# ND18 New Zealand Aff

### Notes

Omitted generics

## 1AC

### adv

#### Foreign donations up now in New Zealand and countries circumvent current restrictions – allows for China to buy their way into politics

Chapple 10/23 Simon Chapple, 10-23-2018, "New Zealand politics: foreign donations and political influence," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-politics-foreign-donations-and-political-influence-105489> OHS-AT

There is no requirement for political parties to report the amounts of overseas donations under $1,500. Consequently, the public does not know how many foreign donations come in under that amount.

It would be easy for a foreign state to funnel money into a political party from a large number of foreign donors, all under the $1,500 threshold. Equally, if that state had access to local actors, it could funnel money into the system at amounts above or below the $15,000 threshold.

What donors get for their donations is unclear. At its least malign, donors seek to passively promote a political ideology which they consider to be beneficial. Where donations are part of developing a long-term quid pro quo relationship along multiple dimensions, donors’ and receivers’ motivations and exactly what is traded is very difficult to pin down from the outside.

Transparency International reports that New Zealand political parties are one of the weakest pillars supporting local transparency and good governance. Within this weak pillar, one of the weakest strands involves political finance and donations.

They argue that with the demise of mass political participation, parties are increasingly dependent on donations to function. This weakness means that local politicians are more likely to seek to “supply” influence, or at least dangle the prospect of influence, in front of wealthy bidders.

The “demand” to buy political influence has also risen. With the increase in worldwide inequality and kleptocracy, there are more rich people for whom buying influence is the norm. Specifically in New Zealand, there has been an influx of wealthy expatriates from China, where buying influence is an accepted practice. They often retain close links to the Chinese Communist Party, which runs an authoritarian, anti-democratic and oppressive regime. It is thus not surprising that issues of donations and foreign influence are increasingly entering into domestic political debates.

#### Desperate political campaigns accept anonymous Chinese money in exchange for corrupt candidates that provide valuable intel

Graham-Mclay 10/25Charlotte Graham-Mclay, 10-25-2018, "Campaign Contribution Raises Concerns About China’s Meddling in New Zealand," No Publication, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/world/asia/new-zealand-china-politics.html> OHS-AT

WELLINGTON, New Zealand — The two politicians started their conversation casually, but there was serious business at hand: a donation recently deposited into a party account from a wealthy businessman, which one of the lawmakers said totaled 100,000 New Zealand dollars.

The reported size of the donation, about $66,000, was large by New Zealand standards. But the cash, the lawmaker says, came with strings attached — a promise to add the names of two businessmen to a list of candidates for Parliament — and a plan to disguise the identity of the donor, a man with deep pockets and well-documented connections to the Chinese Communist Party.

The conversation, a recording of which was leaked last week, is the latest in a series of scandals that suggest New Zealand is vulnerable to political interference at a time when China is seeking greater influence throughout the Pacific.

New Zealand is often portrayed as a progressive paradise far removed from the rest of the world, but it plays an important role in the Five Eyes network, an alliance of Western intelligence agencies assigned to listen in on communications worldwide. Similar concerns were raised last year when it was revealed that Jian Yang, a Chinese-born lawmaker and member of the National Party, had taught at a Chinese spy academy. Mr. Yang denied being a spy himself and remains in Parliament.

Analysts and allies fear that China can buy influence on the cheap and without raising alarms in New Zealand’s political system, which they say has weak rules about lobbying, by channeling money through small, anonymous donations.

Political donations, said Miguel Martin, a commentator who writes about China under the pseudonym Jichang Lulu, are an expedient way for the Communist Party to acquire “an avenue of influence on that country’s policy.”

Others said politicians at the local and national levels and from every party are desperate for funding, and therefore potentially easy prey.

#### Concerns mounting now – new Chinese president pursuing aggressive policies

**Meshino 11/12** Katsuhiko Meshino [Nikkei senior staff writer],, 11-12-2018, "New Zealand scandal renews fears of China's 'United Front' influence," Nikkei Asian Review, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/New-Zealand-scandal-renews-fears-of-China-s-United-Front-influence> OHS-AT

TOKYO -- New Zealand's opposition National Party is reeling after allegations that leader Simon Bridges took donations from an individual with suspected links to the Chinese Communist Party, fueling concern over Beijing's influence in the country.

On Oct. 16, Jami-Lee Ross, then a National party member of parliament, claimed that Bridges illegally accepted 100,000 New Zealand dollars ($67,700) from Chinese businessman Yikun Zhang, and in return added two businessmen to the party's candidate list. The National Party is the largest in the country's parliament.

Bridges has denied the allegations and the authorities have launched an investigation into Ross's claims.

The 32-year-old Ross was an influential member of the National Party, and it has been suggested that his claims were prompted by infighting. He has left the party and is currently away from parliament on medical advice.

The scandal has renewed anxiety over Chinese influence in New Zealand politics. Just over a year ago, it emerged that Jian Yang, another National Party lawmaker, had taught languages at a Chinese military academy, leading to suspicion of him being involved in espionage himself.

Yang denied being a spy and won a third term in the general election held shortly after the speculation surfaced.

In a report titled "Magic Weapons: China's Political Influence Activities Under Xi Jinping," University of Canterbury professor Anne-Marie Brady claimed that, under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Communist Party had increased "United Front Work" activity, which aims to boost China's influence overseas.

Brady said New Zealand was a key target of the activity, and alleged that Yang has "had varying degrees of relations with united front organizations in New Zealand."

#### Chinese interference undermines Five Eyes – New Zealand is their key and necessary entry point and the critical stage is now

Woody 6/4 Christopher Woody, 6-4-2018, "Western intelligence is warning that Chinese influence in New Zealand is at a 'critical' level," Business Insider, <https://www.businessinsider.com/western-intelligence-agencies-warn-of-chinese-influence-in-new-zealand-2018-6> OHS-AT

Countries around Asia and their partners are increasingly concerned about China's growing influence, and members of the Five Eyes partnership — the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand — are concerned about Beijing's growing influence in New Zealand, according to a report published in May by Canada's Security Intelligence Service.

The report, which is based on presentations at an academic conference but does not represent the security service's formal views, says New Zealand faces "a concerted foreign interference campaign" from China, which wants to "access strategic information and resources" and build support for its objectives "by co-opting political and economic elites" in New Zealand.

These efforts have taken the form of business opportunities, investments, scholarships, and vanity projects to win over local business elites; attempts to bring local Chinese communities under Beijing's sway and influence voting habits; and the use of acquisitions and partnerships with New Zealand companies and universities to establish a local presence, expand influence, and gain access to military technology, commercial secrets, and other valuable information.

Chinese Communist Party leadership regards New Zealand as "an exemplar" of the kind of relationship it wants with other countries, the report says, adding that China's "political influence activities in New Zealand have now reached a critical level."

Some of these efforts are direct threats to national security, according to the report, while others pose long-term risks to free society, including limiting the rights for the ethnic Chinese community, quashing public debate about China, and corrupting the political system.

Governments in New Zealand have courted China for some time, first to balance Soviet influence and secure aid, and later to diversify Wellington's international relationships. New Zealand was the first Western country to sign on to China's massive international-development project, the Belt and Road Initiative.

The previous government in Wellington also worked to avoid offending China and develop links with Chinese Community Party leaders — which, the report says, "fed and encouraged the success of China's political influence activities in New Zealand."

New Zealand itself is of particular interest to Beijing for several reasons, according to the report.

The government in Wellington is responsible for the defense and foreign affairs of three South Pacific territories, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, which means influence in New Zealand could potentially yield four votes in support of China at international bodies.

