# Notes

When I was prepping out this aff before Harvard, I realized I thought it was just true and decided to cut it for myself. This is the only plan I’ve ever read that I would’ve felt comfortable having a full on LARP debate with—it was more thoroughly frontlined on substance than any aff I’ve ever written. I’m only including topic specific stuff in this doc—if you’re curious about how I organized my other f/l, it’s all in the Niger aff.

# 1AC – Uganda

## Advantage

### 1AC – Advantage – H.R.

#### American military aid allows and encourages state repression of citizens from the Ugandan government.

Epstein 18 [Helen C. Epstein, (Helen C. Epstein teaches at Bard College and is the author of Another Fine Mess: America, Uganda and the War on Terror.) "The US Turns a Blind Eye to Uganda’s Assault on Democracy" The Nation, 7-20-2018, https://www.thenation.com/article/us-turns-blind-eye-ugandas-assault-democracy/, DOA:1-30-2019 // WWBW]

Few Americans know much about **Uganda**, but it **is** almost certainly **America’s closest military ally in Africa.** For years, its army has served as a proxy force for the US War on Terror in Eastern and Central Africa. During the 1990s, the Ugandan military, with US support, fought dirty wars in Sudan, Rwanda, and Zaire in order to ensure Central Africa’s estimated $24 trillion in coltan, uranium, gold, and other mineral riches remained in the West’s sphere of influence. Today, **more than 6,000 US-supported Ugandan troops are battling** the Islamist group **Al Shabaab** in Somalia and thousands more serve as guards in Iraq. President Donald Trump’s Arab allies are now reportedly negotiating the recruitment of thousands of Ugandans to join the ghastly quagmire in Yemen. **In exchange for Uganda’s military favors, Washington has long turned a blind eye to grave human-rights abuses** committed by its leader Yoweri Museveni—who has held power for 32 years through brute force, election rigging, and corruption. But with Museveni’s most recent attacks on opposition figures, the United States is now ignoring one of the most evil and blatant recent assaults on democracy anywhere in the world. In February 2016, Museveni was declared winner of Uganda’s seventh presidential election. The poll had been marred, like others, by police raids on opposition rallies, the arrest of opposition candidates, the killing of unarmed opposition supporters, and electoral fraud. At the time, Uganda’s Constitution limited the age of presidential candidates to 75, making Museveni, who claims to be 73, ineligible to run in the next election, scheduled for 2021. However, during the summer of 2017, a back-bencher from Museveni’s party named Raphael Magyezi began drafting a bill to remove the age limit from the Constitution. If passed, it would enable Museveni to rule indefinitely. Reputable polls found some 80 percent of Ugandans opposed lifting the age limit, but all Museveni needed was the support of a two-thirds majority of Uganda’s 427 MPs. **Museveni’s political machine runs on a war chest of hundreds of millions of dollars, much of it stolen from the Treasury and foreign-aid programs.** This ensures his party has a comfortable parliamentary majority, so that if Magyezi’s bill were to be voted on, it would surely pass. Nevertheless, MPs like Nambooze who opposed the amendment were emboldened by the knowledge that Uganda’s people were behind them and launched a campaign to block it. Known as Togikwatako, or “Don’t touch it!”—a common parental warning to Ugandan children—the campaign organized demonstrations against the age-limit amendment around the country. Museveni’s forces responded by shooting student demonstrators and arresting activists passing out Togikwatako leaflets and MPs making Togikwatako speeches. On September 19, the day Magyezi’s bill was to be introduced, tanks were deployed around Parliament and police carrying military-grade weapons closed off surrounding streets to prevent demonstrations. But as soon as the session was called to order, Togikwatako MPs donned red headbands—the symbol of their campaign—and began trying to filibuster the bill by singing Uganda’s national anthem over and over while waving copies of the Constitution. Uganda’s formidable Parliamentary Speaker Rebecca Kadaga, in black robes and white-horsehair judicial wig glared down at them from the dais and closed the session without introducing Magyezi’s bill. Afterward, the Togikwatako MPS danced and sang in the hallways, punching their fists in the air in triumph. Nambooze received the “they will break your back” threat from her colleague the following Monday. Since joining politics in 2000, she’d been arrested numerous times and even breastfed two of her children in jail. Though worried, she attended the sitting the next day anyway. The filibuster stunts resumed under Speaker Kadaga’s expressionless gaze. At one point, a scuffle broke out when Museveni loyalist Ronald Kibuule brandished a gun at Togikwatako MP Ibrahim Ssemujju Nganda, and, according to Ssemujju, told him to prepare for a bullet in his nervous system. Again the session ended without the introduction of Magyezi’s bill. That night, operatives from Museveni’s elite special forces snuck into Parliament, checking the routes in and out of the central chamber and identifying the locations of security cameras. Speaker Kadaga opened Parliament the following afternoon by announcing the suspension of 25 mostly Togikwatako MPs, including Nambooze. Kadaga then departed the chamber as dozens of operatives in business attire streamed in via Museveni’s private entrance and began violently arresting the MPs Kadaga had named. Images of what looked like MPs throwing chairs, fencing with microphone stands, pirouetting on tables, and waving the Ugandan flag like toreadors were broadcast on the Internet and even evoked merriment on Trevor Noah’s The Daily Show. But off camera, something horrible was happening. While attempting to assist a fellow MP who had been slugged by an army officer, Nambooze found herself face to face with about six of the burly intruders. They led her to a small room without security cameras where two of them grabbed her from behind and began squeezing her shoulders and arms together. Then one of them shoved a knee into her back, and Nambooze felt something break. The pain was so intense, she thought she might die. Her assailants were dressed like women, but she told a local reporter that she had her doubts: “I could not see them, because they held me from behind but the hands were so hairy and I doubt that they were actually women.” Nambooze was rescued when a female member of the Parliamentary police force that routinely patrols the building burst in. “Why are you killing Hon Nambooze?” she recalled the officer shouting. Her tormentors released her, but she was no longer able to stand unaided and fell to the ground. In November she was flown to India where surgeons performed a six-hour operation in which metal implants were inserted in her spine so she could walk again. After the raid, attendance at Parliament dwindled and the filibusters ceased. But Togikwatako demonstrations continued around the country, and in October, police shot dead three unarmed demonstrators. Several NGOs that had been supporting community education about the age-limit amendment were shut down by the police, and explosives were thrown at the homes of some Togikwatako MPs. The presidential-age-limit amendment passed on December 20, 2017. Early in the New Year, Nambooze’s health began deteriorating, and by spring the pain had become unbearable. She arranged to travel to India to consult her surgeon, planning to fly out on June 15. But on June 8, masked men on motorcycles gunned down Ibrahim Abiriga, a ruling-party MP whom Nambooze had once teased for always wearing yellow—signifying his loyalty to Museveni. Such drive-by motorcycle murders have become increasingly frequent in Uganda; a police commander, a senior prosecutor, several Muslim sheiks, and many others have been killed in this way in recent years. While Abiriga’s killers are not known, his constituents rioted before his burial, shouting, “We don’t want yellow!” and blamed the government for his death. In a Facebook message of condolence to Abiriga’s family, Nambooze wrote, “Uganda will be better not through elimination of those we don’t agree with, but because of our effort to put up systems that will work for us all irrespective of our political beliefs. Every life must be respected and every murder must be condemned.” Her message also lamented that Abiriga had allowed himself to become a “loud speaker” for Museveni and his henchmen—“who have chosen to love power more than the future of our Uganda”—a sentiment shared by thousands of Ugandans on Twitter. Three days later, Nambooze was arrested on charges of “[offensive communication](http://allafrica.com/stories/201806140305.html),” in connection with the Facebook post. She paid bail and was released, but during a budget speech the next day, Museveni announced that bail for murder suspects would be scrapped. Nambooze was immediately rearrested, and for two days she lay in a bare jail cell on a wooden bench, [unable to sit up or stand](http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Doctors-MP-Nambooze-condition-Kiruddu-Hospital-police-bond/688334-4621254-xemonsz/index.html). She was then taken to a hospital, but on the way a police vehicle rammed into the ambulance, further damaging her spine and severely injuring her knee. While it’s impossible to prove, Nambooze suspects the collision was deliberate and intended to further physically traumatize her. Doctors later determined that one of the metal screws implanted in her back had been dislodged and was pressing on a major nerve. Demonstrations broke out around the country, and she was finally released on bond and flown to India for another round of surgery on July 4. In recent years, **Uganda’s security forces have manipulated elections, tortured nonviolent political activists, and shot dead roughly 100 unarmed people**—including 14 children in a traditional palace in western Uganda. **Government security forces have also thrown countless peasants off their land to make way for politically connected investors** such as Total, which is constructing an oil pipeline, and General Electric, which is building a refinery in western Uganda **As Uganda’s largest foreign-aid donor—with over $500 million in grants per year, plus an unknown amount of classified military aid—the US government has the leverage to rein Museveni in.** Much of our aid pays for medical and other humanitarian projects, which should continue, but US tax dollars also flow through the World Bank directly into Uganda’s treasury, where much of it is looted to fund Museveni’s repression. **Suspending aid to Museveni might also help quell tensions in Uganda’s war-torn neighborhood. For far too long, gullible US national-security officials have relied on Museveni to interpret Central Africa’s complex regional conflicts**, including the wars in South Sudan and Congo, even as **Museveni himself has exacerbated those conflicts by arming one side or the other, while pretending to be a peacemaker. Uganda-backed rebel groups now appear to be emerging in Burundi and Congo, and Uganda may soon be embroiled in a new war—this time with Rwanda.**

