### 1AC—Plan

#### Plan: The United States Federal Government ought to provide a federal Green Jobs Guarantee.

### 1AC—Advantage: COVID

#### COVID cases are increasing and will continue through the winter.

Wan and Dupree 10-13 [William Wan is a national reporter covering health, science and news for The Washington Post. He previously served as the Post's China correspondent in Beijing, roving U.S. national correspondent, foreign policy reporter and religion reporter. Jacqueline Dupree currently tracks COVID-19 case, hospitalization, and death numbers as reported by state health departments, “Coronavirus cases are rising in U.S., sparking worries the next big wave has begun,” 10-13-2020, Washington Post, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/10/13/coronavirus-cases-rising/>, 10-14-2020 amrita]

**U.S. coronavirus cases are rising again, driven by rapid transmission in Midwestern states** and sparking fears that a forewarned wave of infections this fall and winter has begun**. For almost a month, new U.S. cases have been trending upward**. Since Saturday, **more than 20 states have hit a new high in their seven-day average of case counts, and more than half of those states set records again on Tuesday, according to data tracked by The Washington Post.** The rising numbers are especially concerning because **they set the stage for an even greater surge this winter when the virus will be helped by drier conditions and people spending more time indoor**s. The upward **trend comes before the increased mingling of people expected to arrive with Halloween, Thanksgiving and Christmas.** The virus has become especially rampant in Midwestern states after dominating U.S. coastal and urban areas in the spring, according to data tracked by The Washington Post. It is unclear what factors are driving the recent increase — whether it is the long-feared winter effect already taking place or the resumption of business and schools, or simply fatigue and people letting down their guard on social distancing efforts. Because of day-to-day fluctuations in the reporting of cases, experts often look at the seven-day average of case counts to accurately spot trends. **In 40 states, cases are higher when compared with the week before.** Indiana, Minnesota and North Dakota have set a new average high for cases each of the past eight days. More than a dozen other states have set new average highs in recent days. “**A lot of the places being hit are Midwest states that were spared in the beginning,”** said William Hanage, a Harvard University infectious-diseases researcher. **“That’s of particular concern because a lot of these smaller regions don’t have the ICU beds and capacity that the urban centers had.”** Even D.C. and some Northeastern states — including Connecticut, New Jersey and New York — are beginning to see case counts creep back up**. Hospitalizations** for covid-19, the illness caused by the virus, **have also begun rising in almost a dozen states** — including Ohio and Pennsylvania — raising the specter that **increasing death counts will soon follow.** On Tuesday, Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine (R) warned in a tweet: “In all likelihood, things will get worse before they get better. This virus is sneaky and cunning and won’t give up. It has a mind of its own.” Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, said on Monday he hopes the numbers “jolt the American public into a realization that we really can’t let this happen, because it’s on a trajectory of getting worse and worse.” In a CNN interview, he **called the rising numbers “the worst possible thing that could happen as we get into the cooler months.”**

#### American unwillingness for action on COVID has jeopardized the foundations of US soft power.

Norrlöf 20 [Carla Norrlöf is a researcher at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA), “Is COVID-19 the end of US hegemony? Public bads, leadership failures and monetary hegemony,” 9-1-2020,OUP Academic,https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/96/5/1281/5901398, 10-21-2020 amrita]

In this section I discuss **the domestic and international engagement of the US administration during the first six months of the pandemic in order to assess what it has done to prevent the COVID-19 public bad. Crisis times are precisely when the dominant actor within the order, the hegemon, is expected to behave responsibly and organize states to solve collective action problems. Hegemonic stability theory and theories of hierarchy lead us to expect the hegemonic actor to mitigate the hazardous long-term effects of COVID-19 on other states and on the public goods that define the LIO. Public good provision and public bad prevention require strong domestic foundations. Securing the health of American citizens is vital for domestic economic stability, even given the existence of short-term trade-offs between securing the health of Americans and that of the economy**. While the United States has expended enormous resources on keeping Americans safe from external military aggression, **it has spent far less on generalized health care and social safety nets. This failure to provide domestic public goods has created long-term fissures between winners and losers from globalization, putting hegemony at risk long before the pandemic arrived on US shores**.20 The **under-provision of domestic public goods and the retreat from ‘embedded liberalism’—whereby the benefits from openness are redistributed through greater safeguards and labour adjustment programmes**—did not originate with the Trump administration.21 But the administration intensified these trends in the area of health by reducing funding for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). **By negating the science pertaining to the virus, and by responding slowly and inadequately, the government has prolonged rather than contained the public bad, further undermining the domestic foundations of its hegemony. As for the administration's international response, it has been fragmented. Instead of organizing states to fight the ‘public bad’, the Trump administration used the crisis to crack down on open borders and threatened to rescind financial contributions to the WHO, eventually promising to withdraw from the institution altogether with effect from 1 July 2021.** As the United States has become a focal point of the crisis, **US leadership has been restricted to the exercise of monetary hegemony**. Undermining US legitimacy Up to mid-March 2020, President Trump denied the scope, gravity and lethality of COVID-19, ignoring warnings from his own administration, US intelligence and the WHO.

