# A2 Plan Affs Master

## Egypt

### Russia Fill In DA

#### Empirics prove that Russia fills in when the US cuts aid to Egypt. Turns case and strengthens Russia’s military presence in the middle east causing conflict.

BORIS ZILBERMAN deputy director of congressional relations and a Russia analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, AND ROMANY SHAKER ,research analyst and Arabic language specialist at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (06/06/2018). Russia and Egypt are Growing Closer - The American Interest. [online] Available at: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/06/06/russia-and-egypt-are-growing-closer/ [Accessed 5 Jan. 2019]. ///AHS PB

Since 2014, Egypt has been increasingly turning to Russia for arms sales. The decision to do so was initially triggered by al-Sisi’s disappointment with Washington after the 2013 removal of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi’s regime. When the Obama Administration halted the delivery of previously contracted weapons systems including F-16 fighter jets and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, and canceled joint military exercises between Egyptian and American armed forces, al-Sisi and Putin started to talk. And the disappointment did not end with Obama’s term in office. Despite apparently warm personal relations between al-Sisi and President Donald Trump, in August 2017 the Trump Administration decided to condition economic and military aid over Cairo’s track record towards human rights, democracy, and rule of law. With all that as a backdrop, Russia has stepped up to fill the void, with several arms deals worth billions of dollars signed during al-Sisi’s presidency. 50 MiG-29 fighter jets were purchased in 2014 and delivery started late last year. Egypt also purchased 46 of a naval version of the Kamov Ka-52 Alligator helicopter, intended for the two French Mistral helicopter carriers that Cairo bought from Paris in September 2015. (France originally built the two ships for Russia, but canceled the sale after Moscow’s invasion and annexation of Crimea.) The military developments go beyond arms sales, with strategic cooperation increasing as well. In November 2017, the two countries inked an agreement during a visit by the Russian Defense Minister to Cairo that allows for the joint use of each other’s airspace and military airbases. The five-year deal, which could be extended further if both parties agree, has raised eyebrows in Washington. If implemented, it would reinforce Russia’s military presence in the Middle East and create a potential launching pad for wider Russian operations in North Africa. The countries’ militaries have also held several joint exercises in that time period. In 2015, Russia and Egypt held joint naval drills off the Mediterranean Egyptian port of Alexandria. In 2016, Egyptian and Russian paratroopers participated in a joint military exercise titled “Defenders of Friendship,” the first of its kind in Africa, which was followed by a similar exercise in Russia in 2017. Egypt will again host Russian and Egyptian paratroopers in 2018, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense. And finally, Egypt and Russia increasingly share common views on regional issues. On Syria, both countries have been calling for preserving the country’s territorial integrity and its national army. In October 2017, the two countries brokered a ceasefire deal in southern Damascus. In Libya, the two countries support the Libyan National Army, which is led by Khalifa Haftar, the military commander who dominates eastern Libya. In addition, the airspace deal with Egypt could bring Russia closer to Libya and raise the likelihood of greater Russian military involvement there.

#### And Increased Russian military presence in the middle east causes a struggle with the US for power that goes nuclear.

**Borger**, Guardian's world affairs editor. He was previously a correspondent in the US, the Middle East, eastern Europe and the Balkans, J. (April 14 2018). The Syria powder keg: danger in rush for influence on crowded battlefield. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/14/syria-crisis-danger-airstrikes-assad-battlefield [Accessed 8 Jan. 2019]. Recut AHS PB

It’s debatable when the world last found itself in such a perilous situation – and there are disturbing echoes of the eve of the first world war As UN secretary general, it is António Guterres’s increasingly frequent duty to warn the major powers they are rushing towards catastrophe. On Friday, on the eve of the US-led airstrikes, it was the former Portuguese prime minister’s turn once again to raise the alarm at the latest of a series of deadlocked security council sessions on Syria. “The cold war is back with a vengeance and a difference,” Guterres said. The difference is that it is no longer cold. American troops are already a grenade’s toss away from Russians and Iranians in Syria, and this weekend, missiles and planes from the US, UK and France flew at the Syrian regime. “The mechanisms and safeguards that existed to prevent escalation in the past no longer seem to be present,” the secretary general said. It is debatable exactly when the world last found itself in such a perilous situation. Perhaps the 1983 missile standoff in Europe, when a Nato exercise, Able Archer, almost triggered a panicked nuclear launch by the Soviet Union. The level of paranoia has not yet reached that pitch, but other aspects of the current crisis are arguably more dangerous. There is less communication between Washington and Moscow and there are no longer just two players in the game, but a jostling scrum of major powers in decline and middling powers on the rise. Pursuing national agendas on such a crowded battlefield without colliding with others is increasingly hard. The precise targeting of the Friday night airstrikes was all about avoiding such a potentially catastrophic collision. But US defence secretary James Mattis and his generals were reportedly under pressure from the White House to use the strikes as an opportunity to take a swipe at Iran. Those temptations are not going to go away, particularly after the arrival in the White House of John Bolton, a radical hawk on Iran, whose new position as national security adviser at Trump’s ear will echo what the president is hearing from Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In the gravitational pull of these agendas and allies, there are disturbing echoes of the eve of the first world war. It has more than a whiff of Sarajevo 1914 – with nuclear weapons looming not far off stage.

### Isis DA

#### ISIS is currently going strong in rural Egyptian provinces, only continued US military aid to Egypt prevents a successful militant insurgency which could topple the country and cause ISIS to take over large portions of the middle east, global econ collapse, a new refugee crisis, and Iraq war 2.0. This card isn’t power tagged, the aff is just a really bad idea.

Bruce Clingan. Retired United States Navy admiral who last served as Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces, Africa and Allied Joint Force Command Naples from February 24, 2012 to July 22, 2014 and was awarded Defense Distinguished Service Medal Navy Distinguished Service Medal (3) Defense Superior Service Medal (3) Legion of Merit (5) Bronze Star Defense Meritorious Service Medal Meritorious Service Medal Navy Achievement Medal (3), Commentary: The U.S. is right to restore aid to Egypt. JUL 30 2018 ,[online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-clingan-egypt-commentary/commentary-the-u-s-is-right-to-restore-aid-to-egypt-idUSKBN1KK1YE [Accessed 4 Jan. 2019]. ///AHS PB

Egypt has long been a critical U.S. security partner because of its control of the Suez Canal and its border with Israel. When U.S. forces are engaged in the region, Egypt provides expedited access for U.S. naval vessels transiting the Suez Canal and overflight rights for U.S. military aircraft, both of which are crucial for the United States’ ability to project power across the Middle East. Its role as a linchpin of regional stability has grown with multiple forces roiling the Middle East in recent years. Amid Iranian and Russian entrenchment in the Levant, and the recent rise in IS and Hamas operations, Egypt has remained squarely in the camp of secular and reformist Middle Eastern countries trying to stop the spread of Islamist extremism. Cairo is working with Israel to contain IS in the Sinai and Hamas in Gaza, and the countries’ navies coordinate regularly on Mediterranean security issues. I met with Sisi in May, when I visited Egypt as part of a delegation sponsored by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, and he was keen to emphasize the common security interests Cairo shares with Washington and Jerusalem, and his desire to advance both partnerships. Egypt’s internal security is threatened by a relentless IS-affiliated insurgency in Sinai. In November the group attacked a Sinai mosque, killing more than 300 people. Egypt also faces the ever-present challenge of preventing the conflict in Libya from spilling over its western border. (While Cairo and Washington both want a stable Libya, the Sisi government is backing Gen. Khalifa Haftar, a military strongman who was once a CIA asset; the United States is supporting his rival and UN-backed Libyan government.) Further instability in Egypt would be disastrous for its nearly 100 million citizens, the region and the United States. Regardless of which might come first – the collapse of Egypt’s economy or the spread of Islamist insurgency – the other would surely follow. The result would be new extremist safe havens, millions of desperate Egyptians seeking to flee to Europe, an existential threat to Israel, the disruption of the Suez Canal upon which global economic stability depends and the potential for the United States to get involved in yet another Middle East quagmire. Recent American support for Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts in Sinai and the resumption of Bright Star joint military exercises are both steps in the right direction. So is the United States’ recent decision to provide Egypt with its fully-authorized $1.3 billion in foreign military financing. Egypt needs this assistance to replenish military capabilities expended combatting IS in Sinai, and to respond effectively to any IS resurgence. It will also help improve bilateral military interoperability and promote Egypt’s continued phaseout of Soviet-era weaponry. U.S. assistance should also include greater technical support for U.S. equipment that Egypt uses in the Sinai and more bilateral military exchanges, including sharing U.S. lessons-learned from counterterrorism operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. These policy changes can bolster Washington’s influence in Cairo, helping to disrupt Russia’s shaping of a Middle East security environment reminiscent of the Cold War. They can also capitalize on a fleeting opportunity to defeat the scourge of IS by advancing an important relationship and promoting economic development and democracy in a vital Middle East partner.

#### **And we need to stop ISIS as soon as possibility, modern technology and global connectivity has given them the ability to pose an existential threat.**

Johnson, Brigette. Managing Editor for Homeland Security Today. A veteran journalist whose news articles and analyses have run in dozens of news outlets across the globe, Bridget first came to Washington to be online editor and a foreign policy writer at The Hill. Previously she was an editorial board member at the Rocky Mountain News and syndicated nation/world news columnist at the Los Angeles Daily News. Bridget is a weekly columnist for the New York Observer and a senior fellow specializing in terrorism analysis at the Haym Salomon Center. She is a Senior Risk Analyst for Gate 15 and Washington Bureau Chief for PJ Media. She is an NPR on-air contributor and has contributed to USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, National Review Online, Politico, New York Daily News, The Jerusalem Post, The Hill, Washington Times, RealClearWorld and more, and has myriad television and radio credits including Al-Jazeera and SiriusXM. Article cites Assistant defense secretary of Homeland security and the Senate armed Services committee, February (2018). Terror Groups Keen on WMD as It's 'Never Been More Difficult' to Prevent. [online] Homeland Security Today. Available at: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/terror-groups-keen-wmd-never-been-more-difficult-prevent/ [Accessed 4 Jan. 2019]. ///AHS PB

Terrorist groups are as interested as ever in acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a global landscape where chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents have grown more difficult to track, senators heard from Defense officials last week. Assistant Defense Secretary for Homeland Defense and Global Security Kenneth Rapuano told the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that “rapid technological advancements and increased access to dual use technologies, expertise, and materials that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes heighten the risk that adversaries can more easily seek or acquire WMD.” “It has never been more difficult to prevent adversaries from acquiring the materials or expertise necessary to develop WMD or use CBRN materials in intentional attacks,” he said. “Additionally, the speed, volume, and coverage of international travel means that naturally occurring pathogens of security concern can spread worldwide in days, potentially having the same catastrophic consequences of a deliberate biological attack.” The Intelligence Community, State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy and Justice Department “all play critical roles in detecting threats, preventing attacks on the homeland, and working with foreign partners to stop and respond to incidents,” he added. Rapuano noted that best efforts at prevention only go so far, thus the agency coalition “must be prepared to contain and reduce CBRN threats once they have developed.” “DoD is postured to isolate, identify, neutralize, and dispose of CBRN threats before they can reach our borders,” he said. That includes concern about reports of ongoing use of chemical agents by the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, where “the U.S. and our coalition partners continue to exploit opportunities on the ground to better understand and disrupt their CW networks.” “We must anticipate that our adversaries will continue to evolve and develop increasingly sophisticated methods to pursue, develop, or deploy CBRN weapons,” Rapuano stressed. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Joseph Osterman, deputy commander of United States Special Operations Command, emphasized the importance of increased integration of intelligence, planning and assessments in a counter-WMD fusion center “dedicated to coordinating information flow and planning, fusing intelligence and operations, and providing the WMD community of action a single point of contact for DOD operational capability.” Chairwoman Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) asked Rapuano which WMD threat concerned him most at this point. Rapuano picked biotechnology, due to the “rapid advances and ubiquitous availability” today. “Things that you can buy on the web now and essentially do a paint-by-numbers instruction were the province of Nobel Prize-winning scientists only decades ago, and that really levels the playing field for any actor looking to develop biotechnology, biological agents and novelly engineered agents that can present a real threat,” he added. The assistant secretary confirmed that “both Al-Qaeda and ISIS are interested in chemical, biological, nuclear,” and “certainly would be if they had opportunity to acquire the materials and know-how.” He wouldn’t elaborate in open session. Osterman said that “functional campaign planning” helps officials “observe where the technology transfer may occur between state and non-state actors.” “Also, where one non-state actor perhaps is working with another non-state actor in a different geographic location or in a functional capacity,” the general added. “So we try to weave that in with the translation of our strategy and policy to actual tactical application of interdiction in order to basically reinforce the larger protocol efforts that are in place.” The CBRN Response Enterprise is nearly 19,000 strong, consisting of National Guard and Title X military arranged into teams. “We have the WMD-CSTs, the civil support teams. We have the enhanced response teams. We have a range of teams with a different mix of capabilities that go from decontamination, detection, medical effects, medical treatment,” Rapuano said. “There is air transportation, ground transportation, the whole package that can be integrated that can either be commanded by the state National Guards and there’s at least one team in every state. Or they can be authorized under Title X and under DOD command.” Response teams are deployed “on a routine basis starting with National Special Security Events, the Super Bowl, other large events, Fourth of July.” “And these assets will be pre-deployed in the vicinity of activities for which there may be some concern that they would be the target of an attack that might include WMD,” Rapuano explained. “And they are prepared to respond in concert with all of the other assets that are typically deployed for those events — law enforcement and others.” DoD has been working “very closely” with Health and Human Services and DHS “to look at bio threats in general, including naturally occurring, to sync our research with them to ensure that we’re covering the full landscape of what’s naturally occurring and what perhaps could be intensified or developed for malevolent use,” the assistant secretary told lawmakers. Pressed on how the departments wouldn’t get caught off-guard, with the 2014 spread of the Ebola virus offered as an example, Rapuano replied that “we’re looking at ways that we can get quick production, just in time, but that’s very difficult because you need that base in terms of the manufacturing base.” Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) mused on whether ISIS stripped of its physical caliphate poses the same WMD threat. “Because, obviously, this is about talent as much as anything, and intellectual capacity,” Heinrich noted. Osterman replied that “they are still a threat, to put it simply.” “Really, when we look at pathways, we’re looking at intent, infrastructure and expertise to your point, production, weaponization, delivery systems in use,” the general added. “And they’ve demonstrated not only that capability over time, but even though as they lose the geographic caliphate, that those individuals that have the technical knowledge and frankly, the level at which they were working and had been working is not one that by loss of that geographic caliphate that it would undermine their ability to continue to pursue the weapons of mass destruction capability.”

## Cameroon

### Advantage CP

#### Counterplan: The United Nations ought to require and pressure Cameroon to return to a linguistic federal system. Empirics prove it works and solves the root cause of the conflict.

Herman J. Cohen, former U.S. ambassador who served as United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1989 to 1993, Cameroon: A Solution from History for Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis, 22 MARCH 2018, <https://allafrica.com/stories/201803221043.html> //AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

Cameroon’s history points to an outcome that might end [to] its conflict: a return to a federal system in which each linguistic region enjoys a level of autonomy. In 1884, Germany under Otto von Bismarck established the colony of “Kamerun”. Germany’s colonial situation in Africa changed drastically at the end of the First World War. As part of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany lost all its colonial territories, which were converted into League of Nations mandates. Under this system, the former colonies did not become colonies of the new administering powers – policy control remained with the League of Nations, and the powers were required to follow the League’s instructions. South Africa was mandated to administer Southwest Africa (now Namibia), France administered Togo, and Belgium administered Rwanda and Burundi. After 1945, the successor United Nations, through its Trusteeship Council, assumed the role of guardian of the mandated territories. “Kamerun” was a special case: it was mandated to two separate governments. The country’s northwest and southwest were assigned to the UK, which had the colony of Nigeria immediately to the West. The north, east and south were mandated to France, which had its own set of colonies in Central Africa immediately to the east, headquartered in Brazzaville. A major mountain range between the two regions provided a convenient geographic separation. As the German-speaking populations of “Kamerun” began to fade away, the two mandated territories became Cameroon under the UK, and Cameroun under the French. The main languages became English and French respectively. When the time came for the European powers to begin transitioning their African colonies to independence between 1956 and 1962, the United Nations Trusteeship Council instructed the UK to hold a referendum for the population of British Cameroon. The people were a given three options: (a) independence as a sovereign state; (b) join Nigeria; and (c) join French-speaking Cameroun in a federal relationship. The people voted to join Cameroun. The new federal constitution gave west Cameroun significant autonomy, with its own parliament, security force, and the right to elect the federal Vice President. The Federal Government, based in Yaoundé, controlled the currency, the central bank, national defense and foreign affairs. On May 20, 1972, the total population of Cameroun, French and English speaking, were called to vote in a new referendum. The choice was to maintain the existing federation, or abolish it and form a new unitary state. Since the French-speakers outnumbered Anglophones three-to-one, [and a] the unitary state option was overwhelmingly adopted. The referendum’s results were accepted without initial reservation by the Anglophone population of Cameroon and by the international community. In retrospect, however, the referendum was a violation of the original United Nations mandate. The English-speaking population of west Cameroon voted to enter into a federal system. Only they could decide whether or not to leave the federal system to enter into a unitary system. If consulted at the time, the International Court in The Hague would certainly have invalidated the 1972 referendum. Until the 1990s, the English-speaking peoples of West Cameroon did not experience major changes in their lives. But through successive regime changes in Yaoundé, Anglophone Cameroonians increasingly began to complain about discrimination and linguistic repression. Political tensions slowly boiled until recently, when anti-regime violence erupted. The response of the Cameroonian government has been harsh. Security forces have shoot-to-kill orders. The international community may wish to give the government in Yaoundé some friendly advice: work to restore the original federal system, creating a stronger Cameroonian state in which both the Anglophone and Francophone people enjoy reasonable self-determination while building a shared future.

### Boko Haram DA

#### Coalition forces are winning the fight against Boko Haram now, but backsliding is possible.

International Crisis Group, Global think tank on international conflict and presupposing peace solutions, full bio is <https://www.crisisgroup.org/who-we-are>, Cameroon’s Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram, 14 August 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/263-extreme-nord-du-cameroun-nouveau-chapitre-dans-la-lutte-contre-boko-haram> ///AHS PB

In Cameroon’s Far North, Boko Haram is weakened but not yet defeated. A number of senior Cameroonian army officers expect the conflict to end in 2020.  This prospect is realistic only if the road to stabilisation is carefully plotted. The conflict’s decreasing intensity since 2016, as shown by a reduction in the number of attacks, the greater failure rate of suicide bombings and (since October 2017) the surrender of combatants, confirms that the jihadist insurgency is weakening. It still poses a genuine threat, however: in 2017, it carried out some 80 attacks and kidnappings in Cameroon and planned 90 suicide bombings (51 of which either failed or were foiled), killing at least 210 civilians and about 30 soldiers. Since January 2018, Boko Haram has caused the death of at least 135 civilians and eighteen soldiers. There is a risk that the Cameroonian armed forces will get bogged down in this low-intensity conflict. The history of Boko Haram, and of jihadist groups in general, shows their capacity to lie low before re-emerging in a different form and even making alliances with non-Islamist armed groups and criminal networks. The government of Cameroon must remain vigilant and take security, political, economic and social measures to accelerate the denouement of the conflict. Such steps are all the more necessary given that a presidential election is scheduled for the autumn of 2018. If the situation has not improved by then, the risk of unrest in the region will be high.

