# Mimesis K

## CX

Why do other countries model the US under Trump

How does china coop function?

What is “global governance”

 Why does it matter

## 1NC

#### The spectre of the climate disaster functions as a new zone of investment in which humanity can legitimize itself as in a perfectly cohesive image. Reflecting a divine will to will, the affirmative reasserts the unity of being in a reactionary attempt to ward off contingency, ultimately resulting in endless foddering and chatter by masses of indifference

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 59-72

Questions, today, of climate and climate ethics—and even concerns regarding the sustainability and viability of this life of ours on earth— appear to present a new imaginary for political questions. One might say that it was only in the late twentieth century, with events such as the picturing of the earth from space, the possibility of nuclear annihilation of earthly life or the increasing speeds of new media allowing for the possibility of global audiences (such as the entire world viewing 9/11), that something like the problem of a global ethos would emerge. If there had always been a silent presupposed ‘we’1 in any ethical theory, then this virtual universalism would always struggle alongside moral valorizations of specified communities.2 How do we, from the particular world we inhabit, begin to think of life as such? It is the present sense of the planet as a whole, as a fragile bounded globe that might present us, finally, with the opportunity and imperative to think a genuine ethos. Now that we have a notion of climate that seems to break with the etymology of this specific inclination or latitude of the earth, and does so by gesturing to something like a sense of the earth as a region or inclination in itself, this might open a new imaginary of the globe. We might think of ethos as no longer bound to a territory within the planet; instead there might be the ethos of this globe of our own, that has no other region against which we might define ourselves or towards which we might direct our fantasies of another future. If there is something like climate change, perhaps it takes this form: not only a mutation of this climate (warming, depleting, becoming more volatile) but an alteration of what we take climate to be. One might want to suggest that as long as we think of climate in its traditional sense—as our specific milieu—we will perhaps lose sight of climate change, or the degree to which human life is now implicated in timelines and rhythms beyond that of its own borders. The figure of the globe appears to offer two ethical trajectories: on the one hand an attention to global interconnections and networks would expand responsibility and awareness beyond the figure of the isolated moral subject. Ethics may have to be considered beyond discursive, human and political modes (especially if one defines politics as the practice of a polity). On the other hand, the figure of the globe—considered as a figure—is intertwined with a tropology of interconnectedness, renewal, cyclic causality and organicism. This traditionally theological series of motifs, with the globe’s circularity reflecting a divine intentionality, is maintained today in many of the most profound and seemingly secular ecological theses, including the Gaia hypothesis and the global brain. It is the possibility of extinction or the end of human time that forces us to confront a new sense of the globe: far from being an unfortunate event that accidentally befalls the earth and humanity, the thought of the end of the anthropocene era is both at the heart of all the motifs of ecological ethics and the one idea that cannot be thought as long as the globe is considered in terms of its traditional and anthropocentric metaphors. The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagination to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exotically untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s environmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bodies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multitude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers (Hardt and Negri 2004). Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with a cognitive ~~paralysis~~ [inability] to think of any future that would not be one more chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term thinking; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corporations, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imaginary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring and unified. Perhaps—given the advent of globalism as a concrete event where there can now be no time, place or body that can live outside a certain destructive force field of events (such as the possibility of viral, political, economic and climactic terrors)—now is the time to think non-globally. The usual figures of the bounded earth, the ideally-self-balancing cosmos, the interconnectedness of this great organic home of ‘ours’ are modes of narrative self-enclosure that have shielded us from confronting the forces of the present. It is not surprising that ‘globalism’ is at once a term of mourning, signaling a world economy and politics that has taken every space and timeline into its calculative, cynical and rigid systematic maw at the same time as it signals a redemptive potential. We are, so various environmental and ecological imperatives remind us, always interconnected across and through this one living globe, this living world that environs us. The maxim, ‘act locally, think globally,’ should be reversed: there can be no encompassing global thought, for insofar as we think we are fragmented by various locales, figures, lexicons, disciplines and desire, but we nevertheless are caught up in a globe of action where no intent or prediction will be enough to secure or predict the outcome of any action. It was the great contribution of Lacanian psychoanalysis to point out that the visual figural unity of the human body—the bounded organism we see in the mirror—serves as a captivating lure that precludes us from confronting that ex-centric predicament of the speaking subject whose desire is never given in a living present but is articulated and dispersed in a time that is never that of a self-comprehending and self-affecting whole. Just as the spatial unity of the human body covers over the temporal dispersion of the speaking and desiring subject, so the delimited material object of the planet enables a misrecognition of the multiple systems, forces, timelines, planes and feedback loops that traverse what we imagine to be the single object of the globe. The advent of globalism— or the intensification of the world’s various modes of systemic interconnectedness and hyper-volatility—should, if anything, have prompted a destruction of the figure of the globe. And yet the opposite appears to be the case: even in the genre that is apparently most devoted to global catastrophe—the disaster movie—the globe is strangely reinforced and consolidated. A typical instance is Independence Day of 1996, in which an invasion of earth is initially viewed from the contained space of a US government control room, as though we will be able to have advance vision of ‘our’ end and limit from the point of view of a single screen and panel of experts. Perhaps today we might note that it is the physical image of the globe that serves as a reaction formation, precluding a thought of the consequences of globalism (if globalism remains the correct term for the increasingly evident and non-human complexities that are precluding any possibility of a global or comprehensive vision). If capitalism could once have been thought of as ‘a’ power imposed upon the globe then this is no longer the case. As the recent economic crises demonstrated capitalism is not a system, cannot be attributed to a body of interests, and is less a transcendent structure imposed upon organic life than it is just one of the many ways in which local, ill-considered, barely intentional forces of consumption and acquisition exceed the comprehension of any body (be that a physical, political, national or economic body). Marxist theory’s attempt to locate capitalism within history and within a theory of interests can be compared to a whole series of localizations and narrative therapies. Popular culture has for decades been giving a face and/or body to a series of diffuse and essentially ‘unglobable’ threats. Despite a series of calls for thinking in terms of distributed, de-centered and dispersed cognition, where we acknowledge that institutions, cultures and even organisms are not governed by a central organizing brain, the political imaginary remains wedded to organic figures. Popular culture has presented viral invasion more often than not in terms of an isolable and intruding body: conquering such threats can then be placed in a standard narrative of good and evil, self and other. Terrorism, too, is given a specific face in media culture (either the named Osama Bin Laden or an ethnically specified other). But it is not only popular culture that has been unable to confront a temporality and politics that is no longer that of contesting agents waging a war for the sake of a determined end. Lamenting the fall of modernity into a bio-politics that manages populations according to a general and quantifiable ‘life,’ Giorgio Agamben argues that it will be possible to arrive again at a genuine politics only by considering what Foucault failed to confront: the problem of sovereignty in modernity (Agamben 1998). That is, whereas Foucault was critical of the sovereign model of power, or power as an external and imposed body, Agamben’s critical concept of bio-politics wants to resist a modernity of diffused or capillary power, focusing again on how power establishes itself as a body. Agamben refuses the notion of the political and the polity as a universal or a given; the polity is constituted in and through human potentiality’s realization that it lacks any determined end. For Agamben, what needs to be recalled is the genesis or emergence of the political fold, the opening of something like a political space that then enables a distinction between that which is interior and that which is exterior to the polity. What counts as political is, for Agamben, itself not a political decision, and this is because ‘the polity’ or the opening of a space of what will become ‘our’ concern is an event, and one to which genuine thinking ought to (constantly) return. Today’s losses of commonality, or the absence of something like a global community, should prompt us to address that the global community or horizon is neither given nor guaranteed, but is nevertheless urgently required if we are not to lose sight altogether of our potentiality to be political, to open a political space. What bio-politics and its terrors force us to acknowledge is that our defining potentiality—for speaking together and opening up a political space— discloses itself most fully when it is not actualized. For bio-politics, too, bears the same double valence as globalism. It is precisely in the era of the bio-political, when all decisions regarding what we ought to do are grounded on maximizations of life that the passage from life to polity, and the political constitution of what counts as political life is forgotten. It is Auschwitz, modern hedonism, and the bio-political absence of a genuine political space of speech and decision that evidences the true nature of politics. Politics occurs not when bodies located in a world then decide to speak together, for politics is—through the event of speaking—the opening out of a world. Here, then, in this confrontation with a modern bio-politics that is criticized and lamented for being insufficiently political—insufficiently oriented to the opening and manifestation of a political space—Agamben gives the contemporary term ‘bio-politics’ a force that relates directly to the imaginary hyper-investment in the globe. Agamben, unlike the Foucault whom he criticizes for not confronting the relation between bare life and sovereignty, regards bio-politics in its various forms—both totalitarian managements of populations and democratic aims to increase a society’s happiness—as a loss of the political. As long as politics is focused on bare life, or the calculation of a living substance we will have retreated from the question of the potentiality of the political: man is not born as a political animal but becomes one, and he does so by creating a political space through speaking, opening up a world that is always his world. The Greek distinction between bios (or a life that is formed, bounded and oriented to what man might make of himself) and zoe (or mere bare life that, in modernity, becomes so much disposable waste and that increasingly becomes the subject of politics) is, for Agamben a difference that needs to be re-thought and re-inscribed. It is bios—created, formed, bounded, delimited life—that has been lost and that entails a loss of the political. How does this relate to globalism? Both Agamben’s critique of biopolitics and the reaction against globalism express a traditional and theological mourning for a loss of form. Globalism’s evils follow from its ravaging disrespect for limits and difference, its tendency to consume all previously distinct and specified nations and cultures into one vast calculative system without definition or limit. Not surprisingly the response to both globalism (seen as an inhuman, mindless and unbounded system) and to biopolitics (seen as a loss of the self-defining polity) has been the reaffirmation of the figure of the globe or bounded form. Agamben, for example, posits a series of positive manoeuvres that would ameliorate the biopolitical ravaging of the man of poiesis; these include a return to the active creation of man as a political living form as bios rather than zoe, as a being whose political nature has little or nothing to do with his mere life but requires creation. Not surprisingly, then, Agamben also wishes to retrieve a more authentic aesthetic encounter, where art is not passive spectatorship of an artist’s private invention but an opening out or disclosure of a created world. Here, art as poiesis or putting into distinct form would not be disengaged from collective praxis. Hardt and Negri, reacting more explicitly to a globalism that has precluded any active and intentional formation of a polity, call for the creation of a single, self-producing, self-aware and self-referring open whole of humanity: a single, continually re-productive body of man: In addition to envisioning revolution in ethical and political terms, we also conceive of it in terms of deep anthropological modification: of metissage and continuous hybridization of populations, of