#### **A green jobs guarantee would boost public sanitation.**

Olderham 20 [James Olderham is a graduate economic student at Wright State University, "Green Jobs Guarantee, Coronavirus, and Public Sanitation," Spring 2020, https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=econ\_student\_papers\_economies, 10-14-20 amrita]

The COVID-19 Crisis **The current global Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic presents a challenge** unprecedented in modern times. The complexity of preventing the disease, treating the infected, and **taking necessary precautionary measures as a society have combined to create an incredibly complex and multidimensional problem**. Discovering a solution **presents major challenges** on several issues – public health, the global economy, and the institutional structure of our modern world itself. This situation is ongoing, and testing is not yet available on a full-scale, making the accuracy of current statistics difficult to determine. However, the following statistics help to paint a picture of the 5 magnitude of the impact in the United States. The below public health numbers come from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and are current as of April 24th, 2020: Total Cases: 895,766 Total Deaths: 50,439 Total Jurisdictions: 55 The jurisdictions measure indicates the U.S areas in which cases of the virus have been documented; it includes all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The numbers **indicate a massive negative impact on global health, even with the preventative steps that have been taken**. The economic impact is even harder to quantify. Naturally, **the fact that the situation is so new means that there has not been time to accurately measure economic data that would portray the true impact**. It is likely that the true magnitude of effect on the economy will not be known for some time. One measure that does **give some early indication as to the possible implications is the number of jobless claims that have occurred in the US since the virus containment measures have been put in place**. As of April 23rd, jobless claims in the previous 5 weeks in the U.S. totaled over 26 million, a number that is historically unparalleled (Cox, 2020). Though some **large portion of these claims are likely due to temporary layoffs imposed by mandated closings, even these temporary job losses are sure to have some level of economic impact.** Though difficult to quantify at this point, it is clear the pandemic has resulted in serious detrimental impact to U.S public health and economic well-being. 6 Application of the Green Job Guarantee **This is where a Green Job Guarantee program comes in**. This program **could provide stable employment for the many unemployed while also helping to fight the spread of the disease itself.** The specific proposal is this: **a job opportunity that involving sanitation of public places as a way to help improve public health and slow the spread of the Coronavirus**. The pandemic has **brought tremendous attention** to the **importance of cleaning in preventing the spread of disease**, from simple tasks such as adequate handwashing to larger scale efforts such as the sanitation of factories and workspaces. Under the proposal here, the **Government would employ all who are willing and able to go and perform cleaning and sanitation in a variety of settings**. This could **include restrooms and other facilities at public parks, or in buildings for essential government services that must remain open during the pandemic**, such as unemployment offices. The program could also be expanded, and perhaps **the Government could provide sanitation services to private firms and facilities that request the support**. In a social sense, the benefits could be tremendous**. Improved sanitation and cleaner working environments could help to prevent the spread of Coronavirus, but also generally improve the health and safety of these sanitized facilities.** In an economic sense, the benefit is clearly large. The **guarantee of meaningful employment helps to bolster the economy and help to solve the rapid spike in unemployment that the virus has cause**d. Not only does this help return individuals to employment in the short-term, but **the improved sanitation practices could have some effect on the duration of the closings and economic “lockdown” that has necessarily been put in place to contain the spread of the virus**. Effectively, by improving the safety of public and workspaces, perhaps the program could help so that the economy can be “re-opened” sooner. This type of employment is a great fit for the profile of typical Job Guarantee tasks, as **it requires little training and would 7 certainly support a fair wage in light of the importance of the task**. To meet ecological ends, the **program could mandate the use of environmentally safe cleaning chemicals** and recyclable products to the maximum extent possible. This would help **ensure that public health and economic improvements do not come at the expense of the environment.**

#### Widespread movements to improve public sanitation are the best way to hedge back against COVID—timeframe.

WHO 20 [WHO (World Health Organization), “Water, sanitation, hygiene, and waste management for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19,” 7-29-2020,WHO,https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/water-sanitation-hygiene-and-waste-management-for-covid-19, 10-15-2020 amrita]

Though little evidence is available, some data suggest that transmission via faeces, is possible but unlikely, especially where faeces become aerosolized (see further the section entitled “Sanitation and plumbing”). Because of the potential infectious disease risks from excreta, including the potential presence of SARS-CoV-2, **wastewater and sludge should be contained, and treated** either on-site or conveyed off-site and treated **in well-designed and managed wastewater and/or faecal sludge treatment plants.** Standard treatment **processes are effective for enveloped viruses, including SARS-CoV-2**. Each **stage of treatment combining physical, biological and chemical processes** (e.g. retention time, dilution, oxidation, sunlight, elevated pH, and biological activity) **results in a further reduction of the potential risk of exposure and accelerates pathogen reduction**. A final **disinfection step may be considered if existing treatment plants are not optimized to remove viruses. Sanitation services and workers are essential for operational support during the COVID-19 pandemic. Existing recommendations for protecting the health of sanitation workers should be followed.** (28) Workers should follow standard operating procedures which includes wearing appropriate PPE (protective outerwear, heavy-duty gloves, boots, medical mask, goggles and/or a face shield), minimising spills, washing dedicated tools and clothing, performing hand hygiene frequently, obtaining vaccinations for sanitation related diseases and self-monitoring for any signs of COVID-19 or other infectious disease with support of the employer. Additional precautions to prevent transmission between workers, which apply to the general population as well, include avoiding touching the eyes, nose or mouth with unwashed hands, sneezing into one’s sleeve or a disposal tissue, practising physical distancing while working, travelling to and from work and staying home if one develops symptoms associated with COVID-19 (e.g. fever, dry cough, fatigue). 4. Keeping water supplies safe **Several measures can improve water safety. These include: protecting the source water; treating water at the point of distribution, collection or consumption; and ensuring that treated water is safely stored at home in regularly cleaned and covered containers. Such measures can be effectively planned, implemented and monitored using water safety plans**. (29) Conventional, **centralized water treatment methods that utilize filtration and disinfection** should **significantly reduce the concentration of SARS-CoV-2.** Other human coronaviruses have been shown to be sensitive to chlorination and disinfection with ultraviolet (UV) light. (30, 31) For effective centralized disinfection, there should be a residual concentration of free chlorine of ≥0.5 mg/L after at least 30 minutes of contact time at pH < 8.0. (13)A chlorine residual should be maintained throughout the distribution system including distribution via water trucks or alternative transport systems (e.g. bicycle, cart, etc). In addition**, for effective water treatment, water utility managers can adopt several other preventive measures, as part of a broader water-safety planning approach.** These measures include: **ensuring adequate stocks of chemical additives and consumable reagents for water-quality testing, ensuring that critical spare parts, fuel and contractors can still be accessed and that there are contingency plans for staff and training to maintain the required supply of safe drinking.**