#### And US military aid fuels regional interoperability – Boko Haram survives by exploiting borders – which means cutting aid to Cameroon cuts their ability to work cohesively.

OFEIBEA QUIST-ARCTON, Award-winning broadcaster from Ghana, Degrees in IR, Journalism, and two different languages, if someone wants to see more her complete list of qualifications is here <https://www.npr.org/people/4513318/ofeibea-quist-arcton>, Amid Aid Uncertainty, U.S. Counterterrorism Cooperation Continues In Africa, April 17, 2017 <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/04/17/521400443/amid-aid-uncertainty-u-s-counter-terrorism-cooperation-continues-in-africa> BRACKETS IN ORIGINAL CARD ///AHS PB

"Our assistance to this area is critical for promoting stability," said Matt Nims of the U.S. Agency for International Development, speaking at a House subcommittee hearing earlier this month. U.S. special operations troops don't typically deploy in large numbers to help African security forces work together and fight Boko Haram, but local officials say they're useful in serving as the glue that helps everything stick together. For Flintlock 2017, forces from 27 countries took part at seven training sites across west and central Africa. "Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger – unfortunately, the entire region, we are facing the same reality," said Cameroonian police commander Gilbert Nagassou, in charge of the border post at Kousseri, just across the river separating Chad and Cameroon. "That's why we must join forces and together confront terrorism." When it comes to fighting Boko Haram's threats to the Lake Chad Basin, "The military can't do it by itself," Bolduc told NPR in Ndjamena, Chad's capital. "Regionalize all the efforts, work closely together in an effective military construct ... and then bring in the police, the civil administration, religious leaders and include anybody working to bring the stability necessary to the local villages." A U.S. special forces commander involved in Flintlock, who asked that his name be withheld for security reasons, says the challenges shouldn't be underestimated." We have a regional issue of Boko Haram, easily exploits the seams between international boundaries – especially when you have something like a river way that separates two nations," he says. "And they currently use islands in this pretty broad [Chari and Logone] river to hide out in. It's an easy area to have ungoverned and hard to police and patrol." Members of U.S. military and, for the first time, law enforcement agencies are working with African security forces to enhance their techniques, said Billy Alfano, a special agent with the State Department's law enforcement arm, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. "Interoperability" – groups and forces working well together — is the current buzzword. "It's critical for our African partner nations to work together and more and more important for police to collaborate with the military, to conduct joint investigations and to truly counter the terrorism threat in the region, with law enforcement in those communities," Alfano said. Law enforcement agents are often first responders after an attack, he explained, so training them in forensics and skills like fingerprinting also helps "attack the terrorist network." Alfano said this year's more broadly focused exercises reflected an emphasis on governance and rule of law, "making a transition from a military-controlled area to training the police to more effectively take over when the military has moved on." And there was what he called "a mass migration training," to teach rural communities how to respond to potential terrorists who may cross porous borders where large numbers of people are already traveling. Cross-border cooperation During Flintlock, training scenarios involved agents from across the region simulating the aftermath of a terrorist bombing, as well as chasing and apprehending hostage-taking terrorist suspects. "Terrorism knows no boundaries or borders," warned Nagassou, the Cameroonian police commander. Deadly Boko Haram bomb blasts and suicide bombing raids have targeted all four countries battling the terrorist network, he said. "Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to Islamic State," he said, "so geographic frontiers mean nothing to this group or other terrorist networks and their regional allies. Borders are simply a joke to them — they have connections and communications." Terrorists, he said, easily slip across. "If there's intelligence from Nigeria and it's relayed to Chad, then Cameroon must also be made aware," said Nagassou. "And Niger also needs to be informed, so that together we can nip Boko Haram's nefarious plans in the bud and stop them attacking our people."

**Hellman 8** [(Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford) “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)]

**The threat of nuclear terrorism looms** much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. **A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions**: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. **The likelihood of such an attack is also significant**. Former Secretary of Defense William **Perry** has **estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident** within the next decade **to be roughly 50 percent** [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. **In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found** a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of **an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government** [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because **terrorism is** one of **the** potential **trigger mechanism**s **for a full-scale nuclear war**, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, **society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important**. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. **No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide**.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western **civilization will be destroyed**” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “**The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent**. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous **nuclear explosions** and their resultant fire- storms **could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth**, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that **even a limited nuclear exchange** or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, **could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences** due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that **preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option**.

### Case

#### Sqou solves and nonuniques the aff: Through a filtering system we make sure US Aid doesn’t reach the soldiers complicit in human rights abuses, and use military aid to promote human rights in numerous ways.

Michael Houza, Former ambassador to Cameroon – was ambassador at the time of writing, US Cameroon Embassy letter to Amnesty International, July 11 2017, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_GpV5UKUYpnX3MxdWltUk9lWmc/view> //AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

Thank you for your letter of June 23 concerning allegations of human rights abuses committed by Cameroonian security forces, including the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) based in Salak, and other authorities. The U.S. Embassy in Yaoundé and the Department of State take such allegations seriously and, in accordance with the Leahy Law, do not furnish assistance to any security force unit if the Secretary of State has credible information that such a unit [it] has committed a gross violation of human rights (GVHR). In addition, the Department continuously seeks to identify the unit involved when it has credible information of a GVHR but the identity of the unit is unknown. Currently, certain units of the BIR based out of Salak, Mora, and Adamawa are ineligible for assistance in accordance with the Leahy Law because of credible information implicating those units in the commission of GVHRs, and we continue to review all allegations of GVHRs committed by the BIR and other Cameroonian security forces. With our active engagement, the Government of the Republic of Cameroon shares with our Embassy in Yaoundé information regarding alleged GVHRs. This allows us to help ensure that no assistance is furnished to security force units when there is credible information that the unit committed a GVHR. Cameroon is an important partner in addressing security challenges on the continent and the State Department take all aspects of its partnership seriously. The U.S. government takes a five-fold approach with regard to its engagement with respect to human rights with Cameroon military forces that receive U.S. military assistance. First, in accordance with the Leahy Law, the Department of State vets all foreign military personnel or units that receive training or security assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, so that no assistance is furnished to security force units implicated in the commission of GVHRS. Second, the U.S. military conducts routine training for recipients of U.S. security assistance through mobile training teams, provided by the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS). DIILS teams come to Cameroon to teach courses on respect for human rights to the Cameroonian military units that receive U.S. security assistance, Third, the Department of State mandates by policy that ten percent of each country's International Military Education & Training (IMET) allocation must support Expanded IMET (E-IMET) courses, such as participation in military law and justice courses, human rights courses, or courses on the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). DIILS conducts E-IMET courses at their school in Providence, Rhode Island, and Cameroonian graduates of these courses go on to serve in Cameroon's military justice system. Fourth, all Cameroonian personnel who attend U.S. professional military institutions undergo the same human rights and LOAC training that the U.S. military provides to its own personnel who attend those institutions. Lastly, U.S. military to military exchanges with Cameroon focus on defense institution-building, including a course designed to share best practices, adapted to Cameroon's situation. The course focuses on teaching Cameroonian forces to conduct military training and operations in accordance with international norms and standards. The Department of State and other relevant agencies follow a thorough, transparent, and deliberate remediation process under the Leahy Law for any units who have committed GVHRs. Both local offices at the U.S. Embassy and various bureaus at the Department of State retain records of vetted personnel and units, as well as the routine recertification of such units through recurrent vetting. The United States Government, both in Washington and at the Embassy in Yaoundé, is regularly and deeply engaged on these issues. We have expressed explicit concerns about all of these issues at the highest levels, including with President Biya, and continue to do so.

#### China provides aid if the US stops, means they get weapons for repression and hurts interoperability.

Defense Web, African Defense Think Tank, China, Cameroon sign military assistance agreement, 19th Jul 2018, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/joint/diplomacy-a-peace/china-cameroon-sign-military-assistance-agreement/> ///AHS PB

China and Cameroon have signed a military assistance agreement that includes China providing $8 million for the acquisition of military equipment. Cameroon’s Ministry of Defence on 18 July said the Chinese Ambassador to Cameroon, Wang Yingwu on behalf of the Chinese government and Cameroon’s Minister of Defence Beti Assomo Joseph signed an agreement on military assistance in the Hall of Acts of the ministry of defence. “Bilateral military cooperation is being reinforced once more between the government of Cameroon and the People’s Republic of China as the Chinese Ambassador to Cameroon Wang Yingwu and the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in Charge of Defence signed a convention worth 4.5 billion francs CFA [$7.9 million] to assist the Cameroon defence forces acquire some military equipment,” the Ministry said. It added that the objective of the agreement is to promoting peace and security in Cameroon particularly as the country is facing numerous threats as emphasized by Yingwu. “It should be recalled that this is the 5th time the People’s Republic of China is exhibiting a benevolent gesture to the Cameroon Defence Forces. This convention merely comes to reaffirm the fruitful bilateral military cooperation existing between Beijing and Yaounde not only security wise but in diverse domains,” the Ministry said. Cameroon’s armed forces have acquired a variety of weaponry from China, including infantry fighting vehicles and tank destroyers. Since 2010 Cameroon has received from China two P-108 patrol craft, two MA60 twin turboprop aircraft, 50 FN-16 surface-to-air missile launchers, 12 Type-90 (PG-99) 35 mm anti-aircraft guns, two Type-07 armoured personnel carriers, 18 Type-07P/VN-1 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 WMA-301 Assaulter armoured combat vehicles, two P-108 patrol craft and four Z-9WE helicopters that can be armed with Red Arrow-8 missiles, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s arms transfers database.

## Tajikistan

### Solar PIC

#### Counterplan: The United States ought not provide military aid to Tajikistan except for the acquisition of solar panels and wind turbines for Tajikistani border checkpoints.

#### The US provides military aid under the umbrella of antidrug/terror funding to pay for this power: Multiple pieces of evidence:

#### [1] Gorenburg 14

DMITRY GORENBURG**,** expert on security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. His recent research topics include decision-making processes in the senior Russian leadership, Russian naval strategy in the Pacific and the Black Sea, and Russian maritime defense doctrine.Gorenburg is author of "Nationalism for the Masses: Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation" (Cambridge University Press, 2003), and has been published in journals such as World Politics and Post-Soviet Affairs. In addition to his role at CNA, he currently serves as editor of Problems of Post-Communism and is an Associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. From 2009 to 2016, he edited the journal Russian Politics and Law.Gorenburg previously served as Executive Director of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES). He received a B.A. in international relations from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He blogs on issues related to the Russian military at Russian Military Reform. He is a native Russian speaker. External Support forCentral Asian Militaryand Security Forces, 2014, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-OSFno1WP.pdf> ///AHS PB

In 2013, the US Government allocated $9.5 million to support the military and to fight smuggling and drug trafficking in Tajikistan. Vehicles and equipment provided to the border troops included 20 all-terrain vehicles, 10 snowmobiles, 650 Motorola radios, 33 solar power systems, 44 computer kits and tactical individual protective gear.248a

#### [2] State Department 10

US State Department 2010 Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Tajikistan, <https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/eurasiafy10/156879.htm> ///AHS PB

-- The USG provided 22 all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) to the Tajik Border Guards. USG assistance also continued renovating border outposts on the Afghan border, outfitting them with solar and wind-energy technology, which will provide free and reliable energy for those living at and operating the posts.

#### [3] US Tajikistan embassy 17

U.S. Embassy Hands Over Customs Office at Qizil Art Border Crossing, December 21 2017, https://tj.usembassy.gov/pr-12212017/

Chargé Covert recognized the important work of the Customs Service and reaffirmed the United States respect for Tajikistan’s sovereignty in securing its borders. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) of the U.S. Department of State spent $767,000 on the structure. Next year, INL has plans to fund the installation of a wind turbine and solar array to power the building.

#### And improving the use of solar power in rural Tajikistan is important—use of non renewable sources causes ecological degradation.

Timur Idrisov, senior advisor at the environmental organization Little Earth. Little Earth is a participant of the program Climate Workshop organized by 350.org to promote decisions about the use of renewable energy and reduce the impact of humanity on climate, How Can Solar Energy Make Life in Tajikistan's Mountains More Sustainable?, 26 March 2015, <https://globalvoices.org/2015/03/26/renewable-solar-tajikistan-pamirs/> //AHS PB

Renewable energy currently provides the main hope that the world can avoid the catastrophic consequences of climate change. But in addition to its bigger picture promise, renewable technologies can help solve the pressing social and environmental problems of local communities without requiring complex gadgets or significant investment. In late December 2014 the village of Roshorv (located at an altitude of more than 3000m) in the Bartang Valley of Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) was presented with a solar cooker. Sadarbek Tohirbekov, a teacher of Russian language at the local school and the head of a family of six, received the facility from the Tajik environmental organization Little Earth. After the cooker was installed in the yard, an employee of the NGO Oyandasoz — Little Earth’s partner in the region — tested the efficiency of the device and discussed potential for expanding their use across the area. Tajikistan, the poorest state to emerge from the former Soviet Union, suffers blackouts during winter due to the declining capacity of its domestic energy infrastructure, yet hosts strong potential for renewable energy with over 200 sunny days during the average year and significant hydro resources. In addition to Tohirbekov’s solar cooker, which other residents in the village have access to, Roshorv has its own mini-hydro station that helps power the village and the surrounding area during the evenings. Tests on the parabolic collector dishes that power the solar cooker were held over a series of days. Measurements were taken at 1000, 1400 and 1600 hours in Tohirbekov’s yard. During mild winter conditions the dishes were able to bring a 3-liter aluminum kettle to boil in 20-25 minutes, and cook a soup with rice and potatoes in an aluminum pressure cooker in around 20 minutes. “To prepare a lunch or dinner [without a solar cooker], we use about half a kilo of bush kindling and then a couple of kilos of firewood and three kilos of dried manure or coal. For example, just to boil five to seven liters of water requires about three to five kilos of bush. A solar kitchen can greatly reduce the consumption of firewood and other fuels, even if you use it only once a day,” says Tohirbekov. Land clearing and logging by local people has become a major problem in the mountainous areas of Tajikistan, where wood is often the only available source of energy. Hillsides stripped of their tree and bush cover have increased the hazard posed by dangerous and often fatal mudslides. According to Rozik Yaftaliev, director of Oyandasoz, a solar kitchen of the type at Tohirbekov’s house can be used whenever there is a sun and a clear sky for cooking or boiling water. “This easy-to-use device helps save time and wood, and when cooking there is no smoke! Since last October, my family in the village Nisour has used a similar solar kitchen. On the days when we use it, we cut consumption of bush wood by 70-80%,” he said. Currently demand among local residents for assistance obtaining solar devices is soaring. This is not surprising, because solar kitchens are inexpensive, easy to use, and do not have any mechanisms that might need repairing if they break. Most importantly, the fuel – sunshine – is free and renewable. The solar cooker is not perfect, however. It can support a weight of just over eight kilograms while the rings are of a single size and thus do not suit all utensils. And, of course, on a cloudy day a solar cooker can be rendered impotent. However, such technologies can significantly reduce the burden on the local environment and improve the living conditions of the mountain villagers. “Solar kitchens can be a good helper for people in remote mountain villages that have difficulties with access to modern energy services and for whom access to fuel is a critical priority. We, for our part, will do everything possible to continue the dissemination of resource-saving and energy-efficient technologies in the mountain communities of the republic,” said Musavvara Shukurova, Little Earth’s director. In the first half of 2015 Little Earth intends to distribute about 10 solar cookers to the most vulnerable families in the villages of the upper reaches of the Bartang Valley. “Even if we imagine that each cooker can save about 15-20 kilos of wood per day, accounting for only 100 days of sunshine a year, it would equal about two tons of fuel saved. Accordingly, 10 solar kitchens help people save more than 20 tons of wood annually at that rate. This is a good opportunity to reduce felling and prevent CO2 emissions,” says Anton Tymoshenko, assistant coordinator of energy-saving programs at Little Earth.

### Fill In

#### Pakistan proves that Russian and China Fill In

**Michael Peel and Kiran Stacey write in 2018**, Writers for the Financial Times, “Pakistan turns to Russia and China after US military aid freeze,” The Financial Times. January 28, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/81aea830-0238-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5>//RJP

Pakistan is deepening its relationships with Russia and China, the country’s defence minister has said, as the fallout continues from the US decision to suspend $2bn in military aid to Islamabad. Khurram Dastgir Khan told the Financial Times that his government was engaged in a “regional recalibration of Pakistan’s foreign and security policy” that threatens to undermine the US war effort in Afghanistan. Mr Khan said Pakistan would look to Russia and China — as well as Europe — for new military supplies, as the US had “chosen castigation over co-operation”. “We have already bought some Russian helicopters in the past three years,” he said. “This is what we call a regional recalibration of Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. It’s because of the unfortunate choice the United States continues to make.” The US said this month that it would suspend security assistance to Pakistan worth $2bn because of what Washington sees as Islamabad’s refusal to do enough to tackle terrorism, particularly around the Afghan border. President Donald Trump has reversed the policy of removing US troops from Afghanistan, in an effort to restore security to the country, which has suffered a string of deadly attacks in recent years — some apparently originating from across the Pakistani border. Earlier this month Mr Trump tweeted that Pakistan had taken $33bn of US aid over 15 years and given back “nothing but lies and deceit”. Mr Khan called his comments “deeply offensive” and “counterproductive”. Mr Khan added: “It is unfortunate that we are even discussing the numbers [the amount of aid] while Afghanistan slowly spirals out of the American and Afghan control.” Listen: China acts as peacemaker in Pakistan's Balochistan The row has become one of the biggest rifts in the 70-year alliance between the US and Pakistan, with Islamabad warning it would buy weapons from other countries. Mr Khan said Pakistan and the US still shared many interests but in Washington “lately the focus has been on areas of divergence”. Asked about reports that Islamabad could buy a batch of Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets from Russia, Mr Khan said “not yet”, but added: “We have opened a dialogue with Russia, which traditionally we have never had, because we were firmly in the western camp.” The backbone of the Pakistan air force currently consists of F-16 jets made by Lockheed Martin of the US, although Mr Khan said Islamabad had not received spare parts from the US for several years. “We are using our own ingenuity and using other sources to keep the fleet up in the air,” he said. “It has been very difficult.” Recommended Afghanistan blames militant group for Kabul hotel attack Pakistan defends move not to take military action against Haqqan Trump takes aim at Pakistan’s duplicity Mr Khan added that there was “a discussion” about taking the more drastic step of cutting off US access to land and air routes into Afghanistan — though Pakistani officials have told the FT they were more likely to increase the fees instead. Islamabad has already stopped sharing key parts of the intelligence it gathers from close to Afghanistan with the US. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s burgeoning relationship with Beijing is also causing concern in Washington, where officials are strengthening alliances with other countries in the region — including India — as a bulwark against Chinese regional ambitions. China plans to spend $55bn in Pakistan on infrastructure projects as part of its plan to build a network of trade routes across the world, sparking concerns in the US that it could turn Pakistan into a client state of its northern neighbour. Officials in Islamabad have been emboldened in their row with Washington by backing from Beijing. Mr Khan said: “The fact that we have recalibrated our way towards better relations with Russia, deepening our relationship with China, is a response to what the Americans have been doing. And they have their own reasons. They want to use India, in our view, to contain China.”