#### And, Ugandan peace-keeping operations throughout Africa result in similar human rights abuses.

McCormick 16 [Ty McCormick, () "Is the U.S. Military Propping Up Uganda’s ‘Elected’ Autocrat?" Foreign Policy, 2-18-2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/18/is-the-us-military-propping-up-ugandas-elected-autocrat-museveni-elections/, DOA:1-30-2019 // WWBW]

But at the same time that it was drawing closer to the United States on the counterterrorism front, **the Ugandan military became embroiled in conflicts in neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan** that put it at odds with its American partners. In Congo, the Ugandans were accused of looting the country’s natural resources while in South Sudan they fought on behalf of President Salva Kiir in the country’s civil war even after the United States called on them to withdraw. **Ugandan peacekeepers in Somalia have also been accused of serious human rights violations, including sexual violence and torture.** The Obama administration claims to vet troops that participate in its so-called “train-and-equip” programs in accordance with the Leahy Laws, which theoretically require the United States to terminate security assistance to suspected human rights violators. “Should a Ugandan military unit or individual be credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights in the mission area, that individual and their unit will be denied further assistance, until such time that the Government of Uganda and the [Ugandan military] have taken sufficient corrective actions,” Jeffrey Loree, a spokesperson for the Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. State Department, said in an emailed statement. “We rely on a range of reporting to monitor the performance of our partners once they are deployed, including U.S. personnel in the mission area, international organizations, NGOs, and media reports.” But **given the remote and lawless environments in which Ugandan troops routinely operate** — South Sudan, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the Congo — **it’s virtually impossible to know whether human rights violations have been committed.** “You assess it as best you can,” said a former U.S. diplomat who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “There are times that you’re never going to get the facts.” It’s also not clear that punitive measures are always taken, even when there is convincing evidence of abuse. The United States does not make public when it sanctions individuals for violations under the Leahy Laws, so it’s difficult to assess whether they are applied consistently across countries. Local media [reports](http://allafrica.com/stories/201405160926.html) as well as diplomatic [cables](http://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/240275) published by WikiLeaks suggest that the U.S. Embassy in Kampala does investigate suspected human-rights abuses in an effort to comply with Leahy. But how often those investigations result in the blacklisting of Ugandan officials is anybody’s guess. Lt. Col. Paddy Ankunda, **a spokesman for the Ugandan military, told Foreign Policy that he “could not recall any case” in which U.S. training or assistance had been terminated because of human rights violations.** The United States cut a small portion of its annual aid package and cancelled military exercises in 2014, after Uganda enacted a harsh anti-gay law, but it has never taken a similarly public stand as a result of human rights violations by the military. A Human Rights Watch [report](https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/08/somalia-sexual-abuse-african-union-soldiers) published that same year documenting sexual abuse by Ugandan peacekeepers in Somalia, for instance, did not result in a reduction of military assistance, despite the fact that the Ugandan military found it credible enough to [suspend](http://news.yahoo.com/uganda-suspends-officers-over-somalia-conduct-sex-abuse-083750559.html) 15 of its soldiers, including two generals.

### 1AC – Advocacy

#### I affirm Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes in Uganda. Further specification is in the doc.

Reuters 9/7 [Reuters Editorial, () "U.S. Should Suspend Military Aid To Uganda: Lawyer For Critic Of Museveni" Reuters, 9-7-2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-politics-wine/u-s-should-suspend-military-aid-to-uganda-lawyer-for-critic-of-museveni-idUSKCN1LM2OU, DOA:1-30-2019 // WWBW]

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - **The United States should suspend military aid to Uganda over the government’s human rights record**, the U.S. lawyer for a prominent critic of President Yoweri Museveni said on Thursday. The call broadened criticism of the government by opposition lawmaker Robert Kyagulanyi, a musician known by his stage name Bobi Wine. Authorities charged Kyagulanyi with treason last month over the suspected stoning of Museveni’s convoy. He denies the charge and says he was tortured in detention. He arrived in Washington on Saturday for medical treatment for his injuries. A State Department official said Kyagulanyi met with representatives from the department on Thursday, “as they have done in the past when he visited the United States.” Undersecretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy did not participate in the meeting at the State Department. There was no immediate comment from the government in Kampala. Kyagulanyi has gained popularity for his attacks on Museveni. The president has ruled since 1986 and has won a series of elections, but is viewed by some as out of touch. The government in Kampala denies torturing Kyagulanyi. “We want the American taxpayer to know that the American taxpayer is funding this. The military equipment we are supplying to Uganda is being used in a war of terror against Uganda’s citizens,” lawyer Robert Amsterdam, flanked by Kyagulanyi, told a news conference in Washington “We call on the U.S. government to immediately suspend military funding to Uganda,” he said. Kyagulanyi, 36, used crutches and showed reporters blisters on the palm of his hand he said were traces of the torture. “I must go back home. Uganda is my home,” he said. “I want you (my supporters) to stand with the oppressed, not the oppressor.” **Washington is a major source of funding for Uganda’s military, supplying hardware, cash and training. It has given equipment, money and intelligence** for the military’s hunt for Lord’s Resistance Army warlord Joseph Kony. **Museveni also receives diplomatic support from Washington for his deployment of troops in international peacekeeping missions including the fight against militants in Somalia.** Chinese offshore oil and gas company CNOOC Ltd, France’s Total SA and London-listed Tullow Oil Plc are among major investors in Uganda. “International investors in Uganda have obligations,” Amsterdam said. “While we are not today in any way seeking disinvestment from Uganda, what we are seeking is responsible investment in Uganda,” Amsterdam said.

Military aid is defined as:

ICIJ 7 - The Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, “A citizen’s guide to understanding U.S. foreign military aid,” <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2007/05/22/5772/citizen-s-guide-understanding-us-foreign-military-aid> WJ

For the “Collateral Damage” investigative study, the Center for Public Integrity created a database that tracks a subset of those financial flows: taxpayer-funded programs or assistance that contribute to a nation’s offensive military capabilities. The database does not include certain large nuclear non-proliferation programs or expenditures such as Foreign Military Sales or Direct Commercial Sales, which are not supported directly with taxpayer dollars. The database is also limited to tracking funds appropriated to either the Defense Department or the State Department. For this report, these are the criteria for “foreign military assistance” or “foreign military aid.”

