# 1NC

## Part 1 is the web of lies

#### Voting for all has never been voting for all, one person one vote is a lie.

#### A story from the Library of Congress in Collaboration with the National Museum of African American History and Culture.

**Library Of Congress** (an act, No Date, accessed on 9-2-2020, The Library of Congress, "Voting Rights  | Articles and Essays  | Civil Rights History Project  | Digital Collections  | Library of Congress ", https://www.loc.gov/collections/civil-rights-history-project/articles-and-essays/voting-rights/)[KDandu]

**When Reconstruction ended** in 1877, **states** across the South **implemented new laws to restrict the voting rights of African Americans**. These included onerous requirements of owning property, paying poll taxes, and passing literacy or civics exams. Many African Americans who attempted to vote **were also threatened physically or feared losing their jobs**. One of the major goals of the Civil Rights Movement was to register voters across the South in order for African Americans to gain political power. Most of the interviewees in the Civil Rights History Project were involved in voter registration drives, driving voters to the polls, teaching literacy classes for the purposes of voter registration, or encouraging local African Americans to run as candidates. Robert G**. Clark,** Jr., **explained the retaliation** against those who dared to register voters **in his interview**. **When Clark worked as a teacher** in Belzoni, Mississippi, **a local minister named Reverend Lee was shot and killed for registering voters in the mid-1950s**. He also remembered the difficulties his father faced in his career for taking the same risk: “**My father was a schoolteacher. He was fired in Holmes County because he was teaching voter registration classes… he could not get another job** in Mississippi. See, what they would do, **they would take your name and give your name to the Sovereignty Commission. That Sovereignty Commission would send those names to all of the superintendents of education.**” The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission was created by an act of the Mississippi State Legislature in 1955 as a backlash against the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court case and the perceived encroachment of the federal government’s power. The commission investigated activists across the state, using a network of informants, economic reprisals, and threats. Clark was later elected as the first black Representative elected to the Mississippi State House after Reconstruction, a result of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rosie Head remembers her attempt to register to vote in Mississippi in 1964, when the local clerk used police dogs to try to intimidate her and other women. She says, “The chancellor clerk had said to me, ‘Now, I know you know better!’ He knew my grandparents. ‘I’ve known your people for years and years, and I know you know better. What are you doing out here anyway?’ And so, I told him what I wanted. And he said, ‘You go home and do like your mama and your grandmama did. You don’t need to come out here. This ain’t for black folk.’” The clerk would not approve her test and it was not until the Voting Rights Act passed the following year that federal registrars found her records and allowed her to vote. Voter registration drives also brought African American communities together to work for a common cause. John Churchville was registering voters when he came across two rival teenage gangs fighting in Americus, Georgia. He stepped into the fight to stop it and recalls, “And they just stopped. I said, ‘This is what white folks want you to do! Why are you doing this?! We’re here to help you to register so you can get some power for real and stop fighting each other.’ They stopped gang warring. We were able to recruit them to first register themselves, and then to negotiate a peace treaty and help us go out and recruit people to register and vote.” **Voting was a lifelong dream for** many older **African Americans in the South**. Charles Siler worked on a voter registration project in Baton Rouge in 1962. He remembers an elderly Mrs. Williams, whom he took to register, her third attempt. He took a gun with him, under his coat, for protection. He remembers, “I was prepared to shoot somebody if they had decided to go that far. They didn’t, because when she walked in, she was in charge. They moved aside. She walked—and when she walked into the Registrar of Voters office, I was told, ‘You can’t go in there.’ I said, ‘No problem.’ I stood back against the wall… I was waiting. And I was standing there like this and I was pressing that little Beretta because I wanted—when she came out she had this smile on her face. Okay? That made all of it worth it. It was, you know, as good as it could get at that moment, because she got what she wanted and she got to vote before she died. And, you know, you think about being eighty-four in 1962. Her parents had been slaves… to her, it was important.” **The long struggle for African American voting rights was part of a centuries-old effort to ensure that the United States Constitution applied to all citizens, not just white male landowners. Despite the passage of many constitutional amendments, federal and state laws, and Supreme Court cases, the full participation of every American citizen in elections is an ideal that has never been reached**. John Rosenberg worked in the 1960s as an attorney for the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, primarily investigating voting rights violations and abuses in the South. He laments the 2013 Supreme Court case that repealed section IV of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided special protections for voters in states in the South with a history of violations. He advises, “Now whether it is congressional work or lawsuits that are going to be filed in some of the cases, you saw in a number of these states that they immediately started coming out with voter ID laws or other kinds of statutes, other laws that are obviously intended to turn the clock back and make it more difficult for people, minorities, to register to vote and that kind of thing. … I think the decision is wrong, but … that’s our system and we don’t go into the streets, we start working on trying to change it.”