biopolitical metamorphosis. The first terrain of struggle is, from this point of view, the universal right to move, work and learn over the entire surface of the globe. Thus revolution, as we see it, is not only within Empire but also through Empire. It is not something which is fought against some implausible Winter Palace, but something which extends against all the central and peripheral structures of power, in order to empty them and subtract the capacity of production from capital. (Negri, Hardt and Zolo 27) We can pause here to note that what underpins Agamben’s call for a new politics and Hardt and Negri’s manifesto for a self-productive multitude is a figural globalism that is a variant of a traditional and theological organicism. That is, the figure of the globe—the ideally bounded sphere in which each point is in accord with the whole, and in which the whole is a dynamic and self-maintaining unity—harbours an axiology that privileges bios over zoe. What must be asserted as dominant and proper is a whole or bounded form that has no external or transcendent principle, no ordering that is given from without or that would elevate one point or term above another. Literal globalism, perceived as humanity’s alienation from itself and its earth through dead technical systems (such as the market, mechanization, computerization and speculation), is to be cured by figural globalism. Life as zoe, the mere life that lives on without a sense of itself, without a world and without form, is to be combated by life as bios: a properly political life of self-formation and speaking in common. Politics ought to be of, by and for the polity: thus, the call to immanence, whereby a body is not deflected by any power other than that of its own making is yet one more refusal to consider the predicament of a palpably non-sovereign power. Recall that for Agamben Foucault failed to consider the relationship between biopolitics and sovereign power, between power as instituted law that creates the border between law and non-law, or between governable life and the merely living. For Agamben the problem with biopolitics is that it is insufficiently directed towards bios: both totalitarian governments and democracies focus on well-being and happiness rather than confronting the problem that mere life does not proceed without some sort of gap or decision towards its proper world and end. If one were to recall the Greek attention to bios, or formed life, one might be able to retrieve something of the proper political potentiality that is covered over in modernity. Foucault, however, suggests an opposite path. The problem with biopolitics is not its inattention to bios or self-making but, rather, its maintenance of organic—or what I will refer to here as ‘global’—thinking. One could be misled by reading Foucault’s corpus backwards, concluding that his final thoughts on Greek and Hellenistic arts of the self would be the natural consequence of a theorization of biopolitics, leading to a retrieval of a poetics of the subject. But there are other possibilities indicated in his earliest criticisms of the concept of life. The problem with this concept, or more accurately this problem, is that its manner of folding an inside from an outside, or of producing a relation through which something like knowledge is possible, is—to use a Deleuzian term—its reactive reterritorializing quality. It is the concept of life as such, the life from which bounded beings emerge and against which they maintain themselves, that leads to a certain structure of ethics. Man becomes that being who is nothing more than a reflective structure, a being whose only law is that of giving a law to himself. The three concepts analyzed by Foucault that constitute the modern empirical-transcendental episteme are life, labour and language. It is because there is something in general called ‘life’ as a process of striving, self-production and self-maintenance that language and labor become the means through which man creates himself as an historical being. On the one hand Foucault suggests that this is in quite a specific sense the consequence of a refigured globe: the pre-modern space of knowledge had distributed beings in relations of analogy, such that the universal order of things was reflected in each living being. In classicism this book of nature, or experience of the earth as possessing its own sense that could be unfolded in various ways in each living form, gives way to an order that appears in representation and tabulation. Man, in classical thought, is not yet that being produced through the act of speech and labour that forms him in relation to a life in general that is only known after the event of its formation. In modernity the globe is no longer the book of nature or scene of readable order, becoming a site of ‘life’ that is now known as the enigmatic progression through which organisms and systems emerge: life is a process that can be read after the event of its ongoing acts of formation. Critically, then, this would suggest that with the politics of life itself something of the globe is lost or occluded. And this, indeed, is how ecological and anti-globalist theory understands both biopolitics and globalism more generally. What is lost is any sense of the earth as a living whole, as bearing a life and temporality of its own, within which human beings are located and towards which they ought to pay due respect and care. Yet despite the sense that globalism as a political event has erased all traditional and enchanted senses of the globe as a living whole that harbors its own order, the appeals to the figure and normativity of englobed life have become more intense than ever. If Agamben seeks to retrieve a sense of the world as that which man gives himself through speaking in common, and if Hardt and Negri aim to catalyze the self-expressing multitude, then they do so in thorough accord with a tradition and spirit of the self-evident beauty and worth of the organic globe. First, we can note the theological nature of this figure of the self-referring, self-creating living form that has no end or determination outside its own existence.3 Not only is this how the Christian God of monotheism was defined (as a potentiality that has no essence other being in pure act, never deflected from pure self-forming), it is also the case that theological poetics used the figure of the bounded sphere to express a divine intentionality of perfect accord, balance and (most importantly) self-reference. Such a form has its own temporality which is at once linear, organic and circular; it is a time of increasing creation and fruition, in which beings arrive at their proper form and in which the end concludes and discloses the reason of the whole. As an example we can think of Milton’s frequent references to the pendant world or balanced globe, contrasted with the boundless, formless and time-deprived chaos. The divine meets the human in John Donne’s frequent references to globes, circles, circumference and recovery, as though the earth’s form is that of the soul: Then, soul, to thy first pitch work up again; Know that all lines which circles do contain. For once that they the centre touch, do touch Twice the circumference, and be thou such (Donne 2000, 229). Second, this divine, organic and perfectly bounded form of immanent self reference can take the form of philosophy itself: that activity through which human reason refers back to, and redeems, itself by circling back and recognizing its own constitutive conditions. One could include here Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, Hegel’s philosophy of absolute self-reference, and more recent and supposedly scientific claims for ‘human’ understanding, such as Robert Wright’s recent claim that the monotheistic figure of God will, organically, evolve to become nothing more than that of human nature understanding itself as the origin of all the figures to which it was once enslaved (2010). Third, and finally, when current ecological theorists continue to refer to the environment—as that which environs or encloses—or call for a due reverence to an earth that bears its own balance and self-ordering, it is once again a figure of bounded form or bios that is maintained against a life that would be a force without sense of itself, a time without disclosure of fruition. The problem with this anti-globalization global tropology is twofold. First, it is inefficacious when one considers the nature of modern power. The twenty-first century is marked by an intensification of diffuse and destructive forces. The cold war and its threat of nuclear annihilation had already troubled the motif of life as a war of interests among bodies, for it was clearly possible that the trajectory of man for survival and dominance was the same path that would lead to his disappearance. The subsequent wave of annihilation threats, from the AIDS awareness of the 1980s, followed by increasing anxieties about global warming, food shortages, viral panics (SARS, bird flu, swine flu), terrorist organizations that no longer concerned themselves with a worldly survival, and then economic crises that exposed an absence of any centered or commanding viewpoint: all these serve to show that the image of the globe, of an interconnected whole, is a lure and an alibi. We have perhaps always lived in a time of divergent, disrupted and diffuse systems of forces, in which the role of human decisions and perceptions is a contributing factor at best. Far from being resolved by returning to the figure of the bounded globe or subject of bios rather than zoe, all those features that one might wish to criticize in the bio-political global era can only be confronted by a nonglobal temporality and counter-ethics. Second, it follows that far from being an ecological figure that will save us from the ravages of globalism, subjectivism and bio-politics, it is the image of the globe that lies at the center of an anthropocentric imaginary that is intrinsically suicidal. Of course, extinction and annihilation lie at the heart of all life. But accelerated and self-witnessing extinction can only be achieved by a global animal, a ‘man’ whose desire for survival and mastery is so frenzied that he consumes his own milieu. And he does so because his milieu is a globe. If, as recent ‘returns’ to phenomenology insist, the thinking and living being always has a world, and if that world is always a world of meaning—defined in terms of potentialities and the organism’s timeline—then we are truly global. We are bounded by our own living form, with a world of our own folded around our sensory- motor apparatus (Thomson 2007). But does not the phenomenon of a violent, life-annihilating and globe-destroying globalism present us with another possibility? Perhaps what we need is a zoopolitics: not a lament for the ways in which politics has taken hold of human populations as mere life, but a critique of the ways in which political thinking remains human all too human—repressing the utter contingency of life by insisting on the meaning and form of bios. Rather than criticize biopolitical modernity for rendering mere life as formless, calculative, and void of meaning and mindful creativity, we should cast both bios and zoe on the side of figural lures, and strive to think beyond all forms of life. Neither the mere life of animality nor the formed life of political man, our attention would be better directed to a multiple and divergent network of times and matters. That is, bio-politics ought to be criticized not for seizing upon bare or mere life—not for forgetting the human forming power that enables politics, not for regarding man as bios rather than zoe. Rather, the biopolitics that is hysterically and morally regarded as destructive of well-bounded life would still be captured by bios, by the good form of self-producing man and would be better directed towards forces beyond the human, beyond the organism and beyond the globe. The globe or earth as the planet that was blessed with the contingency of life, including the human species whose global imagination has done so much to create destructive systems beyond its own power and comprehension, cannot be saved. Insofar as it is imagined as a globe or living whole with its own order and proper potentiality that might be restored, the earth will continue to be sacrificed to the ~~blindness~~ [ignorance] of an organic thinking that can only insist upon its own self-evident value. One final feature of globalism that needs to be noted, and that might suggest a new counter-global temporality is that of information. There is no public sphere, no bordered polis in which circulating data may be reflected upon, and incorporated; there is no transcendental and procedural ideal of consensus that would emerge as an aspect of an all encompassing life-world. According to Habermas, and other theorists of discourse theory, insofar as one speaks or even insofar as one claims to know, an intersubjective claim is presupposed (Habermas 1991, 378); it would be a performative contradiction to say something that one did not also claim to be true (Apel 2001, 47). Insofar as one speaks one is already with an ideal domain of recognition that is procedurally, if not actually, intersubjective and global. But the actual fact of globalism destroys global inclusion, consensus and recognition. There is a glut of speech and a deficit of both recognition and the demand for recognition. The more global citizens seek and demand inclusion the less attention and media space becomes available: every tweet, blog, Facebook post and text message places more and more pressure on the bloated domain of available consumable information. Individual speech acts are not fragments of one grand communicating globe; rather, the excess of production is utterly destructive of any possibility of (even ideal) reception. Indeed, it is the surfeit of information, especially information regarding the limits of the globe (such as data about global warming, resource depletion, new speeds of viral mutation, terrorist cells without traceable command centers) that requires a micro-politics (if that term could be freed from the notion of a polis) and demands some mode of schizo-analysis. The latter would refer to a tracking of splits in forces, of divergent systems and incongruous fields. One may never free oneself from the figure of the globe, or even the globe as the notion of figure—the notion that ‘we’ give a world to ourselves through our own recuperating imagination. But if the present has the capacity to teach us anything it may be this: only a shattering of the globe, with an attention to forces that resist recuperation, incorporation and comprehension—forces that operate beyond intentionality and synthesis— only this radical destruction can save us from ourselves.