#### Taking substantial structural action on COVID-19 now boosts our hegemony and rolls back previous damage.

Tellis 20[Ashley J. Tellis is the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is also a counselor at the National Bureau of Asian Research and the research director of the Strategic Asia Program, “Covid-19 Knocks on American Hegemony,” 5-4-2020,The National Bureau of Asian Research,https://www.nbr.org/publication/covid-19-knocks-on-american-hegemony/, 10-15-2020 amrita]

While **any attempts at protecting the United States are obviously laudable**, the strategy of coercing allies and partners who are themselves victimized by the pandemic did not advance this goal. Rather, it **stymied the cooperation that might have allowed the United States to benefit from the research, development, testing, and production capabilities possessed by its allies** and only confirmed the view entrenched abroad that the United States under the Trump administration cares little about its friends and has no compunctions about sacrificing their equities. That the European states failed to help one another during this disaster has not helped matters either. Yet, **in a visible attempt to both exploit the shortcomings of intra-Western fraternity and demonstrate that it can serve as an alternative provider of global public goods, China grandly announced the delivery of medical assistance** (albeit of suspect quality) to various European countries that were hit hard by the virus. The self-serving nature of this Chinese magnanimity should not be lost on any of its recipients, but the contrast with Washington’s self-absorption was plain for all to see. The **absence of the United States in leading the international response to the pandemic has strengthened the perception, now commonplace even among its own allies and partners, that Washington can no longer be relied on to uphold the international order that it once created. If this pessimism takes root, it will denude U.S. alliances of their coherence and effectiveness, compelling allies to seek refuge in deeper self-help rather than to invest in cooperative action. International collaboration, even when most necessary, rarely arises as a result of spontaneous movement**. It must be orchestrated. When the stakes are high, hegemonic powers usually are the states most capable of bearing the transaction costs required to make effective coordination possible, as U.S. leadership during the global financial crisis clearly demonstrated. At the moment, the United States appears to believe—if its behavior is any indication—that bilateralism is a sufficient substitute for friendly coalitions and that its alliances are little more than the burdensome legacies of history with minimal relevance to the strategic competition that lies ahead. Nothing could be further from the truth. The **United States is preparing for the return of great-power rivalry with China at a time when its own relative power is declining and may be eroded further, depending on the outcomes of the current pandemic.** Although there is no assurance that China will come out of this crisis greatly advantaged, given the uncertainties involved, **prudence demands that the United States reinvest in those resources that offer the most promise. “Washington must double down on its alliances and partnerships. Only this U.S.-led confederation contains the preponderance of the global product that will durably immunize the liberal international order against any future challenges emanating from China or other rivals.”** That means **focusing first and foremost on revitalizing its own national power and ensuring a more equitable distribution of economic gains** domestically in order to protect a broad consensus in support of continued international primacy. But even as it attends to the business of internal regeneration, Washington must double down on its alliances and partnerships. Only this U.S.-led confederation contains the preponderance of the global product that will durably immunize the “strategic West” against any future challenges emanating from China or other rivals. **Preserving American hegemony over the long term thus must begin with consolidating Washington’s leadership within the largest single bloc of material power in order that it may be effective beyond.** Ensuring this outcome requires the United States to take seriously—and deepen meaningfully—the special geopolitical ties it has nurtured throughout the postwar period, which would among other things enable it to better shape the world’s engagement with China to advance its own interests. The management of the global pandemic thus far raises doubts about the United States’ ability to sensibly expand its power and to manage the evolving rivalry with China intelligently and in league with the nations that will be most needed for success. This is unfortunate given this administration’s otherwise astute recognition of the return of strategic competition.

#### Consensus of the best theoretical and empirical research concludes US deep engagement deters conventional conflict and nuclear proliferation cascades that cause extinction – nuclear optimism is phony baloney.

Brooks and Wohlforth ’16 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, PhD from Yale University

