protection of human security, and potentially generative of a norm cascade such that it will have an effect even on non-signatories.25 This chimes with the academic literature on norms, which makes the case for the possibility of moral progress in international politics and a rising tide of principled action. The UK government is seen as having “humanitarian, developmental and moral justifications” or “motivations” for exercising leadership on the ATT, according to norms scholar Denise Garcia.26 As an example of “disarmament diplomacy”, the ATT signals the way in which the rise of norms based on moral concerns can change conduct in international politics:27 “The creation of new international norms transforms deeply held practices and changes behaviour.”28 This is resonant with a common theme within the constructivist norms literature that norms co-exist with and sometimes trump material and strategic concerns, requiring a move beyond interest-based explanations.29 As Price puts it, “almost any international treaty dealing with subjects such as human rights or war would seem to be a mix of the brutal bargaining of national interests and coercion sprinkled, if not always enveloped, with other, including moral, considerations.” 30 At first blush, then, we cannot understand the entry into force of the ATT without the role of human security norms. However, whilst the circulation of norms around human security was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the agreement and content of the treaty, the character of the explanation given by a constructivist norms account is limited. Norms are supposed to facilitate more progressive standards of behaviour through, for example, the “rhetorical entrapment and shaming involved in hypocrisy” and a constructivist approach is supposed to illuminate the “nuances of progressive and regressive effects of even strategically moral uses of morality.”31 But existing norms-based accounts of the ATT have taken at face value the moral representations of leading liberal states, as seen in Garcia’s equation of justifications with motivations.32 And broader constructivist accounts of weapons activism have not tackled the ongoing patterns across the spectrum of weapons transfers, outside of the banning of specific technologies. Carpenter’s insightful analysis of the question of why some weapons systems are targeted for delegitimation and not others brackets the wider system of war preparation of which the development of weapons systems is a part.33 Constructivist arguments implicitly assume that progressive change in the area of weapons issues can come from delegitimating one technology at a time. Yet broader systems of war preparation and war fighting will always generate new technologies. And as I argue later, liberal states’ war practices are kept off the agenda through risk assessment processes and legitimating claims based on a universalising morality. Claims about the normative power of conventional arms transfer control regimes have been sternly tested by empirical studies. Studies of patterns of arms exports demonstrate how the “self-declared ethical turn” of major western arms suppliers in the 1990s has not acted as a bar on weapons exports.34 The US and Western European states “have generally not exercised export controls so as to discriminate against human rights abusing or autocratic countries during the post-Cold War period.”35 At best, the effect of the EU Code of Conduct, which served as one of the templates for the ATT, has been that “EU members no longer appear to reward poor human rights with arms transfers, even if they are not punishing it either.” 36 And in specific cases such as EU member states’ arms transfers to Libya, evidence demonstrates comprehensive violation of export control principles even though exporting governments were aware of the risks posed by transfers: licence denials "constitute exceptions in an overall export-friendly environment.”37 These empirical patterns raise the question of how liberal states manage to both transfer weapons to human rights violating and authoritarian regimes, and claim the mantle of responsibility by being publicly in favour of the ATT. The empirical studies cited above tend to adopt a realist explanation in which seemingly normatively progressive regimes serve as rhetorical cover for material or strategic interests,38 yet they do not go into detail as to how that process works. Realist explanations are inadequate because they fail to take into account the hard work that such rhetoric performs or the way that regimes function often despite the good intention of some proponents.39 Law and regulation are not merely superficial cover, a distraction from a focus on the advancement of material interests: law “does matter; that is both the problem and the promise.”40 Thus whilst constructivists are right that rationalist assumptions of narrowly instrumental behaviour are false,41 they do not give an adequate explanation of the significance of the morally oriented work that is going on in the ATT: the ways in which a seemingly progressive initiative contains the seeds of its own complicity in broader systems of preparation for war and violence. Yet Price does point to how, “if hypocrisy becomes too endemic then it may undercut the power of the moral legitimacy more generally that is required for hypocrisy’s piggy-back effects.” 42 So it may be that arms transfers are so embedded in hypocrisy that normative shaming is less effective. As Erickson argues, “the ATT faces a hard road ahead”: “without the means to expose and punish noncompliance, … [ambitious policies] do little more than enhance states’ reputations without improving human rights and conflict conditions on the ground.” 43 Yet “Research explaining major suppliers’ support for ‘responsible’ arms export controls is lacking.” 44 –To start thinking about this gap between commitment and compliance, and to explain major suppliers’ positions, I advance the concept of liberal militarism. This moves beyond arguments based on hypocrisy and instrumental or functional pursuit of material interests, in order to explain key effects of the treaty in ways other approaches cannot. The normalization and legitimation of liberal ways of war and war preparation via the ATT are an important component of contemporary militarism. The concept of militarism, understood as the social and international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political violence,45 allows us to examine the historical, socio-economic and political sources and character of military power.46 Understood this way, the concept goes beyond a definition of militarism as ideology, and militarisation as the material process through which militarism comes about. Militarism includes an ideological component but is not restricted to it, because war and armed violence can be justified and facilitated even if not necessarily glorified; and because social forces beyond ideology are required to produce it. Arms transfers and arms transfer control may thus contribute to militarisation (an increase in the intensity of military power in society, whether domestic or international), demilitarisation (a decrease), or a change in the character of militarism. The concept allows for the analysis of the different forms across space and time taken by war and preparation for it.47 And whilst the number of deaths caused by the arms trade is clearly an important yardstick, a militarism frame goes beyond numbers. Rather, it captures the influence of military relations on social relations in general, and the ways that war and armed violence are prepared for. This requires broadening the empirical focus beyond conflict in Africa and organized crime in Latin America, which have been the main focus for arms transfer control. Scholars are increasingly challenging the long- and widely cherished belief that liberalism and militarism are antithetical.48 Key features of the specificity of liberal militarism include the capital- and technology-intensive character of the preparation for and conduct of war; a strong commitment to military production across war and peacetime and self-understanding as a primarily “economic, industrial and commercial power;” the distanced form of attacks on Southern populations and simultaneous containment of social conflict at home and policing empire abroad, often featuring supposedly “small” massacres; a universalist ideology and conception of world order; low levels of military participation by society; and a state-capital relation that is formally separate but organically related.49 Justifications based on values and morals promoting human rights and humanitarian values are central to legitimating these features of liberal militarism, and are in contrast to the justifications based on sovereignty of other major, non-liberal suppliers and recipients such as Russia, China and India. In the case of the ATT, language and regulatory bureaucratic practices of risk assessment are embedded in western, liberal regimes that on paper already exceed the standards set out in the ATT. More generally, the turn to law has been central to the development of liberal militarism. The laws of war serve a legitimizing effect for western ways of war, preempting criticism through reassurance, shielding acts and practices from criticism, and giving rhetorical protection from challenge, which serves to naturalise and normalise the prevailing distribution of power. 50 And the combination of human rights and IHL has served to criminalize low-tech violence and legitimate high-tech forms of war.51 The turn to law is “productive of the social and political context that makes possible certain forms of war and certain relations of hierarchy,” as the “perceived compliance with the law itself is partly productive of the global order in which contemporary war occurs.”52 This allows liberal states to pitch their practice in terms of responsibility, morality and legitimacy. Overall, then, whilst it is inappropriate to claim that legal regimes are mere instruments of the powerful, it is also too strong to say that humanitarian security regimes such as the ATT operate “in opposition to the aspirations of the most powerful states.”53 What is at stake, rather, is the legitimation of specific forms of war fighting and war preparation.

#### The impact is permanent racialized targeting and elimination of bodies to maintain a global economy of violence. The Empire is a regime of biopower that regulates entire populations justifying endless imperial violence.

Harting 6. [Heike, prof at University of Montreal, Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies, globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA\_Harting\_GlobalCivilWar]

¶ The Necropolitics of Global Civil War¶ As with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. It "tends," as Hardt and Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." At the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ In fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the European imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). In other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. Indeed, not only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what David Harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005, 2). Instead, it has become the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer decides over but has itself become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about the disembodiment of global war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech precision wars without casualties, but it also represses narratives about the ways in which the modi operandi of global war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war.¶ In her short story "Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually considered an ethnic civil war restricted to internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the country's Sinhalese and Tamil population. Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the government and leads a group of highly trained assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah 1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to private corporations, including its army, and profits from the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter. Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a self-proclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted, pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes death.¶ According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's prolonged abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency, facilitated the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and social values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and "the most vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the mercenary has no need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society structured by habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because it is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of what Balibar calls "disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national sovereignty. The mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality of objective cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the mercenary's detached behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from oneself ??? not just from belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words, while global civil war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage and orchestrate the politics of death of global war. It is through the dialectics of the embodiment and disembodiment of global violence that the dehumanization of the majority of the globe's population takes on a normative and naturalized state of existence.¶ Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe calls the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term refers to his analysis of global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4 Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work, Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that the ways in which global violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of legitimizing and making killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial population control. If global civil war is a continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of embodiment, that is, of politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-legitimization, specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the ideological dynamics of ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic population, reinforcing and enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body.

#### The alternative is the multitude, a mode of proliferated tactics that disrupts notions of sovereignty. This is a method of resistance that neither devolves into biocapitalist unity or anarchist fragmentary but rather exists as a living flesh that rules itself – only by acknowledging Empire’s new expanses can we find new solidarities.