#### Attaching political will to shaping the environment exactly to their liking using subsidy cuts only re-entrenches human mastery, violently trying to quell excess – this ensures the failure of their planetary project

Bauman 15. Whitney, Department of Religious Studies, Florida International University, Oxford JournalsArts & Humanities Jnl of the American Academy of Religion Volume 83, Issue 4Pp. 1005-1023. “Religion, Ecology, and the Planetary Other: Opening Spaces for Difference.” July 14, 2015.

PART II: MIMESIS AND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE WORLD AS SACRIFICIAL STANDING RESERVE. Generalized imitation has the power to create worlds that are perfectly disconnected from reality: at once orderly, stable, and totally illusory. (Dupuy 2011: 209) In order to navigate the creative and destructive mechanism of mimesis, I argue that it is first necessary to distinguish between mimetic projects that attempt to create new worlds regardless of the rest of the natural world and those that are grounded in planetary systems. Obviously, the opening quote of this section suggests that mimesis in our meaning-making practices has the capacity to create orderly but illusory worlds. This, I would argue, is the mimetic function of something like the truth regime of the global mobiles outlined above. Of course, such mimetic processes—ones that ignore the evolving planetary context—ultimately create a lot of violence toward the rest of the natural world because the world becomes standing reserve, separated out from moral concern as that which is used in the project to re-create the orderly world of contemporary globalized capitalism. One can also see this type of mimesis at work in (abstract) foundations of gender and sexuality roles that are defined as “normal” (usually as heteronormative), and into which our bodies are forced. These types of mimesis force life into specific channels. To some extent, religions have played a large role in this process as well. However, religion ought not to be seen only in a negative light. Religions and philosophies also reveal the mimetic structure of our very imaginings as grounded in evolutionary mimetic structures, and part of ecological healing is the re-cognition of such groundings. Refusal of our Mimetic Entanglement How did we begin to refuse our embeddedness in larger cosmic and evolutionary mimetic structures? When did humans begin to regard humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world? This is, of course, a question that obviously cannot be answered; but some wagers can be made. Rather than lay the blame of domination on sexism, racism, anthropocentrism, or any other isms as the critical theories that I am in debt to tend to do, I would lay it on an emergent transition resulting from the space of mimetic excess. My reasons for this are that if one travels down the rabbit hole of searching for the ultimate source of the logic of domination that leads to all isms, then one has already committed him/herself to the idea that humans are (at least from that point on) really separate from the rest of the natural world. Not to mention one is already then committed to laying blame for oppressions onto a scapegoat: patriarchy, heterosexism, speciesism, or racism. In order to re-read humans as always and already a part of the natural world, I follow an idea put forth by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2007). Bruce Martin sums up their insight well. He writes: Human reason ‘degenerated’ as it imitated the nature it came to dominate; in so doing it created a vicious, lifeless circle of domination perpetuated by a ‘rational’ society that has come to dominate the individual as much as ‘nature’ ever did. (Martin 2011: 116) In other words, we could attribute our forward looking and deliberating brains that emerged from the rest of the evolutionary process and more specifically out of lines of hominids, to the location of our eyes in front of our skulls, our ears on the side of our heads that give us honing abilities, and our upright posture that made it easier for our ancestors to hunt. Such features orient us toward critically examining the evidence and making decisions toward and about things that are not immediately present or in the distance. These features, along with our opposable thumbs, set us up eventually in a fairly dominant position vis-à-vis other animals and species on the planet. These moments of mimetic excess or spaces of creative emergence eventually lead to hominization. As Girard notes, “We can conceive of hominization as a series of steps that allow for the domestication of progressively increasing and intense mimetic effects, separated from one another by crises that would be catastrophes but also generative in that they would trigger the founding mechanism and at each step provide for more rigorous prohibition within the group, and for a more ritual canalization toward the outside” (1987: 96).6 In other words, at each emergent level, an inside/outside is created that marks sameness off from that which is other. The patterns of sameness that led to success would be mimicked—as any useful evolutionary adaptation is—and over time the genetic lines that survived would see differences in brain structures that lead to something like critical reflection. Far from being intentional, such a “dominating” position is an emergent phenomenon from the spaces of mimetic excess when our species began taking advantage of emergent possibilities (rather than necessarily falling into the same patterns of the past). Eventually, reason becomes the key in human success and in the domination over other humans and the rest of the natural world. The repetition of such narratives of dominations has led to the “isms” of our species rather than any sort of inherent capacities or tendencies, and it is this type of narrative that has led to the refusal of our mimetic embeddedness and to the type of human exceptionalism that we are so familiar with and critical of. This desire for control makes sense in an evolutionary context in which hominids and Homo sapiens have largely been at the whim of a nature “red in tooth and claw.” At a time before modern technologies, mastery of nature would be an essential component of survival. Humans would be the victims of a nature that was uncaring and unkind. Nature then becomes the ultimate victim and scapegoat that the logic of mastery then sacrifices. As Girard notes: The accusation makes the victim responsible for the disorder and catastrophe, in other words for the crisis, that afflicts the community. … [The mistreatment of the victim] is an aggressive reaction against a victim that would not be killed if it were not held responsible for the mimetic crisis. (1987: 38) One important point that helps to argue for something like nature as victim in the ways in which I am arguing here is the writings of Francis Bacon and other authors of the early scientific method and scientific revolution. There is no clear reason as to why natural science had to understand nature as dead matter, religion as somehow subjective opinion, and science as an objective adventure. Philosophical and other literary works such as Bacon's New Atlantis had to teach people that science would replace the church, that it was okay to experiment on other animals, and that this would lead to human progress (Merchant 1980). What some have termed “literary lynchings” and “literary sacrifices” had to prepare the euro-western imagination for treating nature as if it were merely standing reserve and for creating the human logic of domination.7 Though the contemporary logic of domination has long forgotten its founding myth, the religious, philosophical, and scientific attempts to make humans exceptional all participate in this story. This recognition can help us to argue for and re-inscribe our continuity with the rest of the natural world in ways that might open our meaning-making practices up toward planetary concerns. If we understand our whole thought process as dependent upon mimetic structures and processes found in the rest of the natural world, then we can begin to see even our meaning-making practices as emerging out of and addressing these types of structures. As Girard notes, “Order in human culture certainly does arise from an extreme of disorder, for such disorder is the disappearance of any and all contested objects in the midst of conflict, and it is at such a point that acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis and tends toward the unification of conflict against an adversary” (1987: 28–29). Just as order seems to emerge out of chaos in other biological systems, so too in our cultural and religious systems; and, Girard argues, these moments of mimetic frenzy require some type of scapegoat, ritual, or expulsion of adversary if order is to be restored (1987: 30). However, there is in much of Girardian thought too much fear of chaos, hybridity, and disorder. Such a fear, or at least a desire to project order onto disorder where no real order exists, is actually part of the problem of a projective form of mimesis that leads to more and more disorder (or so I am arguing). In other words, perhaps mimetic identification with the rest of the natural world could provide an alternative way in which we can appreciate our difference and recognize our continuity without the need for continuing mass ecological destruction in the name of the enforced (dis)order of human exceptionalism. From this understanding, religions and philosophies have captured within their meaning-making structures certain truths expressed in the form of human thinking that can be found in other systems of the rest of the natural world: the balance between chaos and order, the sacrifice necessary for life to continue, and the inherent impossibility of any ultimate order or peace in the worlds that we currently inhabit. As Eric Schneider, Dorion Sagan, and other scientists that discuss non-equilibrium thermodynamics argue, equilibrium—or in this case ultimate order and peace—means death (Schneider and Sagan 2006). Perhaps this last insight is the reason that humans strive for some sort of transcendent resolution: every part of our being cries out against the seeming injustice of predator–prey, creative–destructive cycles, so our reason forces us to produce some sort of order that we just have not arrived at yet, in the case of religions, or imposes a logic of order on the entire planet, in the case of sciences. In any event, this type of understanding could help us understand our current planetary crises in a way that is in continuity with the ongoing creative–destructive processes of the planet. \*\*\*\*\*\*The Earth as Sacrificial Standing Reserve: The Logic of Domination One thing I find promising about the mechanism of mimesis as Girard understands it is that it has the potential to help re-write human thinking, including religious imaginings and scientific logic and reasoning, into the rest of the evolving planetary community, even if Girard himself did not imagine such a re-writing. If our human thinking operates according to mimetic structures, then they are in continuity with other repetitive cycles and systems in the cosmos and planet—as I argued above. In particular, I think that Girard's discussion of mimetic crisis has something to offer in terms of thinking about our current, global ecological problems. Girard argues that paroxysm is the result of certain points of conflictual mimesis within communities (1987: 26). At some points in human histories, the energy of mimetic excess must be released in moments of violence or breakdown. The repetitions of roles—defined in terms of gender, sex, sexuality, race, nationality, and even humanity—are always imperfect and lead to some type of remainder that is other from the repetitive role performances. This mimetic excess must be dealt with or the loss of all order and fall into chaos is risked (Girard 1987: 7). Religions, and I would argue the logic of domination found in reductive materialism, positivism, and scientism, all have ways of dealing with mimetic excess and releasing the violence that builds up. As Girard notes, “All modern ideologies are immense machines that justify and legitimate conflicts that in our time could put an end to humanity” (1987: 31). In other words, these systems must deal with mimetic excess, but they always risk violence. This is where the concept of the scapegoat comes in: as mimetic release. If, as I have argued, one of the dominant ideologies through which humans create meaning-making practices in the contemporary process of globalization relies on the logic of domination via science and technology, then perhaps the mimetic excess, the moment of paroxysm, can be understood as climate change and all the other environmental disasters we are faced with at this planetary moment. In the case of the effects of climate change especially, the human “community thinks of itself as entirely passive vis-à-vis its own victim, whereas” the rest of the natural world “appears by contrast, to be the only active and responsible agent in the matter” (Girard 1987: 27). We have now become victims of the excess of our own desire to impose order on the world. The logic of domination that imposes human desires and values upon the rest of the natural world and sets it up as standing reserve for humans returns in the form of climate change, huge storms, cancers, droughts, heat waves, and other acts of “nature” or “God” over which we poor humans have no control. In this case, the evolutionary fear of nature, leading to the imposition of order through repetition of the place of humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world, is creating terror, disorder, and chaos that are rising to a planetary frenzy.8 This mimetic excess, this abject remainder is the space of chaos and complexity, of creativity and destruction; but this excess demands some sort of recognition at threat of even greater destruction and chaos. Current rituals of scapegoating and release of this mimetic excess, in my opinion, only lead to projections of repressed mimesis. That is, “where the self as subject is projected onto the external world. The result is often fear of the other and subsequent attempts to master or dominate it” (Martin 2011: 120). In this case, “reversal of domination requires ‘mimetic identification’—that is internalization of the external that honors the particularity or individuality of the other” (Martin 2011: 120). We need new rituals and ways of thinking that help us to leave open spaces for mimetic excess, for the abject, and for creative emergence of possibilities toward planetary alternatives. I end this article with some ideas of what that might look like. Previous Section Next Section PART III: TRANSHUMANITY AND THE PLANETARY FUTURE: MIMETIC EXCESS, ABJECTION, AND SITES OF TRANSFORMATION Only the damming of mimetic forces by means of the prohibition and the diversion of these forces in the direction of ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the reconciliatory effect of the surrogate victim. … The Sacred is Violence. (Girard 1987: 32) The seemingly simple insight that Girard articulates here, that the sacred is violence, is a hard pill to swallow for many contemporary minds. The idea that the ground of being, that god or ultimate reality is somehow supposed to be peace, harmony, or some type of wholeness, may be the very idea that leads to much ecological and human violence today. We seek in our repetitions of actions and roles to enforce some type of order and balance upon the world that just does not exist. This desire to enforce equilibrium on the planet is actually wreaking havoc on humans and the rest of the planetary community. What if we begin our meaning-making practices from a space that suggests we are always already mixed up in a creative–destructive process of planetary becoming and that there is no ultimate explanation, end, or goal toward which all life can be conformed. This is what I have articulated elsewhere as a viable agnostic, planetary theology (Bauman 2009, 2014). Here I articulate three components of our meaning-making practices that might help us create points of mimetic identification with the abject: human thinking as “lines of flight,” thinking toward the trans-human, and planetary ethics of the “not yet.”

#### The aff’s political theology is the legacy of American Calvinism – a political religion sustained by the will to global dominance, belief in our destiny to manage the world, attempts to overcome past atrocities by new purifying actions, and belief in the idea that we are redeemed by sacred objects like the plan

Wellman 15. James, Professor and Chair of Comparative Religion at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. “Empire of Sacrifice: Violence and the Sacred in American Culture.” In Can We Survive Our Origins?: Readings in René Girard's Theory of Violence and the Sacred, Studies in Violence, Mimesis, & Culture

