# SO20 – NC – Kant (2:00)

#### Permissibility and Presumption negate: A] “Ought” in the resolution mean that you need to prove an obligation to do the aff – permissibility means that aff isn’t an obligation, I prove it false so vote neg B] Probability – There are infinite number of ways to prove a statement false and only one way to prove it true – means res is more likely to be false.

#### The metaethic is practical reason. Prefer:

#### [1] Regress – Ethical theories must have a basis. We can always ask why we should follow the basis of a theory, so they aren’t morally binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow

#### [2] Action Theory – Every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason

#### Now, practical reason means we all have a unified perspective: What can be justified to me can be justified to everyone who is a practical reasoner. If I can conclude that 2+2 is 4, then I understand not only that I know 2+2 is 4, but that everyone around me can arrive at the same conclusion. These things are temporally consistent: I know that me adding two numbers now and taking that sum will not result in me adding the same two numbers in the future and getting a different sum. Our unified perspective does not change but rather stays consistent.

#### But, willing an action that violates the freedom of others is a contradiction: If I decide to kill someone, that action is not universalizable because that would justify other people killing me too. If I die, I cannot exercise my freedom to kill someone else. This is a contradiction: I both justify extending my freedom to kill others and limiting my own freedom. That justifies a libertarian state. Otteson 9.

[Otteson 9 \*\*brackets in original\*\* James R. Otteson (professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter 2009] SHS ZS

In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “Universal Principle of Right” is **“‘[e]very action which** by itself or by its maxim **enables the** **freedom of** each **individual’s** will **to co-exist** with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law **is right**.’” He concludes, “Thus **the universal** law of right is as **follows**: **let your** external **actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone** in accordance with a universal law” (1991, 133, emphasis in original).5 **This stipulation becomes** for **Kant** the grounding **justification for the** existence of a **state**, its raison d’être, and **the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum freedom** compatible with the same freedom of all others. Because this freedom must be complete, in the sense of being as full as possible given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that **the state** may—indeed, **must**—**secure this condition of freedom**, **but undertake to do nothing else** because any other state activities would compromise the very autonomy the state seeks to defend. **Kant’s position** thus outlines and **implies a political philosophy that is** broadly **libertarian**; that is, it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting its citizens against invasions of their liberty. For Kant, **individuals create a state to protect their moral agency**, and in doing so **they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent** themselves or **others from impinging on their own** or others’ **agency**. In his argument, **individuals cannot** rationally **consent to a state that** instructs them in morals, coerces virtuous behavior, **commands them** to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for their own or others’ pursuits of happiness. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 **this severe limitation on the scope of the state**’s authority **must** always **be respected**: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that **a Kantian state protects against invasions of freedom and does nothing else**; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### [1] Performativity – Argumentation presupposes a priori truth in trying to prove claims as valid. Being able to objectively decide between arguments and evaluate them necessitates a higher framework that is a priori knowledge. Refuting this claim concedes to the authority of the argument, as you rely on an external framework to prove it false.

#### Negate:

#### [1] Abstention – Compulsory voting destroys the right to abstain from voting which is constitutive to libertarian democracies. Schafer 11.

[Schäfer 11, Armin, (2011) : Republican liberty and compulsory voting, MPIfG Discussion Paper, No. 11/17, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, <https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51552/1/672242184.pdf> SJCP//JG] SHS ZS

**The** second normative **argument against compulsory voting sees abstention [is] as a** valuable **political act in itself**. If one dislikes the party platforms or the political personnel on offer, **there might be political reasons to abstain**. In fact, **if participation** in an election **perpetuated injustice** – unfair electoral rules or a corrupt regime – **it would be morally appropriate to abstain** (Hanna 2009). **Not to vote under** these circumstances **can convey a stronger** political **message than** **voting for the lesser evil does**. Stripping citizens of the possibility to send this message impoverishes democracy. Creating an artificially high turnout rate could cover up a lack of interest and the level of political dissatisfaction among the citizens (Franklin 1999: 206). If, in particular, the marginalized do not vote because they feel generally sidelined from society, unable to obtain access to education, decent housing, or jobs, it seems difficult to see how compulsory voting will address, rather than exacerbate, the alienation of these non-voters, who are typically the objects, not the subjects, of political debate and policy, and who typically constitute the ‘problems’ that politicians are competing to solve. (Lever 2008: 62) From this perspective, making people vote appears to be a palliative move rather than an appropriate cure for the disease. Third, while some authors accept that mandatory voting is an effective way to increase turnout and equalize participation, they nonetheless insist that these benefits do not carry enough weight to justify coercion. Even if abstention meant that non-voters acted against their interest, it would still not be legitimate to force them to behave differently. **In a** liberal **democracy**, **citizens have** guaranteed political rights, and **the right to vote** is a crucial one. However, if someone who holds this right chooses under no duress not to make use of it, there is little to worry about. **The right to vote entails the inverse right not to vote** (Katz 1997: 244). **Just as the right of free speech does not mean** that **everyone has to** queue at Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park to **debate an issue** and just as religious liberty entails the right not to believe, the right to vote leaves it up to the holder of this right what to do with it.12 **Rights do not come as duties**, and it is paternalistic to judge on behalf of others the type of behavior that would promote their own interests best.