Stephen Brooks, William C. Wohlforth is Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, America Abroad: Why the Sole Superpower Should Not Pull Back from the World (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 103-110.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.”8 These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists.9 Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed.10 Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above-average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are: • The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.”11 In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states.12 • Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter.13 • Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program.14 As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.”15 • Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment.16 In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks.17 • Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur.18 But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear-armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program.19 In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.”20 Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter-proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear-armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them.21 It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces.22 The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil-military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.”23 Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use.24 If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war.i Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.”25 Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises.26 As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?”27 The more nuclear-armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk-taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. It is also the case that for nuclear weapons to deter a given level of conflict, there must be a real probability of their use at that level of conflict. For nuclear weapons to deter conventional attack, they must be configured in such a way as to make their use credible in response to a conventional attack. Highly controlled and reliable assured-retaliation postures might well be credible in response to a conventional attack that threatens a state’s existence. But as newer research shows, the farther the issue in question is from a state’s existential security, the harder it is to make nuclear threats credible with the type of ideally stable nuclear posture whose existence proliferation optimism presupposes.28 If a state wishes, for example, to deter a conventionally stronger neighbor from seizing a disputed piece of territory, it may face great challenges fashioning a nuclear force that is credible. Following Schelling’s logic about the “threat that leaves something to chance,” it may face incentives to create a quasi-doomsday nuclear posture that virtually locks in escalation in response to its rival’s attempt to seize the territory conventionally. Key here is that nuclear spread cannot be treated as binary: “You have ‘em or you don’t.” States can choose the kind of nuclear postures they build. Some states may choose to build dangerous and vulnerable nuclear postures. And because they lack the money or the technological capacity or both, many states may not be able to create truly survivable forces (that is, forces that can survive a nuclear first strike by a rival power) even if they wanted to. The links between nuclear possession and conflict are hard to assess empirically. Still, there are relevant findings that are probative for this debate: • Nuclear weapons are most credible at deterring the kind of conflict— threats to a state’s core territorial security—that is least relevant to the actual security concerns of most states most of the time. Both quantitative and case study research validates the claim that territorial conquest is rarely an issue in armed conflicts in the present era. Yet states that are bullish on their prospects for territorial survival as sovereign units still have plenty of security concerns and also often find plenty of reasons to use force and plenty of ways to use force other than by conquering other states.29 • Robust, secure nuclear postures do not stop states from engaging in intense security competition. Though the United States and Soviet Union did not fight each other during the Cold War, their nuclear arsenals did not prevent them from engaging in one of history’s most costly rivalries, complete with intense arms racing and dangerous crises that raised the specter of nuclear war. • Though they built massive arsenals, at various junctures the two superpowers adopted dangerously escalatory postures to attempt to deter various levels of conflict.30 • The mere possession of nuclear weapons does not deter conventional attack, as both India and Israel discovered. • In both statistical and case study tests, Vipin Narang finds that the only nuclear posture that has any effect on conventional conflict initiation and escalation is a destabilizing “asymmetrical escalatory” force, a doomsday posture designed to create intense incentives for early use, such as that constructed by Pakistan in the 1990s.31 In short, nuclear spread is a Hobson’s choice: it will inevitably increase the chances of nuclear use, and it will either not deter conventional war or will do so only by raising the risks of nuclear war even more. Add to this the risk that states in the real world may not behave in ways consistent with the assumptions underlying proliferation optimism. That is, some subset of new nuclear-armed states may not be led by rational leaders, may not prove able to overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, may not pursue security as the only major state preference, and may not be risk-averse. The scale of these risks rises as the world moves from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces (making them susceptible to a first-strike attack and thus creating incentives for early first use)—are prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. Moreover, the risk of unforeseen crisis dynamics that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage to dangerous, undeterrable nonstate actors, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. And all of these concerns emerge independently of other reasons the United States is generally better off in a world with fewer nuclear states, notably increased US freedom of action.

#### For them to win an impact turn, they need to defend and robustly define their alternative to US primacy.

Kagan ’18 - Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings

Robert Kagan, “The World America Made—and Trump Wants to Unmake,” POLITICO Magazine, September 28, 2018, <https://politi.co/2zB3qCg>.

So, yes, the liberal order has been flawed, with its share of failure and hypocrisy. Liberal goals have sometimes been pursued by illiberal means. Power, coercion and violence have played a big part. The order has been the product of American hegemony and it has also served to reinforce that hegemony. But to note these facts is hardly to condemn the order. No order of any kind can exist without some element of hegemony. The Roman order was based on the hegemony of Rome; the British order of the 18th and 19th centuries was based on the hegemony of the Royal Navy; such order as existed briefly in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon—the so-called Concert of Europe—rested on the collective hegemony of the four victorious great powers. The idea of a peaceful, stable multipolar world where no power or powers enjoy predominance is a dream that exists only in the minds of one-world idealists and international relations theorists. The same is true of those who would condemn the liberal world order because of the persistence of violence, coercion, hypocrisy, selfishness, stupidity and all the other evils and foibles endemic to human nature. Perhaps in the confines of academia it is possible to imagine a system of international relations where our deeply flawed humanness is removed from the equation. But in the real world, even the best and most moral of international arrangements are going to have their dark, immoral aspects. The question is, as always, compared to what? Patrick Porter, the author of a widely discussed critique of the liberal world order, acknowledges that “if there was to be a superpower emerging from the rubble of world war in midcentury, we should be grateful it was the United States, given the totalitarian alternatives on offer. Under America’s aegis, there were islands of liberty where prosperous markets and democracies grew.” Indeed, that would seem to be the key point. At any given time there are only so many alternatives, and usually the choice is between the bad and the worse. Are the alternatives on offer so much better now? Graham Allison, dismissing any return to the “imagined past” when the United States shaped an international liberal order, proposes that we instead make the world “safe for diversity” and accommodate ourselves to “the reality that other countries have contrary views about governance and seek to establish their own international orders governed by their own rules.” Others, such as Peter Beinart, similarly argue that we should accommodate Russian and Chinese demands for their own spheres of interest, even if that entails the sacrifice of sovereign peoples such as Ukrainians and Taiwanese. This wonderfully diverse world would presumably be run partly by Xi Jinping, partly by Vladimir Putin, and partly, too, by the Ayatollah Khamenei and by Kim Jong Un, who would also like to establish orders governed by their own rules. We have not enjoyed such diversity since the world was run partly by Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. The idea that this is the solution to our problems is laughable. Porter points out American policy has led to “multiplying foreign conflicts” and put the United States “on a collision course with rivals.” Setting aside the fact that multiplying foreign conflicts and collisions between rivals is the natural state of international relations in any era, it is hard for any student of history to imagine that these problems would lessen if only we returned to the competitive multipolar world of the 19th and early 20th centuries. To suggest that there could be a world with no collisions and no foreign conflicts, if only the United States would pursue an intelligent policy, is the very opposite of realism. Strikingly absent from all these critiques of the liberal world order, too, is any suggestion of an alternative approach. The critiques end with lists of questions that need to be answered. Allison calls for a “surge of strategic thinking.” Others call for “new thinking” about “difficult trade-offs.” Some critics even complain that so long as people continue to talk about a U.S.-dominated liberal order, it will be “impossible for us to construct a reasonable alternative for the future.” The most the critiques will offer are suggestions that sound more like attitudes than policies. They throw around words like “realism,” “restraint” and “retrenchment.” Allison proposes that the United States “limit its efforts to ensuring sufficient order abroad.” Beinart comes closest to offering an alternative, but he clearly has not yet thought it through fully. He wants to grant other powers their spheres of interest, for instance, but he mentions only Russia and China. Does this mean Russia should be granted full sway in, say, Ukraine, the Balkans, the Baltics and the Caucuses? Should China be able to impose its will on the Philippines and Vietnam? And what of the other great powers? Does Japan get its own sphere of interest? Does India? Do Germany, France and Britain? They all had their spheres a century ago, and of course it was the clashes over those inevitably overlapping spheres that led to all the great wars. Is Beinart suggesting we should return to that past? Of course, we may be moving toward that world, anyway. That is the implication of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy philosophy, his attacks on “globalism” and his recent suggestion that all nations look out strictly for themselves. Trump’s speech at the U.N. was an invitation to global anarchy, a struggle of all against all. His boasting about American power put the world on notice that the United States was turning from supporter of a liberal order to rogue superpower. This breakdown may be our future, but it seems odd to choose that course as a deliberate strategy, as Allison and others seem to do. Little wonder that they don’t wish to spell out the details of their alternative but prefer to carp at the inevitable failures and imperfections of the liberal world we have. As John Hay once remarked, “Our good friends are wiser when they abuse us for what we do, than when they try to say what ought to be done.” No honest person would deny that the liberal world order has been flawed and will continue to be flawed in the future. The League of Nations was also flawed, as was Woodrow Wilson’s vision of collective security. Yet the world would have been better had the United States joined in upholding it, given the genuine alternative. The enduring truth about the liberal world order is that, like Churchill’s comment about democracy, it is the worst system—except for all the others.