#### Empirics prove Tajikistan fill in happens

PressTV, 24-hour English- and French-language news and documentary network affiliated with Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, Tajikistan, Russia begin joint anti-Taliban military drills near Afghan border, Tue Jul 17, 2018,, https://www.presstv.com/DetailFr/2018/07/17/568430/Tajikistan-Russia-drills-Taliban-Afghanistan, ///AHS PB

Tajikistan and Russia have commenced joint military exercises near the Tajik-Afghan border in a bid to boost the Central Asian country’s readiness in warding off potential attacks by the Afghanistan-based Taliban militant group. Tajikistan's Defense Ministry in a statement announced the news on Tuesday, saying that more than 10,000 soldiers, mostly Tajik reservists, had participated in the first such drills in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region. Combined troops will practice “eliminating terrorists who broke through” from Afghanistan in an imagined incursion, the statement added. Meanwhile, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation said in a statement that some 400 troopers and 80 pieces of Russian military equipment were deployed from a military base in Tajikistan for the drills, which are scheduled to be concluded on Friday. The two countries have intensified military cooperation since US-led forces began pulling out troops from Afghanistan in large numbers in 2014. The ex-Soviet allies also held similar drills in March 2016. This is the first time that Dushanbe has held such military drills in the sometimes restive Gorno-Badakhshan, where clashes between government troops and rebel forces broke out some six years ago. Previous exercises had been held in the country's southern province of Khatlon. Back in 2016, China held its own joint drills with Tajiks. Beijing has also beefed up its security assistance in the Central Asian country in recent times, notably building infrastructure on the 1,300-kilometer border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, the world's biggest opium producer. The turbulent border is a haven for drug traffickers and was guarded by Russian troops before they stepped back in 2005.

#### Tajikistan specifically is vulnerable to fill in –they can only get weapons through external suppliers like Russia.

DMITRY GORENBURG**,** expert on security issues in the former Soviet Union, Russian military reform, Russian foreign policy, and ethnic politics and identity. His recent research topics include decision-making processes in the senior Russian leadership, Russian naval strategy in the Pacific and the Black Sea, and Russian maritime defense doctrine.Gorenburg is author of "Nationalism for the Masses: Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation" (Cambridge University Press, 2003), and has been published in journals such as World Politics and Post-Soviet Affairs. In addition to his role at CNA, he currently serves as editor of Problems of Post-Communism and is an Associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University. From 2009 to 2016, he edited the journal Russian Politics and Law.Gorenburg previously served as Executive Director of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES). He received a B.A. in international relations from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. He blogs on issues related to the Russian military at Russian Military Reform. He is a native Russian speaker. External Support forCentral Asian Militaryand Security Forces, 2014, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-OSFno1WP.pdf> ///AHS PB

Tajikistan has virtually no domestic defence industry. Its few Soviet-era military plants, located in the northern part of the country, were involved primarily in the processing and enrichment of locally mined uranium for the Soviet nuclear industry. The Vostokredmet plant in Chkalovsk, the successor to the Soviet-era Leninabad Mining and Chemical Combine, resumed uranium processing in 2009, supposedly from Chinese sources.84 In nearby Istiklal, the Zaria Vostoka plant was involved in producing fuel for missiles. After almost two decades in mothballs, the plant has recently concluded an agreement with a Russian company to resume production of unspecified military components.85 Given their nature, neither of these plants can be useful for producing weapons or equipment for Tajikistan’s military. Looking toward the future, Tajikistan is hoping to develop its military through the acquisition of new and modern weapons and equipment, without increasing the size of the force. Given the state’s financial problems, this emphasis requires foreign assistance. Although Russia remains the country’s primary security partner and equipment donor, Tajikistan has been willing to take assistance from a broad range of foreign actors, including the USA, China, India, and several European states. It has also engaged with all major regional organizations, such as the CSTO, SCO, and NATO. Beyond access to bases, the main security interest of most outside actors vis-à-vis Tajikistan remains limited to maintaining internal stability and ensuring narcotics interdiction. Assistance is likely to be limited to equipment relevant for these tasks. Given its lack of resources and the limited nature of potential assistance, the capabilities of Tajikistan’s military and security forces are likely to remain quite constrained for the foreseeable future.

#### And this turns case, Russian control is net worse.

John Raine, Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence, Russia in the Middle East: hard power, hard fact, 25th October 2018, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/10/russia-middle-east-hard-power> ///AHS PB

This entails offering an alternative model of partnership and patronage in which it is less the scale and breadth of the relationship with partners that matters as the hardness of the power projected and the behaviours encouraged. In the case of currently stable states, that means being willing not just to sell weaponry, but to condone and support behaviours that ignore or undermine international law and conventions. That applies both to activities that states are expected to undertake (such as counter-terrorism), as well as to those they are not (assassination). Russia has always exported not just alternative weapons systems to those on offer from the West, but, as part of the package, an alternative worldview. That used to be ideological. Socialist, nominal or otherwise, Arab states were Russia’s natural partners and beneficiaries. Now the export is more a worldview than an ideology, and a view on the rule of law in particular. That’s potentially pernicious in a time and a region where mounting uncertainty is increasingly tempting conservative regimes to resort to the arbitrary use of force. The suspected assassination of Khashoggi looks like an egregious case of assumed licence on the part of Saudi Arabia. The danger of Russian patronage and influence is that it promotes just such new and dark norms. In the contest for influence, something else is at stake than markets and resources.

### On Case

## Honduras

### Drugs DA

#### Cutting aid now leads to increased drug shipments across the border.

MEGAN KELLER, Reporter from the Hill, Quotes Marco Rubio, American attorney and politician currently serving as the senior United States Senator from Florida on Foreign Relations and National Intelligence Committees. A Republican, Rubio previously served as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, "Rubio Defends US Aid To Honduras And Guatemala: 'Helps Us More Than Them'." TheHill. N. p., 10/23/18. Web. 15 Feb. 2019. ///AHS PB

"I understand instinct to cut U.S. aid to punish countries for failing to stop illegal migration. But our aid to #Honduras & #Guatemala isn’t cash," Rubio wrote on Twitter. "It’s primarily equipment & training to stop drugs headed to U.S. & to deal with the gangs causing people to leave those countries." "Our aid to #Honduras & #Guatemala isn’t charity. It helps us more than them," he also said. "By seizing drugs before they enter U.S. & kill Americans." He added that the money also goes towards border security because "it helps fight the gangs that are terrorizing the people who ultimately wind up on our border." Rubio explained that he agrees the U.S. should be "firm" on the approaching caravan of migrants, but also called on the U.S. to be "smart." "If we end training & equipment to #Honduras & #Guatemala, it will become easier to ship drugs here," he wrote. "And it will empower MS13 & other dangerous gangs to continue to terrorize people, who will then eventually leave & come illegally."

#### And empirics prove—US Military aid to Honduras stops trafficking

Elyssa Pachico, Reporter, InSight Crime, 9-28-2015 ["'Drug Trafficking Down 72% in Honduras'", http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/drug-trafficking-down-72-in-honduras, 9-16-2016] JRB

According to an unidentified source in the Honduran security forces, **drug trafficking has dropped significantly in Honduras thanks to military and intelligence work, the latest in a series of assertions that the country is no longer a major hub for organized crime.** El Heraldo reported that the source, identified as an official with inter-agency security force Fusina, said that the amount of drugs moved through Honduras has **dropped 72 percent.** While Honduras was once the top transit nation for drug trafficking in the region, now Guatemala, Costa Rice, and Nicaragua all see more drug shipments than Honduras does, the source told the newspaper. **The improvement is thanks to Honduras' improved ability to act on intelligence from the US** and Colombia, as well as increased maritime and land patrols, and use of radars to track drug flights, the source reportedly said. **More than 12,000 Honduran police, military, and other security officials are dedicated to combatting drug trafficking**, with about 1.8 tons of cocaine seized so far in 2015, the source added. Daily, 24-hour maritime patrols off Honduras' Pacific coast have forced drug traffickers to seek alternate routes in non-Honduran waters, according to El Heraldo's report. Meanwhile, use of radar has resulted in drug flights dropping down to a fifth of the previous number, with 25 clandestine landing strips destroyed thus far in 2015, the newspaper's source said. The country's easternmost border state, Gracias a Dios, remains a primary entry point for drug shipments, which is then moved to the neighboring states of Olancho and El Paraiso. To the south, Choluteca remains an important entry point for drugs being moved by land. El Heraldo's source also said that most drug shipments that do end up transiting through Honduras originate in either Venezuela or Colombia's Providencia island, and are moved through Nicaragua first before continuing through Central America. InSight Crime Analysis While El Heraldo's report is based on a single, unidentified source, there have been multiple previous claims that drug trafficking has dropped significantly in the country. Earlier this year, security forces claimed that the number of drug flights through Honduras had dropped to zero. The commander of the US Southern Command has also said that Honduras is no longer the principal transit nation for US-bound cocaine.

#### And Drug trafficking is a large scale, structural impact, its really bad in a bunch of different ways.

U.S. Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 February 2010, <https://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs38/38661/drugImpact.htm> ///AHS PB

The trafficking and abuse of drugs in the United States affect nearly all aspects of our lives. The economic cost alone is immense, estimated at nearly $215 billion. The damage caused by drug abuse and addiction is reflected in an overburdened justice system, a strained healthcare system, lost productivity, and environmental destruction. The Demand for Illicit Drugs NSDUH data show that in 2008, 14.2 percent of individuals 12 years of age and older had used illicit drugs during the past year. Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug, with 25.8 million individuals 12 years of age and older (10.3%) reporting past year use. That rate remains stable from the previous year (10.1%) (see Table B1 in Appendix B). Psychotherapeutics4 ranked second, with 15.2 million individuals reporting past year "nonmedical use" in 2008, a decrease from 16.3 million in 2007. In 2008, approximately 5.3 million individuals aged 12 and older reported past year cocaine use, 850,000 reported past year methamphetamine use, and 453,000 reported past year heroin use. Rates of drug use vary by age. Rates are highest for young adults aged 18 to 25, with 33.5 percent reporting illicit drug use in the past year. Nineteen percent of youth aged 12 to 17 report past year illicit drug use. Finally, 10.3 percent of adults aged 26 and older report past year illicit drug use. These rates are relatively stable when compared with 2007 rates. In 2008, approximately 2.9 million individuals tried an illicit drug or used a prescription drug nonmedically for the first time, representing nearly 8,000 initiates per day. More than half of these new users (56.6%) report that marijuana was the first illicit substance that they had tried. Other past year illicit drug initiates report that their first drug was a psychotherapeutic drug used nonmedically (29.6%), an inhalant (9.7%), or a hallucinogen (3.2%). By drug category, marijuana and pain relievers used nonmedically each had an estimated 2.2 million past year first-time users. Also identified frequently as the first drug used by initiates were tranquilizers (nonmedical use--1.1 million), ecstasy/MDMA (0.9 million), inhalants (0.7 million), cocaine (0.7 million), and stimulants (0.6 million). Methamphetamine appears to be fading in popularity among initiates. In 2008, an estimated 95,000 individuals tried methamphetamine for the first time--a 39 percent decrease from the 2007 estimate (157,000) and a 70 percent decrease from the 2004 estimate (318,000). The Consequences of Illicit Drug Use The consequences of illicit drug use are widespread, causing permanent physical and emotional damage to users and negatively impacting their families, coworkers, and many others with whom they have contact. Drug use negatively impacts a user's health, often leading to sickness and disease. In many cases, users die prematurely from drug overdoses or other drug-associated illnesses (see text box). Some users are parents, whose deaths leave their children in the care of relatives or in foster care. Drug law violations constitute a substantial proportion of incarcerations in local, state, and federal facilities and represent the most common arrest category. Colombian Cocaine Producers Increase Use of a Harmful Cutting Agent Since late 2007, cocaine has increasingly contained levamisole, a pharmaceutical agent that typically is used for livestock deworming. According to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Cocaine Signature Program data, before 2008, less than 10 percent of the tested wholesale-level cocaine samples contained levamisole. By 2009, approximately 71 percent of the tested cocaine samples contained levamisole. Because levamisole is being found in kilogram quantities of cocaine, investigators are confident that Colombian traffickers are adding it as part of the production process, possibly to enhance the effects of the cocaine. However, levamisole can be hazardous to humans, especially those with weakened immune systems. Ingesting levamisole can cause a person to develop agranulocytosis, a serious, sometimes fatal, blood disorder. At least 20 confirmed and probable cases of agranulocytosis, including two deaths, have been associated with cocaine adulterated with levamisole. The consequences of abusing levamisole are serious enough that in September 2009, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) issued a nationwide public alert on its effects. Impact on Health and Health Care Systems Drug use and abuse may lead to specialized treatment, ED visits (sometimes involving death), contraction of illnesses, and prolonged hospital stays. In 2008, NSDUH estimated that 7 million individuals aged 12 and older were dependent on or had abused illicit drugs in the past year, compared with 6.9 million in 2007. The drugs with the highest dependence or abuse levels were marijuana, prescription pain relievers, and cocaine. The number of individuals reporting past year marijuana abuse or dependence was 4.2 million in 2008, compared with 3.9 million in 2007; the number of individuals reporting past year prescription pain reliever abuse or dependence was 1.7 million in both 2007 and 2008; and the number of individuals reporting past year cocaine abuse or dependence was 1.4 million in 2008, compared with 1.6 million in 2007. Many individuals who become dependent on illicit drugs eventually seek treatment. The Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS) provides information regarding the demographics and substance abuse patterns of treatment admissions to state-licensed treatment facilities for drug dependence. In 2007, there were approximately 1.8 million admissions to state-licensed treatment facilities for illicit drug dependence or abuse. The highest percentage of admissions reported opiates as the primary drug of choice (31%, primarily heroin) followed by marijuana/hashish (27%), cocaine (22%), and stimulants (13%). Although approaches to treatment vary by drug, more than half of the admissions were to ambulatory (outpatient, intensive outpatient, and detox) facilities rather than residential facilities. (See Table B2 in Appendix B for data on admissions for specific drugs.) Individuals often experience adverse reactions to drugs--including nonfatal overdoses--that require them to go to the hospital. In 2006, the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) reported that of 113 million hospital ED visits--1,742,887 (1.5%)--were related to drug misuse or drug abuse. An estimated 31 percent of these visits involved illicit drugs only, 28 percent involved CPDs, and 13 percent involved illicit drugs in combination with alcohol. When drug misuse or abuse plays a role in these ED visits, the most commonly reported substances are cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and stimulants (typically amphetamines or methamphetamine). A 2007 DAWN survey of 63 metropolitan areas found an average of 12.1 deaths per 100,000 persons related to drug use.5 Rates of drug-related deaths range from 1.1 per 100,000 in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, to 26.1 per 100,000 in the New Orleans area. DAWN also records the number of drug-related suicide deaths. In 2007, the number of drug-related suicides per 100,000 persons ranged from less than one in several jurisdictions (including Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, and Minneapolis) to 6.2 per 100,000 in Fargo, North Dakota. To put these statistics in perspective, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports other nonnatural death rates as follows: Motor vehicle accidents, 15.1 per 100,000; nontransport accidents (e.g., falls, accidental drownings), 24.4 per 100,000; suicide, 11.1 per 100,000; and homicides, 6.2 per 100,000. The consequences of drug use usually are not limited to the user and often extend to the user's family and the greater community. According to SAMHSA, combined data from 2002 to 2007 indicate that during the prior year, an estimated 2.1 million American children (3%) lived with at least one parent who was dependent on or abused illicit drugs, and 1 in 10 children under 18 lived with a substance-addicted or substance-abusing parent.6 Moreover, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated in 1999 that substance abuse was a factor in two-thirds of all foster care placements. Many states have enacted drug-endangered children laws to protect children from the consequences of drug production, trafficking, and abuse. Typically associated with methamphetamine production, drug-endangered children are exposed not only to abuse and neglect but also to fires, explosions, and physical health hazards such as toxic chemicals. In 2009, 980 children were reported to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) as present at or affected by methamphetamine laboratories, including 8 who were injured and 2 who were killed at the laboratories. These statistics do not include children killed by random gunfire associated with drug activity or who were physically or sexually abused by a "caretaker" involved in drug trafficking or under the influence of drugs. Contents Impact on Crime and Criminal Justice Systems The consequences of illicit drug use impact the entire criminal justice system, taxing resources at each stage of the arrest, adjudication, incarceration, and post-release supervision process. Although drug courts and diversion programs in many jurisdictions have helped to alleviate this burden (see text box), substance abuse within the criminal justice population remains widespread. Drug Courts To alleviate the burden that drug use and abuse have caused to the nation's criminal justice system, most jurisdictions have developed drug courts or other diversion programs aimed at breaking the drug addiction and crime cycle. In these nonadversarial, coordinated approaches to processing drug cases, participants receive a full continuum of treatment services, are subject to frequent urinalyses, and experience strict judicial monitoring in lieu of traditional incarceration. Once the offender successfully completes treatment, charges may be dropped. Since the first drug court became operational in Miami in 1989, the number of drug courts has grown each year, and such courts now exist in all 50 states as well as the District of Columbia, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and Indian Country. As of July 2009, there were 2,038 active drug court programs and 226 in the planning stages. Research has shown that drug courts are associated with reduced recidivism by participants and result in cost savings. For instance, a 2006 study of nine California drug courts showed that drug court graduates had recidivism rates of 17 percent, while a comparison group who did not participate in drug court had recidivism rates of 41 percent. A study of the drug court in Portland, Oregon, found that the program reduced crime by 30 percent over 5 years and saved the county more than $79 million over 10 years. With success stories abundant, drug courts have gained approval at the local, state, and federal levels. The most recent annual data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) show that 12.2 percent of more than 14 million arrests in 2008 were for drug violations, the most common arrest crime category. The proportion of total drug arrests has increased over the past 20 years: in 1987, only 7.4 percent of all arrests were for drug violations. Approximately 4 percent of all homicides in 2008 were drug-related, a percentage that has not changed significantly over the same 20-year period. The characteristics of populations under correctional supervision reflect these arrest patterns. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), 20 percent of state prisoners and 53 percent of federal prisoners are incarcerated because of a drug offense. Moreover, 27 percent of individuals on probation and 37 percent of individuals on parole at the end of 2007 had committed a drug offense. The drug-crime link is also reflected in arrestee data. In 2008, the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) II program found that the median percentage of male arrestees who tested positive in the 10 ADAM II cities for any of 10 drugs, including cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, opioids, and phencyclidine (PCP), was 67.6 percent, down slightly from 69.2 percent in 2007. Other data reflect the link as well. In 2002, a BJS survey found that 68 percent of jail inmates were dependent on or abusing drugs and alcohol and that 55 percent had used illicit drugs during the month before their offense. In 2004, a similar BJS self-report survey identified the drug-crime link more precisely: 17 percent of state prisoners and 18 percent of federal prisoners had committed their most recent offense to acquire money to buy drugs. Property and drug offenders were more likely than violent and public-order offenders to commit crimes for drug money. Impact on Productivity Premature mortality, illness, injury leading to incapacitation, and imprisonment all serve to directly reduce national productivity. Public financial resources expended in the areas of health care and criminal justice as a result of illegal drug trafficking and use are resources that would otherwise be available for other policy initiatives. There is a great loss of productivity associated with drug-related premature mortality. In 2005, 26,858 deaths were unintentional or undetermined-intent poisonings; in 2004, 95 percent of these poisonings were caused by drugs. Although it is difficult to place a dollar value on a human life, a rough calculation of lost productivity can be made based on the present discounted value of a person's lifetime earnings. There are also health-related productivity losses. An individual who enters a residential drug treatment program or is admitted to a hospital for drug treatment becomes incapacitated and is removed from the labor force. According to TEDS data, there were approximately 1.8 million admissions to state-licensed treatment facilities for illicit drug dependence or abuse in 2007. Productivity losses in this area alone are enormous. Health-related productivity losses are higher still when lost productivity associated with drug-related hospital admissions (including victims of drug-related crimes) is included. The approximately one-quarter of offenders in state and local correctional facilities and the more than half of offenders in federal facilities incarcerated on drug-related charges represent an estimated 620,000 individuals who are not in the workforce. The cost of their incarceration therefore has two components: keeping them behind bars and the results of their nonproductivity while they are there. Finally, there is productivity lost to drug-related unemployment and drug-related absenteeism. According to the 2008 NSDUH, 19.6 percent of unemployed adults may be defined as current users of illicit drugs. Based on population estimates from the same study, this translates into approximately 1.8 million unemployed individuals who were current drug abusers. Further, approximately 8 percent of individuals employed full time and 10.2 percent of individuals employed part-time were current users of illicit drugs. Individuals who are employed but have chronic absenteeism resulting from illicit drug use also accrue substantial lost productivity. Impact on the Environment The environmental impact of illicit drugs is largely the result of outdoor cannabis cultivation and methamphetamine production. Many of the chemicals used to produce methamphetamine are flammable, and the improper storage, use, and disposal of such chemicals that are typical among methamphetamine producers often lead to fires and explosions at clandestine laboratories. Additionally, the process used to produce methamphetamine results in toxic chemicals--between 5 and 7 pounds of waste per pound of methamphetamine--that are typically discarded improperly in fields, streams, forests, and sewer systems, causing extensive environmental damage. Currently, there are no conclusive estimates regarding the nationwide cost of methamphetamine production site remediation because many of the methamphetamine laboratories and dumpsites in the United States are undiscovered due to their clandestine locations. However, in California alone, from January through December 10, 2009, the California Department of Toxic Substance Control responded to and cleaned up 232 laboratories and dumpsites at a cost of $776,889, or approximately $3,349 per site. Outdoor cannabis cultivation, particularly on public lands, is causing increasing environmental damage. Grow site operators often contaminate and alter watersheds, clear-cut native vegetation, discard garbage and nonbiodegradable materials at deserted sites, create wildfire hazards, and divert natural water courses. For example, cultivators often dam streams and redirect the water through plastic gravity-fed irrigation tubing to supply water to individual plants. The high demand for water often strains small streams and damages downstream vegetation that depend on consistent water flow. In addition, law enforcement officials are increasingly encountering dumpsites of highly toxic insecticides, chemical repellants, and poisons that are produced in Mexico, purchased by Mexican criminal groups, and transported into the country for use at their cannabis grow sites. These toxic chemicals enter and contaminate ground water, pollute watersheds, kill fish and other wildlife, and eventually enter residential water supplies. Moreover, the National Parks Conservation Association (NPCA) reports that while preparing land for cannabis cultivation, growers commonly clear the forest understory, which allows nonnative plants to supplant native ones, adversely affecting the ecosystem. They also terrace the land--especially in mountainous areas--which results in rapid erosion. Limited research on the environmental impact of the improper disposal of pharmaceuticals7 indicates that contamination from dissolved pharmaceutical drugs is present in extremely low levels in most of the nation's water supply. The harm to aquatic life and the environment has not been determined, and according to the Environmental Protection Agency, scientists have found no evidence of adverse human health effects from the minute residue found in water supplies. Nonetheless, as a precaution based on environmental research to date, the ONDCP and the Food and Drug Administration suggest that consumers use take-back programs to dispose of unused prescription drugs (see text box in Vulnerabilities section).