New Zealand is also a potential asset to China because of its plans for Antarctica and outer-space research. It also has unexplored oil and gas resources. Moreover, New Zealand is an important agricultural supplier to China and has cheap, arable land of which China could make use.

New Zealand is a member of the Five Eyes network as well as a NATO partner.

"New Zealand is valuable to China, as well as to other states such as Russia, as a soft underbelly through which to access Five Eyes intelligence," the report states, noting that pulling New Zealand away from those alliances would also further China's efforts to become a global power.

#### The alliance is key to global cyber-resilience

Moens et al 15 [Alexander, professor of Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver and a Senior Fellow at the Fraser Institute in the Centre for Canadian-American Relations, Seychelle Chusing – Manager, Strategic Initiatives and Special Projects at the Simon Fraser Institute, Alan Dowd – senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute , Cybersecurity Challenges FOR CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, Fraser Institute, March 2015, <http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research/publications/cybersecurity-challenges-for-canada-and-the-united-states.pdf>]

Both the Canadian and American cyberstrategies recognize the shift in threats over the past five years. In 2004, cyberattacks were considered a low-risk threat by the government of Canada. Today, cyberattacks are “about as high as terrorism in terms of national security threats” (Canada, SSCNSD, 2012a). Canada’s Cyber Security Strategy notes that the Canadian federal government is increasing the resilience of government systems, pursuing publicprivate partnerships to secure critical infrastructure, sharing information about cybersecurity with the public, and enhancing police powers (Public Safety Canada, 2010: 1). The American Cyberspace Policy Review calls on the US to “improve [its] … resilience to cyber incidence” through infrastructure hardening, and defence and recovery tactics (US, White House, 2013). Cyberthreats will be confronted through international partnerships, deterrence strategies, and “appropriate responses for … state and non-state actors” (US, Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2009a: 5). In 2011, the United States released its International Strategy for Cyberspace, which formalized the Policy Review into an actionable agenda for international collaboration (US, Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2011).

On a state-to-state level, Canada and the United States have an extensive history of working together through the Five Eyes alliance (Gendron, 2013). The 1946 UKUSA Agreement formalized an intelligence-sharing arrangement between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that began in World War II and remains in force today (National Security Agency, Central Security Service, 2010). The Five Eyes—a shorthand that refers to the alliance members (Cox, 2012)—predominantly targeted states of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War (Rudner, 2001). After the Cold War, the alliance shifted its focus to tackle competing threats from multiple states and actors.

To ensure adequate coverage, the Five Eyes divided the world up into five regional clusters, one for each alliance member (Richelson, 1990). Unofficial accounts suggest that Canada covers the Arctic, Latin America, and the North Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans. The United States surveys “the Caribbean, China, Russia, the Middle East and Africa”. The United Kingdom is responsible for Europe and Western Russia, while Australia and New Zealand cover South and East Asia, and the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, respectively (Cox, 2012: 6; Rudner, 2001: 103).

The United States possesses cyberintelligence capabilities that are significantly more advanced than most states (Nye, 2011), yet alone it is unable to gather the volume of information it needs. Cooperation with the Five Eyes is necessary to reduce this intelligence deficit. Without the Five Eyes, America could only “collect [information] … against a part of the target” (Lander, 2004: 492). Cooperation provides more information so the US government can prepare more effectively for the threats it faces directly, and the threats its allies face that could spill over to the United States (Cilluffo and Cardash, 2013). Cooperation between Canada and the United States in the cyberrealm is largely embedded in, and a by-product of, the Five Eyes regime. As with much of the Canada-US partnership on security-related matters, Canada-US cooperation for cybersecurity goes even further than the Five Eyes. Close cooperation occurs between the NSA and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE)2 to target “approximately 20 high-priority countries” in the collection of signals intelligence (SIGINT) (US, National Security Agency, Central Security Service, 2013).

A capabilities gap exists between the United States—the primary, technologically advanced, well-resourced partner—and the secondary Five Eyes partners (Lefebvre, 2003). Since Canada has a more limited ability to develop sophisticated technology, Canada acquires and uses NSA capabilities (US, National Security Agency, Central Security Service, 2013) to help manage its portion of the partnership’s mission. Inevitably, the United States influences some of the intelligence gathering done by Canada.

US-Canada resource-sharing in the cybersphere—including hardware, software, and personnel—means that the NSA and CSE are relatively well integrated (US, National Security Agency, Central Security Service, 2013; Rudner, 2001). While integration increases efficiency, it also increases the prospect of a cyberattack against one partner spreading to another. Titan Rain, for example, was a series of coordinated cyberattacks from 2003 to 2005 that originated from China (Markoff, Sanger, and Shanker, 2010). Although Titan Rain initially stole information from the systems of the US Department of Defense, it later spread to other “sensitive government and private-sector systems” (Porteous, 2011: 1). By 2005, Titan Rain had infiltrated the systems of the Five Eyes governments, amongst other American allies (Porteous, 2011; Thornburgh et al., 2005). Likewise, an attack against a Five Eyes ally could spread into the United States via the allies’ integrated cyberintelligence assets. An adversary in cyberspace may only need to penetrate one Five Eyes system to find and retrieve American secrets through the linked networks (Cox, 2012). Interoperability, while efficient, is perhaps more of a double-edged sword in cybersecurity than in conventional military defence.

Canadians should not underestimate the benefits they gain from America’s willingness to share advanced capabilities. The NSA’s US$10.8 billion budget (Gellman and Miller, 2013) easily dwarfs CSE’s 2013 budget of CA$460 million and 2014 budget of CA$829 million (Freeze, 2013; Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2014). To upgrade CSE’s capabilities to roughly equivalent NSA levels would require a very large increase in its budget, a costly and most unlikely investment. Instead, Canada has “access to a $15 billion global [information-sharing] partnership” that imparts vital intelligence on key “threats and … technological challenges” through the Five Eyes (Canada, SSCNSD, 2012b). Participating in the alliance provides Canada with access to a multi-billion dollar intelligence apparatus without needing to make equivalent investments in its own SIGINT capabilities. Cooperation is decidedly cheaper than independently developing competitive intelligence capabilities (Sims, 2006).

Access to American capabilities and the dynamic of an alliance relationship, such as the Five Eyes, includes US requests on Canada’s intelligence collection. Several Canadian embassies, for example, have been set up as listening posts at the request of the NSA (LeBlanc and Freeze, 2013; Weston, Greenwald, and Gallagher, 2013b). More recently, Canada allowed the NSA to carry out surveillance during the 2010 G20 Summit in Toronto. The specifics of Canada’s involvement are unknown, but a leaked memo points to close operational cooperation between the NSA and “the Canadian partner” during the G20 (US, National Security Agency, 2010: 3; Weston, Greenwald, and Gallagher, 2013a).3

To carry out its Five Eyes mission—defending government systems in cyberspace and providing intelligence to support governmental decisionmaking (Cox, 2012)—Canada relies in part on American capabilities and, specifically, US intelligence. This means that the United States, in turn, can influence Canadian intelligence priorities (Richelson, 1990). In this relationship, Canada is, of course, in a more dependent position. The government of Canada must thus keep its eye continually on both the effectiveness of its cooperative cybersecurity network with the United States and the sovereign Canadian parameters for security and privacy. Despite some of the embarrassing leaks emanating from the Snowden incident, the relationship’s disadvantages are outweighed by Canada’s continued access to high-level American intelligence and the advanced technologies Canada and the United States use together to confront the ever-evolving threat of cyberattacks (Richelson, 1990). At the same time, on a balance of vulnerabilities, cooperating with the Five Eyes and Canada in particular provides an important means for the United States to expand its global surveillance reach (Bauman et al., 2014) and to enhance North American cybersecurity.