Hardt and Negri 2 [Michael, American literary theorist and political philosopher, best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio, Italian Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, best known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on Spinoza, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, 99-102, The Penguin Press, 2004] recut TJHSSTAD

Political action aimed at transformation and liberation today can only be conducted on the basis of the multitude. To understand the concept of the multitude in its most general and abstract form, let us contrast it first with that of the people. 1 The people is one. The population, of course, is composed of numerous different individuals and classes, but the people synthesizes or reduces these social differences into one identity. The mul­titude, by contrast, is not unified but remains plural and multiple. This is why, according to the dominant tradition of political philosophy, the peo­ple can rule as a sovereign power and the multitude cannot. The multitude is composed of a set of singularities- and by singularity here we mean a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, a differ­ ence that remains different. The component parts of the people are indif­ ferent in their unity; they become an identity by negating or setting aside their differences. The plural singularities of the multitude thus stand in contrast to the undifferentiated unity of the people. The multitude, however, although it remains multiple, is not fragmented, anarchical, or incoherent. The concept of the multitude should thus also be contrasted to a series of other concepts that designate plural collectives, such as the crowd, the masses, and the mob. Since the different individuals or groups that make up the crowd are incoherent and recog­nize no common shared elements, their collection of differences remains inert and can easily appear as one indifferent aggregate. The components of the masses, the mob, and the crowd are not singularities-and this is obvious from the fact that their differences so easily collapse into the in­ difference of the whole. Moreover, these social subjects are fundamentally passive in the sense that they cannot act by themselves but rather must be led. The crowd or the mob or the rabble can have social effects-often horribly destructive effects-but cannot act of their own accord. That is why they are so susceptible to external manipulation. The multitude, des­ignates an active social subject, which acts on the basis of what the singu­larities share in common. The multitude is an internally different, multiple social subject whose constitution and action is based not on identity or unity (or, much less, indifference) but on what it has in common. This initial conceptual definition of the multitude poses a clear challenge to the entire tradition of sovereignty. As we will explain in part 3, one of the recurring truths of political philosophy is that only the one can rule, be it the monarch, the party, the people, or the individual; social sub­ jects that are not unified and remain multiple cannot rule and instead must be ruled. Every sovereign power, in other words, necessarily forms a political body of which there is a head that commands, limbs that obey, and organs that function together to support the ruler. The concept of the multitude challenges this accepted truth of sovereignty. The multitude, although it remains multiple and internally different, is able to act in com­mon and thus rule itself. Rather than a political body with one that com­ mands and others that obey, the multitude is living flesh that rules itself. This definition of the multitude, of course, raises numerous conceptual and practical problems, which we will discuss at length in this and the next chapter, but it should be clear from the outset that the challenge of the multitude is the challenge of democracy. The multitude is the only so­cial subject capable of realizing democracy, that is, the rule of everyone by everyone. The stakes, in other words, are extremely high. In this chapter we will articulate the concept of the multitude prima­ rily from a socioeconomic perspective. Multitude is also a concept of race, gender, and sexuality differences. Our focus on economic class here should considered in part as compensation for the relative lack of attention to class in recent years with respect to these other lines of social difference and hierarchy. As we will see the contemporary forms of production, which we will call biopolitical production, are not limited economic phenomena but rather tend to involve all aspects of social life, including communication, knowledge, and affects. It is also useful to recognize from the beginning that something like a concept of the multitude has long en part of powerful streams of feminist and antiracist politics. When we say that we do not want a world without racial or gender difference but in­stead a world in which race and gender do not matter, that is, a world in which they do not determine hierarchies of power, a world in which dif­ferences express themselves freely, this is a desire for the multitude. And, of course, for the singularities that compose the multitude, in order to take away the limiting, negative, destructive character of differences and make differences our strength (gender differences, racial differences, dif­ferences of sexuality, and so forth) we must radically transform the world.2 From the socioeconomic perspective, the multitude is the common subject of labor, that is, the real flesh of postmodern production, and at the same time the object from which collective capital tries to make the body of its global development. Capital wants to make the multitude into an organic unity, just like the state wants to make it into a people. This is where, through the struggles of labor, the real productive biopolitical figure of the multitude begins to emerge. When the flesh of the multitude is imprisoned and transformed into the body of global capital, it finds itself both within and against the processes of capitalist globalization.

#### The role of the ballot is to produce constituent power, constructive and interpersonal forms of power that create social life. Engaging with reterritorializing strategies to unify struggle and reclaim spaces of construction should be our ultimate political task.

Dean 04 The Networked Empire: Communicative Capitalism and the Hope for Politics Jodi Dean Published in 2004 by Routledge 29 West 35th Street New York, NY 10001 www.routledge-ny.com Published in Great Britain by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane London EC4P 4EE www.routledge.co.uk Copyright © 2004 by Taylor & Francis Books, Inc TJHSSTAD

The second idea Hardt and Negri invoke on behalf of the political potential of the multitude is constituent struggle. Strikes in France, riots in Los Angeles, the 282 EMPIRE’S NEW CLOTHES Intifada against Israel, and the uprising in Chiapas (to mention but a few) all merge political, economic, and cultural concerns. They are biopolitical— struggles over the form of life. For Hardt and Negri this means that “they are constituent struggles, creating new public spaces and new forms of community” (56). (Presumably these new forms of community lack duration and extension, although it is difficult to understand what sort of community this might be. What occurs to me is the faux community of fans called into being by branded media products—like the Pepsi Generation—or again, the community as audience interpellated through spectacle.) Understood most simply, constituent power involves the creative, productive power of the multitude to bring something new into being. Perhaps this “new” will last only a moment. Perhaps it will be manifest only in a glimpse, only as a possibility, before it is either squashed by an imperial intervention or its own instantiation confronts it as its opposite, as sterile, lifeless, constituted power—which is actually the very same thing as imperial power given that the multitude calls Empire into being. Since the constituent power of the multitude is at the heart of Hardt’s and Negri’s hope for politics, it makes sense to look at the concept in greater depth. To do so, I turn to Negri’s discussion in Insurgencies. 27 There he asserts that “the concept of constituent power is the core of political ontology.”28 Negri considers how the concept appears in juridical theory, namely, as a power that arises from nowhere to establish a new arrangement. For him, this arising from nowhere is the ideal moment of absolute democracy: the appearance of the new out of nothing and without determination in a fundamental act of innovation. Insofar as it is necessarily outside and prior to what it constitutes, constituent power is “alien to the law.” Constituent power, then, can be thought of as a sort of crisis and a sort of passion. It is a sort of crisis because of its radical rupture with what came before it; indeed, insofar as it installs new principles and arrangements, it cannot be judged by what came before it. (To this extent, constituent power seems to refer to the paradox of constitution that has long plagued democratic theory and to treat that paradox as a strength and potentiality to be celebrated.) It is a sort of passion in that it is a moment of subjective action that exceeds the rational; it is a desire to open things up to the future, to possibility. The problem for Negri in Insurgencies is that what is constituted ends up desiccating and perverting the passion constituting it: sovereignty and the state dilute constituent power through representation, neutralize it through the political system, and rationalize it through the organization of time.29 Constituent power, then, loses its strength, its effects, once it is actualized, once the constituting moment has passed. For Negri, then, the fundamental political task is to find a way to retain constituent power. “The problem of constituent power,” Negri writes, “is a question about the construction of a constitutional model capable of keeping the formative capacity of constituent power itself in motion: it is a question of identifying a subjective strength adequate to this task.”30 THE NETWORKED EMPIRE 283 He identifies this subjective strength in the Other of global capitalist reformations of democracy, that is, the alien, the foreigner, the outsider, the rabble, or the multitude.31 This move, the one celebrated in Empire, is in keeping with a tradition in Hegelian thought, a tradition that has emphasized the force of the mob and has identified the foreclosed excess as that point at which a system can be disrupted. Slavoj Žižek notes that Hegel posited the Poebel as that “necessary surplus excluded from the closed circuit of a social edifice.” The Poebel, Žižek continues, is a “nonintegrated segment in the legal order, prevented from partaking of its benefits, and for this very reason delivered from any responsibilities toward it.”32 Negri’s argument differs from the typical Hegelian line, first, in that he does not understand the multitude as an excluded element. As he and Hardt emphasize in Empire, under imperial conditions, there is no outside. Negri’s argument differs, second, in that what makes the multitude inside is its biopolitical productivity, rendered in Insurgencies, as in Empire, as a Foucauldian version of Marx’s living labor. Hence, Negri interprets biopolitics as that which enhances strength and releases productivity, creating subjects in the process. The forces or arrangements through which subjects are created, in other words, make them strong and, in effect, install in them the potential for liberation. So politics in its constituted form governs or administers productive strength like so much dead labor controlling living labor. What is really political thus becomes “the ontological strength of a multitude of cooperating singularities.”33

### 1NC Shell [Short]

#### Power must viewed through the lens of the Empire – a form of sovereignty that exists through globalization. Nation-states no longer have the capacity to regulate capital because capitalism now operates transnationally. The aff’s state centered understanding of power is too simplistic because it fails to meaningfully change control systems. Thus, the role of the ballot is to endorse the debater with the best resistance strategy to the Empire.