#### The aff mirrors the past now saying that there is no difference between citizen and voter and with that there is no difference between person and number. The aff is not helping any cause, they get to cement the alienation of the black community, even if they say black voters increase, voting aff is throwing away their revolution. I am not saying that voting is bad, I am saying the product of making everybody the same as a voter throws away black history.

## Part 2 is the new revolution

#### The 1NC speech act is a genealogical investigation and deconstruction of this master narrative and the story is a part of the process to breakdown these shared assumptions that we have and the harmful ideology they set up. The alternative we endorse is to engage in a genealogical approach to the topic. Through the reading of our stories, we reject the claim to throw away centuries of civil rights for a misconception of suffrage. Our speech act disrupts these narratives and remembers forgotten histories.

Brown 01, Wendy. “ONE. INTRODUCTION Politics Out of History.” Politics Out of History, 2001, pp. 3–17., doi:10.1515/9780691188058-002. (I can provide the pdf upon request)

Why have I insisted on pointing out, with the greatest care, the distinction between theory and practice, between the Croce here assists us in making an intriguing return to the problematic of morality whose trace I have argued we now experience painfully as the antilife, antipolitical, and anti-intellectual force of political moralism. Yet our return is not a simple recuperation, precisely because we are today forced to openly invent our political projects and their moral content, without relying on either teleological or redemptive history, without having recourse to moral or other ontological systems rooted in nature, fetishized reason, the dialectic, or the divine. We are confronted today with the fact of history-and so also with political futures and the actions that would produce and configure them-as a sheer problem of power. This is what is brought into view at the moment that historical metanarratives are fully exposed as fictions. Croce's argument for a literal and figural separation between political life and intellectual inquiry suggests possibilities both for the rejuvenation of a rich moral political vision and for an abatement of the moralizing by which contemporary intellectual and political formations currently infect each other. To imagine what this stance might look like for intellectual consider Foucault's response to an interviewer who asked whether he wrote *The Use of Pleasure and* Techniques of the Self “for the liberation movement.” “Not for,” replied Foucault steadily, “but in terms of, a contemporary situation.” 20 The difference between "for" and "in terms of" is critical: it indicates whether intellectual life will be submitted to existing political discourses and the formulation of immediate political needs those discourses articulate, or will be allowed the air of independence that it must have in order to be of value as intellectual work for political life. Foucault does not position his work with indifference to an existing political movement, nor does he argue that his thinking is unconditioned by it or irrelevant to its prospects. Rather, he distinguishes the value of critical thinking from policy formulation, or blueprints for action. Maurice Merleau-Ponty made a similar argument while quarreling with Jean-Paul Sartre about the relevant level of engagement with politics by philosophers. I have in no way renounced writing about politics ....With the Korean War, I made the decision-and this is something entirely different-to stop writing about events as they occur. ... In times of tension, taking a stand on each event ... becomes a system of "bad faith." ...That is why on several occasions I suggested in this journal [Les Temps Modernes] that we present comprehensive studies rather than hastily taken positions ....This method is closer to politics than your method of continuous engagement. That in itself makes it more philosophical, as it creates a distance between the event and our judgment of it, defusing the trap of the event.21 The trap of the event, to which we might today add the "trap of existing discourses," is precisely that which intellectuals who aim to be thoughtful and useful to political life need to spring open; Foucault (in a formulation elaborated in chapter 6) similarly calls for a critique of the political rationalities organizing existing events and political aims, a critique that can occur neither inside the terms of "the event" nor inside an existing array of political and subject positions. Yet both Foucault and Merleau-Ponty also insist that to argue for a separation between intellectual and political life is not to detach the two. The point instead is to cultivate among political intellectuals an appreciation of the productive, even agonistic, interlocution made possible between intellectual and political life when they maintain a dynamic distance and tension. By itself a political act at a time when universities are increasingly underwritten by "interested" corporate, private, and state funds, such cultivation is also quite possibly a route to freeing political life from its current moralizing despair and intellectual life from the grip of bad conscience. In the effort to revitalize left politics with rich genealogies, discerning institutional analyses, and compelling political visions, intellectuals who are deeply learned, imaginative, and independent can be of enormous value.