Canada draws a clear net benefit from close cooperation with the United States in cybersecurity because the nature of the evolving threat and the nature and cost of countering this capacity is increasingly more difficult for a state to address on its own. At the same time, the Canadian government faces a balance between security and the Canadian definition of freedom as it cooperates with the United States and Five Eyes. Surveillance capacity, like capacity for cybersecurity, is on the increase. Managing the information that results from this capacity remains a key value that both the American and Canadian public demand.

#### Losing comparative allied advantage in cyberdefense capabilities emboldens China to take Taiwan

Hjortdal 11 [Magnus Hjortdal is a researcher associated with CHINA-SEC, Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen. He holds an M.Sc. in Political Science from the University of Copenhagen and is owner of MH International Relations, which advise s private and public institutions, “China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence” Journal of Strategic Security , 4 (2): 1-24]

China's military strategy mentions cyber capabilities as an area that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) should invest in and use on a large scale. 13 The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has also declared that China's development in the cyber area increasingly concerns him, 14 and that there has been a decade-long trend of cyber attacks emanating from China. 15 Virtually **all digital and electronic military systems can be attacked via cyberspace**. Therefore, it is essential for a state to develop capabilities in this area if it wishes to challenge the present American hegemony. The interesting question then is whether China is developing capabilities in cyberspace in order to deter the United States. 16 China's military strategists describe cyber capabilities as a powerful asymmetric opportunity in a deterrence strategy. 19 Analysts consider that an "important theme in Chinese writings on computer-network operations (CNO) is the use of computer-network attack (CNA) as the **spearpoint** of deterrence." 20 CNA increases the enemy's costs to become too great to engage in warfare in the first place, which Chinese analysts judge to be essential for deterrence. 21 This could, for example, leave China with the potential ability to deter the United States from intervening in a scenario concerning Taiwan. CNO is viewed as a focal point for the People's Liberation Army, but it is not clear how the actual capacity functions or precisely what condit ions it works under. 22 If a state with superpower potential (here China) is to create an opportunity to ascend militarily and politically in the international system, it would require an asymmetric deterrence capability such as that described here. 23 It is said that the "most significant computer network attack is characterized as a pre-emption weapon to be used under the rubric of the rising Chinese strategy of [...] gaining mastery before the enemy has struck." 24 Therefore, China, like other states seeking a similar capacity, has recruited massively within the hacker milieu inside China. 25 Increasing resources in the PLA are being allocated to develop assets in relation to cyberspace. 26 The improvements are visible: The PLA has established " information warfare " capabilities, 27 with a special focus on cyber warfare that, according to their doctrine, can be used in peacetime. 28 Strategists from the PLA advocate the use of virus and hacker attacks that can paralyze and surp rise its enemies. 29

#### Draws in the US and goes nuclear – deterrence and no first use don’t apply

Littlefield and Lowther 15, Alex Littlefield is Senior Editor at Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Adam Lowther is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) at Maxwell Air Force Base, (8/11/15, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)

For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

### Impx add-on

#### Escalation likely, goes nuclear, defense is wrong, but it’s not inevitable

Allison 17 Graham Allison, director of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, this article is adapted from his book published May 30 2017, How America and China Could Stumble to War, May-June 2017, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-america-china-could-stumble-war-20150?page=show>