#### Uganda is a competitive authoritarian regime.

Kagoro 16 [Jude Kagoro, (Institute for Intercultural and International Studies, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany) "Competitive authoritarianism in Uganda: the not so hidden hand of the military" In: Bogaards M., Elischer S. (Eds) Democratization And Competitive Authoritarianism In Africa., 2016, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-658-09216-0\_9#citeas, DOA:1-30-2019 // WWBW]

Levitsky and Way ( 2010 ) propose: **Competitive authoritarian regimes are distinguished** from full authoritarianism **in that constitutional channels exist through which opposition groups compete in a meaningful way for executive power.** Elections are held regularly and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them. Opposition activity is above ground … **What distinguishes competitive authoritarianism from democracy, however, is the fact that incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of the three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing field.** (Levitsky and Way 2010 , p. 7) **Coercive capacity is one of the central features for the stability of competitive authoritarian regimes. The greater the coercive capacity to contain or disorient the opposition, the greater the chance that a competitive authoritarian regime survives** (Levitsky and Way 2010 , p. 57). According to Levitsky and Way ( 2010 , pp. 57–59), competitive authoritarian regimes may instrumentalize security forces to engage in high-intensity and/or low-intensity acts of suppression. In the former, security forces engage in explicit acts of suppression such as shooting into opposition crowds, curtailing renowned opposition figures, breaking political demonstrations, and partisanship during elections. In the latter, security forces rely on less visible, subtler suppressive strategies including surveillance of the opposition, and recruitment of an elaborate network of informants and agents. Whereas high-intensity coercion is often applied to deal with immediate and highly threatening opposition challenges, lowintensity coercion is normally intended to prevent such challenges from emerging in the first place (Levitsky and Way 2010 , p. 58). Levitsky and Way ( 2010 , pp. 58–61) advance that coercive capacity may be measured from two perspectives: scope or cohesion. Whereas scope considers the effective reach of the state’s coercive apparatus, cohesion reÀ ects the level of compliance within the state’s security apparatus. Particularly, scope denotes the size and qual ity of the security apparatus directly responsible for domestic order. This apparatus includes the military, police, intelligence and paramilitary outfits (see Mann 1984 ; Weitzer 1990 , p. 3). On the other hand, Levitsky and Way propose that the highest levels of cohesion depend on the existence of at least one of the following factors: shared ethnic identity, shared ideology, and solidarity based on participation in violent struggles. These factors can be observed in the NRM’s security apparatus. The regime came to power through a violent armed struggle dominated by President Museveni’s ethnic group, the Banyankole (Kasfir 2000 , p. 63; Carbone 2008 , pp. 46–47). **Empirically, as elaborated in subsequent sections, contemporary political trends in Uganda strongly suggest that the incumbent regime resonates with** Levitsky and Way’s framework of **competitive authoritarianism** and that the threefold trinitarian constellation is a key factor for its continuance. Since 1996 **Uganda has held regular presidential elections in which the opposition has seen significant results** (see Tangri and Mwenda 2010 , p. 34; Girke and Kamp 2011 , pp. 49–51; Gibb 2012 , p. 460). Between 1996 and 2006 for instance, President Museveni’s vote decreased from 75 to 59 % (Girke and Kamp 2011 , p. 54). In 2006 the opposition received a combined vote of 40 % (Tangri and Mwenda 2010 , p. 40), although this number decreased to 31.6 % in the last presidential elections held in 2011 (Girke and Kamp 2011 , p. 50). 8 In addition, the opposition largely operates in the open and maintains significant presence in the national assembly. 9 In some areas the opposition wins elections with wide margins. Historically, as Gibb ( 2012 , p. 459) notes, the opposition has had more success in cities and in northern Uganda. Although the NRM won with 56.6 % in the 2011 elections in northern Uganda, it had lost all prior elections in that region in 1996, 2001 and 2006 (Van Acker 2004 , pp. 353–354; Rubongoya 2007 , p. 83). Though Museveni won nationally with 74.2 % of the total votes cast in the 1996 elections, his rival Paul Ssemogerere enjoyed massive support throughout most of the north, scoring 90 % in some areas (Hause 1999, pp. 621–641). This trend did not change in the 2001 and 2006 elections when Museveni lost to Kizza Besigye, Uganda’s main opposition leader, by a wide margin in most districts in the north (Rubongoya 2007 , p. 84). Opposition leaders and other regime critics are relatively free to express their opinions in both print and electronic media, especially in the capital Kampala. Despite some isolated government attacks on the media, the industry remains relatively free. 10 In an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on 28 May 2014, Kizza Besigye stated he would not categorise the NRM as an entirely authoritarian regime. 11 In that sense, **the NRM is not a full authoritarian, but a competitive authoritarian regime. The regime has instrumentalized the military and paramilitary organs to profoundly tilt the political field in its favor**, an aspect that is particularly externalized at times when competitive stakes are high such as during presidential elections. To resist opposition challenges, the NRM has constructed elaborate security structures and has at the same time maintained its effective command and control. Since 1986 the NRM’s power has been challenged militarily by over seven rebel groups, including Joseph Kony’s cult-like group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) (Prunier 2004 , pp. 359–383; Rubongoya 2007 , p. 82; Rodríguez 2009 ; Lindemann 2011 , pp. 387–416). 12 There are claims that the NRM intentionally sustained some of the rebellions, especially the LRA, for purposes ranging from forestalling organized political opposition from emerging in the north and maintaining a large defense budget, to schemes by senior of¿ cers to turn the wars into a money-making venture, to which President Museveni turned a blind eye (Carbone 2008 , pp. 74–76; van Acker 2004 , p. 343; Rodríguez 2009 , pp. 88–89). 13 These challenges may be seen as undermining the NRM regime’s control and the strength of its coercive capacity, yet the regime managed to largely con¿ ne these rebellions to the periphery, especially in the northern part of the country. Moreover, none of the rebel groups can be said to have substantially controlled a particular territory at one time but used mostly hit-and-run tactics on weak targets, especially civilians in remote villages. In that sense, none of these groups can be considered to have had a profoundly threatening effect on the regime’s power. Since the LRA rebels were forced out of Uganda in 2006 there have been no con¿ rmed reports of rebel attacks within the con¿ nes of the country’s territory (Lindemann 2011 , p. 388; see also BBC News, Uganda country pro¿ le, June 2014). To that end, **the NRM regime, led by President Yoweri Museveni, has largely been able to maintain power for nearly 3 decades, based on a high level of coercive capacity grounded in the trinitarian constellation.**

### 1AC – Solvency

#### The Ugandan government doesn’t use aid effectively—it engages in rent-seeking—only absolute withdrawal solves.

Romaniuk and Durner 18 [Peter Romaniuk & Tracey Durner, (Peter Romaniuka—John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate Center, City University of New York and Global Center on Cooperative Security; Tracey Durner—Global Center on Cooperative Security, New York, USA) "The politics of preventing violent extremism: the case of Uganda" Conflict, Security & Development Volume 18, 2018 - Issue 2, 3-27-2018, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14678802.2018.1447863, DOA:1-30-2019 // WWBW]

**Uganda’s strategic behaviour in leveraging the terrorist threat** for both domestic political purposes (in the cause of regime maintenance) and **to maximise aid flows from external donors is well documented.** Recall that counter-terrorism measures have repeatedly been used against domestic political opponents and journalists. The regime has not hesitated to politicise terrorism and counter-terrorism in the context of electioneering, for example, by citing the 2010 attacks to cast itself as the guarantor of Uganda’s security. The heavy public presence of troops in successive elections has been justified on these terms.93 **Relatedly, Uganda’s intervention in Somalia and continued prominence in AMISOM has positioned it as a central pillar in regional counter-terrorism, a status that sometimes shields the regime from criticisms on issues such as democracy, human rights and corruption.**94 Uganda’s heavy reliance on international aid has created an environment where **it is beneficial for government and civil society actors to highlight potential vulnerabilities in order to attract or retain funding streams.** This perhaps inadvertently stigmatises and alienates target demographics. Further, **the regime manages information and access strategically, to maximise foreign support in a manner that aligns with its own interests. Museveni has become** CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 171 **adept at capitalising on the West’s concerns with state fragility and counter-terrorism as a means to secure continued donor aid.**95 As noted above, Uganda’s interventions against the LRA and ADF were crafted with this in mind, too. Fisher describes Uganda’s ‘image management’ strategy vis-à-vis donors, wherein its actions have sought to underscore its status as an, ‘economic showcase […] a guarantor of regional stability, and as an ally in the [global war on terror]’.96 **Uganda’s success in this regard can be observed in the greater leniency** (for example, regarding corruption) **and higher overall aid levels that it has attracted** relative to Kenya.97 Again, the picture that emerges is that, far from responding to threats in an effective and proportional way, **counter-terrorism for Uganda has been an exercise in strategic rent-seeking. Moreover, ‘donors have been compliant in helping construct and augment a military regime in Uganda through consenting to [the] gradual securitisation of their relationship with the Museveni government. In doing so, they have assisted in the creation of an increasingly militarised, illiberal state’.**98