#### [2] Coercion – The state has an obligation to uphold the law of equal freedom; when they call upon individuals to vote they are forcing citizens to labor when they have never given consent. Otteson 2.

[Otteson 2 James R. Otteson (professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter 2009 12/31/14] SHS ZS

Poor relief and charitable activities, however, cannot be supported on these grounds because such state activities violate Kant’s law of equal freedom in at least two ways. The first way involves the people to whom such aid is provided. Kant has argued that **each rational being must be allowed the freedom to make** his own **decisions about how** best **to lead** his own **life and** how to **achieve happiness**. This freedom presumably includes the freedom to make even poor decisions because Kant’s claim that freedom is necessary for progress to occur implies that people make and learn from their mistakes. But **if the state steps in** when one has made a mistake and protects him from the consequences of that mistake, as may happen in cases of state-sponsored poor relief, foundling hospitals, and so on,9 then **the state robs** those **citizens of the opportunity for the moral progress that the law of equal freedom is supposed to protect**. Such state-sponsored activities, however well intentioned and whatever good they in fact may do, seem to be instances of the kind of paternalism that Kant elsewhere repeatedly rejects. The paternalism he disallows seems especially evident in the case of state-endorsed “church activities.” **The** second way such **state** activities **violate the law of equal freedom** involves those whom **[when]** **the state calls on** **to provide** the money, goods, and **services** in question. **The alternative** to having the state sponsor these activities **is to allow** them to occur (or not) according to private initiative, allowing **individuals to decide on their own how much time or money to contribute**, which people or charities to support, and so on. When Kant calls on the state to take over such activities, however, he is calling on the state—or the “supreme commander”—to substitute its judgment about such matters for individuals’ judgment. He thus grants to some a scope of freedom and authority that is denied to others, which would seem to violate the law of equal freedom.10 Moreover, **because** the **people now required to provide** the goods and **services** did not freely choose to do so—which, by hypothesis, is the case because we are not considering private provision—**a Kantian might** then **consider the state’s** requiring them to provide such support [is] as tantamount to the state’s **forcing them to labor** against their will: they must work either in a way they would not have chosen or to an extent they would not have chosen or for an end they would not have chosen. But **each of these possibilities** again **seems a violation of the law of equal freedom**, which, for Kant, is unacceptable: “For a human being can never be manipulated just as a means of realizing someone else’s intentions. He is protected against this by his inherent personality” (Metaphysics of Morals, 1991, 155).

#### [3] There is an act-omission distinction – A. Otherwise there would be an infinite amount of obligations for a moral agent which would render action impossible B. It’s consequentialist and assumes we would know what happens when an agent doesn’t take an action, since there is nothing inherent to not acting. C. Incoherent – you wouldn’t blame someone for drowning baby in their pool equally as somebody who didn’t risk their life to save a drowning baby. That negates: the aff is a critique on the effects of not voting, but we cannot hold entities responsible for omissions of actions, which means the only offense can be derived from negating.

# Frontlines

## Extensions

### Overview

#### Extend the framework – the metaethic is practical reason, which means that all people are rational agents that set and pursue their own ends when acting. Since all practical reasoners have access to a priori knowledge, that means that actions must be universalizable to all since we are all practical reasoners. That means violations of freedom are not universalizable, because in violating somebody else’s freedom, you would be restricting your own freedom in the first place. That justifies a libertarian state which protects the freedom of all of its citizens.

#### Extend the offense which shows compulsory voting is a restriction upon people’s freedom. People have the right to abstain from voting since mandating it is an overreach of the state’s authority and a violation of freedom.

## Offense Frontlines

### AT Free Riders

#### [1] No link – nonvoters aren’t free-riders insofar as they aren’t putting anyone at a disadvantage for not voting. This card is in the context of how a citizen could harm another by NOT doing their civic duty.

#### [2] No warrant – you don’t explain why voting is constitutive to a democracy, which means citizens don’t even have an obligation to partake in the voting process – this assumes voting is already mandatory

#### [3] There isn’t a benefit to more people voting – just because some people vote doesn’t mean it creates a better society, which means people aren’t freeriding since the action of voting isn’t beneficial to begin with. Don’t let them sandbag why voting is good – that would be consequentialist and doesn’t function under the framing.

### AT Equality of Voting

#### [1] Squo solves – citizens still have equitable access to the ballots if they want their opinion heard

#### [2] Universal participation isn’t constitutive to a democracy; merely being offered the opportunity to vote is

#### [3] Cross apply Otteson – the SOLE obligation of the state is to facilitate the freedom of its citizens and do nothing more – that means the coercion of forcing voting outweighs