### 1AC—Advantage: Climate Change

#### Despite renewable energy movements, both the labor market and industrial production are currently severely dependent on non-renewable resources.

Rosa 20 [Jeff Della Rosa is an editor for Talk Business and Politics , “Fossil fuels account for largest share of energy production, consumption,” 9-21-2020,Talk Business & Politics,https://talkbusiness.net/2020/09/fossil-fuels-account-for-largest-share-of-energy-production-consumption/, 10-17-2020 amrita]

**Fossil fuels**, or energy sources formed in the Earth’s crust from decayed organic material, including petroleum, natural gas and coal**, continue to comprise the largest share of energy production and consumption in the United States, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). In 2019, 80% of domestic energy production was from fossil fuels, and 80% of domestic energy consumption could be attributed to fossil fuels.** The share of U.S. total energy production from fossil fuels reached a peak of 93% in 1966. **Total fossil fuel production has continued to increase, but production has also risen for non-fossil fuel sources such as nuclear power and renewables. As a result, fossil fuels have accounted for about 80% of U.S. energy production over the past decade.** Since 2008, U.S. production of crude oil, dry natural gas and natural gas plant liquids has risen by 15 quadrillion British thermal units (quads), 14 quads and 4 quads, respectively**. These increases have more than offset declining coal production, which has fallen 10 quads since its peak in 2008.** In 2019, U.S. energy production exceeded energy consumption for the first time since 1957, and U.S. energy exports exceeded energy imports for the first time since 1952. U.S. energy net imports as a share of consumption rose to a peak of 30% in 2005. Energy net imports fell below zero in 2019, but many regions in the United States continued to import significant amounts of energy. **Most U.S. energy trade is from petroleum, including crude oil and petroleum products, which accounted for 69% of energy exports and 86% of energy imports in 2019. Much of the imported crude oil is processed by U.S. refineries and is exported as petroleum products. Petroleum products accounted for 42% of total U.S. energy exports in 2019.** The share of U.S. total energy consumption attributed to fossil fuels has fallen from its peak of 94% in 1966 to 80% in 2019. The total amount of fossil fuels consumed in the United States has also declined from its peak of 86 quads in 2007. Since then, coal consumption has fallen by 11 quads. In 2019, renewable energy consumption in the United States surpassed coal consumption for the first time. The decline in coal consumption, along with a 3-quad decrease in petroleum consumption, more than offset an 8-quad increase in natural gas consumption.

#### We can’t transition away—white, low-income blue collared workers will continue to support non-renewable industries like fracking and anti-climate change policies since they depend on jobs from fossil fuel corporations.

Sances and You 19 [Michael W. Sances is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at University of Memphis, Hye Young You is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University, “Voters and Donors: The Unequal Political Consequences of Fracking,” 05-2019, Political Institutions and Economic Policy ,https://hyeyoungyou.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/fracking.pdf, 10-15-2020 amrita]