#### Presence weakens US and international diplomatic leverage and enables continued government abuses.

**Arieff et al. 15** (9/28, Alexis Arieff, Analyst in African Affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), former Desk Officer for Littoral West Africa at the US Department of Defense – Undersecretary for Policy, MA in International Relations and African Security Studies from Yale, Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Specialist in African Affairs at CRS, MA in Security Studies from Georgetown, and Tomas F. Husted, Research Assistant at CRS, “The Lord’s Resistance Army: The U.S. Response,” <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42094.pdf>) //ZL recut WWBW

The State Department characterizes Uganda as “a key partner to the United States in the region and an important force in regional stability,”68 and the UPDF is widely viewed as one of the region’s most effective military forces. At the same time, alleged **past UPDF abuses in LRA-affected areas of northern Uganda and allegations of Ugandan support for rebel groups** in DRC **render its regional role sensitive.**69 The UPDF’s involvement in the internal conflict in South Sudan has also complicated regional security dynamics. **Analysts have periodically questioned the UPDF’s capacity and commitment to defeating the LRA, given Uganda’s competing regional and internal security priorities**70 **and the fact that ongoing counter-LRA operations are linked to substantial U.S. military aid.** Some observers further question whether **U.S. support** for the UPDF’s engagement in multiple regional missions **has encouraged a small country to maintain an otherwise unsustainably large military.** As the International Crisis Group has noted, while **the UPDF** may be “essential, because no one else is prepared to send competent combat troops to do the job,” it **is** also **a “flawed and uncertain instrument for defeating the LRA.”**71 The U.S.-based advocacy group Resolve has reported on unease among some civilian communities and Central African officials regarding the UPDF’s continued deployments, regarding whether **the UPDF was profiting from its counter-LRA operations through U.S. military assistance and alleged involvement in resource smuggling.**72 Some might question whether ongoing U.S. support to the Ugandan military is having unintended consequences for U.S. policy and the region, for example in relation to Uganda’s military role in the internal conflict in South Sudan. **The U.S. security partnership with the UPDF may also impede U.S. diplomatic leverage with regard to criticizing Uganda’s record on democracy, governance, and human rights.** U.S. officials have periodically expressed concerns about Uganda’s governance trajectory—in 2014, President Obama described Uganda’s AntiHomosexuality Bill (subsequently enacted and later overturned) as “reflect[ing] poorly on Uganda’s commitment to protecting the human rights of its people” and as “complicat[ing] our valued relationship.”73 The State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2014 states that **the Ugandan government has restricted speech and press freedoms as well as rights of assembly and association, at times with excessive force.** Regional Coordination and Capacity **The U.S. policy of supporting regional military operations relies on an assumption that local partners are willing and able to take potentially costly and risky steps to end the LRA conflict.** The level of operational and intelligence coordination among the UPDF, host country forces, and civilian communities may be key to success. However, despite efforts by affected countries and multilateral entities to foster regional cooperation, African states have not fulfilled their troop commitments to the AU Regional Task force in full, and the coordination of counter-LRA efforts remains a thorny diplomatic issue. **Difficulties related to coordination are attributable to several factors, including competing priorities and a lack of capacity among regional governments and militaries**; language and communications gaps; civilian communities’ distrust of UPDF capacities and motives; and distrust among political leaders linked to competition over external assistance as well as to recent history—as discussed above. The U.N. Group of Experts on the DRC has noted that the inability of military operations to neutralize transnational armed groups, including the LRA, “continually tests the level of trust” among leaders in the region.74 Tensions between the Congolese and Ugandan militaries have been particularly salient, and DRC authorities have prohibited UPDF forces from conducting counter-LRA operations within DRC territory since 2011. **Congolese officials alleged** at the time that there were no LRA fighters left in DRC, that **the LRA was being used by the UPDF as an excuse to plunder Congolese resources and benefit from international military aid**, and that **Uganda was ultimately uninterested in defeating the group.**75 Yet, reported LRA attacks have continued in northeastern DRC, and DRC security forces have reportedly conducted counter-LRA operations in coordination with their South Sudanese counterparts, with U.S. support.76 Such accusations point to Congolese sensitivities over Uganda’s regional role, its related ability to benefit from U.S. assistance, and its troubled history in DRC. Similar tensions periodically surfaced in CAR prior to the current conflict there, as have civilian-military tensions that may have hindered UPDF operations.77

# 1AR – Case

## Ext – Case

### 1AR – Advantage

The aff is a good idea—Uganda uses American military aid to arm its oppressive military and cause human rights abuses, that’s Epstein and McCormick.

[Outweighs] Outweighs their offense: [a] Cyclicality—systems of state repression are self-perpetuating and guarantee more violence in the future [b] Probability—the impact is already happening so we know it’s real.

### 1AR – Rent-seeking

Extend **Romaniuk and Durner**—aid to Uganda backfires—the oppressive government knows that if they use aid for its intended purpose, then the problem will be solved and donors will withdraw aid. Instead, the regime leverages domestic threats to extract more aid.

### 1AR – Symbolism

Extend **Arieff**—US aid and training prevents the US from taking the moral high ground in criticizing Uganda—means the PIC can’t solve the aff since Uganda uses any US support to justify abuse.

## F/L – Case

### 1AR – AT PMCs

[1] Durable fiat solves—PMCs are a form of aid since they enhance the power of the recipient government.

[2] PMCs don’t replicate the impact—the advantage is about how Musevini directs his troops to commit HR abuses, but PMCs are controlled by the USFG.

[3] US training to Uganda is counter-terrorism training—PMCs are only used to replace troops on the ground.

### 1AR – AT Fill-in

#### Russia and China can’t and won’t fill-in.

Miller and Sokolsky 18 [Andrew Miller and Richard Sokolsky, (Andrew Miller is a former director for Egypt on the National Security Council and current deputy director for policy at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Richard Sokolsky is currently a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served in the State Department for 37 years and was a member of the Secretary of State’s Office of Policy Planning from 2005-2015.) "What Has $49 Billion in Foreign Military Aid Bought Us? Not Much" American Conservative, 2-27-2018, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/what-has-49-billion-in-foreign-military-aid-bought-us-not-much/, DOA:12-5-2018 // WWBW]

Most in the American defense establishment would agree in principle that introducing more accountability for U.S. military assistance and arms sales is a worthy goal. But they would also express concern that the measures we recommend would prompt Middle Eastern countries to turn to Russia or China for easier terms. However, **for** many of our security **partners**, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, **integrating Russian and Chinese weapons into their force structure would create serious operational and logistical problems.** Moreover, **neither Moscow nor Beijing offers grant assistance, which means they are not viable substitutes for countries that depend on U.S. financial help to buy equipment.** Even for **countries** that use their own money, their **strong preference for U.S. equipment, which they view as both superior** to the alternatives and a sign of American support, suggests they would be willing to submit to more rigorous oversight if that is the price of obtaining American weapons.

### 1AR – AT Circumvention

[1] Durable fiat solves—imagining the plan is actually implemented is key to engagement and aff ground.

[2] Triggers presumption since the plan wouldn’t change anything. That affirms—[a] we presume things are true until disproven—if I told you my name was Ben, you’d believe me [b] 7-4-6-3 time skew means the neg will always have more time to do comparison—that means if the debate is tied, I did the better debating.