Hardt and Negri 17 Hardt M, Negri A. Assembly. New York: Oxford University Press; 2017. Michael, American literary theorist and political philosopher, best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio, Italian Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, best known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on Spinoza TJHSSTAD

Faced with a globalizing world out of control, many politicians, analysts, and scholars, on the Right and the Left, claim that the nation-state is back—or, rather, they wish it would come back. Some cite the need for sovereign national control over the economy, especially in light of the continuing crisis, to hold at bay the threat of a “secular stagnation” spreading across the globe or to protect workers and citizens against the depredations of financial markets. Others point to the need for secure national borders to defend the dominant countries against migrations of the poor and thus to preserve national identities. Finally, in the rush to respond to terrorist threats, the national security apparatuses are often posed as the primary or only defense. Given the renewed calls for the nation-state, globalization seems to have for many reaped more disasters than advantages.26 In these terms, however, the problem is poorly posed: arguing about the virtues of globalization versus the control of nation-states will lead only to dead ends. And, furthermore, the faith that national sovereignty can solve any of these contemporary problems is completely illusory. We need to 264 empire today formulate the problem better before we can see clearly the challenges we really face today. Almost twenty years ago we proposed that there was forming an Empire that is reorganizing global political relations and shifting priority away from the sovereignty of nation-states. One guiding hypothesis was that, at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformations of Chinese socialism, the position of the United States as superpower was also changing. US imperialism, we claimed, is being displaced such that the United States can no longer successfully dictate global relations in unilateral fashion. In Giovanni Arrighi’s terms, US global hegemony has suffered a terminal crisis.27 In the formation of Empire, furthermore, no sovereign national power will be able to exert control in the manner of the old imperialisms. Another hypothesis we forwarded was that the increasingly global capitalist markets require a global power to give them order and coherent rules. As the circuits of capitalist production and accumulation achieve properly global reach, nation-states are no longer sufficient to guarantee and regulate the interests of capital. Consequently we foresaw the formation of a mixed imperial constitution, that is, an Empire composed of a changing cast of unequal powers, including nation-states, supranational institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), the dominant corporations, nonstate powers, and others. Empire, one might say, is incomplete. Indeed it is incomplete in the same way that capitalist society is incomplete, containing within itself a diverse array of previously existing social and economic forms. One should never expect either, in fact, to arrive at completion in some pure state. And yet their incompletion or mixed constitution is no obstacle to attacking them right now, in their present form. Numerous authors working along the same lines in recent years have helped us see the problem of Empire even more clearly. Saskia Sassen, for example, puts to rest useless arguments that pose nation-states and globalization as opposed and mutually exclusive. She argues instead that nation-states and the interstate system maintain important roles, but they are being transformed from within by forces of the emerging global political and institutional order. Empire is an assemblage, one might say, of various state and nonstate authorities in concord and conflict.28 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, to give another example, make clear that globalization is not bringing about a borderless world but instead the geographies of Empire are defined by proliferating and fluctuating borders at all levels, empire today 265 which cut across the territory of each city and across continental divides. In fact, they argue that the standpoint of the border, the point of inclusion and exclusion, is the privileged site for bringing into clear view the dynamics of global power.29 Finally, Keller Easterling, as we saw in chapter  10, demonstrates that rather than a homogeneous globe or one divided along national lines, the space of the world market should be understood as a myriad of varied “zones” subject to both state and extrastate governance: industrial zones, free trade zones, export processing zones, and so forth.30 The problem, these authors and many more make clear, is not one of deciding whether to submit to globalization or return to the nation-state, but rather understanding the mixed constitution of this emerging Empire and inventing adequate political means to intervene in and combat its rule. The proclamations of the return of the state, on the Right and the Left, have nonetheless been frequent in recent decades. The most dramatic and hubristic example of the renewed power of the nation-state on the Right was proclaimed by the United States in its “war on terror” and its occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. The Bush administration believed it could unilaterally remake the global environment, starting with the Middle East, acting in the style of the old imperialist powers. In 2003, some viewed US forces rolling into Baghdad as evidence of the centrality of nationstates—the dominant nation-states, of course—in global affairs, but only a few years later it was clear to all that the utter failure of US unilateral adventures in military, economic, and political terms proved just the opposite: neither the United States nor any other nation-state can successfully dominate in imperialist terms.31 On the Left, arguments about the “return of the state” and of national sovereignty have been especially prominent in Latin America, where progressive governments came to power as part of political projects to counter the policies of neoliberalism and the rule of global markets.32 These experiences were extremely important and had enormously beneficial effects, in varying degrees and in various ways, for the populations of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere in the continent. The temporary successes of holding neoliberalism at bay were primarily due, however, not to the individual sovereign states but rather to the continental coalitions of states and the interdependence among them. Indeed as that interdependence is now falling apart the incapacity for individual states to achieve a “postneoliberal” economic and political order or to protect against the spread of the global crisis or even to slow the worst misdeeds of capitalist globalization is becoming increasingly clear. 266 empire today The return of the state is an illusion. The dignity of the nation-state today would hinge on its provision of social welfare, the quality of services, education, health, housing, the levels of wages, and the potential for social mobility. But the crisis of social and political reformism goes hand in hand with the economic crisis, and the nation-state has proven unable on its own to reconstruct prospects of social well-being and development. Moreover, even when nation-states lavish spending on military and security apparatuses, these quickly prove unable to provide anything resembling real security to their citizens. We are convinced, in fact, that if the rebirth of the nation-state were not an illusion, if it were to come to pass, it would bring only tragedy, deepening crises, exacerbating poverty, and setting off wars, awakening demons that were thought to have been exorcized. “Those who sneer at history,” declares Henry Kissinger, the brilliant reactionary stalwart of Empire, “obviously do not recall that the legal doctrine of national sovereignty and the principle of noninterference—enshrined, by the way, in the U.N. Charter—emerged at the end of the devastating Thirty Years War,” referring to the two world wars from 1914 to 1945. The new discipline of international law sought, he continues, “to inhibit a repetition of the depredations of the seventeenth century, during which perhaps 40 percent of the population of Central Europe perished in the name of competing versions of universal truth. Once the doctrine of universal intervention spreads and competing truths contest, we risk entering a world in which, in G. K. Chesterton’s phrase, virtue runs amok.”33 We are not saying, of course, that since the return of national sovereignty is illusory and undesirable, we need to content ourselves with neoliberal globalization and the devastating rule of finance capital. That is not the choice. We need, as we said earlier, to pose the problem properly. The first task is to interpret Empire from above, that is, to track its shifting internal hierarchies. The mixed constitution of Empire is a constantly changing composition of numerous unequal powers. In part this still involves the old-fashioned realist analysis of international relations, gauging, for instance, the extent to which Russia has succeeded in shuffling the powers at play in the Middle East or eastern Europe, or evaluating the prospects of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Similarly, one would have to understand if and how significantly the United States’ “pivot to Asia” has shifted the primary axis of imperial power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Imperial analysis, however, also has to consider many nonstate actors. The notion of a clash of civilizations, although purely empire today 267 hollow and false, animates equally those fighting to establish a new caliphate in the Middle East and the conservative ideologues in North America and Europe. Furthermore, material and digital infrastructures, mediascapes, production chains, international and global legal conventions, finance markets, and much more are structures of imperial power that must be illuminated by an analysis from above. The second and crucial task, however, is to interpret Empire from below, that is, to grasp and nurture the existing powers of resistance and revolt. Resistance, of course, is expressed in specific locations, but it can also extend to the national scale and beyond. In part, this perspective carries on the tradition of proletarian internationalism, which seeks to carry class struggle beyond the limits of national capital and the national state. But we must also analyze all the other struggles endowed with the powers of social production and reproduction that we have investigated at different points in this book. Ultimately, against the power of money and the social relation it institutionalizes, against the power of property, stand the struggles for the common in their many diverse forms. In the next chapter we sketch some of the elements of a platform for an effective struggle for the common within and against Empire.

#### **The Empire wields the threat of nuclear destruction to enact a permanent state of exception in which systemic forms of violence are normalized, social hierarchies are maintained, and social life is regulated. Paradoxically, the nuclear threat is empty – mutually assured destruction ensures nuclear war will never happen.**

Hardt and Negri 04 MULTITUDE WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE MICHAEL HARDT ANTONIO NEGRI THE PENGUIN PRESS NEW YORK 2004 THE PENGUIN PRESS a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. 375 Hudson Street New York, New York 10014 Copyright © Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 2004 All rights reserved LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBUCATION DATA Hardt, Michael. Multitude : war and democracy in the Age of Empire Michael Hardt and Anconio Negri. p. cm. Sequel to: Empire. Includes index. ISBN 1-59420-024-6 TJHSSTAD