### Case

#### The Aff is nonunique: Trump has already said he wants to cut aid, means he is likely to do it if the shutdown ends.

John Wagner, National reporter leading The Post's breaking political news team, and David Nakamura, Washington Post Reporter covering the White House, Trump vows to reduce aid to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador as migrant caravan grows, October 22, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-vows-to-reduce-aid-to-guatemala-honduras-and-el-salvador-as-migrant-caravan-grows/2018/10/22/44c48982-d5f8-11e8-83a2-d1c3da28d6b6_story.html?utm_term=.722fad75554e> ///AHS PB

President Trump vowed Monday to cut off or “substantially” reduce aid to three Latin American nations, voicing fresh frustration as a growing caravan of migrants that originated in Honduras continued to make its way toward the U.S.-Mexico border. “Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador were not able to do the job of stopping people from leaving their country and coming illegally to the U.S.,” Trump said in one of a string of morning tweets on the subject. “We will now begin cutting off, or substantially reducing, the massive foreign aid routinely given to them.”

#### And United States aid to Honduras is good—most recent evidence shows it fosters democracy.

Kurt Alan Ver Beek, sociology professor at Calvin College, has lived in Honduras since 1988 and is co-founder of the Association for a More Just Society., and James D. Nealon, Former U.S. Ambassador to Honduras from 2014 to 2017. He is currently a Wilson Center Global Fellow, Don't Give Up on Honduras, Dec 10, 2018, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/dont-give-honduras> ///AHS PB

There is much more to be done in Honduras, and many significant challenges. Corruption remains an issue in the police, the courts, and the Attorney General’s office. Homicides have dropped but they remain high, and issues like gang extortion and domestic violence still are drastically underreported. But progress is being made. Honduras’ President and Attorney General have put their support behind these positive changes because of both pressure and support from civil society and the international community. Foreign aid helps to tip the cost-benefit analysis for politicians and leaders, showing them that if they do the right thing, the United States will have their back. Cutting aid to Honduras not only halts the positive change we are beginning to see; such a move also leaves those who have bravely taken on substantial risk to bring about change without the protection and international support that this aid provides. Fragile Progress in Corruption and Transparency Civil society involvement has also led to significant but fragile change in the arenas of anti-corruption and transparency, including important reforms in public education, medicine procurement in the public health sector, and the establishment of an international anti-corruption body. Transformemos Honduras, a coalition of religious and nonprofit organizations, has exposed corruption in teachers’ unions and substantially reduced corruption and clientelism in the hiring of teachers and education administrators. Transformemos Honduras released evidence that 26 percent of Honduran teachers on the payroll were not in their assigned classrooms, and that Honduran schools managed just 125 class days per year. Those investigations led to reforms that resulted in returning teachers to their classrooms and increasing the school year to more than 200 days. Transformemos Honduras also uncovered serious corruption in government procurement of medicine that resulted in the theft of an estimated 30–40 percent of the government budget for medicine. Their report led the Honduran government to create a system under which the United Nations Office of Project Services now purchases all medicines through a Honduran government trust fund, reducing loss and corruption in the purchasing process. In 2015, the National Anti-Corruption Council, another civil society anti-corruption organization, began working on a corruption case involving over $300 million stolen from the Honduran social security system. The scandal spawned massive protests. One result of these protests was the establishment of the Support Mission against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH, in Spanish), part of the OAS’s secretariat for political affairs and special missions, and comprised of international experts brought in to investigate emblematic corruption cases in Honduras. The MACCIH has spearheaded several key corruption investigations, including one against former First Lady Rosa Elena de Lobo, and the “Pandora” case, which implicates high-ranking members of Congress in acts of corruption. These cases have prompted fierce pushback by members of the elite, including a challenge to the constitutionality of the MACCIH, and legal reforms making it significantly more difficult to prosecute corruption. Extradition, asset seizure, and preventative detention had previously been applied to drug traffickers and gang members without much pushback from Honduran elites, but once the MACCIH and Attorney General’s office began to focus on well-connected officials, prominent political and business elites reacted with force. One law approved by Congress in the wake of MACCIH’s cases required corruption cases to be first handled by an administrative auditing commission with a 7–10 year backlog of audits. This law virtually assures that new corruption cases will not make it to criminal court. While the political pushback is frustrating, it is, ironically, an encouraging sign of progress. Corrupt government officials clearly feel threatened by the coordinated anti-corruption work led by civil society and supported by the international community and key government actors, such as the Attorney General’s office, the Anti-Corruption Unit of the Attorney General’s office (UFECIC), and the MACCIH. Sustained Support Is Needed Honduras’ progress against violence and corruption is currently in a vulnerable place. Civil society has lost some battles against corruption and violence, minority groups and activists continue to be in serious danger, and threats to human rights continue. The MACCIH survived this last fight to be eliminated but did not emerge unscathed; it continues its work under some burdensome new requirements. It needs support, nationally and internationally, so that it can continue to battle the corruption of powerful elites. The United Nations is leading the country in a dialogue process after a controversial election in November 2017, but the process has been bogged down by political infighting and has made little progress. Meanwhile, under President Hernández, the executive branch has concentrated power and the country’s military continues to grow, with a budget increase of approximately 660 percent in five years, compared to a judiciary budget increase of only 160 percent.[2] Despite these challenges, there is good news in Honduras. Brave civil society groups are advocating for and seeing institutional reforms which have resulted in real-life changes: halving the homicide rate, nearly doubling the days of school, and improving transparency in the purchase of medicines. Civil society leaders are putting themselves at risk. And they need international support as they work for advances that are in the best interest of both Honduras and the United States – confronting drug trafficking and criminal groups, and improving the lives and livelihoods of Hondurans who are so desperate that they would walk across a continent to try to make a better life elsewhere. We can achieve a safer and more just Honduras. But this requires sustained investment in rule of law, anti-corruption, and systemic reform measures. Making progress toward these objectives requires international interest and accountability as well as a sign from the United States that it will stand by those who work on behalf of these reforms.

## Bahrain

### Iran Take Over DA

#### The small middle eastern kingdom of Bahrain is a vital check against Iran for US Interests. Cutting military aid destroys US presence there, cedes power to Iran, causes Bahrain to become more authoritarian, prolongs the war in Yemen, and causes nuclear proliferation.

James Phillips, senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs at The Heritage Foundation, Senate Move to Block Arms Sales to Bahrain Would Undermine U.S. Interests, Nov 16th, 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/senate-move-block-arms-sales-bahrain-would-undermine-us-interests> ///AHS PB

But depriving Bahrain of arms that it requires for its own defense will undermine U.S. national interests by weakening ties to a major non-NATO ally, giving a psychological boost to Iran, and encouraging the Houthis to continue to drag their feet on peace talks. Bahrain: A Key Ally The Trump administrating has made it clear that its main priorities in the Middle East are to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and to curtail its malign influence in the re gion. In addition to increasing sanctions and bringing debilitating economic pressure on Iran, the administration needs to work on improving and deepening bilateral security relationships in the region—especially with the Gulf States. Bahrain is a key U.S. ally. First and foremost, it is home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet, and the U.S. has maintained some kind of naval presence in the country since 1958. All U.S.-led maritime operations from the Horn of Africa to the Arabian Sea are controlled out of Bahrain. Some 7,000 U.S. military personnel are based in Bahrain. In addition to the large Navy presence, a significant number of U.S. Air Force personnel operate out of Shaykh Isa Air Base, where F-16s, F/A-18s, and P-3 surveillance aircraft are stationed. The deep-water port of Khalifa bin Salman is one of the few facilities in the Gulf that can accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers. Bahrain has also showed that it is willing to step up to the plate when it comes to its own defense and security. It has led the Combined Task Force-152—which is a multilateral naval operation in the Gulf—on numerous occasions. When it is not commanding the task force, it provides ships to the operations. Bahrain has also deployed troops as part of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Bahrain—like the internationally recognized government of Yemen, which the U.S. supports against the Houthi rebels—faces significant threats from Iran. Since Iran’s 1979 revolution, the Tehran regime has sought to overthrow Bahrain’s pro-Western monarchy and replace it with an Islamist dictatorship. Some revisionist hardliners in Iran argue that Bahrain is a lost province of Iran because it once was part of the Persian Empire. Iran sponsored a failed coup against Bahrain back in the 1980s, and recently stepped up its long-standing efforts to radicalize the Shiite majority living under Bahrain’s Sunni-led government. Tehran has backed Islamist groups such as the Dawa Party in Bahrain and trained militants from Bahrain in camps in Iraq. It has been caught red-handed sending arms to terrorists in Bahrain, including sophisticated bombs called explosively formed penetrators that were responsible for the deaths of several hundred U.S. troops in Iraq, and now threaten Bahraini security forces. If there is a link between Bahrain and Yemen, it is that both are threatened by Iran. Yet advocates of blocking defense sales to Bahrain ignore this link and prefer to focus on penalizing U.S. allies. What is needed is stronger action against Iran—not misguided efforts to end wars by abandoning our allies.

#### And loosing Bahrain gives Iran regional control and spurs conflict.

Răzvan Munteanu, Geopolitician working on a Ph.D. in Middle East studies, President of Chamber of Excellence in International Affairs (CEIA) Think Tank and CEO of newsint.ro media publication, The Battle for Bahrain, 2017, <http://www.themarketforideas.com/the-battle-for-bahrain-a203/> ///AHS PB

The entry of Bahrain into the Iranian sphere of influence would change the paradigm of analyzing the regional power ratios. Firstly, from the military point of view, the Saudi oil facilities may be threatened because the Saudi oil fields (Ghawar, Abqaiq, Abu Safah, Qatif, and Berri), the oil export terminals (Ras Tanura, Al Juaymah), and the critical oil processing facilities at Abqaiq, are located 42 kilometers away from the Bahraini shores. Secondly, this would be the keystone for the so-called Awakening of the Shi’ite Axis process which will foment the Shi’ite movements in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Bahrain could, were it to have a pro-Iranian leadership, weaken the power projection capacity of the Saudis, thus giving Iran the role of regional hegemon. In this context, Riyadh feels the Shi’ite pressure from the South, where the Houthi rebels are located, from the North-East, where a pro-Iranian Shiite government is installed in Iraq and in the east where Bahrain is located. A political or military success of the opposition from Yemen or Bahrain is viewed as a de-legitimation of Saudi policy, which may prompt internal protests and, thereby, destabilize the Saudi Kingdom. The Shi’ite presence in Saudi Arabia is powerful enough and, just as with Bahrain, only armed intervention managed to calm the internal turmoil during the Arab Spring before it could escalate. The Saudi strategic vulnerability is heightened by the fact that the Shi’ite community is situated in the Eastern provinces, the Nejd, where the oil resources are located in close proximity to Bahrain.

#### Iranian regional heg causes mass structural violence and nuclear proliferation, actively containing them solves.

Mike Pompeo, Secretary of state, this guy’s job is running all of the governments foreign policy, After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy, May 21, 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/event/after-the-deal-new-iran-strategy> ///AHS PB BRACKETED FOR CLARITY

Lebanon is an even more comfortable home for Hizballah today than it was when we embarked on the JCPOA. Hizballah is now armed to the teeth by Iran and has its sights set on Israel. Thanks to Iran, Hizballah provides the ground forces for the military expedition in Syria. The IRGC, too, has continued to pump thousands of fighters into Syria to prop up the murderous Assad regime and help make that country 71,000 square miles of kill zone. Iran perpetuates a conflict that has displaced [11 (total adding 6 mil + 5 mil)] more than 6 million Syrians inside the – 6 million Syrians and caused over 5 million to seek refuge outside of its borders. These refugees include foreign fighters who have crossed into Europe and threatened terrorist attacks in those countries. In Iraq, Iran sponsored Shia militia groups and terrorists to infiltrate and undermine the Iraqi Security Forces and jeopardize Iraq’s sovereignty – all of this during the JCPOA. In Yemen, Iran’s support for the Houthi militia fuels a conflict that continues to starve the Yemeni people and hold them under the threat of terror. The IRGC has also given Houthi missiles to attack civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and to threaten international shipping in the Red Sea. And in Afghanistan, Iran’s support to the Taliban in the form of weapons and funding leads to further violence and hinders peace and stability for the Afghan people. Today, the Iranian Qods Force conducts covert assassination operations in the heart of Europe. We should remember, too, that during the JCPOA Iran continues to hold Americans hostage: Baquer Namazi, Siamak Namazi, Xiyue Wang, and Bob Levinson, who has been missing for over 11 years. I will note for the American people, you should know we are working diligently to bring each American missing wrongfully detained in Iran home. The list continues. Iran continues to be, during the JCPOA, the world’s largest sponsor of terror. It continues to serve as sanctuary for al-Qaida, as it has done since 9/11, and remains unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qaida members residing in Tehran. Today we ask the Iranian people: Is this what you want your country to be known for, for being a co-conspirator with Hizballah, Hamas, the Taliban, and al-Qaida? The United States believe you deserve better. And I have an additional point for the Iranian people to ponder. Here in the West, President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Zarif are often held apart from the regime’s unwise terrorist and malign behavior. They are treated somehow differently. The West says, “Boy, if only they could control Ayatollah Khamenei and Qasem Soleimani then things would be great.” Yet, Rouhani and Zarif are your elected leaders. Are they not the most responsible for your economic struggles? Are these two not responsible for wasting Iranian lives throughout the Middle East? It’s worth the Iranian people considering, because instead of helping their own citizens, the regime continues to seek a corridor stretching from Iran’s borders to the shores of the Mediterranean. Iran wants this corridor to transport fighters and an advanced weapons system to Israel’s doorsteps. Indeed in recent months, the IRGC has flown an armed drone into Israeli airspace and launched salvos of rockets into the Golan Heights from Syria. Our steadfast ally has asserted the sovereign right of self-defense in response, a stance the United States will continue to unequivocally support. So the bet – the bet that the JCPOA would increase Middle East stability was a bad one for America, for Europe, for the Middle East, and indeed for the entire world. It is clear that the JCPOA has not ended Iran’s nuclear ambitions, nor did it deter its quest for a [and] regional hegemony. Iran’s leaders saw the deal as the starting gun for the march across the Middle East. So, the path forward. America’s commitment to the Iran strategy President Trump laid down in October remains. It will now be executed outside of the JCPOA. We’ll continue to work with allies to counter the regime’s destabilizing activities in the region, block their financing of terror, and address Iran’s proliferation of missiles and other advanced weapons systems that threaten peace and stability. We will also ensure Iran has no path to a nuclear weapon – not now, not ever.