# 1AR – T/Theory

## 1AR – T-EIU

### CI

#### Counter-interp: regimes are authoritarian when they use military force to alter elections—that’s Kagoro.

#### The EIU Democracy Index rankings are arbitrary – anonymous creators, random ratings, and lack of checks.

Tasker 16. [(Peter Tasker, Analyst with Tokyo-Based Arcus Research and Author) “Peter Tasker: The flawed ‘science’ behind democracy rankings” *Nikkei Asian Review*, February 25, 2016]. MCM recut WWBW

How did **the EIU** come up with a scoring system that is supposedly accurate to two decimal places? What it did has the semblance of rigor. **It asked various experts to answer 60 questions and assigned each reply a numerical value**, with the weighted average deciding the ranking. **Who are these experts**? Nobody knows. Wikipedia dryly notes that **the report does not reveal their number, nationality, credentials or even field of expertise.** Some idea of where they are coming from can be gauged by the report's comments on individual countries. France, we learn, has been defenestrated because of a "deterioration in social cohesion." Those inveterate goodie-goodies, the Swedes, are on the naughty seat because of declining membership in political parties and more social discrimination. An important recent phenomenon, **the growth in support for populist politicians, is not seen as a sign of democratic systems responding to shifts in public opinion. Rather, it is evidence of "discontent with democracy" itself and thus to be deplored.** In other words, **despite the appearance of scientific objectivity, the whole exercise of ranking a country's democratic credentials is as much riddled with biases, value judgments and hidden agendas as awarding Oscars to films or Michelin stars to restaurants** -- which are also decided by groups of mysterious experts using criteria best known to themselves.

#### **The EIU uses polling data, which is inconsistent and requires arbitrary expert estimation because surveys are not widely available.**

Coppedge et al. 17[Coppedge, Michael; Gerring, John; Lindberg, Staffan I.; Skaaning, Svend-Erik; Teorell, Jan, ([Michael Coppedge](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=855313): University of Notre Dame - Kellogg Institute; University of Notre Dame, Department of Political Science; [John Gerring](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=430457): University of Texas at Austin; [Staffan I. Lindberg](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=864348): Göteborg University - Varieties of Democracy Institute; Göteborg University - Department of Political Science; [Svend-Erik Skaaning](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1512183): Aarhus University; [Jan Teorell](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1194923): Lund University - Department of Political Science) "V-Dem Comparisons And Contrasts With Other Measurement Projects" V-Dem Institute, 2017, https://gupea.ub.gu.se/handle/2077/52225, DOA:3-11-2019 // WWBW]

**Some indices such as the EIU rely heavily on polling data, which is available on a noncomparable and highly irregular basis** for 100 or so nation-states. For other countries (about half of the population covered by the EIU) these **data must be estimated by country experts or imputed. Procedures employed for this estimation are not made publicly available.**7 Although **surveys** of citizens are important for ascertaining attitudes, they **are not available for every country in the world, and in no country are they available on an annual basis.** Moreover, use of such surveys severely limits the historical reach of any democracy index, since the origin of systematic surveying stretches back only a half-century (in the US and parts of Europe) and is much more recent in most countries. Other **survey-based questions are of questionable relevance for understanding the quality of democracy in a polity.** It is of course interesting to know whether citizens regard their country as democratic, whether they support democratic institutions and practices, and whether they subscribe to democratic norms such as tolerance. However, **responses to these questions should not without great caution be regarded as accurate reflections of how democratic a country is.** For example, **a recent** Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project **survey asked citizens** of 18 Latin American countries **whether they preferred “a democratic form of government” over “a leader with a strong hand”** to solve their country’s problems (Pew Research Center 2014). There was no familiar pattern in their responses: Nicaragua, Panama, and Bolivia came out on top and the **conventionally most democratic countries** Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica **were in the middle.** The correlation with Freedom House’s ratings was -0.002, and with our Electoral Democracy Index, -0.067.8

#### Prefer: Topic lit—allowing a broader topic is key to innovation in different fields of literature—their interp arbitrarily excludes core aff ground.

### AT Limits

[1] begs the question of what affs are topical—if I win the counter-interp, that’s a legitimate limit on the topic.

[2] functional limits and solvency advocates check—most authoritarian regimes don’t have lit around them.

# 1AR – LARP

## 1AR – Conditions

### 1AR – Perm

Perm do both: The advocacy says authoritarian regimes in Uganda—that means we can give them aid when they’re no longer authoritarian after they’ve met the condition.

Perm do both: The CP isn’t textually competitive because it’s just the aff but with a condition so it requires our advocacy. Prefer textual competition because functional competition causes infinite judge intervention and is subjective, whereas textuality is verifiable.

Perm do the CP: Should is not deliberate and allows consultation

Eddy, 15 - Berlin correspondent for The International New York Times, a position she has held since January 2012(“The Road to a Paris Climate Deal”, The New York Times, 14 December 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/at-climate-talks-three-letters-almost-sunk-the-deal)//SL

PARIS — In the 11th hour before the landmark climate deal was approved on Saturday, a few letters threatened to derail years of calculated negotiations and two weeks of intense diplomacy — those that made “should” into “shall.” Those two words may seem disarmingly similar, but on the international stage, they are worlds apart in terms of the [diplomatic meaning](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks/a-leaner-climate-proposal-emerges-complete-with-big-questions) they carry. The legally binding “shall” stopped the United States cold when it showed up on Saturday in what was to be the final draft of the historic pact. Throughout the process, the longer and less binding “should” was a deliberate part of the international agreement, put there to establish that the richest countries, including the United States, felt obligated to pony up money to help poor countries adapt to climate change and make the transition to sustainable energy systems. “Shall” meant something altogether different, American officials said. When “shall” was spotted in the document on Saturday, Secretary of State John Kerry called his French counterpart and made it clear that unless a switch was made, France could not count on American support for the agreement.

### 1AR – Circumvention

Conditions get circumvented and don’t solve the aff—the **McCormick** evidence says that the U.S. has not withdrawn aid despite the Leahy Law, which prohibits giving aid to countries with H.R. abuses—conditions already exist in the squo, and they’re being circumvented right now.

### 1AR – Rent-seeking

Conditions don’t solve rent-seeking—cross-apply **Romaniuk and Durner** that countries don’t solve domestic problems to keep aid money flowing—aid creates a reverse incentive for the recipient country.

### 1AR – Theory

## 1AR – PICs – Generic

### 1AR – Perm

Perm do the cp—if any military aid to Uganda should be abolished, then that affirms because an instance of the res is still desirable.

Perm do both: The CP isn’t textually competitive because it’s just the aff but with an exception so it requires our advocacy. Prefer textual competition because functional competition causes infinite judge intervention and is subjective, whereas textuality is verifiable.

Perm do the aff and re-appropriate the net benefit to non-military aid—net benefit is that there’s no risk of circumvention.

### 1AR – Doesn’t Solve

The PIC doesn’t solve the advantage since it’s linear—all aid is used to strengthen the power of the Ugandan military, which is bad.

### 1AR – Rent-seeking

The PIC doesn’t solve rent-seeking—cross-apply **Romaniuk and Durner** that countries don’t solve domestic problems to keep aid money flowing—aid creates perverse incentives to not solve problems. Even if aid is theoretically effective, Uganda won’t use it that way.

### 1AR – Symbolism DA

Extend **Arieff**—US aid and training prevents the US from taking the moral high ground in criticizing Uganda—means the PIC can’t solve the aff since Uganda uses any US support to justify abuse.

### 1AR – Training DA

US officials who go to Uganda to train troops get corrupted by Museveni, that’s **Arieff**—that lets him circumvent the PIC by using the US officials to bring in money for his regime through resource smuggling and stealing the aid.

### 1AR – Theory

## 1AR – Demining PIC

### 1AR – No Mines LOLz

#### There are no landmines in Uganda—even if there were, humanitarian agencies would provide aid—that’s what happened in the past.

Tumwebaze 12 [Sarah Tumwebaze, () "Uganda declared landmine free" Daily Monitor, 12-23-2012, https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Uganda-declared-landmine-free/688334-1649922-2kirma/index.html, DOA:2-20-2019 // WWBW]

**The government has declared Uganda free of landmines.** Speaking at the Media Centre on Thursday, the State Minister for Relief and Disaster Preparedness, Mr Musa Ecweru, said the government was making arrangements to rehabilitate and compensate victims of landmines planted during insurgencies. Mr Ecweru said the Prime Minister’s Office is working with the Ministry of Gender to ensure that more than 2,000 landmine victims and other people, who were maimed during the Lords’ Resistance Army war, have registered for assistance and rehabilitation. “Following the landmine clearing exercise that was started in 2006 by the Uganda Mine Action Unit, 46 mine areas in northern Uganda, West Nile and Ruwenzori sub-regions were cleared and are now free of mines,”Mr Ecweru said. He said 1,617, 156 square metres of area has already been released and is free for cultivation. Uganda signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in 1997 through which it was supposed to clear all landmines accumulated during the years of conflict between the army and insurgents in northern and western Uganda. Mr Ecweru said **the National Mine Action Programme in collaboration with Danish Demining Group, the humanitarian mine action unit of the Danish Refugee Council, recovered and destroyed** 4,314 anti-personnel **mines** and 20 anti-tank mines. He added that government has already started giving artificial limbs to people who lost legs during the LRA insurgency.