#### Local narratives are uniquely key for genealogy – objective historical analysis doesn’t take context into account and thus is counterproductive in offering counter memories to the master narrative. Jørgensen & Boje 08

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The concept of story implies the suspension of beginning, middles and ends in order to or-der that we might gain a more reflexive relationship with the world. To perform such an-tenarrative inquiry, we propose drawing on **genealogical analysis** (Flyvbjerg 2001; Jørgen-sen 2002; Jørgensen 2007). This means that emphasis is shifted in Ricoeur’s model from the narrator to the conditions and circumstances in which stories grew, evolved and changed; that is, emphasis is shifted from seeing changes as subjectively constructed to see-ing them as inter-subjectively constructed. Ricoeur has a tendency to emphasize the narrators of organizational change, where a post-modern or poststructural position emphasizes the context and spaces where change is sto-ried, and re-storied (Cunliffe, Luhmann et al. 2004, p. 272) – a viewpoint that makes the change process more dynamic, liquid, polyphonic and paradoxical. These circumstances comprise other actors/actants (Latour 1996) with whom/what we engage. That means that an important aspect of any narrative becomes visible – **namely the relations of power and how they influence the narrative** (Hardy and Clegg 1996; Hardy and Phillips 2004; Clegg, Courpasson et al. 2006; Jørgensen 2007). By emphasizing performance (Cunliffe, Luh-mann et al. 2004, p. 272), narrating becomes more situated and relational and thus influ-enced by other actors in more or less powerful positions and with diverging interests and intentions. **Genealogy was Nietzsche’s way of writing critical history** that was acting counter to our time, thereby acting on our time and hopefully for the time to come (Nietzsche 1997, p. 60; Elden 2001, pp. 111-112). It later became an indispensable part of Foucault’a studies of the relations between power and knowledge (Gordon 1980) where it was employed in writing the history of the present, which means taking an interest in the past in order to write the history of the present (Foucault 1979, p. 31). This demands that we see our thoughts, ideas, concepts, actions, norms and standards as descended from history. As such we have to fol-low the stories in order to understand the present, including the narratives which are an in-dispensable part of identity (Chappell, Rhodes et al. 2003; Sfard and Prusak 2005). By writing a history of the present, Foucault wishes **to go beyond** the narratives of the pre-sent in order **to open them up for questioning.** He calls these uses of history, the parodic, dissociative and sacrificial uses of history (Foucault 1984, pp. 91-95; Bauer 1999, p. 62; Jørgensen 2007, pp. 71-74). They are characterized by the attempt to tear of the “masks” (narratives) of the present in order to write an alternative memory of what happened. The parodic use is directed against reality in opposing “…the theme of history as reminiscence or recognition” (Bauer 1999, p. 61). The dissociative use is directed against identity in op-posing history as continuity or representative of tradition. Finally, the sacrificial use is di-rected against truth in opposing the traditional “objective” historian (Bauer 1999, p. 61). Power is as noted as an indispensable part of this development and the question of power is one reason why Nietzsche criticizes traditional historians of morality because the “… his-torical spirit itself is lacking in them …” (Nietzsche 1992, p. 12). According to Nietzsche everything said and done needs to be judged according to questions of who, where and when - that is, there is no independently **objective** and de-contextualised **truth** or justice. It is “the good themselves who have judged themselves and their actions as good (Nietzsche 1994, p. 12). Therefore, Dreyfus and Rabinow claim that Foucault’s gene-alogy is interpretive analytics (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982). Interpretive analytics involves this kind of historical spirit where everything said and done is judged and evaluated accord-ing to the context in which it is said and done. It seeks to make people conscious of who they are, where they come from and why things are the way they are. Through the use of history, Foucault wishes to bring subjected knowledges into play in or-der to show that things need not be so. History is his critique (Haugaard, 1997, p. 44). More specifically genealogy is “…an insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (Foucault 1980, p. 81). Two kinds of knowledge are resurrected. The first is historical contents that have been buried and disguised in coherence or formal systemisation (Foucault 1980, pp. 81-82). That is, BME **narratives of the present impose an** abstract and unitary order on ma-terial that is otherwise fragmented and distorted. This means that instead of looking at or-ganizational change with the unifying order of the BME narrative, we should look at organ-izational change as a collection of dispersed events with their own history and identity and existing in their own specific context. It is through the revival of such local knowledge – local stories – that Foucault wishes to give us a more appropriate picture of the conditions of organizational change and thus wants to allow us to follow the stories before they be-come trapped in narrative.