#### Iranian nuclear weapons cause Isreal to launch a preemptive nuclear strike – causes nuclear war and global proliferation.

Robert Farley, Visiting Professor at the United States Army War College, 3 Reasons Israel Would Start a Nuclear War, May 12, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/3-reasons-israel-would-start-nuclear-war-25794> ///AHS PB

If a hostile power (let’s say Iran, for sake of discussion) appeared to be on the verge of mating nuclear devices with the systems needed to deliver them, Israel might well consider a preventive nuclear attack. In the case of Iran, we can imagine scenarios in which Israeli planners would no longer deem a conventional attack sufficiently lethal to destroy or delay the Iranian program. In such a scenario, and absent direct intervention from the United States, Israel might well decide to undertake a limited nuclear attack against Iranian facilities. Given that Iran lacks significant ballistic missile defenses, Israel would most likely deliver the nuclear weapons with its Jericho III intermediate range ballistic missiles. Israel would likely limit its attacks to targets specifically linked with the Iranian nuclear program, and sufficiently away from civilian areas. Conceivably, since it would be breaking the nuclear taboo anyway, Israel might target other military facilities and bases for attack, but it is likely that the Israeli government would want to limit the precedent for using nuclear weapons as much as possible. Would it work? Nuclear weapons would deal more damage than most imaginable conventional attacks, and would also convey a level of seriousness that might take even the Iranians aback. On the other hand, the active use of nuclear weapons by Israel would probably heighten the interest of everyone in the region (and potentially across the world) to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

### Russia Fill In DA

#### Russia fills in US aid to Bahrain, They don’t care about human rights and have a ton of cheap weapons to sell making them the ideal partner. This increases Russian control of the region and turns case.

NIKITA SMAGIN, Russian Reporter, Middle East pressure point: Why Russia needs Bahrain, MARCH 10 2017, <https://www.rbth.com/international/2017/03/10/middle-east-russia-bahrain-716863> ///AHS PB

The changing point was 2011, when during the Arab Spring Washington openly supported the protesters in Egypt and refused to help its ally President Hosni Mubarak. This fact combined with criticism of human rights in Bahrain raises a concern that in a crisis, Washington may abandon support for the current government in the island state. In addition, the United States in recent years has embarked on reducing its involvement in the Middle East. Therefore, not only Bahrain, even other Arab monarchies in the Persian Gulf are losing confidence in Washington’s ability and willingness to help resolve the Iranian problem. Russia, on the other hand, significantly increased its involvement in the region in the last two years. And since, unlike the White House, the Kremlin does not require compliance with human rights in exchange for the supply of weapons, for Bahrain relations with Russia are an alternative way of ensuring its own security. A mediator role For Russia, Bahrain is important because Manama is ready to become a mediator in Russia’s negotiations with other Arab countries and particularly with Saudi Arabia over the handling of the Iranian problem. The willingness of Bahrain to become a mediator is confirmed by the fact that, according to the Ambassador of Bahrain to Russia this year Manama will host a meeting of foreign ministers of Arab monarchies and Russia. This also suggests that the Arab States of the Persian Gulf believe that Russia is today a force to be reckoned with in the region. Arab Spring Russia and Bahrain began a new kind of relationship with the rise of the Arab Spring in 2011. After the suppression of mass demonstrations in the kingdom led to casualties, France and the UK cancelled their license for the supply of arms to Bahrain. In response, Manama signed an agreement with Moscow for the supply of AK-103 assault rifles, and has launched a program to train the military of Bahrain. Kremlin’s game: What Moscow is looking to achieve in Libya The next step was in 2014, when Bahrain, despite the sanctions of Brussels and Washington against the Kremlin, signed an investment agreement with Russia. In the same year, direct flights were launched between Moscow and Manama. Washington did not hide his irritation and regarded these actions as a disregard for their interests. In 2016, when the international community accused the Kremlin of war crimes in Syria, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa visited Russia twice. During these visits, the parties discussed the development of trade and political relations, and signed a military agreement. Moreover, in November 2016 the King of Bahrain invited Vladimir Putin to visit Bahrain, and in December 2016 the Russian state news agency Sputnik reported that there is a list of companies from Bahrain ready to invest in Crimea. There have also been some positive developments in beginning of 2017. At the end of February Manama hosted the first ever Bahrain-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. On Mar. 6, the Bahraini Ambassador in Russia confirmed that Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalif will arrive in Russia on Mar. 24. These developments suggest that, despite the complicated relations of Moscow with Manama’s allies, Bahrain and Russia continue to strengthen their relationship. Access to the arms market Despite a well-developed infrastructure, the most liberal legislation in the region and high level of economic development, the small size of Bahrain means it is not a big target for Russian businesses. At the same time, the country can be a convenient place to launch economic and political penetration in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. Russia and the UAE will develop a fifth-generation fighter jet First of all, in terms of sanctions and low oil prices, Russia is experiencing a lack of investment, so the Gulf countries are of direct interest. Bahrain has invested more than $50 million in retail, commercial real estate, mining and logistics services in Russia. Working with Manama demonstrates Russia's desire to enter the weapons market on the Arabian Peninsula. Today, in addition to supplying machines Moscow is executing a contract for the provision of the Kornet anti-tank complexes to Bahrain. According to Kommersant, even such a modest result may be considered a success for Russia, since Bahrain, as all the monarchies of the Persian Gulf traditionally focus on buying arms from the United States. In addition, during the Bahrain-Russian intergovernmental commission meeting the sides agreed to start the supplies of Russian meat products, and held talks about the possibilities of grain exports, and the simplification of the visa regime. The successful implementation of such plans can be used an example of beneficial cooperation with Russia for other Arab monarchies.

#### And this turns case, Russian arm sales encourage regimes authoritarian regimes to become more abusive towards their citizens and ignore human rights.

John Raine, Senior Adviser for Geopolitical Due Diligence, Russia in the Middle East: hard power, hard fact, 25th October 2018, <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/10/russia-middle-east-hard-power> ///AHS PB

This entails offering an alternative model of partnership and patronage in which it is less the scale and breadth of the relationship with partners that matters as the hardness of the power projected and the behaviours encouraged. In the case of currently stable states, that means being willing not just to sell weaponry, but to condone and support behaviours that ignore or undermine international law and conventions. That applies both to activities that states are expected to undertake (such as counter-terrorism), as well as to those they are not (assassination). Russia has always exported not just alternative weapons systems to those on offer from the West, but, as part of the package, an alternative worldview. That used to be ideological. Socialist, nominal or otherwise, Arab states were Russia’s natural partners and beneficiaries. Now the export is more a worldview than an ideology, and a view on the rule of law in particular. That’s potentially pernicious in a time and a region where mounting uncertainty is increasingly tempting conservative regimes to resort to the arbitrary use of force. The suspected assassination of Khashoggi looks like an egregious case of assumed licence on the part of Saudi Arabia. The danger of Russian patronage and influence is that it promotes just such new and dark norms. In the contest for influence, something else is at stake than markets and resources.

## Uganda

### T Authoritarian

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend that the United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.

#### Violation: Uganda isn’t authoritarian,

#### Standards:

#### Uganda is a hybrid regime. Screenshot of the EIU democracy index in the doc

The Economist ‘18, “Democracy Continues its Disturbing Retreat” January 31, 2018, [https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat //](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat%20//)AHS PB



#### Prefer the EIU index: A) Common Usage: if you look up “list of democracies” on google this is the most widely cited study B) Intent to delineate—Our study specifically compares authoritarian to non—authoritarian regimes in the context of global politics instead of just presenting an isolated opinion C) Objectivity: The EIU index relies on statistics derived from empirical data, such as voting records, which more realistic then subjective evidence

#### That Outweighs:

#### [1] Jurisdiction—they’re aff but not affirming the res. That’s an indepdent voter since the ballot asks who does the better debating in the context of the res.

#### [2] Semantics Outweigh pragmatics:

Nebel 15. (Jake, “The Priority of Resolutional Semantics,” 2/20/15, http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/)

One reason why LDers may be suspicious of my view is because they see topicality as just another theory argument. But unlike other theory arguments, topicality involves two “interpretations.” The first is an interpretation, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the resolution or of some part of it. The second is a rule—namely, that the aff**irmative** must defend the resolution.[**2**](http://vbriefly.com/2015/02/20/the-priority-of-resolutional-semantics-by-jake-nebel/#fn2)If we don’t distinguish between these two interpretations, then the negative’s view is merely that the affirmative must defend whatever proposition they think should be debated, not because it is the proposition expressed by the resolution, but rather because it would be good to debate. This failure to see what is distinctive about T**opicality** leads quickly to the pragmatic approach, by ignoring what the interpretation is supposed to be an interpretation of. By contrast, the topicality rule—i.e., that the affirmative must defend the resolution—justifies the semantic approach. This rule is justified by appeals to fairness and education: it would be unfair to expect the negative to prepare against anything other than the resolution, because that is the only mutually acceptable basis for preparation; the educational benefits that are unique to debate stem from clash focused on a proposition determined beforehand.The inference to the priority of semantic considerations is simple.Consider the following argument: We ought to debate the resolution. The resolution means X. Therefore, We ought to debate X. The first premise is just the topicality rule. The second premise is that X is the semantically correct interpretation. Pragmatic considerations for or against X do not, in themselves, support or deny this second premise. They might show that it would be better or worse if the resolution meant X, but sentences do not in general mean what it would be best for them to mean. At best, pragmatic considerations may show that we should debate some proposition other than the resolution. They are **(if anything)** reasons to change the topic, contrary to the topicality rule. Pragmatic considerations must, therefore, be weighed against the justifications for the topicality rule, not against the semantic considerations: they are objections to the first premise, not the second premise, in the argument above**.**

### Case

#### Seriously doubt the scope of their impacts—the US has reduced 2019 aid to 1/80th of where it was in 2018, Screenshots of charts in the Doc

Security Assistance Monitor Uganda, 2019 (page is continuously updated with newest info) https://securityassistance.org/uganda ///AHS PB





#### And US aid to Uganda is net good—it helps improve the living situation in the country.

Mehruba Chowdhury, writer at the Borgen Project which is an internationally renowned NGO and think tank on African development, (2018). How the US Benefits from Foreign Aid to Uganda | The Borgen Project. [online] The Borgen Project. Available at: https://borgenproject.org/us-benefits-from-foreign-aid-to-uganda/ [Accessed 15 Feb. 2019]. ///AHS PB

The U.S. international aid budget cuts would severely affect the aid given to Uganda, and consequently might hamper Uganda’s development. This is because Uganda’s rapid development is at least partially due to the foreign aid it receives. However, it is in the United States’ interests to continue providing aid to Uganda, because the U.S. benefits from foreign aid to Uganda as well. The rapid poverty rate decline in Uganda is notable: in 2013, the proportion of the population living below the national poverty line declined from 31.1 percent in 2006 to 19.7 percent and the share of people living on $1.90 per day or less dropped from 53.2 percent in 2006 to 34.6 percent in 2013, one of the fastest decreases in sub-Saharan Africa. Poverty reduction among households in agriculture accounts for 79 percent of Uganda’s national poverty reduction from 2006 to 2013. Favorable prices and weather led to the increase in income in the agriculture sector. Factors that demonstrate market efficiencies, such as investments in infrastructure, economic liberalization and better trade services, lead to favorable prices. Foreign aid, especially from the U.S., has led to the decline in poverty since much of the aid is used to develop agriculture and infrastructure and boost the economy. For instance, Uganda is a part of the U.S. government’s global hunger and food security initiative Feed the Future. Through this initiative, USAID investments focus on three value chains (maize, coffee, and beans) with the greatest market potential, nutritional benefits and income potential for farming households. This has the benefit of transforming subsistence farms into more commercial operations. Additionally, USAID works to improve farmers’ skills in production, post-harvest handling and storage technologies, all of which increase the likelihood of earning a higher income. This initiative has clearly made a notable impact in the country, as Feed the Future farmers in Uganda earned $97 million from agricultural sales. These numbers show that Uganda benefits immensely from foreign aid. However, other effects such as social capital derived from foreign aid show that the U.S. also benefits from foreign aid to Uganda. A recent study found that foreign aid has a strong impact on trust among people and can change beliefs and social capital. This study surveyed specific counties in Uganda and found a positive correlation between aid in a county and the subsequent level of trust, which aligns with the hypothesis that foreign aid contributes to an increase in trust. This is significant because trust is considered a “proxy of social capital and determinant of future growth,” meaning it can be converted into conventional economic gains in the future. In this way, the U.S. benefits from foreign aid to Uganda since it allows the U.S. access to Ugandan domestic and foreign policy, making foreign aid to Uganda an essential foreign policy tool. Moreover, foreign aid helps both the U.S. and Ugandan government establish a mutually beneficial relationship based on cooperation on a wide range of shared issues.

## Afghanistan

### Case

#### The aff is nonunique—current US Aid policies are leading to a peace treaty now

Patrick Reevell, ABC News Moscow bureau reporter, Taliban and senior Afghan politicians hold talks in Moscow, upsetting government, Feb 5, 2019, <https://abcnews.go.com/International/taliban-senior-afghan-politicians-hold-talks-moscow-upsetting/story?id=60852053> //AHS PB

Taliban officials and senior Afghan political leaders met in Moscow on Tuesday for peace talks, despite objections from Afghanistan’s government, which criticized the meeting as undermining its legitimacy. The two-day gathering was the second time Moscow has hosted high-level talks on Afghanistan attended by the Taliban in recent months. It comes a week after negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban in which both sides agreed to a draft framework for a deal which could open a path to peace talks, raising hopes that an end to the 18-year war could be closer. Tuesday's talks were attended by around 70 political and social leaders from Afghanistan, among them former president Hamid Karzai, who said they hoped it could build trust and lay a foundation for a future political settlement that might help end the war. But the meeting also underlined the anxieties and political uncertainties raised by any possible U.S. pull out from Afghanistan.

#### And be highly suspect of AC evidence. The sqou is empirically the best possible and outcome, and their predictions are just moral fear mongering.

Luke Coffey, oversees research on nations stretching from South America to the Middle East at the Heritage foundation, No, We Have Not Failed in Afghanistan. Here’s Why the U.S. Should Stay, May 16th, 2018, <https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/no-we-have-not-failed-afghanistan-heres-why-the-us-should-stay> ///AHS PB

Far from having failed in Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies have delivered considerable progress in Afghanistan. After the successful targeting of Taliban leaders, combined with a robust counterinsurgency campaign over the years, the Taliban as a national movement has degenerated into several smaller, weaker, and localized insurgencies—each with a different set of grievances and goals. Even with the recent horrific attacks in Kabul, the level of violence in Afghanistan is nowhere close to its peak. Al Qaeda, which once used Afghan territory with impunity, no longer enjoys a safe haven in Afghanistan. The threat posed to Afghanistan by the Islamic State is not even close to being in the same league as the Taliban, and pales in comparison to the terrorist group’s other affiliates in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. No major terrorist attack originating from Afghanistan has been successful in the United States since 2001. The Taliban that rolled into Kandahar and Kabul in the mid-1990s with tanks and planes is a shadow of its former self today. In 2001, outside of a small rump of territory run by the Northern Alliance in northeast Afghanistan, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of the entire country. Today, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s most recent quarterly report to Congress, the Taliban has “control or influence” in an area equaling only 13 percent of the country’s population. By contrast, 65 percent of Afghanistan’s population live under the “control or influence” of the Afghan government. The remaining 22 percent of the population lives in “contested” areas. That is not bad. Al Qaeda is essentially gone. ISIS is unable to establish a meaningful foothold in the country. The once omnipresent Taliban have been relegated to a divided and disparate insurgency. Even so, there is a constant drumbeat of articles and commentary talking about America’s failure in Afghanistan. It is unclear what would make these critics of the Afghan war happy. Would they be happy when only 10 percent of Afghanistan’s population was under Taliban control? 5 percent? None? After almost 17 years of warfare, maybe we should come to terms with the fact that until there is a genuine political settlement between all warring parties, and until Pakistan stops providing succor to the Taliban, what we see in Afghanistan might be as good as it’s going to get. The American public has every reason to be proud of what the U.S. military has accomplished under very challenging circumstances in Afghanistan. It is time that we have a dose of realism of what to expect in Afghanistan and lower our expectations on what is achievable for the future. Afghanistan will not be perfect or suddenly become some Switzerland in the Hindu Kush. Unless you are some idealistic dreamer who has never stepped foot in the country, that was never the goal. Success will be achieved when there is a stable enough Afghanistan—that is, when it is able to manage its own internal and external security to a degree that stops interference from outside powers, allowing the country to resist the re-establishment of terrorist bases that were there before. Nothing more and nothing less. The immediate criticism of Trump’s strategy last year was based on the argument that 4,000 more trainers will not be able to do in 2018 what more than 100,000 U.S. troops were unable to do in 2011. But this argument stems from an old way of thinking about America’s role in Afghanistan. The war being fought in Afghanistan today is not the same war as in 2001 or even 2009 (the year President Barack Obama unveiled his Afghan strategy), when the U.S. was leading combat operations. Today, the Afghans are in the lead, and the U.S. mission is one of training, advising, and assisting. The Afghan security forces are that country’s ticket to long-term security and stability. If the U.S. and its allies continue to mentor, train, and fund the Afghan military, the Afghans will be able to do a better job at taking on the insurgency themselves. Not only will that help the Afghans prevent their country from becoming a hub for transnational terrorism, but it also will eventually establish the security conditions in which a genuine political process can take place. That latter point is the most important. In his speech last year when announcing his new strategy, Trump alluded to an eventual political settlement “after an effective military effort.” That is right. You can no more fight your way out of a insurgency campaign any more than you can drink yourself out of alcoholism. The goal of any counterinsurgency is to allow those who have legitimate political grievances the ability to address these grievances through a political process and not through violence. If the insurgency in Afghanistan ever ends, it will be through a political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. As Trump makes a decision later this summer about the future of the U.S. role in Afghanistan, he needs to start measuring success by achievements on the ground and not by unrealistic expectations. The president should drown out the constant criticism of the campaign and remain committed to the realistic, reasonable, and responsible strategy he outlined last year.