### AT Makumbi and Oweny

#### Their ev is awful—it’s from 2017 but only cites examples from 2010—our ev is functionally more recent.

Makumbi and Owiny 17 Cissy Makumbi &Tobbias Jolly Owiny, 13 SEPTEMBER 2017, "Uganda: Land Mines, Bombs Disrupt Farming in Northern Uganda," allAfrica, Cissy Makumbi &Tobbias Jolly Owiny, 13 SEPTEMBER 2017, "Uganda: Land Mines, Bombs Disrupt Farming in Northern Uganda," allAfrica, https://allafrica.com/stories/201709130158.html //WWBW

**One morning in 2010**, Esther Lakari, a resident of Panyul Village in Agago Sub-county, Lamwo District, set off to her farm to harvest food for her family. She had no idea that tragedy awaited her.

**Lakari** says she was walking to her garden when she **had a blast and became unconscious.** She later woke up at Kitgum Hospital to find her right leg amputated. **She had stepped on a land mine** that maimed her leg.

Lakari, a mother of five, was later abandoned by her husband and is now struggling to raise her children on her own.

Lakari's case is not isolated in northern region which was ravaged by a two-decade Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency.

### 1AR – Symbolism DA

Extend **Arieff**—US aid and training prevents the US from taking the moral high ground in criticizing Uganda—means the PIC can’t solve the aff since Uganda uses any US support to justify abuse.

### 1AR – Training DA

US officials who go to Uganda to train troops get corrupted by Museveni, that’s **Arieff**—that lets him circumvent the PIC by using the US officials to bring in money for his regime through resource smuggling and stealing the aid.

### 1AR – Aff Solves

The aff solves the net benefit—cross-apply **Arieff** that Uganda uses the rebel group that planted these land mines as a mechanism to attract aid—if we withdraw aid they’ll be forced to actually fight the LRA.

### 1AR – Perm

Perm do the cp—if any military aid to Uganda should be abolished, then that affirms because an instance of the res is still desirable.

Perm do the cp—demining isn’t military aid since it doesn’t enhance offensive military capabilities—that was the definition the aff defends in the doc.

Perm do both: The CP isn’t textually competitive because it’s just the aff but with an exception so it requires our advocacy. Prefer textual competition because functional competition causes infinite judge intervention and is subjective, whereas textuality is verifiable.

Perm do the aff and re-appropriate the net benefit to non-military aid—net benefit is that there’s no risk of circumvention.

### 1AR – Theory

## 1AR – HIV/AIDS PIC

### 1AR – Abstinence

#### Turn/ PEPFAR in Uganda has caused a shift to abstinence only education that prevents AIDs preventation—lit review.

Silnicki 14 [Silnicki, Adrienne, () "Aid for AIDS: the policies and performance of PEPFAR in Uganda” A Thesis Submitted to Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Development Studies, 2014, http://library2.smu.ca/handle/01/25837?show=full, DOA:3-12-2019 // WWBW]

This thesis argues that funding from PEPFAR has contributed to policy changes in the HIV/AIDS prevention programmes of Uganda. **Through use of aid tied to the adoption of U.S. polices for HIV/AIDS prevention, many of Uganda’s prevention programs are now focused on an abstinence-only model to sexual health education**. This is also **backed by the President of Uganda** and the First Lady. In order **to receive foreign aid Uganda has foregone a** unified, and **comprehensive evidence-based prevention programme in favour of introducing abstinence-only campaigns** into the health promotion landscape. **Since receiving PEPFAR funding Uganda has been less effective at reducing their rate of HIV/AIDS.** By diversifying the public health education of the country, and by consequently introducing conflicting and conflating public health awareness into the country, **Uganda’s capacity for reducing HIV/AIDS has been compromised. Findings from the literature conclude that several factors, including comprehensive sexual health education campaigns and a reliable supply of condoms are essential to once again decrease the rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence.** The key findings are: 1. **Uganda prevented much of the spread of HIV/AIDS in the late 1980s-early 2000s through comprehensive HIV/AIDS sexual health programming** which focused on abstinence, being faithful and consistent and correct condom use. The language of the campaign 20 (“zero grazing” and “just chill”) was familiar to Ugandans and the phrases became popularized. The initial effort to curb the climbing of HIV/AIDS rates was inclusive of all Ugandans including sex workers9 and family planning clinics. The vast availability of free condoms was also attributed to the decrease in the rates of HIV/AIDS. “Zero grazing” was a homegrown prevention programme and reflected Ugandan culture. **The introduction of PEPFAR guidelines on prevention programming did restrict Uganda’s original HIV/AIDS campaign.** The PEPFAR prevention programme excludes high risk groups such as sex workers and intravenous drug users. It limited campaigning on messages other than abstinence, and later on messages outside abstinence or faithfulness (meaning having sex only with those you are in a committed relationship with). PEPFAR’s policies did influence the design of Uganda’s original homegrown “no grazing” approach to HIV/AIDS. 2. **Foreign aid from the U.S. is earmarked for particular plans and programs. Many of these are in favour of abstinence-only education. Funding from PEPFAR far outweighs the international funding available from any other source. Most of the Uganda HIV/AIDS prevention programs depend on PEPFAR funding and wish to attract more funding. Therefore, they are required to adopt an abstinence-only campaign in order to receive international financing.** 3. A campaign promoting abstinence and largely neglecting condoms has been waged by 21 political and religious leaders in Uganda since 2003. These campaigns are largely supported both politically and financially by leaders in the U.S.. In Uganda, new policies requiring additional quality testing on condoms has been put in place. This delays market entry of condoms and often causes a short supply problem. Without available condoms, progressive and comprehensive sexual health education is at risk. If condoms cannot be obtained by those wishing to use them because of their short supply, then safe sex cannot be practiced and people are either forced into abstinence or they risk contracting HIV.

### 1AR – Perm

Perm do the cp—if any military aid to Uganda should be abolished, then that affirms because an instance of the res is still desirable.

Perm do the cp—PEPFAR isn’t military aid since it doesn’t enhance offensive military capabilities—that was the definition the aff defends in the doc.

Perm do both: The CP isn’t textually competitive because it’s just the aff but with an exception so it requires our advocacy. Prefer textual competition because functional competition causes infinite judge intervention and is subjective, whereas textuality is verifiable.

Perm do the aff and re-appropriate the net benefit to non-military aid—net benefit is that there’s no risk of circumvention since the military can’t steal the funding.

Perm do the aff and all non-competitive parts of the CP—their ev literally says there are other aspects to PEPFAR besides just military aid, no warrant for why the US providing aid to the Ugandan military is key—the US could just distribute the aid directly to victims.

### 1AR – Symbolism DA

Extend **Arieff**—US aid and training prevents the US from taking the moral high ground in criticizing Uganda—means the PIC can’t solve the aff since Uganda uses any US support to justify abuse.

## 1AR – Terror DA

### 1AR – Security K

#### The 1NC’s national security discourse of “stopping terrorism” creates threats that are not real or objective through false representations. That creates exclusionary violence and war that they try to prevent. Vote aff to reject security discourse and the reps of the NC.

