# AC – Citizen Corps

## Framework

### 1AC - Util

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. If you want me to spec further on my standard just tell me.

#### First, the constitutive obligation of the state is to protect citizen interest—individual obligations are not applicable in the public sphere. Goodin 95

Robert E. Goodin. Philosopher of Political Theory, Public Policy, and Applied Ethics. Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1995. p. 26-7

The great adventure of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures as best we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that policies are sensitive to people’s interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realms, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one’s duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation on motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is required at all arises from the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain morally desirable endss. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at the individual level – the same thing that relieves individuals of responsibility – makes it morally incumbent upon individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different circumstances and their conclusions inevitably take very different forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. And those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.

#### Second, only impacts and values that exist in the physical world are relevant. Physical realism is the only meaningful ontological theory of being. Williams,

Donald Williams. “Naturalism and the Nature of Things.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 53, No. 5 (Sep., 1944), pp. 417-443. Duke UP. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181355

Casting up our accounts to this point, we observe that physical realism is in sum a meaningful, consistent, and essentially confirmable hypothesis. We turn accordingly to assess its credibility a posterior, in relation to the actual evidence, as we should that of a scientific theory or a war communique. We can know forthwith that materialism, granted that metaphysics is confirmable at all, is in principle the most thoroughly confirmable of all world hypotheses. It initiates the most conclusive confirmation or disconfirmation. The ideal aim of systematic knowledge is to disclose the fewest primitive elements into which the diversest objects are analyzable, and the fewest primitive facts, singular and general, from which the behavior of things is deducible. Metaphysics is the most 'scientific' of the sciences because it tries the hardest to explain every kind of fact by one simple principle or simple set of principles. It is the most empirical of sciences (as Peirce reminded us) because, by the same token, a metaphysics is relevant to and confirmable by every item of every experience, whereas every other science is concerned with only a few select and abstract aspects of some experiences, Physical realism is the ideal metaphysics, the veritable paradigm of philosophy, because its category of spatio-temporal pattern best permits analysis of diverse complexity to uniform and ordered simplicities, is most thoroughly numerable, and so most exactly and systematically calculable. Socratic purposes, Platonic ideals, Aristotelian qualities, Plotinian hierarchies-these are surds in comparison with a system de la nature, limned in patterns of action in the ordered dimensions of a spatio-temporal hypersphere

#### Third is the act omission distinction, governments are morally responsible for their omissions because they always face choices between different sets of policy options, all of which advantage some while disadvantaging others.

Cass R. **Sunstein and Vermeule** Adrian [“Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs. Copyright (c) 2005 The Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University. Stanford Law Review December,2005 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703]

The critics of capital punishment have been led astray by uncritically applying the act/omission distinction to a regulatory setting. Their position condemns the "active" infliction of death by governments but does not condemn the "inactive" production of death that comes from the refusal to maintain a system [\*720] of capital punishment. The basic problem is that even if this selective condemnation can be justified at the level of individual behavior, it is difficult to defend for governments. [n58](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.737298.6087973779&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1187847773274&returnToKey=20_T1938900223&parent=docview##) A great deal of work has to be done to explain why "inactive," but causal, government decisions should not be part of the moral calculus. Suppose that we endorse the deontological position that it is wrong to take human lives, even if overall welfare is promoted by taking them. Why does the system of capital punishment violate that position, if the failure to impose capital punishment also takes lives? We suggest that the distinction between government acts and omissions, even if conceptually coherent, is not morally relevant to the question of capital punishment. Some governmental actions are morally obligatory, and some governmental omissions are blameworthy. In this setting, we suggest, government is morally obligated to adopt capital punishment and morally at fault if it declines to do so. The most fundamental point is that, unlike individuals, governments always and necessarily face a choice between or among possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context, and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. [n61](http://www.lexisnexis.com.floyd.lib.umn.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.737298.6087973779&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1187847773274&returnToKey=20_T1938900223&parent=docview##) Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action - for example, private killing - becomes obscure when the government formally forbids private action but chooses a set of policy instruments that do not adequately or fully discourage it. To be sure, a system of punishments that only weakly deters homicide, relative to other feasible punishments, does not quite authorize homicide, but that system is not properly characterized as an omission, and little turns on whether it can be so characterized. Suppose, for example, that government fails to characterize certain actions - say, sexual harassment - as tortious or violative of civil rights law and that it therefore permits employers to harass employees as they choose or to discharge employees for failing to submit to sexual harassment. It would be unhelpful to characterize the result as a product of governmental "inaction." If employers are permitted to discharge employees for refusing to submit to sexual harassment, it is because the law is allocating certain entitlements to employers rather than employees. Or consider the context of ordinary torts. When Homeowner B sues Factory A over air pollution, a decision not to rule for Homeowner B is not a form of inaction: it is the allocation to Factory A of a property right to pollute. In such cases, an apparent government omission is an action simply because it is an allocation of legal rights. Any decision that allocates such rights, by creating entitlements [\*722] and prohibitions, is not inaction at all.

#### Fourth, Phenomenal introspection is reliable and proves that util’s true.

Sinhababu Neil (National University of Singapore) “The epistemic argument for hedonism” [http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3 accessed 2-4-16](http://philpapers.org/archive/SINTEA-3%20accessed%202-4-16) JW

The Odyssey's treatment of these events demonstrates how dramatically ancient Greek moral intuitions differ from ours. It doesn't dwell on the brutality of Telemachus, who killed twelve women for the trivial reasons he states, making them suffer as they die. While gods and men seek vengeance for other great and small offenses in the Odyssey, no one finds this mass murder worth avenging. It's a minor event in the denouement to a happy ending in which Odysseus (who first proposes killing the women) returns home and Telemachus becomes a man. That the[y] Greeks could so easily regard these murders as part of a happy ending for heroes shows how deeply we disagree with them. It's as if we gave them a trolley problem with the 12 women on the side track and no one on the main track, and they judged it permissible for Telemachus to turn the trolley and kill them all. And this isn't some esoteric text of a despised or short-lived sect, but a central literary work of a long-lived and influential culture. Human history offers similarly striking examples of disagreement on a variety of topics. These include sexual morality; the treatment of animals; the treatment of other ethnicities, families, and social classes; the consumption of intoxicating substances; whether and how one may take vengeance; slavery; whether public celebrations are acceptable; and gender roles.12 Moral obligations to commit genocide were accepted not only by some 20th century Germans, but by much of the ancient world, including the culture that gave us the Old Testament. One can only view the human past and much of the present with horror at the depth of human moral error and the harm that has resulted. One might think to explain away much of this disagreement as the result of differing nonmoral beliefs. Those who disagree about nonmoral issues may disagree on the moral rightness of a particular action despite agreeing on the fundamental moral issues. For example, they may agree that healing the sick is right, but disagree about whether a particular medicine will heal or harm. This disagreement about whether to prescribe the medicine won't be fundamentally about morality, and won't support the argument from disagreement. I don't think the moral disagreements listed above are explained by differences in nonmoral belief. This isn't because sexists, racists, and bigots share the nonmoral views of those enlightened by feminism and other egalitarian doctrines – they don't. Rather, their differing views on nonmoral topics often are rationalizations of moral beliefs that fundamentally disagree with ours.13 Those whose fundamental moral judgments include commitments to the authority of men over women, or of one race over another, will easily accept descriptive psychological views that attribute less intelligence or rationality to women or the subjugated race.14 Moral disagreement supposedly arising from moral views in religious texts is similar. Given how rich and many-stranded most religious texts are, interpretive claims about their moral teachings often tell us more about the antecedent moral beliefs of the interpreter than about the text itself. This is why the same texts are interpreted to support so many different moral views. Similar phenomena occur with most moral beliefs. Environmentalists who value a lovely patch of wilderness will easily believe that its destruction will cause disaster, those who feel justified in eating meat will easily believe that the animals they eat don't suffer greatly, and libertarians who feel that redistributing wealth is unjust will easily believe that it raises unemployment. We shouldn't assume that differing moral beliefs on practical questions are caused by fundamental moral agreement combined with differing nonmoral beliefs. Often the differing nonmoral beliefs are caused by fundamental moral disagreement. As we have no precise way of quantifying the breadth of disagreement or determining its epistemic consequences, it's unclear exactly how much disagreement the argument requires. While this makes the argument difficult to evaluate, it shouldn't stop us from proceeding, as we have to use the unclear notion of widespread disagreement in ordinary epistemic practice. If 99.9% of botanists agree on some issue about plants, non-botanists should defer to their authority and believe as most of them do. But if disagreement between botanists is suitably widespread, non-botanists should remain agnostic. A more precise and systematic account of when disagreement is widespread enough to generate particular epistemic consequences would be very helpful. Until we have one, we must employ the unclear notion of widespread disagreement, or some similar notion, throughout epistemic practice. Against the background of widespread moral disagreement, there may still be universal or near-universal agreement on some moral questions. For example, perhaps all cultures agree that one should provide for one’s elderly parents, even though they generally disagree elsewhere. How do these narrow areas of moral agreement affect the argument? This all depends on whether the narrow agreement is reliably or unreliably caused. If narrow agreement results from a reliable process of belief-formation, it lets us avoid error, defeating the argument from disagreement. But widely accepted moral beliefs may result from widely prevailing unreliable processes leading everyone to the same errors. There's no special pressure to explain agreement in terms of reliable processes when disagreement is widespread. Explaining agreement in terms of reliable processes is preferable when we have some reason to think that the processes involved are generally reliable. Then we would want to understand cases of agreement in line with the general reliability of processes producing moral belief. But if disagreement is widespread, error is too. Since moral beliefs are so often false, invoking unreliable processes to explain them is better than invoking reliable ones. The next two sections discuss this in more detail. We have many plausible explanations of narrow agreement on which moral beliefs are unreliably caused. Evolutionary and sociological explanations of why particular moral beliefs are widely accepted often invoke unreliable mechanisms.15 On these explanations, we agree because some moral beliefs were so important for reproductive fitness that natural selection made them innate in us, or so important to the interests controlling moral education in each culture that they were inculcated in everyone. For example, parents' influence over their children's moral education would explain agreement that one should provide for one's elderly parents. Plausible normative ethical theories won't systematically connect these evolutionary and sociological explanations with moral facts. If disagreement and error are widespread, they'll provide useful ways to reconcile unusual cases of widespread agreement with the general unreliability of the processes producing moral belief. 1.3 If there is widespread error about a topic, we should retain only those beliefs about it formed through reliable processes Now I'll defend 3. First I'll show how the falsity of others' beliefs undermines one's own belief. Then I'll clarify the notion of a reliable process. I'll consider a modification to 3 that epistemic internalists might favor, and show that the argument accommodates it. I'll illustrate 3's plausibility by considering cases where it correctly guides our reasoning. Finally, I'll show how 3 is grounded in the intuitive response to grave moral error. First, a simple objection: “Why should I care whether other people have false beliefs? That's a fact about other people, and not about me. Even if most people are wrong about some topic, I may be one of the few right ones, even if there's no apparent reason to think that my way of forming beliefs is any more reliable.” While widespread error leaves open the possibility that one has true beliefs, it reduces the probability that my beliefs are true. Consider a parallel case. I have no direct evidence that I have an appendix, but I know that previous investigations have revealed appendixes in people. So induction suggests that I have an appendix. Similarly, I know on the basis of 1 and 2 that people's moral beliefs are, in general, rife with error. So even if I have no direct evidence of error in my moral beliefs, induction suggests that they are rife with error as well. 3 invokes the reliability of the processes that produce our beliefs. Assessing processes of belief-formation for reliability is an important part of our epistemic practices. If someone tells me that my belief is entirely produced by wishful thinking, I can't simply accept that and maintain the belief. Knowing that wishful thinking is unreliable, I must either deny that my belief is entirely caused by wishful thinking or abandon the belief. But if someone tells me that my belief is entirely the result of visual perception, I'll maintain it, assuming that it concerns sizable nearby objects or something else about which visual perception is reliable. While providing precise criteria for individuating processes of belief-formation is hard, as the literature on the generality problem for reliabilism attests, individuating them somehow is indispensable to our epistemic practices.16 Following Alvin Goldman's remark that “It is clear that our ordinary thought about process types slices them broadly” (346), I'll treat cognitive process types like wishful thinking and visual perception as appropriately broad.17 Trusting particular people and texts, meanwhile, are too narrow. Cognitive science may eventually help us better individuate cognitive process types for the purposes of reliability assessments and discover which processes produce which beliefs. Epistemic internalists might reject 3 as stated, claiming that it isn't widespread error that would justify giving up our beliefs, but our having reason to believe that there is widespread error. They might also claim that our justification for believing the outputs of some process depends not on its reliability, but on what we have reason to believe about its reliability. The argument will still go forward if 3 is modified to suit internalist tastes, changing its antecedent to “If we have reason to believe that there is widespread error about a topic” or changing its consequent to “we should retain only those beliefs about it that we have reason to believe were formed through reliable processes.” While 3's antecedent might itself seem unnecessary on the original formulation, it's required for 3 to remain plausible on the internalist modification. Requiring us to have reason to believe that any of our belief-formation processes are reliable before retaining their outputs might lead to skepticism. The antecedent limits the scope of the requirement to cases of widespread error, averting general skeptical conclusions. The argument will still attain its conclusion under these modifications. Successfully defending the premises of the argument and deriving widespread error (5) and unreliability (7) gives those of us who have heard the defense and derivation reason to believe 5 and 7. This allows us to derive 8. (Thus the pronoun 'we' in 3, 6, and 8.) 3 describes the right response to widespread error in many actual cases. Someone in the 12th century, especially upon hearing the disagreeing views of many cultures regarding the origins of the universe, would do well to recognize that error on this topic was widespread and retreat to agnosticism about it. Only when modern astrophysics extended reliable empirical methods to cosmology would it be rational to move forward from agnosticism and accept a particular account of how the universe began. Similarly, disagreement about which stocks will perform better than average is widespread among investors, suggesting that one's beliefs on the matter have a high likelihood of error. It's wise to remain agnostic about the stock market without an unusually reliable way of forming beliefs – for example, the sort of secret insider information that it's illegal to trade on. 3 permits us to hold onto our moral beliefs in individual cases of moral disagreement, suggesting skeptical conclusions only when moral disagreement is widespread. When we consider a single culture's abhorrent moral views, like the Greeks' acceptance of Telemachus and Odysseus' murders of the servant women, we don't think that maybe the Greeks were right to see nothing wrong and we should reconsider our outrage. Instead, we're horrified by their grave moral error. I think this is the right response. We're similarly horrified by the moral errors of Hindus who burned widows on their husbands' funeral pyres, American Southerners who supported slavery and segregation, our contemporaries who condemn homosexuality, and countless others. The sheer number of cases like this requires us to regard moral error as a pervasive feature of the human condition. Humans typically form moral beliefs through unreliable processes and have appendixes. We are humans, so this should reduce our confidence in our moral judgments. The prevalence of error in a world full of moral disagreement demonstrates how bad humans are at forming true moral beliefs, undermining our own moral beliefs. Knowing that unreliable processes so often lead humans to their moral beliefs, we'll require our moral beliefs to issue from reliable processes. 1.4 If there is widespread error about morality, there are no reliable processes for forming moral beliefs A reliable process for forming moral beliefs would avert skeptical conclusions. I'll consider several processes and argue that they don't help us escape moral skepticism. Ordinary moral intuition, whether it involves a special rational faculty or our emotional responses, is shown to be unreliable by the existence of widespread error. The argument from disagreement either prevents reflective equilibrium from generating moral conclusions or undermines it. Conceptual analysis is reliable, but delivers the wrong kind of knowledge to avert skepticism. If all our processes for forming moral beliefs are unreliable, moral skepticism looms. 4 is false only because of one process – phenomenal introspection, which lets us know of the goodness of pleasure, as the second half of this paper will discuss. Widespread error guarantees the unreliability of any process by which we form all or almost all of our moral beliefs. While widespread error allows some processes responsible for a small share of our moral beliefs to predominantly create true beliefs, it implies that any process generating a very large share of moral belief must be highly error-prone. Since the process produced so many of our moral beliefs, and so many of them are erroneous, it must be responsible for a large share of the error. If more of people's moral beliefs were true, things would be otherwise. Widespread truth would support the reliability of any process that produced most or all of our moral beliefs, since that process would be responsible for so much true belief. But given widespread error, ordinary moral intuition must be unreliable. This point provides a forceful response to Moorean opponents who insist that we can't give up the reliability of a process by which we form all or nearly all of our beliefs on an important topic, since this would permit counterintuitive skeptical conclusions. Even if this Moorean response helps against external world skeptics who employ counterfactual thought experiments involving brains in vats, it doesn't help against moral skeptics who use 1 and 2 to derive widespread actual error. Once we accept that widespread error actually obtains, a great deal of human moral knowledge has already vanished. Insisting on the reliability of the process then seems implausible and pointless. I'll briefly consider two conceptions of moral intuition – as a special rational faculty by which we grasp non-natural moral facts, and as a process by which our emotions lead us to form moral beliefs – and show how widespread error guarantees their unreliability. Some philosophers regard moral intuition as involving a special rational faculty that lets us know non-natural moral facts.18 They argue that knowledge on many topics including mathematics, logic, and modality involves this rational faculty, so moral knowledge might operate similarly. This suggests a way for them to defend the reliability of moral intuition in the face of widespread error: if intuition is reliable about these other things, its overall reliability across moral and nonmoral areas allows us to reliably form moral beliefs by using it. This defense won't work. When an epistemic process is manifestly unreliable on some topic, as widespread error shows any process responsible for most of our moral beliefs to be, the reliability of that process elsewhere won't save it on that topic. Even if testimony is reliable, this doesn't imply the reliability of compulsive gamblers' testimony about the next spin of the roulette wheel. Even if intuition remains reliable elsewhere, widespread disagreement still renders it unreliable in ethics. I see ordinary moral intuition as a process of emotional perception in which our feelings cause us to form moral beliefs.19 Just as visual experiences of color cause beliefs about the colors of surfaces, emotional experiences cause moral beliefs. Pleasant feelings like approval, admiration, or hope in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are right, virtuous or good. Unpleasant emotions like guilt, disgust, or horror in considering actions, persons, or states of affairs lead us to believe they are wrong, vicious, or bad. We might have regarded this as a reliable way to know about moral facts, just as visual perception is a reliable way to know about color, if not for widespread error. But because of widespread error, we can only see it as an unreliable process responsible for our dismal epistemic situation. Reflective equilibrium is the prevailing methodology in normative ethics today. It involves modifying our beliefs about particular cases and general principles to make them cohere. Whether or not nonmoral propositions like the premises of the argument from disagreement are admissible in reflective equilibrium, widespread error prevents reflective equilibrium from reliably generating a true moral theory, as I'll explain. If the premises of the argument from disagreement are admitted into reflective equilibrium, the argument can be reconstructed there, and reflective equilibrium will dictate that we give up all of our moral beliefs. To avoid this conclusion, the premises of the argument from disagreement would have to be revised away on moral grounds. These premises are a metaethical claim about the objectivity of morality which seems to be a conceptual truth, an anthropological claim about the existence of disagreement, a very general epistemic claim about when we should revise our beliefs, and a more empirically grounded epistemic claim about our processes of belief-formation and their reliability. While reflective equilibrium may move us to revise substantive moral beliefs in view of other substantive moral beliefs, claims of these other kinds are less amenable to such revision. Unless ambitious arguments for revising these nonmoral claims away succeed, we must follow the argument to its conclusion and accept that reflective equilibrium makes moral skeptics of us.20 If only moral principles and judgments are considered in reflective equilibrium, it won't make moral skeptics of us, but the argument from disagreement will undermine its conclusions. The argument forces us to give up the pre-existing moral beliefs against which we test various moral propositions in reflective equilibrium. While we may be justified in believing something because it coheres with our other beliefs, this justification goes away once we see that those beliefs should be abandoned. Coherence with beliefs that we know we should give up doesn't confer justification. Now I'll consider conceptual analysis. It can produce moral beliefs about conceptual truths – for example, that the moral supervenes on the nonmoral, and that morality is objective. It also may provide judgments about relations between different moral concepts – perhaps, that if the only moral difference between two actions is that one would produce morally better consequences than the other, doing what produces better consequences is right. I regard conceptual analysis as reliable, so that the argument from disagreement does not force us to give up the beliefs about morality it produces. Unfortunately, if analytic naturalism is false, as has been widely held in metaethics since G. E. Moore, conceptual analysis won't provide all the knowledge we need to build a normative ethical theory.21 Even when it relates moral concepts like goodness and rightness to each other, it doesn't tell us that anything is good or right to begin with. That's the knowledge we need to avoid moral skepticism. So far I've argued that our epistemic and anthropological situation, combined with plausible metaethical and epistemic principles, forces us to abandon our moral beliefs. But if a reliable process of moral belief-formation exists, 4 is false, and we can answer the moral skeptic. The rest of this paper discusses the only reliable process I know of. 2.1 Phenomenal introspection reveals pleasure's goodness Phenomenal introspection, a reliable way of forming true beliefs about our experiences, produces the belief that pleasure is good. Even as our other processes of moral belief-formation prove unreliable, it provides reliable access to pleasure's goodness, justifying the positive claims of hedonism. This section clarifies what phenomenal introspection and pleasure are and explains how phenomenal introspection provides reliable access to pleasure's value. Section 2.2 argues that pleasure's goodness is genuine moral value, rather than value of some other kind. In phenomenal introspection we consider our subjective experience, or phenomenology, and determine what it's like. Phenomenal introspection can be reliable while dreaming or hallucinating, as long as we can determine what the dreams or hallucinations are like. By itself, phenomenal introspection doesn't produce beliefs about things outside experience, or about relations between our experiences and non-experiential things. So it doesn't produce judgments about the rightness of actions or the goodness of non-experiential things. It can only tell us about the intrinsic properties of experience itself. Phenomenal introspection is generally reliable, even if mistakes about immediate experience are possible. Experience is rich in detail, so one could get some of the details wrong in belief. Under adverse conditions involving false expectations, misleading evidence about what one's experiences will be, or extreme emotional states that disrupt belief-formation, larger errors are possible. Paradigmatically reliable processes like vision share these failings. Vision sometimes produces false beliefs under adverse conditions, or when we're looking at complex things. Still, it's so reliable as to be indispensible in ordinary life. Regarding phenomenal introspection as unreliable is about as radical as skepticism about the reliability of vision. While contemporary psychologists reject introspection into one's motivations and other psychological causal processes as unreliable, phenomenal introspection fares better. Daniel Kahneman, for example, writes that “experienced utility is best measured by moment-based methods that assess the experience of the present.”22 Even those most skeptical about the reliability of phenomenal introspection, like Eric Schwitzgebel, concede that we can reliably introspect whether we are in serious pain.23 Then we should be able to introspectively determine what pain is like. So I'll assume the reliability of phenomenal introspection. One can form a variety of beliefs using phenomenal introspection. For example, one can believe that one is having sound experiences of particular noises and visual experiences of different shades of color. When looking at a lemon and considering the phenomenal states that are yellow experiences, one can form some beliefs about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're bright experiences. And when considering experiences of pleasure, one can make some judgments about their intrinsic features – for example, that they're good experiences. Just as one can look inward at one's experience of lemon yellow and recognize its brightness, one can look inward at one's experience of pleasure and recognize its goodness.24 When I consider a situation of increasing pleasure, I can form the belief that things are better than they were before, just as I form the belief that there's more brightness in my visual field as lemon yellow replaces black. And when I suddenly experience pain, I can form the belief that things are worse in my experience than they were before. Having pleasure consists in one's experience having a positive hedonic tone. Without descending into metaphor, it's hard to give a further account of what pleasure is like than to say that when one has it, one feels good. As Aaron Smuts writes in defending the view of pleasure as hedonic tone, “to 'feel good' is about as close to an experiential primitive as we get.” 25 Fred Feldman sees pleasure as fundamentally an attitude rather than a hedonic tone.26 But as long as hedonic tones are real components of experience, phenomenal introspection will reveal pleasure's goodness. Opponents of the hedonic tone account of pleasure usually concede that hedonic tones exist, as Feldman seems to in discussing “sensory pleasures,” which he thinks his view helps us understand. Even on his view of pleasure, phenomenal introspection can produce the belief that some hedonic tones are good while others are bad. There are many different kinds of pleasant experiences. There are sensory pleasures, like the pleasure of tasting delicious food, receiving a massage, or resting your tired limbs in a soft bed after a hard day. There are the pleasures of seeing that our desires are satisfied, like the pleasure of winning a game, getting a promotion, or seeing a friend succeed. These experiences differ in many ways, just as the experiences of looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day differ. It's easy to see the appeal of Feldman's view that pleasures “have just about nothing in common phenomenologically” (79). But just as our experiences in looking at lemons and the sky on a sunny day have brightness in common, pleasant experiences all have “a certain common quality – feeling good,” as Roger Crisp argues (109).27 As the analogy with brightness suggests, hedonic tone is phenomenologically very thin, and usually mixed with a variety of other experiences.28 Pleasure of any kind feels good, and displeasure of any kind feels bad. These feelings may or may not have bodily location or be combined with other sensory states like warmth or pressure. “Pleasure” and “displeasure” mean these thin phenomenal states of feeling good and feeling bad. As Joseph Mendola writes, “the pleasantness of physical pleasure is a kind of hedonic value, a single homogenous sensory property, differing merely in intensity as well as in extent and duration, which is yet a kind of goodness” (442).29 What if Feldman is right and hedonic states feel good in fundamentally different ways? Then phenomenal introspection suggests a pluralist variety of hedonism. Each fundamental flavor of pleasure will have a fundamentally different kind of goodness, as phenomenal introspection more accurate than mine will reveal. This isn't my view, but I suggest it to those convinced that hedonic tones are fundamentally heterogenous. If phenomenal introspection reliably informs us that pleasure is good, how can anyone believe that their pleasures are bad? Other processes of moral belief-formation are responsible for these beliefs. Someone who feels disgust or guilt about sex may not only regard sex as immoral, but the pleasure it produces as bad. Even if phenomenal introspection on sexual pleasure disposes one to believe that it's good, stronger negative emotional responses to it may more strongly dispose one to believe that it's bad, following the emotional perception model suggested in section 1.4. Explaining disagreement about pleasure's value in terms of other processes lets hedonists maintain that phenomenal introspection univocally supports pleasure's goodness. As long as negative judgments of pleasure come from unreliable processes instead of phenomenal introspection, the argument from disagreement eliminates them. The parallel between yellow’s brightness and pleasure’s goodness demonstrates the objectivity of the value detected in phenomenal introspection. Just as anyone's yellow experiences objectively are bright experiences, anyone's pleasure objectively is a good experience.30 While one's phenomenology is often called one's “subjective experience”, facts about it are still objective. “Subjective” in “subjective experience” means “internal to the mind”, not “ontologically dependent on attitudes towards it.” My yellow-experiences objectively have brightness. Anyone who thought my yellow-experiences lacked brightness would be mistaken. Pleasure similarly is objectively good. It's true that anyone's pleasure is good. Anyone who denies this is mistaken. As Mendola writes, the value detected in phenomenal introspection is “a plausible candidate for objective value” (712). Even though phenomenal introspection only tells me about my own phenomenal states, I can know that others' pleasure is good. Of course, I can't phenomenally introspect their pleasures, just as I can't phenomenally introspect pleasures that I'll experience next year. But if I consider my experiences of lemon yellow and ask what it would be like if others had the same experiences, I must think that they would be having bright experiences. Similarly, if in a pleasant moment I consider what it's like for others to have exactly the experience I'm having, I must think that they're having good experiences. If they have exactly the same experiences I'm having, their experiences will have exactly the same intrinsic properties as mine. This is also how I know that if I have the same experience in the future, it'll have the same intrinsic properties. Even though the only pleasure I can introspect is mine now, I should believe that others' pleasures and my pleasures at other times are good, just as I should believe that yellow experienced by others and myself at other times is bright. My argument thus favors the kind of universal hedonism that supports utilitarianism, not egoistic hedonism.

## Inherency

### Staffing

#### Emergency workers overwhelmed right now and outbreak is likely. Welch 8/28

Welch, Ashley. “Biggest Health Threats from Hurricane Harvey Flooding.” CBS News, CBS Interactive, 28 Aug. 2017, www.cbsnews.com/news/houston-flooding-biggest-health-threats-from-hurricane-harvey-flooding/. //nhs-VA

In the wake of [Hurricane Harvey](https://www.cbsnews.com/feature/hurricane-harvey/), as reports of destruction from torrential rains and flooding continue to come in, a number of health hazards put Texas residents at risk. [At least two deaths have been attributed to Harvey](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houston-flooding-weather-recovery-latest-hurricane-harvey-live-updates/), which has now been downgraded to a tropical storm, and thousands of people were forced to their rooftops or higher ground, [overwhelming emergency workers](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/harvey-texas-coast-live-updates/) who could not keep up with [calls for help](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houston-flooding-khou-reporter-brandi-smith-helps-rescue-truck-driver/). Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price declared a public health emergency in response to Harvey, and has sent more than 500 personnel and tons of medical supplies to the region. As the rains continue and floodwater keeps rising, there are several health risks to keep in mind. Drowning and injuries from floodwater Floodwater poses a drowning risk for everyone, even for those who are strong swimmers. Swiftly moving shallow water can be deadly, quickly sweeping away anyone and anything in its path. Experts warn not to rely on a vehicle for protection, as it can be [swept away or stall in moving water](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houston-flooding-khou-reporter-brandi-smith-helps-rescue-truck-driver/). Even a [big rig truck driver](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/houston-flooding-khou-reporter-brandi-smith-helps-rescue-truck-driver/) found himself stranded on a Houston street and in desperate need of rescue. Beware of fallen power lines. Never approach them and report any downed lines to authorities. Finally, floodwaters may contain dangerous sharp objects such as glass or metal debris, and the uneven terrain beneath the water can be hazardous. Never walk barefoot through floodwater. Infectious diseases Floodwater may also contain a number of pathogens that can cause illness. "Floodwater harbors bacteria, different viruses, and fungi, all of which can make people sick," Dr. Robert Glatter, an emergency physician at Lenox Hill Hospital in New York City, told CBS News. One of the biggest concerns with floodwater is the possibility of [cholera](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/yemen-united-nations-cholera-famine-war-houthi-rebels-saudi-arabia/), a highly contagious bacterial disease causing severe diarrhea. Cholera can spread when water is contaminated with infected feces and then others ingest it, either by drinking the water or consuming food that has come in contact with the water. While cholera is far more common in third-word countries, Glatter says the possibility of it occurring in Texas "wouldn't be impossible." "These types of bacteria can live in mixtures of murky water," he said. "It's possible to have this type of infection, especially if the water supply becomes contaminated." Other infectious diseases that can be passed through floodwater include hepatitis A, typhoid fever, and Leptospirosis, a bacterial infection that can cause muscle aches, vomiting, abdominal pain, and diarrhea. If the water supply does become compromised, experts recommend only using bottled water for drinking, brushing your teeth, or bathing or boiling water before use. Keep informed about any warnings from local officials about the water supply. People should also throw away any food that has come in contact with floodwater, even those that are wrapped or packaged in plastic. "There could be microbreaks in the plastic," Glatter said. "There's no way to know if it's been compromised." Canned food is safe to eat, he said. Open wounds or rashes exposed to floodwater can become infected and skin infections and conjunctivitis are also common after heavy flooding. Avoid direct contact with floodwater whenever possible by wearing gloves and waterproof clothing and never walk barefoot through a flood. "Often if your feet get waterlogged that's a set-up for getting infections, including fungal infections between the toes," Glatter said. "Wear high boots and keep your feet as dry as possible." Health risks while cleaning up after flooding If your house becomes flooded during the storm, Glatter says, carpeting and fabric-based furniture should not be salvaged. "Bacteria can leach onto fabrics and lead to airborne infections," he said. "I would not recommend holding onto anything with fabric that absorbs floodwater." Hard surfaces that have come in contact with floodwater, including walls, floors, stoves, and countertops should be thoroughly disinfected. Wearing rubber boots and gloves while cleaning homes is important to reduce risk of infection. Mold is also common after heavy flooding and can exacerbate asthma, allergies, or other respiratory diseases like COPD. Mold can appear in as little as 24 to 48 hours after floodwater recedes. "Don't touch it. Wear rubber gloves, wear a mask," Glatter said. "Try not to remain in any dwelling where there's mold." Mosquito-borne diseases After the rains subside, pools of standing water offer breeding grounds for mosquitoes, which can carry infectious diseases like West Nile and [Zika virus](https://www.cbsnews.com/zika/). Glatter recommends draining these pools when you see them and alerting authorities to larger areas of standing water.

#### Police departments understaffed and overstretched – lack of community commitment. Wyllie 16

Wyllie, Doug. “What Can Be Done about Understaffing of Police Departments?” PoliceOne, 13 July 2016, www.policeone.com/police-jobs-and-careers/articles/197612006-What-can-be-done-about-understaffing-of-police-departments/. //nhs-VA

There has recently been a spate of headlines decrying understaffing at police departments across the nation, with media reports coming from places such as [Austin](http://www.expressnews.com/news/texas/article/Austin-police-to-share-patrol-duties-amid-staff-7946809.php), [Albuquerque](http://krqe.com/2016/02/21/albuquerque-mayor-talks-bonuses-to-solve-officer-shortage/), [Burbank](http://myburbank.com/09/sections/city-of-burbank/understaffing-still-plagues-burbank-police-department/), [Dallas](http://www.wfaa.com/news/crime/dallas-police-having-trouble-recruiting/199705564), [Pittsburgh](https://www.policeone.com/police-jobs-and-careers/articles/8687150-Pittsburgh-struggles-to-recruit-officers/), [Portland](http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2015/10/portland_police_union_presses.html) and [Washington, D.C.](http://wtop.com/dc/2016/06/dc-police-see-shortage-officers-year/slide/1/%20and%20dozens%20of%20other%20places) Sadly, this trend is about seven years old. Police agencies were severely hit when municipal tax revenues went in the tank following the housing bubble burst and the "Great Recession" began in 2008. At its worst stage, many agencies lost as much as 10 to 15 percent of their work force through a combination of attrition and layoffs — mostly layoffs. Even when the economy recovered (and it’s a debatable point that it truly has recovered for many cities and individuals who live there), those shrunken police budgets did not substantially bounce back. Some positions were added, but many agencies were forced to "do more with less" — the new normal. Another contributing factor for agencies that continue to struggle to attract qualified candidates for this great profession is the ["Ferguson Effect."](https://www.policeone.com/community-policing/articles/194645006-4-ways-to-stave-off-the-Ferguson-effect/) It is widely accepted that in the aftermath of that incident on West Florissant Avenue, a whole host of potential recruits looked at the profession and simply changed their minds, choosing instead to pursue a totally different profession. This is understandable when considering a career path in which simply doing their job could land them in court, in jail, or in the grave. Suddenly, becoming a computer engineer looks incredibly appealing. So, what can be done? **10 Opinions from LinkedIn** With this problem persisting beyond a reasonable period of time, we asked our PoliceOne members active on our [LinkedIn page](https://www.linkedin.com/groups/736347) to offer some solutions. Here are 10 of those opinions (edited for brevity and clarity). Add your own thoughts in the comments area below. **Greg King:** Current events reveal a greater need for our services than ever before, but society in large part doesn't seem to place a value on the services we provide. Arguably some of our own employers don't truly value what we do. Can we capitalize on this opportunity to market what we can do for them? Seems we would have the high ground in this dilemma if we were a private business. But we are sworn to duty in this profession and our customers can have their cake and eat it too. **Russel Workman:** Privatize a portion of the uniform and investigative branches with highly rated and respected security/private investigation companies, free up sworn personnel for selective enforcement in areas they are needed most. **Darrin Zehnpfennig:** This is a reflection of police reputation being attacked by the media (coupled) with cutting benefits, pay, and the elimination of pension plans. While middle class cost of living has increased, many departments have frozen wages, and cut benefits. You get what you pay for. Officers are asked to take on more responsibility every year. Agencies want the best of the best but instead they get what they pay for. **Roy Turnwall:** Stop looking for perfect candidates. Value experience — there is a lot to be said for a candidate who is currently working as a police officer for a government agency with an excellent work history. **Martin Gilliland:** The lack of organizational commitment, community commitment, personnel commitment and the list can go on. Our "leadership" is more concerned about themselves than anything else. People leave good jobs because of the lack of true all-around good leadership. It looks like the "me generation" has taken over. I would say the spate of negative publicity hasn’t helped, but leadership comes into play in this area as well. Take control of the situation! Don’t let outside influences dictate what you need to do. **Richard Dettmer:** There are at least two reasons for understaffing. First is as mentioned by some already the fact that "becoming a police officer is not as attractive as it used to be." Pay and retirement benefits used to be very good in the ‘90s to early 2000s and the work was not as hazardous as it is today plus there was more respect given to good cops by the general public. The second is one of economics — not yours, but cities, counties, and states. The very reasons that made being a cop a good choice went south. Local governments could not afford to offer the great pensions, early retirements, salaries and other benefits so what did they do to cut costs? New hire benefit plans were reduced and required copay, LE positions were cut if not eliminated and cops had to do more with less even with perhaps too strong a cop union support on their side. Lastly, cops started getting bad raps — some deservedly, most not so — that lost some of their public trust. Blame the cell video or whatever, but it hurt. **TK Brown:** In this current climate, I’m not sure we could get more qualified applicants if there were a large pay increase. That could help some, but it won’t solve the entire problem. And it’s not just recruitment, its retention of current officers. We need to try and keep the solid, seasoned officers instead of letting them walk away when they get other offers. **Fredric McQuiggan:** The fix to labor shortages is no great mystery. Departments can either raise pay and benefits and/or increase the size of the hiring pool (i.e. lower the minimum hiring standards for police). Problem solved! **Tim Gordon:** Pay, benefits, and resources. Pay your officers a rate commensurate with the community they serve. Give them good health and traditional retirement. Then support them publicly when they do their job. Provide them with the resources they need to work safely. Cars with 200000 miles and working solo tours make you question the commitment of your administration — add to that the traditional nepotism and corruption of government and you can see why many officers become disillusioned with their chosen profession. Oh yes, and provide them with training, lots of training. But make sure it’s relevant to what they need and not just smoke and mirrors PR for political reaction. **Michael Habash:** Find a way to recruit midcareer professionals from other fields looking for a change. Right now if someone wants to leave their field and enter law enforcement it comes with a pay cut. Millennial tend to switch career more frequently, are well educated and could help meet public expectations. **Conclusion** Historically, a commonly accepted "standard" staffing level was one officer for every 1,000 citizens. This ratio is, of course, not present in truly massive cities like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, where the geography and other factors allow a lower ratio. But in too many jurisdictions, the problem of understaffing has police: citizen ratios nowhere near that level. In those places, police service can be slower for the citizens and more dangerous for the police.