WOULD A Chinese leader barely in control of his own country after a long civil war dare attack a superpower that had crushed Japan to end World War II five years earlier by dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? As American troops pushed North Korean forces toward the Chinese border in 1950, Gen. Douglas MacArthur could not imagine so. But Mao Zedong did. MacArthur was dumbstruck. Chinese forces rapidly beat American troops back to the line that had divided North and South Korea when the war began. That thirty-eighth parallel continues to mark the border between the two Koreas today. By the time the war ended, nearly three million had perished, including thirty-six thousand American troops. Similarly, in 1969, Soviet leaders could not imagine that China would react to a minor border dispute by launching a preemptive strike against a power with overwhelming nuclear superiority. But that is precisely what Mao did when he started the Sino-Soviet border war. The gambit showed the world China’s doctrine of “active defense.” Mao sent an unmistakable message: China would never be intimidated, not even by adversaries that could wipe it off the map. In the years ahead, could a collision between American and Chinese warships in the South China Sea, a drive toward national independence in Taiwan or jockeying between China and Japan over islands on which no one wants to live spark a war between China and the United States that neither wants? It may seem hard to imagine—the consequences would be so obviously disproportionate to any gains either side could hope to achieve. Even a non-nuclear war conducted mostly at sea and in the air could kill thousands of combatants on both sides. Moreover, the economic impact of such a war would be massive. A 2016 RAND study found that, after just one year, American GDP could decline by up to 10 percent and Chinese GDP by as much as 35 percent—setbacks on par with the Great Depression. And if a war did go nuclear, both nations would be utterly destroyed. Chinese and American leaders know they cannot let that happen. Unwise or undesirable, however, does not mean impossible. Wars occur even when leaders are determined to avoid them. Events or actions of others narrow their options, forcing them to make choices that risk war rather than acquiesce to unacceptable alternatives. Athens did not want war with Sparta. Kaiser Wilhelm did not seek war with Britain. Mao initially opposed Kim Il-sung’s attack on South Korea in 1950 for fear of blowback. But events often require leaders to choose between bad and worse risks. And once the military machines are in motion, misunderstandings, miscalculations and entanglements can escalate to a conflict far beyond anyone’s original intent. To better understand these dangers, Washington and Beijing have developed scenarios, simulations and war games. These often begin with an unexpected incident or accident. Individuals assigned to play the hand of China or the United States take it from there. Participants in these exercises are repeatedly surprised to find how often and easily small sparks lead to large wars. Today, there are at least three plausible paths to war between the world’s two greatest powers. IN WAR scenarios, analysts use basic concepts made familiar by the U.S. Forest Service. Arsonists cause only a small fraction of fires. Discarded cigarettes, smoldering campfires, industrial accidents and bolts of lightning are much more common sources. Fortunately, in the forest as well as in relations among nations, most sparks do not ignite a blaze. Background conditions often determine which sparks become fires. While Smokey the Bear’s warning that “only you can prevent forest fires” teaches campers and hikers about sparks, the Forest Service posts additional warnings after long dry spells or periods of extreme heat, occasionally closing high-risk areas. Moreover, it regulates the storage of flammable chemicals, propane tanks and gas depots, becoming increasingly stringent as conditions worsen. In relations between China and the United States today, relevant background conditions include geography, culture and history. “History,” Henry Kissinger observed in his first book, “is the memory of states.” China’s memory is longer than most, with the century of humiliation forming a core part of the country’s identity. Recent military engagements are also part of each state’s living memory. The Korean War and Sino-Soviet border conflict taught Chinese strategists not to back down from more powerful adversaries. Moreover, both the American and Chinese militaries acknowledge that the United States has lost, or at least failed to win, four of the five major wars it has entered since World War II. The most pertinent background conditions, however, are Thucydides’s Trap and the syndromes of rising and ruling powers that China and the United States display in full. Thucydides’s Trap is the severe structural stress caused when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling one. Most contests that fit this pattern have ended badly. Over the past five hundred years, a major rising power has threatened to displace a ruling power sixteen times. In twelve of those, the result was war. The rising power syndrome highlights the upstart’s enhanced sense of itself, its interests, and its entitlement to recognition and respect. The ruling power syndrome is essentially the mirror image: the established power exhibiting an enlarged sense of fear and insecurity as it faces intimations of “decline.” As in sibling rivalries, so too in diplomacy one finds a predictable progression reflected both at the dinner table and at the international conference table. A growing sense of self-importance (“my voice counts”) leads to an expectation of recognition and respect (“listen to what I have to say”) and a demand for increased impact (“I insist”). Understandably, the established power views the rising country’s assertiveness as disrespectful, ungrateful and even provocative or dangerous. Exaggerated self-importance becomes hubris; unreasonable fear, paranoia. LIKE GASOLINE to a match, accelerants can turn an accidental collision or third-party provocation into war. One cluster of accelerants is captured by what Carl von Clausewitz called the “fog of war.” Extending Thucydides’s insight about war as “an affair of chances,” Clausewitz observed that “war is the realm of uncertainty. Three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” This profound uncertainty can lead a commander or policymaker to act aggressively when a fuller set of facts would advise caution, and vice versa. The advent of disruptive weapons that promise “shock and awe” makes the fog and uncertainty even worse. With attacks on command-and-control systems, enemies can paralyze a nation’s military command. In Desert Storm, U.S. forces demonstrated version 1.0 of this option. They destroyed Saddam Hussein’s intelligence and cut communication links to his commanders in the field. Isolated, his forces hunkered down; it was like “shooting fish in a barrel,” U.S. pilots remarked. Antisatellite weapons are one accelerant that military planners expect to play a big role in any U.S.-China conflict. Long a subject of science fiction, such weapons are today a fact of life, running the gamut from kinetic ones that physically destroy their targets to quieter systems that use lasers to jam or “dazzle” satellites, rendering them inoperable. In 2007, China successfully destroyed a weather satellite, and it regularly tests its antisatellite capabilities in less dramatic fashion. Satellites provide a crucial link in almost every U.S. military endeavor, from early warning of ballistic-missile launches and providing imagery and weather forecasts to planning operations. Global positioning satellites put the “precision” in almost all the military’s precision-guided munitions and allow ships, planes and ground units to know where they are on the battlefield. The United States depends on this technology more than any of its competitors, making it a perfect target for Chinese military planners. Cyberspace provides even more opportunities for disruptive technological transformations that could provide a decisive advantage, on the one hand, but might also risk uncontrolled escalation, on the other. The details of offensive cyberweapons remain heavily classified and are constantly evolving. But the public has seen glimpses of them in some cases, such as America’s cyberattack against Iran’s nuclear program or its “left-of-launch” attacks on North Korea’s missile tests. America’s primary cyberspace organizations, the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command, as well as their Chinese counterparts, can now use cyberweapons to silently shut down military networks and critical civilian infrastructure like power grids. Moreover, by employing proxies and assembling an international web of compromised computers, they can disguise the origins of a cyber-operation, slowing the victim’s ability to identify the attacker. Like antisatellite measures, cyberweapons could create a decisive advantage in battle by disrupting the command-and-control and targeting information on which modern militaries depend—and without bloodshed. This presents a dangerous paradox: the very action that attackers believe will tamp down conflict can appear reckless and provocative to the victims. Similarly, cyberattacks that disrupt communication would intensify the fog of war, creating confusion that multiplies the chances of miscalculation. While both the United States and China now have nuclear arsenals that could survive the other’s first strike and still allow for retaliation, neither can be sure its cyber arsenals could withstand a serious cyber assault. For example, a large-scale Chinese cyberattack against the U.S. military’s networks could temporarily cripple Washington’s ability to respond in kind, or even to operate some of its critical command-and-control and surveillance systems. This creates a dangerous use-it-or-lose-it dynamic in which each side has an incentive to attack key links in the other’s computer networks before their capabilities are disabled. Compared with the bluntest instruments of war, especially nuclear bombs, cyberweapons seem to offer the promise of subtlety and precision. But this promise is illusory. Increased connectivity among systems and devices creates a domino effect. Unable to determine how the hacking of one system may affect others, attackers would find it difficult to narrowly tailor the effects of their operation and avoid unintended escalation. In 2016, 180,000 Internet-connected industrial control systems were operating around the world. Along with the proliferation of the “Internet of Things,” which encompasses some ten billion devices worldwide, the number of enticing targets is growing rapidly. Another accelerant might involve compromising the confidentiality of sensitive networks. Some are obvious, such as those that operate nuclear command and control. Each side, however, may perceive other actions quite differently. Take China’s “Great Firewall,” a collection of hardware and software that enables Beijing to monitor and block vast segments of online