Continuing to explore and diversify Jon Pahl’s theme, I will argue that the seed of American preemption (i.e., the myth of American preeminence, insofar as it rests on violence—“containing” it, but also recycling it in the guise of preemptive aggression at home or abroad) lies in a form of religious sadism. Girard, by virtue of the defi nition of desire given in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, argues that the driving force of culture is, at its heart, “metaphysical desire.” He suggests that “mimetic desire,” whereby humans imitate the desire of the other and then use this mediator-model as a motivating source, 82 Jon Pahl and James Wellman are seeking to borrow from him godlike qualities and the power to exist in a godlike mode. Of course, for Girard, this ferocious need always “ends in enslavement, failure, and shame” (1961, 176). Since these desires are always just beyond reach, so that desire is thwarted and rivalries form, which in the end produce conflict and violence, and eventuate in scapegoating. Blood is shed, and through these confl icts, the archaic process of sacralizing the victim produces a new—if fragile and provisional—glow of unity and potential prosperity. The cycle of violence contained by sacrifice continues as a natural fl ow of cultural construction. We might protest against this bloody dynamic of history, but as Walter Benjamin remarked, “Th ere is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (Benjamin 1968, 256). Indeed, Girard argues that the sacralizing process is precisely the way in which this barbarism is transmogrifi ed into myth, so that the community’s “founding murder” becomes the community’s project of salvation. In America, the ongoing violence (against Native peoples, slaves, women, and minorities of every kind) has been authorized by a specific type of Christianity—an American Calvinism, which is enrolled and mobilized in the process of sacralizing and rationalizing forms of preemptive war, thus producing a myth that vindicates American forms of exceptionalist nationalism, and justifi es steps taken in pursuit of world domination. This particular species of American Calvinism, I will argue, acts as a seedbed for this desire for dominance, arising out of a metaphysical craving to mimic the mediator and become the divine sadist, whose dominance American leaders both seek and suffer from. Girard writes in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: We know that all victims of metaphysical desire seek to appropriate their mediator’s being by imitating him. The sadist wants to persuade himself that he has already attained his goal; he tries to take the place of the mediator and see the world through his eyes, in the hope that the play will gradually turn into reality. The sadist’s violence is yet another effort to attain divinity. (1961, 185) The empirical evidence for this peculiar American DNA is everywhere in plain sight. The Calvinist creed of the obligation of rebelling against unjust Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 83 tyranny is well documented in David Hackett Fischer’s Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (1989). Fischer paints a picture of the four primary folk cultures making up American culture. Fischer never describes them as religious cultures per se, but simply as “cultures”; and yet in each case, the heart of this civilization is the sacralization of revenge, and a desire to overcome past grievances—using the ferocity of the Calvinist God as a motive force for moving forward and dominating one’s rivals. Thus each culture in its own way uses theories of Reformed Calvinism to fi ght against forms of real or felt tyranny: the Puritans resisting the British; the Anglicans holding down the Catholics; the Quakers struggling against almost everyone; and the Scots-Irish against anyone not ScotsIrish. Th is latter group put it best: “The best enemy is a dead enemy.” Each group carries a strain of Calvinist theology that promoted the fi ght against tyranny and yearned, in one form or another, to dominate in the name of this God. And this Calvinist God (the one orthodox Calvinists worship and believe in) is indeed a ferocious and even sadistic god. Conservative evangelical theologians themselves—i.e., those defending strict Puritanevangelical theologies—admit the vengeful nature of this god. In fact, if they argue against it, they do so precisely because this theology “impugns the good character of God” (Olson 2011, 179). Roger Olson, speaking directly to the recent rise of an American-based younger generation of New Calvinists, describes their view of God as a picture in which God “ordains, designs, controls, and renders certain the most egregious evil acts such as the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a small child and genocidal slaughter of hundreds of thousands in Rwanda” (178). Olson warns against this image of God, but to no avail. For these “young, restless and Reformed Calvinists glory in a God who takes no prisoners—quite literally—proudly proclaiming a God that . . . only saves some when he could save all” (179). Many would blanch at these images, but the core texts of Calvinism, at least in the most extreme and unrevised versions, depict a sadistic—and impenitently Old Testament—God who arbitrarily commits acts of global genocide, whether in time or beyond time. As Girard argues: “Divine punishment is demystified by the gospels; its only place nowadays is in mythic imagination, to which modern scepticism remains strangely attached” (1987 [2003]: 195). We are curiously faithful in part because our primary metaphysical desire, mimetically enhanced, is to 84 Jon Pahl and James Wellman sacralize our violence as a way of maintaining our dominance and as a way of rationalizing the motive force of American exceptionalism. But more than that, the god desired is a god who is arbitrarily violent and who needs no justification for his violence. This god makes commands, chooses whom he wants, destroys whom he wants, using whatever means are necessary to get what he wants. Seen through this lens, a domestic or foreign policy that imitates these kinds of arbitrary divine rigor makes absolute sense. Thus, forms of violence and torture are normal and to be expected from such culturegenerated forms of mimesis: this is the way of the god. Early American fi gures in this form of Calvinism give us quintessential and spectacular exemplars of the movement. Th e eighteenth-century Reformed thinker and Calvinist Jonathan Edwards, the revivalist minister who spearheaded the First Great Awakening, who is oft en lauded as the greatest American theologian, and who is a hero to many of the New Calvinists, oft en chastised his fellow ministers that it was their duty to scare the hell out of their people—literally.10 Edwards famously did this by preaching “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” which literally imagined a god who would dangle the sinner over the fi res of hell, waiting for repentance from the sinner. In Edwards’s classic Religious Affections, he argued that even the devil can mimic the aff ections of conversion, further putting his congregation in a state of terror about that state of their salvation (Edwards 2009). How does one know if one is saved? In fact, Edwards, as well as his fellow ministers, terrifi ed their congregations to such an extent that suicides were reported across the Northeast region—a man in Edwards’s own congregation took his life. Not long aft erwards, the revival plateaued, at least in part because congregations had had enough of the manipulation. Edwards was shortly thereaft er dismissed from his pulpit. We see in this example a form of terror, a religious sadism, a way of coercing consent by dangling the possibility of arbitrary violence from which one has only one outlet—to give in to the same god who is simultaneously the source of the threat. In his chapter “Masochism and Sadism,” Girard, quite intentionally, puts masochism as the fi rst term of the two. He argues that the sadist “persecutes because he feels he is being persecuted.” Th e masochist becomes a sadist because he realizes “the key to the enchanted garden appears to be in the hands of the tormentor” (1961, 185). Th e tormentor in this case is “Yahweh, the God of revenge,” who condemns whom he wishes and saves Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 85 whomever he wants. This god legitimates an arbitrary form of terror, which the sadist seeks to mirror and model, in part to overcome his own fear and in part to express his sense of revenge. Th us, Girard makes clear that these characters are neither essentially good nor evil, but damaged persons, victims of their own metaphysical desire. He quotes Dostoevsky: “Do not hate the atheists, the professors of evil, the materialists, or even the wicked among them, for many are good, especially in our time” (190). Moral illumination means understanding the terror that haunts sadists, even in the midst of their persecution. We are, then, identifying Calvinism as the bulwark religion of America: a sadistic and sacrifi cial religion where one’s success is a marker of blessing and a providential promise of sacred acceptance. American exceptionalism is legitimated through sacral and sacrificial forms, and its arbitrary nature is hidden behind paeans raised to the glory of its promise, and to all who bow to its power. Disciplined moral action demands that one have victory; one must not be a victim, because this is the mark of defeat, both morally and in respect of one’s salvation. Grace is limited in this system and thus it must be sought, even though one can’t earn it, and yet one’s success is a sign of it, as are the sobriety and iron will of those who follow the creed. The warp and woof of masochism and sadism keeps many in its grip—another kind of Weberian “iron cage.” Preemptive aggression is thus a natural extension of this creed—when in doubt, act fi rst, ask for forgiveness later. Scots-Irish culture simply takes the victor’s right to an extreme, in an ethic of radical freedom whereby contests over scarce resources create an ecstasy of battle—as illustrated by the violence in American football and in military academies, and by the anger of Second Amendment rights groups. Scott Appleby’s “ecstatic asceticism” in which one’s joy is founded in solidarity with the power of the state, triumphant over all enemies, is a further extension of this sacrificial ethic (Appleby 1999). To sacrifice one’s life for this power sacralizes not only one’s own life but the life of the nation. Violence becomes a sacrament by which one wins glory for oneself, one’s family, and the state.11 This ecstatic asceticism reigns supreme in the ethic of the American military—deeply entrenched in the South and Midwest—which carries on the legacy of their Scots-Irish heritage. The Navy Seal 6 team that was able to find and “take out” Osama bin Laden code-named their target “Geronimo”—thus 86 Jon Pahl and James Wellman rehearsing an early episode of American Indian scapegoating involved in America’s “winning” of the West. Following this murder (in its own way, a founding murder), scenes were shown of various American military academies; cameras panned the literal dance of ecstasy, in which soldiers chanted together, “u.s.a., u.s.a., u.s.a.” Th e fervency of this sacramental ritual was as powerful as any I have ever witnessed. One might, once again, say: this is a kind of inverted gospel—in which the one who comes in peace and in the name of the Lord only arrives in and through the act of murder. And, of course, the model is not the Jesus of the Sermon on the Mount or of the Cross, but rather the apocalyptic Christ from the Book of Revelation, who comes on a white horse and tramples his enemies underfoot. This god is then interpreted as a Sovereign War God, a sadistic Master—and, of course, one who can and should be imitated in the pulpit, whether in church or in the White House. And, to be sure, there are many masochists who love this god, who love this kind of leadership, and who take pleasure in the demanding nature of this gospel. Again, we see an inverted gospel of peace—a powerful culture-construct (and cultureconstructing) god who motivates a righteous and unrelenting violence, as effi cient as it is arbitrary.

#### Their sacrilization of United States climate governance as a new God to save us from climate change guarantees constant violence and sacrifice of the outside in the name of the divine ethicality of the West.

Pahl 15.Jon, Peter Paul and Elizabeth Hagan Professor of History and Director of MA Programs in The Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. “Empire of Sacrifice: Violence and the Sacred in American Culture.” In Can We Survive Our Origins?: Readings in René Girard's Theory of Violence and the Sacred, Studies in Violence, Mimesis, & Culture