#### Firefighters are understaffed but 911 calls are increasing – this causes burnout. Bodin 6/29

Bodin, Madeline. “Volunteer Fire Departments Are Struggling to Retain Firefighters, While 911 Calls Are Surging.” Emergency Management, E.Republic, 29 June 2017, www.govtech.com/em/disaster/EM-Summer-2017-Dwindling-Force.html. //nhs-VA

Constantly recruiting new firefighters is a strain on the department, and on Maruca. The situation got bad enough that officials looked into staffing the department only with career firefighters. Maruca found that not only would that cost taxpayers more, it would also reduce the number of firefighters responding to each call. Nationwide, volunteer fire departments save municipalities, and taxpayers, $139.8 billion per year in firefighting costs, according to a 2014 report from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). About 70 percent of America’s firefighters are volunteers, and 85 percent of the nation’s fire departments are all or mostly volunteer, according to NFPA. The smallest communities — those with fewer than 10,000 residents — are almost always served by volunteer departments, also, according to NFPA. Across the country, small, rural fire departments like West Barnstable’s are struggling to recruit and retain volunteer firefighters. But even where the number of volunteer firefighters is holding steady, the number of calls is exploding. The nationwide tally of the calls departments respond to each year has tripled in the last 30 years, according to NFPA. These numbers influence a community’s ability to deal with emergencies, both large and small. “Career and volunteer firefighter and emergency services are the infantry in every community when disaster strikes,” said Denis Onieal, acting U.S. Fire Administrator. “There is no force at the state level or at the federal level, with the exception of the National Guard, that can provide a community with rescue, mitigation and recovery services like the fire and emergency services community.” Communities like West Barnstable illustrate why some departments are struggling to recruit and retain volunteer firefighters. “Small towns like ours are losing our young adult populations,” Maruca said. They are moving to where there are more jobs and a lower cost of living. Unfortunately, though, the cities these young people move to don’t necessarily see the benefit of more, young volunteers, says Kimberly Quiros, chief of communications for the National Volunteer Fire Council (NVFC). “People who are transplants to new areas may not have that community tie that makes them want to volunteer with the fire department. And people may not even be aware that their community needs volunteers.” Volunteer fire departments once depended on local employers who offered full-time jobs with benefits to their volunteers and were willing to have employees leave work to fight fires. Today a typical job is as a per-hour worker with unpredictable shifts for a national or international company with no ties to community. The nation’s top employer is Walmart. Second on the list: McDonald’s, according to stock market information analyzed by 24/7 Wall St. and reported in USA Today. According to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by the nonprofit group Young Invincibles, reported in *USA Today*, millennials (born from 1982 to 2004) earn 20 percent less than baby boomers did at the same age, and millennials have more student loan debt. Because the number of volunteer firefighters nationwide has declined 15 percent between its all-time high in 1984 and its all-time low in 2011 and, because over that same period, the number of calls has increased nearly 300 percent, existing firefighters are suffering from burnout. (Most of that increase is in medical calls, Quiros said.) Fighting fires as a volunteer requires the same training career firefighters receive. The training requires a significant time investment. “Even as people have less time to volunteer, the training required to volunteer has become more intensive, taking more time,” Quiros said.

#### Fiscally strapped local communities are laying off first-responders who play vital roles in preventing future terrorist attacks – police and fire departments are massively understaffed. Hall 04

Hall, Mimi. “Police, Fire Departments See Shortages across USA.” USA Today, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 28 Nov. 2004, usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-11-28-police-shortages-cover\_x.htm. //nhs-VA

Mayor Jane Campbell calls police and firefighters part of the nation's "domestic army" — the troops who will be called upon to respond to the next terrorist attack. But in Cleveland and many other financially troubled cities, the ranks of those first responders are thinning. Staffing problems in police and fire departments could leave citizens unprotected during a terrorist attack, officials say. At least two-thirds of the nation's fire departments are understaffed, according to the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which sets firefighting codes and standards. The shortage is worst in rural volunteer departments that have trouble recruiting new members. But many big and medium-size cities that are more likely to be terrorist targets are also short-handed. Some, including New York, have had to close fire stations; others, such as Houston, have had temporary closures. In many cities, response times are slower, and trucks go out with too few firefighters. That can have a real impact. Investigators cited many factors that contributed to the deaths of 100 people in a West Warwick, R.I., nightclub fire last year. But a report commissioned by the state noted that the five firetrucks at the scene arrived with only two firefighters each — half the number recommended by the NFPA — and video showed delays in getting hoses turned on. While staffing companies to nationally recognized standards is desirable," the report said, "it is beyond the reach of many financially strapped communities." Many big-city police departments such as Cleveland also are bleeding officers. Nationally, the number of police has remained stagnant in recent years, despite federal help from the Clinton-era COPS community-policing program, which spent $9 billion to help put 118,000 more officers on the streets. The Bush administration, which has emphasized training and says staffing levels should be largely a local responsibility, is phasing out the program. Staffing problems are being felt coast to coast. New York City, with 23,000 police officers, has lost 1,000 a year for the past three years. Minneapolis cut 38 positions from its police force last year. The Oregon State Police laid off 129 troopers from its 600-member force. "It's almost completely budget-driven," says Gene Voegtlin of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. There also are staffing problems at 911 emergency centers. National figures are not available for 911 call-takers and dispatchers, sometimes called the first of the first responders. But Steve Souder, director of the Montgomery County, Md., 911 Emergency Communications Center, says staff shortages are at a crisis point nationwide. In his county, 25% of 911 jobs turn over each year as employees burn out from the stress and hectic schedule and take better-paying jobs with private companies. In many cities, police and fire chiefs say, layoffs and attrition are leading to dangerously low staffing levels that could leave emergency workers unprepared and citizens unprotected during future terrorist attacks. The call-up of reservists and National Guard members for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also is taxing police and fire departments. Since Sept. 11, 2001, the National Guard has called up 4,153 police officers and 451 firefighters. After the 2001 attacks, "politicians wanted nothing but to stand by us and tell us what heroes we were and talk about all they were going to do for us," says Bob Fisher, president of the firefighters union in Cleveland. But with 7% of the city's firefighters laid off this year and little time for training, he says, "the capabilities of this department have been reduced since 9/11." **Smaller staffs, higher standards** Emergency preparedness officials are most concerned about the shortage of firefighters, who would be the first to respond to a catastrophic attack. In the past 20 years, the number of firefighters nationwide has declined, despite a 25% increase in the nation's population. The fire protection association estimates that to combat terrorism, the nation needs 75,000 to 85,000 new paid firefighters in its cities. In the last major assessment of the nation's fire service in 2002, the association and the Federal Emergency Management Agency found that only 13% of departments were trained and equipped to handle a chemical or biological incident with at least 10 people injured. Only 11% could handle the collapse of a building with 50 or more occupants. "If you can't even tackle a structural fire, how are you going to handle a mass-casualty event?" asks Tim Raducha-Grace of New York University's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response. Kansas City Fire Chief Richard "Smokey" Dyer, past president of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, says his city is the only one in the country where voters approved a sales tax to pump money into the fire department. Despite the approval of that 2001 ballot measure, ongoing staffing problems mean that a third of his city's firetrucks are still sent out with fewer than four firefighters — an NFPA safety standard that allows for two firefighters to enter a burning building while two remain outside to handle equipment and, if necessary, rescue their colleagues. Thanks to the local tax increase, Dyer is slowly building up his staff. But elsewhere, he says, staffing shortages are getting worse — and at a terrible time. "As the threat has risen for our cities, and as additional tasks have been assigned to our fire departments, the resources for the fire service have gone down," he says. "Most big-city fire departments are in the process of reducing staffing." Here in Cleveland, Fire Station 13 no longer has a hook-and-ladder truck. There aren't enough firefighters to keep up safety inspections they used to do at local metal-plating plants and chemical companies that store thousands of gallons of deadly toxins. They can't spare the people to take time out for special weapons-of-mass-destruction training offered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The city's fire training academy, with its three-story practice tower, is like a "ghost town" now, says Dean Murad, a member of the station's rescue squad. At least half the classes have been cut, he says, and instead of regularly scheduled training sessions for firefighters, training is now "haphazard." After 70 layoffs since January, the city's fire department would struggle "to do what they're counting on us to do" if a terrorist attack or other disaster caused mass casualties, Fire Chief Paul Stubbs says. Even if there were a few house fires at once, "I don't know if this city could handle it," says Station 13 firefighter Roy Bruder, a 23-year veteran. The situation at the police department, where 250 officers were laid off this year, is no better. Special units for the harbor, street crimes, auto thefts, narcotics, youth gangs and community policing are among those eliminated since January as part of an effort to close the city's $60 million budget deficit. Among the pieces of equipment now lying idle are two $1.1 million helicopters, bought with grant money from Washington for an eight-person police aviation unit that's now defunct. The helicopters were used to patrol the city for security breaches along the waterfront and at power plants and high-rises whenever the nation's terror alert level was raised. To keep enough patrolmen on the streets, Police Chief Edward Lohn says he had to cut the department's more specialized units. The result, police spokesman Wayne Drummond says, "is that we're more of a reactive department now than a pro-active department." When he eliminated 15% of the department's 1,826 officers, Lohn says, he also had to recall 10 of the 15 officers he had assigned to work with the FBI on area terrorism task forces. "I feel bad when I get a call from the agent in charge at the FBI," Lohn says, because he can no longer offer to help. The cuts "have been very painful." **Problems nationwide** Staffing problems are showing up across the nation: • Three years ago, the Springfield, Mass., fire department had 395 members, 10 open fire stations, 76 firefighters on duty at any given time and four firefighters per truck. By this summer, the department had 256 members, seven open fire stations, 39 firefighters on duty at a time and only three firefighters per truck — the result of budget cuts. Local union chief David Wells says the city is engaged in "Russian roulette" when it comes to the safety of its citizens. • In Richmond, Calif., which has an oil refinery and a deep-water port, the city has laid off 18 firefighters since January, bringing the department down to 60. Ten years ago, it had 110. To compensate, the department occasionally closes stations and runs trucks with fewer than four firefighters on board. "It's a dangerous situation," says Lou Paulson, president of California Professional Firefighters. • In Ohio, there are roughly the same number of state troopers today — 1,500 — as there were in the mid-1970s, "even though we have 20 times the amount of work," says Jim Roberts, director of the Ohio State Troopers Association. He said post-9/11 demands have driven up overtime costs and overtaxed troopers. • In Seattle, firefighters are protesting a decision by the mayor to address a shortage of 911 dispatchers by reassigning firefighters to that job. The move means the number of firefighters at one of the city's stations will be cut to three per firetruck. In a letter to members last month, union president Paul Atwater said the move creates "unsafe working conditions." • In Boston, the number of police officers has dropped from 1,800 in the late 1990s to fewer than 1,400 today. "It's been a gradual deterioration of the force," says Michael O'Hara of the International Union of Police Associations. He says the department is also strained by the need for officers to go through more extensive training for biological and chemical attacks and by military operations abroad. About 40 officers now serve in Iraq and Afghanistan.

### Budget Cuts

#### Trump’s budget significantly cuts funding to the CNCS – that decreases personnel. Green 5/25

GREEN, ERICA L. “Trump’s Budget, Breaking Tradition, Seeks Cuts to Service Programs.”The New York Times, The New York Times, 25 May 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/05/25/us/politics/trump-budget-americorps-peace-corps-service.html?mcubz=1. //nhs-VA

In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy exhorted the youth of America to ask what they could do for their country. In his inaugural budget, President Trump wants the government largely out of the national service business. Mr. Trump’s budget proposal would eliminate the Corporation for National and Community Service, and with it, [AmeriCorps](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/a/americorps/index.html?inline=nyt-org), Senior Corps and Vista, one of Kennedy’s first national service programs. He would zero out a popular loan forgiveness program for graduates who choose public service jobs, and he would cut the Peace Corps by 15 percent. The cuts would extend to other programs that encourage young Americans to teach in at-risk schools, become police officers or take careers in social work. Mr. Trump’s budget proposal “ends eight decades of presidential leadership on national service,” said AnnMaura Connolly, president of Voices for National Service. “It’s disappointing to see that strong string of bipartisan leadership broken.” The Trump administration has said the proposals are part of the larger effort to balance the nation’s budget, emphasize national security and spend taxpayer dollars on programs that are efficient and effective. But since Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Civilian Conservation Corps, which helped the country recover from [the Great Depression](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/g/great_depression_1930s/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier), presidents have used service programs to engage Americans in tackling issues such as poverty, housing and disaster relief; offer young people experience; and create jobs. Kennedy founded the Peace Corps for Americans to provide service abroad, and Vista for those wishing to serve at home. Richard M. Nixon created the Senior Corps for older Americans. Jimmy Carter’s Habitat for Humanity still receives federal assistance for its efforts to build affordable housing. George Bush promoted his “Points of Light” to enroll the private sector and lay the groundwork for Bill Clinton’s AmeriCorps. George W. Bush embraced the USA Freedom Corps and made the largest investment in national service ever, including expanding the Peace Corps program. John Bridgeland, who served as director of the USA Freedom Corps, which coordinated service after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, said presidents had turned to national service programs to heal divides, solve public problems at a lower cost and train young people to become leaders who can get past their differences. Each successive president protected the legacy of his predecessor. And on the campaign trail, [Mr. Trump acknowledged](http://about.serviceyear.org/trump_on_national_service) that national service was popular among young people. saying there was “something beautiful about it.” “What presidents have been remembered for is awakening people to be part of democracy and part of repairing and fixing the country,” said Mr. Bridgeland, who now serves as vice chairman of Service Year Alliance. “It seems more urgent now than ever, given the state of things.” William A. Galston, who helped start AmeriCorps as domestic policy adviser to Mr. Clinton, said, “The people who put together the president’s budget know the cost of everything but the value of nothing.” Mr. Trump’s tax and spending blueprint for the fiscal year that begins in October is a break in a nearly century-old tradition of layering service programs on existing service programs. The president’s proposed cut to the Peace Corps would be the largest the agency has seen in 40 years, the National Peace Corps Association said. Mr. Trump’s “orderly shutdown” of the Corporation for National and Community Service, which has been operating national service programming since 1993, [has the goal](https://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CNCS_FY2018_CBJ.pdf) of “returning responsibility to fund national service and volunteerism to the private and nonprofit sectors,” according to the Trump budget. The proposals are almost certain to face bipartisan opposition. Eric Tanenblatt, who served on the board of the national service corporation during the George W. Bush administration, said that the agency is one of the few with a bipartisan board, and it retains support in both parties. While Congress funds about $1 billion of its budget, another $1.2 billion comes from private and local sources. “We have to prioritize where we spend our scarce resources,” Mr. Tanenblatt said, “but the funding for C.N.C.S. is one of the bright lights in the federal government that is doing tremendous work.” Disbanding the organization’s most high-profile programs, AmeriCorps and Senior Corps, would jeopardize posts for about 80,000 AmeriCorps members and 245,000 Senior Corps volunteers serving in more than 50,000 locations across the country. The cuts could also have collateral damage to high-profile education programs, such as City Year and Teach for America, which rely on AmeriCorps experience to supply the educators that they send to low-performing schools. The most recent Teacher of the Year, Sydney Chaffee, is an AmeriCorps alumna. Precious Lango, 25, relied on federal [student loans](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/s/student_loans/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier) to get through Georgia Southern University. When she graduated in 2014, her plans to pursue an advanced degree in physical therapy fell through. Then she came across AmeriCorps. She moved across the country to Tulsa, Okla., where for two years she has been helping to teach math in a high school of at-risk youths through City Year, which is supported by AmeriCorps. Next year, she will continue teaching at the school through Teach for America. “I’ve learned that education is where I was supposed to be,” Ms. Lango said. “It’s just showed me how life is not just about me. These students have made my heart so much larger.” In exchange for their service, AmeriCorps members receive an education award, currently $5,815, another benefit on the chopping block. And cuts like that come at a time when college students looking to go into public service are facing the loss of other financial assistance. The proposed 2018 budget would also zero out a student loan forgiveness program for college graduates who choose lower-paying service careers, such as teaching and public safety. More than 500,000 people have signed up for the Public Loan Forgiveness Program, which started in 2007. Under the program, college graduates who pursue certain public service jobs are relieved of student loan debt after 10 years. If the Trump proposal is adopted, the program would not be available to students borrowing after 2018. The Education Department said that the elimination of the program was to help simplify student loan programs, and “generate savings to help put the nation on a more sustainable fiscal path.” Teachers’ union leaders say the program has been a valuable recruitment tool, especially for teachers who take on hard subjects, like special education, and go to particularly rural or urban areas. “Those are the ones we are willing to convince to do the hard work,” Lily Eskelsen García, president the National Education Association, said. “We have actively gone out and promoted careers in public service, teaching based on this program.” The budget proposal has shaken the public service community, and many borrowers who benefit from the program are panicking, said Natalia Abrams, executive director of Student Debt Crisis. She said that even borrowers who qualify are concerned about what will happen to the program 10 years from now. “Students are planning their careers around these programs,” Ms. Abrams said, “and we’re discouraging public servants.”

#### Despite Harvey, FEMA is taking an L. Stein 8/30

Stein, Jeff. “Report: Congress Is Eyeing Cuts to FEMA's Budget to Pay for Trump's Wall.”Vox, Vox, 30 Aug. 2017, www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/30/16228592/congress-fema-wall-harvey. //nhs-VA

Republicans in Congress are reportedly moving to slash funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency just as FEMA goes to work rebuilding Houston and the Texas coast from Hurricane Harvey. Searching to pay for President Donald Trump’s border wall with Mexico, Republicans in [the House are preparing to](https://www.apnews.com/83e6782d48e04993a741b834771c078b?utm_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=AP_Politics) cut about $876 million out of FEMA’s total budget of $13.9 billion, the Associated Press reports. The money cut from FEMA would cover about half of Trump’s “down payment” for the wall, according to the AP. It’s [**too early to know exactly how Congress will react to Hurricane Harvey**](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/8/29/16215012/hurricane-harvey-congress-funding). Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and Trump have promised to send Texas officials an aid package worth billions of dollars — meanwhile, nobody seems to know how funding will work out in a bill to avert a looming government shutdown. Some experts suspect that Trump and congressional Republicans’ brinkmanship over securing funding for the wall will be sidelined amid the push to help Harvey. “I expect they will back off of the discussion about the debt limit or tying the shut down to the wall,” William Hoagland, a former GOP staff director for the Senate Budget Committee, told me. “I think that takes a real backseat to the situation [in Houston] ... The big picture is that this will put pressure on Congress and the president to make sure that the government does not shut down first of all, and that assistance continues.” Trump, for his part, has spent the past several months vowing to shut down the government without funding for his border wall. And that funding could be drawn from the budget for something else. So FEMA cuts could be on the table.

#### CNCS is getting wrecked. Aisch and Parlapiano 5/23 – It’s getting more than a 90% cut.

AISCH, GREGOR, and ALICIA PARLAPIANO. “How Trump’s Budget Would Affect Every Part of Government.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 May 2017, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/23/us/politics/trump-budget-details.html?q=community. //nhs-VA



## Advantages

### 1AC – Zika

#### Harvey and Irma present perfect conditions for Zika spread – the aftermath is key. Blackburn et al 9/15

Christine Crudo Blackburn Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, et al. “Harvey and Irma Present Nearly Perfect Conditions for Zika-Spreading Mosquitoes.”The Conversation, 15 Sept. 2017, theconversation.com/harvey-and-irma-present-nearly-perfect-conditions-for-zika-spreading-mosquitoes-83938. Christine is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Gerald is a Associate Dean For Global One Health, College of Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences; and Director, Pandemic and Biosecurity Policy Program, Scowcroft Institute for International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Morten is Policy Sciences Lecturer, Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Texas A&M University //nhs-VA

Even as the floodwaters from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma begin to recede, significant but less obvious health threats remain. The standing water the storms have left behind will almost certainly cause an explosion of the mosquito population. In addition to the already difficult task of recovery, the affected areas will need to stem the mosquito population growth to avoid the potential for a disease outbreak. As experts with diverse research and government experience, we believe mosquito prevention and control measures must be given high priority and incorporated into long-term hurricane recovery operations. Why the disease threat is worse now [Eleven cases](http://www.houstonpress.com/news/six-new-zika-cases-confirmed-in-houston-bringing-tally-up-to-eleven-9531868) of Zika have been confirmed this year in the Houston area alone, although none of these were locally transmitted, and Florida has reported [33 symptomatic cases](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/reporting/2017-case-counts.html). [Zika virus](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/about/index.html) is a disease spread to humans primarily through the bite of infected Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. The infection often occurs without causing any symptoms. In the continental United States, the two areas where Aedes aegypti have the [most favorable climates to thrive](http://currents.plos.org/outbreaks/article/on-the-seasonal-occurrence-and-abundance-of-the-zika-virus-vector-mosquito-aedes-aegypti-in-the-contiguous-united-states/) are exactly southeastern Texas and south Florida. The greatest threat posed by Zika is the risk of infection among [pregnant women](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/pregnancy/index.html). Previous outbreaks of the disease have shown there is an association between Zika infection during pregnancy and babies born with [microcephaly](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/about/needtoknow.html). The birth of infants with incomplete brain development creates a long-term public health challenge that extends far beyond the immediate outbreak. Although the current number of confirmed cases of Zika in Florida and Texas is not large, the growth of the Aedes aegypti mosquito greatly increases the chance the disease will begin to spread. Each case of Zika presents the opportunity for the disease to begin circulating in the local mosquito population. While Zika is the greatest concern, dengue fever, Chikungunya virus and yellow fever are also spread by the Aedes aegypti mosquito. In all cases, of course, the disease must be present in an area for mosquitoes to transfer it, but like Zika, dengue fever [is already present in Texas and Florida.](http://www.healthmap.org/dengue/en/)Since Houston and Miami are both large international hubs, it is possible for almost any vector-borne disease to be introduced by travelers. The breeding ground for mosquitoes is not actually the large, sometimes deep blanket of floodwaters, most of which recedes fairly quickly. Small bodies of left-behind water, such as that in a dog’s water bowl, become ideal breeding areas. Unless these breeding sites are emptied, there could be tens of thousands of new breeding grounds in the cities of Houston and Miami alone. This presents a special kind of public health challenge in the wake of the storms. In some areas, people may not return to their homes for a long time. Government and response agencies must figure out a way to eliminate standing water in order to prevent mosquito [breeding grounds](http://www.texaszika.org/prevention.htm). However, almost all of the breeding grounds will be on private property, with no one present to either dump the waters or authorize the government to do so. Moreover, Houston is home to more than [half a million undocumented immigrants](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ft_17-01-31_unauthorizedmetros_table/), who may not be likely to cooperate with authorities, even if they are in their homes, for fear of [prosecution or deportation](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/for-houstons-many-undocumented-immigrants-storm-is-just-the-latest-challenge/2017/08/28/210f5466-8c1d-11e7-84c0-02cc069f2c37_story.html?utm_term=.7f64057b4dac). Prevention and control strategies Vaccines and antivirals are not available to prevent or treat Zika and other mosquito-borne viral diseases, such as dengue fever and Chikungunya virus. There is a licensed [vaccine for yellow fever](https://www.cdc.gov/yellowfever/vaccine/index.html), but vaccines will be in short supply if outbreaks occur.

#### Citizen Corps k2 disaster readiness. Montgomery 8/31

Montgomery, Trevor. “TEMECULA: In Hurricane Harvey’s Wake, Temecula Citizen Corps Advocates Personal Preparedness.” Riverside County News Source, 31 Aug. 2017, riversidecountynewssource.org/2017/08/31/temecula-in-hurricane-harveys-wake-temecula-citizen-corps-advocates-personal-preparedness/. //nhs-VA

In 2003, the City of Temecula formed the Temecula Citizen Corps (TCC) to educate and train local residents to contribute to the community’s well-being. Building on the successful efforts already in place in many communities around the country, designed and intended to “prevent crime and respond to emergencies,” Citizen Corps programs continuously strive to “make Temecula safer” through various forms of training, education, preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. “The TCC provides Temecula residents the resources they need, in the event of an emergency or disaster, by providing and advocating for personal responsibility, disaster training, and volunteer service,” according to the release. Moreover, the TCC’s mission is to “harness the power of every individual through education, training, and volunteer service to make Temecula safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues and disasters of all kinds.” One of the TCC’s primary goals is to provide group and individual training to those willing and interested and reminds the community that there are ways citizens can remain safe and prepared: **Prepare yourself and your family** Formulate a family disaster preparedness plan. Prepare your emergency kits and supplies. ([Click here for a full list of necessary and important supplies to always have on hand,](https://riversidecountynewssource.org/2017/08/31/temecula-disaster-preparedness-advice-from-temeculas-office-of-public-safety/) as well as other important information and advice.) Know of the possible emergencies and stay informed. **Join and become active in your local Neighborhood Watch program** Keep your home and neighborhood safe. Know enough to know when something or someone is out of place. Be eligible for TCC training: First Aid, CPR, AED, and more! **CERT: Community Emergency Response Team** Train to help your family, help your neighbors; and if possible, help emergency responders and the City in time of need.

#### Disaster readiness prevents vector-borne disease outbreaks. Watson et al 07

Watson, John T., Michelle Gayer, and Maire A. Connolly. “Epidemics after Natural Disasters.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 13.1 (2007): 1–5. Jan 2007 PMC. Web. 17 Aug. 2017. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/> Watson - Director/Professor, [Bioengineering](http://www-bioeng.ucsd.edu/) at UCSD. Gayer - Director of Emergency Reform, World Health Organization. Marie Connolly is Chair and Head of Social Work at the University of Melbourne //nhs-VA

Water-related Communicable Diseases Access to safe water can be jeopardized by a natural disaster. Diarrheal disease outbreaks can occur after drinking water has been contaminated and have been reported after flooding and related displacement. An outbreak of diarrheal disease after flooding in Bangladesh in 2004 involved >17,000 cases; Vibrio cholerae(O1 Ogawa and O1 Inaba) and enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli were isolated ([13](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R13)). A large (>16,000 cases) cholera epidemic (O1 Ogawa) in West Bengal in 1998 was attributed to preceding floods ([14](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R14)), and floods in Mozambique in January–March 2000 led to an increase in the incidence of diarrhea ([15](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R15)). In a large study undertaken in Indonesia in 1992–1993, flooding was identified as a significant risk factor for diarrheal illnesses caused by Salmonella enterica serotype Paratyphi A (paratyphoid fever) ([16](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R16)). In a separate evaluation of risk factors for infection with Cryptosporidium parvum in Indonesia in 2001–2003, case-patients were >4× more likely than controls to have been exposed to flooding ([17](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R17)). The risk for diarrheal disease outbreaks following natural disasters is higher in developing countries than in industrialized countries ([8](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R8),[11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R11)). In Aceh Province, Indonesia, a rapid health assessment in the town of Calang 2 weeks after the December 2004 tsunami found that 100% of the survivors drank from unprotected wells and that 85% of residents reported diarrhea in the previous 2 weeks ([18](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R18)). In Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, an outbreak of acute watery diarrhea occurred in an unplanned, poorly equipped camp of 1,800 persons after the 2005 earthquake. The outbreak involved >750 cases, mostly in adults, and was controlled after adequate water and sanitation facilities were provided ([19](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R19)). In the United States, diarrheal illness was noted after Hurricanes Allison ([20](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R20)) and Katrina ([21](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R21)–[23](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R23)), and norovirus, Salmonella, and toxigenic and nontoxigenic V. cholerae were confirmed among Katrina evacuees. Hepatitis A and E are also transmitted by the fecal-oral route, in association with lack of access to safe water and sanitation. Hepatitis A is endemic in most developing countries, and most children are exposed and develop immunity at an early age. As a result, the risk for large outbreaks is usually low in these settings. In hepatitis E–endemic areas, outbreaks frequently follow heavy rains and floods; the illness is generally mild and self-limited, but in pregnant women case-fatality rates can reach 25% ([24](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R24)). After the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, sporadic hepatitis E cases and clusters were common in areas with poor access to safe water. Over 1,200 cases of acute jaundice, many confirmed as hepatitis E, occurred among the displaced ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). Clusters of both hepatitis A and hepatitis E were noted in Aceh after the December 2004 tsunami ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). Leptospirosis is an epidemic-prone zoonotic bacterial disease that can be transmitted by direct contact with contaminated water. Rodents shed large amounts of leptospires in their urine, and transmission occurs through contact of the skin and mucous membranes with water, damp soil or vegetation (such as sugar cane), or mud contaminated with rodent urine. Flooding facilitates spread of the organism because of the proliferation of rodents and the proximity of rodents to humans on shared high ground. Outbreaks of leptospirosis occurred in Taiwan, Republic of China, associated with Typhoon Nali in 2001 ([27](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R27)); in Mumbai, India, after flooding in 2000 ([28](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R28)); in Argentina after flooding in 1998 ([29](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R29)); and in the Krasnodar region of the Russian Federation in 1997 ([30](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R30)). After a flooding-related outbreak of leptospirosis in Brazil in 1996, spatial analysis indicated that incidence rates of leptospirosis doubled inside the flood-prone areas of Rio de Janeiro ([31](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R31)). Diseases Associated with Crowding Crowding is common in populations displaced by natural disasters and can facilitate the transmission of communicable diseases. Measles and the risk for transmission after a natural disaster are dependent on baseline immunization coverage among the affected population, and in particular among children <15 years of age. Crowded living conditions facilitate measles transmission and necessitate even higher immunization coverage levels to prevent outbreaks ([32](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R32)). A measles outbreak in the Philippines in 1991 among persons displaced by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo involved >18,000 cases ([33](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R33)). After the tsunami in Aceh, a cluster of measles involving 35 cases occurred in Aceh Utara district, and continuing sporadic cases and clusters were common despite mass vaccination campaigns ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). In Pakistan, after the 2005 South Asia earthquake, sporadic cases and clusters of measles (>400 clinical cases in the 6 months after the earthquake) also occurred ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). Neisseria meningitidis meningitis is transmitted from person to person, particularly in situations of crowding. Cases and deaths from meningitis among those displaced in Aceh and Pakistan have been documented ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25),[26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). Prompt response with antimicrobial prophylaxis, as occurred in Aceh and Pakistan, can interrupt transmission. Large outbreaks have not been recently reported in disaster-affected populations but are well-documented in populations displaced by conflict ([34](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R34)). Acute respiratory infections (ARI) are a major cause of illness and death among displaced populations, particularly in children <5 years of age. Lack of access to health services and to antimicrobial agents for treatment further increases the risk for death from ARI. Risk factors among displaced persons include crowding, exposure to indoor cooking using open flame, and poor nutrition. The reported incidence of ARI increased 4-fold in Nicaragua in the 30 days after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 ([35](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R35)), and ARI accounted for the highest number of cases and deaths among those displaced by the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)) and by the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). Vectorborne Diseases Natural disasters, particularly meteorologic events such as cyclones, hurricanes, and flooding, can affect vector-breeding sites and vectorborne disease transmission. While initial flooding may wash away existing mosquito-breeding sites, standing water caused by heavy rainfall or overflow of rivers can create new breeding sites. This situation can result (with typically some weeks’ delay) in an increase of the vector population and potential for disease transmission, depending on the local mosquito vector species and its preferred habitat. The crowding of infected and susceptible hosts, a weakened public health infrastructure, and interruptions of ongoing control programs are all risk factors for vectorborne disease transmission ([36](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R36)). Malaria outbreaks in the wake of flooding are a well-known phenomenon. An earthquake in Costa Rica’s Atlantic Region in 1991 was associated with changes in habitat that were beneficial for breeding and preceded an extreme rise in malaria cases ([37](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R37)). Additionally, periodic flooding linked to El Niño–Southern Oscillation has been associated with malaria epidemics in the dry coastal region of northern Peru ([38](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R38)). Dengue transmission is influenced by meteorologic conditions, including rainfall and humidity, and often exhibits strong seasonality. However, transmission is not directly associated with flooding. Such events may coincide with periods of high risk for transmission and may be exacerbated by increased availability of the vector’s breeding sites (mostly artificial containers) caused by disruption of basic water supply and solid waste disposal services. The risk for outbreaks can be influenced by other complicating factors, such as changes in human behavior (increased exposure to mosquitoes while sleeping outside, movement from dengue-nonendemic to -endemic areas, a pause in disease control activities, overcrowding) or changes in the habitat that promote mosquito breeding (landslide, deforestation, river damming, and rerouting of water). Other Diseases Associated with Natural Disasters Tetanus is not transmitted person to person but is caused by a toxin released by the anaerobic tetanus bacillus Clostridium tetani. Contaminated wounds, particularly in populations where vaccination coverage levels are low, are associated with illness and death from tetanus. A cluster of 106 cases of tetanus, including 20 deaths, occurred in Aceh and peaked 2-1/2 weeks after the tsunami ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). Cases were also reported in Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). An unusual outbreak of coccidiomycosis occurred after the January 1994 Southern California earthquake. The infection is not transmitted person to person and is caused by the fungus Coccidioides immitis, which is found in soil in certain semiarid areas of North and South America. This outbreak was associated with exposure to increased levels of airborne dust subsequent to landslides in the aftermath of the earthquake ([39](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R39)). Disaster-Related Interruption of Services Power cuts related to disasters may disrupt water treatment and supply plants, thereby increasing the risk for waterborne diseases. Lack of power may also affect proper functioning of health facilities, including preservation of the vaccine cold chain. An increase in diarrheal illness in New York City followed a massive power outage in 2003. The blackout left 9 million people in the area without power for several hours to 2 days. Diarrhea cases were widely dispersed and detected by using nontraditional surveillance techniques. A case-control study performed as part of the outbreak investigation linked diarrheal illness with the consumption of meat and seafood after the onset of the power outage, when refrigeration facilities were widely interrupted ([40](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R40)). Historically, fears of major disease outbreaks in the aftermath of natural disasters have shaped the perceptions of the public and policymakers. These expectations, misinformed by associations of disease with dead bodies, can create fear and panic in the affected population and lead to confusion in the media and elsewhere. The risk for outbreaks after natural disasters is low, particularly when the disaster does not result in substantial population displacement. Communicable diseases are common in displaced populations that have poor access to basic needs such as safe water and sanitation, adequate shelter, and primary healthcare services. These conditions, many favorable for disease transmission, must be addressed immediately with the rapid reinstatement of basic services. Assuring access to safe water and primary healthcare services is crucial, as are surveillance and early warning to detect epidemic-prone diseases known to occur in the disaster-affected area. A comprehensive communicable disease risk assessment can determine priority diseases for inclusion in the surveillance system and prioritize the need for immunization and vector-control campaigns. Five basic steps that can reduce the risk for communicable disease transmission in populations affected by natural disasters are summarized in an ([Appendix Table](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#SD1)). Disaster-related deaths are overwhelmingly caused by the initial traumatic impact of the event. Disaster-preparedness plans, appropriately focused on trauma and mass casualty management, should also take into account the health needs of the surviving disaster-affected populations. The health effects associated with the sudden crowding of large numbers of survivors, often with inadequate access to safe water and sanitation facilities, will require planning for both therapeutic and preventive interventions, such as the rapid delivery of safe water and the provision of rehydration materials, antimicrobial agents, and measles vaccination materials.

#### Empirics prove Citizen Corps k2 safe water access. Emmett 10

Emmett, Ed. “Harris County Citizen Corps Builds Community Preparedness.” The County Judge Report, Aug. 2010, www.judgeemmett.org/Newsletters/Newsletter\_August\_2010.html. //nhs-VA

Harris County Citizen Corps’ value was proven during Hurricane Ike in September 2008. A powerful Category 2 hurricane with sustained winds of 110 miles per hour, its storm surge flooded 2,500 homes. Another 1,200 homes were flooded due to the heavy rainfall, and almost 98% of area residents were left without power. The community’s response was a testament to the extraordinary results that are achieved when residents adopt a culture of preparedness. Volunteers from Harris County Medical Reserve Corps delivered over 81,000 meals to homebound individuals immediately after Ike struck our community. Efforts led by Harris County Citizen Corps, its partners and volunteers helped distribute more than 1.1 million gallons of water, 10.5 million pounds of ice and 2.8 million ready-to-eat meals to devastated residents. Volunteers made the difference in ensuring that the natural disaster did not become a *massive public health disaster* as well. Harris County Citizen Corps has been recognized as a National Best Practice and received the 2003 Best Practices for Innovation Award from the Texas Association of Counties and the 2006 Governors Volunteer Award for Community Capacity Builder. In 2007, HCCC was awarded “The President’s Call to Service Award,” recognizing its coordination of the volunteer response to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. Further, in 2008 the organization was honored by President Bush at the White House, received the National Citizen’s Corps Council Achievement Award for Volunteer Integration in 2009 and was recently chosen as a finalist for the 2010 National Citizen Corps Achievement Awards-Celebrating Resilient Communities (award winners will be announced in September). Having built strong partnerships with the 53 fire departments, 34 incorporated cities and over 100 law enforcement entities in Harris County, Citizen Corps will continue to build upon the foundation put in place over the past eight years. Its focus on developing and supporting volunteer opportunities for residents will only sharpen as new challenges become apparent and new volunteers come forward.

#### Disease-spread causes extinction – evolution of new strains and ability to spread quickly. DUJS 09

DUJS. “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate.” DUJS Online, 22 May 2009, dujs.dartmouth.edu/2009/05/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate/#.WaHznJOGOYU. //nhs-VA

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

### 1AC – Wildfires

#### Wildfires are more likely and potentially dangerous than ever before. Hodgson interviewing Ferguson 7/27

Ferguson, Gary. “How Climate Change Is Making Wildfire Season Worse.” How Climate Change Is Making Wildfire Season Worse | Here & Now, WBUR, 27 July 2017, www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2017/07/27/land-on-fire-gary-ferguson. Gary Ferguson is an American writer. Ferguson is the author of more than 20 nonfiction books. His books have won awards from the Society of American Travel Writers, the High Plains Book Festival, and the Montana Book Award committee.//nhs-VA

On how much worse wildfires are because of climate change "The most comprehensive study to come out last year, kind of a collaborative effort between Columbia University and the University of Idaho, suggested that when you pull out all the natural climate change factors — things like ocean circulation patterns and whatnot — human-caused climate change is probably responsible for doubling the number of acres burned since 1985. So it's a very, very fast change, and it looks like from all the evidence out there that this is just simply going to be worse before it gets better." On whether humans moving into new areas has exacerbated wildfires' impact "Absolutely, and that's part of the perfect storm going on. There's something that land use planners refer to as the 'wildland-urban interface,' and that's exactly what it sounds like: People moving into the edge of large swaths of vegetation, and pretty fire-prone areas. And remarkably, a billion acres are now in the wildland-urban interface, so that's about 40 percent of the land mass in the United States. And 200 million acres of that — about 70,000 communities — are living in land that has been designated as high risk for wildfire in the coming years." On whether it's always been hard for forests to come back from a wildfire "Not so much. And while there have always been the occasional big fires, they have gotten much, much more common since roughly 2000. Typically, in the days of thousands of years before Europeans and Anglos arrived in the West, there were what were called stand-maintenance fires burning through, and they were fairly low temperature, smaller fires, 6- to 8-foot tall flames, and they would actually be very healthy. They are very healthy for the forest. And so by eliminating those stand-maintenance fires, we allowed the fuel load to build up to an incredibly high degree. We've got about 300 million acres in the West now with unnaturally heavy fuel loads. And so now when the fires go through, they hit these accumulated fuel loads, and that's what makes them hot — that along with climate change — and that's what's sterilizing the soil to a degree and creating these hydrophobic soils to a degree that simply wouldn't have happened with this kind of regularity 50 or 100 years ago."

#### Fire Corps is a division of Citizen Corps – the aff relieves recruiting strains and frees up space for firefighters. Fire Corps Website n.d.