BIOPOWER AND SECURITY At this point we need to go back once again and try to understand this regime of biopower from another, more philosophical, perspective. Although global war, as we said, has become increasingly indistinct from global police action, it also now tends toward the absolute. In modernity war never had an absolute, ontological character. It is true that the moderns considered war a fundamental element of social life. When the great modern military theorists spoke of war, they considered it a destructive but inevitable element of human society. And we should not forget that war often appeared in modern philosophy and politics as a positive element that involved both the search for glory (primarily in aristocratic consciousness and literature) and the construction of social solidarity (often from the standpoint of the subaltern populations). None of this, however, made war absolute. War was an element of social life; it did not rule over life. Modern war was dialectical in that every negative moment of destruction necessarily implied a positive moment of the construction of social order. War really became absolute only with the technological development of weapons that made possible for the first time mass and even global destruction. Weapons of global destruction break the modern dialectic of war. War has always involved the destruction of life, but in the twentieth century this destructive power reached the limits of the pure production of death, represented symbolically by Auschwitz and Hiroshima. The capacity of genocide and nuclear destruction touches directly on the very structure of life, corrupting it, perverting it. The sovereign power that controls such means of destruction is a form of biopower in this most negative and horrible sense of the term, a power that rules directly over death-the . 18 . WAR death not simply of an individual or group but of humanity itself and perhaps indeed of all being. When genocide and atomic weapons put life itself on center stage, then war b�comes properly ontological. 28 War thus seems to be heading at once in two opposite directions: it is, on one hand, reduced to police action and, on the other, raised up to an absolute, ontological level by technologies of global destruction. These two movements, however, are not contradictory: the reduction of war to poIic� action does not take away but actuaUy conjirms its ontological dimension. The thinning of the war function and the thickening of the police function maintain the ontological stigmata of absolute annihilation: the war police maintain the threat of genocide and nuclear destruction as their ultimate foundation.29 Biopower wields not just the power of the mass destruction of life (such as that threatened by nuclear weapons) but also individualized violence. When individualized in its extreme form, biopower becomes torture. Such an individualized exercise of power is a central element in the society of control of George Orwell's 1984. " 'How does one man assert his power over another, Winston?' Winston thought. 'By making him suffer,' he said. 'Exactly. By making him suffer. Obedience is not enough.' "30 Torture is today becoming an ever more generalized technique of control, and at the same time it is becoming increasingly banalized. Methods for obtaining confessions and information through physical and psychological torments, techniques to disorient prisoners (such as sleep deprivation), and simple means of humiliation (such as strip searches) are all common weapons in the contemporary arsenal of torture. Torture is one central point of contact between police action and war; the torture techniques used in the name of police prevention take on all the characteristics of military action. This is another face of the state of exception and the tendency for political power to free itself from the rule of law. In fact, there are increasing numbers of cases in which the international conventions against tortUre and the domestic laws against cruel and unusual punishment have little effect,3l Both dictatorships and liberal democracies use torture, the one by vocation and the other by so-called necessity. According to the logic of the state of exception, torture is an essential, unavoidable, and justifiable technique of power . . 19 . MULTITUDE Sovereign political power can never really arrive at the pure production of death because it cannot afford to eliminate the life of its subjects. Weapons of mass destruction must remain a threat or be used in very limited cases, and torture cannot be taken to the point of death, at least not in a generalized way. Sovereign power lives only by preserving the life of its subjects, at the very least their capacities of production and consumption. If any sovereign power were to destroy that, it would necessarily destroy itself. More important than the negative technologies of annihilation and torture, then, is the constructive character of biopower. Global war must not only bring death but also produce and regulate life. One index of the new, active, constituent character of war is the policy shift from "defense" to "security," which the U.S. government has promoted, particularly as an element of the war against terrorism since September 2001 .32 In the context of U.S. foreign policy, the shift from defense to security means the movement from a reactive and conservative attitude to an active and constructive one, both within and outside the national boundaries: from the preservation of the present domestic social and political order to its transformation, and similarly from a reactive war attitude, which responds to external attacks, to an active attitude that aims to preempt attack. We should keep in mind that modern democratic nations uniformly outlawed all forms of military aggression, and their constitutions gave parliaments power only to declare defensive wars. Likewise international law has always resolutely prohibited preventive or preemptive attacks on the basis of the rights of national sovereignty. The contemporary justification of preemptive strikes and preventive wars in the name of security, however, explicitly undermines national sovereignty, making national boundaries increasingly irrelevant.33 Both within and outside the nation, then, the proponents of security require more than simply conserving the present order-if we wait to react to threats, they claim, it will be too late. Security requires rather actively and constantly shaping the environment through military and/or police activity. Only an actively shaped world is a secure world. This notion of security is a form of biopower, then, in the sense that it is charged with the task of producing "and transforming social life at its most general and global level. This active, constituent character of security is, in fact, already implicit " 20 . WAR in the other transformations of war we analyzed earlier. If war is no longer an exceptional condition but the normal state of affairs, if, that is, we have NOW entered a perpetual state of war, then it becomes necessary that war not be a threat to the existing structure of power, not a destabilizing force, but rather, on the contrary, an active mechanism that constantly creates and reinforces the present global order. Furthermore, the notion of security signals a lack of distinction between inside and outside, between the military and the police. Whereas "defense" involves a protective barrier against external threats, "security" justifies a constant martial activity equally in the homeland and abroad. The concept of security only gestures partially and obliquely to the extensive transformative power involved in this passage. At an abstract, schematic arrange level we can see this shift as an inversion of the traditional ment of power. Think of the arrangement of the elements of modem sovereign power like a Russian matrioshka doll, whose largest shell consists of disciplinary administrative power, which contains the power of political control, which in turn contains in the final instance the power to make war. The productive character of security, however, requires that the order and priority of these nested shells be reversed, such that war is now the outermost container in which is nestled the power of control and finally disciplinary power. What is specific to our era, as we claimed earlier, is that war has passed from the final element of the sequences of powerlethal force as a last resort-to the first and primary element, the foundation of politics itself. Imperial sovereignty creates order not by purring an end to "the war of each against all," as Hobbes would have it, but by proposing a regime of disciplinary administration and political control directly based on continuous war action. The constant and coordinated application of violence, in other words, becomes the necessary condition for the functioning of discipline and control. In order for war to occupy this fundamental social and political role, war must be able to accomplish a constituent or regulative function: war must become both a procedural activity and an ordering, regulative activity that creates and maintains social hierarchies, a form of biopower aimed at the promotion and regulation of social life. To define war by biopower and security changes war's entire legal. 21 . M ULTI TUDE framework. In the modern world the old Clausewitz adage that war is a continuation of politics by other means represented a moment of enlightenment insofar as it conceived war as a form of political action and/or sanction and thus implied an international legal framework of modern warfare. It implied both a jus ad bellum (a right to conduct war) and a jus in bello (a legal framework to govern war conduct). In modernity, war was subordinated to international law and thus legalized or, rather, made a legal instrument. When we reverse the terms, however, and war comes to be considered the basis of the internal politics of the global order, the politics of Empire, then the modern model of civilization that was the basis of legalized war collapses. The modern legal framework for declaring and conducting war no longer holds. We are still nonetheless not dealing with a pure and unregulated exercise of violence. War as the foundation of politics must itself contain legal forms, indeed must construct new procedural forms of law. As cruel and bizarre as these new legal forms may be, war must nonetheless be legally regulative and ordering. Whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework. 34

#### The aff’s view of [insert impact scenario] as an exceptional form of violence creates an ideological fog that obscures discussion of everyday, unspectacular violence. This fractures transnational movements that aim to expose Empire, the root cause of such violence. For every localized form of spectacular violence the aff critiques, hundreds of larger wounds are left hidden.

Hardt and Negri 17 Hardt M, Negri A. Assembly. New York: Oxford University Press; 2017. Michael, American literary theorist and political philosopher, best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio, Italian Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, best known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on Spinoza TJHSSTAD