American self-understanding has been brutally efficient in producing “innocent domination” (Pahl 2012b). Throughout American history, deathdealing, pursued as a matter of public policy, has been cloaked repeatedly in a sacralizing aura of rhetorical innocence. According to this “exceptionalist” narrative, usually asserted in direct contrast to the evidence, killing is an unfortunate accident, “collateral damage” in the otherwise noble history of American progress. American domination, even and especially where violently pursued, is innocent. Usually, this killing is dressed up as “sacrifice,” i.e., as heroic and costly self-dedication to an ideal or value (Denton-Borhaug 2011). The trope is remarkably mobile—and exceptionally slippery in the semantic ambiguities it generates. The “sacrifice” of others (and of American “boys”)—implying their bloody immolation (i.e., sacrifi ce in its archaic and original sense)—has been invoked as necessary across the centuries (Ebel 2010). The removal of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, the conquest of the Spanish in the South of North America, the revolution against the English across the 72 Jon Pahl and James Wellman Atlantic seacoast, and the pushback of the French to what became Canada were all justified, already in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by rhetorics of “sacrifice” ( Jewett 2008). In the nineteenth century, the Civil War was described by both sides as a sacrifi cial struggle “upon the altar of the nation,” as Yale’s Harry Stout has aptly put it (Stout 2006). Most recently, the dawn of U.S. empire in the Philippines, the (belated) entry into World War I, the “good war” against the Axis Powers in World War II, the “Cold War” against the Soviet Union and Communist China (via proxies in Korea and Vietnam), and the military adventures in Iraq (twice) and in Afghanistan were all shrouded in sacralizing discourses of “sacrifi ce” (Stout 2006). American interventions have thus always been presented as exceptional necessities justifying exceptional measures. Such violence, no matter how sadistic, “preemptive,” and domination-driven, has been cloaked as “defensive” action, hence as innocent. Domination, so the exceptionalist narrative goes, is invariably “good” for the peoples Americans have invaded and fought. Religion itself has been pressed into service as a key component in an ongoing rationalization of violence-in-the-name-of-evolutionary-“progress” (progress being understood in racial, economic, nationalist, and gendered terms and marked by potent binaries of “us” versus “them”). Indeed, the production of sacralizing narratives out of violence tends to institute a civil religion parallel and rival to Christianity, operating essentially with transposed structures of thought and language (mis)appropriated from it. The thought of René Girard insightfully illuminates this trend in American history, since for Girard, such phenomena are to be understood most fundamentally as “regressions” characteristic of Christendom and its aftermath, to primitive archaic patterns programmed by our evolutionary history. In his most recent (and probably final) writings, especially I See Satan Fall Like Lightning; Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith; Evolution and Conversion; and especially Battling to the End, René Girard has emphasized insistently what he calls his “realist” approach to anthropology, while also taking a decidedly theological turn (Girard 2001, 2008, 2010; Girard and Vattimo 2010). For our purposes, Girard’s emphasis, in particular, on the historical actuality of a “founding murder” at the beginning of human civilization can point us toward a fully “realist” refusal to blink in the face of violence, or be deceived by its sacralizing disguises. Girard’s theological turn too can help us Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 73 to recognize in American history the dynamics of a paradoxical oscillation, of “apocalyptic” tenor, between a “crescendo towards extremes” of violence (producing domination) and what Pierpaolo Antonello has identifi ed as the “containments” of violence (presented as innocence)—a paradox operating via what Girard calls forms of “false transcendence” (Girard 2001, 46, 98–100, 119, 185). Th is “realist theology,” if we may so call it, embodies Girard’s most mature refl ections not only on human nature and Christianity, but also on an American culture that he called “home” for most of his adult life. It is true that the American empire (as Hardt and Negri observed [2008]) now operates as a global regime of transnational corporate power (one is tempted to say banking power). Yet the exchanges and flows (of weapons as well as cash) within this system are no less, for being global, part of a “sacrifi cial” economy than they were when tied to the nation-state and its policies (as is, in fact, still largely the case). Even more, the capacity of these sacrifi cial processes to produce victims has escalated, as Girard observes throughout Battling to the End—while also being at least temporarily contained in modern judicial rituals and systems of economic exchange. We have to understand here, however, that when violence is “contained,” for Girard, it is also redistributed and recycled around the body politic. What Girard helps us to realize, then, is that the system of false transcendence that marks American exceptionalism takes two primary forms. First, the ideological construct of innocent domination operates through overt, physical warfare rationalized and sanctifi ed as (noble) “sacrifi ce”—at which construction Americans have proven themselves to be exceptionally skilled, not least in recent decades. Secondly, the “false transcendence” of superordaining necessity and sacralized innocence is deployed in various forms of “cultural warfare.” Here, the battle is over symbols or “truth” more than actual physical territory. In these battles, what is “sacrifi ced” is not as evident (perhaps) as an actual human victim, but these ossifications of human reasoning that produce both the ideology of American exceptionalism and the false transcendence it secretes are, in the long run, no less destructive—are, indeed, perhaps more dangerous—than actual warfare. For ideological rigor mortis is the exact opposite of devotion to a living God (not to mention devotion to living human beings and commitment to alleviating their suff ering, insofar as possible). Such ideological certainty 74 Jon Pahl and James Wellman (which can have the function of masking a deeper want of assurance) marks a deep-lying strain in American history from its origins to the present. Of course, American history is not to be reduced to any single deconstructionist narrative of anti- or para-Christian American exceptionalism cloaking domination with innocence through the workings of a false transcendence. Th ere is also a deep stratum of trust (what Robert Putnam has identifi ed as “social capital”) manifest in spiritually grounded, pragmatically realistic, nonviolent movements for social change that give some empirical and cultural “heft ” to what Kant long since identifi ed as the conditions for perpetual peace, and that might collectively point (ironically enough) to the prospects for a Pax Americana.1 For the moment, however, we must explore and expand the fruitfulness of the present exercise in the application of Girardian theory. To which end, my colleague and I here present a series of four selected culture-readings, designed to illustrate the logic of sacred and “sacrifi cial” violence. In Guns We Trust: The Origins of American Exceptionalism Jon Pahl “American” identity, according to this reading of the culture-story, originated in murder. From the very beginning of European settlement, shifting alliances between indigenous tribal groupings and English settlers produced competing, and largely unresolved, charges of murder and injustice. For instance, in 1636 an English trader named John Oldham was murdered in Massachusetts Bay Colony. Th e English accused various Native Americans of the crimes. Th ese accusations were apparently driven less by the facts of the case than by the benefi ts that accrued to the English from playing on tribal rivalries that pitted the Mohegans and Narragansetts against the Pequots. English-speaking clergy preached repeated sermons demanding that the Pequots punish the murderers of Oldham, and when the Pequots refused and began carrying out raids on English villages, the English escalated the confl ict with an attack on the Pequot village in what is now Mystic, Connecticut, on May 26, 1637. Captain John Mason led a band of ninety English soldiers, accompanied by several hundred friendly Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 75 Narragansetts, and torched the entire village, killing hundreds of Pequots, most of whom were women, children, and the elderly. Commander of the attack John Mason explained the religious rationale for the mass murder aft erwards, claiming that God “laughed his Enemies and the Enemies of his People to scorn making them as a fi ery Oven. . . . Th us did the Lord judge among the Heathen, fi lling the Place with dead Bodies!” (Mason 1763, 10). A few decades later, Nathaniel Morton imagined the scene in vivid terms for readers, and explicitly justifi ed it as a “sacrifi ce”: it “was a fearful sight to see [the Pequots] thus frying in the Fire, and the streams of Blood quenching the Same; and horrible was the stink and scent thereof; but the Victory seemed a sweet Sacrifi ce, and they gave praise thereof to God, who had wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to enclose their Enemies” (Morton 1669, 101). In the coming years, New England’s Puritan settlers actually secured their dominance by promising free trade with various indigenous peoples in exchange for the severed heads and hands of murdered Pequots as tributes—thus establishing early connections between religion, violence, and commercial exchange in the “New World.” And lest the theological point be lost—namely, that encouraging the murder and dismembering of an enemy could be an act of love on the part of Christians committed to Enlightened moral values like not killing—William Bradford of Plymouth Plantation opined that “cutting off [Pequot] heads and hands, which the [Indians] sent to the English, [was] a testimony of their love and service” (Lipman 2008). In the decades to come, the English came to specialize in this method of dividing and conquering the fi rst peoples of North America. Th ey did so by using a murder as a pretext for more killing, although of course the killing was also legitimized by inquests, trials, and other legal procedures. Th e case of Sassamon—a “praying Indian” found dead near Plymouth in January of 1675—is the best-studied example. As a Christian, Sassamon was an ally of the English, although he also advised Wampanoag sachem Metacom (King Philip). Th ree Wampanoags were charged with Sassamon’s murder, tried in English courts, and found guilty and sentenced to death. Metacom protested, and eventually began organizing raids against English settlements. Th e confl ict escalated into total war—something Girard comments on with great insight in Battling to the End. Historian Francis Jennings has estimated 76 Jon Pahl and James Wellman that six of seven Native Americans and six of thirteen English in New England died during the war ( Jennings 1976). King Philip’s War, as it came to be called, ended with the death of Metacom in 1677. Aft er being captured by the English, he was fi rst tortured, then beheaded. His head was then displayed on a pole in Plymouth for decades. According to Jill Lepore, the war—triggered by the murder of Sassamon, and ending with the murder of Metacom—rigidifi ed cultural distinctions between “Indians” and “Americans,” and established a dualistic pattern for cultural confl ict that defi ned “American” identity (Lepore 1999). Murder, war, torture, destruction—the “sacrifice” of some to preserve others— these are the themes with which American history ought rightly to begin. Throughout the centuries, of course, Native Americans continued to bear much of the violence that fl owed from this us-them dualism and its sacrifi cial operations—from the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864 (led by Colonel [and Methodist Reverend] J. M. Chivington), to the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, to the repression of the AIM uprising in 1973, to untold murders and crushing poverty down to the present.2 All of this was done, of course, in the name of “progress”; in the name of the “modern” (if not putatively “Christian”) renunciation of “primitive” religion and ritual. It would not be diffi cult to trace the way this initial incident spiraled into ideological trajectories that take us quite directly to Iraq and Abu Ghraib.3 Instead, however, let us, with Girard’s help, draw out the historical and evolutionary signifi cance of this “founding murder.” He writes: Th e modern shedding of ritual brings to light the psychosocial substratum of ritual phenomena. We cry “scapegoat” to stigmatize all the phenomena of discrimination—political, ethnic, religious, social, racial, etc.—that we observe about us. We are right. We easily see now that scapegoats multiply wherever human groups seek to lock themselves into a given identity— communal, local, national, ideological, racial, religious, and so on. (Girard 2001, 160) It is the mobility and pluriform diversity of the religious phenomenon—the construction, within the gap created by the “secularization” of inherited traditions, of hybrid civil religions and of self-sacralizing “cultural religions” or “identities”—that has marked the modern world. Girard again draws the Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 77 conclusion: “All discourses on exclusion, discrimination, racism, etc. will remain superfi cial as long as they don’t address the religious foundations of the problems that besiege our society” (Girard 2001, 210). I have said something of the religious foundations of American violence in this brief excursion on the founding murder(s) in American history. For other case studies in the history of innocent domination, readers are invited to explore my book Empire of Sacrifi ce (2010a), which discusses in turn: the execution of the Quaker Mary Dyer on Boston Common in 1660; the sacrifi ces associated with slavery in North America, as outlined by Frederick Douglass; the ruthlessly mimetic “war on drugs” that is, in eff ect, a war on youth and adolescents in American policy; and (fi nally) the exclusion of women, gays, and lesbians from full participation in American society, in what I call the “sacrifi ce of sex.” Each of these trajectories off ers an enduring thread, open to a Girardian reading, throughout American history; and each demonstrates quite real “sacrifices” of ritual immolation illustrating America’s ideology of innocent domination, albeit in forms that are not immediately and evidently identifi able as religious. Other “sacrifi cial” trajectories of reading in American history are explored in my previous book, Shopping Malls and Other Sacred Spaces: Putting God in Place (2003), which tracks the ways shopping malls, Walt Disney World, or the suburban home—and especially domestic sanitation and lawn care—originate in a “desire to acquire” in America, and produce “sacred places” that reinforce what I call the “violence of banality.” But too many examples are wearisome. Th e point is the same in any event. Mimetic rivalries operate contagiously in America, through market and social systems that bear religious signifi cance without appearing to be religious. In other words, innocent domination stems from a false transcendence, the falsity of which is evidenced by the existence underneath a religious rhetoric of innocence of a brutal, and escalating, system of interrogations, surveillance, torture, prisons, military expansion, and weaponry, the ballistic capacity of which is matched only by its destructive intent (Bacevich 2010). Unfortunately, the most troubling and insidious of the forms of innocent domination is the way in which truth itself suff ers under the fi xed ideology of American exceptionalism. Th is is the case in the “warfare” between science and religion in America, which has been concentrated, with special heat, on the topic of evolution, and which deserves special attention.

#### In the face of the 1AC’s mimetic act of violence we propose the alternative of active nihilism – a form of self-overcoming that instead of deferring the role of scapegoat onto something else, self-sacrifices as a rejoice in the agon of life

MacCormac 13. James, Masters of Arts in Theology and Religious Studies, Saint Mary‘s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, April 2013. “Saved from Salvation: Friedrich Nietzsche in the Work of René Girard.” [brackets for gendered language]