“Frequently Asked Questions.” Fire Corps - Supporting Fire & EMS Services, www.firecorps.org/volunteers/frequently-asked-questions. //nhs-VA

Fire Corps is a locally-driven Citizen Corps program that enables community members to offer their time and talents to their local fire/EMS department in a non-emergency capacity. What is Citizen Corps? Citizen Corps is an initiative under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to help coordinate volunteer activities that will make our communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to any emergency situation. It provides opportunities for people to support first responders and participate in a range of measures to make their families, homes, and communities safer from the threats of crime, terrorism, and disasters of all kinds. Citizen Corps is comprised of five programs – USAOnWatch/Neighborhood Watch, Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), and Fire Corps – along with several affiliate organizations. Citizen Corps activities are coordinated at the local level by Citizen Corps Councils. For more information about Citizen Corps, please visit [www.citizencorps.gov](http://www.citizencorps.gov/). Department Questions How can Fire Corps benefit my department? Fire Corps provides opportunities for community members to assist your department by performing non-emergency tasks and roles, enabling department members to focus on emergency response and training. Engaging citizens may also allow departments to increase the services they offer, such as enhanced fire safety education programs. In return, citizens gain a greater understanding of the fire and emergency services and become better prepared to handle their own emergencies as well as those of their neighbors. Fire Corps members also act as advocates for the fire and emergency services in the community. My department already has a citizen volunteer program in place. Does it qualify as a Fire Corps program or do we have to change it in any way? If citizens offer their time to support your department in a non-emergency capacity, it qualifies as a Fire Corps program. Registering your program with Fire Corps allows you to use the nationally recognized Fire Corps name, opens your program up to increased funding opportunities, and grants you access to using all of Fire Corps’ resources and materials without having to make modifications. [Register your program](http://www.firecorps.org/program-login/register). Is there funding available for Fire Corps program? Yes. As a registered member of Fire Corps, your department may be eligible for grants through your local Citizen Corps Council. Contact your local or state Citizen Corps Council for more information or visit [www.citizencorps.gov](http://www.citizencorps.gov/). There are also increased grant opportunities through other federal grant programs, such as the Fire Prevention and Safety grants available through the Department of Homeland Security's Assistance to Firefighters Grant program. [Learn more about grant and funding opportunities](http://www.firecorps.org/departments/start-a-program/grants-and-funding). My department would like to start a program. What help is available? The Fire Corps national office has created a myriad of resources to help you start, market, maintain, and expand your department’s efforts to generate more community support through Fire Corps. These include resource guides, sample documents, training and evaluation materials, public service announcements, complimentary newsletters, and promotional materials. Access these resources and more [here](http://www.firecorps.org/departments/overview). In addition, Fire Corps has created a network of State Advocates to assist you as you start and implement a Fire Corps program. These State Advocates serve as the point of contact to assist departments and programs in their assigned geographic area. [Find your State Advocate](http://www.firecorps.org/departments/start-a-program/connect-with-your-state-advocate/161-state-advocate-contacts-).You can also contact Fire Corps at 1-888-FC-INFO1 or info@firecorps.org for more information and guidance. My department already has a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program. How would establishing a Fire Corps program in addition to CERT benefit my department? CERT and Fire Corps are complimentary programs that can work together to create a comprehensive citizen volunteer support program. By implementing both CERT and Fire Corps, it becomes even easier to meet a department’s diverse range of needs as well as keep community volunteers actively engaged both in times of crisis and in between. Fire Corps has produced a guide that outlines how Fire Corps and CERT can work together to benefit both the departments and the citizen volunteers as well as how to build stronger communities. [Download the guide](http://www.firecorps.org/files/documents/cert-fire-corps-working-together.pdf). Community Volunteer Questions Why should I join a Fire Corps program? As a Fire Corps volunteer, you will be part of a renowned national volunteer program where you can support your local fire/EMS department with non-emergency tasks so department members may better protect your community from fires, natural disasters, terrorism, and other emergencies. In return, you will gain a greater understanding of the fire and emergency services and become better prepared to handle your own emergencies as well as those of your neighbors. What can I do for my local fire/EMS departments? Fire Corps members can use their individual talents and skills to support various non-emergency tasks, including but not limited to: Conducting fire prevention and life safety education in the community Providing rehab or canteen services (providing food and water to first responders during lengthy incidents) Raising much-needed funds for the department Performing data entry tasks Assisting with bookkeeping Providing administrative support Conducting public relations Assisting with events Preplanning and conducting research for emergency incidents Apparatus and facility maintenance The types of tasks available are limited only by the needs of the department. Fire/EMS departments seek a variety of skills and will match your talents and interests to an appropriate assignment. For example, if you're a graphic designer, they may ask you to help design a brochure, or if you're a computer software expert, they may want you to help improve their existing information system.

#### Wildfires kill the economy. Diaz 12

Diaz, John M. “Economic Impacts of Wildfire.” Southern Fire Exchange, July 2012, fireadaptednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/economic\_costs\_of\_wildfires.pdf. Diaz - assistant professor and Extension specialist, Department of Agricultural Education and Communication//nhs-VA

Wildfires frequently damage community infrastructure, including highways, communication facilities, power lines, and water delivery systems. Restoring basic services is a top priority, and, many agencies and organizations incur significant restoration costs after a fire. State transportation departments’ efforts to restore roads and highways include the costs of maintenance and damage assessment teams, field data collection, and replacement or repair of roads, guardrails, signage, electrical supply, culverts, and landscaping. Direct impacts to municipal water supply may occur through contamination of ash and debris during the fire, destruction of aboveground delivery lines, and soil erosion or debris deposits into waterways after the fire. Municipal water managers must address water supply impacts, and the potential costs associated with changes in quantity and quality. Utilities and communications repairs are also necessary for equipment damaged by a fire. This includes power lines, transformers, cell phone towers, and phone lines. Tax payers feel the squeeze on these repairs as each state typically reimburses the majority of costs incurred by the companies paying for the repairs. Florida facilitated these repairs by increasing sales tax variably throughout the 16 county region affected by wildfires to collect almost $43 million dollars for the fire season of 1998. The 2003 wildfires resulted in significant losses to San Diego’s infrastructure. The total economic impact on infrastructure was $147.3 million, with a majority of the loss as 3,200 utility power poles, 400 miles of wire, 400 transformers, and damage to 100 other pieces of related utility equipment. NATURAL AREAS ECONOMIC IMPACT Post-catastrophe management of endangered species and their habitat is a complex issue. Management requires extensive funding for watershed restoration and hazard mitigation efforts. Portions of these funds are used to restore habitat and control the potential impact of erosion and floods in the following seasons. While not easily measured, loss of ecosystem services could potentially be included in the total economic loss. The Florida study did not quantify these economic impacts due to the complexity of environmental management and restoration. The San Diego State study was able to estimate costs associated with erosion, flood control, and watershed restoration. FEMA provided $47 million in watershed restoration funding and $14 million in hazard mitigation efforts. Recognizing the extent of these restoration efforts, San Diego County received additional financial support from the US Department of Agriculture and San Diego Gas and Electric totaling just over $42 million. This left a huge financial responsibility on the county to provide the remaining funds to effectively restore watersheds and ecosystems. Loss of ecosystems services was estimated based on the reduced function to control runoff and reduce air pollution. These costs were estimated at $25,349,000 and $798,000, respectively. Along with the economic impact identified, these natural areas may also serve as significant cultural and historical resources, for which losses are not easily quantified. BUSINESS ECONOMIC IMPACT Determining the total economic loss and impact of the wildfires to the region is challenging. While many of the local businesses experience impacts to facilities, shipping delays, and interruptions in employee productivity, few of them actually estimate this loss. In 1998, the counties in the SJRWMD that were affected by the fires lost $138 million in tourism but also experienced an increase of over $1 billion in total business sales, compared to the same period the previous year. Forest landowners with burned timber lost approximately $350 million in value. The lost economic activity in the San Diego region was calculated at a conservative 10% based on gross productivity. This was due to a loss of 24 commercial buildings, a $32.5 million drop in tourism, and almost 5,000 people out of work. As with the Florida fires, there was a significant increase in economic activity following the wildfire season associated with recovery and rehabilitation efforts. Economic growth after large wildfire events is not a result of true economic growth, but rather a response to large-scale economic and infrastructure losses. COMMUNITY IMPACT Wildfires impact communities in multiple ways, from closing natural areas that residents and tourists visit to damaging homes and harming residents or firefighters. Short- and long-term impacts on recreational activity are challenging to quantify. Closures of areas often eliminate recreational activity, while interest in post-fire impacts on the wildlands may actually attract new visitors. As fires are inherently dangerous, residents and firefighters can be injured or even lose their lives during a wildfire. While it is impossible to place a dollar value on human life, it is very important to consider the impacts of these events on communities and families. In addition, long-term exposure to smoke can increase the incidence of respiratory conditions and hospital visits*. The loss of homes and employment are frequently the largest of the economic loss indicators*. From 1985 to 2011 approximately 9,000 homes have been lost to wildfires across the United States. In 1998, Florida observed $12 million dollars in property loss, but fortunately no fatalities, while in 2003 San Diego County lost 3,241 homes, 16 civilians, and 1 firefighter.

#### Trump lashes out – this causes conflict. Foster 16

Foster 12/16 - Dennis M. Foster is professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute. “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” December 19, 2016, Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm\_term=.9ac2999a0f48) LADI

Then-Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump gives a speech aboard the World War II battleship USS Iowa in San Pedro, Calif., in September, 2015. (Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images) If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy. In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior. Do words translate into foreign policy action? One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. [Trump may put 5 former top military brass in his administration. That’s unprecedented.] For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively. Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force). [Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?] Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. What about Donald Trump? Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action. I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

### 1AC – Bioterror

#### Bioterror coming now – can’t afford to say it’s improbable. Holgate and Cameron 9/2

Laura Holgate and Elizabeth Cameron, opinion contributors. “Trump Must Prevent the next Biological Attack before It Strikes.” TheHill, 2 Sept. 2017, thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/348977-trump-must-stop-our-next-biological-threat-before-it.//nhs-VA

Biological threats have a way of sneaking up on you when you least expect it. This summer, while nuclear tensions are center stage, we can’t afford to divert attention from biological threats. Pathogens know no borders, don’t have passports, can come from a bioterrorist or Mother Nature and can ignite already volatile situations. And the devastation wrought by Hurricane Harvey in Texas is yet another reminder of the importance of health security before, during and after a crisis. Being prepared to respond to immediate threats is, of course, paramount to save lives. At the same time, as the former White House [National Security Council](https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc) staffers responsible for countering biological threats, we saw firsthand the need to maintain long-term focus — even during a crisis — on bolstering our nation’s biodefense capability. We know that biological threats must remain at the top of the national security agenda, and leaders must recognize that stopping outbreaks at the source requires strong global and domestic capacity to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to naturally occurring outbreaks and biological attacks A test of this focus came in April 2013, when two biothreats developed that proved vital for shaping biodefense and global health security policy over the next four years. First, the deadly toxin ricin was found in letters mailed to President Obama, a U.S. senator and a Mississippi judge. Second, a worrisome new strain of H7N9 avian influenza that could infect humans was discovered in China. These events occurred during the same week as the devastating Boston Marathon bombing, and all the events were happening as Abu Bakr Baghdadi announced the formation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

#### First responders are first preventers – Citizen Corps stops the terror before it happens. Lieberman 03

Lieberman 03 (Joseph, US Senate--CT, FNS, 5/22, lexis)

But the resources necessary have not been given to this department yet. The potential for change and improvement is still there. Let me cite as examples the fire fighters, police officers and medical emergency professionals in communities across America who are the first to respond to a disaster, and the last to leave, and who can become also the first preventers, because they are out there in enormous numbers everywhere in America, still desperately need proper training, proper communications to allow them to talk to one another in a crisis, so they can protect us, **and they need personal reinforcements**. Instead, many first responders -- more than half of the communities in America, from one statistic I have seen have been laying off first responders today, **because the cities and towns are so fiscally strapped**. That makes about as much sense as reducing America's troop strength in the middle of a conventional war. Yet, I regret to say that the administration and the majority here in Congress have not adequately funded first responders or the Department of Homeland Security. There is much more to be done. We have made so strides in securing our air travel, that is true. But other forms of transportation remain inadequately protected, and require your consideration. Our nation's seaports I fear remain an Achilles' heel in our domestic defenses. Too little cargo is being inspected, and to few containers are being tracked from their port of origin to their final destination. At the current rate of funding, it will take the Coast Guard 20 years to build the modern fleet it needs to fight terrorism now. And here again the president's budget under-supports basic physical security at ports for items like perimeter fencing, guards and monitors. Our borders remain painfully porous and cry out for the Border Patrol to be beefed up. But I do want to say that to me perhaps the most significant gap remaining is the one that people can't see, and that is the gap in our intelligence community. There has been too much reluctance to challenge the status quo in the intelligence community. The best way to stop terrorism, all the experts agree, is to interrupt the plot before it's executed. And that can only come from great intelligence. Today, unfortunately, when it comes to understanding the scope and depth of the intelligence failures that led to September 11th, we simply don't have enough information. Too many of the failures that we have already identified remain unchanged today, a full 20 months after the attacks. And I want to say bluntly it starts at the top. And today at the top of our intelligence and law enforcement communities there remains too much division, too many of the same bureaucratic barriers that I think contributed to the disaster of September 11th. And all of the federal agencies continue to keep state and local first responders and first preventers, as I call them, **at arm's length, when it really is these front-line forces who have the vital knowledge to share**, and most desperately need useful federal intelligence shared with them.

#### Bioterror attacks cause extinction

Mhyrvold 13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013

As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important, the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to choose from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Buller’s variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldn’t be done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.

### 1AC – Vaccines

#### The next pandemic is coming now, and only vaccines can stop it. The impact is millions of deaths. Gupta 4/10

Gupta, Dr. Sanjay. “The Big One Is Coming, and It's Going to Be a Flu Pandemic.” CNN, Cable News Network, 10 Apr. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-gupta/index.html. Sanjay Gupta is an American [neurosurgeon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurosurgeon) and media reporter. He serves as associate chief of the neurosurgery service at [Grady Memorial Hospital](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grady_Memorial_Hospital) in [Atlanta, Georgia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta), and as assistant professor of [neurosurgery](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurosurgery) at the [Emory University School of Medicine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emory_University_School_of_Medicine). //nhs-VA

Experts say we are "due" for one. When it happens, they tell us, it will probably have a greater impact on humanity than anything else currently happening in the world. And yet, like with most people, it is probably something you haven't spent much time thinking about. After all, it is human nature to avoid being consumed by hypotheticals until they are staring us squarely in the face. Such is the case with a highly lethal flu pandemic. And when it comes, it will affect every human alive today. Pandemic flu is apolitical and does not discriminate between rich and poor. Geographical boundaries are meaningless, and it can circle the globe within hours. In terms of potential impact on mankind, the only thing that comes close is climate change. And, like climate change, pandemic flu is so vast, it can be challenging to wrap your head around it. When most people hear "flu," they typically think of seasonal flu. No doubt, seasonal flu can be deadly, especially for the very young and old, as well as those with compromised immune systems. For most people, however, the seasonal flu virus, which mutates just a little bit every year, is not particularly severe because our immune systems have already probably seen a similar flu virus and thus know how to fight it. It's called native immunity or protection, and almost all of us have some degree of it. Babies are more vulnerable because they haven't been exposed to the seasonal flu and older people because their immune systems may not be functioning as well. Pandemic flu is a different animal, and you should understand the difference. Panˈdemik/: pan means "all"; demic (or demographic) means "people." It is well-named, because pandemic flu spreads easily throughout the world. Unlike seasonal flu, pandemics occur when a completely new or novel virus emerges. This sort of virus can emerge directly from animal reservoirs or be the result of a dramatic series of mutations -- so-called reassortment events -- in previously circulating viruses. In either case, the result is something mankind has never seen before: a pathogen that can spread easily from person to defenseless person, our immune systems never primed to launch any sort of defense. With pandemic flu, we cannot solely rely on our bodies' ability to fight. A vaccine is our only real hope. That fact is part of the reason the number 24 has been stuck in my head the past few months as I have been working on the CNN original film "[Unseen Enemy](http://edition.cnn.com/shows/unseen-enemy)." I have become convinced that if we can develop and deploy a pandemic flu vaccine just 24 weeks faster than is currently projected, the impact could change the course of human history. Twenty-four weeks faster could mean the difference between 20,000 people dying in the next flu pandemic or more than 20 million people dying. In the 20th century alone, we experienced serious flu pandemics. The Spanish Flu of 1918 was an unprecedented catastrophe. Experts' best estimates (before there was more formal census and record-keeping) were that 20% to 40% of the world became ill and more than 50 million people died. In the United States alone, approximately 675,000 people died in just the eight months between September 1918 and April 1919. Some people died the same day they became ill, and others died within a few days from complications of the flu, such as pneumonia or meningitis. Forty years later, the Asian flu of 1958 and 1959 had a global death toll as high as 2 million and an estimated 70,000 of those in the US alone. Early in 1968, the year before I was born, the Hong Kong flu began. By September, it made its way around the world, including the United States, and became widespread by December. It is believed that the number of those infected peaked during the fall, when kids were at school, transmitting the virus more freely. Still, as many as a million people died, 34,000 in the US alone between September 1968 and March 1969. We have learned a lot over the past 100 years and are better prepared because of it. In the developed world, at least, we have the ability to ease suffering with antivirals, breathing machines and antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections. Experts can also more quickly characterize pathogens causing outbreaks. Although it took several years to identify the virus causing AIDS, for example, it took only a few weeks to identify the SARS virus. We are also much faster at developing vaccines. According to research [compiled by the science publication Mosaic](https://mosaicscience.com/story/outpacing-pandemics-epidemics-vaccines-infectious-disease), a typhoid vaccine was first tested in 1896 but only developed into a safe and effective vaccine nearly a hundred years later, in 1994. It took just 12 years, however, to develop a safe and effective Ebola vaccine (2003 to 2015). And, last week, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases announced initiation of a phase II trial for a [Zika vaccine](http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/31/health/zika-vaccine-nih-trial/) that started in August with the hope it may be ready for emergency use by 2018. Most important, our production capabilities have increased tremendously around the world. In 2006, according to the World Health Organization, we had the ability to make only 350 million doses of flu vaccine, but now, in theory, we could make 5.4 billion doses of flu vaccine if we harnessed and aligned manufacturing facilities all over the world. Would it ever be possible, however, to create and distribute a vaccine 24 weeks faster -- in six weeks instead of 30 weeks -- and save more than 20 million lives? For starters, the way we typically make flu vaccine is still pretty antiquated and hasn't changed much in nearly 70 years. We rely largely on hens' eggs to incubate and replicate the virus, which is too slow of a process to respond rapidly to pandemic flu. Richard Hatchett, CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, told me that recent scientific advances, however, are fully transforming the speed at which vaccines can be developed and approved. Genomic techniques can be used to map the DNA or RNA of a new pathogen, genetically to engineer and mass-produce the same DNA or RNA and then inject it into the human body, leading to the production of antibodies to fight the virus. This method results in a new type of vaccine, a DNA vaccine. Faster development and production is one critical step to shortening the vaccine process by 24 weeks. Another is more robust surveillance systems everywhere in the world. As we were reminded with Ebola and Zika, an infection anywhere can be an infection everywhere. The first time an ill patient shows up at a hospital anywhere on the planet with a novel virus, the clock starts ticking. Improved surveillance means that hospital staff has to be astute enough to recognize that the patient doesn't fit the normal patterns we were taught in medical school and start to investigate further. After that, there has to be speedy and accurate identification of the virus, purification and sequencing of the genetic material and then immediate sharing of the knowledge (via the cloud) enabling researchers everywhere to get to work on the development of new vaccines. After this genetically engineered vaccine is developed, it would have to be manufactured in the billions and then distributed to every city in the world. Join the conversation See the latest news and share your comments with CNN Health on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/CNNHealth) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/cnnhealth). To make this a reality, it will take unprecedented partnerships between governments, even those at odds with each other. It will take the public and private sector working together every step of the way to ensure that the newly created vaccine can be distributed, trusted and administered. It will take research and development money, as it always does, to bolster the techniques and infrastructure I described and make them available everywhere. And it will take accepting that a pandemic of flu is likely in our lifetime. But with preparation and imagination, it need not be as nearly catastrophic as it was 50 or 100 years ago. Make no mistake, outbreaks -- sudden, unexpected and localized eruptions of infection -- are inevitable. But, as epidemiologist Larry Brilliant (who spearheaded the effort to eradicate Small Pox), puts it: pandemics can be optional.

#### Medical Reserve Corps are key to distributing vaccines and promoting community vaccination but underfunded now. Hasbrouck 16

Hasbrouck, LaMar. “Emergency Medical Response Program Threatened by Federal Budget Cuts.” TheHill, 4 Feb. 2016, thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/247092-emergency-medical-response-program-threatened-by-federal-budget-cuts. Hasbrouck, a former local and state health commissioner, is executive director of the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). He served earlier as an official with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization. //nhs-VA

A life-saving emergency medical response program staffed by more than 200,000 volunteer healthcare professionals and others across the United States is threatened by a devastating 55 percent cut in federal funds that was recently approved by a U.S. Senate committee. The program, called the Medical Reserve Corps, is a national network of volunteers organized locally to protect the health and safety of their communities. It deploys doctors, nurses, emergency medical technicians, paramedics, mental health professionals and non-medical volunteers with specialized skills who assist healthcare professionals to care for people in emergencies. But despite all this good work by the Medical Reserve Corps, the Senate Appropriations Committee recently voted to slash the budget of the organization from $9 million this year to just $4 million in the 2016 fiscal year that begins in October. If these big cuts make it through the Senate and the House as part of next year’s federal budget, the Medical Reserve Corps will be forced to cut back on its activities, leaving millions of people more vulnerable just when they need help the most. There are nearly 1,000 Medical Reserve Corps units, scattered through all 50 states and many U.S. territories. A [survey](http://www.naccho.org/topics/emergency/MRC/upload/TTC-NACCHO-MRC-Report-2013-lo-res.pdf) by the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) found that two-thirds of the Medical Reserve Corps units are part of their local health departments. The rest are run by a broad range of other organizations, including emergency management agencies, volunteer centers, hospitals, colleges and universities, medical societies and civic and religious organizations. The role of the volunteers is particularly critical because cuts in federal, state and local government funding for local health departments around the nation have resulted in the elimination of 51,700 jobs at the local health departments since 2008, [a NACCHO study](http://nacchoprofilestudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Forces-of-Change-Slidedoc-Final.pdf) published in June found. The Medical Reserve Corps volunteers have taken on some of the work formerly carried out by these local health department employees. Medical Reserve Corps volunteers rush to the scenes of natural disasters like hurricanes and tornadoes, transportation disasters like airliner crashes and train derailments, major infectious disease threats like H1N1 (originally referred to as Swine Flu) or Ebola, terrorist attacks and other mass-casualty incidents. For example, following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, more than 6,000 Medical Reserve Corps volunteers from 150 units supported the emergency response and recovery efforts. When Superstorm Sandy hit New York and New Jersey in 2012, more than 2,000 Medical Reserve Corps volunteers swung into action and donated more than 18,000 hours of their time. The volunteers provided medical care to people hurt in the deadly storm, helped operate emergency shelters and distributed food and clothing. And when bombs planted by terrorists went off at the Boston Marathon in 2013 – killing three people and sending 260 people (including 16 who lost limbs) to local hospitals – the first medical emergency responders who rushed to help the injured were 151 Medical Reserve Corps volunteers who were already on the scene to treat the typical injuries some runners suffer in the race. When not dealing with emergencies, Medical Reserve Corps volunteers spend time training and working on other projects to promote good health, such as community health education and vaccination programs. While the volunteers don’t get paid, they need funds for supplies, medications, training and equipment.

### 1AC – Ports

#### West Coast port security is weak now. KABC 8/17

Kabc. “Port of LA's Security Questioned after Chase Suspect Falls from Crane.” ABC7 Los Angeles, 17 Aug. 2017, abc7.com/port-of-las-security-questioned-after-chase-suspect-falls-from-crane/2318231/. //nhs-VA

Brackets in original

A wild chase that ended with a car theft suspect slipping from atop a loading crane at the Port of Los Angeles is raising questions about the strength of the vital port's security measures. The coroner's office on Thursday identified the man as 23-year-old James Llamas. He has previous arrests for drugs and robbery, police said. The fall came after Llamas had been on top of the crane hundreds of feet in the air, dancing, rolling around and at one point removing his clothes. After the hours-long standoff and bizarre behavior, Llamas fell from the crane. He died at the scene. The chase started around 3:50 p.m. in the area of Mid-City by the westbound 91 Freeway. Authorities began a chase with the suspect, who they believed had stolen a white SUV. At some point, authorities lost the vehicle on the 91 Freeway. He was spotted again around 5:40 p.m. and headed through Carson on the 405 Freeway. The chase eventually ended up in Long Beach and then in the Wilmington area along the waterfront. Llamas was able to easily blow through two guardhouses at the port with no barriers or other obstructions in his way. After driving around erratically for several minutes, Llamas fled from the car, leaving it to roll away. Los Angeles City Councilman Joe Buscaino, who called for a full investigation into the incident, said [He] could have been carrying anything in the vehicle that entered into the region's most sensitive zone for commerce. The Port of Los Angeles processes $750 million worth of goods per day. Port officials said in a statement that Los Angeles Port Police have launched an investigation into the security breach at the container terminal that led to Llamas being able to climb the crane. "This thorough review, including protocols necessary to address improvements, will be completed as soon as possible," port officials said.

#### Civilians at West Coast ports lack CERT training—the absence of such training leads to inefficient allocation of port security resources. Allen et al 03

Allen et al 03 (Warren, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, Seth Jacobson, Masters Students @ UCLA School of PUblic Policy + Social Research, "Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergence Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach," 4/15, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\_content/documents/PSAPP\_042103.pdf)

Meanwhile, CERT is a voluntary program, and agencies simply schedule classes based on local civilian demand. A community organization, such as a church, school, or business, must contact a training agency to schedule a class for interested volunteers. **Although the port complex is a high-risk target, its workers have not proactively sought training, and they receive no formalized preferences in the CERT scheduling system**. Consequently, port workers must wait for the next available class like other civilians, while proactive volunteers in lower-risk locations are scheduled to receive CERT training first. For example, in July 2003, the Los Angeles County Fire Department plans to establish pilot CERT programs in the communities of Inglewood, Palos Verdes, Palmdale, West Hollywood, and the unincorporated areas of East Los Angeles.105 One reason that the county fire department plans to target these five communities is that they are not within the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Fire Department’s CERT training program. In addition, they were selected based on factors such as population density, number of government offices, and earthquake risk.106 Nonetheless, **the Operational Area’s resources might be more efficiently allocated by training civilians at the port complex** rather than training volunteers in many of these neighborhoods, whose populations may be exposed to comparatively lower risks.

#### CERT significantly improves disaster readiness. Allen et al 03

Allen et al 03 (Warren, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, Seth Jacobson, Masters Students @ UCLA School of PUblic Policy + Social Research, "Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergence Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach," 4/15, [http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\_content/documents/PSAPP\_042103.pdf)](http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/PSAPP_042103.pdf%29)

The CERT program was first developed by the Los Angeles Fire Department in 1985. The following description is an excerpt from the Los Angeles Fire Department’s CERT Course Syllabus: The Los Angeles Fire Department’s “FREE” CERT program was developed because of the need for a well-trained civilian emergency work force. These teams will assist the government by responding during disaster situations where the number and scope of incidents have overwhelmed the conventional emergency services. The training program provides for community self-sufficiency through the development of multi-functional response teams who will act as an adjunct to the city’s emergency services during major disasters. Through this unique program, people from community organizations, business and industry, and city employee groups will become members of CERT, or perform as individual leaders by directing untrained volunteers in the initial phase of an emergency. The CERT members receive 17 hours (one day a week for seven weeks) of initial training. The seven-week course is followed by continuing education programs, including full day biannual refreshers. The ability of a business or community to effectively recover from the devastating effects of an earthquake requires the active participation, planning, and cooperation of all levels of the population. The fundamental responsibility for preparedness, however, lies with every individual. By encouraging preparedness efforts and hazard mitigation, the effects of a disaster can be minimized considerably, as well as facilitate recovery. The benefits of this program are numerous. It has increased our overall level of disaster readiness, provided emergency skills that people may use in day-to-day emergencies, enhanced the bond between government and community, increased community spirit, and improved the quality of life for the people of our city.95 In addition to the curriculum originally developed by the Los Angeles Fire Department, FEMA has added a new terrorism module to the CERT curriculum, which expands the overall training to 20 hours.

#### The lack of port security is the Achilles’ heel of US homeland security policy—only effective preparedness can prevent a terrorist attack on West Coast ports from inflicting catastrophic economic damage. Allen et al 03

Allen et al 03 (Warren, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, Seth Jacobson, Masters Students @ UCLA School of PUblic Policy + Social Research, "Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergence Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach," 4/15, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\_content/documents/PSAPP\_042103.pdf)

The oceans no longer protect America. In fact, **our seaports are among our nation’s most vulnerable terrorist targets**. Recent studies by the General Accounting Office, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the United States Coast Guard note that **America’s ports may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of homeland security policy**.2 Ninety-five percent of all international cargo that either enters or leaves the United States is shipped through our seaports, but the United States Customs Service and other law enforcement agencies inspect only two percent of the shipping containers.3 Consequently, terrorists have ample opportunities to deliver bombs and other destructive devices directly into the nation’s shipping infrastructure. The attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the more recent attack on the French oil tanker Limburg show that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda are both interested in maritime attacks and capable of executing them. **America’s seaports may be next**: Some analysts believe that “the target closest to [Osama] bin Laden's heart likely remains a seaport that would allow him to go to his Allah in the belly of the Eagle – perhaps on the western seaboard of the United States.”4 Given this possibility, the Los Angeles and Long Beach port facilities warrant special attention as high-risk targets. One cannot accurately assess the terrorism vulnerability of the Port of Los Angeles without also considering the vulnerability of the Port of Long Beach, which sits adjacent in Los Angeles County’s south bay. Although they are business competitors, these ports share the same roadways, harbor, and workforce; and therefore, like conjoined twins, the ports also share their vulnerability. A terrorist attack at one port could easily impact its neighbor’s docks. For this reason, the Coast Guard does not endeavor to protect the two ports separately, but instead protects the infrastructure as a single port complex.5 State and local policymakers, however, still consider the ports separately when determining public policy. The California Attorney General’s Office recently released a list of the top 624 terrorist targets in California; the Port of Long Beach was ranked third, the Port of Los Angeles was sixth, and the Queen Mary cruise ship, which is berthed at Long Beach, was not far behind.6 If the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach had been considered together as pieces of a single port complex, then the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex (“the port complex”) may have been more accurately identified as the state’s number one target, instead of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). If experts are correct to assert that Al Qaeda's ultimate military objective is “the economic paralysis of the West,” then it is also worth noting that the port complex is more substantial to the nation’s shipping infrastructure than LAX.7 Although LAX is the world’s third busiest airport and carries an average of 185,000 passengers per day, it ships only 2.1 million tons of cargo worth $80 billion annually.8 In comparison, the port complex is the world’s third busiest seaport, and handles 189 million tons of cargo worth $200 billion each year.9 This tonnage represents 43 percent of the cargo containers shipped to and from the United States annually, more than all East Coast ports combined.10 **A terrorist attack on the port complex may cause catastrophic economic damage**. Various models provide a basis for estimating the financial damage that a terrorist attack on the port complex would cause. The 2002 West Coast port shutdown, for example, provides a conservative, real-world approximation of the economic impact a terrorist attack might have. During the shutdown, Stephen Cohen, co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, estimated that the first five days of port closures would cost the national economy $4.7 billion; he projected that a twenty-day closure would cause $48 billion in losses.11 This exponential increase in Cohen’s model is a consequence of America’s dependence on international trade. According to Cohen, “Thirty years ago, when we had a dock closure, foreign trade didn’t matter to our economy. It was trivial…It’s quite different now. It’s an integrated system, and if you cut the supply line, you stop the system.”12 The actual amount of economic damage from the ten-day shutdown is still debatable, but estimates range from $1.7 billion to $20 billion.13 Three key differences between a potential terrorist attack on the port complex and the West Coast port shutdown **suggest** that **a terrorist event would** **generate more dire economic consequences**. First, the West Coast port shutdown did not directly produce deaths or significant damage to maritime and shipping infrastructure. Second, stakeholders in the 2002 shutdown were **able to anticipate and prepare for the closure**. Members of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) had been working without a contract for three months before the lockout and were accused of engaging in work “slowdowns” before the ports were actually closed. Ships that were in port were able to make efforts to unload and get underway before the port closed. A terrorist attack would not afford such a warning. The only preparation that stakeholders would have is the time that they invest ex-ante in training and planning. Third, the mechanisms for reopening the ports after the 2002 shutdown were clear: President Bush invoked the Taft-Hartley Act and a federal court ordered the ports to reopen. Moreover, the ILWU and Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) could have negotiated a contract and reopened the port. In contrast, following a terrorist attack, there is no clear statutory authority or standard operating procedure to reopen America’s ports.14 This **confusion could extend port closures and complicate the resumption of shipping. Any of these factors could produce substantial, additional economic losses**.

#### Economic decline causes conflict – this is specifically true under Trump. Foster 16

Foster 12/16 - Dennis M. Foster is professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute. “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” December 19, 2016, Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm\_term=.9ac2999a0f48) LADI

Then-Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump gives a speech aboard the World War II battleship USS Iowa in San Pedro, Calif., in September, 2015. (Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images) If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy. In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior. Do words translate into foreign policy action? One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. [Trump may put 5 former top military brass in his administration. That’s unprecedented.] For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively. Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force). [Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?] Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. What about Donald Trump? Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action. I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

## Plan

### Text

#### The United States federal government should require all citizens, as early as age 16 to complete a minimum of one year of national service in the Citizen Corps.

### Solvency

#### This is the only way to solve – here’s a solvency advocate

Brennan and Upshaw 12 – Matthew and Kyle, Naval Postgraduate School (“AMERICAN SERVICE: NEW NATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE UNITED STATES” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573814.pdf) LADI

UNIVERSALITY IS A MUST . . . YES, IT MUST BE COMPULSORY  All men and women must participate in a program to achieve the desired benefits of national service. As evidenced by case studies in Israel, Singapore, and India, without full participation the outcomes of the program will never fully meet the original objectives.  Service must be accomplished by men and women some time between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five. For example, high school dropouts could serve as early as sixteen years of age. Others could serve upon completing high school, and could use their national service experience to explore different possibilities for where they may seek work afterwards. For others, by expanding the upward boundary for service to twenty-five, individuals could complete college prior to completing their service.  Our own history during the Revolutionary and Civil Wars has shown that when military service is not fully undertaken by all parts of American society, the burden of service falls to the poor, which certainly does not bind society more closely together.  As practiced in Nigeria, completion certificates should have to be presented upon completion of service and should be required for obtaining work within the U.S. This would ensure compliance with the program. B. SERVICE IS MORE THAN FULL-TIME  The length of service could vary by service type with the typical obligation lasting one year. However, a program where an individual serves in a physically demanding or austere environment, such as on a trail construction crew in Appalachia may only need to require service for nine months. The military, where a significant investment is made to train members, would require an eighteen month service commitment. At the high end, service in the Peace Corps would remain at its current twentyseven months.  Service should be performed thirty-five to forty hours per week. One nuance is that, as in Canada’s Katimavik program, during some nights and weekends, individuals might engage in competency development or other community-related activities to promote specific national service objectives, such as fulfilling local and social needs.  Service needs to remain service and not become a job. Following completion of an individual’s service obligation, s/he can seek employment or other opportunities with the same organization, but not under the auspices of national service. For example, upon completing one’s national service in the military, an individual should have the opportunity to re-enlist and pursue the military as a career option. C. SO MANY DIFFERENT WAYS TO SERVE  A key finding of examining national service is the notion that a successful program must provide a wide variety of service options. Service options should overlap almost every sector of society: finance, the environment, healthcare, education, disaster response, military and foreign service.  Fully recognizing that not every individual can serve where they would want, it needs to be recognized that some areas, e.g., anti-poverty work, simply require someone with a broader range of life and educational experiences.  A national service program should eliminate some, but not all, of the opportunities which exist under current domestic service programs. The national service program should absorb a significant portion of AmeriCorps SN and the entire NCCC. The Senior Corps and portions of AmeriCorps SN and VISTA should remain as they are today to allow for a lifetime of service opportunities for individuals. D. EVERYONE IS INVOLVED—IT IS A CULTURE OF SERVICE  Service needs to be accepted by everyone with an understanding that everyone has a role to play. For its part, the government needs to make service a sustained priority. This means that a program cannot be reduced 69 or cut (as occurred with the CCC, Zivildienst in Germany, the NSS in India, and the IDF in Israel) as other national priorities emerge. Parents, meanwhile, need to encourage and motivate youth to find the right area in which to serve.  Service needs to be viewed as valuable. The value cannot be measured just in terms of financial cost-benefit terms. The value in service lies in the benefits that accrue for both the individual and society in terms of social glue, civic engagement, and democratic commitments that service inspires.  Role models are critical to the success of future service programs. Young people will benefit greatly from seeing former service members both draw on and speak about their service experiences. Leadership by and encouragement from service members are both powerful elements, vital in motivating future generations.

#### Only increased participation in Citizen Corps can enable volunteers to contribute to effective emergency preparedness. Scrocca 04

Joseph E. Scrocca, B.A., May 2004. “National Service and Volunteerism in Homeland Security: Past, Present and Future,” LBJ SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, <http://rgkcenter.utexas.edu/research/articles/scrocca-pr.pdf>

\*Bracketed for gendered language

Together, the military, national and state emergency management offices, and first responders are working with volunteers to help ensure our nation’s security at home. However, as this study will indicate, there are still many challenges to meet if volunteers are to be effectively and efficiently utilized across the spectrum of homeland security needs, such as in emergency preparedness, emergency response, public health, and public safety. To accomplish this, traditional barriers against first responder and volunteer collaboration need to be broken down, while the number of neighborhood watch programs, emergency response teams, and other vital volunteer services are increased, sustained, coordinated, and proliferated throughout every state, county, and city in America. This study will show that it is not enough for the federal government to just guard against the obvious vulnerabilities; education is the key, and every citizen must also be prepared to do his or her [their] part to ensure their own security, as well as that of their families and communities. Best practices must be also identified, shared, and duplicated across the country and recognition given to those programs and individuals who are making a positive impact on homeland security.

#### Citizen Corps is key to solvency- a centralized program is key to the effectiveness of volunteers. Biladeau 06

Pamela G. Biladeau, Master of Arts in Security Studies (Pending), March 2006, “Strengthening and Expanding the Citizen Corps”, Naval Postgraduate School, <https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/theses/06Mar_Biladeau.pdf>

The Neighborhood Watch program and the CERT programs are already geographically structured. Local emergency plans should be scaleable and can easily use the pre-existing geographic boundaries set by Citizen Corps councils. The use of geographically located and trained Corps volunteers and prepared civilians would help bridge the predeployment gap. The standardization and reorganization of civilian roles and functions will send a strong message to the general population that civilians have a responsibility for their preparedness and they are, in fact, responders.