#### We are not trying to offer a perfect solution, but the genealogical method allows us to deconstruct every part of society and open it to constant critique keeping us from staying complicit in any issues in the status quo. We critique the topic from the negative lens that shows the representation of taking and giving voting that props up the narratives we criticize.

#### Fiat is illusory- nothing leaves this round, meaning that even if X hypothetically solves Y it doesn’t change anything in the real world if the means is fiat so you prefer meaningful education such as genealogy.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that presents the genealogical analysis that best exposes underlying power. It’s a prerequisite to any link to the role of the judge since subjugated knowledges can’t be considered as methodological options until they have a seat at the table.

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Subjugated knowledges remain invisible to mainstream perspectives; they have a precarious subterranean existence that renders them unnoticed by most people and impossible to detect by those whose perspective has already internalized certain epistemic exclusions. And with the invisibility of subjugated knowledges, certain possibilities for resistance and subversion go unnoticed. The critical and emancipatory potential of Foucaultian genealogy resides in challenging established practices of remembering and forgetting by excavating subjugated bodies of experiences and memories, bringing to the fore the perspectives that culturally hegemonic practices have foreclosed. The critical task of the scholar and the activist is to resurrect subjugated knowledges—that is, to revive hidden or forgotten bodies of experiences and memories—and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges.4 In order to be critical and to have transformative effects, genealogical investigations should aim at these insurrections, which are critical interventions that disrupt and interrogate epistemic hegemonies and mainstream perspectives (e.g. official histories, standard interpretations, ossified exclusionary meanings, etc). Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories. An epistemic insur- rection requires a collaborative relation between genealogical scholars/activists and the subjects whose experiences and memories have been subjugated: those subjects by themselves may not be able to destabilize the epistemic status quo until they are given a voice at the epistemic table (i.e. in the production of knowledge), that is, until room is made for their marginalized perspective to exert resistance, until past epistemic battles are reopened and established frameworks become open to con- testation. On the other hand, the scholars and activists aiming to produce insurrec- tionary interventions could not get their critical activity off the ground if they did not draw on past and ongoing contestations, and the lived experiences and memo- ries of those whose marginalized lives have become the silent scars of forgotten struggles.

# 2NR

### Overview

### Curry and Curry phil add on

### A2 narratives bad

### A2 policymaking works

### A2 phil

### A2 Cap

### Race affs add on

### A2 theory

### Genealogy First

### ROB add ons

### Empirically proven