#### And only military aid to Afghanistan avoids a poverty crisis and econ collapse

https://www.csis.org/analysis/afghanistan-vietnam-redux-bomb-declare-peace-and-leave

The real Afghan economy now relies on three main forces: outside aid – most of it military which generally benefits a relatively small elite and the Afghan military, civil servants, and contractors; narcotics sales which provide limited benefit to the grower but high incomes to power brokers, narcotraffickers, and the Taliban; and a subsistence economy that is primarily agricultural but has a growing element of urban poor. This subsistence often means poverty to the point of malnutrition at the rural level. Afghan cities are packed with displaced persons from an increasingly insecure countryside. Afghanistan does get substantial economic aid from other countries, but partly because of United States involvement. The Lead Inspector General-Overseas Contingency Operations (LIG-OCO) estimated in October 2018 that United States economic and civil aid would be $1.6 billion in FY2019, the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) put the total cost of civil and economic aid at $45.5 billion. Much of the impact of aid, however, comes from the military support and aid the United States spends in country

### Disad

#### US Military aid is the only thing propping the current Afghan gov, cuts cause state collapse–this isn’t about winning a war against the Taliban but internal stability.

Anatol Lieven, senior editor at The National Interest , is a professor in the War Studies Department of King's College London and a senior fellow of the New America Foundation in Washington, DC. He is author of America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2004) and Pakistan: A Hard Country (PublicAffairs, 2011)., A Way Forward for Afghanistan, August 21, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/way-forward-afghanistan-29397> //AHS PB

THERE IS no chance of military victory over the Taliban. Nor, without a U.S. commitment to withdraw its troops and accept a major share of power for the Taliban, does there seem any serious chance of a peace settlement (the brief truce to mark a religious festival notwithstanding). Nor, with 100 percent of the Afghan security budget and around 60 percent of the civilian budget funded by the United States and other outside donors, is there any chance of the Afghan state standing on its own feet. Financially and militarily, the existing U.S. commitment is sustainable. With U.S. military actions reduced to air support for the Afghan national forces and limited interventions by U.S. special forces, casualties have been vastly reduced. Only four U.S. soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan so far this year, and seventeen in 2017, compared to 496 at the height of U.S. operations in 2010. At around $4.94 billion in military aid to the Afghan state and $1.3 billion in civilian aid in 2017–18, the financial cost is a tiny proportion of the current U.S. military budget of almost $700 billion. There have been strong complaints from the U.S. Congress and the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John Sopko, about the corruption and waste in these programs. To some extent, however, this misses the point. If the intention is to prop up the existing Afghan state, rather than to perpetuate fantasies about turning that state into an economically successful democracy, then just because the U.S. money was stolen does not mean that it was wasted. It went to provide the patronage on which the Afghan state depends to keep local power brokers on their side, rather than joining the Taliban or setting up as independent warlords. And if the U.S. goal is limited to maintaining the Afghan state at its existing very circumscribed level, then from a purely military point of view the U.S. strategy is working. As was the case with the (much better armed) mujahideen rebels during the period from the Soviet military withdrawal in March 1989 to the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Taliban guerrillas have been able to conquer large areas of the countryside (mainly, but not exclusively, those inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns).

#### And the resulting state collapse absent aid causes civil war which explodes into global refugee crisis. Causes massive structural violence and Europe to shift the Far Right away from US interests.

Anatol Lieven, senior editor at The National Interest , is a professor in the War Studies Department of King's College London and a senior fellow of the New America Foundation in Washington, DC. He is author of America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 2004) and Pakistan: A Hard Country (PublicAffairs, 2011)., A Way Forward for Afghanistan, August 21, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/way-forward-afghanistan-29397> //AHS PB

RATHER THAN a clear-cut Taliban victory, the collapse of the existing Afghan state and the fall of Kabul to the Taliban would almost certainly lead to a civil war. This would pose real dangers. The greatest threat to America’s global position and the ideological basis of U.S. soft power in the world does not come from the rise of China or even the rise of right-wing populism in the United States itself. It comes from the impact of Muslim migration on Europe, and (reinforced by the socio-economic decline of the white working classes) the resulting swing of European populations to chauvinist positions hostile to the European Union and often sympathetic to Russia. In Germany, the wave of Syrian refugees has largely wrecked the Social Democratic Party and forced it into what looks like a permanent coalition with Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The cdu, and the coalition, are now in danger as the CDU’s more right-wing sister party, the Bavarian Christian Social Union, moves to more and more anti-immigrant positions in a bid to save itself from being overtaken by the new and quite radical Alternative for Germany party. Afghans already make up the second largest group of refugees to Europe after Syrians. A collapse of the Afghan state and intensified civil war would greatly increase their numbers, while adding to Europe’s moral dilemma—for on what legal or moral grounds, given the Western role of the past seventeen years in Afghanistan, could eu members refuse to grant asylum to refugees from the Taliban? To prevent masses of Afghan refugees heading to Europe would require not only a new deal with Turkey, but one with Iran as well—at which point the eu would find itself completely at odds with the United States. In his latest book, The Retreat of Western Liberalism , Edward Luce of the Financial Times has written that European democracy will not survive another decade like the last one. He has a point. The greatest threat from Afghanistan to the West is not terrorism, Islamist revolution or regional instability, but its potential impact on the political systems of European countries three thousand miles away (of course, a U.S. citizen might well reply that in that case European countries should be doing the fighting in Afghanistan—but realistically speaking there is no point in even suggesting this). This danger is an entirely sufficient reason for the United States to go on fighting in Afghanistan, at least as long as costs in U.S. blood and treasure remain at their present level and the Afghan state does not implode for its own internal reasons. This military strategy should in no way exclude peace overtures to the Taliban and serious, realistic American thinking about what a peace settlement would entail.

## Ukraine

### Non-Lethal Assistance PIC

#### Counterplan: The United States ought to only provide to non-lethal military equipment to Ukraine. To clarify this means we do not provide offensive weapons, only defensive systems like radar. Solves and turns the advantage, it helps save civilian lives, and since it can’t be used offensively so it doesn’t escalate tensions with Russia.

PATRICK TUCKER, Editor at Defense One, (2015). How US Technology Could Help Ukraine Without ‘Arming’ It. [online] Available at: https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/02/how-us-technology-could-help-ukraine-without-arming-it/104931/ [Accessed 15 Feb. 2019]. ///AHS PB BRACKETS IN ORIGINAL CARD

The question of whether or not to arm the Ukrainian military against Russian-backed separatists is quickly becoming contentious, both inside of Washington and also between the United States and its allies. But the debate misses a key point: The majority of the equipment that the Ukrainian military is asking for is not lethal. Some experts, such as Micah Zenko, have suggested that any U.S. decision to give (very limited) weapons to Ukraine would have either no effect or a highly negative one by escalating the conflict. But non-lethal aid, others argue, could help reduce civilian casualties in the region by allowing the Ukrainian military to operate more safely.In a recent Brookings Institution report titled, “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do,” former Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy; retired four-star Air Force Gen. Charles Wald; Steven Pifer, a current Brookings Senior Fellow and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and others make the case for expanded aid for Ukraine, based on conversations with Ukrainian military officials. Several of the report’s authors visited the front lines of the ongoing fighting in Ukraine and spoke directly with the commanding officer at Kramatorsk in Donetsk, about 40-50 km from the line of contact with the Russian-backed separatist fighters. Russian and separatist forces are using drones so [the Ukrainian military] is looking for some kind of electronic counter-measures to jam those. STEVEN PIFER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO UKRAINE “What we got was a very professional briefing of the military situation in Eastern Ukraine… then they gave us a presentation on what would be the specific things that, if the U.S. were to provide more military assistance, what would be of particular value,” Pifer told Defense One. “We looked at what the Ukrainians said and asked, ‘Does this make sense.’ Most of us concluded that it did in terms of the gaps that they now face.” While the request from Ukrainian military leaders did call for light anti-armor missiles, specifically Javelins, that could be used against a tank, it consisted primarily of other, less dangerous items, such as armored Humvees, drones for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, and secure communications equipment and jammers to stop Russian drones. The most important item on the list was, perhaps, anti-tank radar. Give Them Radar More than 70 percent of Ukraine’s military losses come from rocket fire, according to the report, which relies on figures drawn from conversations with Ukrainian military leaders. That suggests that better missile and rocket tracking could play a huge role in changing the battle dynamic on the Russian-Ukrainian border. The U.S. has already given Ukraine some rocket radar equipment for use against mortars. But what Ukrainian military officers are seeking is the aid of counter-battery radar that can operate at the same range as the rockets that separatists are lobbing into Ukraine. “That would allow the Ukrainian military to pinpoint the origin of both attacking artillery and attacking rockets,” Pifer said. One example of a medium- to long-range radar capable of spotting incoming Russian rockets is the AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Weapon Locating System, produced by Thales Raytheon and originally designed by Hughes aircraft. The AN/TPQ-37 is a big truck-based radar that runs off of a 60 kW generator and can detect enemy rockets at 50 kilometers (30 km for artillery.) It’s the kind of device that could be “very valuable” to the military in Ukraine by allowing Ukrainian forces to quickly pinpoint the origin of incoming rockets and then take out separatist positions in response. More importantly, Pifer said, it could also “reduce civilian casualties to the extent that the Ukrainians can make their fire more accurate, it would bring down the number of civilians who get caught [in crossfire.]” The United Nations has said that 5,400 civilians have died as result of the conflict in Ukraine, with an additional 1,200 combatants killed. Some coverage out of Russia is placing the number at 10 times that, with closer to 50,000 dead. Better targeting could meliorate casualties no matter what the number. But other nonlethal equipment could also play a constructive role in providing situational awareness, showing what assets are where.

### Demining PIC

#### Counterplan: The United States ought not provide military aid to Ukraine, except for the use of demining operations.

#### Demining Operations are Military Aid

**ICIJ 7** - The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “A citizen’s guide to understanding U.S. foreign military aid,” <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid> WJ

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: **taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s** offensive **military capabilities**. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these **are the criteria for** “foreign military assistance” or “foreign **military aid**.”

Funds appropriated to the State Department and Defense Department represent the vast majority of unclassified military aid and assistance. This report does not attempt to track smaller overseas programs where funding is appropriated to the Justice Department, Drug Enforcement Agency, or Department of Homeland Security. The public does not have any way of tracking classified programs administered by the U.S. intelligence community. These classified programs likely command large amounts of funding, especially after the 9/11 attacks, and oversight is limited to members of congressional intelligence committees.

Programs **included** in the Center’s database:

Coalition Support Funds (CSF): created after 9/11 to reimburse key allied countries for providing assistance to the U.S. in the global war on terror.

Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP): created after 9/11 to give the Defense Department its own funding to train and educate foreign military officers in counterterrorism techniques. In practice, CTFP has evolved into a program very similar to IMET (see definition below).

Department of Defense Counterdrug Funding: assists foreign militaries and security forces to combat drug trafficking around the world; also known as Section 1004 appropriations.

Economic Support Fund (ESF): provides grants to foreign governments to support economic stability. ESF is often used for non-military purposes, but the grants are commonly viewed as a way to help offset military expenditures. They have historically been earmarked for key security allies of the United States. Israel and Egypt are the two largest recipients of ESF.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF): finances foreign governments’ acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and training.

International Military Education and Training (IMET): educates foreign military personnel on issues ranging from democracy and human rights to technical military techniques and training on U.S. weapons systems.

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement/Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI): the primary State Department funding effort for countering drugs, including the large Colombian initiatives.

Military Assistance Program (MAP): provides military material and services to foreign countries; the U.S. government is not reimbursed. MAP includes “emergency drawdowns,” which are emergency transfers authorized by the president for weapons, ammunition, parts and military equipment to foreign governments.

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, **De-mining** and Related **Activities** (NADR): supports de-mining, anti-terrorism, and nonproliferation training and assistance.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): supports programs that improve foreign militaries’ peacekeeping capabilities.

#### And The United States gives military aid to Ukraine for the purpose of Demining.

UA Wire, reporting station on Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine to receive $6 million from the US for the demining of Donbas, January 26, 2018, <https://uawire.org/ukraine-will-receive-6-million-from-the-us-for-the-demining-of-donbas> ///AHS PB

The US will allocate $ 6 million to Ukraine for the demining of the Donbas, as reported by the Director of the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement of the Bureau of Political and Military Affairs of the US State Department, Stanley Brown, Radio Liberty reports. "We have a number of programs in Ukraine. First of all, the USA is implementing the Partnership for Peace program, in the framework of which we are destroying ammunition left over from the Soviet times. At the same time, the US is funding demining programs along the demarcation line. We are providing $900,000 just for this. We also decided to allocate money for projects that will help you set up your own demining center, and will also pay for technical expertise to advise your country," Brown said. According to him, last year $ 2 million was allocated to Ukraine for these purposes. In this fiscal year, the funds have already amounted to $6 million. "In addition, we recently sent an emergency team to Ukraine, the Rapid Reaction Force, after the explosions in military depots and figured out how we can help," Brown said.

#### Demining Operations save lives in the Crimean conflict—State based action is uniquely key as NGOs are unable to help.

Natalia Liubchenkova, EuroNews Reporter and Correspondent, There’s only one way to tackle Ukraine’s infestation of mines ... slowly, 13/03/2019, <https://www.euronews.com/2019/01/28/mine-ridden-areas-in-eastern-ukraine-face-deadly-threat> ///AHS PB

In the past four and a half years, since the beginning of the ongoing armed conflict between Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists, around 1,900 people have been killed or injured in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by landmines or other types of unexploded ordnance. Civilians account for 42% of the victims. Over 2 million Ukrainians, including 220,000 children, are risking their lives every day conducting their normal daily activities in the areas infested by landmines and other deadly remnants of war, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This situation makes Ukraine’s east one of the most dangerous areas for civilians in the world. Both on the frontline and in the areas that are no longer under direct fire, this silent killer remains, threatening children and teenagers who walk to school or play outside and locals who pick mushrooms, gather firewood or work on the land. Mykola Zadorozhniy, is a neighbour of the mushroom-picker Korolyova who works as a security guard at the local water pumping station. He remembers finding unexploded ammunition near his workplace and home. “I have seen two “Grads” (122 mm rockets) in the forest. And just here...near the oak tree, we found a device from an under-barrel grenade launcher. Deminers came and took it away”, he remembers. An even closer brush with death came when Mykola was working in the fields: “I was sowing sunflower seeds, and I could obviously see the tracks left by my tractor. I looked back and saw a 70-centimetre missile lying there, it was right between the tracks from the seeding machine. Emergency responders came and took a picture of it. The next day it was taken away.” Less than €3 to lay, almost €1,000 to remove The villagers told about their findings of suspicious objects to experts from The HALO Trust - the largest of the humanitarian operators in east Ukraine engaged in mine clearance. Alongside two other organisations - the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action and the Danish Demining Group - it works under the approval of the Ukrainian government and is financially supported by a number of European Union countries: Germany, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic as well as the US State Department. Experts say it costs around €2.5 to lay a mine but around €900 to clear it. After the end of the conflict, Ukraine will need at least 15 years to clear anti-personnel, anti-tank mines, unexploded missiles and other explosive remnants of war. This is only a prediction: the security situation does not allow any of the three NGOs to operate either directly on the line of contact, nor in territories occupied by the separatists. And that’s where the situation might be worst.

### T Authoritarian

#### This has EIU but the good card is the one I cut today at the bottom, even if you don’t want to read EIU you should probably read this shell as a separate off with just that card because it is definitely true, and will take 30 seconds. ALSO NONE OF THEIR EVIDENCE MATTERS BC UKRAINE HAD A NEW ELECTION THIS WEEKEND

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend that the United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.

#### Violation: Ukraine isn’t authoritarian,

#### Standards:

#### [1] The most recent statistical data classifies Ukraine as a hybrid regime. Screenshot of the EIU democracy index in the doc

The Economist ‘18, “Democracy Continues its Disturbing Retreat” January 31, 2018, [https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat //](https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/01/31/democracy-continues-its-disturbing-retreat%20//)AHS PB



#### Prefer the EIU index: A) Common Usage: if you look up “list of democracies” on google this is the most widely cited study B) Intent to delineate—Our study specifically compares authoritarian to non—authoritarian regimes in the context of global politics instead of just presenting an isolated opinion C) Objectivity: The EIU index relies on statistics derived from empirical data, such as voting records, which more realistic then subjective evidence.