## AT: K

### Underview

#### Understanding the intricacies of politics and the state is a prerequisite to addressing oppression – this comes prior to the alt. Bryant 12

Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/).

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you ~~guys~~ behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

#### Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – it enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the creation of positive alternative futures. Barma 16

Barma et al. 16 – (May 2016, ~Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15~, Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, "'Imagine a World in Which': Using Scenarios in Political Science," International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using\_scenarios\_in\_political\_science\_isp\_2015.pdf).

Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool to be used in combination with simulations of decision-making. Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created. We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to articulate surprising and yet plausible futures, often referred to as “alternative worlds.” Scenarios are thus explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns, and they are not hypothesis-based expert predictions. Nor should they be equated with simulations, which are best characterized as functional representations of real institutions or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world, offered together with a narrative of the driving causal forces and potential exogenous shocks that could lead to those futures. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way. While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector. Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policy- making tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects. As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013). Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking. Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals break out of conventional modes of thinking and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present. The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic atten- tion, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global political-economic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation. Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance. The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the trans- formation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with de- tails about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases. An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are tradi- tionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our scenarios are deliberately forward-looking and are designed to explore potential futures that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might ex- pand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools. In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas. The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance. The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these do not appear as puzzles in existing research programs or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future so that they can begin thinking critically about them now. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity and for overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

#### No root cause claims

Levy & Thompson 13 (Jack S. Levy is Board of Governors' Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, and Affiliate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and William R. Thompson is Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly, "The Decline of War? Multiple Trajectories and Diverging Trends", International Studies Review, 2013, 15, pp. 396-419)

If true, we would have a unified theory of violence. Pinker subsequently steps back from this expansive claim. He notes that some other forms of violence— including homicides, lynchings, domestic violence, and rapes—do not fit a power law model, suggesting that the mechanisms driving these practices differ from those driving international war. Still, there are others who have insisted on a unified theory of violence. Examples might include Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of aggressive instincts as a root cause of war (Einstein and Freud 1933), frustration-aggression theory (Durbin and Bowlby 1939), and contemporary rational choice theories. We are highly skeptical. We fear that any theory broad enough to explain violence at the levels of the individual, family, neighborhood, communal group, state, and international system would be too general and too indiscriminating to capture variations in violence within each level, which is a prerequisite for any satisfactory theoretical explanation. It is difficult to imagine an explanation for great power war, or interstate war more generally, that does not include system-level structures of power and wealth, dyadic-level rivalries, and domestic institutions and processes. All but the latter contribute little if anything to an explanation of homicides and domestic violence. It is not even clear whether **different kinds of organized warfare**—hegemonic wars, interstate wars, colonial wars, and civil wars—can be explained with a single theory. In fact, the theoretical literature on interstate war and civil war remains for the most part two distinct literatures, with little overlap in their respective analyses of the causes of war.9 Exceptions include the concept of the security dilemma (Posen 1993; Snyder and Jervis 1999) and the increasingly influential bargaining model of war (Fearon 1995), which cut across both literatures. International relations scholars are even divided on the question of whether **different kinds of interstate wars** can be subsumed under a single theory. A 1990 symposium addressed the questions of whether big wars and small wars had similar causes and whether a single theory could account for both.10 Whereas Bueno de Mesquita (1990) argued that an expected utility framework can explain all kinds of wars, Thompson (1990) argued that system-level structures of power and wealth differentiate big wars from small wars.11 The closely related question of whether the outbreak and spread (expansion) of war are driven by the same or different variables and processes was the subject of another recent symposium (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011). Our skepticism about the utility of a unified theory of violence or war is reinforced by the systematic and rigorous evidence Pinker provides about the trends in different forms of violence over time

**Extinction first --- survival is a prerequisite to other values**

**Fassin 10** - James D. Wolfensohn Professor in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, as well as directeur d’études at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris. (Didier, Fall, “Ethics of Survival: A Democratic Approach to the Politics of Life” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Vol 1 No 1, Project Muse)

Conclusion

Survival, in the sense Jacques Derrida attributed to the concept in his last interview, not only shifts lines that are too often hardened between biological and political lives: it **opens an ethical space for** **reflection and action**. Critical thinking in the past decade has often taken biopolitics and the politics of life as its objects. It has thus unveiled the way in which individuals and groups, even entire nations, have been treated by powers, the market, or the state, during the colonial period as well as in the contemporary era. However, through indiscriminate extension, this powerful instrument has lost some of its analytical sharpness and heuristic potentiality. On the one hand, the binary reduction of life to the opposition between nature and history, bare life and qualified life, when systematically applied from philosophical inquiry in sociological or anthropological study, erases much of the complexity and richness of life in society as it is in fact observed. On the other hand, the normative prejudices which underlie the evaluation of the forms of life and of the politics of life, when generalized to an undifferentiated collection of social facts, end up by depriving social agents of legitimacy, voice, and action. The risk is therefore both scholarly and political. It calls for ethical attention. In fact, the genealogy of this intellectual lineage reminds us that the main founders of these theories expressed tensions and hesitations in their work, which was often more complex, if even sometimes more obscure, than in its reduced and translated form in the humanities and social sciences today. And also biographies, here limited to fragments from South African lives that I have described and analyzed in more detail elsewhere, suggest the necessity of complicating the dualistic models that oppose biological and political lives. Certainly, powers like the market and the state do act sometimes as if human beings could be reduced to “mere life,” but democratic forces, including from within the structure of power, tend to produce alternative strategies that escape this reduction. And people themselves, even under conditions of domination, [End Page 93] manage subtle tactics that transform their physical life into a political instrument or a moral resource or an affective expression.

#### Reps Ks assumes *Representational Determinism*. Prefer the *particularized* and *surrounding context* of HOW our reps were deployed.

Shim ‘14(David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

### FW

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater that presents the most desirable policy option

#### a) Fairness—alternate frameworks moot 6 minutes of the 1ac – it’s the only basis for aff offense – that means we should get to weigh our impacts. Turns the K because it means we can’t properly engage.

#### b) Decisionmaking – debate should develop our ability to weigh the consequences of our actions – it’s the only portable skill – that means the ballot should compare policy options – the only acceptable alt is one that presents a clear policy action

#### c) considering policy implications is key to effective theory

Feaver 01 (Peter, Asst. Prof of Political Science at Duke University, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p 178)

At the same time, virtually all good theory has implications for policy. Indeed, if no conceivable extension of the theory leads to insights that would aid those working in the ‘real world’, what can be ‘good’ about good theory? Ignoring the policy implications of theory is often a sign of intellectual laziness on the part of the theorist. It is hard work to learn about the policy world and to make the connections from theory to policy. Often, the skill sets do not transfer easily from one domain to another, so a formidable theorist can show embarrassing naivete when it comes to the policy domain he or she putatively studies. Often, when the policy implications are considered, flaws in the theory (or at least in the presentation of the theory) are uncovered. Thus, focusing attention on policy implications should lead to better theorizing. The gap between theory and policy is more rhetoric than reality. But rhetoric can create a reality–or at least create an undesirable kind of reality–where policy makers make policy though ignorant of the problems that good theory would expose, while theorists spin arcana without a view to producing something that matters. It is therefore incumbent on those of us who study proliferation–a topic that raises interesting and important questions for both policy and theory–to bring the communities together. Happily, the best work in the proliferation field already does so.

#### The government has flawed components but challenging our understanding of government is important and valuable through discussion of federal policies--- learning the language of that allows us to confront and challenge those institutions outside of this round and resolves a lot of the impacts at the root of their explanation

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ACCORDING TO LASSWELL (1971), policy science is about the production and application of knowledge of and in policy. Policy-makers who desire to tackle problems on the political agenda successfully, should be able to mobilise the best available knowledge. This requires high-quality knowledge in policy. Policy-makers and, in a democracy, citizens, also need to know how policy processes really evolve. This demands precise knowledge of policy. There is an obvious link between the two: the more and better the knowledge of policy, the easier it is to mobilise knowledge in policy. Lasswell expresses this interdependence by defining the policy scientist's operational task as eliciting the maximum rational judgement of all those involved in policy-making. For the applied policy scientist or policy analyst this implies the development of two skills. First, for the sake of mobilising the best available knowledge in policy, he/she should be able to mediate between different scientific disciplines. Second, to optimise the interdependence between science in and of policy, she/he should be able to mediate between science and politics. Hence Dunn's (1994, page 84) formal definition of policy analysis as an applied social science discipline that uses multiple research methods in a context of argumentation, public debate [and political struggle] to create, evaluate critically, and communicate policy-relevant knowledge. Historically, the differentiation and successful institutionalisation of policy science can be interpreted as the spread of the functions of knowledge organisation, storage, dissemination and application in the knowledge system (Dunn and Holzner, 1988; van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1989, page 29). Moreover, this scientification of hitherto 'unscientised' functions, by including science of policy explicitly, aimed to gear them to the political system. In that sense, Lerner and Lasswell's (1951) call for policy sciences anticipated, and probably helped bring about, the scientification of politics. Peter Weingart (1999) sees the development of the science-policy nexus as a dialectical process of the scientification of politics/policy and the politicisation of science. Numerous studies of political controversies indeed show that science advisors behave like any other self-interested actor (Nelkin, 1995). Yet science somehow managed to maintain its functional cognitive authority in politics. This may be because of its changing shape, which has been characterised as the emergence of a post-parliamentary and post-national network democracy (Andersen and Burns, 1996, pages 227-251). National political developments are put in the background by ideas about uncontrollable, but apparently inevitable, international developments; in Europe, national state authority and power in public policy-making is leaking away to a new political and administrative elite, situated in the institutional ensemble of the European Union. National representation is in the hands of political parties which no longer control ideological debate. The authority and policy-making power of national governments is also leaking away towards increasingly powerful policy-issue networks, dominated by functional representation by interest groups and practical experts. In this situation, public debate has become even more fragile than it was. It has become diluted by the predominance of purely pragmatic, managerial and administrative argument, and under-articulated as a result of an explosion of new political schemata that crowd out the more conventional ideologies. The new schemata do feed on the ideologies; but in larger part they consist of a random and unarticulated 'mish-mash' of attitudes and images derived from ethnic, local-cultural, professional, religious, social movement and personal political experiences. The market-place of political ideas and arguments is thriving; but on the other hand, politicians and citizens are at a loss to judge its nature and quality. Neither political parties, nor public officials, interest groups, nor social movements and citizen groups, nor even the public media show any inclination, let alone competency, in ordering this inchoate field. In such conditions, scientific debate provides a much needed minimal amount of order and articulation of concepts, arguments and ideas. Although frequently more in rhetoric than substance, reference to scientific 'validation' does provide politicians, public officials and citizens alike with some sort of compass in an ideological universe in disarray. For policy analysis to have any political impact under such conditions, it should be able somehow to continue 'speaking truth' to political elites who are ideologically uprooted, but cling to power; to the elites of administrators, managers, professionals and experts who vie for power in the jungle of organisations populating the functional policy domains of post-parliamentary democracy; and to a broader audience of an ideologically disoriented and politically disenchanted citizenry.

# Case

## Zika

### 1AR - OV

### UQ

#### Extremely active hurricane season coming now – Harvey is only the beginning. Rice 8/9

Rice, Doyle. “'Extremely Active' Hurricane Season Now Likely, Federal Forecasters Say.”USA Today, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 9 Aug. 2017, www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2017/08/09/hurricane-season-now-likely-extremely-active-noaa-says/552254001/#. //nhs-VA

Batten down the hatches. The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season should be "extremely active, and could be the most active since 2010," federal forecasters from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration announced Wednesday. Six named storms have already formed, including Hurricane Franklin, which is expected to hit the east coast of Mexico late Wednesday. Two of the tropical storms, Cindy in June and Emily in July, struck the United States. “We’re now entering the peak of the season when the bulk of the storms usually form,” said Gerry Bell, lead seasonal hurricane forecaster at NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center. NOAA said 14-19 named storms are now likely to form this year, with 5-9 becoming hurricanes. The numbers include the six storms that already occurred. The 2010 season had 19 named storms. A tropical storm contains wind speeds of 39 mph or higher and becomes a hurricane when winds reach 74 mph. The latest forecast, an update to the original one released in May, makes no prediction about where or exactly when the storms and hurricanes will hit. The wind and air patterns in the Atlantic and Caribbean where many storms develop make an above-average season more likely, Bell said. Last year, NOAA predicted 10 to 16 named storms, of which 4 to 8 would be hurricanes. 15 storms formed, of which 7 were hurricanes. Meteorologists at Colorado State University last week also updated their forecast, predicting 16 tropical storms will form, with eight becoming hurricanes. The late Colorado State University meteorologist William Gray was the first scientist to make seasonal hurricane forecasts back in the 1980s.

#### Harvey and Irma present perfect conditions for Zika spread – the aftermath is key. Blackburn et al 9/15

Christine Crudo Blackburn Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University, et al. “Harvey and Irma Present Nearly Perfect Conditions for Zika-Spreading Mosquitoes.”The Conversation, 15 Sept. 2017, theconversation.com/harvey-and-irma-present-nearly-perfect-conditions-for-zika-spreading-mosquitoes-83938. Christine is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Gerald is a Associate Dean For Global One Health, College of Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences; and Director, Pandemic and Biosecurity Policy Program, Scowcroft Institute for International Affairs, Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University Morten is Policy Sciences Lecturer, Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Texas A&M University //nhs-VA

Even as the floodwaters from Hurricanes Harvey and Irma begin to recede, significant but less obvious health threats remain. The standing water the storms have left behind will almost certainly cause an explosion of the mosquito population. In addition to the already difficult task of recovery, the affected areas will need to stem the mosquito population growth to avoid the potential for a disease outbreak. As experts with diverse research and government experience, we believe mosquito prevention and control measures must be given high priority and incorporated into long-term hurricane recovery operations. Why the disease threat is worse now [Eleven cases](http://www.houstonpress.com/news/six-new-zika-cases-confirmed-in-houston-bringing-tally-up-to-eleven-9531868) of Zika have been confirmed this year in the Houston area alone, although none of these were locally transmitted, and Florida has reported [33 symptomatic cases](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/reporting/2017-case-counts.html). [Zika virus](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/about/index.html) is a disease spread to humans primarily through the bite of infected Aedes aegypti mosquitoes. The infection often occurs without causing any symptoms. In the continental United States, the two areas where Aedes aegypti have the [most favorable climates to thrive](http://currents.plos.org/outbreaks/article/on-the-seasonal-occurrence-and-abundance-of-the-zika-virus-vector-mosquito-aedes-aegypti-in-the-contiguous-united-states/) are exactly southeastern Texas and south Florida. The greatest threat posed by Zika is the risk of infection among [pregnant women](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/pregnancy/index.html). Previous outbreaks of the disease have shown there is an association between Zika infection during pregnancy and babies born with [microcephaly](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/about/needtoknow.html). The birth of infants with incomplete brain development creates a long-term public health challenge that extends far beyond the immediate outbreak. Although the current number of confirmed cases of Zika in Florida and Texas is not large, the growth of the Aedes aegypti mosquito greatly increases the chance the disease will begin to spread. Each case of Zika presents the opportunity for the disease to begin circulating in the local mosquito population. While Zika is the greatest concern, dengue fever, Chikungunya virus and yellow fever are also spread by the Aedes aegypti mosquito. In all cases, of course, the disease must be present in an area for mosquitoes to transfer it, but like Zika, dengue fever [is already present in Texas and Florida.](http://www.healthmap.org/dengue/en/)Since Houston and Miami are both large international hubs, it is possible for almost any vector-borne disease to be introduced by travelers. The breeding ground for mosquitoes is not actually the large, sometimes deep blanket of floodwaters, most of which recedes fairly quickly. Small bodies of left-behind water, such as that in a dog’s water bowl, become ideal breeding areas. Unless these breeding sites are emptied, there could be tens of thousands of new breeding grounds in the cities of Houston and Miami alone. This presents a special kind of public health challenge in the wake of the storms. In some areas, people may not return to their homes for a long time. Government and response agencies must figure out a way to eliminate standing water in order to prevent mosquito [breeding grounds](http://www.texaszika.org/prevention.htm). However, almost all of the breeding grounds will be on private property, with no one present to either dump the waters or authorize the government to do so. Moreover, Houston is home to more than [half a million undocumented immigrants](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/ft_17-01-31_unauthorizedmetros_table/), who may not be likely to cooperate with authorities, even if they are in their homes, for fear of [prosecution or deportation](https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/for-houstons-many-undocumented-immigrants-storm-is-just-the-latest-challenge/2017/08/28/210f5466-8c1d-11e7-84c0-02cc069f2c37_story.html?utm_term=.7f64057b4dac). Prevention and control strategies Vaccines and antivirals are not available to prevent or treat Zika and other mosquito-borne viral diseases, such as dengue fever and Chikungunya virus. There is a licensed [vaccine for yellow fever](https://www.cdc.gov/yellowfever/vaccine/index.html), but vaccines will be in short supply if outbreaks occur.

### Link

#### 911 is overwhelmed and the city can’t wait for outside assets – local organizing is important. Chakraborthy 8/27

Chakraborthy, Barnini. “Harvey Causes 'Catastrophic Flooding' in Houston, Thousands of Rescue Calls Made.” Fox News, FOX News Network, 27 Aug. 2017, www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/27/harvey-causes-catastrophic-flooding-in-houston-shuts-down-airport.html. //nhs-VA

Harris County Judge Ed Emmett asked that anyone who has a boat or a high water vehicle to help with rescue efforts in the Houston area. Those sent to Houston to help from outside the city are unable to enter due to flooded roadways. "We desperately need boats and high water vehicles," Emmett said. "We can't wait for assets to come from outside." Between 1,500 and 2,000 high-water rescues have been conducted since Harvey began wreaking havoc in the area, the Harris County Sheriff's Department wrote. Houston Police Chief Art Acevedo wrote on Twitter that Houston Police have "completed 90 flood rescue missions resulting in over 1,100 community members being brought to safety." Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner said in a news conference Sunday more than 2,000 calls to 911 for rescues have been made, assuring priority has been given to life-threatening calls. Turner also defended his previous decision not to ask residents to evacuate before the heavy rain swamped roads. "If you think the situation right now is bad and you give an order to evacuate, you are creating a nightmare," Turner said. The director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Brock Long, said the government is expected to conduct a "mass care mission" and predicted that the aftermath of the storm would require FEMA's involvement for years. More than 1,200 FEMA employees have been deployed to assist with Harvey response. "This disaster's going to be a landmark event," Long said. Acevedo said the city's 911 system has been "overwhelmed" since Harvey struck. "Do not call 911 unless it is a life or death situation... [we're telling people] not to panic," Acevedo said, adding that "we haven't seen the worst of it yet."

#### Volunteers key to aiding first responders – the only program that allows this to happen is Citizen Corps. Achenbach and O’Keefe 8/28

Achenbach, Joel, and Ed O'Keefe. “'Please Don't Give up on Us,' Houston Police Chief Says amid Disaster Response.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 28 Aug. 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/national/please-dont-give-up-on-us-houston-police-chief-says-amid-disaster-response/2017/08/28/aa559d9c-8bec-11e7-84c0-02cc069f2c37\_story.html?utm\_term=.06d55df9dc0a. //nhs-VA

While many volunteer rescuers may be acting of their own volition, the federal government is welcoming their help and encouraging others to jump in too. “This is a landmark event for Texas. Texas has never seen an event like this,” Brock Long, the head of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, said Monday. “What I need the media to do is organize the efforts, to help us organize citizen efforts, to ultimately help Texas. These people are in need.” That isn’t necessarily a sign that FEMA was unprepared for the hurricane, or that it’s unusually overwhelmed. In fact, the expectation that civilians will spring to action is central to the way federal, state, and local governments approach huge disasters like Harvey. There’s simply no way for those levels of government to marshal the resources fast enough to do all that needs to get done. Roads are impassable; resources are spread out; and manpower is limited. “When you step back and look at most disasters, you talk about first responders—lights and sirens—that’s bullshit,” Craig Fugate, who headed FEMA during the Obama presidency, [told me in 2015](https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/09/we-are-all-first-responders/402146/). “The first responders are the neighbors, bystanders, the people that are willing to act.” That underpinned “whole-community response,” the principle around which Fugate organized FEMA during his eight years in office. (Long only recently started on the job, having been confirmed in June.) The basis for whole-community response is that, while the government simply can never provide a response as quickly as needed, a top-down response from the government isn’t the best answer anyway. Local people know much better what they need, and they benefit from being involved. In a small disaster, it’s true that professional responders can often take care of nearly everything that needs to be done. But the problems with a top-down response became clear during disaster simulations run by the government to help it plan. Imagine a drill that assumes that 6 million people are affected by a hurricane. From one perspective, that means that the government has to deploy enough people to aid all 6 million. But that’s not right at all: While some people will be rendered helpless after a storm, the vast majority will not be passive observers but will be ready and able to help. “We had almost by default defined the public as a liability,” Fugate said. “We looked at them as, We must take care of them, because they’re victims. But in a catastrophic disaster, why are we discounting them as a resource? Are you telling me there aren’t nurses, doctors, construction people, all kinds of walks of life that have skills that are needed?” People who have gone through a storm—Fugate was careful to quit referring to them as victims and start calling them survivors—have just gone through a massively disorienting experience, but treating them as powerless hobbles both their own ability to bounce back and the government’s ability to get things back to normal. “It’s something that responders, whether they’re in the private sector, or they’re volunteer, or they’re in government—it’s this compelling nature that, I want to help them because it makes me feel good. The more I do for them, the better I feel. But, it's not good for them!” Fugate said. “It doesn't really make sense to people: But they need us! They need help. But they also need to be in control.” The logic of whole-community response—the catch-phrase for this approach—becomes obvious in thinking about a small, acute event like a tornado. Funnel clouds strike with very little warning, and depending on where they hit, they may swamp local emergency-response teams. State and federal government can only move so fast, so even if aid arrives within hours, what happens in between? The answer is that people start helping each other out. While a hurricane offers a bit more warning—usually at least a couple days—it’s also much larger, and remains unpredictable. Thus citizen assistance is just as necessary, and obviously just as useful, in a case like Harvey. The presence of efforts like the Cajun Navy means that highly trained first responders are freed up to work on the most pressing cases, from [an explosion in downtown Houston Monday](http://abc13.com/witness-explosion-rocks-building-in-downtown-houston/2350911/) to the [2,000 critical rescues local police have already completed](http://ksnt.com/2017/08/28/2000-people-rescued-from-flooding-in-houston/). And while government sometimes isn’t able to get to a community fast enough, it has a tendency to get in the way once it’s there. What do people need after a disaster strikes? For one thing, they need basic provisions, like food and water and clothing. Where do they get those things? Well, the government can attempt to marshal resources and move those things in, but private businesses like big-box stores already have all the goods and they have the logistics and supply chains to move them in. When do big-box stores restock? Usually overnight, when people aren’t trying to shop. But first-responders often impose curfews after a disaster, seeking to keep the peace and deter looting. If the curfews keep stores from resupplying, however, people are more cut off from what they need, and they’re more likely to turn to things like looting. The flip side of all this is what happens when disaster planners don’t account for the community’s role in recovery. One failure of the Hurricane Katrina response, according to some disaster managers, was that FEMA and other agencies only planned up to the limits of their own resources, rather than planning for the maximum damage a disaster might create. That’s a natural error to make—the idea of a storm too great to handle is awful to imagine, but the results are even worse. If, however, managers think of the community—and not just local officials like firefighters and doctors—as a resource, they both avoid the problem of planning only to their own capacity, and they radically expand the pool of potential first responders. “The most effective response you’ll get is just a simple request: ‘Once you do all the stuff you’re supposed to do, check on a neighbor,’” Fugate told me. “It’ll save more lives than anything else we can do.”

#### Citizen Corps solves lack of preparedness. Montgomery 8/31

Montgomery, Trevor. “TEMECULA: In Hurricane Harvey’s Wake, Temecula Citizen Corps Advocates Personal Preparedness.” Riverside County News Source, 31 Aug. 2017, riversidecountynewssource.org/2017/08/31/temecula-in-hurricane-harveys-wake-temecula-citizen-corps-advocates-personal-preparedness/. //nhs-VA

In 2003, the City of Temecula formed the Temecula Citizen Corps (TCC) to educate and train local residents to contribute to the community’s well-being. Building on the successful efforts already in place in many communities around the country, designed and intended to “prevent crime and respond to emergencies,” Citizen Corps programs continuously strive to “make Temecula safer” through various forms of training, education, preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery. “The TCC provides Temecula residents the resources they need, in the event of an emergency or disaster, by providing and advocating for personal responsibility, disaster training, and volunteer service,” according to the release. Moreover, the TCC’s mission is to “harness the power of every individual through education, training, and volunteer service to make Temecula safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to the threats of terrorism, crime, public health issues and disasters of all kinds.” One of the TCC’s primary goals is to provide group and individual training to those willing and interested and reminds the community that there are ways citizens can remain safe and prepared: **Prepare yourself and your family** Formulate a family disaster preparedness plan. Prepare your emergency kits and supplies. ([Click here for a full list of necessary and important supplies to always have on hand,](https://riversidecountynewssource.org/2017/08/31/temecula-disaster-preparedness-advice-from-temeculas-office-of-public-safety/) as well as other important information and advice.) Know of the possible emergencies and stay informed. **Join and become active in your local Neighborhood Watch program** Keep your home and neighborhood safe. Know enough to know when something or someone is out of place. Be eligible for TCC training: First Aid, CPR, AED, and more! **CERT: Community Emergency Response Team** Train to help your family, help your neighbors; and if possible, help emergency responders and the City in time of need.

### Impact

#### The timeframe is now – Gulf Coast is susceptible to disease outbreaks. Guarino 9/1

Guarino, Ben. “The Health Dangers from Hurricane Harvey’s Floods and Houston’s Chemical Plants.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 1 Sept. 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/08/29/the-health-consequences-to-expect-from-hurricane-harveys-floods/?utm\_term=.31340b923fd5.//nhs-VA

Based on experience following Hurricane Katrina, there will be several competing effects on the population of mosquitoes and the prevalence of arboviruses, such as Zika, [dengue](http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/10/16/235628882/houston-we-have-dengue-fever) and West Nile, that they transmit. Mosquitoes need stagnant water to lay eggs. Winds and floods will wash away containers that would have been breeding pools, said Hayden, who studies weather and vector-borne disease. In the immediate future, both Hayden and Hotez anticipate that local mosquito populations will decline. But once the floodwaters recede, mosquitoes will recover. In 2006, a year after Katrina, Tulane University public-health experts reported that cases of West Nile infection increased more than [twofold](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2600257/) in communities that had been in that hurricane's path. The study authors suggested that increased exposure was the culprit. Fleeing partially submerged buildings, people spent days outside waiting for rescue. Without air conditioning or dry spaces, Texans may find themselves outdoors, too. “There's going to be a need for insect repellent down there,” Hayden said. **Long term: Mental health** Hurricanes can damage mental health in long-term ways, Nature [reported](http://www.nature.com/news/hurricane-katrina-s-psychological-scars-revealed-1.18234) in 2015. A year after Hurricane Katrina, residents reported an increase in suicidal thoughts, increasing from 2 percent to 6 percent among the 815 people studied. Post-traumatic stress disorder and depression also worsened. **Long term: Mold** Mold is another hurricane holdover. Hayden, who assessed damage in Galveston after [Hurricane Ike](http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/abs/10.1175/2010WCAS1041.1), said evacuees may not realize they could spend two or three weeks away from home. In a waterlogged, overheated home, mold can run rampant in that time. The Washington Post reported that two months after Hurricane Katrina, CDC investigators found [mold](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/mold-growing-in-flooded-basements-or-other-damp-spots-can-cause-allergic-reactions/2013/01/12/d3fd7218-43a9-11e2-8e70-e1993528222d_story.html?utm_term=.7c4ae08dbe93) in the walls of half of 112 water-damaged homes. The worst symptoms from routine mold exposure — some amount of mold is in the air we breathe every day — are typically allergic reactions and are rarely fatal but can exacerbate other health problems. Post-Katrina mold, however, was implicated in the deaths of four Southern University at New Orleans professors — all of whom worked in the same storm-damaged building. All died [within a few months](http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2015/07/suno_faculty_deaths_mold.html) of one another. The economic impact of mold and water damage also can be severe. “That’s a whole consequence that people really don't consider,” Hayden said. “It’s devastating on all levels.” **Big picture: Preparedness planning** What comes into focus from disasters such as Harvey is a lack of disaster preparedness compared with pandemics such as the flu, according to Hotez. “We don’t realize that the Gulf Coast is America’s vulnerable underbelly of infectious disease,” he said, referring to a paper he wrote [in 2014](http://journals.plos.org/plosntds/article?id=10.1371/journal.pntd.0002760). The hot and humid region combines high levels of poverty with major transportation hubs, with problems exacerbated by the effects of climate change. “All of those forces,” he explained Monday, “combine to make the Gulf Coast especially susceptible to infectious and tropical disease.

#### Zika still a public threat – just because it’s out of the news cycle doesn’t mean we don’t need to prevent an outbreak. Greenwood 8/20

Greenwood, Jim. “Zika Threat Is Still Real - but so Is a 'Friendly Mosquito' Solution.” TheHill, 20 Aug. 2017, thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/347265-zika-threat-is-still-real-but-so-is-a-friendly-mosquito. //nhs-VA

Unfortunately, in this instance, our collective attention span is shorter than the length of the global public health emergency declared by the World Health Organization that remains in effect today. Just because Zika is “yesterday's news” doesn't mean it's not still today's problem — not just in Brazil, but here in the United States. Last year alone, [more than 40,000 cases of Zika were reported](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/reporting/2016-case-counts.html) in the United States and U.S. territories, according to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Those figures invariably represent a significant undercount since most people with the virus don’t realize they have it. Even more concerning is [laboratory evidence](https://www.cdc.gov/zika/reporting/pregwomen-uscases.html) that more than 2,000 pregnant U.S. women have been exposed to Zika through June 2017. Ninety-five percent of the cases reported in the continental United States were acquired by travelers returning from affected countries, underscoring that fighting the global pandemic is a legitimate domestic public health issue. Globally, [more than two billion people](http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/zika-virus-outbreak/new-map-finds-2-billion-people-risk-zika-virus-n558546) live in areas where the environment is suitable for Zika transmission. To date, Brazil has been the country hardest hit, with [as many as 1.5 million local residents currently infected](http://www.reuters.com/article/health-zika-brazil-exclusive-idUSKCN0VA33F)and [1,800 babies diagnosed with microcephaly](http://fortune.com/2016/09/30/zika-virus-microcephaly-thailand/). This number doesn't include countless babies born with normal-size heads but significant vision, hearing and developmental problems due to Zika. World Mosquito Day is this Sunday. It was originally conceived as a commemoration of Sir Ronald Ross’s 1897 discovery that female mosquitos transmit malaria between humans. Now, we’ve come to learn that the mosquito — and one invasive species, in particular, called Aedes aegypti — infects human victims with Zika, yellow fever, dengue fever, and chikungunya. While Aedes aegypti originated in North Africa, it is now present in more than 100 countries and still expanding its range. Researchers are hard at work on a promising vaccine, but the breakthrough could still be several years away. World Health Organization experts have noted that in the fight against diseases like Zika, controlling the mosquito population is critical. Millions of dollars have been spent funding programs seeking to improve methods of mosquito control. Even with the best available methods like insecticide spraying, invasive mosquito populations can only be reduced by 30 to 50 percent. That’s not enough to prevent the spread of the disease. Other options like reversing the DDT ban could help but would have detrimental impacts on wildlife and the environment.

#### Zika will infect millions – Messer 16

Messer 4/16/16 (Luke, Rep. US House of Reps, “Let's stop Zika in its tracks”, http://www.greensburgdailynews.com/opinion/columns/let-s-stop-zika-in-its-tracks/article\_05e3d167-f8ac-5aa7-bff9-70c3de98c970.html)

**Zika** Virus **is** “a bit **scarier than we initially thought.”** That was the warning from a Centers for Diseases Control and Prevention spokesperson during a White House briefing this week. **It was a pretty unsettling update** that made headlines across the country, and for good reason. **The virus**, which is typically spread by mosquitos, started to **move quickly through Brazil** last May. Since then, thousands of people in dozens of countries have been infected by Zika, including residents of both Indiana and Ohio who contracted the virus overseas. In fact, **the** **W**orld **H**ealth **O**rganization **declared the Zika** virus **a global health emergency that could infect more than 4 million people by the end of the year.** And, right now, **there are no known vaccines, treatments, or rapid diagnostic tests for the virus**. That’s why Congress acted quickly this week to encourage researchers, scientists, and pharmaceutical companies to find a cure before Zika becomes a problem in the U.S.

#### Disease causes extinction; it spreads quickly.

Quammen 12 – David, award-winning science writer, long-time columnist for Outside magazine for fifteen years, with work in National Geographic, Harper's, Rolling Stone, the New York Times Book Review and other periodicals (“Could the next big animal-to-human disease wipe us out?,” The Guardian, pg. 29, 9/29, Lexis)

Infectious disease is all around us. It's one of the basic processes that ecologists study, along with predation and competition. Predators are big beasts that eat their prey from outside. Pathogens (disease-causing agents, such as viruses) are small beasts that eat their prey from within. Although infectious disease can seem grisly and dreadful, under ordinary conditions, it's every bit as natural as what lions do to wildebeests and zebras. But conditions aren't always ordinary. Just as predators have their accustomed prey, so do pathogens. And just as a lion might occasionally depart from its normal behaviour - to kill a cow instead of a wildebeest, or a human instead of a zebra - so a pathogen can shift to a new target. Aberrations occur. When a pathogen leaps from an animal into a person, and succeeds in establishing itself as an infectious presence, sometimes causing illness or death, the result is a zoonosis. It's a mildly technical term, zoonosis, unfamiliar to most people, but it helps clarify the biological complexities behind the ominous headlines about swine flu, bird flu, Sars, emerging diseases in general, and the threat of a global pandemic. It's a word of the future, destined for heavy use in the 21st century. Ebola and Marburg are zoonoses. So is bubonic plague. So was the so-called Spanish influenza of 1918-1919, which had its source in a wild aquatic bird and emerged to kill as many as 50 million people. All of the human influenzas are zoonoses. As are monkeypox, bovine tuberculosis, Lyme disease, West Nile fever, rabies and a strange new affliction called Nipah encephalitis, which has killed pigs and pig farmers in Malaysia. Each of these zoonoses reflects the action of a pathogen that can "spillover", crossing into people from other animals. Aids is a disease of zoonotic origin caused by a virus that, having reached humans through a few accidental events in western and central Africa, now passes human-to-human. This form of interspecies leap is not rare; about 60% of all human infectious diseases currently known either cross routinely or have recently crossed between other animals and us. Some of those - notably rabies - are familiar, widespread and still horrendously lethal, killing humans by the thousands despite centuries of efforts at coping with their effects. Others are new and inexplicably sporadic, claiming a few victims or a few hundred, and then disappearing for years. Zoonotic pathogens can hide. The least conspicuous strategy is to lurk within what's called a reservoir host: a living organism that carries the pathogen while suffering little or no illness. When a disease seems to disappear between outbreaks, it's often still lingering nearby, within some reservoir host. A rodent? A bird? A butterfly? A bat? To reside undetected is probably easiest wherever biological diversity is high and the ecosystem is relatively undisturbed. The converse is also true: ecological disturbance causes diseases to emerge. Shake a tree and things fall out. Michelle Barnes is an energetic, late 40s-ish woman, an avid rock climber and cyclist. Her auburn hair, she told me cheerily, came from a bottle. It approximates the original colour, but the original is gone. In 2008, her hair started falling out; the rest went grey "pretty much overnight". This was among the lesser effects of a mystery illness that had nearly killed her during January that year, just after she'd returned from Uganda. Her story paralleled the one Jaap Taal had told me about Astrid, with several key differences - the main one being that Michelle Barnes was still alive. Michelle and her husband, Rick Taylor, had wanted to see mountain gorillas, too. Their guide had taken them through Maramagambo Forest and into Python Cave. They, too, had to clamber across those slippery boulders. As a rock climber, Barnes said, she tends to be very conscious of where she places her hands. No, she didn't touch any guano. No, she was not bumped by a bat. By late afternoon they were back, watching the sunset. It was Christmas evening 2007. They arrived home on New Year's Day. On 4 January, Barnes woke up feeling as if someone had driven a needle into her skull. She was achy all over, feverish. "And then, as the day went on, I started developing a rash across my stomach." The rash spread. "Over the next 48 hours, I just went down really fast." By the time Barnes turned up at a hospital in suburban Denver, she was dehydrated; her white blood count was imperceptible; her kidneys and liver had begun shutting down. An infectious disease specialist, Dr Norman K Fujita, arranged for her to be tested for a range of infections that might be contracted in Africa. All came back negative, including the test for Marburg. Gradually her body regained strength and her organs began to recover. After 12 days, she left hospital, still weak and anaemic, still undiagnosed. In March she saw Fujita on a follow-up visit and he had her serum tested again for Marburg. Again, negative. Three more months passed, and Barnes, now grey-haired, lacking her old energy, suffering abdominal pain, unable to focus, got an email from a journalist she and Taylor had met on the Uganda trip, who had just seen a news article. In the Netherlands, a woman had died of Marburg after a Ugandan holiday during which she had visited a cave full of bats. Barnes spent the next 24 hours Googling every article on the case she could find. Early the following Monday morning, she was back at Dr Fujita's door. He agreed to test her a third time for Marburg. This time a lab technician crosschecked the third sample, and then the first sample. The new results went to Fujita, who called Barnes: "You're now an honorary infectious disease doctor. You've self-diagnosed, and the Marburg test came back positive." The Marburg virus had reappeared in Uganda in 2007. It was a small outbreak, affecting four miners, one of whom died, working at a site called Kitaka Cave. But Joosten's death, and Barnes's diagnosis, implied a change in the potential scope of the situation. That local Ugandans were dying of Marburg was a severe concern - sufficient to bring a response team of scientists in haste. But if tourists, too, were involved, tripping in and out of some python-infested Marburg repository, unprotected, and then boarding their return flights to other continents, the place was not just a peril for Ugandan miners and their families. It was also an international threat. The first team of scientists had collected about 800 bats from Kitaka Cave for dissecting and sampling, and marked and released more than 1,000, using beaded collars coded with a number. That team, including scientist Brian Amman, had found live Marburg virus in five bats. Entering Python Cave after Joosten's death, another team of scientists, again including Amman, came across one of the beaded collars they had placed on captured bats three months earlier and 30 miles away. "It confirmed my suspicions that these bats are moving," Amman said - and moving not only through the forest but from one roosting site to another. Travel of individual bats between far-flung roosts implied circumstances whereby Marburg virus might ultimately be transmitted all across Africa, from one bat encampment to another. It voided the comforting assumption that this virus is strictly localised. And it highlighted the complementary question: why don't outbreaks of Marburg virus disease happen more often? Marburg is only one instance to which that question applies. Why not more Ebola? Why not more Sars? In the case of Sars, the scenario could have been very much worse. Apart from the 2003 outbreak and the aftershock cases in early 2004, it hasn't recurred. . . so far. Eight thousand cases are relatively few for such an explosive infection; 774 people died, not 7 million. Several factors contributed to limiting the scope and impact of the outbreak, of which humanity's good luck was only one. Another was the speed and excellence of the laboratory diagnostics - finding the virus and identifying it. Still another was the brisk efficiency with which cases were isolated, contacts were traced and quarantine measures were instituted, first in southern China, then in Hong Kong, Singapore, Hanoi and Toronto. If the virus had arrived in a different sort of big city - more loosely governed, full of poor people, lacking first-rate medical institutions - it might have burned through a much larger segment of humanity. One further factor, possibly the most crucial, was inherent in the way Sars affects the human body: symptoms tend to appear in a person before, rather than after, that person becomes highly infectious. That allowed many Sars cases to be recognised, hospitalised and placed in isolation before they hit their peak of infectivity. With influenza and many other diseases, the order is reversed. That probably helped account for the scale of worldwide misery and death during the 1918-1919 influenza. And that infamous global pandemic occurred in the era before globalisation. Everything nowadays moves around the planet faster, including viruses. When the Next Big One comes, it will likely conform to the same perverse pattern as the 1918 influenza: high infectivity preceding notable symptoms. That will help it move through cities and airports like an angel of death. The Next Big One is a subject that disease scientists around the world often address. The most recent big one is Aids, of which the eventual total bigness cannot even be predicted - about 30 million deaths, 34 million living people infected, and with no end in sight. Fortunately, not every virus goes airborne from one host to another. If HIV-1 could, you and I might already be dead. If the rabies virus could, it would be the most horrific pathogen on the planet. The influenzas are well adapted for airborne transmission, which is why a new strain can circle the world within days. The Sars virus travels this route, too, or anyway by the respiratory droplets of sneezes and coughs - hanging in the air of a hotel corridor, moving through the cabin of an aeroplane - and that capacity, combined with its case fatality rate of almost 10%, is what made it so scary in 2003 to the people who understood it best. Human-to-human transmission is the crux. That capacity is what separates a bizarre, awful, localised, intermittent and mysterious disease (such as Ebola) from a global pandemic. Have you noticed the persistent, low-level buzz about avian influenza, the strain known as H5N1, among disease experts over the past 15 years? That's because avian flu worries them deeply, though it hasn't caused many human fatalities. Swine flu comes and goes periodically in the human population (as it came and went during 2009), sometimes causing a bad pandemic and sometimes (as in 2009) not so bad as expected; but avian flu resides in a different category of menacing possibility. It worries the flu scientists because they know that H5N1 influenza is extremely virulent in people, with a high lethality. As yet, there have been a relatively low number of cases, and it is poorly transmissible, so far, from human to human. It'll kill you if you catch it, very likely, but you're unlikely to catch it except by butchering an infected chicken. But if H5N1 mutates or reassembles itself in just the right way, if it adapts for human-to-human transmission, it could become the biggest and fastest killer disease since 1918. It got to Egypt in 2006 and has been especially problematic for that country. As of August 2011, there were 151 confirmed cases, of which 52 were fatal. That represents more than a quarter of all the world's known human cases of bird flu since H5N1 emerged in 1997. But here's a critical fact: those unfortunate Egyptian patients all seem to have acquired the virus directly from birds. This indicates that the virus hasn't yet found an efficient way to pass from one person to another. Two aspects of the situation are dangerous, according to biologist Robert Webster. The first is that Egypt, given its recent political upheavals, may be unable to staunch an outbreak of transmissible avian flu, if one occurs. His second concern is shared by influenza researchers and public health officials around the globe: with all that mutating, with all that contact between people and their infected birds, the virus could hit upon a genetic configuration making it highly transmissible among people. "As long as H5N1 is out there in the world," Webster told me, "there is the possibility of disaster. . . There is the theoretical possibility that it can acquire the ability to transmit human-to-human." He paused. "And then God help us." We're unique in the history of mammals. No other primate has ever weighed upon the planet to anything like the degree we do. In ecological terms, we are almost paradoxical: large-bodied and long-lived but grotesquely abundant. We are an outbreak. And here's the thing about outbreaks: they end. In some cases they end after many years, in others they end rather soon. In some cases they end gradually, in others they end with a crash. In certain cases, they end and recur and end again. Populations of tent caterpillars, for example, seem to rise steeply and fall sharply on a cycle of anywhere from five to 11 years. The crash endings are dramatic, and for a long while they seemed mysterious. What could account for such sudden and recurrent collapses? One possible factor is infectious [from] disease, and viruses in particular.