God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? That which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives — who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games will we need to invent? Isn't the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it?57 The madman speaks of the momentous event but is unsure what will happen after it. Girard notes that in the madman‘s speech, ―[e]verything is presented in the form of questions, no affirmation is possible."58 These questions surrounding God‘s murder are what Nietzsche finds himself both proclaiming and responding to. Nietzsche‘s answer to the madman‘s plea is to actively affirm the world, a world that Girard sees as a potentially never-ending mimetic crisis, and to provide, tentatively, a model for this affirmation in the form of his ―Dionysian‖ prophet Zarathustra. Nietzsche’s World After God [The] Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my "beyond good and evil," without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself-- do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?-- This world is the will to power -- and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power -- and nothing besides! - Nietzsche59 In this dramatic and abstract image Nietzsche outlines what he sees as the supreme problem for modern individuals -- the groundless, purposeless nature of reality - - and his strategy for dealing with that problem.60 As was suggested above, Nietzsche‘s central philosophical idea is ―the will to power,‖ which Nietzsche here claims as the ―name for this world,‖ and it is this identification and its consequences that Nietzsche sees as a solution. That the world is ―eternally self-destroying,‖ ―without goal,‖ and ―beyond good and evil marks it as one where to be nihilistic is to be truthful, for there is no final state to attain, no true measure of value. To seek wealth or pleasure or even peace in the world has been presented in the past as ultimate goals, safeguarded by firm role models, but Nietzsche believes that an honest human being can no longer see things this way. Some see that the world is ―eternally self-destroying‖ and so they despair -- these are the ―passive nihilists.‖ Without an ultimate goal, they succumb to a ―decline and recession of the power of spirit.‖61 To put it another way, the passive nihilists cease to strive to become something, whether through competition with others or themselves. Nietzsche sees Christianity as bringing nihilism to its fullest expression in humanity through its commitment to truth, and the Christianity of his time as representing a full flowering of passive nihilism. Christianity‘s search for truth, and identification of truth with God, leads to a sense that truth is beyond life, in heaven, and so beyond humans. Most do not know that they believe life to be meaningless, but they live in such a fashion. In contrast, others, a select few whom Nietzsche greatly admires (the ―free spirits‖ he often addresses), see clearly that life has nothing grounding it, and act creatively to pursue power over themselves and their environment. This is what Nietzsche calls ―active nihilism,‖ which he identifies with ―increased power of spirit.‖62 Nietzsche addresses these few active nihilists in his writing, and he names the world ―will to power‖ for them. He hopes that by acknowledging the desire for power as the paradoxical, ever-shifting foundation of life, the active nihilists can affirm life, rather than giving way to despair or attributing meaning to a transcendent and unattainable end. The obstacle to Nietzsche‘s affirmative quest is the great complex of fears which drag all people back to ultimate goals and simple answers, including those gilded with the complex language of philosophy. Uncertainty, insecurity, and, overwhelmingly, suffering are what create these fears, which Nietzsche names ―the spirit of gravity.‖ To succumb to gravity is inevitable, as all are involved in a web of power and influence (that is, all are involved in mimetic desire) -- but the free spirit seeks to always recognize the powers that compel and sustain her, and in doing so to find a way to both affirm the situation and create something new. This Nietzsche refers to as ―self-overcoming,‖ which, looking with a Girardian lens, I claim is an effort to escape the deadlock of mimetic desire, that ceaseless search for stability and safety. On Self-Overcoming "With Nietzsche, everything is mask. [...] Nietzsche didn't believe in the unity of a self and didn't experience it." - Gilles Deleuze63 Nietzsche‘s thought undermines the notion of a stable self, and attempts to find joy in the endless insecurity humans deal with throughout their lives. Self-overcoming is the name Nietzsche gives to the active affirmation of this insecurity and the endless opportunities for new creation it affords. From the point of view of self-overcoming, desires lead one to recreate one‘s self over and over, rather than confining one to a narrow, single role in life. This stands against notions of a ―true self‖ or soul hidden beneath the flux of consciousness, opposing what Descartes saw as the possibility of a sure foothold in the cogito. Nietzsche posits the world as an endless flow of conflicting forces (the will to power), taking over one another and trying to gain new powers and possibilities. Deleuze follows this perspective when he proclaims that ―everything is mask‖ for Nietzsche. This means that each thing identified as ―I‖ is fabricated, changeable, and without a definite structure. The will to power is the ―root‖ of the self, a ―self‖ being a particular configuration of forces, struggling to both preserve and surmount their current form, and to draw in other forces (whether ideas, persons, or nations). The self is overcome continually by creating, destroying, and experimenting with forms and habits, especially those most powerful habits which construct identity. This is happening at all times, though most are passive about this constant death and rebirth of one‘s self, never acknowledging how the encounter with new people and ideas affects them. As Girard might put it, we do not understand that our desire is mimetic, that it is not ours in any final sense. Acknowledging that we are constantly destroying and remaking ourselves, rather than believing we have a fixed essence, is Nietzsche‘s way of affirming the will to power, becoming its partner rather than its victim, a friend rather than a slave. This embodies Dionysian ―faith‖ by admitting the ―essential fact of our life,‖ which is procreation, eros, or creativity in the broadest sense. Life itself confides to Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra, ―I am that which must always overcome itself.” 64 The health or usefulness of a notion of self, of a given ―mask,‖ is determined by the particular forces at a given time and place. In the fullness of history, the self concept and role of ―humanity‖ too will not be perfected or ended, but instead overcome. The self that replaces ―humanity‖ is, for Nietzsche, the coming Übermensch, translated variously as ―super-man,‖ ―over-man,‖ or ―beyond-man.‖ The Nietzschean idea of creating, as Deleuze writes, "is to lighten, to unburden life, to invent new possibilities of life. The creator is legislator – dancer."65 The Übermensch is contrasted to the ―last man,‖ a figure who no longer wishes to improve, as [they believes [they are] experiencing the end point of all history, the aim of all human lives –- a figure who brings disaster (mimetic crisis) through modeling inactivity. This attitude is something Nietzsche feared was already present among the privileged classes of his time. It is worthwhile to pause at the idea of the Übermensch and see in it the configuration of a positive desire, one which is not trapped in mimetic struggles, though it still exists with them. The Übermensch comes after humanity, as the figure who understands and takes on the meaning of the will to power. Nietzsche argues that there have been a few exemplary men who have approached the next stage, being masters of themselves and others (Goethe being his favourite), but he does not locate the Übermensch anywhere in human history. The Übermensch is a creator -- of new values, new selves, new friends, new enemies, and most of all, new joy. Nietzsche imagined that the Übermensch would not struggle with or avoid self-overcoming, as his contemporaries seemed to, but will take it on as a joyful dance. An extension of the Nietzschean ideas about both religion and selves that I have been examining is the key idea that forms of life create forms of thought, whatever they may be named. Nietzsche claims that “Every philosophy is the philosophy of some stage of life,‖ 66 and it could be said further that each god also belongs to a stage of life. There is no grand cosmic plan to figure out, and so no absolute model, but instead many wills which seek to justify and affirm themselves and expand their powers. So the thinking, feeling creature calling itself ―human‖ looks to find ways to continue thinking and feeling, and to honour those above other possibilities. And, among humans, different humans develop philosophies (and religions) which help to affirm and expand their particular form of life. So warriors find a way of war, fisherman a way of fishing, and so on, each with their own models to imitate. Due to this there is no ―right way,‖ despite the protests of many systems of imitation and order, but only multiple expressions of a ―will to power‖ which characterizes all living things. So a way of life or a philosophy privileges and sustains a certain system of mimetic desire. When this is brought to bear upon the Christianity of Nietzsche‘s time, it can be seen why he eschews the Enlightenment ideal of a ―rational‖ critique, instead moving to a frowned upon mode of argumentation, ad hominem: he attacks persons rather than arguments. He asks ―what sort of person worships this sort of God?‖ and finds his answers that way, rather than asking other questions about God‘s possibility or necessity. For Nietzsche, the figure which expresses the God‘s powerlessness is a negatively configured Christian believer, understood by Nietzsche as an anti-Übermensch, a person who lives a life based around an unattainable central aim, the afterlife -- which seems to him to deny that life has any value here and now, and preclude any notions of creatively reconfiguring life. Though Nietzsche would not see it, this figure has, in the language of mimetic theory, misunderstood a defense of victims (the defenseless, weak, and defeated) as a command to remain static, wishing for a share of being without movement. For Nietzsche, Christianity is a tool of control and denial which contains a secret will to power. Yet its existence, and its affirmation of the importance of a commitment to truthfulness and discipline are essential tools that lead Nietzsche to his conceptualization of the ―will to power.‖ Arguably, Christianity is Nietzsche‘s greatest ally in his growth and also his greatest enemy in his quest for self overcoming. Yet the vitriol that grows and grows towards Christianity over the course of his career leaves out one peculiar target -- the figure of Jesus. Nietzsche imagines Jesus as a worthy opponent and figure, and attributes to him a doctrine of liberation like Nietzsche‘s own, beyond morals and guilt: ―Jesus said to his Jews: ‗The law was for servants;--love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!‘‖67 It is in The Antichrist that Jesus is given full attention for the first time, alongside with Paul, who Nietzsche claims is truly to blame for the monstrous Christianity that Nietzsche opposes. In The Antichrist, Jesus is presented not quite as a hero, but one who is blameless for what others did with his example, and who was a spirit too free for his time (and so someone Nietzsche admires). Nietzsche not only sees Christians as not living up to Christ‘s example, but goes a step further, proclaiming with typical hyperbole that ―There was only one Christian, and he died on the cross.‖68 Nietzsche spares Jesus as an exemplary individual, one who did not truly found a religion, but told of a new way of life which broke with what had come before. As somebody who self-overcomes, and affects his society profoundly, Jesus is spared what so much of Christianity is subjected to by Nietzsche. This admiration overflows in his final days, when Nietzsche‘s sense of identity ends up slipping fluidly between that of his beloved Dionysus and The Crucified (Jesus) who is configured by Nietzsche as that god‘s structural cousin.69 Nietzsche‘s treatment of Jesus is notable for several reasons. It serves as a reminder that Nietzsche's contempt for Christianity is mixed with deep respect. It shows that Nietzsche is not an advocate for one single way of life, but for a single type of person, the ―free spirit‖ who finds [their] own way, and so affirms a plurality of models. Most importantly, Nietzsche‘s treatment of Jesus demonstrates that his configuration of Christianity is different from the one Girard attributes to him, in that Nietzsche does intuit another, ―healthy‖ version of it. In his quest to create new forms of life after the death of the Christian God, Nietzsche finds a new ―faith‖ in a god he called Dionysus, who commands humankind to create and say ―yes‖ to life, by embracing even destruction, and self-destruction (in the form of self-overcoming), a god who is prefigured by a Jesus imagined by Nietzsche as seeking no followers. This vision of human life, and of divinity, is a criticism of most forms of religion which emphasize the eternal stability of the law, the order given by the gods. Yet it is one which, surprisingly, has strong resemblance with Girard‘s own positive account of a liberating Christianity, which stands in contrast to other religions. In the next chapter, this resemblance will be brought into sharper focus, as Nietzschean selfovercoming is given a place in Girard‘s theory of sacrifice. Chapter 3 Better to Burn Out: Nietzsche’s Self-Sacrifice What is the New Testament? A handbook for those who are to be sacrificed. - Kierkegaard70 [T]he happiness of the spirit is this: to be anointed and through tears to be consecrated as a sacrificial animal. Did you know that? -Zarathustra71 The Gospel reveals "things hidden since the foundation of the world" and through the intermediary of Nietzsche this revelation begins to become self-aware. -Girard72 In order to give Nietzsche‘s work a fuller place as an ally to Girard‘s mimetic theory, an examination of Nietzsche using a more rigorous version of that same theory is necessary. In conjunction with the work of Tyler Roberts on Nietzsche‘s asceticism and accounts of Zarathustra‘s ―gift giving virtue‖, this chapter begins that examination. The emphasis of this analysis will be on the dual insight that Girard claims Nietzsche shares with him most strongly -- the importance of sacrificial victims (scapegoats) for religion, and Christianity‘s rejection of sacrificial victims. In Girard‘s view, Nietzsche is brilliant to see this but is also reprehensible for choosing to go back to a culture of victims. I propose, however, that this reading is lacking in proper Girardian insight, and 70 Soren Kierkegaard, Provocations: Spiritual Writings of Kierkegaard Compiled and translated by Charles E. Moore (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2003), 220. 71 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ―On the Famous Wise Men.‖ 72 Girard, ―Founding Murder,‖ 244. 44 Nietzsche‘s understanding of sacrifice can be a helpful supplement to Girard‘s, as Nietzsche sees that in the time after the death of the god (or, for Girard, the weakening of the sacred due to Christianity), a process unfolds where each human being becomes a new sort of sacrifice. It is this process that Nietzsche names ―self overcoming‖ throughout his work, which I show here. Each God is a Consuming Fire Before turning to Nietzsche, Girard‘s viewpoint must be reviewed once more, this time focusing on the image of fire in relation to sacrifice. To begin, I examine two images drawn from Girard‘s work on sacrifice in The Scapegoat. Girard is speaking of the Aztec sun god Teotihuacan and his role as destroyer of plagues. The god, in the role of a sacrifice, is killed in order to end the plague. Girard explains the consequence of this act: If then the epidemic recedes, the victim becomes divine in that he is burned and becomes one with the fire that instead of destroying him mysteriously transforms him into a force for good. The victim is thus transformed into that inextinguishable flame which shines on humanity. Where can this flame be found thereafter? The answer is immediately apparent. It can only be found in the sun, or maybe in the moon and the stars.73 This image of fire, and of the sun and stars, is one which appears in many different myths, which Girard appeals to later in the chapter as well. The role of the fire in religious ritual, especially sacrifice, is too vast to review here, as is the role of the sun and stars as the abode (or identity) of the gods. What is important to highlight in this paragraph is Girard‘s understanding of the fire as both transformative, by shifting a being from a lower 73 Girard, The Scapegoat, 60. 45 status to one of divinity and goodness in the eyes of the community, and centering, by stabilizing and giving the community a symbol of unity. Girard notes similar imagery when he analyzes Peter‘s betrayal of Jesus as recounted in the Gospels. Peter warms himself by a fire among other men and women, having followed at a distance after Jesus‘ arrest. Peter falls into a mimetic pattern, simply wanting to be one of the group. But his association with Jesus is known to one woman in the group, and she lets the others know it. It is then that Peter denies Jesus, for he realizes that his association with Jesus puts him outside the group. As much as Peter wishes to remain loyal, he is drawn to conform to the group, for, as Girard puts it, Peter ―cannot warm himself without wanting obscurely the being that is shining there, in this fire, and the being that is indicated silently by all the eyes staring at him, by all the hands stretched toward the fire.‖74 Girard explains that beyond the practical reasons of heat and light, the fire creates a community. The woman who addresses Peter acts to exclude him from the community. By noting that he was with Jesus she implies that he does not belong with them. Peter, being alone and confused after the loss of Jesus, or ―the collapse of his universe,‖75 is eager to join a new group. ―Hands and faces are turned toward the fire and in turn are lit by it; it is like a god‘s benevolent response to a prayer addressed to him. Because everyone is facing the fire, they cannot avoid seeing each other; they can exchange looks and words; a place for communion and communication is established.‖76 As the scene unfolds, Peter denies his former master in order to gain safety and community around the fire. Girard goes as far as to state that ―Peter makes Jesus his 74 The Scapegoat, 150. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid, 151. 46 victim...‖77 But the others know by his accent that Peter is not from Jerusalem, and that he came there following Jesus. They reject him in order to maintain the order strengthened and founded by the scapegoat mechanism. They tell each other, ―We are all of the same clan, we form one and the same group inasmuch as we have the same scapegoat.‖78 To return to Teotihuacan, let us consider the similarity between the fire and the god. The fire plays the role of illuminating and defining the boundaries of the community, and the great fire of the sun does this to an even greater degree, doing the same for the world. When the role of a sacrificed god like Teotihuacan is compared to a star or sun, the exaggeration shows how important the role is -- this god‘s sacrifice (that which makes sacred) has given order, and so a secure life, to the community, even to the world. The sacrificed god, despite the myths that surround him, is for Girard definitely a victim, one who was rejected violently. When Peter seeks to join the community by rejecting Jesus, he wants to defer this role of scapegoat. Not only does Peter wish to avoid pain, insecurity, and possible death, but, as Girard astutely notes, shame. ―Peter is ashamed of this Jesus whom all the world despises, ashamed of the model he chose, and therefore ashamed of himself.‖79 People often seek to avoid being rejected by their community in some way, and so betray certain commitments they have made. At the level of the grand, divine sacrifice of a Teotihuacan, those like Peter imagine that the god must have had some special power to be able to give his own life for the good of the community, something Peter 77 Ibid, 154. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid, 155. 47 cannot imagine having. For Girard this special power, this true being, is what we seek when we imitate others. The myths of those like Teotihuacan are a lie in that the victim did not choose to give himself for the cure of a plague, but instead was killed to found a new community (or to renew one). The Gospel account of Jesus is, in contrast to this, a ―true myth‖ in that it takes the same tale and reveals that the victim-god, the scapegoat, is innocent of any collective guilt, and did not want to become sacrifice for the community. Jesus is the only scapegoat to show this truth to his followers -- the sacrifice to end sacrifices. In doing so he founds a community of rejects, of wanderers whose center is elsewhere and invisible. But with such sacrifices ended, or at least encouraged to end, after this revelation, how is a community to be built? How is it to renew itself? For Girard this question remains unanswered in any concrete manner, and the great proliferation of answers put forward in the period after Christianity‘s ascent, and especially in the modern period, are a consequence of this revelation. The old ways fail not because they have no strength, but because: Henceforth we can no longer pretend not to know that the social order is built upon the blood of innocent victims. Christianity deprives us of the mechanism that formed the basis of the archaic social and religious order, ushering in a new phase in the history of mankind that we may legitimately call ―modern.‖ All the conquests of modernity begin there, as far as I am concerned, from that acquisition of awareness within Christianity.80 So the Gospels slowly remove the community‘s ability to build new ―fires‖ from victims by removing the ability to believe in the absolute power of those fires, and we return again to the loss of a stable self, both for the community and for persons. When 80 Girard, Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith, 26. 48 Girard discusses Nietzsche‘s approach to such victimage, he notices, with some (perhaps smirking) contempt that, ―[n]ot without coquetry he protests against his future canonization, but he prepares the way for it by setting out to become a living scandal. He behaves like a proper sacrificial beast."81 Girard is quite correct here. Nietzsche does indeed behave like a sacrifice, one who knows he is a sacrifice and one who will be ―canonized,‖ in other words, added to a list of those to imitate, a fire worthy of a community‘s respect and devotion. Giving Birth to a Dancing Star One must still have chaos within oneself, to give birth to a dancing star! - Zarathustra82 Indeed, we philosophers" and "free spirits" feel, when we hear the news that "the old god is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectations. At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea." - Nietzsche83 Both in the voice of Zarathustra and under his own name, Nietzsche speaks of the joyous and terrifying freedom created in the wake of God‘s death. With the idea of both god and sacrifice as a fire still in mind, consider that Nietzsche‘s admonitions to overcome humanity, as well as one‘s self, are in a sense a call to self-sacrifice. The great ―open sea‖ of the world cries out for each person to act as a sacrifice, a makingsacred of human life, a fire to build around and to create new values. Where typically ―self sacrifice‖ is understood as oriented towards some definite future goal or the preservation of the status quo, this self-overcoming wishes to continually find new joy along with new suffering. To Nietzsche each person should burn, voluntarily, rather than deferring the role of scapegoat to another individual. As Girard often emphasizes,84 Nietzsche does not use religious, and specifically Christian, terms and tropes by accident. Nietzsche‘s world is saturated by Christianity, and so the themes he uses are direct from the mythological playbook, including, as Tyler Roberts puts it ―the discovery of a deep-seated sickness unto death; scales falling from eyes; brave and bleak periods of isolation; daily martyrdoms; the bite of hardheartedness, of discipline and desire; the flaming spirit; and, finally, the grace of renewal where one finds one's life and one's world transformed.‖85 It is of course the ―flaming spirit‖ that is most interesting here, and especially its link to Christianity: "Like the desert ascetics of early Christianity, Nietzsche seeks the transfiguration of the body into flaming spirit."86 The sacrificial Christianity that Girard describes is the historical struggle wherein the old way of a sacred center, with which both desire and violence can be channeled, is slowly overtaken by the realization that the old way and its accompanying role models are contingent, that there is ―no Greek or Jew‖ in Christ, which leads to a great freedom. But to live out freedom, one must still, even after this realization, choose and build order -- and so, as Girard shows us, one must sacrifice. If the revelation of Christianity begins to become self-aware in Nietzsche, as Girard claims, it is found most clearly in Nietzsche‘s efforts to sacrifice (that is, ―make sacred‖) his self continually, rather than allowing an external object to be the site of violent expulsion. In the process of this continual self-sacrifice, Nietzsche oscillates between a return to a purely competitive agon where the enemy is expelled, and one rooted in love, where each friend and enemy is both helped to grow and is helpful to growth. Roberts emphasizes the latter when he states: "Love, as Nietzsche understands it, is a rejoicing in the other, a directionality toward or desire for the other manifested in creative giving."87 Girard is right to warn against the Nietzsche who wants to paradoxically reinstate the old order of rank and death, aided by reading in Darwinian ideas popular at the time. Yet he ought to apply his own theory of Christianity‘s dialogue with the violent sacred to Nietzsche, which would clarify Nietzsche‘s role for his thought. The struggle between a ―bad‖ mimetic desire of the closed system and the ―good‖ mimetic desire of Girard‘s nonsacrificial Christianity is embodied explosively in Nietzsche‘s life and writing. At one level, Girard knows Nietzsche rejects a caricature of Christianity, not the "real thing." At the same time, Girard's most consistent statements attribute to Nietzsche a knowing rejection of the Judeo-Christian revelation in favour of violence. This rejection is present, yet it is not as informed as Girard suggests, as Nietzsche‘s disdain for victims comes from a vision of pity and victims rooted in a sacrificial Christianity, as Girard would put it. From Nietzsche‘s viewpoint, victims are praised for remaining victims, for waiting in devotion to a "sickly" reproduction of a Girardian "archaic religion," one which continues using the logic of the scapegoat, but does not allow for any movement or resolution to conflicts, as scapegoating is now shameful. Such a Christianity, which 87 Ibid, 195. 51 punishes the strong and aggressive while telling the poor and weak to remain in that state, is rightfully condemned. Had Nietzsche been able to conceive of a Christianity which includes Jesus' "good news" and a Jesus whose message included a community rather than only individuals ("idiots," like Nietzsche's childlike Christ),88 he might have arrived at views closer to Girard's. An emphasis on incarnation (the body) and divinity (as a creative joy), something more akin to a theosis, would match Nietzsche's longings. Roberts makes this point eloquently, sketching the sort of theology that approaches Nietzsche's Dionysus: ...a theology of the Cross can affirm a God who suffers with humanity, who is immersed, out of love, in the world-reality of the human. This God is closer to the repeated suffering and dying of Nietzsche's Dionysus than the impassible God who supports the dualism of the ascetic ideal. Contrary to Nietzsche's assertion, such a mystical theology would find in the imitation of Christ on the Cross not a means to another life, but an expression of love for this life -- a life in which the deepest suffering is intimately connected with the deepest affirmation.89 The dualism that Roberts refers to here maps onto Nietzsche‘s rejection of an otherworldly source of meaning and redemption for life. The incarnate god seeks not to condemn or give up on life, as Nietzsche fears, but instead to inspire recognition of the continual self-sacrifice each person must undergo in affirming life, which is both death and resurrection. To follow Christ becomes, in Nietzschean terms, a process of continual, affirmative self-overcoming. 88 ―Idiot‖ understood as one who does not belong to a community. As Bruce Ellis Benson notes in Pious Nietzsche, the Jesus portrayed in The Antichrist seems to be similar to the protagonist of Doestoevsky‘s The Idiot. 89 Roberts, Contesting Spirit, 183. 52 Further, Roberts identifies his analysis of Nietzsche with a "metaphoric postmodernity" which can easily be allied with Girard's work: "Whereas analytic postmodernity relegates all significations to the ultimately meaningless play of signifiers, metaphoric postmodernity reconnects the signifier to the signified through the body: signification is not purely linguistic; it is somatic, it speaks desire."90 The emphasis on "the body" which "speaks desire," beyond the purely linguistic, is just what a Girardian account seeks to recover in its emphasis on "the truth of the victim.‖ Missing from this insight, exemplified by the death of Jesus on the cross, is what could be called the "truth of the resurrected" -- that is, the truth of those who have overcome being a victim used for others‘ ―salvation,‖ and instead taken on an identity as living flame. The being who has followed a "holy desire" in a community she loves and desires to flourish is the rehabilitated victim who endures anguish and pain, never denying it in favour of some static "victory" or "other world." The victim‘s body, Nietzsche's body, and the body of the community, all speak and grow in desire, and all imitate each other in continuous, joyous creation by living, growing, and suffering without need of a transcendent guarantee, instead becoming flaming spirit. Nietzsche misses this most difficult challenge of engaging with others due to his great nausea in the face of human laziness and contempt, and a refusal to follow a god of pity, along with his own deep loneliness.91 He remains caught between his contempt for the Christian society of his day and his love of an idealized ancient Greece, neither of which he can truly affirm. In seeking to affirm life in an era which seems to idolize the weak and passive, he moves past his own teaching, the affirmation of everything, and decides to negate once more: ―The weak and the failures shall perish: first principle of our love of man. And they shall even be given every possible assistance.‖92 This statement from Nietzsche immediately brings to mind the charges of proto-Naziism often brought against him. As Tobin Siebers suggests, Nietzsche, if he is to be consistent, would need to affirm even Christianity93 and ―the weak and failures,‖ along with all aspects of life. For him to create a world where those who are intent on self-overcoming could flourish would involve not a new set of masters, but a new ethic of partnership, one that we catch a glimpse of in Nietzsche‘s own insight about religious community. In such a community he sees that: "Love gives the greatest feeling of power. To grasp to what extent not man in general but a certain species of man speaks here....this means no morality, obedience or activity produces that feeling of power that love produces; one does nothing bad from love, one does much more than one would do from obedience and virtue... Being helpful and useful and caring for others continually arouses the feeling of power."94 Yet Nietzsche rejected this community, despite seeming to understand it, and came to embody the violent and ugly aspects of sacrifice in himself rather than its unitive and joyous ones. Christopher Hamilton writes that Nietzsche: believed that to have a sense of such a fellowship was to reject the world in all its morally suspect manner. And he believed that to do this would be to reject the standing conditions of life in the only way we humans can live it, that is, as a life involving much that is morally reprehensible. For Nietzsche, that thought was disgusting, unworthy of human beings. He was trapped between a sense of common fellowship with other human beings, and a desire to affirm life as it actually is. Unable to do either, he tyrannized over his own nature, exercising, but seeking thereby to exorcise, the asceticism he abhorred, and murdering God in the process.95 In Hamilton‘s assessment we find another confirmation of Nietzsche‘s ascetic nature, cloaked though it may be in the rejection of the old God. Nietzsche acts as the sacrificer and sacrifice, the ―worshipper and worshipped‖ as Girard elsewhere claims, insofar as he does constantly overcome (sacrifice) himself, or at least struggles to do so.96 How this consistent self-overcoming is to be maintained while still respecting and interacting with others is unclear to Nietzsche -- he is trapped and alone because of his constant quest for a purely individual freedom and power, the only way he sees to ―affirm life as it actually is.‖ The Lonely Sun When this disgust for human fellowship comes out in Nietzsche‘s work, it stands in contrast to the passages where Nietzsche, or at least his creation Zarathustra, emphasizes the great value of friendship and gift giving. Two scholars have recently examined this in relation to politics, Romand Coles97 and Katrin Froese.98 Both examine 95 Hamilton, ―Murder of God,‖ 179. 96 This loneliness and rejection of community, and their connection with Nietzsche‘s sense of reality, are also taken up in Giles Fraser‘s Redeeming Nietzsche, the theme of gift and giving in Nietzsche‘s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Zarathustra can be seen as a sort of proto-Übermensch who acts out Nietzsche‘s ideal life (which is notably one still built on tragedy, comedy, and an appreciation for Christian symbolism). Coles focuses on the section of Zarathustra concerning ―The Gift Giving Virtue,‖ which Coles notes is the ―highest virtue‖ according to Zarathustra. The attitude here is one who gives out of fullness, who is compassionate in a sense which is positive for Nietzsche, rather than the parasitic ―pity‖ which he attributes to the popular morality of his time. Coles also focuses on an image of fire in Nietzsche‘s work, the sun, and connects it to this virtue.99 The great star, which burns and freely gives to the world, is what Zarathustra strives to be like. In keeping with the theme of self overcoming as self sacrifice, the sun burns and gives. It is a star like so many other gods -- steady, brilliant, and without need of support. Yet it is obvious that Zarathustra does not see an end to strife in the gift-giving virtue, but rather a noble way of negotiating with it, as Coles notes. How can one become the ―dancing star‖ Zarathustra wishes to be without a dancing partner, without others? To give and give without receiving would leave one ―giving‖ without any notion of what is received, or of who is receiving. More than this, the selfovercoming which Nietzsche assumes is necessary for life would seem to have no place. In Froese‘s work this is accounted for in her reading of Nietzsche‘s concept of eternal return as the great interconnectedness of all things.100 This interconnection is held in tension with Nietzsche‘s own aristocratic politics which he builds upon the notion of will to power. As Nietzsche sees it, a will always seeks a stable sovereignty, or, to put it another way, to be a star. Froese points out that Zarathustra‘s comments on friendship indicate the best are those wherein ―each stimulates the other‘s development and rather than a self-sustaining god dictating to another mortal. The porous self that Nietzsche acknowledges is one which can never really become a ―sun‖ or ―star‖ -- or rather, it can only become such a celestial body for those who are kept far away and who do not examine it too closely. This is a recreation of the image of the ―lords‖ on high in relation to the servants and slaves who take the gifts (and commands) of the god. Froese‘s emphasis on the fluid nature of the Nietzschean self, along with the interconnection of life as an eternal return, shows the weakness of Nietzsche‘s politics, which lack imagination. Both Coles and Froese see in the gift giving virtue the potential for another path in Nietzsche, one which Nietzsche himself did not follow, likely out of his stubborn loneliness. In this vision Zarathustra does find the companions he seeks, and more than this, helps create a style of life and community which encourages the generosity and agon which is so difficult to maintain. Julian Young, in his effort to reconstruct a proposed folk religion from Nietzsche‘s writing, suggests that the community which Nietzsche did imagine was one which gave positive role models for many different classes of people, held together by the pia fraus of the philosophers.102