One task of any reformism is to limit the violence and destruction wrought by the ruling powers and to create effective mechanisms for social protection. But before constructing weapons of self-defense and effective counterpowers, before any call to arms, we need to bring out into daylight the contemporary forms of violence and recognize how people are already struggling against them. When Carl von Clausewitz writes about the fog of war he is trying to capture the uncertainty of military enterprises and the inability of commanders and combatants in the field of battle to gauge clearly the relations of force.7 There is another fog of war, though, an ideological fog that clouds myriad forms of violence, making them all but invisible to external observers, and even sometimes to those who suffer them. Some extreme forms of violence, spectacular acts of brutality, of course, rise high above the fog, and no doubt, we must denounce them. But don’t focus too much on exceptional events. We need to confront all forms of violence: civil wars, imperial wars, race wars, the violence of armies and militias, abuses of the police, rapists and wars on women, attacks on LGBTQ people, terroristic attacks of white supremacy and Islamic fundamentalisms, violence of capitalist finance, incarceration, ecological degradation, and the list goes on. We need to train our vision to see also and, especially, down in the fog, to reveal the daily, systematic and systemic, unspectacular forms of violence, what Slavoj Žižek calls the objective violence of the dominant systems of power, which sometimes appears as perpetrator-less crimes.8 Down in the fog is where the real battles must be fought.9 Indignation is a first step toward finding adequate modes of resistance. Art and activism often go hand in hand to reveal and protest violence and war. impossible reformism 259 In the center of Picasso’s Guernica a woman cranes her neck out the window and holds a lamp to illuminate the destruction and suffering. In some respects documentary film has today become the central art form of indignation. Indignation, however, is not merely a victim’s cry, a weapon of the weak. Our hypothesis that power always comes second means that power acts to block the development of free subjectivities: the violence of power is aimed at containing and undermining the potential of those who resist and struggle for their own freedom. Indignation is a first expression of strength.10 But indignation is not enough. To disarm the perpetrators we need to forge new weapons. The critique of violence requires, in other words, creating new counterpowers. And even that is not enough. Resistance must contribute to the constitution of new subjectivities, to the project of their liberation. We will take up this argument in chapter 15 but here let us attempt a (admittedly partial and schematic) catalogue of some of the axes of violence seen and unseen that plague our societies, along with some of the emerging struggles against them.11 From the standpoint of these struggles begin to emerge the transversal lines of coalition that we can construct across these different domains and across national boundaries. Building coalitions in an intersectional and international framework is the first step toward creating counterpowers.12 Criminal acts of police brutality against black people in the United States, including Michael Brown, Eric Garner, Freddie Gray, Tamir Rice, Philando Castile, and so many others, have recently taken center stage. But police brutality against black men and women in the United States, of course, is not new; what is new are the widespread technologies, such as video cameras in phones, that allow it to be seen and the outcry that has made it the object of mass indignation. And police violence against people of color is not by any means limited to North America. “We have a Ferguson every day,” claims Ignacio Cano, referring to police killings of black men in Brazil’s favelas.13 Certainly the perpetrators of all these deaths should be held to account. But equally important battles are further down in the fog. We need to train our eyes not only and maybe not even primarily on police brutality (as an exceptional event) or even on the police culture of impunity that makes such acts of brutality possible but also on the normal and daily violence of the police together with the courts and carceral systems.14 Traffic stops, drug arrests, unequal sentencing, the routine violence of the prison, housing policies, racially divided education systems—these are some of the scenes of racial violence 260 new prince from which we need to clear away the fog. Generating indignation against the silent institutionalized racism is one important aim of contemporary forms of antiracist activism. Black Lives Matter, the BlackOUT Collective, and the Movement for Black Lives are some of the activist organizations in the United States already constructing paths in this direction.15 Sexual violence similarly is most often seen in cases of spectacular brutality, such as the globally publicized 2012 rape of Jyoti Singh Pandey on a bus in New Delhi. The perpetrators of such crimes must be prosecuted and sometimes the horror can urge legislators to pass stronger laws. But most sexual violence takes place down in the fog, even when it involves mass deaths such as the femicide of hundreds of poor women and girls in Juárez, Mexico. “No one pays attention to these killings,” writes Roberto Bolaño in his fictionalized account, “but the secret of the world is hidden in them.”16 Indeed the visibility of spectacular cases can lead women to “associate danger with public places,” Kristin Bumiller writes, “despite the fact that most physical and sexual assaults take place in private,” committed by known perpetrators.17 Combating the daily and routine sexual violence—including rape on college campuses, abuse by husbands and fathers in the home, threatening environments for girls, as well, of course, as limits on reproductive rights—is just as important as protesting the spectacular cases of brutality. We can trace the lines of an emerging international cycle of struggles: the October 2016 demonstration for reproductive rights in Poland and the NiUnaMenos protests in Argentina against sexual violence in the same month are extending to other countries, including Italy, and they have strong resonances with the January 2017 Women’s March on Washington.18 Ecological violence, suffered disproportionately by the poor, almost always takes place silently, unseen in the fog. It forms “a shadow,” Rachel Carson writes, “that is no less ominous because it is formless and obscure.”19 For every Union Carbide Bhopal gas leak or BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill that monopolizes the attention of the global media there are millions of largely unseen industrial disasters, which little by little pollute and destroy the fabric of the earth and its ecosystems, leaving toxic rivers and lakes, flotillas of discarded plastic in the oceans, unbreathable air, and cancerous soils. The challenge of making visible these myriad forms of unseen ecological violence is doubled because their effects are most often delayed and only felt gradually. This is, to use Rob Nixon’s phrase, a slow violence that is no less dangerous (and maybe more so) for its temporal delays.20 Climate change is emblematic impossible reformism 261 of the complex temporality of ecological violence because once its effects are finally visible the options for combatting it are (almost entirely) closed. And as many authors argue, the violence of ecological degradation and change affects first and most strongly the poor and the indigenous, in part because they rely most directly on the earth and have the fewest defenses. The 2016 Standing Rock protests to block construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline are one inspiring moment in recent environmental activism. In addition to being a historic gathering of North American tribes, it has been significant for the fact that environmental activists have followed the lead of indigenous activists in the direction and organization of the movement.21 The systemic violence of capitalist relations against working classes and the poor also leaves wounds that are often hidden. In 2010, global indignation was aroused when it was publicized that eighteen employees of Foxconn in China, the company that provides components for Apple computers, attempted suicide. In Japan the phenomenon of hikikomori, youth who withdraw to a solitary existence, sometimes refusing to come out of their rooms at home, is a symptom of the violences of precarity and unemployment in a society where social value has been so strongly associated with work.22 The weapons of finance leave wounds that cripple just as other weapons do: indebtedness creates stunted forms of life that exclude all manners of social development and flourishing. The strategy of social unionism that we discussed in chapter 9, bringing together trade union and social movement traditions to address issues of full-time workers, the unemployed, the indebted, and the growing strata of precarious workers, is one of the most promising developments for addressing these forms of violence.23 The catalogue we have begun here is obviously an inadequate accounting. We have said too little to do justice to the few axes of violence we have mentioned, and still nothing yet about homophobic and transphobic violence, violence against the disabled, religious-based violence, and much more. These partial considerations should already make apparent, though, that where there is violence there will also be resistance, which will eventually emerge in organized and powerful movements. That is the key understanding we need to make in the next step in our argument. Before leaving the question of violence, however, we need to turn our attention briefly to war. Military campaigns too, despite their spectacular, lethal effect, can hide their violence, at least from the view of certain observers. That is one intended consequence, for instance, of the restructuring of US military 262 new prince strategy known as “revolution in military affairs” and “defense transformation,” among other names. Those efforts, which use new technologies to make the fighting forces more mobile and flexible, further earlier techniques of killing at a distance, thus reducing the numbers of US troops at risk and ultimately lowering the number of US fatalities. The dream behind these changes is to create a mode of warfare that (from the standpoint of those waging it) is virtual in the technological terms and bodiless in military terms, while being very real and corporeal for those who suffer it. The semblance of the virtual and the incorporeal allow for the violence to be (at least partially) clouded. The emblem of this military mindset is the drone. Unmanned, guided lethal projectiles are in many respects the continuation of long-range missiles and bombers in that they allow those who are killing not to see those who die.24 Although the strategic plans and the weapons technologies were already in place beforehand, the Bush administration’s war on terror along with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq were in many respects a proving ground. Over a decade later, however, it is widely recognized that these wars were dramatic failures, but remarkably the military logics behind them continue to be deployed. As US forces began to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan under President Obama, for example, the military use of drones only increased. Just like the bombing campaigns in Vietnam, drone warfare has quickly proven to be a failure—drones sometimes succeed in killing targeted enemies but, especially given the wide collateral deaths and damages, they reinforce the will and recruitment of those they intend to defeat—but that failure does not mean they will cease to be employed. The organized indignation of antiwar movements is necessary to make visible the systematic violence of drones and bombing campaigns to the populations of the United States, Europe, and Russia (those who suffer these attacks see them very well).25 Migrants can testify to the violence of war together with many other forms: through warfare and economic destitution enormous populations are forced to flee, who then suffer racist subordination along their journey and when they arrive at their destination. Innumerable scenes of violence, for example, followed Syrians fleeing war in 2015: the refugee centers set on fire in Sweden; US politicians seeking to ban their entry; Hungary building a wall on its Serbian border; the French riot police attacking the refugee camp at Calais; and the list goes on. And yet there have also been extraordinary, heroic mobilizations in countries throughout Europe and the world to welcome empire today 263 migrants, to provide housing, clothing, and food, and to counter the toxic atmosphere of antimigrant violence. Our catalogue of contemporary violence makes us sick even though, as we said, we only scratched the surface! May the gods, wherever they are, curse and plague the sad perpetrators of violence in all these hidden and overt forms! The racists, misogynists, homophobes, transphobes, destroyers of the earth, warmongers—may the putrid rot of their souls gnaw at them from within! Invective and indignation are vital, of course, especially when organized as movements of resistance, and fortunately such movements arise all around us. But such movements are merely the first building block. We need to link the movements to create transversal coalitions in an intersectional and international frame. Furthermore, these connections have to transform identities and produce the kinds of subjective transformation that we spoke of earlier in the processes of translation in order to create effective counterpowers. Finally, then, counterpowers need to be formed into a project for liberation and the constitution of a real social alternative. In chapter 15 we will turn to the needs of that constituent process.

#### The alternative is the Multitude, a mode of proliferated tactics that disrupts notions of sovereignty. This is a method of resistance that neither devolves into biocapitalist unity or anarchist fragmentary but rather exists as prefiguration to global democracy.