content. Washington could disable a system essential to the Great Firewall, intending it as a modest, private warning. But for Chinese leaders who regard the ability to control citizens’ access to information as vital, the operation could be misconstrued as the tip of a spear aimed at regime change. Given these background conditions, potential sparks can be frighteningly mundane. Escalation can occur rapidly. The following three scenarios show just how easily the United States and China can stumble into a war that each side hopes to avoid. CURRENTLY, AMERICAN and allied warships and aircraft are operating in greater proximity to their Chinese counterparts than ever before. U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers periodically conduct freedom-of-navigation operations near Chinese-controlled islands in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Suppose that during routine operations an American destroyer passes near Mischief Reef, one of the newly constructed islands where China has built runways for aircraft and installed air and missile defenses. As the ship nears the contested site, Chinese coast guard vessels harass the destroyer, just as they did during the USS Cowpens incident in 2013. Unlike that encounter, however, the U.S. destroyer is unable to swerve in time. It collides with a Chinese ship and sinks it, killing all on board. The Chinese government now has three options. The dovish course would be to avoid escalation by allowing the American destroyer to leave the area and to protest its actions through diplomatic channels. At the other end of the spectrum, it could adopt an eye-for-an-eye approach and sink the destroyer using aircraft or missiles stationed on Mischief Reef. By refusing to be the “chicken,” while also not wanting to escalate, Beijing could opt for what it believes is a middle course. As the U.S. destroyer attempts to leave the area, a PLA Navy cruiser blocks its way, insisting that the destroyer entered Chinese territorial waters and demanding that its crew surrender and face justice for the deaths of the coast-guard personnel. China believes it is deescalating the situation by allowing for a diplomatic solution, akin to the deal that permitted an American crew to go free after a crash landing near Hainan Island sixteen years ago. The background conditions have changed since that incident. From a U.S. perspective, China’s reckless harassment of the destroyer caused the collision in the first place. China’s attempt to arrest American sailors in international waters would undermine the principles of the law of the sea. Surrendering would have far-reaching repercussions: if the U.S. military will not stand up to China to defend operations conducted by its own navy, what message does that send to America’s allies, including Japan and the Philippines? Not willing to undermine its credibility by surrendering, the destroyer could simply sink the Chinese cruiser blocking its path. Alternatively, to avoid further bloodshed and to show a degree of sensitivity to the nationalistic pressures Chinese leaders face at home, the United States could use a show of force to get the cruiser to back down peacefully. U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii, in consultation with leaders in Washington, could order nearby aircraft to fly to the area, send an aircraft carrier stationed in Japan toward the South China Sea, and forward-deploy B-2 bombers to Guam. American officials believe these actions will signal their seriousness without risking any further escalation. Events look different to Beijing, especially amid the fog of war. As China sees it, the United States has already sunk a Chinese vessel. Now scores of American aircraft are aloft, threatening attacks on the Chinese cruiser, other naval vessels, or military installations on nearby islands. Mindful of public opinion, Chinese leaders are especially conscious that any further bloodshed inflicted by the United States would force them to retaliate aggressively. But events are running beyond Beijing’s control. As U.S. fighter jets rush to the scene to assist the stranded destroyer, a Chinese antiaircraft battery panics and fires on the oncoming aircraft. The U.S. aircraft take desperate evasive action, and the destroyer begins firing on Chinese antiaircraft sites on the island. Under attack, the Chinese commander on the island bombards the destroyer with antiship missiles. The missiles hit their intended target, killing hundreds of American sailors and sinking the ship. Those who escape are now stranded in small lifeboats. Chinese leaders are desperate to avoid a full-scale war with the United States, but also cannot admit that their chain of command broke down. They claim their actions were a proportionate and defensive response because the American destroyer was the aggressor. Officials in Washington are stunned that China has sunk a $3 billion vessel and killed hundreds of American sailors. Though wary of going to war with China, those in the Situation Room cannot back down: video of the ship’s wreckage and stranded U.S. sailors on cable news and social media has made that impossible. Many in Congress are calling on the administration to authorize war plans based on the doctrine formerly named Air-Sea Battle, which calls for massive air strikes against missile and radar systems on the Chinese mainland. Realizing that attacks on China’s mainland would trigger war, the president authorizes Pacific Command to instead destroy China’s military bases on disputed islands in the South China Sea. The president reasons that this is a proportionate response, since these islands were directly responsible for the sinking of the destroyer. Furthermore, eliminating these military bases will allow U.S. ships to rescue the sailors stranded nearby. Most important, such an action would target only China’s artificial islands, leaving its mainland untouched. President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials do not make this distinction. For years they have told the public that China has undisputed sovereignty over these islands. They are an integral part of China proper, and America has just attacked them. (Americans who scoff should recall that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor struck neither the mainland nor even a U.S. state, yet still rallied a nation to war.) Many in China are demanding that Xi order the PLA to destroy U.S. military bases in Guam, Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific. Some want China to attack the United States itself. No one is calling for China to exercise restraint. As millions of its citizens’ social-media postings are reminding the government, after its century of humiliation at the hands of sovereign powers, the ruling Communist Party has promised: “never again.” Still, President Xi clings to the hope that war can be avoided, an impossibility if China begins attacking U.S. military bases in Guam or Japan, killing soldiers and civilians and triggering retaliatory attacks on the Chinese mainland. Seeking a proportionate response to the U.S. attack on China’s island bases, Xi instead approves an alternative plan: using lasers, electronic and kinetic weapons to destroy or disable all U.S. military satellites in orbit above the crisis area, and using cyberattacks to cripple American command-and-control systems throughout the Asia-Pacific. The goal is to deescalate: Xi hopes that the United States will be shocked into backing down. But from the American perspective, these “blinding” attacks are indistinguishable from the first stage of a coordinated attack on the U.S. aircraft carrier and its strike group sailing from Japan—an event for which the PLA has spent decades developing its “carrier-killer” antiship ballistic missiles. The ninety-thousand-ton carrier, a floating city of 5,500 sailors that the United States describes as sovereign American territory, is simply too big to lose. The president is not willing to take the risk. On the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the president reluctantly approves the only plan ready on short notice that has a chance of saving the carrier: a war plan based on Air-Sea Battle. Using those assets still operational after the Chinese attack, the United States military begins destroying China’s “kill chains,” the various satellite and surveillance systems that allow Beijing to accurately target American carriers with its antiship missiles. It also launches massive cruise missile and stealth bomber attacks on PLA missile sites and air bases on the Chinese mainland, which could at any moment be used to sink U.S. vessels anywhere within the first island chain. The attacks provoke exactly what they intended to avoid. Its mainland now under attack, and the targeting systems needed to operate China’s antiship weapons about to be lost, China must use them or lose them. Xi authorizes attacks on all U.S. warships within range, including the carrier group. American aircraft and naval escorts intercept Chinese bombers and fighter jets flying to the carrier, but a swarm of DF-21D ballistic missiles—the so-called carrier killers—prove too much to handle. Enough reach their target to sink the carrier, killing most of the 5,500 sailors on board—far more than died during Pearl Harbor. The dynamics of playing chicken with cyber and space weapons over the South China Sea has transformed a tiny spark into a roaring fire. IF TAIWAN were an independent nation, it would be among the most successful countries in the world. Its hardworking population of twenty-three million has developed a market economy twice the size of the Philippines, Thailand or Vietnam. Although many in Taiwan want independence, China views it as a province. Beijing is prepared to do whatever it takes to keep Taipei from asserting its sovereignty. No other country has been prepared to fight China over the matter. Suppose, however, that the Chinese government were to substantially increase repression at home, including in Hong Kong, where China promised to maintain considerable autonomy and freedom when Britain returned control of the city in 1997. Enraged that the Chinese government is backtracking on its promises, residents of Hong Kong take to the streets to demand that Beijing uphold its commitment to “One Country, Two Systems.” As the protests drag on for weeks with no resolution in sight, Xi orders the military to do what it did in Tiananmen Square in 1989: crush the protests. The ensuing violence shocks the Taiwanese, particularly the younger generation. Pro-independence and anti-Beijing sentiment soars. In this atmosphere, the Taiwanese president is emboldened to ramp up rhetoric emphasizing her people’s hard-won rights and democracy. Her political allies go further, insisting that what has occurred in Hong Kong proves that Taiwan can never guarantee its citizens’ freedom without becoming a sovereign, independent country. To signal disapproval of Chinese regression in Hong Kong, the American president pointedly announces his respect for the Taiwanese president’s strong stance and declares that the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act fully commits the United States to defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. This is a major break from the long-standing U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the issue, and the Taiwanese president interprets it as tacit endorsement of a move toward independence. In an interview with the New York Times, she announces that Taiwan will apply for full membership to the UN (a move that China has long opposed) and rejects the so-called 1992 Consensus, under which both parties had agreed to the One-China concept while allowing for differing interpretations of what it actually meant. To punish Taiwan’s insubordination and scare it into backing down, China conducts an enhanced version of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis by barraging Taiwanese waters with “tests” of ballistic and cruise missiles, severely interrupting the commercial shipping that constitutes the island’s lifeline to the world. When Taipei still refuses to withdraw its membership application, China uses other weapons, including mine-laying drones, to further disrupt shipping into and out of Taiwan. As a small island nation, Taiwan imports 70 percent of its food and most of its natural resources, including energy. A sustained blockade would grind its economy to a halt and cause large-scale food shortages. Despite opposition to Taiwan’s application to join the United Nations, the United States feels obliged to prevent its strangulation. Many pro-Taiwan members of Congress are demanding that the White House send aircraft carriers to Taiwan’s aid, just as Bill Clinton did during the 1995–96 crisis. But the administration knows that China’s antiship ballistic missiles would now pose a serious threat to any U.S. carriers moving into the area, and the American public has little stomach for another war. Instead, U.S. Pacific Command offers to escort commercial shipping through the affected seas, a gesture of support but not of willingness to fight. The escort campaign puts U.S. warships at risk of being sunk by the Chinese missile barrage, either deliberately or accidentally—an event that could instantly kill more than one thousand Americans and spark calls for retaliation. In this scenario, a Chinese antiship missile—ostensibly fired as part of ongoing test barrages—sinks the USS John P. Murtha, an amphibious transport dock ship acting as an escort to civilian shipping. All of the nearly eight hundred sailors and marines aboard are killed—more than the United States lost in the first year of the Iraq War. China insists that the sinking was accidental; the Murtha merely got in the way of a missile fired at a random patch of ocean. It reminds Washington that America accidently bombed China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999. But in Washington, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the joint chiefs urge the president not to be deceived by this explanation. Instead they urge him to authorize the Air-Sea Battle plan to strike PLA antiship missile-launch sites on the mainland. Confronted with the sinking of the Murtha, the president accedes to pressure from military and political advisers, and agrees to preemptively strike antiship and other ballistic-missile systems on the Chinese mainland. Because China’s conventional and nuclear missiles are kept in the same locations, and their command-and-control systems are intertwined, Beijing mistakenly believes the United States is trying to eliminate its nuclear arsenal in a surprise first strike. In a desperate attempt to “deescalate by escalating”—an Orwellian doctrine that is nevertheless a pillar of Russian military strategy—China fires one of its land-based, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles into an empty tract of ocean south of Okinawa. The nuclear threshold has been crossed. And while no lives have been lost in the strike, it is but a short step from here to all-out nuclear war. THE SPARK to a Sino-American clash need not initially involve American or Chinese military forces. Instead, it might result from a confrontation with or between third-party allies. Such a scenario nearly became reality in 2010, when North Korea sank the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing forty-six South Korean sailors. China supported North Korea’s denial of involvement. Seoul, meanwhile, insisted that Pyongyang be held accountable. Ultimately, the two Koreas and their allies stepped back from the brink. But with a new set of background conditions and accelerants today, it is not clear that it would be so easy to avoid war, especially if the third parties involved were less inured to the sort of slow, grinding tensions that the Korean Peninsula has endured for decades. Besides South Korea, the other major U.S. ally in China’s immediate vicinity is Japan, a country with a post–World War II history of pacifism, but whose politics have become increasingly militaristic in recent years. Conservative Japanese politicians have spoken ever more stridently about revising the pacifist constitution imposed on their country by the United States. They have also been chafing against Chinese claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. In a crisis involving its historical rival Beijing, any steps Tokyo takes would certainly be shaped by these memories, and by the Japanese government’s shifting attitude toward military force. A likely flashpoint is the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands), located near valuable fishing grounds, trade routes and potential oil reserves in the East China Sea. The United States controlled the islands after World War II, before returning them to Japan in the early 1970s. That same decade, China began claiming sovereignty over the islands. Chinese ships regularly pass through these waters, raising tensions between Beijing and Tokyo and risking a collision that could set off a chain reaction. Consider a scenario that provided the story line for a recent war game designed by the RAND Corporation. A group of Japanese ultranationalists set sail for the Senkakus in small civilian watercraft. On social media, they explain that they are headed for Kuba Jima, one of the smaller islands, which they intend to claim and occupy on behalf of Japan. They land and begin building unidentified structures. Taking a page out of the Chinese playbook, they live stream their activities for the world to see. China reacts swiftly, its coast guard arriving within hours with officers who arrest the Japanese dissidents and take them back to the Chinese mainland for trial. Does Japan allow them to face justice in a Chinese court? It could. Instead, rather than lose face, Japan dispatches some of its own coast-guard vessels to intercept the ship carrying the ultranationalists and prevent them from being taken to China. A pileup ensues as both the PLA Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force deploy warships and fighter planes to the area. Neither side backs down. To make matters worse, some of the Japanese vessels land amphibious troops to occupy Kuba Jima, doubling down on the nationalists’ actions. A skirmish has become a military confrontation. In an urgent call, the Japanese prime minister reminds the U.S. president that Tokyo expects Washington to uphold the seven-decade-old mutual defense treaty, noting that senior officials have repeatedly confirmed that America’s commitment applies to the Senkakus. As the standoff enters its third day, the president and his National Security Council must decide: Does the United States wholeheartedly respond to Japan’s appeal, putting air power over the disputed island to protect the Japanese troops now on the ground there? Or is there a more restrained course that will satisfy the Japanese without antagonizing China and further escalating the tense naval standoff? The president opts for the latter, directing the Japan-based carrier strike group to patrol outside the range of the PLA’s land-based carrier-killer missiles, but keeping aircraft and submarines close enough to aid Japanese vessels and territory if things get ugly. They do. The next morning, a Chinese destroyer collides with a Japanese fishing boat in the crowded waters off the Senkakus, and soon fighter jets from both sides are provocatively buzzing their opponent’s warships. The standoff erupts into a brief, bloody naval battle as a Japanese captain, fearing for his ship’s safety, downs one of the low-flying Chinese fighters, and the PLA Navy warships, in return, sink his vessel. Both sides are at the edge of war at this point, and so is the United States, which is in a position to sink Chinese vessels with its hidden attack submarines or to send its carrier’s air wing into action. At this juncture, however, before the next decision has been made, something unexpected happens. All communications between Japanese forces on and around the Senkakus and their headquarters go dark. A cyberattack has severely disrupted one of the Japanese military’s command-and-control systems. The United States and Japan immediately blame China. The attacker has even left the telltale signs of the PLA’s offensive hacking unit. There is little hesitation in Washington or at U.S. Pacific Command about what to do next. To prevent the Japanese naval force from being annihilated while it is incommunicado, U.S. submarines sink three PLA Navy warships off the Senkakus with torpedoes. China, Japan and the United States have now fired their opening shots in a three-nation war. But what if it was not the PLA that launched the cyberattack after all? What if it was a carefully timed false-flag operation by Russia, seeking to draw the United States and China into a conflict in order to distract Washington from its wrestling match with Moscow over Ukraine? By the time intelligence agencies around the world learn the truth, it will be too late. The Kremlin has played its hand brilliantly. From the Senkakus, the war zone spreads as China attacks more Japanese vessels elsewhere in the East China Sea. Tokyo is desperate for the United States to commit its carrier strike group to the fight. If Washington makes that call, the same point of no return may well be crossed as in the collision-at-sea scenario: the destruction of one of the crown jewels of the U.S. Navy and the loss of life of all aboard could be the tragedy that the U.S. administration is forced to avenge with widening attacks on Chinese forces in a full-scale Pacific war. WAR BETWEEN the United States and China is not inevitable, but it is certainly possible. Indeed, as these scenarios illustrate, the underlying stress created by China’s disruptive rise creates conditions in which accidental, otherwise inconsequential events could trigger a large-scale conflict. That outcome is not preordained: out of the sixteen cases of Thucydides’s Trap over the last five hundred years, war was averted four times. But avoiding war will require statecraft as subtle as that of the British in dealing with a rising America a century ago, or the wise men that crafted a Cold War strategy to meet the Soviet Union’s surge without bombs or bullets. Whether Chinese and American leaders can rise to this challenge is an open question. What is certain is that the fate of the world rests upon the answer.