Grondin 08 [David, Masters in Political Science & Ph.D. Candidate – University of Ottawa, “(Re)Writing the ‘National Security State,’ Center for United States Studies]

Approaches that deconstruct theoretical practices in order to disclose what is hidden in the use of concepts such as “national security” have something valuable to say. Their more reflexive and critically-inclined view illustrates how terms used in realist discourses, such as state, anarchy, world order, revolution in military affairs, and security dilemmas, are produced by a specific historical, geographical and socio-political context as well as historical forces and social relations of power (Klein, 1994: 22). Since realist analysts do not question their ontology and yet purport to provide a neutral and objective analysis of a given world order based on military power and interactions between the most important political units, namely states, realist discourses constitute a political act in defense of the state. Indeed, “[…] it is important to recognize that to employ a textualizing approach to social policy involving conflict and war is not to attempt to reduce social phenomena to various concrete manifestations of language. Rather, it is an attempt to analyze the interpretations governing policy thinking. And it is important to recognize that policy thinking is not unsituated” (Shapiro, 1989a: 71). Policy thinking is practical thinking since it imposes an analytic order on the “real world”, a world that only exists in the analysts’ own narratives. In this light, Barry Posen’s political role in legitimizing American hegemonic power and national security conduct seems obvious: U.S. command of the commons provides an impressive foundation for selective engagement. It is not adequate for a policy of primacy. […] Command of the commons gives the United States a tremendous capability to harm others. Marrying that capability to a conservative policy of selective engagement helps make U.S. military power appear less threatening and more tolerable. Command of the commons creates additional collective goods for U.S. allies. These collective goods help connect U.S. military power to seemingly prosaic welfare concerns. U.S. military power underwrites world trade, travel, global telecommunications, and commercial remote sensing, which all depend on peace and order in the commons” (Posen, 2003: 44 and 46). Adopting a more critical stance, David Campbell points out that “[d]anger is not an objective condition. It (sic) is not a thing which exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat. […] Nothing is a risk in itself; [...] it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event” (Campbell, 1998: 1-2). In the same vein, national security discourse does not evaluate objective threats; rather, it is itself a product of historical processes and structures in the state and society that produces it. Whoever has the power to define security is then the one who has the authority to write legitimate security discourses and conduct the policies that legitimize them. The realist analysts and state leaders who invoke national security and act in its name are the same individuals who hold the power to securitize threats by inserting them in a discourse that frames national identity and freezes it.9 Like many concepts, realism is essentially contested. In a critical reinterpretation of realism, James Der Derian offers a genealogy of realism that deconstructs the uniform realism represented in IR: he reveals many other versions of realism that are never mentioned in International Relations texts (Der Derian, 1995: 367). I am aware that there are many realist discourses in International Relations, but they all share a set of assumptions, such as “the state is a rational unitary actor”, “the state is the main actor in international relations”, “states pursue power defined as a national interest”, and so on. I want to show that realism is one way of representing reality, not the reflection of reality. While my aim here is not to rehearse Der Derian’s genealogy of realism, I do want to spell out the problems with a positivist theory of realism and a correspondence philosophy of language. Such a philosophy accepts nominalism, wherein language as neutral description corresponds to reality. This is precisely the problem of epistemic realism and of the realism characteristic of American realist theoretical discourses. And since for poststructuralists language constitutes reality, a reinterpretation of realism as constructed in these discourses is called for.10 These scholars cannot refer to the “essentially contested nature of realism” and then use “realism as the best language to reflect a self-same phenomenon” (Der Derian, 1995: 374). Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the many neorealist and neoclassical realist discourses in International Relations are not useful. Rather, I want to argue that these technicist and scientist forms of realism serve political purposes, used as they are in many think tanks and foreign policy bureaucracies to inform American political leaders. This is the relevance of deconstructing the uniform realism (as used in International Relations): it brings to light its locatedness in a hermeneutic circle in which it is unwittingly trapped (Der Derian, 1995: 371). And as Friedrich Kratochwil argues, “[…] the rejection of a correspondence theory of truth does not condemn us, as it is often maintained, to mere ‘relativism’ and/or to endless “deconstruction” in which anything goes but it leaves us with criteria that allows us to distinguish and evaluate competing theoretical creations” (Kratochwil, 2000 : 52). Given that political language is not a neutral medium that gives expression to ideas formed independently of structures of signification that sustain political action and thought, American realist discourses belonging to the neorealist or neoclassical realist traditions cannot be taken as mere descriptions of reality. We are trapped in the production of discourses in which national leaders and security speech acts emanating from realist discourses develop and reinforce a notion of national identity as synonymous with national security. U.S. national security conduct should thus be understood through the prism of the theoretical discourses of American political leaders and realist scholars that co-constitute it. Realist discourses depict American political leaders acting in defense of national security, and political leaders act in the name of national security. In the end, what distinguishes realist discourses is that they depict the United States as having behaved like a national security state since World War II, while legitimating the idea that the United States should continue to do so. Political scientists and historians “are engaged in making (poesis), not merely recording or reporting” (Medhurst, 2000: 17). Precisely in this sense, rhetoric is not the description of national security conduct; it constitutes it. It is difficult to trace the exact origins of the concept of “national security”. It seems however that its currency in policymaking circles corresponds to the American experience of the Second World War and of the early years of what came to be known as the “Cold War”. In this light, it is fair to say that the meaning of the American national security state is bound up with the Cold War context. If one is engaged in deciphering the meaning of the Cold War prism for American leaders, what matters is not uncovering the “reality” of the Cold War as such, but how, it conferred meaning and led people to act upon it as “reality”. The Cold War can thus be seen as a rhetorical construction, in which its rhetorical dimensions gave meaning to its material manifestations, such as the national security state apparatus. This is not to say that the Cold War never existed per se, nor does it “make [it] any less real or less significant for being rhetorical” (Medhurst, 2000: 6). As Lynn Boyd Hinds and Theodore Otto Windt, Jr. stress, “political rhetoric creates political reality, structures belief systems, and provides the fundamental bases for decisions” (Hinds and Windt, cited in Medhurst, 2000: 6). In this sense, the Cold War ceases to be a historical period which meaning can be written permanently and becomes instead a struggle that is not context-specific and not geared towards one specific enemy. It is “an orientation towards difference in which those acting on behalf of an assumed but never fixed identity are tempted by the lure of otherness to interpret all dangers as fundamental threats which require the mobilization of a population” (Campbell, 2000: 227). Indeed, if the meaning of the Cold War is not context-specific, the concept of national security cannot be disconnected from what is known as the Cold War, since its very meaning(s) emerged within it (Rosenberg, 1993 : 277).11 If the American national security state is a given for realist analysts,12 it is important to ask whether we can conceive the United States during the Cold War as anything other than a national security state.13 To be clear, I am not suggesting that there is any such essentialized entity as a “national security state”.14 When I refer to the American national security state, I mean the representation of the American state in the early years of the Cold War, the spirit of which is embodied in the National Security Act of 1947 (Der Derian, 1992: 76). The term “national security state” designates both an institutionalization of a new governmental architecture designed to prepare the United States politically and militarily to face any foreign threat and the ideology – the discourse – that gave rise to as well as symbolized it. In other words, to understand the idea of a national security state, one needs to grasp the discursive power of national security in shaping the reality of the Cold War in both language and institutions (Rosenberg, 1993 : 281). A national security state feeds on threats as it channels all its efforts into meeting current and future military or security threats. The creation of the CIA, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Security Council at the onset of the Cold War gave impetus to a state mentality geared to permanent preparedness for war. The construction of threats is thus essential to its well-being, making intelligence agencies privileged tools in accomplishing this task. As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15 While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998: 221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again reproduces the idea of a national security state. This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and marginalization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is necessary: the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “national unity” on society; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

### 1AR – Rent-seeking

Cross-apply **Romaniuk and Durner** that Uganda has intentionally misused counter-terrorism aid so that their problems won’t be solved—that keeps aid coming.