#### This is empirically true. Burnout and self-interest don’t check.

Casadevall 12 – Prof @ Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division of Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Arturo. (“The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, p. 584-5)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001)

## Wildfires

### 1AR - OV

### UQ

#### Warming makes risk of wildfires more likely and amplifies the impact. UCS 11

UCS. “Is Global Warming Fueling Increased Wildfire Risks?” Union of Concerned Scientists, Apr. 2011, www.ucsusa.org/global\_warming/science\_and\_impacts/impacts/global-warming-and-wildfire.html#.WatANZOGOYU. //nhs-VA

The effects of global warming on temperature, precipitation levels, and soil moisture are turning many of our forests into kindling during wildfire season. As the climate warms, [moisture and precipitation levels are changing](http://www.int-res.com/abstracts/cr/v47/n1-2/p123-138/), with [wet areas becoming wetter and dry areas becoming drier](http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/impacts/water-and-climate-change.html). Higher spring and summer temperatures and [earlier spring snow-melt typically](http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/impacts/springs-domino-effect.html) cause soils to be drier for longer, increasing the likelihood of drought and [a longer wildfire season](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6X-523TCYB-1&_user=10301146&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F2011&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_origin=browse&_zone=rslt_list_item&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%235042%232011%23997389992%232922786%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=5042&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=20&_acct=C000099245&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10301146&md5=30a26f7cfa7369bb0bb7c0c107b98716&searchtype=a), particularly in the western United States. These hot, dry conditions also increase the likelihood that, once wildfires are started by lightning strikes or human error, they will be [more intense and long-burning](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5789/940.full). The [costs of wildfires](http://www.economics.noaa.gov/?goal=weather&file=events/fire/), in terms of risks to human life and health, property damage, and state and federal dollars, are devastating, and they are only likely to increase unless we better address the risks of wildfires and reduce our activities that lead to further climate change. Wildfires are already on the rise Wildfires in the western United States have been [increasing in frequency and duration since the mid-1980s](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5789/940.full), occurring nearly four times more often, burning more than six times the land area, and lasting almost five times as long (comparisons are between 1970-1986 and 1986-2003). Natural cycles, human activities—such as land-use (clearing, development, mining) and fire exclusion—as well as climate change [can influence the likelihood of wildfires](http://www.pnas.org/content/107/45/19167). However, many of the areas that have seen these increases—such as [Yosemite National Park](http://www.publish.csiro.au/?paper=WF08117) and the [Northern Rockies](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/313/5789/940.full)—are protected from or relatively unaffected by human land-use and behaviors. This suggests that climate change is a major factor driving the increase in wildfires. What is the relationship between precipitation patterns, global warming, and wildfires? While severe wildfires have been observed to occur more frequently and this trend is projected to continue throughout the 21st century, it is worth noting that not every year has an equal likelihood of experiencing droughts or wildfires. Natural, cyclical weather occurrences, such as [El Niño events](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6X-4XC974D-1&_user=10301146&_coverDate=02%2F05%2F2010&_rdoc=4&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_origin=browse&_zone=rslt_list_item&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%235042%232010%23997409995%231578779%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=5042&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=20&_acct=C000099245&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10301146&md5=b5e9a88f8b7389d20c8232f93adea57d&searchtype=a), also affect the likelihood of wildfires by affecting levels of precipitation and moisture and lead to year-by-year variability in the potential for drought and wildfires regionally. Nonetheless, because temperatures and precipitation levels are projected to alter further over the course of this century, the overall potential for wildfires in the United States, especially the southern states, [is likely to increase as well](http://www.pnas.org/content/107/45/19167). As the world warms, we can expect more wildfires Wildfire seasons (seasons with higher wildfire potential) in the United States are projected to lengthen, with the southwest’s season of fire potential lengthening from seven months [to all year long](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6X-4XC974D-1&_user=10301146&_coverDate=02%2F05%2F2010&_rdoc=4&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_origin=browse&_zone=rslt_list_item&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%235042%232010%23997409995%231578779%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=5042&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=20&_acct=C000099245&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10301146&md5=b5e9a88f8b7389d20c8232f93adea57d&searchtype=a). Additionally, wildfires themselves are [likely to be more severe](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6X-4XC974D-1&_user=10301146&_coverDate=02%2F05%2F2010&_rdoc=4&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_origin=browse&_zone=rslt_list_item&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%235042%232010%23997409995%231578779%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=5042&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=20&_acct=C000099245&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10301146&md5=b5e9a88f8b7389d20c8232f93adea57d&searchtype=a). Researchers and modelers project that [moist, forested areas](http://tenaya.ucsd.edu/~westerli/pdffiles/08CC_WesterlingBryant.pdf) are the most likely to face greater threats from wildfires as conditions grow drier and hotter. Surprisingly, some dry grassland areas may be [less at risk](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6T6X-523TCYB-1&_user=10301146&_coverDate=04%2F01%2F2011&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=browse&_origin=browse&_zone=rslt_list_item&_srch=doc-info(%23toc%235042%232011%23997389992%232922786%23FLA%23display%23Volume)&_cdi=5042&_sort=d&_docanchor=&_ct=20&_acct=C000099245&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=10301146&md5=30a26f7cfa7369bb0bb7c0c107b98716&searchtype=a), but not because they would be flourishing—the intense aridity is likely to [prevent these grasses from growing](http://dels.nas.edu/materials/booklets/warming-world) at all, leaving these areas so barren that they are likely to lack even the fodder for wildfire. A conflagration of costs The economic costs of wildfires can be crippling. Between 2000 and 2009, the property damages from wildfires averaged [$665 million per year](http://www.economics.noaa.gov/?goal=weather&file=events/fire/). In addition to the property damage they wreak, wildfires cost states and the federal government millions in fire-suppression management; the U.S. Forest Service’s yearly fire-suppression costs have exceeded $1 billion dollars [at least twice since FY 2000](http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/ibp/cost_accounting/costmanagement_aug_04.pdf). The risk to property owners at the “wildland-urban interface” in California (more than 5 million homes in southern coastal California, the Bay Area, and north of Sacramento) [is projected to increase](http://tenaya.ucsd.edu/~westerli/pdffiles/08CC_WesterlingBryant.pdf) with the increase in wildfires near these areas. The environmental and health costs of wildfires are also considerable: not only do wildfires [threaten lives](http://www.economics.noaa.gov/?goal=weather&file=events/fire/) directly, but they have the potential to [increase local air pollution](http://www.agu.org/journals/ABS/2009/2008JD010966.shtml)— exacerbating lung diseases and causing breathing difficulties even in healthy individuals. Additionally, a counterintuitive aspect of wildfires—especially in the semi-arid southwest United States—is that when the rains do come, [mountain forest wildfires increase flash flood risk](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hyp.6352/abstract) in lower-lying areas in the days and months following the fire due to loss of vegetation and [the inability of burned soil to absorb moisture](http://www.fsl.orst.edu/ltep/Biscuit/Biscuit_files/Refs/DeBano%20JH2000b%20fire.pdf) (PDF). For example, residents in Arizona living along usually dry stream beds have lost property and life following such tragic and unexpected post-wildfire flash floods.

### Link

#### Citizen Corps solves – spurs recruitment in the Fire Corps, which relieves burned out firefighters. Bodin 6/29

Bodin, Madeline. “Volunteer Fire Departments Are Struggling to Retain Firefighters, While 911 Calls Are Surging.” Emergency Management, E.Republic, 29 June 2017, www.govtech.com/em/disaster/EM-Summer-2017-Dwindling-Force.html. //nhs-VA

What can fire departments and communities do to recruit more firefighters? Some departments have had success with programs created by NVFC. Spring Lake Park-Blaine-Mounds View (SBM) Fire Department in Minnesota, which serves 45 square miles and 80,000 residents, was doing a great job with its fire prevention program, said Shannon Ryder, division chief. Fire calls are way down. The number of department members in this mixed career-volunteer department was holding steady, she says, but the heavy schedule of fire prevention programs was wearing its firefighters down. When she heard about NVFC’s Fire Corps program about 10 years ago, Ryder was skeptical. The nationwide program began in 2004 to engage community volunteers to help their fire departments in non-emergency roles, including fundraising, cleaning equipment and trucks, bookkeeping and other paperwork, and education programs. “When it came across my desk in 2008,” Ryder said, “I wondered who in the world would sign up to help with all this random stuff for nothing but a T-shirt?” Still, it seemed like just the help her department needed, so she gave it a try. Not only did people sign up, they stayed. The SBM Fire Department will soon have 21 Fire Corps members who have been with the department for 10 years. Fire Corps members can get to work with very little training. Because a fire department invests less in each Fire Corps member, it doesn’t need as big of a commitment from them in return. Less strength is required, so elderly or disabled people easily find a role. But Fire Corps members can participate in additional training to help their fire departments in all sorts of ways, from driving a truck to serving as a first responder. Fire Corps is a partner program under the Citizen Corps initiative and is funded through FEMA. That makes it a companion to the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program, and the two complement each other. While CERT provides operational or emergency support during times of disaster, Fire Corps provides non-operational support every day. Ryder says that many of the Fire Corps members in her department are also CERT volunteers. She thinks participating in Fire Corps keeps them involved in helping the community in a way being a CERT member alone can’t. “Not everybody wants to ride the big, red truck,” said Ryder, who now believes in the program so fully that she is the Fire Corps state coordinator for Minnesota. “There are more people who want to give back to the community than you would think.”

### Impact

#### AT: Wildfires Good

#### Empirics disprove – California forests are failing to regrow since fires are too large. Berwyn 16

Berwyn, Bob. “California Forests Failing to Regrow after Intense Wildfires, Doubling the Climate Consequences.” Inside Climate News, 21 Dec. 2016, insideclimatenews.org/news/21122016/california-forests-wildfires-climate-change. //nhs-VA

There are warning signs that some forests in the western U.S. may have a hard time recovering from the large and intense wildfires that have become more common as the climate warms. After studying 14 burned areas across 10 national forests in California, scientists from UC Davis and the U.S. Forest Service said recent fires have killed so many mature, seed-producing trees across such large areas that the forests can't re-seed themselves. And because of increasingly warm temperatures, burned areas are quickly overgrown by shrubs, which can prevent trees from taking root. "With high-severity fires, the seed source drops off," said study co-author Kevin Lynch, a forest researcher at UC Davis. "We aren't seeing the conditions that are likely to promote natural regeneration." Historically, severe fires were uncommon in the forests covered by the study, largely made up of yellow pines and mixed conifers, but extended drought and heatwaves have exacerbated fire conditions across the West. The changing climate is also seen as a factor in [recent wildfires in the Southeast](https://insideclimatenews.org/news/30112016/southeast-wildfires-drought-tennessee-north-carolina-georgia), which is also mired in drought. [For the study, published Wednesday in the journal Ecosphere](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ecs2.1609/full), the researchers surveyed 1,500 plots in burned areas at different elevations in the Sierra Nevadas, Klamath Mountains, and North Coast regions. There was no natural conifer regeneration at all in 43 percent of the plots, they reported. "[O]ur data support growing concern that the well-documented trend toward larger and more severe fires is a major threat to conifer forest sustainability in our study region," the authors wrote. They said the study results could apply to mixed conifer forests across the West. Welch said the study was aimed at helping forest managers decide where to apply limited funding to replant forests that aren't regrowing on their own."There aren't enough of the right kind of trees growing back, the sugar pines and the ponderosa pines," he said, describing the native species that are ecologically and commercially valuable. Firs and cedars dominated in the study plots where there was regeneration, but those trees are much less resistant to future fires. Decades of logging of old fire-resistant trees and fire suppression shifted the composition of the forests, making them more dense. Add in the drying and warming climate, and it's a recipe for intense fires. "Pretty much everyone agrees that's the [**climate change**](https://insideclimatenews.org/topic/climate-change) signal," he said. That meshes with findings in other recent studies, said Ellis Margolis and Collin Haffey, U.S. Geological Survey forest scientists in New Mexico who were not involved in the new study. "The story from recent fires is that, due to a warming and drying climate, combined with increased fuels from a century of fire exclusion, high-severity burn patches in dry conifer forests have been increasing in size,"they said in an email response."Importantly, some of these large, severe burn patches have no surviving trees within them." Some areas are being scorched repeatedly because wildfires are also becoming more frequent. Those re-burns have killed off even more of the mature seed trees. "The loss of seed sources and increasing moisture stress after fires, both related to climate change, does not bode well for the future of large areas of dry conifer forests," theysaid. A wide-ranging [**2015 study**](http://www.treesearch.fs.fed.us/pubs/49107) by other federal researchers suggested that entire forests could succumb to mega-disturbances like fire and insect outbreaks, and that climate change is already driving the transition of forests to shrub and grasslands in drier parts of the U.S. like the Southwest. The new study offers some clues about short-term forest response, but regeneration after big fires can be a centuries-long process, according to Park Williams, a forest researcher with Columbia University's [**Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory**](http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/). "Prior to the modern era, fires in this region seemed to typically be low-intensity," he said. "In the more intense fires that we've been seeing recently, the patches killed by the fire are tending to be far larger and it could take a very long time for the native tree species to repopulate these areas. With climate getting warmer in the coming centuries, it seems more likely that many large burned forest areas in the Southwest U.S. will be recolonized by shrub species that can reproduce quickly and tolerate heat and drought."

#### We’re on the brink of diversionary war – the economy is the only thing Trump has going for him. Price 8/23

Price, Greg. “Trump Is Certainly Not the First President to Appear To.” Newsweek, 23 Aug. 2017, www.newsweek.com/trump-wag-dog-military-presidents-654143. //nhs-VA

With an approval rating that’s ranged between a personal low of 34 percent and 38 percent for the last 10 days, and in the wake of his much maligned responses to the racially charged melee in Charlottesville, Virginia, on August 12, Trump seemingly has turned to diversionary tactics in order to regain control of his administration’s public image and agenda. The example that rings most true is his August 4 threat that North Korea would face “fire and fury” should its leader, Kim Jong Un, continue testing and talking about launching a nuclear-equipped intercontinental ballistic missile at the U.S. The comments by the president came a day after [The Wall Street Journal reported](https://www.wsj.com/articles/special-counsel-mueller-impanels-washington-grand-jury-in-russia-probe-1501788287) that special counsel Robert Mueller had empaneled a grand jury for his investigation of the Trump campaign’s alleged collusion with Russia to win the election. Trump’s threat was also one day removed from a dip to 36 percent in Gallup’s national approval tracking poll. Another possible attempt to wag the dog came Monday, when the 45th president flip-flopped on a campaign pledge to pull U.S. troops out of Afghanistan. Employing a rare softer tone, Trump explained why he was reneging and instead sending more troops to continue fighting the longest war in America’s history. Trump’s perceived ploy—of using the military to distract Americans from problems within his administration—was picked apart fairly quickly, even by a commentator on Trump’s favorite media outlet, Fox News. Juan Williams said his colleagues on The Five had perhaps been blinded to what was going on by Monday’s solar eclipse before going off on the president. Williams said Trump’s decision on Afghanistan was an attempt to use the military to divert negative attention away from the president’s “many sides” argument in response to Charlottesville, Virginia.

## Terrorism

### 1AR – OV

### UQ

#### We are not prepared for a bioterror attack – a more optimized local response is key. Grundmann 14

Grundmann, Oliver. “The Current State of Bioterrorist Attack Surveillance and Preparedness in the US.” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, Dove Medical Press, 9 Oct. 2014, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/. Dr. Grundmann is a Clinical Assistant Professor with the Department of Medicinal Chemistry, College of Pharmacy and the Department of Adult and Elderly Nursing, College of Nursing at the University of Florida. //nhs-VA

Aside from surveillance and monitoring of a potential future bioterrorism attack, preparedness remains a central goal that requires constant improvement on the local, regional, and national levels. A report of the US General Accounting Office from 2005 indicates that in the year 2000, a total of $141.2 million were spent on research efforts related to bioterrorism and terrorism, of which the CDC and the National Institutes of Health received the largest amounts, with $48.2 and $43 million, respectively.[22](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b22-rmhp-7-177) However, in the year 2001, the federal budget increased to a total of $156.8 million. The allocation occurred before the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001 and the anthrax letters following shortly afterwards. Following the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, funding significantly increased with the enactment of the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 to provide the CDC with additional resources to prepare states and the health care system adequately for a potential biological agent dissemination.[23](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b23-rmhp-7-177)The Department of Defense in 2002 had a budget for the chemical and biological defense program of $856 million, which included $507 million for research and development and $348 million for procurement.[24](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b24-rmhp-7-177)In 2002, in response to the anthrax letters and potential other biological threats, the Health Resources and Services Administration was created, which was funded in 2006 with $460 million to establish a national preparedness and response network among hospitals in collaboration with the CDC. Funding for the CDC also significantly increased to dedicate more resources toward bioterrorism preparedness and surveillance, with a budget of $766 million in 2006.[22](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b22-rmhp-7-177),[23](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b23-rmhp-7-177) To this day, preparedness for a bioterrorism attack remains a challenge at the state and federal levels, mainly due to coordination of resources and establishing a network that optimizes state and federal resources to respond adequately and rapidly to an incident.[25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b25-rmhp-7-177) Several federal and state agencies have established response plans and implemented new resources to prepare for a potential bioterrorism incident with guidance from the CDC and the Health Resources and Services Administration. Examples of such plans include training of hospital staff to recognize and respond to a potential biological agent exposure and prevent further contamination among the population at risk. This then also involves a statewide response to enact rapid communication and potentially quarantine for exposed individuals, while allowing the governor of the state to declare a public health emergency. This step then triggers federal agencies to offer additional resources, such as vaccinations, additional testing and epidemiological support, and medical assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency established the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2007 to respond to a potential hazard to include aerosolized anthrax, plague, and food contamination as biological attacks, among others.

#### Bioterror coming now – can’t afford to say it’s improbable. Holgate and Cameron 9/2

Laura Holgate and Elizabeth Cameron, opinion contributors. “Trump Must Prevent the next Biological Attack before It Strikes.” TheHill, 2 Sept. 2017, thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/homeland-security/348977-trump-must-stop-our-next-biological-threat-before-it.//nhs-VA

Biological threats have a way of sneaking up on you when you least expect it. This summer, while nuclear tensions are center stage, we can’t afford to divert attention from biological threats. Pathogens know no borders, don’t have passports, can come from a bioterrorist or Mother Nature and can ignite already volatile situations. And the devastation wrought by Hurricane Harvey in Texas is yet another reminder of the importance of health security before, during and after a crisis. Being prepared to respond to immediate threats is, of course, paramount to save lives. At the same time, as the former White House [National Security Council](https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc) staffers responsible for countering biological threats, we saw firsthand the need to maintain long-term focus — even during a crisis — on bolstering our nation’s biodefense capability. We know that biological threats must remain at the top of the national security agenda, and leaders must recognize that stopping outbreaks at the source requires strong global and domestic capacity to prevent, detect and rapidly respond to naturally occurring outbreaks and biological attacks A test of this focus came in April 2013, when two biothreats developed that proved vital for shaping biodefense and global health security policy over the next four years. First, the deadly toxin ricin was found in letters mailed to President Obama, a U.S. senator and a Mississippi judge. Second, a worrisome new strain of H7N9 avian influenza that could infect humans was discovered in China. These events occurred during the same week as the devastating Boston Marathon bombing, and all the events were happening as Abu Bakr Baghdadi announced the formation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

### Link

#### First responders are first preventers – Citizen Corps stops the terror before it happens. Lieberman 03

Lieberman 03 (Joseph, US Senate--CT, FNS, 5/22, lexis)

But the resources necessary have not been given to this department yet. The potential for change and improvement is still there. Let me cite as examples the fire fighters, police officers and medical emergency professionals in communities across America who are the first to respond to a disaster, and the last to leave, and who can become also the first preventers, because they are out there in enormous numbers everywhere in America, still desperately need proper training, proper communications to allow them to talk to one another in a crisis, so they can protect us, **and they need personal reinforcements**. Instead, many first responders -- more than half of the communities in America, from one statistic I have seen have been laying off first responders today, **because the cities and towns are so fiscally strapped**. That makes about as much sense as reducing America's troop strength in the middle of a conventional war. Yet, I regret to say that the administration and the majority here in Congress have not adequately funded first responders or the Department of Homeland Security. There is much more to be done. We have made so strides in securing our air travel, that is true. But other forms of transportation remain inadequately protected, and require your consideration. Our nation's seaports I fear remain an Achilles' heel in our domestic defenses. Too little cargo is being inspected, and to few containers are being tracked from their port of origin to their final destination. At the current rate of funding, it will take the Coast Guard 20 years to build the modern fleet it needs to fight terrorism now. And here again the president's budget under-supports basic physical security at ports for items like perimeter fencing, guards and monitors. Our borders remain painfully porous and cry out for the Border Patrol to be beefed up. But I do want to say that to me perhaps the most significant gap remaining is the one that people can't see, and that is the gap in our intelligence community. There has been too much reluctance to challenge the status quo in the intelligence community. The best way to stop terrorism, all the experts agree, is to interrupt the plot before it's executed. And that can only come from great intelligence. Today, unfortunately, when it comes to understanding the scope and depth of the intelligence failures that led to September 11th, we simply don't have enough information. Too many of the failures that we have already identified remain unchanged today, a full 20 months after the attacks. And I want to say bluntly it starts at the top. And today at the top of our intelligence and law enforcement communities there remains too much division, too many of the same bureaucratic barriers that I think contributed to the disaster of September 11th. And all of the federal agencies continue to keep state and local first responders and first preventers, as I call them, **at arm's length, when it really is these front-line forces who have the vital knowledge to share**, and most desperately need useful federal intelligence shared with them.

#### Training and staffing is k2 recognizing a bioterror attack in progress. Grundmann 14

Grundmann, Oliver. “The Current State of Bioterrorist Attack Surveillance and Preparedness in the US.” Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, Dove Medical Press, 9 Oct. 2014, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/. Dr. Grundmann is a Clinical Assistant Professor with the Department of Medicinal Chemistry, College of Pharmacy and the Department of Adult and Elderly Nursing, College of Nursing at the University of Florida. //nhs-VA

The response to the dissemination of a biological agent involves a concerted effort by local, state, and federal agencies and stakeholders that have been trained appropriately. Ongoing efforts to optimize the response time and train first responders (police, emergency-response personnel, public health department officials) to recognize the potential involvement of a biological agent remain a priority to initiate appropriate surveillance, allocation of resources, and containment of the source outbreak.[17](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b17-rmhp-7-177) Since many biological agents may present with delayed and unspecific symptoms, there is a lag time in the response, which will likely be initiated by primary care physicians, physician’s assistants, nurses, or hospitals.[42](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b42-rmhp-7-177) Two critical areas should therefore be considered in the response to a bioterrorism attack: 1) adequate training of health care professionals to detect and respond to a potential biological agent exposure, and 2) access to health care facilities for the public at large. The earlier the causative agent can be identified, the faster the response time and potential containment of the outbreak will be. While monitoring and surveillance for potential biological agents has been implemented by the EPA and DHS in large metropolitan areas that are considered a primary target due to high population density, there is no reason that other parts of the country could not be affected. In such cases, training of health care providers will be critical to the outcome and reducing morbidity and mortality. Since implementation of the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) by the US Department of Health and Human Services in 2002, several local and regional coalitions of hospitals, health care providers, and agency representatives have been established.[33](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b33-rmhp-7-177) Such coalitions seek to prepare a community for a potential bioterrorism attack, share resources, establish a protocol to follow, and optimize communication among participating facilities to respond to a mass-casualty event as effectively as possible ([Figure 2](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/figure/f2-rmhp-7-177/)).[43](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4199656/#b43-rmhp-7-177) Examples of health care coalitions that have been well established are Los Angeles, New York City, Seattle and King County, and Minneapolis. All of these coalitions were established and are maintained with funding from the HPP, work by assigning core hospitals with resources to serve as a disaster-response center, and communicate and coordinate with surrounding hospitals to allocate resources, bed capacity, additional staffing, and required medications. However, new and existing coalitions are faced with a range of challenges, despite the importance of maintaining them. Among these challenges, sharing of proprietary information (bed status and capacity), insufficient funding for resources and staffing, geographic limitations (differing regional boundaries for coalitions beyond counties, states, and federal regions), and allocation and continued renewal of HPP grants require further improvement and research.

### Impact

#### Bioterror is the strongest internal link to extinction. Outweighs nuke war. Farmer 2/17

Farmer, Ben. “Bioterrorism Could Kill More People than Nuclear War, Bill Gates to Warn World Leaders.” The Telegraph, Telegraph Media Group, 17 Feb. 2017, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/17/biological-terrorism-could-kill-people-nuclear-attacks-bill/. //nhs-VA

Bioterrorists could one day kill hundreds of millions of people in an attack more deadly than nuclear war, [Bill Gates](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/bill-gates/) will warn world leaders. Rapid advances in genetic engineering have opened the door for small terrorism groups to tailor and easily turn biological viruses into weapons. A resulting disease pandemic is currently one of the most deadly threats faced by the world, he believes, yet governments are complacent about the scale of the risk. Speaking ahead of an address to the Munich Security Conference, the [richest man in the world](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11445375/Bill-Gates-named-worlds-richest-person-for-16th-time.html) said that while governments are concerned with the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, they are overlooking the threat of biological warfare. Mr Gates, whose [charitable foundation](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/bill-gates/9812672/Bill-Gates-interview-I-have-no-use-for-money.-This-is-Gods-work.html)s funding research into quickly spotting outbreaks and speeding up vaccine production, said the defence and security establishment “have not been following biology and I’m here to bring them a little bit of bad news”. Mr Gates will today (Saturday) tell an audience of international leaders and senior officers that the world’s next deadly pandemic “could originate on the computer screen of a terrorist”. He told the Telegraph: “Natural epidemics can be extremely large. Intentionally caused epidemics, bioterrorism, would be the largest of all. “With nuclear weapons, you’d think you would probably stop after killing 100million. Smallpox won’t stop. Because the population is naïve, and there are no real preparations. That, if it got out and spread, would be a larger number.” He said developments in genetic engineering were proceeding at a “mind-blowing rate”. Biological warfare ambitions once limited to a handful of nation states are now open to small groups with limited resources and skills. He said: “They make it much easier for a non-state person. It doesn’t take much biology expertise nowadays to assemble a smallpox virus. Biology is making it way easier to create these things.” The increasingly common use of gene editing technology would make it difficult to spot any potential terrorist conspiracy. Technologies which have made it easy to read DNA sequences and tinker with them to rewrite or tweak genes have many legitimate uses. He said: “It’s not like when someone says, ‘Hey I’d like some Plutonium’ and you start saying ‘Hmmm.. I wonder why he wants Plutonium?’” Mr Gates said the potential death toll from a disease outbreak could be higher than other threats such as [climate change](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/climate-change/) or nuclear war. He said: “This is like earthquakes, you should think in order of magnitudes. If you can kill 10 people that’s a one, 100 people that’s a two... Bioterrorism is the thing that can give you not just sixes, but sevens, eights and nines. “With nuclear war, once you have got a six, or a seven, or eight, you’d think it would probably stop. [With bioterrorism] it’s just unbounded if you are not there to stop the spread of it.” By tailoring the genes of a virus, it would be possible to manipulate its ability to spread and its ability to harm people. Mr Gates said one of the most potentially deadly outbreaks could involve the humble flu virus. It would be relatively easy to engineer a new flu strain combining qualities from varieties that spread like wildfire with varieties that were deadly. The last time that happened naturally was the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic, which went on to kill more than 50 million people – or nearly three times the death toll from the First World War. By comparison, the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa which killed just over 11,000 was “a Richter Scale three, it’s a nothing,” he said. But despite the potential, the founder of Microsoft said that world leaders and their militaries could not see beyond the more recognised risks. He said: “Should the world be serious about this? It is somewhat serious about normal classic warfare and nuclear warfare, but today it is not very serious about bio-defence or natural epidemics.” He went on: “They do tend to say ‘How easy is it to get fissile material and how accurate are the plans out on the internet for dirty bombs, plutonium bombs and hydrogen bombs?’ “They have some people that do that. What I am suggesting is that the number of people that look at bio-defence is worth increasing.” Whether naturally occurring, or deliberately started, it is almost certain that a highly lethal global pandemic will occur within our lifetimes, he believes.

#### ISIS is already weaponizing bioterror – Turkey proves. Herriman 16

Herriman, Robert. “ISIS and Bioterrorism: Tularemia Planned Use in Turkey's Water.”Outbreak News Today, 21 Jan. 2016, outbreaknewstoday.com/isis-and-bioterrorism-tularemia-planned-use-in-turkeys-water-67823/. //nhs-VA

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), as early as five months ago, was implicated at least in planning to use bioweapons to strike terror. You may remember last summer, [an ISIS laptop was found in a former hideout](http://outbreaknewstoday.com/isis-laptop-reveals-plans-to-weaponize-plague-a-little-insight-43444/), which had specific plans on weaponizing Yersinia pestis, or the plague. Now, Turkish officials via an intelligence report revealed plans by the Islamic terror group to attack Turkey water source with biological agents, [according to Turkish media](http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/generalnews/2016/01/21/isis-plans-to-contaminate-turkish-water-with-tularemia_a4de822a-0ac9-485a-8eb8-074eda9d6039.html). According to the report, the main biological threat is the bacterium, Francisella tularensis, which causes tularemia or rabbit fever. [Today’s Zaman reports](http://www.todayszaman.com/national_intelligence-report-reveals-isil-plan-to-poison-water-sources_410173.html): The report states that it is very hard to diagnose the disease because its symptoms resemble those of many other diseases, and in the event of an ISIL attack on Turkey with this poison, many lives in Turkey might be lost because of late diagnosis. The report also states that ISIL plans to poison potable water supplies, water in reservoirs and other water sources. Humans can become infected through several routes, including: Tick and deer fly bites, Skin contact with infected animals, Ingestion of contaminated water, Inhalation of contaminated aerosols or agricultural dusts and Laboratory exposure. Symptoms of tularemia may include: Sudden fever, Chills, Headaches, Diarrhea, Muscle aches, Joint pain, Dry cough and Progressive weakness. People can also develop pneumonia with chest pain, cough, and difficulty breathing. Other symptoms of tularemia depend on how a person was exposed to the tularemia bacteria. These symptoms can include ulcers on the skin or mouth, swollen and painful lymph glands, swollen and painful eyes, and a sore throat. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says Francisella tularensis is very infectious. A small number (10-50 or so organisms) can cause disease. If F. tularensis were used as a weapon, the bacteria would likely be made airborne for exposure by inhalation. People who inhale an infectious aerosol would generally experience severe respiratory illness, including life-threatening pneumonia and systemic infection, if they are not treated. The bacteria that cause tularemia occur widely in nature and could be isolated and grown in quantity in a laboratory, although manufacturing an effective aerosol weapon would require considerable sophistication.

#### Raqqa is just a victory for propaganda – ISIS won’t die that easily. Weiss 9/1

Weiss, Michael. “Opinion: The Surprising Reality of ISIS Threat.” CNN, Cable News Network, 1 Sept. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/09/01/opinions/surprising-reality-isis-threat-weiss/index.html. //nhs-VA

[Pew's latest survey](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__cnn.us11.list-2Dmanage.com_track_click-3Fu-3D47c9040f6ff957a59bd88396e-26id-3Dcae45dc17a-26e-3D55d825dabd&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=eaJsqO1C5kF_PHX6yzuWZAOKNLZC-7OUFYzMGWdcc6k&m=IztAmyZwFOj2R-ysARmspqZZbK96xeEpKo-QlvY1Zl4&s=vM8W2V_fUKXW03L49gMCbH-VztxIqfyUsI5FhdhVBWs&e=) suggests that despite the battlefield advances in the fight against ISIS, the group still casts a significant shadow, at least over the citizens of most of the 38 countries surveyed. That kind of wariness is warranted. The group isn't going away -- and despite all the talk of lone wolf attacks, jihadist plots in the West are far more organized and coordinated than many realize. A common misperception about ISIS-related terror is that the group's fortunes exist in inverse proportion to the square mileage of territory it controls. Carnage on the streets of London, Istanbul, Brussels, Paris and now Barcelona, according to this conventional wisdom, represents the death throes of a medieval enterprise which is crumbling in Syria and Iraq. By taking out ISIS's administrative centers, revenue streams and willing executioners -- and therefore the symbolic strength represented by all of the above to galvanize new members abroad -- exportation of jihad will similarly wither away. Yet such thinking ignores the long history of ISIS's foreign operations, which have outlasted the ups and downs in its real estate holdings and have long predated the establishment of the so-called "caliphate." The founder of the organization, [Abu Musab al-Zarqawi](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__cnn.us11.list-2Dmanage2.com_track_click-3Fu-3D47c9040f6ff957a59bd88396e-26id-3D09138832b8-26e-3D55d825dabd&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=eaJsqO1C5kF_PHX6yzuWZAOKNLZC-7OUFYzMGWdcc6k&m=IztAmyZwFOj2R-ysARmspqZZbK96xeEpKo-QlvY1Zl4&s=UW7sxFN8i86ywQu31NAih3m7oN1fUDP3OxKlsYXBHR0&e=), [nearly exploded a chemical bomb in central Amman, Jordan, in 2004](https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__cnn.us11.list-2Dmanage.com_track_click-3Fu-3D47c9040f6ff957a59bd88396e-26id-3D7dcbfecb31-26e-3D55d825dabd&d=DwMFaQ&c=W8uiIUydLnv14aAum3Oieg&r=eaJsqO1C5kF_PHX6yzuWZAOKNLZC-7OUFYzMGWdcc6k&m=IztAmyZwFOj2R-ysARmspqZZbK96xeEpKo-QlvY1Zl4&s=xff5GlHs7GD38eZG5pW7-SpbRz_kk5_XsfIiZvBOOFw&e=), the year before he orchestrated a grisly series of bombings in hotels in that city, an event Jordanians still consider their own 9/11. A decade ago, European security services uncovered and thwarted a number of Zarqawist plots to bring terror to the continent, even as the warriors of ISIS's predecessor network were escalating sectarian civil war in Iraq and nowhere near being strategically routed. And well before ISIS lost the Kurdish city of Kobani, in a campaign that marked the initiation of the US.-led coalition's war in Syria and the beginning of its military downfall, the organization had been dispatching agents into Europe for the purpose of building up cells and minting a new rank-and-file of Western-born operatives who needn't have ever stepped foot outside their native countries.This campaign, essentially ISIS's foreign policy doctrine, was built on the initial success of its jihadist nation-building. And it was wholly in keeping with the group's well-advertised total war against the West -- a war that was always meant to be fought not only in the deserts of the Middle East, but in the boulevards of Europe and the United States. A defector from the Amn al-Dawla, ISIS's domestic spy service, told me in Istanbul two years ago -- weeks before the Paris attacks -- that he had personally trained two Arab-ancestry French foreign fighters who had subsequently been dispatched back to France. They had volunteered for this coalescing jihadist internationale and their new role was that of semiautonomous overseas assets who, for security reasons, were only be loosely answerable to ISIS HQ. In fact, the true headquarters of ISIS's foreign operations planning, at least for attacks in Europe, was the Syrian city of al-Bab, in Aleppo province. The Turkish military, backed by Syrian rebels, retook it in February, a contingency that has not much disrupted the spate of knifings, bombings and vehicular homicides linked to known ISIS associations in Europe. The now-dead ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, who was also the senior-most official in charge of Syria, issued his infamous injunction, instructing all true believing Muslims living the West -- sometimes known as the "gray zone" -- to murder American, European, Australian and Canadian innocents by any means necessary. Yet while it's true that Adnani was looking to inspire those with no discernible connection to his organization, the "lone wolf" species of terror plot has actually seldom existed in Europe. What may first appear to be the work of a wannabe or fellow traveler individually radicalized by ISIS ideology, later turns out to have been more carefully orchestrated and staffed operation run by domestic networks that have existed for years. This was certainly the case with the Christmas marketplace attack in Berlin last year, perpetrated by [Anis Amri](http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/22/europe/anis-amri-berlin-christmas-market/index.html?utm_source=Fareed%27s+Global+Briefing&utm_campaign=c373ba0587-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_08_24&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6f2e93382a-c373ba0587-83144537). It also increasingly seems to be the case with last week's Barcelona atrocity. Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, the research director at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, and a specialist on Islamist terror in the West, told me that "only six out of 38 plots in Europe between 2014 and 2016 were truly planned and carried out by lone actors." Even in the United States, he added, around one fifth of the 38 ISIS-inspired domestic plots and attacks between March 1, 2014, and March 1, 2017, involved some form of communication with what he calls "virtual entrepreneurs" -- online case officers employed by ISIS to instruct and provide logistical support for prospective attackers. ISIS has also built up an array of offshore outposts, what it grandiosely calls wilayats, or provinces, to ensure its survival beyond the demise of its pseudo state. See Afghanistan, Libya, Russia, Yemen, the Sinai Peninsula, Indonesia and the Philippines. This means that despite the Pentagon's cheerleading, even the fall of Raqqa -- the group's so-called capital -- won't mark the end of the ISIS threat to Europe or the United States.