### solvency

#### Thus the plan – The Parliament of New Zealand ought to value the public’s right to know above the right to privacy of candidates to hide direct and indirect anonymous campaign donations by amending the Electoral Finance Bill to abolish all anonymous donations.

#### Only total ban solves.

Farrar 07 David Farrar,11-16-2007, "Ban all anonymous donations," Kiwiblog, <https://www.kiwiblog.co.nz/2007/11/ban_all_anonymous_donations.html> OHS-AT

Ban all anonymous donations

It is absolutely outrageous that a cosy deal has been done to allow Labour to keep most of its anonymous donations.

If anonymous donations are seen to be bad, then they should be banned totally.

Here’s a challenge to the Greens who have championed ending anonymous donations – move an amendment at committee of the whole stage to the Electoral Finance Bill to abolish all anonymous donations above the discloseable limit. Will the Greens stand up for their principles or have they done a dirty deal with Labour to protect Labour’s anonymous donations?

Most on the left support a ban on anonymous donations. Here’s their chance to show some integrity – join in asking the Greens to move an amendment to ban all anonymous donations above the disclosure limit. Force Labour and National to vote on the amendment.

The principle is simple. Electoral Law should not be written to favour one party. Setting a level of acceptable anonymous donations that is obviously tailored to Labour is outrageous. It is an Americanisation of our electoral system, such as where they set boundaries to favour one party. Reject the Americanisation of NZ politics and reject the cosy deal cooked up by Labour and the Greens.

### framing

#### Extinction is a distinct phenomenon that requires prior consideration

**Burke et al 16** Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, 2016 (Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25)

8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: **it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories.** It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their **unique histories** and **open-ended possibilities**, but it **threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life**.

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the **comprehensive negation** that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a **matter of being and nonbeing**, not one of life and death processes.

Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the **enormity, complexity, and scale** of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to **draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding**. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a **matter of global ethics**. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change.

9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.

The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.

Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of **diverse forms of being** – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘**worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid**. They can be **created**, **modified** – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 **which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.**

#### Methodological pluralism is best

**Bleiker 14** – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives**.** No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand. But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

# Case

## XT - Taiwan

### Yes Invasion

### Taiwan Escalates

### AT: Deterrence Checks

## XT - China Impact

### XT - China War

### first strike notes

### AT: First Strike

### AT: Interdependence

### AT: AI

### Nuke War Impact

# T Frontlines

## New Affs Bad

### CI

### O/V

### AT Engagement

### AT Cheap Shots

## Democracy Spec Good

### C/I

#### CI: the aff may specify a full democracy – solves limits.

1 Norway, 2 Iceland, 3 Sweden, 4 New Zealand, 5 Denmark, 6 Ireland, 6 Canada, 8 Australia, 9 Finland, 9 Switzerland, 11 Netherlands, 12 Luxemburg, 13 Germany, 14 UK, 15 Austria, 16 Mauritius, 17 Malta, 18 Uruguay, 19 Spain

Salome Chelangat 18 “Countries Considered to Be Full Democracies” World Atlas. May 16, 2018. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-considered-to-be-full-democracies.html IB

According to a report conducted by the Economist Intelligent Unit, several nations are considered to be “full democracies.” However, despite being treated as full democracies, they are ranked by the level of democracy. There are nineteen such countries in the world. Among these countries, Norway is considered as the most democratic nation in the world. The other full democracies include Iceland, Canada, Australia, Sweden, and Denmark, among many others.

#### “A” is singular.

Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/a IB

used as a function word before singular nouns when the referent is unspecified

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Clash and shiftiness –

#### 2] Aff ground ---

### Limits

#### They say 19 is still a lot—here’s a few framing issues that prove it’s not really 19 affs and functional limits solve:

#### 1] a third of the countries are tiny islands like Malta and Luxembourg that don’t have robust literature in the context of the topic

#### 2] another third are countries that are geographically next to each other and/or extremely similar politically such as Scandanavian countries—that puts us at about 10 affs max which is definitely manageable

#### 3] countries have to meet a pretty high threshold for being considered full democracies which means even if there are many different countries they all have very similar political structures such that the neg doesn’t need specific prep to each different country

#### 4] if 19 affs is too much, then their interp doesn’t solve because aff’s can still specify candidates for public office, agents, mechanisms, etc. so if the neg can prep for those they can also prep our aff

### Ground

## T – Democracy

### I Meet

#### I meet – NZ is a full democracy.



## T – Right to Privacy

### C/I

#### C/I: Privacy includes both personal and organizational information

#### Business Dictionary ND "What is privacy? definition and meaning," BusinessDictionary, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/privacy.html OHS-AT

In general, the right to be free from secret surveillance and to determine whether, when, how, and to whom, one's personal or organizational information is to be revealed. In specific, privacy may be divided into four categories (1) Physical: restriction on others to experience a person or situation through one or more of the human senses; (2) Informational: restriction on searching for or revealing facts that are unknown or unknowable to others; (3) Decisional: restriction on interfering in decisions that are exclusive to an entity; (4) Dispositional: restriction on attempts to know an individual's state of mind

#### Prefer

#### Aff ground – the only two topical affs under your interp are health disclosure and tax returns which pigeonholes the aff into two positions that can be prepped out

### AT campaign not person

#### 1] no relevant difference between campaign and person—the individual is the face of the campaign and the campaign dissolves if the candidate wants to stop running

#### 2] turn—even if donations are to a campaign, large donations are made based on personal relations with the candidate—means that campaign privacy is personal

#### 3] we meet—anonymous donors are people whose privacy should not be valued above the public’s right to know—their identity is a form of personal info

### AT limits

#### 1] Nonunique—there are still infinite kinds of personal info, like any part of a candidate’s identity or past history

#### 2] Turn--campaign finance is the best aff for limits—there are only a few things like tax records and donations, which can only be completely revealed in a couple scenarios—diverse case list but not unmanageable

### Reasonability---1AR

### Reasonability---2AR

### Reasonability---AT: Arbitrary

#### There’s no way to determine at what point the benefit to one standard overwhelms the harm of another which makes competing interps just as arbitrary

#### Judge intuition is inevitable—debaters will never fully resolve weighing—proven by split decisions

### Reasonability---AT: Collapses

#### .

### Reasonability---AT: Race to the Bottom

### Reasonability---AT: Norms

## T – Conflict

### C/I

#### Counter-interp: the aff may specify a conflict of privacy and the right to know

#### “Right to know” requires policies that make information public.

The Free Dictionary [https://www.thefreedictionary.com/right-to-know]//LC

Of or relating to policies and laws that make some governmental records and other information available to a person who can demonstrate a right or need to know the contents

#### 1] Topic literature – plan’s a core conflict.

Johnson et al 11 Johnson, Deborah G. Regan, Priscilla M. Wayland, Kent. “Campaign Disclosure, Privacy and Transparency.” William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Vol19 Iss4 Art7. 2011. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1585&context=wmborj TG

The question of what information should be displayed entails the balancing between transparency and privacy. Information about amount donated is currently displayed as the exact amount a donor gives, but for purposes of accountability as well as privacy, the amounts could be reported as ranges or categories, e.g., $1–$500, $1,000–$3,000, etc.132 Similarly, one’s full name need not be posted; instead, a first initial and last name may suffice for purposes of accountability as well as providing some privacy. This would mean in effect, the creation of a form of practical obscurity in that someone who wished to use the data for transparency or surveillance purposes would need to exert additional effort to determine who a donor actually is. What we are suggesting here is that we revisit the decision about what data needs to be collected when a donation is made in light of the fact that the data will be posted on the Internet. Although arguments can be made for the value of collecting each item of information, it does not follow that all items have to be posted or posted in the form collected. The five items currently collected are collected for multiple purposes and these purposes were not taken into account when the CFD system went on the Internet.133 Some information seems to be collected to ensure that the donation comes from a legitimate donor, i.e., name and address.134 Some information seems to be collected because it reveals something relevant to appropriate/inappropriate influence, e.g., size of donation and employer.135 The question that has to be raised here is which information is relevant for accountability, which to detect corruption, and which for citizens to evaluate the candidate. Perhaps some will argue that it is better to err on the side of making all information public rather than using a particular theory of corruption. On the other hand, information relevant for making sure the donor is a real person seems very different from information relevant to figure out influence.