To investigate the partisan effects of fracking on turnout, we use the Catalist data on individual ideology. **Given that fracking states are more conservative overall, we create a relative liberalism score for each individual within a state to identify which group of voters within a state is more affected by fracking booms. First, we calculate the average ideology of individuals in the same state; we then subtract the state-level average ideology from an individual’s ideology**. This index gives the relative liberalism of an individual compared to individuals who live in the same state. We divide individuals into five quintiles from the most conservative (1st quintile) to the most liberal (5th quintile). **We then create interaction terms between a fracking variable at the zip code-level and each quintile.** Table 6 presents the results. Columns (1) through (4) present the results when we include all states. Each of the first three columns interacts a different measure of fracking with liberalism quintiles, while the fourth column reports the long difference interacted with liberalism**. In these regressions, the coefficient on “Frack” represents the impact of fracking on the most conservative voters, and this is negative for the estimates in all states.** We also observe **there are additional turnout declines for more liberal voters, as the signs of the interactions are all negative.** For example, when we use a fracking dummy (Any Wells), turnout for voters in the 5th quintile declines by 8.8 percentage points more than baseline voters (column (3)). Columns (5) through (8) present the results when we focus on seven high fracking states. **We do not observe a turnout decline for the most conservative voters, but the turnout decline becomes clear for other voters, with the magnitude of the effect growing larger as voters become more liberal. We also examine whether increased campaign contributions from fracking areas after shale gas booms have asymmetric partisan implications**. To do so, we determine the percentage of total contributions given to Democratic candidates in each zip code area. Table 7 presents the results. Regardless of the specifications and the set of states included in the analysis, campaign contributions given to Democrats in fracking areas declined, despite the fact that total campaign contributions from fracking areas significantly increased after shale booms. We next ask how fracking is correlated with the number of donors in a zip code. That is, we replicate the analysis shown earlier in Table 4, but replace the total amount donated with the total number of donors, the total number of donors giving to Democrats, and the total number of donors giving to Republicans. **To be thorough we conduct this analysis using all three measures of fracking examined earlier, as well as using the long difference specification.** For presentational purposes, we only display the results in the main text when we use the log number of wells and the dummy variable of any wells but Table A1 presents the full results. Table 8 shows the results**. Just as we previously found that the share of contributions to Democrats declines, here we also see that while fracking generally increases the total number of donors, the increases are almost entirely concentrated among Republicans. For Democratic donors, the point estimates are either negative or insignificant and close to zero.** The DIME data also allow us to test within-donor changes in fracking areas. For each individ28 ual donor in a zip code, we calculate the ratio of their total contributions given to all Democratic candidates in any race, in federal-level races, and in state-level races. Within these specifications, we include donor fixed effects as well as year fixed effects. We show the results in Table 9. Again, we present results using different fracking measures, as well as for all states and high fracking states only.14 **To summarize, the pattern of results, in general, shows declines in the ratio of giving to all Democratic candidates** (the columns titled “All**”); breaking this into state and federal candidates shows that the largest declines appear in state races**. Interestingly, in some cases we also find that donors shift toward Democrats at the federal level. In sum**, the larger decline in turnout by more liberal voters and the disadvantages that Democratic candidates suffered in fundraising after fracking booms provide a micro-explanation of the Republican Party’s electoral success and the increased anti-environmental voting records of elected politicians from fracking areas.** This suggests that Democratic voters are more alienated from their party’s policy positions after fracking booms and leads them to be less likely to turnout than Republican voters (Adams and Merrill 2003; Adams, Dow, and Merrill 2006). **When natural resource booms change voters’ preferences but politicians do not change their policy positions following the booms, this often creates larger issues in congruence for liberal voters and donors, since positive income shocks tend to have conservative biases** (Doherty, Gerber, and Green 2006; Brunner, Ross, and Washington 2011). There may be another related mechanism behind this partisan asymmetry. When the Republican party consistently supports pro-fracking, Democratic voters in the fracking areas become less likely to turn out because they may perceive economic benefits are delivered by the opposition party, so it weakens their motivation to turn out (Chen 2013).15

#### A green jobs guarantee creates both a structural and a mindset transition away from fossil fuels by supplying alternative jobs for workers.

Maciel 19 [Carlos Maciel is part of the Young Scholar Initiative, “Green Jobs to Save the World,” 5-26-2019, <https://economicquestions.org/green-job-guarantee-to-save-the-world/>, 10-14-20 amrita]

The **current structure of the economy relies too heavily on fossil fuels**, wasteful production methods and non-renewable resources. Unless we change this, **sustaining full-employment would result in increasing production**, consumption, and waste. This reminds me of my favorite Keynes’ quote, “In the long run we are all dead.” If we’re talking about a long run of increasing pollution, he would surely be right. As we know, too much of a good thing can be a bad thing. This applies to jobs too. **Unless the jobs created are green jobs, too much employment will bring us to environmental destruction.** How do we do it? The issue of the environmental sustainability of a Job Guarantee program has been on my mind since I first heard of the revolutionary employment policy. Mathew Forstater’s Green Jobs proposal has been inspirational to my work. In my Master’s thesis, I tweaked its existing framework to target environmentally sustainable outcomes. I find that we can transform **the Job Guarantee program to ensure its sustainability without increasing its cost**. Here’s how: I set up **the program in a way that promotes social enterprise and community development**, following the work of Pavlina Tcherneva and colleagues. With the help of social entrepreneurs, NGOs, and Nonprofit Organizations, **local communities should decide what projects will be undertaken**. For example, communities along the Hudson River could support a program where workers dealt with invasive species such as the zebra mussel and water chestnut. Other localities could handle neighborhood farming, recycling centers, flood containment structures, bike paths, etc. **It’s been found that if the community is involved in determining what projects are taken on, participation levels are higher.** A more detailed account of my proposal and calculations is available upon request, but this is the gist of it: **I used an Input-Output model to establish what would be the cost of employing the official U-3 unemployed population into “green” Job Guarantee jobs. That framework accounts for indirect job creation related to the proposal, but not induced employment. What I find is that the US government can, under conservative assumptions, employ all of those who are officially unemployed for around 1.1% of GDP while paying them a $15hr wage.** That is about **17% of the annual military budget.** The Green Job Guarantee program is **projected to cost just under 200 billion dollars per year in order to ensure employment for 7.8 million people.** As the **world economy quickly transitions into a more sustainable state, a shift in the productive structure will occur, rendering some current occupations useless**. Workers who are employed in areas like fossil fuel energy generation (the fabled coal workers of the American Midwest for example) will be left without a job and unlikely to find a new one right away. There is no way to predict how quickly this transition will occur: it could be a gradual–albeit fast–process if led by government initiative, a slower and insufficient movement if guided by profit motives, or even a sudden transition caused by a widespread popular response to natural disasters. Given current trends, I don’t believe it’s too optimistic to think the transition to a renewable energy generation and a sustainable economy will occur before the fossil reserves are depleted. As such, **fossil fuel workers (and those who depend on their consumption) are at risk of losing their jobs in the near future**. A **Job Guarantee program would allow those workers to not only find employment readily** but also to acquire on-the-job skills that will allow them an easier transition into the Green economy.