#### ISIS is pigeon-holed; they’ll evolve their strat and lash out. Dugulin 1/19

Dugulin, Riccardo. “ISIS Is Losing Ground - and It Will Try to Double down on Terror Attacks against Europe.” Business Insider, Business Insider, 19 Jan. 2017, www.businessinsider.com/isis-terror-attacks-europe-2017-1. //nhs-VA

Terrorist activity is expected to remain a major [factor of insecurity](http://globalriskinsights.com/2017/01/2017-europe-security-and-political-risk-outlook/) in Western Europe in 2017. However, as the strategic situation shifts in Syria and Iraq, the threat posed by Sunni extremists in Europe is likely to evolve and generate new concerns for local security forces. The evolution of the terrorist threat in Europe is closely linked to strategic changes that are affecting the Islamic State’s position in the Middle East and North Africa. The Sunni extremist group lost control of Sirte in Libya as well as of several key locations in northern Syria and is struggling to delay the offensive in Mosul. As such, its strategy for the first months of 2017 is likely to focus on tactical offensives in Syria and attempts to expand its global operations, especially in Europe. Throughout 2016, the Islamic State has not only lost key regions, it has also witnessed the deaths of various members of its senior leadership . In August, an airstrike killed Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, spokesperson of the Islamic State, and a key figure in planning of external operations. The killing of al-Adnani as well as other senior leaders weakened the Islamic State’s planning and coordination for global attacks and pushes the group to rely on less complex plots as well as in-country recruiting in Europe for future operations. Due to territorial and manpower losses, the Islamic State is trying expand its global operations and develop stronger recruitment and support networks in Western Europe and Turkey. The senior militants that have replaced those killed frequently call for attacks against economic, civilian, military and institutional targets in a bid to boost the radicalisation of specific segments of European societies. The objective of expanding global operations is also an attempt to score key propaganda victories aimed at facilitating the group’s expansion in regions where it so far has a relatively weak penetration, such as Germany. As the Islamic State tries to expand its offensive operations in Europe, the group is likely to implement a shift in strategy. While in January and November 2015, radical Islamists conducted [complex](http://globalriskinsights.com/2015/11/a-strategic-shift-in-the-terrorist-threat-to-france/) and coordinated attacks in Paris, it is almost certain that extremists will pivot toward operationally simpler assaults. The usage of [single-assailants attacks](http://globalriskinsights.com/2016/08/strategy-lone-wolf-terrorist-attacks/) provides the Islamic State with a less demanding planning phase and a higher likelihood of success. Recent messages issued by Islamic State officials increasingly point toward the group’s willingness to boost its sympathisers in order to conduct carry out a high number of attacks. By launching a high volume of low-to medium-scale attacks the Islamic State aims at creating an overall feeling of insecurity and instability in Europe.

## Vaccines

### 1AR – OV

### UQ

#### H7N9 is the pandemic; it’s coming now and vaccines can’t solve in time – what’s needed are well-trained health workers to avoid mass death. Walsh 5/4

Walsh, Bryan. “The World Is Not Ready for the Next Pandemic.” Time, Time, 4 May 2017, time.com/magazine/us/4766607/may-15th-2017-vol-189-no-18-u-s/. Brian Walsh is TIME’s International Editor, its energy and environmental correspondent and was the Tokyo bureau chief in 2006 and 2007. //nhs-VA

Best ev – takes into account literally all factors like why a pandemic is uniquely key **now**

Across China, the virus that could spark the next pandemic is already circulating. It’s a bird flu called H7N9, and true to its name, it mostly infects poultry. Lately, however, it’s started jumping from chickens to humans more readily–bad news, because the virus is a killer. During a recent spike, 88% of people infected got pneumonia, three-quarters ended up in intensive care with severe respiratory problems, and 41% died. What H7N9 can’t do–yet–is spread easily from person to person, but experts know that could change. The longer the virus spends in humans, the better the chance that it might mutate to become more contagious–and once that happens, it’s only a matter of time before it hops a plane out of China and onto foreign soil, where it could spread through the air like wildfire. From Ebola in West Africa to Zika in South America to MERS in the Middle East, dangerous outbreaks are on the rise around the world. The number of new diseases per decade has increased nearly fourfold over the past 60 years, and since 1980, the number of outbreaks per year has more than tripled. Some recent outbreaks registered in the U.S. as no more than a blip in the news, while others, like Ebola, triggered an intense but temporary panic. And while a mutant bug that moves from chickens in China to humans in cities around the world may seem like something out of a Hollywood script, the danger the world faces from H7N9–and countless other pathogens with the potential to cause enormous harm–isn’t science fiction. Rather, it’s the highly plausible nightmare scenario that should be keeping the President up at night. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) ranks H7N9 as the flu strain with the greatest potential to cause a pandemic–an infectious-disease outbreak that goes global. If a more contagious H7N9 were to be anywhere near as deadly as it is now, the death toll could be in the tens of millions. “We are sitting on something big with H7N9,” says Michael Osterholm, the director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota and a co-author of the new book Deadliest Enemy: Our War Against Killer Germs. “Any one of these cases could trigger something big. By then it’d be way too late.” Too late because even as the scientific and international communities have begun to take the threat of pandemics more seriously, global health experts–including Bill Gates, World Health Organization director Dr. Margaret Chan and former CDC director Dr. Tom Frieden, to name just a few–warn that nowhere near enough is being done to prepare, leaving the U.S. scarily exposed. That’s because the system for responding to infectious disease is broken. So broken that it recently prompted Gates and his wife Melinda to put their weight behind a major public-private initiative called the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). The Gates Foundation alone will devote $100 million over the next five years to CEPI, which will help speed the development of vaccines against known diseases, like MERS, while also investing in next-generation technologies that can counter future threats. Since President Donald Trump took office, key government positions remain unfilled, including a new director for the CDC. The budget the President proposed in March would have slashed critical funding at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) by $15.1 billion, including deep cuts to the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which underwrites more infectious-disease research than any other agency in the world. The budget for the State Department and foreign aid–which power vital efforts to stop diseases overseas, where they usually originate–was set to be cut by 28%. Although a bipartisan congressional spending deal reached on April 30 blocked many of those cuts, the signals Trump has sent are worrying. “It’s early days, but if we compare to what we’ve seen in the past, it raises some alarm bells,” says Jeremy Youde, a global health expert at ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. The consequences of a major pandemic would be world-changing. The 1918 flu pandemic killed 50 million to 100 million people–at the top end, more than the combined total casualties of World Wars I and II–and for a slew of reasons, humans are arguably more vulnerable today than they were 100 years ago. First of all, there are simply more of us. The number of people on the planet has doubled in the past 50 years, which means more humans to get infected and to infect others, especially in densely populated cities. Because people no longer stay in one place–nearly 4 billion trips were taken by air last year–neither do diseases. An infection in all but the most remote corner of the world can make its way to a major city in a day or less. Climate change also plays a role as warmer temperatures expand the range of disease-carrying animals and insects we’re exposed to, like the Aedes aegypti mosquitoes that transmit Zika. And if nature isn’t bloody-minded enough, genetic-engineering tools have made it easier for terrorist groups or lone madmen to unleash custom-designed killer germs. In the case of a new pandemic, modern medicine should provide some protection. But experts say it’s more likely that we’ll be caught without a vaccine to prevent it or a drug ready to treat it. That’s true even with many known viruses. When the last Ebola outbreak exploded, in 2014, eventually killing more than 11,000 people, the virus wasn’t a mystery to scientists; it was discovered in 1976. But even though it had been killing people on and off for decades, there were no drugs or vaccines approved to fight it–and there still aren’t today, chiefly because there’s little incentive for pharmaceutical companies to bring them to market. There are troubling economic implications as well. The 2003 SARS epidemic, which killed fewer than 800 people, cost the global economy $54 billion, much of it in lost trade, transportation disruption and health care costs. The World Bank estimates that the toll from a severe flu pandemic could hit $4 trillion. One saving grace is that the scientific understanding of that risk is better than ever. Research groups are working feverishly to predict the next pandemic before it even happens. They’re cataloging threats and employing next-generation genetic-sequencing tools to speed the discovery of new or mysterious viruses. They’re helping identify and track outbreaks as they happen. But microbes evolve about 40 million times as fast as humans do, and we are losing ground. “Of all the things that can kill millions of people in very short order,” says Dr. Ashish Jha, director of the Harvard Global Health Institute, “the one that is most likely to occur over the next 10 years is a pandemic.” The question is how policy–and the government dollars that back it–can catch up with the science and keep the world safe. Doctors couldn’t tell what was wrong with Joshua Osborn, but they knew they were running out of time to save his life. Since the 14-year-old had returned to Wisconsin from a family trip to Puerto Rico, he’d suffered severe headaches and dangerously high fevers. Over the course of many months, each of the three dozen infectious diseases he was screened for–including West Nile virus, tuberculosis, Epstein-Barr and more–came up negative. Joshua was dying, but no one knew why. His doctor, desperate, shipped vials of the boy’s spinal fluid and blood to a team of scientists in San Francisco–a specialty lab run by Dr. Charles Chiu at the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF). Chiu is an undisputed leader in the field of genomic diagnosis–the science of using genetic sequences to identify pathogens–and he was Joshua’s last hope. Joshua’s mystery was extreme in its consequences but not in its details. Up to 25% of pneumonia cases and up to 70% of meningitis and encephalitis cases are caused by unknown pathogens. Doctors are usually able to narrow the cause enough to come up with an effective treatment, but not always. That’s where genomic diagnosis, which involves sequencing all the genetic data in a patient sample in an effort to find all hidden pathogens, will be game-changing. At the UCSF-Abbott Viral Diagnostics and Discovery Center, Chiu and his team can map blood samples against more than 8 million distinct DNA sequences to see if they match any of the known pathogens on file. For Joshua’s case, they had a suspect pegged in just 97 minutes: something called Leptospira santarosai, a rare pathogen found in parts of the Caribbean, including Puerto Rico. “Back in the 1980s, it would take two years to do that kind of computational work,” Chiu says. “We’ve developed a program that can analyze 10 million reads in under 30 minutes.” On the strength of Chiu’s diagnosis, Joshua was treated with basic antibiotics, and four weeks later, he was healthy again. The genetic sequence of a pathogen is a virtually fail-safe fingerprint, which is why tests like Chiu’s can be so effective in diagnosing a single person’s mystery illness. It’s the diagnostic equivalent of fishing for germs with a huge net, instead of a single line. Genetic sequencing is especially valuable when an unknown pathogen starts killing people in droves. In 2009, a cluster of people living in the southwestern corner of the Democratic Republic of Congo came down with a hemorrhagic fever and symptoms that included bleeding from their mucous membranes. Scientists in the field tested them for a range of pathogens known to cause similar symptoms, but it wasn’t until Chiu’s lab analyzed all the genetic information available that the culprit was identified: an entirely new pathogen from the family of viruses that cause rabies, among other things. “It’s a major transition from what we have been able to do in the past,” says John Hackett, divisional vice president of applied research and technology at Abbott, a major global health care company that helps fund Chiu’s lab. Scientists are already using these tools on active outbreaks, tracking the spread of a disease through changes in its genetic sequences. In the 2014 Ebola outbreak, a geneticist from MIT and Harvard, Dr. Pardis Sabeti, was able to determine via genomic sequencing that the virus was spreading primarily from human to human–not from animal to human, as experts had thought. That simple discovery dramatically altered how experts were fighting the spread of the disease in the field. That kind of information can mean the difference between an outbreak that kills hundreds instead of millions. The hope is that scientists will be able to use genetic information to predict how a pathogen will behave–before a single person ever falls ill. “That’s the holy grail,” says Dr. Ian Lipkin, director of the Center for Infection and Immunity at Columbia University. Before that can happen, however, scientists need to collect all those genetic fingerprints in the first place. Nearly all the new infectious diseases that scientists know about today originate in animals, and so will the emerging diseases of tomorrow. HIV began in chimpanzees, SARS in Chinese horseshoe bats, influenza in aquatic birds. At some point the animal pathogens jump the species barrier to humans, an event disease experts call a spillover. Spillovers have always occurred, but the rapid environmental change wreaked by humans in recent years has accelerated the spread. But what if there were a way to prevent those spillovers from ever occurring? That’s the aim of PREDICT, an ambitious program designed to rapidly detect and respond to emerging pathogens. Since it was launched in 2009, PREDICT, which is funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), has helped discover nearly 1,000 new viruses in animals and humans. “Outbreaks are like fires,” says Dr. Eddy Rubin, chief science officer at Metabiota, a San Francisco–based startup that uses big data to analyze outbreaks and is a partner of PREDICT. “If you’re able to understand where there is a greater likelihood of their occurring and detect them early on, you can shift the impact.” Another piece of the pandemic-prevention puzzle is the Global Virome Project, an ambitious strategy to identify, characterize and sequence the nearly half-million viruses that have the potential to spill over. The scientists behind the project estimate that it would cost $3.4 billion to complete. It’s a huge amount of money in the shoestring world of animal health–PREDICT, by comparison, is funded at $100 million–but its proponents believe that the project would easily pay for itself many times over if it could successfully stop a single pandemic. The Global Virome Project, which has been championed by leading infectious-disease experts around the world, is still almost entirely aspirational–though so was the Human Genome Project when it was first proposed by academic biologists years before its formal government launch. But if deep cuts to USAID’s budget are made, there may not be sustained funding for the current work being done in the field–let alone something even more ambitious. “This ties into global security,” says Jon Epstein, a vice president at EcoHealth Alliance, another PREDICT partner. “Hopefully they’ll see the value in that.” For all the advances in finding dangerous pathogens, the simple truth is that neither the world as a whole nor the U.S. in particular is at all prepared to handle a major infectious-disease pandemic–and a significant reason for that is a failure to invest in things now that can keep us safe later. The middle of the 20th century was a golden age for vaccines as scientific heroes like Dr. Jonas Salk developed drugs to protect against life-threatening diseases like polio. Yet today, while the worldwide pharmaceutical market is worth more than $1 trillion, the market for vaccines makes up at most 3% of it. That’s why the Gates Foundation, Britain’s Wellcome Trust charity and several governments launched CEPI this year. Beyond funding research to develop vaccines against existing threats, the CEPI fund–which aims to raise and spend $1 billion over the next five years–will also support research into entirely new ways to develop vaccines. No disease better illustrates the need for a next-gen vaccine than influenza. “We need to do better with flu vaccine,” says Dr. Anthony Fauci, director of the NIH National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. A healthy market exists for the seasonal-flu vaccine, but because the influenza virus constantly mutates, a new version has to be made each year, a process that takes months. That lag could be deadly during a severe influenza pandemic. Humans have little to no immune protection against new flu strains, which then spread rapidly around the world and–sometimes–cause severe disease. And though the flu usually isn’t deadly for otherwise healthy people, it can be, as the 1918 pandemic showed. While flu vaccines didn’t exist in 1918, they did in 2009, when a new flu strain jumped from pigs to people and ultimately killed an estimated 203,000 people around the world, a majority of them under the age of 65. Efforts were made to fast-track a vaccine, but the first doses weren’t available for 26 weeks, and it would have taken a year to produce vaccines for every American. Since it can require years of testing and well over $1 billion to successfully develop a single vaccine against a single pathogen, drug companies have increasingly shied away from the business. “There’s just no incentive for any company to make pandemic vaccine to store on shelves,” says Dr. Trevor Mundel, president of the global health division at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. That’s why most infectious-disease experts aren’t hanging their hopes solely on new treatments or vaccines. After all, that’s not what ultimately contained the most recent lethal outbreak of Ebola. It chiefly fell to health workers on the ground and to Frieden, director of the CDC for eight years under President Obama. And on no day did that effort come closer to failure than on July 23, 2014. That was the day Frieden received news that Ebola had arrived in the Nigerian megacity of Lagos. The virus had been killing people for months in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, but Ebola in Lagos–the biggest city on the African continent, with a metro population of 21 million–represented a threat of an entirely different magnitude. “If it got out of control in Lagos, it could spread through Nigeria and the rest of Africa,” says Frieden. “It could still be going on today.” But it isn’t, thanks largely to the herculean efforts of thousands of expert health workers–U.S. staff from the CDC and Nigerian officials who had been trained in the international effort to stop polio–who were quickly diverted to fight Ebola. This is why Frieden, Gates and others are so bullish about investing in science and foreign aid. Without aid, Nigeria would not have been able to stem the spread of Ebola. And without the next-generation science that helped track the outbreak, far more people would have died. “It’s very important that this kind of work continues,” says Frieden, “or America is going to be less safe.” Make no mistake: for all our high-tech isolation units, top-tier doctors and world-class scientists, the U.S. health care system is not ready for the stresses of a major pandemic. As the infectious-disease expert Osterholm notes, a pandemic is not like other natural disasters, which tend to be confined to a single location or region. Disease can strike everywhere at once. In the event of a pandemic, even the best hospitals could rapidly run out of beds and mechanical ventilators. The U.S. does have a national strategy for pandemics, and there have been welcome steps taken since the bioterrorism fears that followed 9/11. In February, the military think tank DARPA launched a program aimed at producing effective medicines within 60 days of the identification of a new, pandemic-causing pathogen. But the country hasn’t been truly tested yet. Melissa Harvey, who heads the division of national health care preparedness programs at HHS, is in charge of helping U.S. hospitals get ready for the next big threat. She notes that while hospitals were able to handle a handful of sick people during Ebola, a truly major crisis would be a different story. “In a situation like the 1918 pandemic, the expectation is that the resources are not going to be there for everyone.” If you look at the numbers, it’s clear that right now the U.S. government doesn’t spend in a way that says fighting pandemics is a consistent national priority. Instead, money gets issued on a disease-by-disease basis, often after a crisis has started. During Ebola, for instance, Congress appropriated more than $5 billion in much-needed emergency spending–but it did so nearly five months after international health groups had called it a crisis. The drawbacks of this scattershot way of investing in pandemic response became even clearer during Zika, when it took nearly nine months for Congress to finally allocate $1.1 billion to fight a disease that had already begun spreading in the U.S. Even then, Congress required that some of that come from existing Ebola funding that had been going to pandemic preparation. “We literally had to rob Peter to pay Paul,” says Ron Klain, who served as Ebola czar during the Obama Administration.

### Link

#### Medical Reserve Corps k2 distributing vaccines during massive health crises. NY Department of Health n.d.

Department of Health. “NYC Medical Reserve Corps.” Volunteer Management System, Department of Health, apps.health.ny.gov/vms/appmanager/vms/public?prog=34. //nhs-VA

The New York City Medical Reserve Corps (NYC MRC) enhances New York City's (NYC) emergency preparedness by ensuring that a trained group of volunteer health professionals is ready to respond to health emergencies. The NYC MRC works in partnership with professional associations, universities and hospitals to organize this multidisciplinary group of volunteer health professionals. Although the MRC is a federal initiative, NYC's team was created by the city's Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) to support the emergency needs of our local area. A rapid emergency response will help provide a timely return to stability for our communities. NYC MRC volunteers can play a critical role in making this happen by being part of a pre-identified, pre-credentialed, and pre-trained group of potential responders. The primary role of the NYC MRC is to help distribute antibiotics or vaccine to a large number of New Yorkers during a health emergency requiring mass prophylaxis. NYC MRC volunteers may be called upon to fulfill other functions, such as: medical evaluation, vaccination, distribution of medication, patient education, screening, patient "flow monitoring", psychological first aid. Volunteers may also be asked to assist with medical surge capacity (e.g., during a pandemic influenza outbreak) and mass sheltering operations (e.g., during a coastal storm). Any licensed or certified health professional, or health profession student, who lives or works in NYC can join. A wide range of health professionals–including physicians, pharmacists, dentists, nurses, nurse practitioners, mental health providers and others–is needed. A large-scale health emergency would require the help of thousands of health professionals.

### Impact

#### Outbreaks cause extinction – burnout wrong. Kerscher 14

Kerscher 14—Professor, unclear where because every website about him is in German. (Karl-Heinz, “Space Education”, Wissenschaftliche Studie, 2014, 92 Seiten)

The death toll for a pandemic is equal to the virulence, the deadliness of the pathogen or pathogens, multiplied by the number of people eventually infected. It has been hypothesized that there is an upper limit to the virulence of naturally evolved pathogens. This is because a pathogen that quickly kills its hosts might not have enough time to spread to new ones, while one that kills its hosts more slowly or not at all will allow carriers more time to spread the infection, and thus likely out-compete a more lethal species or strain. This simple model predicts that if virulence and transmission are not linked in any way, pathogens will evolve towards low virulence and rapid transmission. However, this assumption is not always valid and in more complex models, where the level of virulence and the rate of transmission are related, high levels of virulence can evolve. The level of virulence that is possible is instead limited by the existence of complex populations of hosts, with different susceptibilities to infection, or by some hosts being geographically isolated. The size of the host population and competition between different strains of pathogens can also alter virulence. There are numerous historical examples of pandemics that have had a devastating effect on a large number of people, which makes the possibility of global pandemic a realistic threat to human civilization.

#### This is empirically true. Burnout and self-interest don’t check.

Casadevall 12 – Prof @ Department of Microbiology and Immunology and the Division of Infectious Diseases of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine Arturo. (“The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, p. 584-5)

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant. However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Tayloret al., 2001)

## Ports

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#### No, cyberattacks don’t trigger the impact – can be easily removed and house is already advancing legislature to stop it. Chalfant 9/7

Chalfant, Morgan. “House Panel Advances Measure to Guard U.S. Ports from Cyberattacks.”TheHill, 7 Sept. 2017, thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/349633-house-panel-advances-measure-to-guard-us-ports-from-cyberattacks. //nhs-VA

\*Bracketed for ableist language

A House panel easily advanced legislation on Thursday aimed at protecting ports in the United States from cyberattacks, in the wake of a massive malware outbreak that [harmed] some operations at the Port of Los Angeles. The House Homeland Security Committee approved the bill, introduced by a California Democrat, at a meeting Thursday morning as members commended it as a step toward boosting cybersecurity of America’s infrastructure. Rep. Norma Torres (D-Calif.) [introduced](https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3101/text) the legislation in late June, after the “notPetya” malware attack ravaged computer systems in Europe and the United States. The computer virus shut down the largest terminal at the Port of Los Angeles after it made its way into the operations of global shipping company A.P. Moller-Maersk. The shipping terminal was closed for several days after the cyberattack. Torres’s bill directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to take steps to boost cybersecurity information sharing and coordination at U.S. ports. For instance, it mandates that at least one maritime community representative participate in DHS’s information sharing hub for cyber threats to critical infrastructure, known as the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center. A version of the bill passed the House last Congress but never moved in the Senate. A Democrat who represents the district of the Port of Los Angeles cheered the legislation on Thursday. “Just a couple months ago, there was a cyberattack there that shut down the largest terminal and really had an impact on the movement of goods and what it means to the economy is enormous,” said Rep. Nanette Diaz Barragán (D-Calif.). “Having a maritime rep in the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center is deeply important.” The committee approved the bill with no amendments, among four pieces of legislation under consideration at the markup. “America’s adversaries have proven to be very agile. With new advances in technology, they seek to expose weaknesses in our transportation systems, our ports of entry, and our online networks,” Chairman Michael McCaul (R-Tex.) said in opening remarks. “The bills we are marking up today are important steps to securing each of those areas.” Following the meeting, McCaul signaled that he will visit the Port of Los Angeles later this year in order to review its cybersecurity operations.

#### West Coast port security is weak now. KABC 8/17

Kabc. “Port of LA's Security Questioned after Chase Suspect Falls from Crane.” ABC7 Los Angeles, 17 Aug. 2017, abc7.com/port-of-las-security-questioned-after-chase-suspect-falls-from-crane/2318231/. //nhs-VA

Brackets in original

A wild chase that ended with a car theft suspect slipping from atop a loading crane at the Port of Los Angeles is raising questions about the strength of the vital port's security measures. The coroner's office on Thursday identified the man as 23-year-old James Llamas. He has previous arrests for drugs and robbery, police said. The fall came after Llamas had been on top of the crane hundreds of feet in the air, dancing, rolling around and at one point removing his clothes. After the hours-long standoff and bizarre behavior, Llamas fell from the crane. He died at the scene. The chase started around 3:50 p.m. in the area of Mid-City by the westbound 91 Freeway. Authorities began a chase with the suspect, who they believed had stolen a white SUV. At some point, authorities lost the vehicle on the 91 Freeway. He was spotted again around 5:40 p.m. and headed through Carson on the 405 Freeway. The chase eventually ended up in Long Beach and then in the Wilmington area along the waterfront. Llamas was able to easily blow through two guardhouses at the port with no barriers or other obstructions in his way. After driving around erratically for several minutes, Llamas fled from the car, leaving it to roll away. Los Angeles City Councilman Joe Buscaino, who called for a full investigation into the incident, said [He] could have been carrying anything in the vehicle that entered into the region's most sensitive zone for commerce. The Port of Los Angeles processes $750 million worth of goods per day. Port officials said in a statement that Los Angeles Port Police have launched an investigation into the security breach at the container terminal that led to Llamas being able to climb the crane. "This thorough review, including protocols necessary to address improvements, will be completed as soon as possible," port officials said.

### Link

#### CERT training is key to augmenting port security at West Coast ports—these ports are terrorist targets. Allen et al 03

Allen et al 03 (Warren, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, Seth Jacobson, Masters Students @ UCLA School of PUblic Policy + Social Research, "Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergence Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach," 4/15, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\_content/documents/PSAPP\_042103.pdf)

¸ CERT Training: The Los Angeles County CERT Advisory Committee should provide CERT training to prepare workers at the port complex to respond to an attack. Community Emergency Response Team (**CERT) training is a voluntary program that provides emergency preparedness training and allows civilians to supplement professional first responders’ efforts.** ¸ CERT Prioritization: The CERT Advisory Committee should prioritize high-risk populations, allocate CERT classes first to these high-priority groups, and set target percentages of volunteers to be trained within these populations. Port workers should receive CERT training because the port complex is a potential target for terrorism, but there is currently a backlog for training and no method of prioritization. ¸ Interagency Joint Training Team: The CERT Advisory Committee should coordinate the creation of an interagency CERT Joint Training Team for the port complex. To overcome resource constraints, the Los Angeles and Long Beach Fire Departments, Los Angeles County Fire Department, and Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department should each dedicate one full-time CERT trainer from their existing staffs to train workers at the port complex. In addition, the American Red Cross should teach CERT modules that do not require instruction by professional first responders. ¸ CERT Funding: The CERT Advisory Committee should pursue both federal grants and private sector donations as funding alternatives for the interagency CERT Joint Training Team.

### Impact

#### Under a skeptical, inward-tending leader like Trump, relative economic decline will trigger worldwide conflict

**Tønnesson 15** (Stein, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Leader of the East Asia Peace program at Uppsala university, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Volume 18, Number 3, p. 297—311)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

# Policy

## DAs

### AT: Politics

#### No link - Dictionary.com says conscription is

“Conscription.” Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/conscription. //nhs-VA

compulsory enrollment of persons for military or naval service; draft.

#### Turn – national service popular – republicans wont go against their constituents. VNS 6/12

VNS. “Take a Stand for Service with Points of Light and Voices for National Service.” Voices for National Service, 12 June 2017, voicesforservice.org/news/voices-blog/take-stand-service-points-light-voices-national-service/. //nhs-VA

And national service is tremendously popular. A [poll](http://voicesforservice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Voices-TP-One-Pager.pdf) in nine presidential battleground states found that 83 percent of registered voters support increased or maintained federal investment in national service. This overwhelming support defies party lines, including 78 percent of Republicans, 84 percent of Independents, and 90 percent of Democrats surveyed. It’s easy to understand why voters support national service. CNCS programs harness the energy and ingenuity of our nation’s most valuable resource – our citizens – to address community needs and help local economies grow.

Methodology: Commissioned by Voices for National Service, TargetPoint Consulting conducted a poll of 800 registered voters from October 3-5. Those voters interviewed were representative of nine presidential battleground states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa,Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The margin of error for this poll is +/- 3.46%. This memorandum reflects the findings from this survey

#### Too many obstacles and risks with impeachment. Drutman 6/1

Drutman, Lee. “Will Republicans Impeach Trump?” Vox, Vox, 1 June 2017, www.vox.com/polyarchy/2017/6/1/15726278/will-republicans-impeach-trump. Lee Drutman is a senior fellow in the Political Reform program at New America. Drutman also teaches in the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies at The Johns Hopkins University. Prior to coming to New America, Drutman was a senior fellow at the Sunlight Foundation and has worked in the U.S. Senate and at the Brookings Institution. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley and a B.A. from Brown University. //nhs-VA

For congressional Republicans, impeaching Trump has three major risks. The real possibility that Trump fights back, and hard. If confronted with impeachment from his own party, Trump might react like an angry bear and try to take as many people down with him as possible. That the fight over Trump’s impeachment splits the Republican Party. Trump still has his supporters, and many of them will stick with him. They share his critique of a corrupt Washington, and this impeachment will almost certainly prove his point. He tried to shake up Washington; “they” came for him with phony charges and stabbed him in the back. Since Democrats will almost certainly vote along with many Republicans to impeach Trump, this will be “proof” that Republican insiders colluded with Democrats (the enemy) to get rid of Trump. This will hurt Republicans’ chances going forward. The pro-Trump remnant may run third-party candidacies just to sink establishment Republicans. Or they may just become demoralized and stop voting altogether. A seething resentment and deep frustration powered Trump. Those feelings are still present in many places. That Trump’s impeachment spoils the Republican brand for at least a few elections to come, maybe even longer. To take him down will require a damning case against him, and perhaps implicate many Republicans. The GOP will be branded as the party of Trump, with all the stink of whatever comes out. Weighing the costs and benefits of Impeachment Now let’s compare the costs and benefits in four areas. **Damage to the party brand** The damage to the party brand question is a short-term/long-term calculus. Trump is clearly hurting the party brand as president in the short term. Impeaching him almost certainly does even more short-term harm to the party brand. In 1974, after Richard Nixon’s resignation, Republicans [**lost 48 House seats and four Senate seats**](http://https//www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch2_full.pdf). But in 1980, Ronald Reagan won the White House, and Republicans won control of the Senate. The party had a new energy and a new force. The sooner Republicans boot Trump, the sooner they can get on with attempting to rebuild the party brand. Of course, that logic may not appeal to the Republicans who will lose their seats in the 2018 and 2020 elections. Or Republicans who are convinced that if Democrats ever get back into power, it will be the [**end of the republic**](http://www.nationalreview.com/article/448086/never-trump-conservatives-donald-trump-still-opposed). **Getting back to legislating** Congressional Republicans initially hoped that Trump would get on board with the team and the GOP would pass a bunch of bills. Now that Trump is self-imploding, so much for that. But to assume that impeaching Trump could end the distraction and let Republicans get back to legislating ignores three inconvenient facts. The first is that congressional Republicans’ legislative problems are not really Trump’s fault. The party itself is internally divided, and does not have a clear vision of what policies it wants to enact. Different factions within the party have different vague ideas, but there is little consensus. And nobody in the party has the ability to unite and work out compromises among the competing instincts. As [**Paul Ryan noted**](http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/nobody-knew-governing-could-be-so-complicated/520824/), it’s easier to be an opposition party. Governing requires trade-offs. The second issue is that without the 60-vote threshold in the Senate, Republicans are going to need at least some Democrats to enact any legislation. If the Republican Party brand is taking a hit from the Trump impeachment, why would Democrats cooperate at all in advance of the 2018 election, after which they will have more power? The third issue is perhaps the most uncomfortable for congressional Republicans to confront: that many of their policy goals (cut taxes on the rich, repeal Obamacare, roll back entitlements) are [deeply unpopular](http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/05/whats-less-popular-than-donald-trump-paul-ryan-and-mitch-mcconnell.html?mid=full-rss-nymag). Republicans might have been able to get away with these under the guise of Trump’s anti-establishment, faux-populist bluster. But with the Republican brand already receding in popularity, more Republican members will find themselves skittish in voting for unpopular policies. **Whither President Pence** Then there is the question of a President Pence. Mike Pence may be seen as a steadier hand than Trump, and far more attuned to the rhythms of Capitol Hill (he was formerly in the House leadership). But it’s hard to imagine him as the charismatic leader restoring the Republican Party to glory. He was [relatively unpopular](http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/trump-mike-pence-vice-president-225387) as governor of Indiana, where he took some extreme far-right stands on social issues. He’s hardly a visionary leader who could rebuild the GOP. Pence may be [**slightly more popular than Trump**](http://www.newsweek.com/polls-vice-president-mike-pence-more-popular-president-donald-trump-618580). But if he ascended to president, he would also face the full fire of Democrats, who have for now targeted their energies at Trump. Pence would also face fire from whatever pro-Trump Republican remnant remains, who will surely view Pence as the establishment usurper. If Pence becomes president, his popularity will probably be even lower than Trump’s. **The Trump backlash** As for the extent of the Trump backlash, it’s hard to say how much he’ll try to take down all the furniture with him on the way out. Some of it depends on how overwhelming the evidence against him is. Some of it will depend on how exhausted Trump himself is. Some of it will depend on who’s with him in the bunker at the end. If it’s just him and Steve Bannon, Trump is probably more likely to go down swinging than he would be with Gary Cohn. My hunch is that if he were impeached at this point, Trump would fight back, and that Bannon would be most likely to be with him at the end, egging him on to finally create the chaos he hoped to sow all along. But Trump may also just be so exhausted at the end of it that he gives up, resigns, begs a pardon, and collapses. And if he does give up, the pro-Trump remnant will lack a leader, and probably be less of a threat than they would be if Trump wanted to keep fighting. Still, it’s possible that even if Trump gives up, some in the right-wing media will take up his cause, and view this as their casus belli for taking down the Republican establishment. After all, the 2016 Republican primary did reveal plenty of internal party resentment. Will Republicans impeach Trump? For congressional Republicans, these are uncertain calculations. Proceeding to impeachment has big risks, with limited and highly uncertain benefits. It seems more likely congressional Republicans will wait and see, and cling to the increasingly small hope that Trump will be exonerated, or that somehow the steady thrum of scandal abates and they can get on with whatever it was they thought they could accomplish. But the political calculus will change as the facts change. Investigations will reveal more. The moment when impeachment becomes a reality is the moment that the majority of congressional Republicans look at the pile of evidence, and the media narratives surrounding that evidence, and can no longer credibly tell themselves that impeachment is not an inevitability. Given the uncertain calculus behind impeaching Trump, and the need for a large number of congressional Republicans to all get on the same page to make impeachment successful, the *case* for impeachment will need to be incredibly compelling — on both political and evidentiary grounds. And this may be the biggest reason impeachment is unlikely to happen immediately: Republicans have to mostly unify around it. And just as Trump benefited from internal party division in the presidential primary, internal party division may continue to keep him in office.

Bottom of Form

### AT: Volunteerism

#### Volunteerism declining – prefer this ev, it accounts for a long-term decline. Dain 15

Dain, Andrew. “Volunteering Is at a 10-Year Low (And What We Can Do About It).” NeonCRM, NeonCRM, 14 Oct. 2015, www.neoncrm.com/volunteering-is-at-a-10-year-low-what-can-we-do-about-it/. Andrew is a Marketing Associate at NeonCRM. He writes about innovation and technology in the nonprofit sector. //nhs-VA

It’s official — volunteering rates in America have reached their lowest point in more than a decade. According to a study released last year by the [Bureau of Labor Statistics](http://www.bls.gov/news.release/volun.toc.htm), only 25.4 percent of Americans volunteered in 2013. That’s means only one in four Americans are volunteering every year. Ouch. In all fairness, it’s only a slight decline from the previous year — 26.6 percent. But the decrease is part of a larger trend. The volunteering rate has slowly dwindled from 29 percent to 25.4 percent in just 10 years. It’s clear that Americans are volunteering less, both in numbers and hours. Volunteering is an undeniably American activity. It’s often called one of the country’s “core values” — the right to form voluntary associations is even mentioned in the [U.S. Constitution](http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/03/volunteering-america-decline-272675.html). And with the average American household donating nearly [$3,000 to charities each year](http://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/), It’s hard to understand why Americans are [engaging](https://philanthropy.com/article/Americans-Engagement-With/152055) with these organizations, but not volunteering. Many in volunteer management think these numbers are disconcerting. Volunteers are such important partners for many organizations, and this trend could threaten the capacity — and even the existence — of several nonprofits. SO WHY ARE THE NUMBERS DECLINING? One of the most frustrating things about the slow decline in volunteering is that we don’t know exactly what’s causing it. The volunteer rates vary widely by just about every metric — age, income, region, race — so it’s hard to pinpoint why the numbers are lower overall. Journalists and thought leaders have pointed to several possible explanations, including ties to the [economic stress](http://verifiedvolunteers.com/Resources/OurBlog/2014/October/The%20Number%20One%20Reason%20Volunteerism%20is%20on%20the%20Decline.aspx), [regional differences](http://www.volunteeringinamerica.gov/), [government funding](http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/troubling-numbers-in-volunteering-rates/) and even the amount of [single-parent households](http://www.newsweek.com/2014/10/03/volunteering-america-decline-272675.html). It seems like everything has some impact on the volunteering rate, but there’s no conclusive and singular cause for the dropoff. What seems to be the most worrisome (and somewhat inconclusive) statistic is a sharp decrease in volunteering rate among highly educated Americans. According to [The Nonprofit Times](http://www.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/troubling-numbers-in-volunteering-rates/), the rate of volunteering among people with a bachelor’s degree or higher plummeted from 42.8 percent in 2009 to 39.8 percent in 2013. Nathan Dietz, a senior research associate at the Center on Nonprofits & Philanthropy said this statistic could be “the canary in the coal mine.” “That number had been stable a long time and all of a sudden the bottom dropped out,” Dietz said. “Education is the single best predictor of volunteering. It’s people with a job, and a good one.”