Hardt and Negri 2 [Michael, American literary theorist and political philosopher, best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio, Italian Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, best known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on Spinoza, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, 99-102, The Penguin Press, 2004] recut TJHSSTAD

Political action aimed at transformation and liberation today can only be conducted on the basis of the multitude. To understand the concept of the multitude in its most general and abstract form, let us contrast it first with that of the people. 1 The people is one. The population, of course, is composed of numerous different individuals and classes, but the people synthesizes or reduces these social differences into one identity. The mul­titude, by contrast, is not unified but remains plural and multiple. This is why, according to the dominant tradition of political philosophy, the peo­ple can rule as a sovereign power and the multitude cannot. The multitude is composed of a set of singularities- and by singularity here we mean a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, a differ­ ence that remains different. The component parts of the people are indif­ ferent in their unity; they become an identity by negating or setting aside their differences. The plural singularities of the multitude thus stand in contrast to the undifferentiated unity of the people. The multitude, however, although it remains multiple, is not fragmented, anarchical, or incoherent. The concept of the multitude should thus also be contrasted to a series of other concepts that designate plural collectives, such as the crowd, the masses, and the mob. Since the different individuals or groups that make up the crowd are incoherent and recog­nize no common shared elements, their collection of differences remains inert and can easily appear as one indifferent aggregate. The components of the masses, the mob, and the crowd are not singularities-and this is obvious from the fact that their differences so easily collapse into the in­ difference of the whole. Moreover, these social subjects are fundamentally passive in the sense that they cannot act by themselves but rather must be led. The crowd or the mob or the rabble can have social effects-often horribly destructive effects-but cannot act of their own accord. That is why they are so susceptible to external manipulation. The multitude, des­ignates an active social subject, which acts on the basis of what the singu­larities share in common. The multitude is an internally different, multiple social subject whose constitution and action is based not on identity or unity (or, much less, indifference) but on what it has in common. This initial conceptual definition of the multitude poses a clear challenge to the entire tradition of sovereignty. As we will explain in part 3, one of the recurring truths of political philosophy is that only the one can rule, be it the monarch, the party, the people, or the individual; social sub­ jects that are not unified and remain multiple cannot rule and instead must be ruled. Every sovereign power, in other words, necessarily forms a political body of which there is a head that commands, limbs that obey, and organs that function together to support the ruler. The concept of the multitude challenges this accepted truth of sovereignty. The multitude, although it remains multiple and internally different, is able to act in com­mon and thus rule itself. Rather than a political body with one that com­ mands and others that obey, the multitude is living flesh that rules itself. This definition of the multitude, of course, raises numerous conceptual and practical problems, which we will discuss at length in this and the next chapter, but it should be clear from the outset that the challenge of the multitude is the challenge of democracy. The multitude is the only so­cial subject capable of realizing democracy, that is, the rule of everyone by everyone. The stakes, in other words, are extremely high. In this chapter we will articulate the concept of the multitude prima­ rily from a socioeconomic perspective. Multitude is also a concept of race, gender, and sexuality differences. Our focus on economic class here should considered in part as compensation for the relative lack of attention to class in recent years with respect to these other lines of social difference and hierarchy. As we will see the contemporary forms of production, which we will call biopolitical production, are not limited economic phenomena but rather tend to involve all aspects of social life, including communication, knowledge, and affects. It is also useful to recognize from the beginning that something like a concept of the multitude has long en part of powerful streams of feminist and antiracist politics. When we say that we do not want a world without racial or gender difference but in­stead a world in which race and gender do not matter, that is, a world in which they do not determine hierarchies of power, a world in which dif­ferences express themselves freely, this is a desire for the multitude. And, of course, for the singularities that compose the multitude, in order to take away the limiting, negative, destructive character of differences and make differences our strength (gender differences, racial differences, dif­ferences of sexuality, and so forth) we must radically transform the world.2 From the socioeconomic perspective, the multitude is the common subject of labor, that is, the real flesh of postmodern production, and at the same time the object from which collective capital tries to make the body of its global development. Capital wants to make the multitude into an organic unity, just like the state wants to make it into a people. This is where, through the struggles of labor, the real productive biopolitical figure of the multitude begins to emerge. When the flesh of the multitude is imprisoned and transformed into the body of global capital, it finds itself both within and against the processes of capitalist globalization.

#### The role of the ballot is to interrogate the scholarship of the plan before its consequences. This means they don’t get to weigh case because we critique their model of debate and theory of power.

### 1NC vs Settler Colonialism [Harrison]

### 1NC vs Ban Treaty Aff

### 1NC vs Nuclear Allergy Aff

### Link – Militarism

#### Nuclear disarmament legitimizes the liberal war machine – the plan rhetorically and legally props up militarism by providing moral cover for violent Western foreign policy. Elimination of specific weaponry sanctifies certain forms of violence which obscures overarching structures of militarism that govern international relations.

Stavrianakis 16 [Anna Stavrianakis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at University of Sussex, MScEcon in Security Studies from University of Wales, Aberystwyth and PhD in Politics from University of Bristol, author of Taking Aim at the Arms Trade, “Legitimizing liberal militarism: politics, law and war in the Arms Trade Treaty”. Third World Quarterly, 37 (5), pp. 840-865, 2016, <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/57545/1/TWQ%20Legitimizing%20liberal%20militarism%20-%20accepted%20clean%20version.pdf>] \*\*\*Note: the ATT is the Arms Trade Treaty, a previous attempt at restricting arms sales led by the US and the UK recut TJHSSTAD