#### Offering an alternative source of work is the only solution that can fully combat the fossil fuel industry since it garners support from unionized, non-renewable workers.

Urpelainen 20 [Johannes Urpelainen is the director and Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz Professor of Energy, Resources and Environment at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He also is the founding director of the Initiative for Sustainable Energy Policy (ISEP),” Fossil fuels: Save the workers, kill the industry,” 4-30-2020,TheHill,https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/494427-fossil-fuels-save-the-workers-kill-the-industry, 10-16-2020 amrita]

The **fossil fuel industry faces a turbulent future.** As **evidence for fossil fuels’ destructive climate impact has mounted, calls for replacing them with cleaner alternatives, such as wind and solar power, have grown louder.** To **avoid a climate disaster and prepare for a low-carbon economy,** governments with oil, gas and coal resources **must help fossil fuel workers find new jobs outside their industry. Fossil fuels are still an enormously important source of employment across the world.** Over 10 million people worldwide are directly employed by the fossil fuel industry. Most of these jobs may disappear in the coming years. Even more people depend indirectly on the fossil fuel industry. In many countries, fossil fuel jobs offer higher salaries and better benefits than most jobs. Each fossil fuel worker generates a number of additional local jobs. Based on interviews with industry experts in India, for example, every coal miner on a monthly salary generates anywhere between 3-10 additional local jobs through their consumption. If the coal miner’s job is lost, these other local jobs also disappear For all these people, **phasing out fossil fuels will mean economic pain. Fossil fuel communities in many countries tend to be “company towns” with few alternative livelihoods**. The dominant **fossil fuel industry crowds out other sectors, and the local community becomes heavily dependent on this one source of income**. Saving the workers is ethical and politically savvy In this situation, **governments must step in to help fossil fuel workers**. First, it is the right thing to do. **Workers in the fossil fuel industry are not responsible for climate change**. Just like everyone else, **they are simply trying to make a living and provide for their families. They do not have much say over the ethically problematic decisions made by corporate leaders, such as denying the existence of climate change**. Second, **adjustment assistance is essential for economic diversification.** To avoid long-term economic stagnation, **fossil fuel workers must find alternative jobs. This is a difficult thing to do because fossil fuel workers tend to have highly specialized skills**. **Government funding for training programs and relocation for a new job is essential to avoid an economic disaster and the social problems that may accompany unemployment**, such as crime and addiction. Finally, helping workers is a smart political move. **If politicians want to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, they need to build a robust political coalition. This is difficult to do without the fossil fuel workers, who are often unionized and politically powerful.** Political **leaders who offer a plausible and appealing transition plan can garner the support of fossil fuel workers, thus breaking through a key barrier to sustainable energy**. Governments should focus their efforts on immediate job creation and training. **Fossil fuel workers should be** quickly **trained to compete for jobs in growing industries,** such as clean energy installation.

#### A smooth energy transition requires worker support in order to prevent rollback and ensure a rapid adaptation to renewable forms of energy.

Dirk Schoenmaker 16, Senior Fellow at Bruegel and Professor of Banking and Finance at Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam; and Rens van Tilburg, senior researcher at SOMO (Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations, 4/22/16, “Financial risks and opportunities in the time of climate change,” <http://bruegel.org/2016/04/financial-risks-and-opportunities-in-the-time-of-climate-change/>

One of the most studied risks to the financial system stemming from ecological imbalances is the so called ‘carbon bubble’ (Carbon Tracker, 2011), or the overvaluation of fossil-fuel reserves and related assets should the world manage to tackle global warming. Staying within a 2°C temperature rise puts a limit on future carbon emissions and hence on the amount of fossil fuels that can be burned, requiring a sharp bending of the current trend (Figure 1)4. This could strand many existing fossil fuel reserves. Without carbon sequestration, McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimate that if global warming is to be kept below 2°C up to 2050, approximately 35 percent of known oil reserves, 52 percent of gas reserves and 88 percent of coal reserves are unburnable (Table 1). The numbers are slightly lower if carbon is sequestrated. Private oil, gas and coal mining companies own about a quarter of fossil fuel reserves; sovereigns and their oil, gas and coal companies own the remainder. If a large part of these reserves cannot be extracted or extraction becomes commercially unviable, the valuation of these companies and their ability to repay their debt is reduced. The equity, bond and credit exposures of EU financial institutions to firms holding fossil-fuel reserves and to fossil-fuel commodities are substantial. Table 2 shows that the total exposure of €1,061 billion is 38 percent equity financed and 62 percent debt financed (Weyzig et al, 2014). Such large numbers raise concerns about the potential consequences of these investments if a large part of the oil, gas and coal reserves ends up stranded. The costs of late transition go well beyond The energy sector Though these exposures and potential losses are large, on their own they will probably not cause a systemic crisis in a healthy economy and financial sector. However, the effect of the bursting of the carbon bubble will not be limited to the oil, gas and coal sectors alone. A sudden transition will be a shock to all sectors that use fossil fuels as an input, either in the production or in the use of their products and services. There are potentially major implications between sectors (electricity powered high speed trains versus fossil fuel jet planes) and within sectors (car manufacturers that specialise in electric cars versus heavy car manufacturers). The financial impact will therefore be much greater than the numbers here indicate. If the transition is sudden and late, the financial system could be affected by its exposure to carbon-intensive real and financial assets. Moreover, reduced energy supply and increased energy costs would impair macroeconomic activity, as the hard landing forces a rapid transition away from fossil-fuel based energy production. While a gradual transition would allow for a gradual write-down of long-lasting carbon-intensive infrastructures and assets, a rapid transition would force more radical write-downs because of the negligible scrap value of stranded assets and not fully anticipated losses. Current market pricing might reflect both a lack of awareness of the challenges posed by climate change and uncertainty about the path of policy (ASC, 2016).