#### And Ukraine’s recent elections prove that it is democratic :

PAUL R. GREGORY, Research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and the author or coauthor of 12 books on economic history, the Soviet economy, transition economies, comparative economics and economic demography, Peaceful Ukrainian election is a win for democracy, 04/22/19, <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/440034-peaceful-ukrainian-election-is-a-win-for-democracy> ///AHS PB

In our world of [declining democracy](https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/subjects/democratic-decline/), Sunday’s Ukrainian [presidential election](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48007487) stands out as a beacon of hope. With a turnout exceeding 60 percent, Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for bold change in a landslide for 41-year-old TV star Volodymyr Zelensky. Incumbent President Petro Poroshenko garnered only a quarter of the vote. The high turnout is made all the more remarkable by the fact that voting places had to accommodate soldiers on the front lines and civilians crossing over from occupied territory in East Ukraine and Crimea. The two run-off candidates agreed on Ukraine’s Western direction with respect to the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and, in the first round, the one pro-Russian candidate garnered a miniscule share of the vote. Sunday’s election demonstrated a stark antagonism against Russia after 13,000 Ukrainians died in the five-year conflict. Russia has lost Ukraine, probably forever. Russian President Vladimir Putin has refused to congratulate Zelinsky on his electoral triumph. He maintains the fiction that Ukraine remains an illegitimate state, created by an unlawful coup of neo-fascists at Maidan Square in 2014. Putin has no choice. If the Kremlin recognizes that Ukraine has a legitimate government, his ongoing military operations in East Ukraine against Kiev must be themselves illegitimate, and his annexation of Crimea must be as well. Ukrainians have made a huge wager by electing a political novice who pledges to overturn rampant corruption and create an independent judiciary. Elected on Sunday to a five-year term by an overwhelming majority, Zelenskiy offers no political experience other than playing an accidental president on TV. Zelenskiy’s promise of “breaking the system” was the message the Ukrainian people wanted to hear. President Poroshenko’s claims of experience and ability to deal with Putin landed on deaf ears. Remarkably, the defeated outgoing administration of Poroshenko is handing over power peacefully and in an orderly fashion. After a tough campaign of insults, false news and Russian intervention — parried rather well by Ukraine’s counter-cyber force — there is no talk of punishing the outgoing regime. Ukraine can be proud of its orderly transition. Poroshenko announced that he was leaving the presidency but not politics. In Ukraine’s mixed presidential-parliamentary system, the political parties are tied to political figures and oligarchs as “blocs.” We have not heard the last of Poroshenko, who held Ukraine together since his election in 2004, under the most difficult of circumstances. Despite his faults, Poroshenko guided Ukraine through an incredibly difficult period. The Ukraine he inherited had virtually no regular army and the forces it did possess were smashed during the Russian attack of August 2014. If Zelenskiy is smart, he will consult with Poroshenko before dealing with Putin. The Ukrainian presidential run-off election had all the trappings and drama of a contested democratic process. The election campaigns used massive social media, private TV stations, and the election campaign culminated in a televised debate in the Olympic stadium two days before the election. The proceedings began emotionally with both candidates kneeling in silence as a tribute to the deceased from war in East Ukraine as the crowd sang the national anthem. In a bizarre move, both candidates were shown giving blood to prove they were free of drugs. Sunday’s election was among the most highly monitored of modern elections. Representatives of each candidate were stationed at polling places alongside foreign observers. Complaints from the field numbered only in the hundreds, and foreign observers characterize the election as clean. The Kremlin has been watching closely from the sidelines. Its attempts to influence or cast doubt on both candidates with cyber attacks and false news did not seem to significantly affect the election outcome. If the Kremlin had a preference, it was for the inexperienced Zelinskiy, whom Putin may believe he can outmaneuver. Russian network television devoted some 40 percent of news show time to the Ukrainian presidential campaign. The Russian people are naturally interested in Ukraine, where many have friends and relatives, and unlike Putin’s 2018 re-re-reelection, the Ukrainian election did not have a predetermined outcome. Russian media characterized Ukraine’s election as a farce, a never-ending mess and a contest between a comedian and chocolate magnate. Belittling its neighbor’s election may have been the Kremlin’s intent, but Russian viewers cannot miss the fact that Ukrainian contenders could register to run without being vetoed by a state-run “electoral commission.” They would surely have noticed that the electoral outcome was determined by voters, who had a real choice of candidates. The reaction of the Russian people may not have been scorn but envy and jealousy. I must confess that I expected Poroshenko to win, despite his weak first-round showing. As president, I expected him to marshal all the forces of the executive branch against the candidacy of Zelenskiy. His example would have been Boris Yeltsin in his 1996 race, which he began with a 3-percent positive rating. Money and the support of the “administrative apparatus” pushed him easily over the line. Poroshenko did not follow the Yeltsin precedent, and Ukraine’s democracy is the beneficiary. The election of Zelinskiy has given Ukraine a third rebirth after the Orange Revolution and the Maidan Revolution. Consider this the “Citizen President Revolution." Ukraine has demonstrated it is a democracy.

### Case

#### Overview: Your advantage makes literally no sense and collapses to presumption since the United States has provided aid to Ukraine for over a year, and the advantage hasn’t happened. You should be very skeptical of claims about “escalation” given that this aff has been claiming an immanent threat since January.

#### The AC doesn’t solve—Canada also sells to Ukraine which fills in and means your impact should have been triggered already.

Murray Brewster, senior defence writer for CBC News, based in Ottawa, Canadian arms makers get OK to sell to Ukraine, Dec 13, 2017, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-ukraine-weapons-1.4446891> ///AHS PB

The Liberal cabinet has given the green light for Canadian defence contractors to sell weapons to Ukraine in a watershed decision which a senior official of that country hopes will influence the Trump administration to follow suit. The embattled eastern European country has been added to Canada's automatic firearms country control list. The decision was made on Nov. 23, according to a cabinet order posted online. It was released publicly on Wednesday, as the House of Commons prepared to rise for the Christmas break. The long-standing plea by the Ukrainian government was a feature of last fall's meeting between President Petro Poroshenko and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The move puts Canada out ahead of the United States, which has been considering its own weapons sales. In a statement, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland said the decision reflects closer ties between Canada and Ukraine. It is, however, expected to anger both the human rights groups that petitioned against it and Russia, which annexed Crimea in 2014 and has been accused of supporting separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.

#### Peace talks are happening in the status quo. Even with Military aid Ukraine’s new president wants to negotiate with Russia, means there is little risk of escalation.

CR, Crime Russia is a Russian media site that reports on Corruption in the government and the Putin administration, it is not state associated, Zelensky's headquarters: negotiations with Russia are priority, April 22 2019, <https://en.crimerussia.com/gover/zelensky-s-headquarters-negotiations-with-russia-are-priority/> ///AHS PB

Ruslan Stefanchuk, who is responsible for the formation of state institutions and ideology at Zelensky’s headquarters, told RBC that staff of the candidate’s team intend to gather and share areas of responsibility for different directions. “I think that the negotiations with Russia will be a priority for us,” he said. "We need to find a way out of the situation, we have to end the war shortly," said Stefanchuk in a conversation with RBC. At the same time, he did not reveal the specific names of those who will be responsible for negotiations with Russia. In early April, Zelensky said that he was ready for talks with President Vladimir Putin for the sake of ending the conflict in the Donbass. According to him, it is necessary to change the Minsk format and involve Moscow in negotiations. At the same time, the candidate stressed that he would not make territorial concessions and would insist on the integrity of Ukraine. Zelensky also spoke about his plan to end the war in the Donbass at several stages. The first stage should be a cease-fire, as well as the resumption of social payments to residents of the region.

#### And Military aid to Ukraine is key—avoids and solves all the affs scenarios—this card is excellent on why all their arguments are improbable.

Oleksandr Tytarchuk, Co-founder of the East European Security Research Initiative (EESRI) Foundation, 9 November 2017, <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-case-for-providing-lethal-military-aid-to-ukraine/> ///AHS PB

Given the extensive military support that Russia provides its proxy forces in the Donbas, this is a corrective measure which would worsen the situation on the ground for the Kremlin. The more statements the US makes about delivering lethal weapons to Ukraine, backed by other decisive U.S. actions, the more likely Moscow will be willing to compromise and negotiate on sensitive topics. Among the arguments made against providing lethal aid was that it might escalate the conﬂict and that U.S. weapons might fall into the wrong hands. Russia has repeatedly opposed the provision of lethal weapons to Kyiv arguing that it would only aggravate the situation in the Donbas and interfere with the implementation of the Minsk agreement. Beyond that, it questions the ability of Ukraine to maintain appropriate control over any additional externally provided lethal assets and to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands. Russia therefore draws attention to the recent accidents in ammunition depots in Ukraine and spreads fake accusations about Kyiv’s support to the North Korean ballistic missile program and delivering weapons to rebels from South Sudan. As far as Ukraine is concerned, the provision of lethal weapons is in line with its national interests. Ukraine should protect its territorial integrity and national sovereignty and has the right to acquire effective modern defensive assets as needed. It is direct and continual military support from Russia to the conflict zone that violates the ceasefire, causing both military and civilian Ukrainian casualties. Providing defensive weapons to Ukraine will not provoke an arms race in the region. Moscow has already deployed many of its state-of-the-art armaments and modernized military equipment to the Donbas. Furthermore, enhancing Kyiv’s defensive capabilities will not provoke a direct U.S.-Russia conflict. This is because Ukraine has no plans to attack Russian territory and the United States will not send its troops to fight in Ukraine (except the option to participate in the UN-lead peacekeeping operation, if any). It is also worth mentioning that all defensive arms transfers to Ukraine and their deployment on the ground are transparent, accountable and verifiable due to Ukraine’s adherence to the commitments undertaken under international export control and conventional arms control regimes. This cannot be said about the extensive Russian military support to the region. New legislative amendments aimed at changing current status of “Anti-Terrorist Operations” in the Donbas should also facilitate the formal procedure of receiving lethal aid to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) engaged in the conflict area, which is now being treated as a temporally occupied territory. Decisions on providing U.S. lethal weapons to Ukraine could have a positive effect on the position of other NATO Allies, convincing them to follow Washington’s example. A U.S. decision to support Ukraine could radically change the situation for Ukraine and also open up a new chapter of military-technical cooperation with foreign defense companies. The scale and parameters of U.S. support depends directly on the successful accomplishment of Kyiv’s “homework” in key areas of reforming its national security sector, namely implementing NATO standards in the UAF, applying civil control measures, improving logistics etc. And it goes without saying that fighting corruption in public domain should remain a top priority. Otherwise, providing lethal aid to Ukraine would only be a means of slightly altering the political dynamics between Washington and Moscow. The supply of U.S. defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine will reduce Russia’s eagerness to use and strengthen Ukraine’s resilience to withstand hybrid attacks and to accomplish security sector reform. In the event of conflict escalation in eastern Ukraine, lethal weapons could significantly curb any further aggressive actions of the Kremlin. This also relates closely to other aspects of security situation in and around Ukraine, including in the annexed Crimea, as well as to recent UN peacekeeping proposals. All Russian scenarios of conflict escalation in and around Ukraine would be based on using a combination of threats from various directions, including building-up military potential in the annexed Crimean peninsula and in Transdniestria. These actions would be counterbalanced in case of deployment of [by] new lethal weapons by Ukraine. As far as peacekeeping initiatives are concerned, Moscow would be more inclined to accept Kyiv’s/Western modalities for peacekeepers deployment in Donbas early on to avoid weakening its position, taken the perspective of increasing UAF potential in the region. At the same time, Ukraine should not perceive the potential U.S. decision as a panacea for all problems and a way to resolve the current conflict. The way to prevent a new escalation in the Donbas is through strong and combat-ready Ukrainian Armed Forces. Even discussing the issue of U.S. providing lethal aid to Ukraine could incite Moscow to reveal its true plans and intentions. Thus, raising the issue publicly has its own benefit, focusing the Kremlin’s attention on the bigger strategic issue of Ukraine’s future, its place in the future European security structure, and the costs of Moscow’s current policy. It is obvious that Ukraine should consider what best serves its own national interest. With this in mind, there are more pros than cons to receiving lethal aid from the United States. This critical point should not be lost within the new reconfiguration of U.S.-Russia relations.

#### Reject low probability high magnitude impacts. Focusing on them is self defeating and makes the world worse—multiple warrants.

STEVEN **PINKER**, Canadian-American cognitive psychologist, linguist, and popular science author. He is Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, and is known for his advocacy of evolutionary psychology and the computational theory of mind, The dangers of worrying about doomsday, February 24, **2018**, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-dangers-of-worrying-about-doomsday/article38062215/> ///AHS PB

Doomsday is hot. **For decades, we have been terrified by dreadful visions of civilization-ending overpopulation, resource shortages, pollution and nuclear war. But recently, the list of existential menaces has ballooned**. We now have been told to worry about **nanobots** that will engulf us, **robots** that will enslave us, **a**rtificial **i**ntelligence **that will turn us into raw materials and teenagers who will brew a genocidal virus** or take down the internet from their bedrooms. **Scientists** and technologists **have been deploying** their ingenuity to identify **ever more ways in which the world will soon end**. In 2003, the eminent astrophysicist Martin Rees published a book entitled Our Final Hour in which he warned that "humankind is potentially the maker of its own demise" **and** laid out some dozen ways in which we have "endangered the future of the entire universe." For example, experiments in particle colliders could create a black hole that would annihilate the Earth, or a "strangelet" of compressed quarks that would cause all matter in the cosmos to bind to it and disappear. **Techno-philanthropists have bankrolled research institutes dedicated to discovering new existential threats and figuring out how to save the world from them**, including the Future of Humanity Institute, the Future of Life Institute, the Center for the Study of Existential Risk and the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. How should we think about the existential threats that lurk behind the vast incremental progress the world has enjoyed in longevity, health, wealth and education? No one can prophesy that a cataclysm will never happen. But, as with our own mortality, there are wise and foolish ways of dealing with the threats to our existence. Some threats turn out to be figments of cultural and historical pessimism. Others are genuine, but we must treat them not as apocalypses-in-waiting but as problems to be solved. **At first glance, one might think that the more thought we give to existential risks, the better. The stakes, quite literally, could not be higher.** What harm could there be in getting people to think about these terrible risks? **The worst that could happen is that we would take some precautions that turn out in retrospect to have been unnecessary. But apocalyptic thinking has serious downsides. One is that false alarms to catastrophic risks can themselves be catastrophic**. **The nuclear arms race** of the 1960s, for example, **was set off by fears of a mythical "missile gap"** with the Soviet Union. **The 2003 invasion of Iraq was justified by the** uncertain but catastrophic **possibility that Saddam** Hussein **was developing nuclear weapons** and planning to use them against the United States. (As George W. Bush put it, "We cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.") And one of the reasons the great powers refuse to take the common-sense pledge that they won't be the first to use nuclear weapons is that they want to reserve the right to use them against other supposed existential threats such as bioterror and cyberattacks. **Sowing fear about hypothetical disasters, far from safeguarding the future of humanity, can endanger it.** A **second** hazard of enumerating doomsday scenarios is that **humanity has a finite budget of resources, brainpower and anxiety**. **You can't worry about everything. Some of the threats facing us**, such as climate change and nuclear war, are unmistakable, and **will require immense effort and ingenuity to mitigate.** **Folding them into a list of exotic scenarios with minuscule or unknown probabilities can only dilute the sense of urgency**. Cognitive psychologists have shown that **people are poor at assessing probabilities, especially small ones, and instead play out scenarios in their mind's eye. If two scenarios are equally imaginable, they may be considered equally probable, and people will worry about the genuine hazard no more than about the science-fiction plot line**. And the more ways people can imagine bad things happening, the higher their estimate that something bad will happen. And **that leads to the greatest danger of all: that reasonable people will think**, as a 2016 New York Times article put it, "These grim facts should lead any reasonable person to conclude that **humanity is screwed." If humanity is screwed, why sacrifice anything to reduce potential risks? Why forgo the convenience of fossil fuels or exhort governments to rethink their nuclear weapons policies? Eat, drink and be merry, for tomorrow we die!** A 2013 survey in four English-speaking countries showed that among the respondents who believe that our way of way of life will probably end in a century, a majority endorsed the statement, "The world's future looks grim so we have to focus on looking after ourselves and those we love." Few writers on technological risk give much thought to the cumulative psychological effects of the drumbeat of doom. As Elin Kelsey, an environmental communicator, points out, "**We have media ratings to protect children from sex or violence in movies, but we think nothing of inviting a scientist into a second-grade classroom and telling the kids the planet is ruined. A quarter of [Australian] children are so troubled about the state of the world that they honestly believe it will come to an end before they get older."** According to recent polls, so do 15 per cent of people worldwide, and between a quarter and a third of Americans. In The Progress Paradox, the journalist Gregg Easterbrook suggests that a major reason that Americans are not happier, despite their rising objective fortunes, is "collapse anxiety": the fear that civilization may implode and there's nothing anyone can do about it. Of course, people's emotions are irrelevant if the risks are real. But **risk assessments fall apart when they deal with highly improbable events in complex systems**. Since we cannot replay history thousands of times and count the outcomes**, a statement that some event will occur with a probability of .01 or .001 or .0001 or .00001 is essentially a readout of the assessor's subjective confidence**. This includes mathematical analyses in which scientists plot the distribution of events in the past (such as wars or cyberattacks) and show they fall into a power-law distribution, one with "fat" or "thick" tails, in which **extreme events are highly improbable but not astronomically improbable. The math is of little help in calibrating the risk, because the scattershot data along the tail of the distribution generally misbehave, deviating from a smooth curve and making estimation impossible.** All we know is that very bad things can happen. That takes us back to subjective **readouts**, which **tend to be inflated by the Availability and Negativity biases** **and** by the market among **social** commentators for **gravitas: Those who sow fear about a dreadful prophecy may be seen as serious and responsible, while those who are measured are seen as complacent and naive**. Despair springs eternal. At least since the Hebrew prophets and the Book of Revelation, prophets have warned their contemporaries about an imminent doomsday. Forecasts of End Times are a staple of seers, psychics, mystics, televangelists, nut cults, founders of religions and men pacing the sidewalk with sandwich boards saying "Repent!" The storyline that climaxes in harsh payback for technological hubris is an archetype of Western fiction, including Promethean fire, Pandora's box, Icarus's flight, Faust's bargain, the Sorcerer's Apprentice, Frankenstein's monster and, from Hollywood, more than 250 end-of-the-world flicks. As author and academic Eric Zencey has observed, "**There is seduction in apocalyptic thinking. If one lives in the Last Days, one's actions, one's very life, take on historical meaning and no small measure of poignance." Scientists and technologists are by no means immune. Remember the Y2K bug? In the 1990s, as the turn of the millennium drew near, computer scientists began to warn the world of an impending catastrophe**. In the early decades of computing, when information was expensive, programmers often saved a couple of bytes by representing a year by its last two digits. They figured that by the time the year 2000 came around, and the implicit "19" was no longer valid, the programs would be long obsolete. But complicated software is replaced slowly, and many old programs were still running on institutional mainframes and embedded in chips. When 12 a.m. on Jan. 1, 2000, arrived and the digits rolled over, a program would think it was 1900 and would crash or go haywire (presumably because it would divide some number by the difference between what it thought was the current year and the year 1900, namely zero, although why a program would do this was never made clear). At that moment, bank balances would be wiped out, elevators would stop between floors, incubators in maternity wards would shut off, water pumps would freeze, planes would fall from the sky, nuclear-power plants would melt down **and** intercontinental ballistic missiles would be launched from their silos. And these were the hardheaded predictions from tech-savvy authorities (such as president **Bill** **Clinton, who warned the nation, "I want to stress the urgency of the challenge**. This is not one of the summer movies where you can close your eyes during the scary part"). Cultural pessimists saw the Y2K bug as comeuppance for enthralling our civilization to technology. Among religious thinkers, the numerological link to Christian millennialism was irresistible. The Reverend Jerry Falwell declared, "I believe that Y2K may be God's instrument to shake this nation, humble this nation, awaken this nation and from this nation start revival that spreads the face of the earth before the Rapture of the Church." A hundred billion dollars was spent worldwide on reprogramming software for Y2K Readiness, a challenge that was likened to replacing every bolt in every bridge in the world. As a former assembly language programmer, I was skeptical of the doomsday scenarios, and fortuitously I was in New Zealand, the first country to welcome the new millennium, at the fateful moment. Sure enough, **at 12 a.m. on Jan. 1, nothing happened** (as I quickly reassured family members back home on a fully functioning telephone). The Y2K reprogrammers, like the elephant-repellent salesman, took credit for averting disaster, but many countries and small businesses had taken their chances without any Y2K preparation, and they had no problems, either. Although some software needed updating (one program on my laptop displayed "Jan. 1, 19100"), it turned out that very few programs, particularly those embedded in machines, had both contained the bug and performed furious arithmetic on the current year. The threat turned out to be barely more serious than the lettering on the sidewalk prophet's sandwich board. The Great Y2K Panic does not mean that all warnings of potential catastrophes are false alarms, but it reminds us that **we are vulnerable to techno-apocalyptic delusions.**

### A2 Not giving aid is a prohibition

#### No—The US provides military aid to Ukraine.

JOHN BOWDEN , Reporter at The Hill, (2017). Trump gives green light to selling lethal arms to Ukraine. [online] Available at: https://thehill.com/policy/international/365906-trump-administration-approves-lethal-arms-sales-to-ukraine [Accessed 15 Feb. 2019]. ///AHS PB

The Trump administration on Wednesday approved the sale of lethal arms to Ukraine's government as the country battles pro-Russian separatists in its eastern provinces. The Washington Post reported Wednesday that the administration approved the sale of Model M107A1 sniper systems and associated equipment to the country at a value of $41.5 million. The administration has not yet moved to approve sales of heavier arms requested by Ukraine's government, including Javelin anti-tank missiles. The move from the White House is a departure from the Obama administration, which frequently condemned Russian aggression in the Ukraine but refused to approve the sale of arms to the country's Western-aligned government.