In this article I argue, contrary to the predominantly optimistic emerging assessment of the treaty, that a key effect of the ATT is the legitimation of liberal forms of militarism exercised by major western states. It is not simply that these states have long been amongst the world’s largest military spenders, arms producers and arms exporters, and claim the ATT will bring no new responsibilities for them. The same applies to major non-western suppliers and non-signatories such as Russia and, increasingly, China. There is something more at stake: the liberal form that war-making and war preparation take when exercised by major western, liberal states. There is a distinct political economy, strategic orientation and – crucially – form of justification based on human rights, humanitarianism and morality that frame their arms transfers as part of broader war-making and war preparation practices. Arms transfers by liberal states that contribute to violations of human rights and IHL are hidden from view by the existence of regulatory regimes that include consideration of human rights and IHL. This legitimating function of regulatory regimes has been uploaded into the ATT in the way it introduces a balancing act in which states can weigh the risk of human rights violations against the interests of peace and security and justify exports in the name of the latter. With the effect of naturalising liberal states’ practices and allowing them to evade scrutiny, create the impression of responsibility and morality, and effect leadership of a liberal international order that is nonetheless reliant on coercion and violence, the ATT takes on a rather different hue as a means for the reworking and relegitimation of liberal forms of militarism. In what follows, I first situate the treaty empirically, set out the emerging scholarly assessment of it based on human security norms, and advance as an alternative the concept of liberal militarism. Second, I analyse the similarities and differences in forms of justification by the USA and the UK. As an ambivalent sceptic-turned-supporter of the treaty, the US engaged in more unilateralist forms of justification than the UK, which was a major champion of the treaty. However, both states’ engagements with the treaty share a framing based on a universalising moral responsibility. Two cases – arms transfers to Egypt during the Arab Spring, and intrawestern transfers – are then used to illustrate the ways in which the US and UK governments justify their arms transfers by reference to regulatory regimes that include explicit reference to IHRL and IHL: regimes that are deemed to already exceed the standards of the ATT. Whilst transfers to the Middle East during the Arab Spring were used by proponent non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as an illustration of why an ATT is needed, intra-western transfers are generally not on the arms transfer control agenda. More broadly, claims around the need for tighter arms trade regulation revolve around an armed violence agenda, primarily in Sub Saharan Africa and Latin America. Analysing a Middle Eastern and an intra-western case helps us think harder about the broader purposes of arms transfer regulation. The existence of transfer regimes that already exceed the standards of the ATT creates a paradox in which contemporary risk transfer militarism is justified by reference to arms export licensing processes that are themselves based on risk assessment. Rather than signalling the success of human security norms then, the effort to use criteria- and risk-based assessments of arms transfers – the core of the ATT – is better understood as having been mobilised as part of the legitimation of contemporary liberal forms of militarism. There is, as yet, no negotiating history of the ATT. This article combines analysis of states’ official statements and expert commentary from observers of the process with off-the-record discussions with US-UK state and civil society participants in the treaty negotiations as a contribution to understanding the dynamics of the treaty negotiation process and early implementation phase. Theorising the ATT: from human security norms to liberal militarism The ATT brings together states’ existing obligations under international law in the form of express prohibitions that are binding on importers and exporters (Article 6), and sets standards for regulatory practice in the form of national risk assessments to bind exporters (Article 7). Its goal is to address “the security, social, economic and humanitarian consequences of the illicit and unregulated trade in conventional arm” whilst protecting the “legitimate political, security, economic and commercial interests of States” 4 As with other arms transfer control regimes, the “illicit” trade is simultaneously an organising term of the ATT and never defined in the treaty text.5 The combination of existing obligations under international law with human rights standards to be enshrined in national regulatory systems is envisaged by proponents to render irresponsible transfers illegal.6 This was resisted by some southern states who saw it as a political move to delegitimise their practices whilst facilitating western ones.7 The idea for the treaty originated in the 1990s with NGO campaigners and a group of Nobel Peace Laureates and was taken up by states via the UN system. A loose coalition of European and Southern states, most notably in Latin America and Sub Saharan Africa, working in alliance with the Control Arms NGO campaign, took on the role of “regional champions” of the treaty and worked together as a “like-minded” group,8 building on the regional “minilateralism” of initiatives such as the Nairobi Protocol9 and existing national and international regimes such as the EU Common Position on Arms Exports. A series of technical criticisms have been levelled at the scope,10 clarity and force of the final treaty text,11 including the absence of an enforcement mechanism.12 And diplomatic obstacles to the implementation of the treaty remain: key exporting and importing states such as Russia, China and India have not signed it; the US has signed but is unlikely to ratify any time soon. However, other states’ widespread enthusiasm for the treaty vote translated into rapid entry into force twenty one months after being agreed at the General Assembly. The emerging scholarly assessment of the ATT is clear that international action to regulate the arms trade is an “unprecedented effort” at norm creation 13 and “one of the most ambitious and difficult goals to achieve in global governance.” 14 It grows out of existing arms control, disarmament and arms transfer control regimes. Extant arms control or disarmament regimes that ban specific technologies such as landmines, cluster munitions, chemical and nuclear weapons, have all relied on their being framed as indiscriminate, inhumane, unacceptable or pariah in some way, thus challenging states’ abilities to produce, use or transfer them as part of legitimate military need and state security practice.15 The difficulty with regulating the conventional arms trade as a whole, as the ATT attempts to do, is that it does not lend itself to such framing due to the centrality of the arms trade to state security and sovereignty, and hence widespread legitimacy.16 Any multilateral action on the trade in conventional weapons as a whole thus has to take the form of regulation rather than abolition or a ban. The ATT is both emblematic of, and distinct from, the post-Cold War nonproliferation paradigm.17 For example, there is specific mention of terrorism as an ill to be combated, and a framing around the “illicit and unregulated” trade; yet it applies to a broad range of military equipment, and does not generate a taboo or ban on particular types of technologies. As such, it may be able to serve to draw attention to the patterns of civilian death and injury “associated with technologies considered ‘normal’ or the use of which is somehow seen as ‘inevitable’.”18 One way this is envisaged is through inclusion not only of the laws of war under existing IHL, but also the inclusion of human rights provisions. This human security content of the treaty secured widespread agreement, with the reduction of human suffering explicitly named as a goal of the treaty. The treaty means different things to the various constituencies involved in the campaign and negotiating processes; indeed, this was a necessary condition for its agreement. It is as much about trade regulation (according to supportive government and industry representatives) as arms transfer control (as most proponent NGOs would have it), with only minority voices ȋsuch as the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, WILPF) articulating a disarmament agenda. And this is quite aside from the vocal hostility of US-based campaign groups and think-tanks such as the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Heritage Foundation on unilateralist and Second Amendment grounds, and the scepticism (e.g. China, India and Russia) and opposition (e.g. Iran, North Korea and Syria) of some non-western states on substantive and/or procedural grounds.19 Overall, the treaty represents the “confluence of arms control, security, human rights, trade, armed violence, sovereignty, development, self-defence, technology, and other issues” 20 and its widely-drawn provisions “must be applied in an innumerable number of different factual contexts … which take shape as the treaty is applied in practice.”21 As experience from international action on small arms has shown, the problems posed by the arms trade are of a different character in different parts of the world: small arms are an issue of recirculation post-conflict in West Africa, of excessive stocks in southeast Europe, and of criminal activity and drug trafficking in Latin America and the CARICOM region.22 And notes of caution have been sounded by more radical campaign groups: to ensure the ATT makes a difference, states, civil society and UN “must avoid legitimising further the international arms trade and irresponsible transfers.”23 But limits of the treaty aside, most agree that “we have to start somewhere” and push for “robust interpretation and effective implementation.” 24 The ATT is seen by proponents as a step forward in the development of norms around the protection of human security, and potentially generative of a norm cascade such that it will have an effect even on non-signatories.25 This chimes with the academic literature on norms, which makes the case for the possibility of moral progress in international politics and a rising tide of principled action. The UK government is seen as having “humanitarian, developmental and moral justifications” or “motivations” for exercising leadership on the ATT, according to norms scholar Denise Garcia.26 As an example of “disarmament diplomacy”, the ATT signals the way in which the rise of norms based on moral concerns can change conduct in international politics:27 “The creation of new international norms transforms deeply held practices and changes behaviour.”28 This is resonant with a common theme within the constructivist norms literature that norms co-exist with and sometimes trump material and strategic concerns, requiring a move beyond interest-based explanations.29 As Price puts it, “almost any international treaty dealing with subjects such as human rights or war would seem to be a mix of the brutal bargaining of national interests and coercion sprinkled, if not always enveloped, with other, including moral, considerations.” 30 At first blush, then, we cannot understand the entry into force of the ATT without the role of human security norms. However, whilst the circulation of norms around human security was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the agreement and content of the treaty, the character of the explanation given by a constructivist norms account is limited. Norms are supposed to facilitate more progressive standards of behaviour through, for example, the “rhetorical entrapment and shaming involved in hypocrisy” and a constructivist approach is supposed to illuminate the “nuances of progressive and regressive effects of even strategically moral uses of morality.”31 But existing norms-based accounts of the ATT have taken at face value the moral representations of leading liberal states, as seen in Garcia’s equation of justifications with motivations.32 And broader constructivist accounts of weapons activism have not tackled the ongoing patterns across the spectrum of weapons transfers, outside of the banning of specific technologies. Carpenter’s insightful analysis of the question of why some weapons systems are targeted for delegitimation and not others brackets the wider system of war preparation of which the development of weapons systems is a part.33 Constructivist arguments implicitly assume that progressive change in the area of weapons issues can come from delegitimating one technology at a time. Yet broader systems of war preparation and war fighting will always generate new technologies. And as I argue later, liberal states’ war practices are kept off the agenda through risk assessment processes and legitimating claims based on a universalising morality. Claims about the normative power of conventional arms transfer control regimes have been sternly tested by empirical studies. Studies of patterns of arms exports demonstrate how the “self-declared ethical turn” of major western arms suppliers in the 1990s has not acted as a bar on weapons exports.34 The US and Western European states “have generally not exercised export controls so as to discriminate against human rights abusing or autocratic countries during the post-Cold War period.”35 At best, the effect of the EU Code of Conduct, which served as one of the templates for the ATT, has been that “EU members no longer appear to reward poor human rights with arms transfers, even if they are not punishing it either.” 36 And in specific cases such as EU member states’ arms transfers to Libya, evidence demonstrates comprehensive violation of export control principles even though exporting governments were aware of the risks posed by transfers: licence denials "constitute exceptions in an overall export-friendly environment.”37 These empirical patterns raise the question of how liberal states manage to both transfer weapons to human rights violating and authoritarian regimes, and claim the mantle of responsibility by being publicly in favour of the ATT. The empirical studies cited above tend to adopt a realist explanation in which seemingly normatively progressive regimes serve as rhetorical cover for material or strategic interests,38 yet they do not go into detail as to how that process works. Realist explanations are inadequate because they fail to take into account the hard work that such rhetoric performs or the way that regimes function often despite the good intention of some proponents.39 Law and regulation are not merely superficial cover, a distraction from a focus on the advancement of material interests: law “does matter; that is both the problem and the promise.”40 Thus whilst constructivists are right that rationalist assumptions of narrowly instrumental behaviour are false,41 they do not give an adequate explanation of the significance of the morally oriented work that is going on in the ATT: the ways in which a seemingly progressive initiative contains the seeds of its own complicity in broader systems of preparation for war and violence. Yet Price does point to how, “if hypocrisy becomes too endemic then it may undercut the power of the moral legitimacy more generally that is required for hypocrisy’s piggy-back effects.” 42 So it may be that arms transfers are so embedded in hypocrisy that normative shaming is less effective. As Erickson argues, “the ATT faces a hard road ahead”: “without the means to expose and punish noncompliance, … [ambitious policies] do little more than enhance states’ reputations without improving human rights and conflict conditions on the ground.” 43 Yet “Research explaining major suppliers’ support for ‘responsible’ arms export controls is lacking.” 44 –To start thinking about this gap between commitment and compliance, and to explain major suppliers’ positions, I advance the concept of liberal militarism. This moves beyond arguments based on hypocrisy and instrumental or functional pursuit of material interests, in order to explain key effects of the treaty in ways other approaches cannot. The normalization and legitimation of liberal ways of war and war preparation via the ATT are an important component of contemporary militarism. The concept of militarism, understood as the social and international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political violence,45 allows us to examine the historical, socio-economic and political sources and character of military power.46 Understood this way, the concept goes beyond a definition of militarism as ideology, and militarisation as the material process through which militarism comes about. Militarism includes an ideological component but is not restricted to it, because war and armed violence can be justified and facilitated even if not necessarily glorified; and because social forces beyond ideology are required to produce it. Arms transfers and arms transfer control may thus contribute to militarisation (an increase in the intensity of military power in society, whether domestic or international), demilitarisation (a decrease), or a change in the character of militarism. The concept allows for the analysis of the different forms across space and time taken by war and preparation for it.47 And whilst the number of deaths caused by the arms trade is clearly an important yardstick, a militarism frame goes beyond numbers. Rather, it captures the influence of military relations on social relations in general, and the ways that war and armed violence are prepared for. This requires broadening the empirical focus beyond conflict in Africa and organized crime in Latin America, which have been the main focus for arms transfer control. Scholars are increasingly challenging the long- and widely cherished belief that liberalism and militarism are antithetical.48 Key features of the specificity of liberal militarism include the capital- and technology-intensive character of the preparation for and conduct of war; a strong commitment to military production across war and peacetime and self-understanding as a primarily “economic, industrial and commercial power;” the distanced form of attacks on Southern populations and simultaneous containment of social conflict at home and policing empire abroad, often featuring supposedly “small” massacres; a universalist ideology and conception of world order; low levels of military participation by society; and a state-capital relation that is formally separate but organically related.49 Justifications based on values and morals promoting human rights and humanitarian values are central to legitimating these features of liberal militarism, and are in contrast to the justifications based on sovereignty of other major, non-liberal suppliers and recipients such as Russia, China and India. In the case of the ATT, language and regulatory bureaucratic practices of risk assessment are embedded in western, liberal regimes that on paper already exceed the standards set out in the ATT. More generally, the turn to law has been central to the development of liberal militarism. The laws of war serve a legitimizing effect for western ways of war, preempting criticism through reassurance, shielding acts and practices from criticism, and giving rhetorical protection from challenge, which serves to naturalise and normalise the prevailing distribution of power. 50 And the combination of human rights and IHL has served to criminalize low-tech violence and legitimate high-tech forms of war.51 The turn to law is “productive of the social and political context that makes possible certain forms of war and certain relations of hierarchy,” as the “perceived compliance with the law itself is partly productive of the global order in which contemporary war occurs.”52 This allows liberal states to pitch their practice in terms of responsibility, morality and legitimacy. Overall, then, whilst it is inappropriate to claim that legal regimes are mere instruments of the powerful, it is also too strong to say that humanitarian security regimes such as the ATT operate “in opposition to the aspirations of the most powerful states.”53 What is at stake, rather, is the legitimation of specific forms of war fighting and war preparation.