#### 2] Clash and shiftiness –

#### 3] Aff ground –

## Reasonability

### Reasonability---1AR

### Reasonability---2AR

### Reasonability---AT: Arbitrary

### Reasonability---AT: Collapses

### Reasonability---AT: Race to the Bottom

### Reasonability---AT: Norms

## Spec

### 1AR – Meta-Theory

### 1AR – Spec

# Extra

## Asher Nebel T stuff

### AT Jurisdiction

### AT Textuality/T Rule

### AT Bare Plurals

### AT Nebel

#### Nebel doesn’t apply – it’s not a bare plural

Potischman 18 Potischman, Nina. [Debated for Hunter College High School, earning 11 career TOC bids. Reached finals of the TOC, where she was the top seed and top speaker. Won Yale, Valley (twice), Valley RR, Harrison RR, Lex, Penn RR, and Harvard. Many speaker awards and competed in lots of late elimination rounds. Pomona College]. “Victory Briefs November/December 2018 LD Brief.” TG

However, the card that people usually read to justify Nebel T – which says that ’Bare plurals, including “just governments,’ lack determiners. There’s no article, demonstrative, possessive, or quantifier in front of the noun to tell you how many or which governments are being discussed – does not apply in this instance. The resolution does include a determiner –”a” – which suggests that it’s not a bare plural.1

### ---------------

### AT Breadth

### AT Ground

### AT Limits

### AT Pre-round prep

### AT Research Burdens

### AT TVA

## Trash

### More Cards

#### Anon decreases voter turnout

Over the last 30 years voter participation in elections held in free countries has slowly declined – from an average of 74 percent in the 1970s to 71 percent in the 1990s.65 Figure 2 shows declining levels of participation in national elections for five OECD countries. For example, turnout (defined as the percentage of registered voters who cast a vote) is declining in the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland and the UK. On average, the number of those voting in these countries has decreased 12 percent between 1945 and 2002. New Zealand’s turnout has declined by over 20 percent over this period – from 98 percent in 1946 to 77 percent in 2002.

Although it is difficult to empirically link declining voter turnout with perceptions of, or levels of, corruption, there is increasing acceptance that corruption is a key explanation for growing voter apathy and cynicism in advanced democracies, and poor economic and political development in emerging democracies. The New Zealand State Services Commission notes that the ‘dignity’ of government appears to have deteriorated in the public’s mind, with trust in institutions closely correlated with the public’s perception of ethical behaviour by government.66

In its annual report for the year ended June 2003, the Electoral Commission links the lack of transparency in New Zealand’s donation disclosure regime to the levels of public confidence in the electoral system. The high disclosure threshold and the ability of donors to make large donations anonymously … reduce the degree of transparency which the disclosure regime is intended to promote and thereby undermine public confidence in the integrity of the disclosure system. 67

#### X

The transparency perspective, on the other hand, regards free choice as

dependent on informed choice. Voters may be the best judge of their own

interests but this judgement requires having enough information – including

information on the fund raising and expenditure activities of political parties. The

perspective is also of the view that political parties which receive public funding

and which are part of the public political life of a country can hardly be regarded

as private organisations. New Zealand’s Justice and Electorate Committee

noted that

making a substantial donation to a political party is not the same as making

a contribution to a charity or other such private association. We think

transparency in election funding is an important principle and the law

should be substantially improved. 69

According to the UK Neil Committee, the advantages of greater transparency

are: the public and the media know who is financing each political party; rumour

and suspicion wither; the possibility of secret influence over ministers or policy

is greatly diminished; public confidence in the probity of the political process is

raised.70 To be most effective, disclosure and transparency provisions need to

ensure that information is available to the voter (and the media) before, rather

than after, elections. They also require an independent media and vigilance on

the part of individual voters.

#### That undermines democracy and

**Chapple 10/25** Simon Chapple, 10-25-2018, "New Zealand politics: foreign donations and political influence," Stuff, <https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/108096827/new-zealand-politics-foreign-donations-and-political-influence> OHS-AT

Transparency International reports that New Zealand political parties are one of the weakest pillars supporting local transparency and good governance. Within this weak pillar, one of the weakest strands involves political finance and donations.

They argue that with the demise of mass political participation, parties are increasingly dependent on donations to function. This weakness means that local politicians are more likely to seek to "supply" influence, or at least dangle the prospect of influence, in front of wealthy bidders.

The "demand" to buy political influence has also risen. With the increase in worldwide inequality and kleptocracy, there are more rich people for whom buying influence is the norm. Specifically in New Zealand, there has been an influx of wealthy expatriates from China, where buying influence is an accepted practice. They often retain close links to the Chinese Communist Party, which runs an authoritarian, anti-democratic and oppressive regime. It is thus not surprising that issues of donations and foreign influence are increasingly entering into domestic political debates.

### XT – Up Now

#### Anonymous foreign donations are up now in New Zealand

**Chapple 10/29** Simon Chapple, 10-29-2018, "New Zealand politics: how political donations could be reformed to reduce potential influence," Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/new-zealand-politics-how-political-donations-could-be-reformed-to-reduce-potential-influence-105805> OHS-AT

Donations and foreign money

Foreign interference in domestic politics is an increasing phenomenon worldwide.

Currently in New Zealand foreign donations to a party of up to NZ$1,500 are permissible. Moreover, foreign donations below this amount are not individually or collectively disclosed.

It would be easy for a foreign state or corporate body seeking political influence to channel a large number of donations into the system just under the threshold via numerous proxies. Whether such interference has been happening is unclear, since New Zealanders do not know how much money currently comes in to political parties via foreign actors.

Even if foreign donations are not a problem now, one could rapidly develop. A strong argument can be made that foreign money has no place in democracy, including New Zealand’s.

New Zealand would not be going out on an international limb by banning foreign donations. Foreign donations to political parties are not permissible in the [United Kingdom, Ireland and the United States. They are also banned in Canada but unfortunately a significant loophole exists. Australia is currently in the process of banning foreign donations.

Lowering threshold for anonymous donations

As noted, the threshold below which political donations can be anonymous could be lowered. A lower threshold would make it more difficult to evade name disclosure rules by splitting donations and attributing each part to a different donor.

Splitting may be what happened to the alleged NZ$100,000 Yikun Zhang donation. The NZ$1,000 threshold proposed by the Greens would be a huge improvement on the status quo. A donor of NZ$100,000 seeking to evade legislation and to remain anonymous would have to coordinate 100 individual donors, rather than seven.

But New Zealand could go lower still, to NZ$200, without being radical. Giving NZ$200 to a political party is huge for an ordinary New Zealander, and the reality is only a very small minority would need to disclose their names under such a law.

There is international precedent for setting much lower thresholds for anonymity than the Greens propose. For example, in Canada, the maximum amount of an anonymous donation was set at C$200 in 2015, while in Ireland it is currently €100.

Donor privacy versus transparency

One concern with non-anonymity is that it delivers public transparency at the cost of private donor privacy. Currently the Electoral Act 1993 contains a mechanism for anyone wanting to donate to a political party and not wanting their identity disclosed to either the public or to the party receiving the donation. To obtain such anonymity, the donation needs to be more than NZ$1,500.

The Electoral Commission aggregates all such donations. It passes them on to parties at regular intervals. It does not identify the dollar amount of individual donations, or the number or names of donors.

Not many donors use this protected disclosure avenue. For example, between September 2015 and June 2018, the commission passed on only NZ$150,000 in anonymised money to parties via this channel. At the same time amounts well in excess of NZ$10 million were passed on by donors identifiable to political parties (but not necessarily to the public).

A preference for identifiable channels suggests current donors get value from non-anonymity. It implies most donors feel they are buying something. The fact that donors feel they are buying something should be cause for concern.