### 1AR – Link Turn

#### Counter-terrorism aid benefits al-Shabaab.

Epstein 17 [Helen C. Epstein, (Helen Epstein is a visiting professor at Bard College. She is the author of Another Fine Mess: America, Uganda, and the War on Terror.) "Negotiating With Al-Shabaab Will Get America Out of Somalia" The Atlantic, 10-14-2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/somalia-shabaab-kenya-uganda-amisom/543063/, DOA:1-30-2019 // WWBW]

**AMISOM troops, particularly Ugandan ones, have committed numerous human rights**[**violations**](https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2016/258859.htm), including the sexual abuse of Somali girls and women, **and are notoriously corrupt.** Often underpaid because their corrupt government is itself skimming their salaries or not paying them at all, some **Ugandan troops have even been caught selling American weapons to al-Shabaab**—and it’s possible that this is how al-Shabaab obtained Saturday’s bombs. Thus, Washington may be arming both sides of the conflict, ensuring the war’s continuation. **AMISOM troops also appear to be engaged in a sugar smuggling racket through Somali ports, which also**[**benefits**](http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/KDF-involved-sugar-smuggling-Somalia-report/2558-2953436-11hg758z/index.html)**al-Shabaab.**

## 1AR – Ptx

### 1AR – Trump hates the aff

#### **Military aid cuts are perceived as a loss for Trump.**

Donnelly 7-19 [John M. Donnelly, () "Senate to Weigh Large Cuts to Military Aid" Roll Call, 7-19-2018, https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/senate-weigh-large-cuts-military-aid, DOA:2-9-2019 // WWBW]

**The Senate will soon take up a Defense spending bill that would cut nearly $2.5 billion in military aid** to foreign fighting forces, an unusually large budget subtraction some say reflects a fundamental change in lawmakers’ security priorities. At issue is the $675 billion fiscal 2019 Defense money bill, which Senate Appropriations approved late last month and which the chamber may take up later this month. **The measure would downsize President Donald Trump’s requests for programs that equip or train militaries and militias that are combating terrorists on America’s behalf in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria and beyond. Some of the proposed cuts are reductions to the president’s fiscal 2019 budget request, and some are so-called rescissions of fiscal 2018 funding that hasn’t yet been spent.** The nearly $2.5 billion in recommended cuts is one of the largest changes to any category of defense spending in either the Senate’s Pentagon appropriations bill or the House’s, and it would stand out as one of the heftiest reductions to any single category of defense programs in recent memory, analysts said. “It’s an unusually large amount to cut,” said Mark Cancian, a defense budget expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Contrasting bills Because the Senate is considering cutting fully $1.9 billion more from such programs than the House-passed bill, this is shaping up as one of the biggest discrepancies that must be reconciled before a final Pentagon spending bill can be written. The House and Senate differences over military aid have to be sorted out in the context of a broader disagreement over how much to reorder the president’s budget request. Specifically, the Senate bill would allocate about $8.6 billion more than Trump proposed for developing and procuring weapons. By comparison, the House would add much less for investments in research and procurement spending — just over $2.6 billion more than Trump wanted. Senate appropriators and authorizers have been more vocal than their House counterparts in arguing that Trump’s budget does not reorient Pentagon programs decisively enough away from combat against al Qaida and the Islamic State and instead toward more rapid modernization of the U.S. arsenal to prepare for fighting nations that wield cutting-edge military forces. The Senate appropriators’ reductions to military aid programs do not appear to represent a withdrawal of congressional support for counterterrorism missions, so much as a reduction in their priority relative to other increasingly pressing goals, experts say. The Senate bill “reflects a change in priorities from counterterrorism to conflicts with great powers like Russia and China,” Cancian said. Senate aides agree that reducing spending on military aid programs will free up more money to modernize U.S. weaponry, but they contend that the aid cuts would have occurred anyway, mainly because the president requested more money for those programs than they need. Four targets The nearly $2.5 billion in Senate Appropriations cuts to military aid would come in four major programs: Coalition Support Fund. This account reimburses U.S. allies, mainly Pakistan, for their costs in fighting terrorism. Since fiscal 2015, defense authorization acts have required the administration to certify that Pakistan is helping, instead of hurting, the fight against terrorism before such funds are spent. Those certifications have not been made, and Trump announced in January that he is ceasing most military aid to Pakistan. As a result, large sums of Coalition Support Fund appropriations are as yet unspent. So Senate appropriators are rescinding the $800 million appropriation for fiscal 2018. Their House counterparts want to rescind only $350 million of it. Afghanistan Security Forces Fund. In addition, the Senate plan would reduce the president’s fiscal 2019 request for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, money to train and equip that country’s military and police. The Senate bill would subtract $533 million from the fund, decreasing it from $5.2 billion down to the current level of spending, which is $4.7 billion. The Senate panel’s stated reason for the decision: The Pentagon has not adequately detailed how the Afghanistan program’s money has been spent to date. The House, by comparison, makes no such cuts. Countering ISIS. The third area of proposed Senate cuts would occur in the so-called Counter ISIS Train and Equip Fund, which bankrolls forces in Syria and Iraq fighting the Islamic State, or ISIS. U.S. and coalition forces have pushed the group out of most of its territory in those countries, though about 1,000 square miles reportedly remains in the group’s hands. The Senate panel would cut $406 million out of the administration’s $1.4 billion request for the anti-ISIS program. The House would reduce the same program by just $25 million. More than half of the Senate’s proposed fiscal 2019 cut, or $250 million, is just a bookkeeping shift of funds from one part of the budget to another, aides said. But the rest of the Senate cuts in the counter-ISIS program are, like the cuts to the Afghanistan aid, due to the Pentagon’s failure to fully explain its spending, the Senate report said. The Senate committee also took back $400 million from the anti-ISIS fund’s fiscal 2018 appropriation, a move the House did not make. Military sales. The final set of reductions to military aid would take place in the budget for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which finances sales of U.S. military equipment to allies. Under the Senate bill, the president’s fiscal 2019 request for that agency would drop $200 million, and another $150 million in fiscal 2018 money would be subtracted. The reason, aides said: The agency has not been able to spend all the money it has received for several years running. The House committee decreased the defense security agency’s proposed budget by a net $243 million. The House report said the cut occurred partly because some programs had been transferred out of the agency’s budget and partly because House appropriators decided to subtract some $93 million from the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, a program that provides assistance to allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Modernization money The military aid programs are funded in the Overseas Contingency Operations section of the budget. That budget would total just under $68 billion in the Senate bill, or nearly the same level as the request, despite the cuts to military aid and other OCO programs. The Senate panel was able to essentially fully fund the OCO request because it provided more money in the OCO account by shifting about $3.4 billion from the base budget’s operations and maintenance accounts to the war budget’s similar accounts. That $3.4 billion was not all that was taken out of the base budget’s operations accounts. All told, nearly $5.5 billion was subtracted from the $199.5 billion request for operations spending in the base budget. Subtracting that $5.5 billion from the base budget’s operations account — and taking another $1.4 billion from the personnel account — provided the bulk of the funds the committee needed to pay for $8.6 billion above the requested amounts for researching and procuring weapons and other gear. The Senate panel wants to spend much of that $8.6 billion on fighter jets, warships, anti-missile interceptors and a National Guard equipment fund, all programs that are also House priorities. But the Senate panel said that it focused nearly half of that additional modernization money, or about $3.8 billion, on seven next-generation programs: hypersonics, space, cyber, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, lasers and improved testing ranges for new weapons. Senate appropriators and authorizers alike are concerned that the rhetoric of the administration’s National Defense Strategy about moving to some degree away from counterterrorism and toward competition against major powers was not matched by enough changes in the fiscal 2019 budget request. “While the NDS recognizes the persistent nature of terrorist threats and the need to counter those threats, it also represents a significant shift toward long-term, strategic competition and operations in contested domains,” the Senate Appropriations report said. When Senate Appropriations passed its bill, Chairman [Richard C. Shelby](https://www.rollcall.com/members?11&utm_source=memberLink?utm_source=memberLink) of Alabama said the seven cutting-edge technologies that netted $3.8 billion in unrequested funds will be needed “to defend our nation in an increasingly complex and competitive national security environment.” **Impeding ‘lasting defeat?’** **The White House has scaled back foreign aid budgets, but when it comes to military aid in particular, administration officials have given no signals that they approve of cuts.** The White House has yet to issue a Statement of Administration Policy on the Senate’s defense spending bill, but in the White House statement on the Senate authorization bill, **Trump’s aides strongly opposed provisions that would merely withhold, but not cut, some anti-ISIS funding, pending submission to Congress of reports on the conflict.** “Restrictions on or gaps in funds that underpin the U.S. strategy of defeating ISIS by, with, and through partner forces — including the vetted Syrian Democratic Forces — would impede our ability to secure a lasting defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria and would limit the Secretary of Defense’s ability to act in the national security interest of the United States,” the White House statement said. Asked for the Pentagon’s reaction to the proposed cuts to foreign military aid, Army Lt. Col. Michelle Baldanza, a spokeswoman, said, “I am not going to be able to provide comment on pending legislation.”