## Burundi

### Case

#### This aff is non-inherent, the US stopped giving Burundi Military aid in 2015, There is a graph in the doc.

Security Assistance Monitor Burundi, 2019 (page is continuously updated with newest info) <https://www.securityassistance.org/burundi> ///AHS PB

#### And here is a card literally reporting on this:

URN, The Uganda Radio Network is an independent Ugandan subscription-based news agency headquartered in Kampala, US Cuts Military Aid To Burundi, Affects AMISOM Operations, 16 May 2015, <https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/us-cuts-military-aid-to-burundi-affects-amisom-operations> ///AHS PB

In a statement on their defence website, the US says they will cut military funding to Burundi until the country's army has steered clear of â€˜human rights violations' allegations that have arisen out of their efforts to combat a coup d'etat that had earlier been declared by General Godefroid Niyombare. "The United States also stresses that, under U.S. law, we cannot provide military training or assistance to military units that commit gross violations of human rights. We support the recent decision by the African Union to delay the next deployment of Burundian troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia" the statement reads.

## Philippines

#### The Philippines fight against ISIS is progressing but not over yet, regional jihadist groups still pose a danger to regional stability.

Carmela Fonbuena, Journalist for the Guardian, 'The fight is not over': fears of Isis resurgence in Philippines, Thu 7 Feb 2019 19.41 EST, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/08/the-fight-is-not-over-fears-of-isis-resurgence-in-philippines> ///AHS PB

A military commander in the Philippines has warned that the country’s fight against Isis is far from over after a deadly church bombing on the island of Mindanao involving local militant groups that have pledged allegiance to the jihadist group. The warning from military commander Colonel Romeo Brawner comes just over a year after Isis was defeated in Marawi City, in the south of the country, after a five-month battle between government forces and Isis-affiliated militants. The Philippine government is continuing to search for the last known surviving leader of the main force behind the siege – Maute Group’s Owaidah Benito Marohombsar, known as Abu Dar, following the discovery of his training camp. “The fight against Isis is not over. When I got assigned here, I said my priority is to hunt down Abu Dar and prevent him from recruiting and training more fighters,” Brawner told the Guardian. In January, a spate of incidents led to fears of the group’s resurgence. On 25 January, violence erupted between government forces and a group led by Abu Dar. The military claimed “big success” for killing three terrorists and dismantling the training camp, even as Abu Dar managed to flee. Two days later, twin bombings ripped through the Cathedral of Our Lady of Mount Carmel in Jolo, on Sulu island in the south-western tip of Mindanao, killing 23 people attending a Sunday mass and wounding 109 others. In the days between the skirmish and the bloody church attack, Isis issued a bulletin, the first since the fall of Marawi in 2017, which claimed more than 30 soldiers had died in the clashes with Abu Dar’s men – a claim Brawner says is false – and issuing what was later interpreted as a warning for the church attack. “Let the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers everywhere know that the Islamic State continues to break their thorn and smash their crosses and idols, and Allah is the granter of success and He is the helper,” said the message translated by the Site Intelligence Group which monitors jihadist activities. The attack came as people in the Muslim-majority south Philippines voted in a historic referendum to create a new autonomous region, which the government hoped would bring peace to a war-torn part of the country and address issues that lure recruits to Isis-inspired groups. According to the military, the church bombing was perpetrated by Indonesian suicide bombers and was planned and executed with the assistance of the Abu Sayyaf group. The Abu Sayyaf group has been responsible for decades of violence, including the 2004 Superferry bombing that killed 116 people, making it south-east Asia’s worst terror attack at the time. It is a highly factionalised group and is divided over its views on Isis, but sub-commanders like the late Isis emir Isnilon Hapilon reached out to develop ties. The Sulu attack created a frenzy in the Isis propaganda machine, with the group publishing a photograph edited to show President Rodrigo Duterte as an Isis captive in the wake of his threats against the group. Duterte has said: “The only way to fight them is to become evil also.” Rommel Banlaoi of the Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism said the Jolo church attack underscored the growing security challenge for the country, at the hands of foreign fighters, citing the blast in Lamitan City by a suspected suicide bomber from Morocco in July 2018. “Isis is a clear and present danger to the Philippines being a new land of jihad by foreign fighters,” he said.

#### Thus the counterplan: The United States ought not to provide military aid to the Philippines in all cases except counter ISIS activities. US aid and cooperation is happening now, and is key to solving the problem while minimizing civil casualties.

Conor McCormick-Cavanagh, Reporter on International affairs, What to Expect in the New American ‘War on Terror’ in the Philippines, Sep 15, 2017, [https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-expect-new-american-war-terror-philippines ///AHS](https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/what-expect-new-american-war-terror-philippines%20///AHS) PB BRACKETS IN ORIGINAL CARD

The U.S. military resumed its counterterrorism mission in the Philippines in September 2017. This new operation comes on the heels of the rise of ISIS-linked groups in the southeast Asian nation. Political analysts believe the new operation will share some similarities with a past one that lasted from 2001 to 2015, but will also include a focus on urban warfare training and equipment improvements. Some analysts also questioned if the plan would succeed. The previous counterterrorism mission, which lasted for 14 years, degraded, but never fully eliminated Al Qaeda-associated groups. Less than two years after the operation ended, groups with allegiances to ISIS seized the Muslim-majority city of Marawi and held it for five months. The seizure sparked fighting that killed 168 Philippine soldiers, wounded 1,584 others, and displaced more than 350,000 civilians. The Marawi siege revealed the threat posed by ISIS-linked militants and spurred the new operation. Codenamed Pacific Eagle – Philippines, the mission will involve 200 to 300 American advisors, as reported by The Wall Street Journal and confirmed by the Department of Defense. Pacific Eagle – Philippines qualifies as an Overseas Contingency Operation, which allows a budget exempt from spending constraints. The Department of Defense justified this designation “to acknowledge the severity of the terrorist threat facing the Philippines,” according to a report by the Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations. Urban Warfare Training The first step of the mission will be to fix a weakness highlighted during the Marawi battle - urban warfare operations. “The Philippine military needs to receive [this],” said Steven Rood of Social Weather Stations, a Philippine social research non-profit. “Everyone is onto that. The Australians, the Singaporeans, and the Americans are all now doing that” in the Philippines. The recent city fighting in Marawi caught the Philippine military by surprise, as their soldiers had been previously trained to engage in jungle warfare. The conflict earned the ignominious title of the longest urban battle in the Philippine’s modern history. The length of the violence in Marawi also troubled some observers. “It was not supposed to last for five months,” said Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College. “I don’t want to take away from the bravery of individual soldiers, but [the battle] revealed glaring weaknesses in the Philippine intelligence, military operations, and joint operations.” Collateral Damage One such weakness proved particularly deadly. During the fight, the Philippine military operated air assets itself, in accordance with domestic law, which prevents foreign military forces from engaging in combat on Philippine soil. Not all of the airstrikes were accurate. These mistakes proved fatal, including one instance where ten Philippine soldiers were killed and eight were wounded by a friendly-fire strike. “Marawi was levelled. Absolutely levelled. The Philippine army has no experience operating with air assets,” said Abuza, indicating another potential area where American advisors can provide guidance. In the future, American military officials might be tempted to just handle the airstrikes themselves. But this may not be sustainable. “You want the Americans to help, but you don’t want them to do it for you. Long term, that brings up a whole host of problems,” said Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Various Forms of Military Assistance Instead of providing boots on the ground or manning their own armed air assets, the U.S. will continue providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assistance in the fight against extremists, according to the new plan. In addition to providing this type of assistance, the U.S. can also capitalize on the manpower advantage that the Philippine military has over the Abu Sayyaf and Maute groups, and a faction of Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, all of whom pledged allegiance to ISIS. The Philippine military killed the top leaders of Abu Sayyaf and Maute groups during the battle. At the same time, it is important to match this size advantage with enough equipment for forces to “make sure that the Philippine military does indeed own the night,” said Rood. The Philippine military could further tilt the balance against Abu Sayyaf if the U.S. provides it with more night-vision goggles, something that groups like Abu Sayyaf have only in small quantities. All of the assistance from the U.S. military is essential in fighting against a mobile insurgency which, during times of pressure from the Philippine military, can easily slip from mainland Mindanao, where Marawi is located, to Sulu, a string of islands to the west and even across borders into Malaysia and Indonesia. Importantly, the Philippines already agreed with Indonesia and Malaysia to cooperate on cross-border pursuit of Islamic militants. This should help limit the freedom of movement of extremist elements. Sulu Archipelago is Located to the West of Mindanao and Marawi Source: Google Maps Human Rights Concerns Critics of President Rodrigo Duterte believe his problematic human rights record should preclude the U.S. from providing military aid. Duterte’s war on drugs has drawn international concern for heavy-handed tactics and extrajudicial killings by police. A report by the U.S. intelligence community pointed to Duterte’s autocratic tendencies as a danger to democracy in southeast Asia. The report highlighted Duterte’s threat to impose martial law throughout the country. Martial law currently exists only on Mindanao. Still, some analysts believe human rights concerns should be separated from military aid. “Countries shouldn’t cut off military training for human rights violations because in a situation like this, it’s crucial that [military] exercises go forward, and colonels go off to the U.S. and do six months or a year” of exchange, said Steven Rood, pointing to the importance of winning over the Philippine military.

#### Failure to irradicate ISIS in the Philippine’s causes regional instability, domestic harms, and the possibility of large scale foreign terror attacks. US Support is key.

Dr. Joseph Felter, as a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and a senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. In July 2017, Felter was selected for appointment to the Senior Executive Service, and for assignment as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia. Felter retired from the US Army as a colonel in 2011 following a career as a Special Forces and foreign area officer. He has conducted foreign internal defense and security assistance missions across East and Southeast Asia and has participated in operational deployments to Panama, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He led the International Security and Assistance Force, Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, in Afghanistan, reporting directly to Generals Stanley McChrystal and and David Petraeus and advising them on counterinsurgency strategy, ISIS In The Philippines: A Threat To US Interests, Wednesday, September 27, 2017, <https://www.hoover.org/research/isis-philippines-threat-us-interests///AHS> PB

As the recent anniversary of the tragic events of 9/11 reminded us, safe havens that allow terrorists to train and prepare for attacks can pose an existential threat to the United States and its interests around the world. The numbers of ideologically committed militants operating in the southern Philippines may be relatively small, but it only takes a small number of trained and motivated extremists to do significant harm. Consider the 19 terrorists responsible for the execution of the 9/11 attacks. For a regional example, look to Jemaah Islamiyah - an Indonesian terrorist group known to have members train in the southern Philippines. A handful of JI militants executed the deadly Bali bombing in 2002 which killed 202 people, including 88 Australians. But the threat to US interests posed by these militant groups extends well beyond terrorism. The Philippines is an important treaty ally, and the US partners with her to pursue a range of mutual strategic interests in the region. Militant groups like ISIS are exacting a huge toll on the Philippines’ military capabilities and costs to its economy – capabilities and resources that could be directed towards providing external security and protecting its sovereignty. As this century’s threats to international security and the rules based order unfold, it is clearly in our strategic interests to maintain the health and viability of our alliance partners like the Philippines and to work closely with other partners in the region like Malaysia and Indonesia to interdict terrorists and other transnational threats and to enforce international law. Stronger economies and militaries mean more capable and effective partners in this global fight. Extremist terrorists threaten these interests. What can be done to address these threats? The militants fighting in Marawi have crossed the line and will cause trouble wherever they go if they are able to escape. Those captured and imprisoned may also be a problem, should they contribute to radicalization efforts from within prison. In the near term, the US and other partners should continue to respond to Philippine requests to provide enablers such as intelligence and surveillance support to help the Philippine military identify and locate these terrorists and improve their capacity to interdict them.

#### 21st Century terrorism can use modern technology to create existential threats. This is specifically true with small and committed ISIS cells.

Johnson, Brigette. Managing Editor for Homeland Security Today. A veteran journalist whose news articles and analyses have run in dozens of news outlets across the globe, Bridget first came to Washington to be online editor and a foreign policy writer at The Hill. Previously she was an editorial board member at the Rocky Mountain News and syndicated nation/world news columnist at the Los Angeles Daily News. Bridget is a weekly columnist for the New York Observer and a senior fellow specializing in terrorism analysis at the Haym Salomon Center. She is a Senior Risk Analyst for Gate 15 and Washington Bureau Chief for PJ Media. She is an NPR on-air contributor and has contributed to USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, National Review Online, Politico, New York Daily News, The Jerusalem Post, The Hill, Washington Times, RealClearWorld and more, and has myriad television and radio credits including Al-Jazeera and SiriusXM. Article cites Assistant defense secretary of Homeland security and the Senate armed Services committee, February (2018). Terror Groups Keen on WMD as It's 'Never Been More Difficult' to Prevent. [online] Homeland Security Today. Available at: https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/counterterrorism/terror-groups-keen-wmd-never-been-more-difficult-prevent/ [Accessed 4 Jan. 2019]. ///AHS PB

Terrorist groups are as interested as ever in acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a global landscape where chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents have grown more difficult to track, senators heard from Defense officials last week. Assistant Defense Secretary for Homeland Defense and Global Security Kenneth Rapuano told the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that “rapid technological advancements and increased access to dual use technologies, expertise, and materials that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes heighten the risk that adversaries can more easily seek or acquire WMD.” “It has never been more difficult to prevent adversaries from acquiring the materials or expertise necessary to develop WMD or use CBRN materials in intentional attacks,” he said. “Additionally, the speed, volume, and coverage of international travel means that naturally occurring pathogens of security concern can spread worldwide in days, potentially having the same catastrophic consequences of a deliberate biological attack.” The Intelligence Community, State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy and Justice Department “all play critical roles in detecting threats, preventing attacks on the homeland, and working with foreign partners to stop and respond to incidents,” he added. Rapuano noted that best efforts at prevention only go so far, thus the agency coalition “must be prepared to contain and reduce CBRN threats once they have developed.” “DoD is postured to isolate, identify, neutralize, and dispose of CBRN threats before they can reach our borders,” he said. That includes concern about reports of ongoing use of chemical agents by the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, where “the U.S. and our coalition partners continue to exploit opportunities on the ground to better understand and disrupt their CW networks.” “We must anticipate that our adversaries will continue to evolve and develop increasingly sophisticated methods to pursue, develop, or deploy CBRN weapons,” Rapuano stressed. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Joseph Osterman, deputy commander of United States Special Operations Command, emphasized the importance of increased integration of intelligence, planning and assessments in a counter-WMD fusion center “dedicated to coordinating information flow and planning, fusing intelligence and operations, and providing the WMD community of action a single point of contact for DOD operational capability.” Chairwoman Joni Ernst (R-Iowa) asked Rapuano which WMD threat concerned him most at this point. Rapuano picked biotechnology, due to the “rapid advances and ubiquitous availability” today. “Things that you can buy on the web now and essentially do a paint-by-numbers instruction were the province of Nobel Prize-winning scientists only decades ago, and that really levels the playing field for any actor looking to develop biotechnology, biological agents and novelly engineered agents that can present a real threat,” he added. The assistant secretary confirmed that “both Al-Qaeda and ISIS are interested in chemical, biological, nuclear,” and “certainly would be if they had opportunity to acquire the materials and know-how.” He wouldn’t elaborate in open session. Osterman said that “functional campaign planning” helps officials “observe where the technology transfer may occur between state and non-state actors.” “Also, where one non-state actor perhaps is working with another non-state actor in a different geographic location or in a functional capacity,” the general added. “So we try to weave that in with the translation of our strategy and policy to actual tactical application of interdiction in order to basically reinforce the larger protocol efforts that are in place.” The CBRN Response Enterprise is nearly 19,000 strong, consisting of National Guard and Title X military arranged into teams. “We have the WMD-CSTs, the civil support teams. We have the enhanced response teams. We have a range of teams with a different mix of capabilities that go from decontamination, detection, medical effects, medical treatment,” Rapuano said. “There is air transportation, ground transportation, the whole package that can be integrated that can either be commanded by the state National Guards and there’s at least one team in every state. Or they can be authorized under Title X and under DOD command.” Response teams are deployed “on a routine basis starting with National Special Security Events, the Super Bowl, other large events, Fourth of July.” “And these assets will be pre-deployed in the vicinity of activities for which there may be some concern that they would be the target of an attack that might include WMD,” Rapuano explained. “And they are prepared to respond in concert with all of the other assets that are typically deployed for those events — law enforcement and others.” DoD has been working “very closely” with Health and Human Services and DHS “to look at bio threats in general, including naturally occurring, to sync our research with them to ensure that we’re covering the full landscape of what’s naturally occurring and what perhaps could be intensified or developed for malevolent use,” the assistant secretary told lawmakers. Pressed on how the departments wouldn’t get caught off-guard, with the 2014 spread of the Ebola virus offered as an example, Rapuano replied that “we’re looking at ways that we can get quick production, just in time, but that’s very difficult because you need that base in terms of the manufacturing base.” Sen. Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.) mused on whether ISIS stripped of its physical caliphate poses the same WMD threat. “Because, obviously, this is about talent as much as anything, and intellectual capacity,” Heinrich noted. Osterman replied that “they are still a threat, to put it simply.” “Really, when we look at pathways, we’re looking at intent, infrastructure and expertise to your point, production, weaponization, delivery systems in use,” the general added. “And they’ve demonstrated not only that capability over time, but even though as they lose the geographic caliphate, that those individuals that have the technical knowledge and frankly, the level at which they were working and had been working is not one that by loss of that geographic caliphate that it would undermine their ability to continue to pursue the weapons of mass destruction capability.”