#### Shifting to renewables is key to solving climate change—US is key.

Burns 18 [(Sean, a visiting assistant professor at The College of William and Mary,) "All the selfish reasons we need an anti-oil foreign policy. It's not just about climate.," USA TODAY 11-29-2018] RE

As a new U.S. government report shows, climate change will have massive negative effects on our economy and cause significant displacement of Americans. Republicans responded by questioning the science of climate change, or like Sens. Mike Lee and Ben Sasse, claiming that a switch to renewable energy sources would hurt the nation. In fact, a transition to renewable energy is quite feasible. And, separate from its effects on the environment, it would advance long-term U.S. foreign policy interests by undermining the international influence of oil. Climate change is the global challenge of our time. Limiting its effects will require the rapid replacement of carbon-producing fossil fuels with battery-powered vehicles and renewable energy sources. But moving away from carbon-based fuels should not be thought of as a cost that America must pay to help the world. It is, rather, an opportunity to advance U.S. domestic and foreign policy goals. America should pursue an aggressive strategy of rapid decarbonization of the world economy for its own selfish interests. We can't fix climate alone, but others will follow Climate change is a worldwide problem that requires a worldwide solution. Sasse and other Republicans, when they accept climate change exists, argue that the United States cutting emissions won’t help because other countries will not follow suit. It is a dubious claim, but it reflects a real concern. In the terms of economic and political theory, climate change is a collective action problem. Everyone will benefit from a reduction in fossil fuel use, but everyone hopes someone else will pay the bulk of the cost. It is easiest to solve a collective action problem when one player is big enough to solve the problem alone and will uniquely benefit from its solution. America is still the world’s only superpower. Ending the world’s reliance on fossil fuels is in its power and would provide us with unique and individual benefits. America cannot solve climate change alone, but it can unilaterally drive down renewable energy prices so much that it makes sense for most of the world to switch away from hydrocarbons, and it should do so to advance its own interests. Oil and natural gas prop up authoritarian states and create security challenges for our country. Hydrocarbon rentier states — nations such as Saudi Arabia that depend on fossil fuel exports for large portions of their revenue — are less democratic, more corrupt and more wasteful than similar states without oil. Oil creates conflict, which often requires U.S. intervention. And much of the U.S. foreign policy exposure, particularly in the Persian Gulf, is a result of the U.S. desire to protect world oil supplies. Most important, however, is that oil and gas wealth props up and empowers U.S. enemies and force the United States to enable and depend on dubious allies. Fossil fuel wealth and control empower Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Iran's government gets most of its revenue from oil exports. And U.S. relationships with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have long represented a trade-off between long-term interests in democratization and short-term interests in keeping the oil flowing. America has the power to cripple the oil states while building on its own technological superiority. Renewable energy technology is becoming cheaper at a rapid rate and, as David Roberts at Vox has shown, it can be purposefully sped up. The industrial learning curve measures the price drop that comes with every doubling of production. It is separate from economies of scale and represents learning how to do things better. We have not reached the bottom of the learning curve for solar or wind, and we are not near the bottom for batteries. So no major technological discoveries are required, just practice. Renewable energy will kill fossil fuels soon It costs less in some places to create wind or solar farms than to keep running coal or natural gas plants. We are on the cusp of making electric cars the standard, and they are ultimately cheaper to own than internal combustion vehicles. Buying more of this technology will make the technology even cheaper, leading to a death spiral for fossil fuel prices. The United States should make large investments in buying and deploying renewable energy technology, both at home and abroad, as a means of disempowering oil states and reducing U.S. defensive exposure abroad. It should do so at home by cutting fossil fuel subsidies, creating a much needed next-generation national power grid, and buying electric cars for its vehicle fleets. Abroad it should provide subsidies for developing countries to buy U.S. renewable energy technology. Eventually, a carbon tax on both domestic and imported goods would be beneficial. Most important, the United States should be clear about what it is doing. America should announce that it plans to make oil and natural gas all but obsolete in the international economy within 20 years. This will have immediate impact on the foreign and domestic affairs of the oil states and reduce potential conflicts over new sources, particularly in the Arctic, Mediterranean and South China Sea. The Montreal Protocol against ozone layer depletion is often cited as a model for climate change mitigation, but it probably would not have happened if the largest producer of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons, DuPont, did not have a replacement product ready or if America had not pushed for the treaty. A U.S. company had the technology and the United States led the change. We need that boldness again. America should lead a world push toward renewable energy, not only to slow climate change but to also disempower its rivals, break free from dubious allies, reduce the number of conflict flashpoints, and increase U.S. technology dominance. It can do so simply by doing what is already in its domestic interests: rapidly scaling up the use of renewable and battery technology, and subsidizing the spread of American technology to the developing world.

#### Climate change is exponential, not linear since it’s a continual and compounded multiplier because of its invisibility, generating massive amounts of slow violence—means it outweighs all other impacts.

Nixon 11[Rob Nixon is a Rachel Carson Professor of English at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, “Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor,” 2011, pg. 2-3, 10-17-2020 amrita]

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By **slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility**. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. **Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification,deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory.** Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence**. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities.** A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, **slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.**

#### Warming causes extinction ☹

Yangyang Xu 17, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).