## CPs

### AT: Incentives CP

# Topicality

## 1AR

### Shell

#### C/I: National service is NOT a term of art and defining it as such is arbitrary. Rather, it encompasses three specific topic areas -- the CNCS, the Peace Corps and the Military.

Brennan and Upshaw 12 – Matthew and Kyle, Naval Postgraduate School (“AMERICAN SERVICE: NEW NATIONAL SERVICE FOR THE UNITED STATES” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a573814.pdf)

In the U.S., the term national service is a nebulous one. Some Americans will argue that true national service in the U.S. is simply non-existent or ceased when the Vietnam-era draft ended in 1973. Other Americans will argue that national service is all around us in the form of volunteers serving at the local food bank or in schools. An individual’s perspective and, in some cases, bias plays an important role when it comes to what one considers national service within the U.S. In the broadest context, national service within the U.S. encompasses three distinct areas: the Corporation for National and Community Service (CNCS), the Peace Corps, and the military. Sometimes there is a bifurcation between military service and other forms of service. In fact, programs like the Corporation for National and Community Service or the Peace Corps are seen as mere “alternatives to military service.” Yet, service is integral to all three; in each, members—be they CNCS workers, Peace Corps volunteers, soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines—display a commitment to a purpose larger than themselves in the undertaking of their duties. There is an old military adage that says that no one ever joined the military to get rich; the same can be said about the other national service programs as well. Understanding why individuals serve and why they choose the service programs they do is critical to providing insight into how future national service can be modeled.

#### **These are all the affs under the C/I – predictable AND similar advantage ground that solves the limits offense. Any further specification of departments (i.e. only the Fire Corps) is not topical. CNCS n.d.**

CNCS No Date (Corporation for National and Community Service, “Who We Are” <https://www.nationalservice.gov/about/who-we-are>



### RVI

### AT Text First

### AT Underlimiting

### AT Ground

# Extra

### Cards

#### Extremely active hurricane season coming now – Harvey is only the beginning. Rice 8/9

Rice, Doyle. “'Extremely Active' Hurricane Season Now Likely, Federal Forecasters Say.”USA Today, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 9 Aug. 2017, www.usatoday.com/story/weather/2017/08/09/hurricane-season-now-likely-extremely-active-noaa-says/552254001/#. //nhs-VA

Batten down the hatches. The 2017 Atlantic hurricane season should be "extremely active, and could be the most active since 2010," federal forecasters from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration announced Wednesday. Six named storms have already formed, including Hurricane Franklin, which is expected to hit the east coast of Mexico late Wednesday. Two of the tropical storms, Cindy in June and Emily in July, struck the United States. “We’re now entering the peak of the season when the bulk of the storms usually form,” said Gerry Bell, lead seasonal hurricane forecaster at NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center. NOAA said 14-19 named storms are now likely to form this year, with 5-9 becoming hurricanes. The numbers include the six storms that already occurred. The 2010 season had 19 named storms. A tropical storm contains wind speeds of 39 mph or higher and becomes a hurricane when winds reach 74 mph. The latest forecast, an update to the original one released in May, makes no prediction about where or exactly when the storms and hurricanes will hit. The wind and air patterns in the Atlantic and Caribbean where many storms develop make an above-average season more likely, Bell said. Last year, NOAA predicted 10 to 16 named storms, of which 4 to 8 would be hurricanes. 15 storms formed, of which 7 were hurricanes. Meteorologists at Colorado State University last week also updated their forecast, predicting 16 tropical storms will form, with eight becoming hurricanes. The late Colorado State University meteorologist William Gray was the first scientist to make seasonal hurricane forecasts back in the 1980s.

#### Fiscally strapped local communities are laying off first-responders who play vital roles in preventing future terrorist attacks—greater federal support is key. Liberman 03

Lieberman 03 (Joseph, US Senate--CT, FNS, 5/22, lexis)

But the resources necessary have not been given to this department yet. The potential for change and improvement is still there. Let me cite as examples the fire fighters, police officers and medical emergency professionals in communities across America who are the first to respond to a disaster, and the last to leave, and who can become also the first preventers, because they are out there in enormous numbers everywhere in America, still desperately need proper training, proper communications to allow them to talk to one another in a crisis, so they can protect us, **and they need personal reinforcements**. Instead, many first responders -- more than half of the communities in America, from one statistic I have seen have been laying off first responders today, **because the cities and towns are so fiscally strapped**. That makes about as much sense as reducing America's troop strength in the middle of a conventional war. Yet, I regret to say that the administration and the majority here in Congress have not adequately funded first responders or the Department of Homeland Security. There is much more to be done. We have made so strides in securing our air travel, that is true. But other forms of transportation remain inadequately protected, and require your consideration. Our nation's seaports I fear remain an Achilles' heel in our domestic defenses. Too little cargo is being inspected, and to few containers are being tracked from their port of origin to their final destination. At the current rate of funding, it will take the Coast Guard 20 years to build the modern fleet it needs to fight terrorism now. And here again the president's budget under-supports basic physical security at ports for items like perimeter fencing, guards and monitors. Our borders remain painfully porous and cry out for the Border Patrol to be beefed up. But I do want to say that to me perhaps the most significant gap remaining is the one that people can't see, and that is the gap in our intelligence community. There has been too much reluctance to challenge the status quo in the intelligence community. The best way to stop terrorism, all the experts agree, is to interrupt the plot before it's executed. And that can only come from great intelligence. Today, unfortunately, when it comes to understanding the scope and depth of the intelligence failures that led to September 11th, we simply don't have enough information. Too many of the failures that we have already identified remain unchanged today, a full 20 months after the attacks. And I want to say bluntly it starts at the top. And today at the top of our intelligence and law enforcement communities there remains too much division, too many of the same bureaucratic barriers that I think contributed to the disaster of September 11th. And all of the federal agencies continue to keep state and local first responders and first preventers, as I call them, **at arm's length, when it really is these front-line forces who have the vital knowledge to share**, and most desperately need useful federal intelligence shared with them.

#### 5 programs. Citizen Corps n.d.

“Citizen Corps.” Citizen Corps | Ready.gov, Department of Homeland Security, www.ready.gov/citizen-corps. //nhs-VA

There are more than 1,200 county, local or tribal Citizen Corps Councils and 56 state or territory Councils. Councils support education and training in multiple locations with 72 percent delivering materials or training and demonstrations in neighborhoods, 71 percent in schools, 63 percent in workplaces and 53 percent in places of worship. Citizen Corps has five partners: Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Fire Corps, USA on Watch, Medical Reserve Corps, and Volunteers in Police Service.

## Advantages – Long Beach

### 1AC –Zika

#### Citizen Corps saves lives during hurricane season – empirically proven. Emmett 10

Emmett, Ed. “Harris County Citizen Corps Builds Community Preparedness.” The County Judge Report, Aug. 2010, www.judgeemmett.org/Newsletters/Newsletter\_August\_2010.html. //nhs-VA

Harris County Citizen Corps’ value was proven during Hurricane Ike in September 2008. A powerful Category 2 hurricane with sustained winds of 110 miles per hour, its storm surge flooded 2,500 homes. Another 1,200 homes were flooded due to the heavy rainfall, and almost 98% of area residents were left without power. The community’s response was a testament to the extraordinary results that are achieved when residents adopt a culture of preparedness. Volunteers from Harris County Medical Reserve Corps delivered over 81,000 meals to homebound individuals immediately after Ike struck our community. Efforts led by Harris County Citizen Corps, its partners and volunteers helped distribute more than 1.1 million gallons of water, 10.5 million pounds of ice and 2.8 million ready-to-eat meals to devastated residents. Volunteers made the difference in ensuring that the natural disaster did not become a *massive public health disaster* as well. Harris County Citizen Corps has been recognized as a National Best Practice and received the 2003 Best Practices for Innovation Award from the Texas Association of Counties and the 2006 Governors Volunteer Award for Community Capacity Builder. In 2007, HCCC was awarded “The President’s Call to Service Award,” recognizing its coordination of the volunteer response to the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. Further, in 2008 the organization was honored by President Bush at the White House, received the National Citizen’s Corps Council Achievement Award for Volunteer Integration in 2009 and was recently chosen as a finalist for the 2010 National Citizen Corps Achievement Awards-Celebrating Resilient Communities (award winners will be announced in September). Having built strong partnerships with the 53 fire departments, 34 incorporated cities and over 100 law enforcement entities in Harris County, Citizen Corps will continue to build upon the foundation put in place over the past eight years. Its focus on developing and supporting volunteer opportunities for residents will only sharpen as new challenges become apparent and new volunteers come forward.

#### Disaster readiness prevents disease outbreaks – especially vector-borne diseases. Watson et al 07

Watson, John T., Michelle Gayer, and Maire A. Connolly. “Epidemics after Natural Disasters.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 13.1 (2007): 1–5. Jan 2007 PMC. Web. 17 Aug. 2017. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/> Watson - Director/Professor, [Bioengineering](http://www-bioeng.ucsd.edu/) at UCSD. Gayer - Director of Emergency Reform, World Health Organization. Marie Connolly is Chair and Head of Social Work at the University of Melbourne //nhs-VA

Water-related Communicable Diseases Access to safe water can be jeopardized by a natural disaster. Diarrheal disease outbreaks can occur after drinking water has been contaminated and have been reported after flooding and related displacement. An outbreak of diarrheal disease after flooding in Bangladesh in 2004 involved >17,000 cases; Vibrio cholerae(O1 Ogawa and O1 Inaba) and enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli were isolated ([13](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R13)). A large (>16,000 cases) cholera epidemic (O1 Ogawa) in West Bengal in 1998 was attributed to preceding floods ([14](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R14)), and floods in Mozambique in January–March 2000 led to an increase in the incidence of diarrhea ([15](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R15)). In a large study undertaken in Indonesia in 1992–1993, flooding was identified as a significant risk factor for diarrheal illnesses caused by Salmonella enterica serotype Paratyphi A (paratyphoid fever) ([16](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R16)). In a separate evaluation of risk factors for infection with Cryptosporidium parvum in Indonesia in 2001–2003, case-patients were >4× more likely than controls to have been exposed to flooding ([17](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R17)). The risk for diarrheal disease outbreaks following natural disasters is higher in developing countries than in industrialized countries ([8](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R8),[11](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R11)). In Aceh Province, Indonesia, a rapid health assessment in the town of Calang 2 weeks after the December 2004 tsunami found that 100% of the survivors drank from unprotected wells and that 85% of residents reported diarrhea in the previous 2 weeks ([18](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R18)). In Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, an outbreak of acute watery diarrhea occurred in an unplanned, poorly equipped camp of 1,800 persons after the 2005 earthquake. The outbreak involved >750 cases, mostly in adults, and was controlled after adequate water and sanitation facilities were provided ([19](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R19)). In the United States, diarrheal illness was noted after Hurricanes Allison ([20](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R20)) and Katrina ([21](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R21)–[23](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R23)), and norovirus, Salmonella, and toxigenic and nontoxigenic V. cholerae were confirmed among Katrina evacuees. Hepatitis A and E are also transmitted by the fecal-oral route, in association with lack of access to safe water and sanitation. Hepatitis A is endemic in most developing countries, and most children are exposed and develop immunity at an early age. As a result, the risk for large outbreaks is usually low in these settings. In hepatitis E–endemic areas, outbreaks frequently follow heavy rains and floods; the illness is generally mild and self-limited, but in pregnant women case-fatality rates can reach 25% ([24](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R24)). After the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, sporadic hepatitis E cases and clusters were common in areas with poor access to safe water. Over 1,200 cases of acute jaundice, many confirmed as hepatitis E, occurred among the displaced ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). Clusters of both hepatitis A and hepatitis E were noted in Aceh after the December 2004 tsunami ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). Leptospirosis is an epidemic-prone zoonotic bacterial disease that can be transmitted by direct contact with contaminated water. Rodents shed large amounts of leptospires in their urine, and transmission occurs through contact of the skin and mucous membranes with water, damp soil or vegetation (such as sugar cane), or mud contaminated with rodent urine. Flooding facilitates spread of the organism because of the proliferation of rodents and the proximity of rodents to humans on shared high ground. Outbreaks of leptospirosis occurred in Taiwan, Republic of China, associated with Typhoon Nali in 2001 ([27](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R27)); in Mumbai, India, after flooding in 2000 ([28](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R28)); in Argentina after flooding in 1998 ([29](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R29)); and in the Krasnodar region of the Russian Federation in 1997 ([30](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R30)). After a flooding-related outbreak of leptospirosis in Brazil in 1996, spatial analysis indicated that incidence rates of leptospirosis doubled inside the flood-prone areas of Rio de Janeiro ([31](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R31)). Diseases Associated with Crowding Crowding is common in populations displaced by natural disasters and can facilitate the transmission of communicable diseases. Measles and the risk for transmission after a natural disaster are dependent on baseline immunization coverage among the affected population, and in particular among children <15 years of age. Crowded living conditions facilitate measles transmission and necessitate even higher immunization coverage levels to prevent outbreaks ([32](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R32)). A measles outbreak in the Philippines in 1991 among persons displaced by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo involved >18,000 cases ([33](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R33)). After the tsunami in Aceh, a cluster of measles involving 35 cases occurred in Aceh Utara district, and continuing sporadic cases and clusters were common despite mass vaccination campaigns ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). In Pakistan, after the 2005 South Asia earthquake, sporadic cases and clusters of measles (>400 clinical cases in the 6 months after the earthquake) also occurred ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). Neisseria meningitidis meningitis is transmitted from person to person, particularly in situations of crowding. Cases and deaths from meningitis among those displaced in Aceh and Pakistan have been documented ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25),[26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). Prompt response with antimicrobial prophylaxis, as occurred in Aceh and Pakistan, can interrupt transmission. Large outbreaks have not been recently reported in disaster-affected populations but are well-documented in populations displaced by conflict ([34](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R34)). Acute respiratory infections (ARI) are a major cause of illness and death among displaced populations, particularly in children <5 years of age. Lack of access to health services and to antimicrobial agents for treatment further increases the risk for death from ARI. Risk factors among displaced persons include crowding, exposure to indoor cooking using open flame, and poor nutrition. The reported incidence of ARI increased 4-fold in Nicaragua in the 30 days after Hurricane Mitch in 1998 ([35](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R35)), and ARI accounted for the highest number of cases and deaths among those displaced by the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)) and by the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). Vectorborne Diseases Natural disasters, particularly meteorologic events such as cyclones, hurricanes, and flooding, can affect vector-breeding sites and vectorborne disease transmission. While initial flooding may wash away existing mosquito-breeding sites, standing water caused by heavy rainfall or overflow of rivers can create new breeding sites. This situation can result (with typically some weeks’ delay) in an increase of the vector population and potential for disease transmission, depending on the local mosquito vector species and its preferred habitat. The crowding of infected and susceptible hosts, a weakened public health infrastructure, and interruptions of ongoing control programs are all risk factors for vectorborne disease transmission ([36](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R36)). Malaria outbreaks in the wake of flooding are a well-known phenomenon. An earthquake in Costa Rica’s Atlantic Region in 1991 was associated with changes in habitat that were beneficial for breeding and preceded an extreme rise in malaria cases ([37](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R37)). Additionally, periodic flooding linked to El Niño–Southern Oscillation has been associated with malaria epidemics in the dry coastal region of northern Peru ([38](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R38)). Dengue transmission is influenced by meteorologic conditions, including rainfall and humidity, and often exhibits strong seasonality. However, transmission is not directly associated with flooding. Such events may coincide with periods of high risk for transmission and may be exacerbated by increased availability of the vector’s breeding sites (mostly artificial containers) caused by disruption of basic water supply and solid waste disposal services. The risk for outbreaks can be influenced by other complicating factors, such as changes in human behavior (increased exposure to mosquitoes while sleeping outside, movement from dengue-nonendemic to -endemic areas, a pause in disease control activities, overcrowding) or changes in the habitat that promote mosquito breeding (landslide, deforestation, river damming, and rerouting of water). Other Diseases Associated with Natural Disasters Tetanus is not transmitted person to person but is caused by a toxin released by the anaerobic tetanus bacillus Clostridium tetani. Contaminated wounds, particularly in populations where vaccination coverage levels are low, are associated with illness and death from tetanus. A cluster of 106 cases of tetanus, including 20 deaths, occurred in Aceh and peaked 2-1/2 weeks after the tsunami ([26](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R26)). Cases were also reported in Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake ([25](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R25)). An unusual outbreak of coccidiomycosis occurred after the January 1994 Southern California earthquake. The infection is not transmitted person to person and is caused by the fungus Coccidioides immitis, which is found in soil in certain semiarid areas of North and South America. This outbreak was associated with exposure to increased levels of airborne dust subsequent to landslides in the aftermath of the earthquake ([39](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R39)). Disaster-Related Interruption of Services Power cuts related to disasters may disrupt water treatment and supply plants, thereby increasing the risk for waterborne diseases. Lack of power may also affect proper functioning of health facilities, including preservation of the vaccine cold chain. An increase in diarrheal illness in New York City followed a massive power outage in 2003. The blackout left 9 million people in the area without power for several hours to 2 days. Diarrhea cases were widely dispersed and detected by using nontraditional surveillance techniques. A case-control study performed as part of the outbreak investigation linked diarrheal illness with the consumption of meat and seafood after the onset of the power outage, when refrigeration facilities were widely interrupted ([40](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#R40)). Historically, fears of major disease outbreaks in the aftermath of natural disasters have shaped the perceptions of the public and policymakers. These expectations, misinformed by associations of disease with dead bodies, can create fear and panic in the affected population and lead to confusion in the media and elsewhere. The risk for outbreaks after natural disasters is low, particularly when the disaster does not result in substantial population displacement. Communicable diseases are common in displaced populations that have poor access to basic needs such as safe water and sanitation, adequate shelter, and primary healthcare services. These conditions, many favorable for disease transmission, must be addressed immediately with the rapid reinstatement of basic services. Assuring access to safe water and primary healthcare services is crucial, as are surveillance and early warning to detect epidemic-prone diseases known to occur in the disaster-affected area. A comprehensive communicable disease risk assessment can determine priority diseases for inclusion in the surveillance system and prioritize the need for immunization and vector-control campaigns. Five basic steps that can reduce the risk for communicable disease transmission in populations affected by natural disasters are summarized in an ([Appendix Table](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2725828/#SD1)). Disaster-related deaths are overwhelmingly caused by the initial traumatic impact of the event. Disaster-preparedness plans, appropriately focused on trauma and mass casualty management, should also take into account the health needs of the surviving disaster-affected populations. The health effects associated with the sudden crowding of large numbers of survivors, often with inadequate access to safe water and sanitation facilities, will require planning for both therapeutic and preventive interventions, such as the rapid delivery of safe water and the provision of rehydration materials, antimicrobial agents, and measles vaccination materials.

#### Zika mutates. Almendrala 16

Almendrala, Anna. “Zika Is Extremely Good At Mutating. Here's What You Need To Know.”The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 19 Apr. 2016, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/zika-is-extremely-good-at-mutating-heres-what-you-need-to-know\_us\_57153223e4b0018f9cbabd9b. //nhs-VA

As a disease, Zika virus caught the world’s doctors and scientists off-guard. It appears to cause [severe harm in a variety of different ways](http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsr1604338?query=featured_home), including birth defects and neurological disorders, yet the symptoms are mild or negligible for most people who contract it. It can be passed both from mother to fetus and through sex — a first in the realm of mosquito-borne diseases. Finally, despite the fact that Zika virus has been around since 1947, it has only inflicted widespread injury in the current 2015-2016 outbreak, centered mostly in Latin America and the Caribbean. That final aspect of Zika virus is what’s most intriguing to scientists like Stephanie Valderramos, co-author of a new study on the way Zika virus has mutated over time and across different host species. Valderramos and her colleagues have found that [the virus is extremely good at mutating](http://www.cell.com/cell-host-microbe/fulltext/S1931-3128%2816%2930142-1), and the way the disease has changed over the decades may help explain how it’s been able to seriously hurt some people who get it. This research, published in the journal Cell Host and Microbe, may also play a preliminary role in broadening our understanding of how the virus is transmitted. According to Valderramos, mosquitoes may not even be the primary mode of Zika virus transmission in this current outbreak. “The fundamental question I think everyone wants to know is, how has this virus that has been around for almost 70 years not really caused such clinical problems until the past two years?” said Valderramos, a clinical research fellow in obstetrics and gynecology at UCLA. In the hope of further understanding Zika’s spread, Valderramos and her team traced the virus’ genetic makeup over several decades, countries and organisms, using samples from both humans and mosquitoes. They hope to one day determine if a constellation of diseases and syndromes, from the birth defect microcephaly to the autoimmune disorders Guillain-Barré Syndrome and [acute disseminated encephalomyelitis](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/04/11/scarier-than-we-initially-thought-cdc-sounds-warning-zika-virus/82894878/), can be attributed to genetic mutations in the virus itself. The mutations could also one day clue scientists in on how the virus has managed to spread so fast within the past two years, after only sporadically popping up in handfuls of people since its discovery in 1947. The Zika virus isolated from mosquitoes has different genetic sequencing than any strain isolated from human beings.

#### Zika will uniquely cause extinction – evolution of new strains and ability to spread quickly. DUJS 09

DUJS. “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate.” DUJS Online, 22 May 2009, dujs.dartmouth.edu/2009/05/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate/#.WaHznJOGOYU. //nhs-VA

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

### 1AC – Wildfires

#### Wildfires are more likely and potentially dangerous than ever before. Hodgson interviewing Ferguson 7/27

Ferguson, Gary. “How Climate Change Is Making Wildfire Season Worse.” How Climate Change Is Making Wildfire Season Worse | Here & Now, WBUR, 27 July 2017, www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2017/07/27/land-on-fire-gary-ferguson. Gary Ferguson is an American writer. Ferguson is the author of more than 20 nonfiction books. His books have won awards from the Society of American Travel Writers, the High Plains Book Festival, and the Montana Book Award committee.//nhs-VA

On how much worse wildfires are because of climate change "The most comprehensive study to come out last year, kind of a collaborative effort between Columbia University and the University of Idaho, suggested that when you pull out all the natural climate change factors — things like ocean circulation patterns and whatnot — human-caused climate change is probably responsible for doubling the number of acres burned since 1985. So it's a very, very fast change, and it looks like from all the evidence out there that this is just simply going to be worse before it gets better." On whether humans moving into new areas has exacerbated wildfires' impact "Absolutely, and that's part of the perfect storm going on. There's something that land use planners refer to as the 'wildland-urban interface,' and that's exactly what it sounds like: People moving into the edge of large swaths of vegetation, and pretty fire-prone areas. And remarkably, a billion acres are now in the wildland-urban interface, so that's about 40 percent of the land mass in the United States. And 200 million acres of that — about 70,000 communities — are living in land that has been designated as high risk for wildfire in the coming years." On whether it's always been hard for forests to come back from a wildfire "Not so much. And while there have always been the occasional big fires, they have gotten much, much more common since roughly 2000. Typically, in the days of thousands of years before Europeans and Anglos arrived in the West, there were what were called stand-maintenance fires burning through, and they were fairly low temperature, smaller fires, 6- to 8-foot tall flames, and they would actually be very healthy. They are very healthy for the forest. And so by eliminating those stand-maintenance fires, we allowed the fuel load to build up to an incredibly high degree. We've got about 300 million acres in the West now with unnaturally heavy fuel loads. And so now when the fires go through, they hit these accumulated fuel loads, and that's what makes them hot — that along with climate change — and that's what's sterilizing the soil to a degree and creating these hydrophobic soils to a degree that simply wouldn't have happened with this kind of regularity 50 or 100 years ago."

#### Fire Corps is a division of Citizen Corps – the aff relieves recruiting strains and frees up space for firefighters. Fire Corps Website n.d.

“Frequently Asked Questions.” Fire Corps - Supporting Fire & EMS Services, www.firecorps.org/volunteers/frequently-asked-questions. //nhs-VA

Fire Corps is a locally-driven Citizen Corps program that enables community members to offer their time and talents to their local fire/EMS department in a non-emergency capacity. What is Citizen Corps? Citizen Corps is an initiative under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to help coordinate volunteer activities that will make our communities safer, stronger, and better prepared to respond to any emergency situation. It provides opportunities for people to support first responders and participate in a range of measures to make their families, homes, and communities safer from the threats of crime, terrorism, and disasters of all kinds. Citizen Corps is comprised of five programs – USAOnWatch/Neighborhood Watch, Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), and Fire Corps – along with several affiliate organizations. Citizen Corps activities are coordinated at the local level by Citizen Corps Councils. For more information about Citizen Corps, please visit [www.citizencorps.gov](http://www.citizencorps.gov/). Department Questions How can Fire Corps benefit my department? Fire Corps provides opportunities for community members to assist your department by performing non-emergency tasks and roles, enabling department members to focus on emergency response and training. Engaging citizens may also allow departments to increase the services they offer, such as enhanced fire safety education programs. In return, citizens gain a greater understanding of the fire and emergency services and become better prepared to handle their own emergencies as well as those of their neighbors. Fire Corps members also act as advocates for the fire and emergency services in the community. My department already has a citizen volunteer program in place. Does it qualify as a Fire Corps program or do we have to change it in any way? If citizens offer their time to support your department in a non-emergency capacity, it qualifies as a Fire Corps program. Registering your program with Fire Corps allows you to use the nationally recognized Fire Corps name, opens your program up to increased funding opportunities, and grants you access to using all of Fire Corps’ resources and materials without having to make modifications. [Register your program](http://www.firecorps.org/program-login/register). Is there funding available for Fire Corps program? Yes. As a registered member of Fire Corps, your department may be eligible for grants through your local Citizen Corps Council. Contact your local or state Citizen Corps Council for more information or visit [www.citizencorps.gov](http://www.citizencorps.gov/). There are also increased grant opportunities through other federal grant programs, such as the Fire Prevention and Safety grants available through the Department of Homeland Security's Assistance to Firefighters Grant program. [Learn more about grant and funding opportunities](http://www.firecorps.org/departments/start-a-program/grants-and-funding). My department would like to start a program. What help is available? The Fire Corps national office has created a myriad of resources to help you start, market, maintain, and expand your department’s efforts to generate more community support through Fire Corps. These include resource guides, sample documents, training and evaluation materials, public service announcements, complimentary newsletters, and promotional materials. Access these resources and more [here](http://www.firecorps.org/departments/overview). In addition, Fire Corps has created a network of State Advocates to assist you as you start and implement a Fire Corps program. These State Advocates serve as the point of contact to assist departments and programs in their assigned geographic area. [Find your State Advocate](http://www.firecorps.org/departments/start-a-program/connect-with-your-state-advocate/161-state-advocate-contacts-).You can also contact Fire Corps at 1-888-FC-INFO1 or info@firecorps.org for more information and guidance. My department already has a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) program. How would establishing a Fire Corps program in addition to CERT benefit my department? CERT and Fire Corps are complimentary programs that can work together to create a comprehensive citizen volunteer support program. By implementing both CERT and Fire Corps, it becomes even easier to meet a department’s diverse range of needs as well as keep community volunteers actively engaged both in times of crisis and in between. Fire Corps has produced a guide that outlines how Fire Corps and CERT can work together to benefit both the departments and the citizen volunteers as well as how to build stronger communities. [Download the guide](http://www.firecorps.org/files/documents/cert-fire-corps-working-together.pdf). Community Volunteer Questions Why should I join a Fire Corps program? As a Fire Corps volunteer, you will be part of a renowned national volunteer program where you can support your local fire/EMS department with non-emergency tasks so department members may better protect your community from fires, natural disasters, terrorism, and other emergencies. In return, you will gain a greater understanding of the fire and emergency services and become better prepared to handle your own emergencies as well as those of your neighbors. What can I do for my local fire/EMS departments? Fire Corps members can use their individual talents and skills to support various non-emergency tasks, including but not limited to: Conducting fire prevention and life safety education in the community Providing rehab or canteen services (providing food and water to first responders during lengthy incidents) Raising much-needed funds for the department Performing data entry tasks Assisting with bookkeeping Providing administrative support Conducting public relations Assisting with events Preplanning and conducting research for emergency incidents Apparatus and facility maintenance The types of tasks available are limited only by the needs of the department. Fire/EMS departments seek a variety of skills and will match your talents and interests to an appropriate assignment. For example, if you're a graphic designer, they may ask you to help design a brochure, or if you're a computer software expert, they may want you to help improve their existing information system.

#### Wildfires kill the economy. Diaz 12

Diaz, John M. “Economic Impacts of Wildfire.” Southern Fire Exchange, July 2012, fireadaptednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/economic\_costs\_of\_wildfires.pdf. Diaz - assistant professor and Extension specialist, Department of Agricultural Education and Communication//nhs-VA

Wildfires frequently damage community infrastructure, including highways, communication facilities, power lines, and water delivery systems. Restoring basic services is a top priority, and, many agencies and organizations incur significant restoration costs after a fire. State transportation departments’ efforts to restore roads and highways include the costs of maintenance and damage assessment teams, field data collection, and replacement or repair of roads, guardrails, signage, electrical supply, culverts, and landscaping. Direct impacts to municipal water supply may occur through contamination of ash and debris during the fire, destruction of aboveground delivery lines, and soil erosion or debris deposits into waterways after the fire. Municipal water managers must address water supply impacts, and the potential costs associated with changes in quantity and quality. Utilities and communications repairs are also necessary for equipment damaged by a fire. This includes power lines, transformers, cell phone towers, and phone lines. Tax payers feel the squeeze on these repairs as each state typically reimburses the majority of costs incurred by the companies paying for the repairs. Florida facilitated these repairs by increasing sales tax variably throughout the 16 county region affected by wildfires to collect almost $43 million dollars for the fire season of 1998. The 2003 wildfires resulted in significant losses to San Diego’s infrastructure. The total economic impact on infrastructure was $147.3 million, with a majority of the loss as 3,200 utility power poles, 400 miles of wire, 400 transformers, and damage to 100 other pieces of related utility equipment. NATURAL AREAS ECONOMIC IMPACT Post-catastrophe management of endangered species and their habitat is a complex issue. Management requires extensive funding for watershed restoration and hazard mitigation efforts. Portions of these funds are used to restore habitat and control the potential impact of erosion and floods in the following seasons. While not easily measured, loss of ecosystem services could potentially be included in the total economic loss. The Florida study did not quantify these economic impacts due to the complexity of environmental management and restoration. The San Diego State study was able to estimate costs associated with erosion, flood control, and watershed restoration. FEMA provided $47 million in watershed restoration funding and $14 million in hazard mitigation efforts. Recognizing the extent of these restoration efforts, San Diego County received additional financial support from the US Department of Agriculture and San Diego Gas and Electric totaling just over $42 million. This left a huge financial responsibility on the county to provide the remaining funds to effectively restore watersheds and ecosystems. Loss of ecosystems services was estimated based on the reduced function to control runoff and reduce air pollution. These costs were estimated at $25,349,000 and $798,000, respectively. Along with the economic impact identified, these natural areas may also serve as significant cultural and historical resources, for which losses are not easily quantified. BUSINESS ECONOMIC IMPACT Determining the total economic loss and impact of the wildfires to the region is challenging. While many of the local businesses experience impacts to facilities, shipping delays, and interruptions in employee productivity, few of them actually estimate this loss. In 1998, the counties in the SJRWMD that were affected by the fires lost $138 million in tourism but also experienced an increase of over $1 billion in total business sales, compared to the same period the previous year. Forest landowners with burned timber lost approximately $350 million in value. The lost economic activity in the San Diego region was calculated at a conservative 10% based on gross productivity. This was due to a loss of 24 commercial buildings, a $32.5 million drop in tourism, and almost 5,000 people out of work. As with the Florida fires, there was a significant increase in economic activity following the wildfire season associated with recovery and rehabilitation efforts. Economic growth after large wildfire events is not a result of true economic growth, but rather a response to large-scale economic and infrastructure losses. COMMUNITY IMPACT Wildfires impact communities in multiple ways, from closing natural areas that residents and tourists visit to damaging homes and harming residents or firefighters. Short- and long-term impacts on recreational activity are challenging to quantify. Closures of areas often eliminate recreational activity, while interest in post-fire impacts on the wildlands may actually attract new visitors. As fires are inherently dangerous, residents and firefighters can be injured or even lose their lives during a wildfire. While it is impossible to place a dollar value on human life, it is very important to consider the impacts of these events on communities and families. In addition, long-term exposure to smoke can increase the incidence of respiratory conditions and hospital visits*. The loss of homes and employment are frequently the largest of the economic loss indicators*. From 1985 to 2011 approximately 9,000 homes have been lost to wildfires across the United States. In 1998, Florida observed $12 million dollars in property loss, but fortunately no fatalities, while in 2003 San Diego County lost 3,241 homes, 16 civilians, and 1 firefighter.

#### Trump lashes out – this causes conflict. Foster 16

Foster 12/16 - Dennis M. Foster is professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute. “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” December 19, 2016, Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm\_term=.9ac2999a0f48) LADI

Then-Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump gives a speech aboard the World War II battleship USS Iowa in San Pedro, Calif., in September, 2015. (Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images) If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy. In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior. Do words translate into foreign policy action? One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. [Trump may put 5 former top military brass in his administration. That’s unprecedented.] For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively. Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force). [Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?] Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. What about Donald Trump? Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action. I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.