### Link – Nuclear Exceptionalism

#### **The Empire wields the threat of nuclear destruction to enact a permanent state of exception in which everyday systemic forms of violence are normalized and social hierarchies are maintained. The aff validates securitizing narratives of fear criminalizing forms of resistance.**

Southall 10 Nicholas A multitude of possibilities: the strategic vision of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Doctorate of Philosophy thesis, University of Wollongong. School of History and Politics and Sociology Program, University of Wollongong, 2010. <http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3274> TJHSSTAD

Neo-Liberalism and Permanent Exceptionalism While looking for alliances with imperial reformist aristocracies, Hardt and Negri continue to recognise the centrality of violence to capital and that capitalist state forms try to organise and to monopolise it. As they explain capitalist society is a "monster of provocation and devastation" (Hardt and Negri: 1994: 204) and constitutional bourgeois democracy is a "theory of the management of legitimate violence" (Negri: 2008a: 129). Paradoxically, the neo-liberal project has involved "a substantial increase of the State in terms both of size and powers of intervention" to deal with capitalist crisis (Hardt and Negri: 1994: 242). While advocating less state intervention, neo-liberal nation states have boosted the prison population and have introduced more repressive laws concerning protests, strikes, behaviour, movement, the use of public space, censorship and civil rights. At the same time as cutting back on the social security of welfare and social spending, expenditure on military and police forces has increased as these forces increasingly intervene wherever Empire is threatened. The military power of this neo- liberal global 'big government' is required to defend capital and to "force open unwilling markets and stabilise existing ones" (Hardt and Negri: 2004: 177). The power of the imperial war police is founded on the threat of nuclear destruction, genocide and torture (Hardt and Negri: 2004: 19), for Empire is "the absolute capacity for destruction", the "ultimate form of biopower", the power of death (Hardt and Negri: 2000a: 345-346). The constant and coordinated application of this violence helps to maintain social hierarchies, social anxiety and conflict within the multitude. Fear of violence is used to maintain capitalist social relations. Yet, as the global state of violence and fear is extended, it aggravates social crisis while helping to connect the multitude more deeply. In Empire, before the September I I attacks, Hardt and Negri (2000a: 18) analysed the "permanent state of emergency and exception" behind supranational interventions justified in the name of the universal values of justice and peace. They describe imperial power in a situation of permanent crisis and war as "a science of police". In response to the growing power of the a.g. movement, Empire launched a "low intensity war. combined with high intensity police action" (Negri: 2004a: 75). This defence of capital and the state by the world's police forces represents "institutional fascism: an implicit and organic fascism, consubstantial with the institutions being defended". This violence is aimed at halting new cycles of struggle and, as sections of the ruling class descend into fascism, "all acts of protest and resistance are potentially terrorism" (Negri: 2004a: 76). The war on terror's destructive power has fostered fear and insecurity across the globe and has stifled opposition. Since September II 2001, in many parts of the world, governments have introduced new police powers and national security measures. These have increased surveillance and the powers and practices of control, including preventative detention without charge, travel restrictions, roundups, deportations, disappearances, torture and assassinations. The function of the U.S. Department of Justice is now "prevention and disruption", not law enforcement (U.S. Department of Justice: 2001) and the army routinely polices the streets in numerous U.S. cities. Hardt and Negri (2004: 13-14) discuss the war on terrorism as developing out of previous wars on poverty and drugs, where the enemy is a concept or a set of practices. These wars are social wars, mobilising society to fight against "immaterial enemies" continually across the globe. As military and police actions increasingly intermingle, distinctions between the "enemy", generally conceived of as outside the nation state, and the "dangerous classes", traditionally viewed as inside, also blur. Enemies of social order and peace can be identified everywhere, leading to the criminalisation of all forms of social contestation and resistance. "In this perspective, whereas global terrorism is part of the 'civil war' for imperial leadership, the movements of resistance and exodus are actually the real new threat for the global capitalist order" (Negri: 2008b: 23). This threat is confirmed by U.S. military strategists who identify the second most dangerous future scenario that the U.S. military could face as the threat from a "Transnational Web" of "radical transnational 'peace and social justice' groups" (Nichiporuk: 2005).

### 1NC O/V vs IndoPak

#### Link overview –

#### 1] The aff’s theory of power is wrong – they assume power resides in nation-states like India and Pakistan but rather power operates through the Empire, an assemblage of multinational corporations and non-state actors. Specific nation-states no longer have power because capitalism is increasingly globalized. Only my theory of power explains why India and Pakistan proliferated, how tensions between them arose in the first place, and how globalization played a role in doing that. That’s a terminal solvency deficit to the alt – even if India and Pakistan disarm, the aff doesn’t eliminate underlying desires that escalated tensions to begin with, which means India and Pakistan will just rearm, escalate conventional warfare or shift to things like bioweapons.

#### 2] Spectacularization of Indo-Pak nuclear war – their focus on extinction from nuclear war between India and Pakistan produces an ideological fog that obscures focus on systemic global structures of neoliberal structural violence, absolving the Empire’s responsibility for endless racialized violence worldwide.

### 1NC O/V vs Militarism Affs

#### Link overview –

#### 1] The aff’s theory of power is wrong – they assume power resides in nation-states like the US i.e. that the US imposes imperialism and militarism globally – this is wrong because power operates through the Empire, an assemblage of multinational corporations and non-states actors. The US doesn’t unilaterally dictate global relations anymore because it can’t regulate capital transnationally – the US invasion of Iraq is a good example of this – the US tried to intervene in Iraq against the will of supranational organizations like NATO i.e. the Empire but it failed.

#### 2] Spectacularization of US militarism – their focus on US militarism produces an ideological fog that obscures focus on systemic global structures of neoliberal violence. Only the K addresses the root cause of their impacts – we can explain how global non-state actors and agents produce violence transnationally and influence structures of US militarism that they discuss.

### 1NC O/V vs Settler Colonialism

#### Link overview –

#### 1] Land focus is wrong – power has become decentralized and no longer lies in specific nation-states – settler relationship to land is the wrong theory of power because it doesn’t account for globalization – rather, view power through the Empire – an assemblage of multinational corporations and non-state actors that shape global systems of capitalism. Only my theory of power explains why indigenous peoples in central America migrated north or how settler colonialism is shaped by corporations like the United Fruit Company – the Empire explains how different forces come together transnationally to generate settler colonialism.

#### 2] Spectacularization of U.S. Settler Colonialism – the USFG is not the main unit of power and focusing on violence within just the U.S. obscures settler colonialism in other nations – only the K can explain how settler colonialism is exported and operates on a global scale – they can’t explain why the U.S. trains Israeli soldiers using the same colonial tactics.

# 2NR

## Deterrence O/V

#### YEET – They have conceded terminal defense to the aff – the Hardt and Negri 04 evidence makes an *embedded deterrence claim* that they dropped – the sovereign would never launch a nuclear weapon because by doing so it might cause nuclear war and threaten its own existence i.e. mutually assured destruction – the nuclear threat is empty and just used to create fear – read the evidence it explains it exactly how I did. That means the aff impact scenario will never happen and they don’t get access to case.

## 2NR O/V vs LARP

### Thesis

### Impact O/V

### Alternative O/V

### Link XT – Theory of Power

### Link XT – Extinction Reps

### \*Link XT – Ideological Fog

### \*Link XT – Militarism

## 2NR O/V – Floating PIK

## 2NR O/V vs Settler Colonialism

## 2NR O/V vs Militarism

## A2 Policymaking

### A2 “State Good” O/V

### A2 Materialism

### A2 Scenario Planning / Language of Power

### A2 Particularism

## A2 Perms

### O/V

### A2 Perm Do Both

### A2 Perm Dbl Bind

### A2 Perm Mindset

### Intrinsic Perms Bad

### Severance Perms Bad

## A2 Perfcons [Pairing with LARP]

### A2 Disads Link [Assuming No Nuke War Impact]