### 1AC – Terrorism

#### Bioterrorism is coming now and will have deadly consequences- we’re not prepared to deal with an attack

Vicinanzo 15 (Amanda, senior editor @ Homeland Security Today, “Biological Terrorist Attack On US An 'Urgent And Serious Threat',” 4/23/15, <http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/biological-terrorist-attack-on-us-an-urgent-and-serious-threat/0ce6ebf3524d83c537b1f4f0cc578547.html> /lg)

In the wake of the recent Ebola crisis, the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response and Communications convened a hearing Wednesday to examine US preparedness for a bioterrorist attack. “The risk of a biological terrorist attack to America is an urgent and serious threat. A bioattack could cause illness and even kill hundreds of thousands of people, overwhelm our public health capabilities, and create significant economic, societal and political consequences,” said subcommittee chairman Martha McSally (R-Ariz). “Our nation’s capacity to prevent, respond to, and mitigate the impacts of biological terror incidents is a top national security priority.” Bioterrorist threat from ISIL and other terrorist organizations In her opening statement, McSally expressed concern over the possibility that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other jihadi terrorist organizations could conduct a biological attack on American soil. “ISIL is better resourced, more brutal, and more organized than any terrorist group to date,” McSally said. “We know that they have an interest in using chemical and biological weapons.” Last year, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper warned the Syrian government might have advanced beyond the research and development stage and may have a restricted capacity to manufacture weaponized disease agents. Counterterrorism officials have worried for years since the conflict in Syria began that ISIL may be able to get a hold of these biological weapons. Moreover, last year, a laptop belonging to a Tunisian jihadist reportedly recovered from an ISIL hideout in Syria contained a hidden trove of secret plans, including instructions for weaponizing the bubonic plague and a document discussing the advantages of a biological attack. “The advantage of biological weapons is that they do not cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can be huge,” stated a document found on the laptop. In October, jihadists and supporters of ISIL stepped up discussions on jihadist social media websites about the possibility and ease of using Ebola, as well as other virulent pathogens and poisons, as weapons against the US and the West, according to reports by the Middle East Media Research Institute. Jim Talent, former Senator from Missouri and former vice-chair of The Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, testified that the threat of a bioattack is “one of the greatest and gravest” facing the nation. Talent said that at the end of 2008, the 9/11 Commission issued the report, World at Risk, which addressed the threat posed by nuclear and biological weapons. Talent and former Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.) gave the biothreat greater emphasis, knowing that terrorists have acquired bio-weapons in the past, and that it’s likely easier for them to secure a bio-weapon than a nuclear weapon. The report stated, “We accept the validity of current intelligence estimates about the current rudimentary nature of terrorist capabilities in the area of biological weapons but caution that the terrorists are trying to upgrade their capabilities and could do so by recruiting skilled scientists. In this regard, the biological threat is greater than the nuclear; the acquisition of deadly pathogens, and their weaponization and dissemination in aerosol form, would entail fewer technical hurdles than the theft of production of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium and its assembly into an improvised nuclear device.” In addition, bio-weapons can be easily transported, stockpiled, can cause more deaths than a tactical nuclear weapon, and, depending on the biological agent used, the terrorists could launch an attack and escape the area before the authorities even knew that an attack had occurred, according to Talent. And he's not alone. Seasoned and veteran counterterrorism officials agree that jihadi organizations appear to have a greater interest in acquiring and using biological and radiological weapons, and that Al Qaeda is known to have experimented with trying to weaponize a number of highly virulent pathogens. In 2005, Homeland Security Today first reported that Al Qaeda had worked on plans to send squads of "bio-martyrs" who would deliberately infect themselves with a human transmittable strain of bird flu once such a strain become a human contagion or a human transmissible form clandestinely bio-engineering to be easily passed between humans, and then to spread the virus as widely around the world as they could by traveling on one international flight after another, officials said at the time. During the height of the Ebola outbreak, intelligence surfaced indicating that jihadi organizations were discussing doing the same thing with the Ebola virus. With a long enough period of sanctuary where terrorists can plan, recruit and get together the necessary lab facilities and experts, they can isolate and weaponize. According to Talent, there are now areas, including in Iraq and Syria, where jihadists have the time and sanctuary to develop these weapons. Although an attack using biological agents or weapons is a low probability, high consequence event, “When you keep running risk and the risk continues to grow, even gradually, eventually the bullet is in the chamber,” Talent said. On August 14, 2013, Homeland Security Today Editor-in-Chief Anthony Kimery and former CIA WMD counterterrorism unit chief Charles Faddis appeared in "Biopocalypse," an episode of the SyFy Channel TV series, "Joe Rogan Questions Everything." The segment dealt with bio-terrorism, designer-hybrid pathogenic threats and unregulated DIY-bio genetics labs from out of which could emerge unregulated designer/hybrid pathogens. US response to Ebola outbreak highlights lack of bio preparedness The recent Ebola outbreak—the deadliest in history—has claimed the lives of over 10,000 and infected over 26,000, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). With no cure and a mortality rate as high as 90 percent, the Ebola epidemic serves as a grim reminder that even with the advent of modern medicine, the spread of deadly infectious diseases is not relegated to history. The World Health Organization (WHO) has been criticized for its slow response in the early months of the outbreak. Recently, WHO admitted to boggling the Ebola response, and released a list of lessons learned as well as suggested reforms for moving forward. "The Ebola outbreak that started in December 2013 became a public health, humanitarian and socioeconomic crisis with a devastating impact on families, communities and affected countries,” WHO said in a statement. “It also served as a reminder that the world, including WHO, is ill-prepared for a large and sustained disease outbreak.” Like WHO, the United States also mishandled the Ebola outbreak, calling into question US bio preparedness, both for terrorism and pandemics or other emerging infectious diseases. McSally stated that bureaucracy, as well as a leadership vacuum, prevented an effective response to the crisis. “Even after the Ebola response we cannot seem to identify the federal official who has the responsibility and authority to coordinate the dozen or so senior officials with responsibility for biological preparedness and defense,” McSally said. “It’s just baffling.” Earlier this month, Homeland Security Today reported that the post-9/11 Commission Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense arrived at the consensus that the government does not have a good answer to the question of who would be in charge if America was beset by a biological or chemical weapons attack. "The federal government has stated that a public health disaster or pandemic is one of the top strategic threats our country faces," said Dr. Kenneth Bernard, a former biodefense official in the Clinton and Bush administrations. "Yet, we were still largely unprepared for the Ebola outbreak this year. We're not managing our leadership properly." Panel co-chair Tom Ridge said a “leadership vacuum” plagues response efforts – especially the response to a large-scale, mass casualty biological or chemical attack, which most public health and emergency public health authorities agree the US isn't prepared for handling or mitigating. "Biological and chemical threats are among the most sinister our nation faces," Ridge said. "Terrorist groups have voiced their desire to obtain and use biological and chemical weapons. The Ebola crisis revealed significant gaps in US public health and medical preparedness. We must consider our current ability to defend against such threats and provide for the health and welfare of our citizens." The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense plans to issue recommendations for changes to US law and policy later this year. In addition to lack of leadership, the US has also failed to effectively manage and oversee its inventory of pandemic preparedness supplies, including protective equipment and antiviral drugs. In October, Homeland Security Today reported that by failing to implement controls to monitor its stockpiles, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) cannot be certain whether it has too little, too much or ineffective supplies for its personnel, especially those who will be needed on the front lines of a large-scale mass casualty attack or event. For example, the stockpile contained 4,982 bottles of hand sanitizer, 84 percent of which is expired, and the Transportation Security Administration’s stock of pandemic protective equipment included about 200,000 respirators that are beyond the 5-year usability guaranteed by the manufacturer. The glut in supplies means millions of dollars wasted on unnecessary drugs and equipment that need to be replaced in order to be continuously prepared. During a House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing, Rep. John Mica (R-Fla.) said, "We spent millions of dollars for a pandemic ... We don't know the inventory, we don't know who's got it, and we don't know who's gonna get it.” Moreover, according to Talent, the lack of sufficient medical countermeasures (MCMs) in our Strategic National Stockpile, and the lack of a system to quickly develop and produce MCMs during a crisis is the number one concern in US preparedness for a bio attack. Talent stated, “The recent Ebola virus outbreak highlighted that unless countermeasures are immediately available, including diagnostics tests that can be used by clinicians who are evaluating suspected cases, therapeutics to treat cases and vaccines to protect health care workers and others at risk, we are left with fairly primitive means to respond to and contain such events.” However, “The list of bio-threat agents for which we should have diagnostics tests, therapeutics and vaccines for is about a dozen. To date, our stockpile contains countermeasures for only three or four,” Talent said. Public health and emergency preparedness As the largest port of entry in the US, New York City activated “a highly detailed, coordinated and expensive multiagency and multijurisdictional effort” in response to increasing cases of Ebola in West Africa last year. Preparedness efforts included development of detailed plans for disease surveillance by the health department, investigation of hundreds of suspect cases, extensive staff training at each of its eleven hospitals to be prepared to receive and screen individuals potentially exposed to the disease, and the designation and readying of Bellevue Hospital as the primary New York City Ebola treatment center. New York City also engaged the community by distributing over 100,000 “Am I at Risk?” palm cards and holding over 115 public events to discuss public health concerns. Marisa Raphael, deputy commissioner of the Office of Emergency Planning and Response for the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, testified that federal funding played a critical role in the success of the city’s response to the Ebola crisis. Raphael also stated, “The greatest danger to our progress is the decline in federal emergency preparedness funding.” Homeland Security Today reported just last week that, as Western counterterrorism and intelligence officials worry about the increasing potential for an Islamist jihadist group or inspired individual to carry out a chemical, biological or radiological mass casualty attack in the United States, combined federal, state and local public health spending has fallen below pre-recession levels at $75.4 billion in 2013 -- or $239 per person ($218 adjusted for inflation)ilynina compared to $241 per person in 2009, according the new Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) report, Investing in America's Health: A State-by-State Look at Public Health Funding and Key Health Facts. Adjusting for inflation, TFAH said, “public health spending was 10 percent lower in 2013 than in 2009. Public health and emergency preparedness funding for New York City has decreased 35 percent from its peak in Fiscal Year 2005, which has led to a 47 percent reduction in our public health preparedness and response workforce. Raphael said, “The erosion of a skilled, dedicated workforce including epidemiologists, laboratory technicians, and preparedness planners threatens to compromise our ability to detect and respond to disease outbreaks.” As Homeland Security Today earlier reported, the federal funding cuts have not affected New York alone. “We cannot afford to let our guard down. We must remain vigilant in preparing for any potential mass casualty event. Yet, year after year, we see less and less funds going to the people who and departments that are responsible for preparing for a public health emergency,” TFAH Deputy Director Rich Hamburg told Homeland Security Today. Although New York demonstrated a high level of public health and emergency preparedness during the Ebola crisis, other large US cities remain vastly unprepared. Many do not access to the amount of funding or resources granted to New York. But beyond New York, hospitals in most major metropolitan cities are inadequately prepared for a surge of people infected with a highly contagious pathogen, a problem Homeland Security Today has reported since 2004.

#### Only bolstering the capabilities of first-responders can identify and stop terrorists before they strike. Eddy 05

Eddy 05 (RP, served as director of counter-terrorism for President Clinton’s National Security Council and is now Manhattan Institute Senior Fellow for Counter-Terrorism, "In the end all terrorism is local," Times of London, 7/8, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,1072-1684947,00.html)

THE LONDON bombings bear an important lesson for security officials. Because terrorism is increasingly carried out by locals, **nations on the receiving end of terrorism must bolster the capabilities of local police to identify and stop terrorists before they strike**. The number and simultaneity of yesterday’s attacks suggest localised surveillance and bombmaking, requiring a local support apparatus. We can presume that the bombers spent a considerable amount of time in the UK and may have even been UK residents. In this way and in others, the London attacks conform to post-9/11 terrorist trends. Globally we have witnessed a movement away from the centralised planning of grandiose attacks seen in Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and towards independent groups attacking smaller and less protected targets. The largest recent terrorist attacks before yesterday’s — the 2003 bomb attacks in Turkey and the 2004 train attacks in Madrid — were both cases of this “homegrown terror ”. The terrorists behind these attacks were residents of these nations and appear to have acted entirely independently of al-Qaeda’s central hierarchy. While a group calling itself “the Secret Organisation Group of al Qaeda of Jihad Organisation in Europe” has claimed credit for the attack on London’s Tube, it is not at all clear if they have any real co-operation with bin Laden’s al-Qaeda or rather simply an emotional or aspirational one, or if their claim is legitimate at all. The UK, with its highly attuned police force and MI5, has been a model for the US and other nations in terrorism prevention. Honed by years of IRA terrorism and a very well-designed counter-terrorism infrastructure, the UK, and particularly London, is considered one of the best examples of active policing used to prevent terror. Sadly, yesterday we learnt that even so, **more emphasis must be placed to train and empower police and citizens to help identify and prevent terrorism**. Faced with the threat of al-Qaeda releasing weapons of mass destruction, many governments have focused on efforts to train local police and fire departments to be “first responders” to terrorism — that is, to spring into action once an attack has occurred. These efforts help the personnel to purchase expensive gear and training to be, in effect, the “clean-up crew” after a successful terrorist attack, as opposed to empowering them to be “first preventers” of terrorism — to stop the terrorists from planning and mounting the attack in the first place. Interest in mitigating a WMD attack after it happens means that in the US we have spent less effort training police to prevent attacks like yesterday’s. **This is short-sighted.** Certainly we must ensure that our police and fire officers receive such “first response” training and equipment — to mitigate the effects of an attack after it occurs — **but we must also empower them to succeed at the very difficult and important task of detecting terrorists before they attack us.** Local police have **unique advantages over national assets** (such as MI5) to help prevent acts of terrorism because they are part of the community. They “walk the beat,” communicate regularly with local residents, and are more likely to notice even subtle changes in the neighbourhoods they patrol daily. Common sense tells us — as does experience — that local law-enforcement personnel are uniquely situated to notice (or otherwise learn of) and investigate unusual or suspicious behaviour. Based on the numbers alone, we can assume that local law enforcement personnel are much more likely than national agents to cross paths with terrorists. **Training police as first preventers also brings substantial deterrence to domestic counter-terrorism**. First, if terrorists feel that all the police eyeballs are trained on them, they might look for less daunting places to operate. Second, in a post-9/11 version of George Kelling’s and James Q. Wilson’s “Broken Windows” theory of policing, officers who are taught to identify the support structures of potential terrorists are more able to create the environment in which the terrorist will not feel comfortable. Since police have typically focused on investigation and prosecution of crime, special programmes are required for terrorism prevention. Just as a seasoned drug enforcement officer can spot signs of drug dealing or use, these programmes seek to train police to identify signs of terrorism: religious radicalism, clues of bomb-making, target surveillance and other suspicious activities. Effective programmes also include training in intelligence analysis. The US record has been poor. New York City Police Department has had the foresight to begin these complex prevention efforts. But they have done so without much federal support. In fact, a recent study funded by the FBI actually criticised the NYPD for running its own independent terrorism-prevention operation. So something can be learnt from the terrible outrage in London. **Failure to develop and foster “first preventers” among local law enforcement leaves our cities and towns defenceless** to the increasing threat of homegrown terror. **Local prevention is the first — and may also be the last — line of defence before any attack.**

#### Bioterror attacks cause extinction

Mhyrvold 13 Nathan, Began college at age 14, BS and Masters from UCLA, Masters and PhD, Princeton “Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action,” Working Draft, The Lawfare Research Paper Series Research paper NO . 2 – 2013

As horrible as this would be, such a pandemic is by no means the worst attack one can imagine, for several reasons. First, most of the classic bioweapons are based on 1960s and 1970s technology because the 1972 treaty halted bioweapons development efforts in the United States and most other Western countries. Second, the Russians, although solidly committed to biological weapons long after the treaty deadline, were never on the cutting edge of biological research. Third and most important, the science and technology of molecular biology have made enormous advances, utterly transforming the field in the last few decades. High school biology students routinely perform molecular-biology manipulations that would have been impossible even for the best superpower-funded program back in the heyday of biological-weapons research. The biowarfare methods of the 1960s and 1970s are now as antiquated as the lumbering mainframe computers of that era. Tomorrow’s terrorists will have vastly more deadly bugs to choose from. Consider this sobering development: in 2001, Australian researchers working on mousepox, a nonlethal virus that infects mice (as chickenpox does in humans), accidentally discovered that a simple genetic modification transformed the virus.10, 11 Instead of producing mild symptoms, the new virus killed 60% of even those mice already immune to the naturally occurring strains of mousepox. The new virus, moreover, was unaffected by any existing vaccine or antiviral drug. A team of researchers at Saint Louis University led by Mark Buller picked up on that work and, by late 2003, found a way to improve on it: Buller’s variation on mousepox was 100% lethal, although his team of investigators also devised combination vaccine and antiviral therapies that were partially effective in protecting animals from the engineered strain.12, 13 Another saving grace is that the genetically altered virus is no longer contagious. Of course, it is quite possible that future tinkering with the virus will change that property, too. Strong reasons exist to believe that the genetic modifications Buller made to mousepox would work for other poxviruses and possibly for other classes of viruses as well. Might the same techniques allow chickenpox or another poxvirus that infects humans to be turned into a 100% lethal bioweapon, perhaps one that is resistant to any known antiviral therapy? I’ve asked this question of experts many times, and no one has yet replied that such a manipulation couldn’t be done. This case is just one example. Many more are pouring out of scientific journals and conferences every year. Just last year, the journal Nature published a controversial study done at the University of Wisconsin–Madison in which virologists enumerated the changes one would need to make to a highly lethal strain of bird flu to make it easily transmitted from one mammal to another.14 Biotechnology is advancing so rapidly that it is hard to keep track of all the new potential threats. Nor is it clear that anyone is even trying. In addition to lethality and drug resistance, many other parameters can be played with, given that the infectious power of an epidemic depends on many properties, including the length of the latency period during which a person is contagious but asymptomatic. Delaying the onset of serious symptoms allows each new case to spread to more people and thus makes the virus harder to stop. This dynamic is perhaps best illustrated by HIV , which is very difficult to transmit compared with smallpox and many other viruses. Intimate contact is needed, and even then, the infection rate is low. The balancing factor is that HIV can take years to progress to AIDS , which can then take many more years to kill the victim. What makes HIV so dangerous is that infected people have lots of opportunities to infect others. This property has allowed HIV to claim more than 30 million lives so far, and approximately 34 million people are now living with this virus and facing a highly uncertain future.15 A virus genetically engineered to infect its host quickly, to generate symptoms slowly—say, only after weeks or months—and to spread easily through the air or by casual contact would be vastly more devastating than HIV . It could silently penetrate the population to unleash its deadly effects suddenly. This type of epidemic would be almost impossible to combat because most of the infections would occur before the epidemic became obvious. A technologically sophisticated terrorist group could develop such a virus and kill a large part of humanity with it. Indeed, terrorists may not have to develop it themselves: some scientist may do so first and publish the details. Given the rate at which biologists are making discoveries about viruses and the immune system, at some point in the near future, someone may create artificial pathogens that could drive the human race to extinction. Indeed, a detailed species-elimination plan of this nature was openly proposed in a scientific journal. The ostensible purpose of that particular research was to suggest a way to extirpate the malaria mosquito, but similar techniques could be directed toward humans.16 When I’ve talked to molecular biologists about this method, they are quick to point out that it is slow and easily detectable and could be fought with biotech remedies. If you challenge them to come up with improvements to the suggested attack plan, however, they have plenty of ideas. Modern biotechnology will soon be capable, if it is not already, of bringing about the demise of the human race— or at least of killing a sufficient number of people to end high-tech civilization and set humanity back 1,000 years or more. That terrorist groups could achieve this level of technological sophistication may seem far-fetched, but keep in mind that it takes only a handful of individuals to accomplish these tasks. Never has lethal power of this potency been accessible to so few, so easily. Even more dramatically than nuclear proliferation, modern biological science has frighteningly undermined the correlation between the lethality of a weapon and its cost, a fundamentally stabilizing mechanism throughout history. Access to extremely lethal agents—lethal enough to exterminate Homo sapiens—will be available to anybody with a solid background in biology, terrorists included.

### 1AC – Vaccines

#### The next pandemic is coming now, and only vaccines can stop it. The impact is millions of deaths. Gupta 4/10

Gupta, Dr. Sanjay. “The Big One Is Coming, and It's Going to Be a Flu Pandemic.” CNN, Cable News Network, 10 Apr. 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/health/flu-pandemic-sanjay-gupta/index.html. Sanjay Gupta is an American [neurosurgeon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurosurgeon) and media reporter. He serves as associate chief of the neurosurgery service at [Grady Memorial Hospital](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grady_Memorial_Hospital) in [Atlanta, Georgia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta), and as assistant professor of [neurosurgery](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neurosurgery) at the [Emory University School of Medicine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emory_University_School_of_Medicine). //nhs-VA

Experts say we are "due" for one. When it happens, they tell us, it will probably have a greater impact on humanity than anything else currently happening in the world. And yet, like with most people, it is probably something you haven't spent much time thinking about. After all, it is human nature to avoid being consumed by hypotheticals until they are staring us squarely in the face. Such is the case with a highly lethal flu pandemic. And when it comes, it will affect every human alive today. Pandemic flu is apolitical and does not discriminate between rich and poor. Geographical boundaries are meaningless, and it can circle the globe within hours. In terms of potential impact on mankind, the only thing that comes close is climate change. And, like climate change, pandemic flu is so vast, it can be challenging to wrap your head around it. When most people hear "flu," they typically think of seasonal flu. No doubt, seasonal flu can be deadly, especially for the very young and old, as well as those with compromised immune systems. For most people, however, the seasonal flu virus, which mutates just a little bit every year, is not particularly severe because our immune systems have already probably seen a similar flu virus and thus know how to fight it. It's called native immunity or protection, and almost all of us have some degree of it. Babies are more vulnerable because they haven't been exposed to the seasonal flu and older people because their immune systems may not be functioning as well. Pandemic flu is a different animal, and you should understand the difference. Panˈdemik/: pan means "all"; demic (or demographic) means "people." It is well-named, because pandemic flu spreads easily throughout the world. Unlike seasonal flu, pandemics occur when a completely new or novel virus emerges. This sort of virus can emerge directly from animal reservoirs or be the result of a dramatic series of mutations -- so-called reassortment events -- in previously circulating viruses. In either case, the result is something mankind has never seen before: a pathogen that can spread easily from person to defenseless person, our immune systems never primed to launch any sort of defense. With pandemic flu, we cannot solely rely on our bodies' ability to fight. A vaccine is our only real hope. That fact is part of the reason the number 24 has been stuck in my head the past few months as I have been working on the CNN original film "[Unseen Enemy](http://edition.cnn.com/shows/unseen-enemy)." I have become convinced that if we can develop and deploy a pandemic flu vaccine just 24 weeks faster than is currently projected, the impact could change the course of human history. Twenty-four weeks faster could mean the difference between 20,000 people dying in the next flu pandemic or more than 20 million people dying. In the 20th century alone, we experienced serious flu pandemics. The Spanish Flu of 1918 was an unprecedented catastrophe. Experts' best estimates (before there was more formal census and record-keeping) were that 20% to 40% of the world became ill and more than 50 million people died. In the United States alone, approximately 675,000 people died in just the eight months between September 1918 and April 1919. Some people died the same day they became ill, and others died within a few days from complications of the flu, such as pneumonia or meningitis. Forty years later, the Asian flu of 1958 and 1959 had a global death toll as high as 2 million and an estimated 70,000 of those in the US alone. Early in 1968, the year before I was born, the Hong Kong flu began. By September, it made its way around the world, including the United States, and became widespread by December. It is believed that the number of those infected peaked during the fall, when kids were at school, transmitting the virus more freely. Still, as many as a million people died, 34,000 in the US alone between September 1968 and March 1969. We have learned a lot over the past 100 years and are better prepared because of it. In the developed world, at least, we have the ability to ease suffering with antivirals, breathing machines and antibiotics for secondary bacterial infections. Experts can also more quickly characterize pathogens causing outbreaks. Although it took several years to identify the virus causing AIDS, for example, it took only a few weeks to identify the SARS virus. We are also much faster at developing vaccines. According to research [compiled by the science publication Mosaic](https://mosaicscience.com/story/outpacing-pandemics-epidemics-vaccines-infectious-disease), a typhoid vaccine was first tested in 1896 but only developed into a safe and effective vaccine nearly a hundred years later, in 1994. It took just 12 years, however, to develop a safe and effective Ebola vaccine (2003 to 2015). And, last week, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases announced initiation of a phase II trial for a [Zika vaccine](http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/31/health/zika-vaccine-nih-trial/) that started in August with the hope it may be ready for emergency use by 2018. Most important, our production capabilities have increased tremendously around the world. In 2006, according to the World Health Organization, we had the ability to make only 350 million doses of flu vaccine, but now, in theory, we could make 5.4 billion doses of flu vaccine if we harnessed and aligned manufacturing facilities all over the world. Would it ever be possible, however, to create and distribute a vaccine 24 weeks faster -- in six weeks instead of 30 weeks -- and save more than 20 million lives? For starters, the way we typically make flu vaccine is still pretty antiquated and hasn't changed much in nearly 70 years. We rely largely on hens' eggs to incubate and replicate the virus, which is too slow of a process to respond rapidly to pandemic flu. Richard Hatchett, CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, told me that recent scientific advances, however, are fully transforming the speed at which vaccines can be developed and approved. Genomic techniques can be used to map the DNA or RNA of a new pathogen, genetically to engineer and mass-produce the same DNA or RNA and then inject it into the human body, leading to the production of antibodies to fight the virus. This method results in a new type of vaccine, a DNA vaccine. Faster development and production is one critical step to shortening the vaccine process by 24 weeks. Another is more robust surveillance systems everywhere in the world. As we were reminded with Ebola and Zika, an infection anywhere can be an infection everywhere. The first time an ill patient shows up at a hospital anywhere on the planet with a novel virus, the clock starts ticking. Improved surveillance means that hospital staff has to be astute enough to recognize that the patient doesn't fit the normal patterns we were taught in medical school and start to investigate further. After that, there has to be speedy and accurate identification of the virus, purification and sequencing of the genetic material and then immediate sharing of the knowledge (via the cloud) enabling researchers everywhere to get to work on the development of new vaccines. After this genetically engineered vaccine is developed, it would have to be manufactured in the billions and then distributed to every city in the world. Join the conversation See the latest news and share your comments with CNN Health on [Facebook](https://www.facebook.com/CNNHealth) and [Twitter](https://twitter.com/cnnhealth). To make this a reality, it will take unprecedented partnerships between governments, even those at odds with each other. It will take the public and private sector working together every step of the way to ensure that the newly created vaccine can be distributed, trusted and administered. It will take research and development money, as it always does, to bolster the techniques and infrastructure I described and make them available everywhere. And it will take accepting that a pandemic of flu is likely in our lifetime. But with preparation and imagination, it need not be as nearly catastrophic as it was 50 or 100 years ago. Make no mistake, outbreaks -- sudden, unexpected and localized eruptions of infection -- are inevitable. But, as epidemiologist Larry Brilliant (who spearheaded the effort to eradicate Small Pox), puts it: pandemics can be optional.

#### Medical Reserve Corps are key to distributing vaccines and promoting community vaccination but underfunded now. Hasbrouck 16

Hasbrouck, LaMar. “Emergency Medical Response Program Threatened by Federal Budget Cuts.” TheHill, 4 Feb. 2016, thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/247092-emergency-medical-response-program-threatened-by-federal-budget-cuts. Hasbrouck, a former local and state health commissioner, is executive director of the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO). He served earlier as an official with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organization. //nhs-VA

A life-saving emergency medical response program staffed by more than 200,000 volunteer healthcare professionals and others across the United States is threatened by a devastating 55 percent cut in federal funds that was recently approved by a U.S. Senate committee. The program, called the Medical Reserve Corps, is a national network of volunteers organized locally to protect the health and safety of their communities. It deploys doctors, nurses, emergency medical technicians, paramedics, mental health professionals and non-medical volunteers with specialized skills who assist healthcare professionals to care for people in emergencies. But despite all this good work by the Medical Reserve Corps, the Senate Appropriations Committee recently voted to slash the budget of the organization from $9 million this year to just $4 million in the 2016 fiscal year that begins in October. If these big cuts make it through the Senate and the House as part of next year’s federal budget, the Medical Reserve Corps will be forced to cut back on its activities, leaving millions of people more vulnerable just when they need help the most. There are nearly 1,000 Medical Reserve Corps units, scattered through all 50 states and many U.S. territories. A [survey](http://www.naccho.org/topics/emergency/MRC/upload/TTC-NACCHO-MRC-Report-2013-lo-res.pdf) by the National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) found that two-thirds of the Medical Reserve Corps units are part of their local health departments. The rest are run by a broad range of other organizations, including emergency management agencies, volunteer centers, hospitals, colleges and universities, medical societies and civic and religious organizations. The role of the volunteers is particularly critical because cuts in federal, state and local government funding for local health departments around the nation have resulted in the elimination of 51,700 jobs at the local health departments since 2008, [a NACCHO study](http://nacchoprofilestudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-Forces-of-Change-Slidedoc-Final.pdf) published in June found. The Medical Reserve Corps volunteers have taken on some of the work formerly carried out by these local health department employees. Medical Reserve Corps volunteers rush to the scenes of natural disasters like hurricanes and tornadoes, transportation disasters like airliner crashes and train derailments, major infectious disease threats like H1N1 (originally referred to as Swine Flu) or Ebola, terrorist attacks and other mass-casualty incidents. For example, following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, more than 6,000 Medical Reserve Corps volunteers from 150 units supported the emergency response and recovery efforts. When Superstorm Sandy hit New York and New Jersey in 2012, more than 2,000 Medical Reserve Corps volunteers swung into action and donated more than 18,000 hours of their time. The volunteers provided medical care to people hurt in the deadly storm, helped operate emergency shelters and distributed food and clothing. And when bombs planted by terrorists went off at the Boston Marathon in 2013 – killing three people and sending 260 people (including 16 who lost limbs) to local hospitals – the first medical emergency responders who rushed to help the injured were 151 Medical Reserve Corps volunteers who were already on the scene to treat the typical injuries some runners suffer in the race. When not dealing with emergencies, Medical Reserve Corps volunteers spend time training and working on other projects to promote good health, such as community health education and vaccination programs. While the volunteers don’t get paid, they need funds for supplies, medications, training and equipment.

#### Flu pandemic will uniquely cause extinction – evolution of new strains and ability to spread quickly. DUJS 09

DUJS. “Human Extinction: The Uncertainty of Our Fate.” DUJS Online, 22 May 2009, dujs.dartmouth.edu/2009/05/human-extinction-the-uncertainty-of-our-fate/#.WaHznJOGOYU. //nhs-VA

A pandemic will kill off all humans. In the past, humans have indeed fallen victim to viruses. Perhaps the best-known case was the bubonic plague that killed up to one third of the European population in the mid-14th century (7). While vaccines have been developed for the plague and some other infectious diseases, new viral strains are constantly emerging — a process that maintains the possibility of a pandemic-facilitated human extinction. Some surveyed students mentioned AIDS as a potential pandemic-causing virus. It is true that scientists have been unable thus far to find a sustainable cure for AIDS, mainly due to HIV’s rapid and constant evolution. Specifically, two factors account for the virus’s abnormally high mutation rate: 1. HIV’s use of reverse transcriptase, which does not have a proof-reading mechanism, and 2. the lack of an error-correction mechanism in HIV DNA polymerase (8). Luckily, though, there are certain characteristics of HIV that make it a poor candidate for a large-scale global infection: HIV can lie dormant in the human body for years without manifesting itself, and AIDS itself does not kill directly, but rather through the weakening of the immune system. However, for more easily transmitted viruses such as influenza, the evolution of new strains could prove far more consequential. The simultaneous occurrence of antigenic drift (point mutations that lead to new strains) and antigenic shift (the inter-species transfer of disease) in the influenza virus could produce a new version of influenza for which scientists may not immediately find a cure. Since influenza can spread quickly, this lag time could potentially lead to a “global influenza pandemic,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (9). The most recent scare of this variety came in 1918 when bird flu managed to kill over 50 million people around the world in what is sometimes referred to as the Spanish flu pandemic. Perhaps even more frightening is the fact that only 25 mutations were required to convert the original viral strain — which could only infect birds — into a human-viable strain (10).

### 1AC – Ports

#### Civilians at West Coast ports lack CERT training—the absence of such training leads to inefficient allocation of port security resources. Allen et al 03

Allen et al 03 (Warren, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, Seth Jacobson, Masters Students @ UCLA School of PUblic Policy + Social Research, "Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergence Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach," 4/15, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\_content/documents/PSAPP\_042103.pdf)

Meanwhile, CERT is a voluntary program, and agencies simply schedule classes based on local civilian demand. A community organization, such as a church, school, or business, must contact a training agency to schedule a class for interested volunteers. **Although the port complex is a high-risk target, its workers have not proactively sought training, and they receive no formalized preferences in the CERT scheduling system**. Consequently, port workers must wait for the next available class like other civilians, while proactive volunteers in lower-risk locations are scheduled to receive CERT training first. For example, in July 2003, the Los Angeles County Fire Department plans to establish pilot CERT programs in the communities of Inglewood, Palos Verdes, Palmdale, West Hollywood, and the unincorporated areas of East Los Angeles.105 One reason that the county fire department plans to target these five communities is that they are not within the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles Fire Department’s CERT training program. In addition, they were selected based on factors such as population density, number of government offices, and earthquake risk.106 Nonetheless, **the Operational Area’s resources might be more efficiently allocated by training civilians at the port complex** rather than training volunteers in many of these neighborhoods, whose populations may be exposed to comparatively lower risks.

#### CERT significantly improves disaster readiness. Allen et al 03

Allen et al 03 (Warren, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, Seth Jacobson, Masters Students @ UCLA School of PUblic Policy + Social Research, "Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergence Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach," 4/15, [http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\_content/documents/PSAPP\_042103.pdf)](http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/PSAPP_042103.pdf%29) //nhs-VA

The CERT program was first developed by the Los Angeles Fire Department in 1985. The following description is an excerpt from the Los Angeles Fire Department’s CERT Course Syllabus: The Los Angeles Fire Department’s “FREE” CERT program was developed because of the need for a well-trained civilian emergency work force. These teams will assist the government by responding during disaster situations where the number and scope of incidents have overwhelmed the conventional emergency services. The training program provides for community self-sufficiency through the development of multi-functional response teams who will act as an adjunct to the city’s emergency services during major disasters. Through this unique program, people from community organizations, business and industry, and city employee groups will become members of CERT, or perform as individual leaders by directing untrained volunteers in the initial phase of an emergency. The CERT members receive 17 hours (one day a week for seven weeks) of initial training. The seven-week course is followed by continuing education programs, including full day biannual refreshers. The ability of a business or community to effectively recover from the devastating effects of an earthquake requires the active participation, planning, and cooperation of all levels of the population. The fundamental responsibility for preparedness, however, lies with every individual. By encouraging preparedness efforts and hazard mitigation, the effects of a disaster can be minimized considerably, as well as facilitate recovery. The benefits of this program are numerous. It has increased our overall level of disaster readiness, provided emergency skills that people may use in day-to-day emergencies, enhanced the bond between government and community, increased community spirit, and improved the quality of life for the people of our city.95 In addition to the curriculum originally developed by the Los Angeles Fire Department, FEMA has added a new terrorism module to the CERT curriculum, which expands the overall training to 20 hours.

#### The lack of port security is the Achilles’ heel of US homeland security policy—only effective preparedness can prevent a terrorist attack on West Coast ports from inflicting catastrophic economic damage. Allen et al 03

Allen et al 03 (Warren, Adam Clampitt, Matthew Hipp, Seth Jacobson, Masters Students @ UCLA School of PUblic Policy + Social Research, "Port Security Applied Policy Project: Recommendations to Improve Emergence Response Capabilities at the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long Beach," 4/15, http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA\_content/documents/PSAPP\_042103.pdf)

The oceans no longer protect America. In fact, **our seaports are among our nation’s most vulnerable terrorist targets**. Recent studies by the General Accounting Office, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the United States Coast Guard note that **America’s ports may prove to be the Achilles’ heel of homeland security policy**.2 Ninety-five percent of all international cargo that either enters or leaves the United States is shipped through our seaports, but the United States Customs Service and other law enforcement agencies inspect only two percent of the shipping containers.3 Consequently, terrorists have ample opportunities to deliver bombs and other destructive devices directly into the nation’s shipping infrastructure. The attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and the more recent attack on the French oil tanker Limburg show that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda are both interested in maritime attacks and capable of executing them. **America’s seaports may be next**: Some analysts believe that “the target closest to [Osama] bin Laden's heart likely remains a seaport that would allow him to go to his Allah in the belly of the Eagle – perhaps on the western seaboard of the United States.”4 Given this possibility, the Los Angeles and Long Beach port facilities warrant special attention as high-risk targets. One cannot accurately assess the terrorism vulnerability of the Port of Los Angeles without also considering the vulnerability of the Port of Long Beach, which sits adjacent in Los Angeles County’s south bay. Although they are business competitors, these ports share the same roadways, harbor, and workforce; and therefore, like conjoined twins, the ports also share their vulnerability. A terrorist attack at one port could easily impact its neighbor’s docks. For this reason, the Coast Guard does not endeavor to protect the two ports separately, but instead protects the infrastructure as a single port complex.5 State and local policymakers, however, still consider the ports separately when determining public policy. The California Attorney General’s Office recently released a list of the top 624 terrorist targets in California; the Port of Long Beach was ranked third, the Port of Los Angeles was sixth, and the Queen Mary cruise ship, which is berthed at Long Beach, was not far behind.6 If the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach had been considered together as pieces of a single port complex, then the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex (“the port complex”) may have been more accurately identified as the state’s number one target, instead of Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). If experts are correct to assert that Al Qaeda's ultimate military objective is “the economic paralysis of the West,” then it is also worth noting that the port complex is more substantial to the nation’s shipping infrastructure than LAX.7 Although LAX is the world’s third busiest airport and carries an average of 185,000 passengers per day, it ships only 2.1 million tons of cargo worth $80 billion annually.8 In comparison, the port complex is the world’s third busiest seaport, and handles 189 million tons of cargo worth $200 billion each year.9 This tonnage represents 43 percent of the cargo containers shipped to and from the United States annually, more than all East Coast ports combined.10 **A terrorist attack on the port complex may cause catastrophic economic damage**. Various models provide a basis for estimating the financial damage that a terrorist attack on the port complex would cause. The 2002 West Coast port shutdown, for example, provides a conservative, real-world approximation of the economic impact a terrorist attack might have. During the shutdown, Stephen Cohen, co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, estimated that the first five days of port closures would cost the national economy $4.7 billion; he projected that a twenty-day closure would cause $48 billion in losses.11 This exponential increase in Cohen’s model is a consequence of America’s dependence on international trade. According to Cohen, “Thirty years ago, when we had a dock closure, foreign trade didn’t matter to our economy. It was trivial…It’s quite different now. It’s an integrated system, and if you cut the supply line, you stop the system.”12 The actual amount of economic damage from the ten-day shutdown is still debatable, but estimates range from $1.7 billion to $20 billion.13 Three key differences between a potential terrorist attack on the port complex and the West Coast port shutdown **suggest** that **a terrorist event would** **generate more dire economic consequences**. First, the West Coast port shutdown did not directly produce deaths or significant damage to maritime and shipping infrastructure. Second, stakeholders in the 2002 shutdown were **able to anticipate and prepare for the closure**. Members of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) had been working without a contract for three months before the lockout and were accused of engaging in work “slowdowns” before the ports were actually closed. Ships that were in port were able to make efforts to unload and get underway before the port closed. A terrorist attack would not afford such a warning. The only preparation that stakeholders would have is the time that they invest ex-ante in training and planning. Third, the mechanisms for reopening the ports after the 2002 shutdown were clear: President Bush invoked the Taft-Hartley Act and a federal court ordered the ports to reopen. Moreover, the ILWU and Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) could have negotiated a contract and reopened the port. In contrast, following a terrorist attack, there is no clear statutory authority or standard operating procedure to reopen America’s ports.14 This **confusion could extend port closures and complicate the resumption of shipping. Any of these factors could produce substantial, additional economic losses**.

#### Economic decline causes conflict – this is specifically true under Trump. Foster 16

Foster 12/16 - Dennis M. Foster is professor of international studies and political science at the Virginia Military Institute. “Would President Trump go to war to divert attention from problems at home?” December 19, 2016, Washington Post Monkey Cage Blog, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/19/yes-trump-might-well-go-to-war-to-divert-attention-from-problems-at-home/?utm\_term=.9ac2999a0f48) LADI

Then-Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump gives a speech aboard the World War II battleship USS Iowa in San Pedro, Calif., in September, 2015. (Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images) If the U.S. economy tanks, should we expect Donald Trump to engage in a diversionary war? Since the age of Machiavelli, analysts have expected world leaders to launch international conflicts to deflect popular attention away from problems at home. By stirring up feelings of patriotism, leaders might escape the political costs of scandal, unpopularity — or a poorly performing economy. One often-cited example of diversionary war in modern times is Argentina’s 1982 invasion of the Falklands, which several (though not all) political scientists attribute to the junta’s desire to divert the people’s attention from a disastrous economy. In a 2014 article, Jonathan Keller and I argued that whether U.S. presidents engage in diversionary conflicts depends in part on their psychological traits — how they frame the world, process information and develop plans of action. Certain traits predispose leaders to more belligerent behavior. Do words translate into foreign policy action? One way to identify these traits is content analyses of leaders’ rhetoric. The more leaders use certain types of verbal constructs, the more likely they are to possess traits that lead them to use military force. [Trump may put 5 former top military brass in his administration. That’s unprecedented.] For one, conceptually simplistic leaders view the world in “black and white” terms; they develop unsophisticated solutions to problems and are largely insensitive to risks. Similarly, distrustful leaders tend to exaggerate threats and rely on aggression to deal with threats. Distrustful leaders typically favor military action and are confident in their ability to wield it effectively. Thus, when faced with politically damaging problems that are hard to solve — such as a faltering economy — leaders who are both distrustful and simplistic are less likely to put together complex, direct responses. Instead, they develop simplistic but risky “solutions” that divert popular attention from the problem, utilizing the tools with which they are most comfortable and confident (military force). [Will Beijing cut Trump some slack after that phone call with Taiwan?] Based on our analysis of the rhetoric of previous U.S. presidents, we found that presidents whose language appeared more simplistic and distrustful, such as Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and George W. Bush, were more likely to use force abroad in times of rising inflation and unemployment. By contrast, John F. Kennedy and Bill Clinton, whose rhetoric pegged them as more complex and trusting, were less likely to do so. What about Donald Trump? Since Donald Trump’s election, many commentators have expressed concern about how he will react to new challenges and whether he might make quick recourse to military action. For example, the Guardian’s George Monbiot has argued that political realities will stymie Trump’s agenda, especially his promises regarding the economy. Then, rather than risk disappointing his base, Trump might try to rally public opinion to his side via military action. I sampled Trump’s campaign rhetoric, analyzing 71,446 words across 24 events from January 2015 to December 2016. Using a program for measuring leadership traits in rhetoric, I estimated what Trump’s words may tell us about his level of distrust and conceptual complexity. The graph below shows Trump’s level of distrust compared to previous presidents. These results are startling. Nearly 35 percent of Trump’s references to outside groups paint them as harmful to himself, his allies and friends, and causes that are important to him — a percentage almost twice the previous high. The data suggest that Americans have elected a leader who, if his campaign rhetoric is any indication, will be historically unparalleled among modern presidents in his active suspicion of those unlike himself and his inner circle, and those who disagree with his goals. As a candidate, Trump also scored second-lowest among presidents in conceptual complexity. Compared to earlier presidents, he used more words and phrases that indicate less willingness to see multiple dimensions or ambiguities in the decision-making environment. These include words and phrases like “absolutely,” “greatest” and “without a doubt.” A possible implication for military action I took these data on Trump and plugged them into the statistical model that we developed to predict major uses of force by the United States from 1953 to 2000. For a president of average distrust and conceptual complexity, an economic downturn only weakly predicts an increase in the use of force. But the model would predict that a president with Trump’s numbers would respond to even a minor economic downturn with an increase in the use of force. For example, were the misery index (aggregate inflation and unemployment) equal to 12 — about where it stood in October 2011 — the model predicts a president with Trump’s psychological traits would initiate more than one major conflict per quarter.