## 2NR – Harvard Westlake

### O/V – Top

They have conceded an ENTIRE THEORY OF DESIRE that makes it nearly impossible to vote aff – the nature of desire is one of mimesis – robust historical analyses indicate that the subject models desires towards external objects off of those projected by others in the global structure of mimeticism – violence today exists as the subject identifies an object of desire another has and attempts to attain it – this is evident in their sacralization of the United States as the arbiter of climate governance, demand that other countries mimic our actions, and scapegoating/use of force on countries that don’t comply

### L – G20

We’re going for the JOINT DOMINATION link – extend Wellman and Pahl – the affirmative is not benign co-operation but rather the extension of the [G20] liberal world order – this is simply a stage within the mimetic project of increasing liberal dominance with the US at the helm. The affirmative facilitates increased information sharing to satiate our need to be the divine arbitrator of desire.

First impact is INTERVENTIONISM – that’s Wellman and Pahl – so long as they are viewed as inferior in their actualization of government, the countries joining force with the US and CHina’s climate project are justified in invading other countries, deploying all necessary force for ensuring compliance, stating that the

Administration should leverage this promise by making climate change the building block of America’s relationships

In Moore 15

They are the newest secret war in Cambodia – a secret genocide of millions of civilians actualized through sending arms to anti-communist forces and deploying Agent Orange – a chemical weapon still causing innumerable birth defects and suffering. Viewed as backwards nations that ‘lack’, empathy is removed and violence ensues. That generates regional instability as we overturn local practices that creates power vacuums that are historically filled by groups like ISIS which causes failed states and ensures a litany of hotspots that escalate to extinction faster than the aff. The underlying motives of domination are evident in their affirmation of military and economic power as they state that

1AC Walt, PhD, 18

(Stephen M., IR@Harvard, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/03/global-warming-will-set-fire-to-american-leadership/>, 12-3)

Climate change could do more to limit America’s global ambitions than all the books, articles, op-eds, and other advocacy undertaken by apostles of restraint. Why? Because adapting to a warmer planet is going to be really expensive. For starters, climate change is already having an impact on military facilities in the United States and will force the Department of Defense to undertake costly remedial measures. Hurricane Michael caused millions of dollars of destruction at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida this fall (including damage to some of the costly F-22s stationed there), and the vast U.S. naval shipyard at Newport News is already prone to flooding and will require costly adaptive actions if it is to remain operational as sea levels rise. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, a three-foot increase in sea levels (which is well within the range of current estimates), could jeopardize the use of 128 U.S. military bases. Protecting these facilities or building new ones will not be cheap, and the money spent on these measures is money that cannot be spent on force structure, personnel, or overseas contingency operations. Second, as noted above, climate change will impose significant costs on the U.S. economy. According to the recent National Climate Assessment, the costs associated with climate change could reduce U.S. GDP by as much as 10 percent by the end of the century.

This justifies innumerable deaths under the euphemism of “collateral damage” and furthers their ambition to place the US on a pedestal as the divine arbiter of the mimetic cycle of desire, determining what the object of desire is and who will be scapegoated.

Second impact is VALUE DEFERRAL – the affirmative understands the world as constantly in need of tinkering, a view tainted by utter pessimism. This neurotic investment in locating flaws is a life-negating orientation that refuses to value the world until everything coincides with western models which constantly defers value to the future and prevents joy which is a precondition for their impacts – that’s MacCormac and Ossewaarde and you should cross apply it as a disad to their framework interp

Third impact is CLEANSING which independently turns case. Our imaginary world characterized by sustainability will inevitably face resistance in the form of underdeveloped countries unable to meet reduction quotas, great powers who view our policies as encroachment, corporations, and trump supporters who think you are a Chinese spy. As the agents of life, empires will launch wars against non-compliance. Imagine the Iraq war with soldiers in green masks. With CO2 as the enemy and the stakes being our existence as a species, all becomes permissible – paradoxically rendering catastrophe inevitable as crops turn to dust in the wake of carpet bombs, military ventures seize resources for innovation, soot initiates nuclear winter, and the stakes of the game force us into an any-means-necessary sprint towards extinction – that’s Bauman

The final impact is the WILL TO SAMENESS – that’s Pahl – their scholarship presumes that the world is only stable if it coincides with western models – this is evident in their affirmation of incorporation of China into the Western climate movement. Evident in their studies that rely on the comparative value of dominant governmental systems, voting affirmative endorses a drive to unify the world – this is evident when they say in 1AC Spitz 16 that

convincing action from Congress is necessary to persuade governments and private actors worldwide that significantly reducing emissions is both necessary and possible.

 This is based on a fundamental uneasiness when encountering difference that causes knee-jerk xenophobia and expulsion of the subaltern.

Independently, this is a reason to prima-facie refuse their studies for they are fueled by implicit bias to maintain the western order.

our alternative is a form of active nihilism – rejecting the attempt to have power over others in the form mimetic violence in favor of power over the self in an affirmative act of joy – an ethic that finds pleasure within the inevitable insecurity that is constitutive of existence – only this can escape the trap of mimeticism that plagues modernity. In specific, our alternative bases itself upon a willingness to live with a plethora of structural logics and refuses the imposition of uniformity unto the globe. Instead of the futile alignment with the norm of US exceptionalism, we align with all outside of that structuring logic. Our radical refusal of the imposition of uniformity allows us to see the world through different models that unravels the strings of the US liberal world order. The alternative solves their internal links – it means that there is no incentive to attempt to master the environment or other countries.

### L – Modelling

We’re going for the CLIMATE GOVERNANCE link – extend Pahl – the will towards solidifying US leverage in climate negotiations as a means of controlling the risk of climate catastrophe is a vital component of the guardian state’s control apparatus. The aff demands that the rest of the world recognize the US’s divine status as the new arbiter of climate governance. This liberal façade of climate cooperation is readily appropriated to grease the wheels of malign soft power and interventions that spreads across the globe to allow for the United States to deify their own economic models and ensure their success in every corner of the world. The affirmative is merely the flipside of Nixon’s secret war of Cambodia – instead of bombing the communist threat, the affirmative immediately jumps on the climate agreement so as to solidify the capitalist trajectory of global economic reforms.

The first impact is constant violence and endless assimilation – when the American empire presents all alterity with a choice – assimilate to our system of climate governance or be exterminated from the global stage, manifesting in the Vietnam war, Korean war, Opium wars, Afghanistan wars, the installation of dictators in Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua – the list goes on which also prove that the accumulation of violence quantitatively outweighs the affirmative’s impact. Impact framing this violence disproportionately affects racialized bodies which independently positions this as an a priori ethical rejection. The link also turns the case as [it’s this system of deification that creates the rhetoric of “but what about X other countries emissions”]. The link also destroys solvency as any perception of one country having something another doesn’t will deck the cooperation creating another Brexit, destroying the possibility for new climate deals.

The second impact is ressentiment – the perfect [solution to climate change] will never exist and thus we will always defer value to a transcendentally better world in which that object of our desire has been attained causing depressive existence, much in the same way that all Trump supporters hate themselves because no matter how many trade agreements they pull out of, America will never be fully great again.

In the context of the link, the alternative would be the United States caring not about **becoming the divine arbiter** of the world in a mimetic at of transcendence that deifies its own systems of climate governance but rather through the **acceptance** of the inevitable failure of such a project.

### O/V – Colebrook

The affirmative’s use of the global warming catastrophe as a sublime image of our own non-existence as a species to generate unification and activism is a sustainability practice of limited openness which operates to make last the current organization of desires that we constitute as humanity. Through projecting and mimicking an idealized ecology fit for the continuation of humanity, the 1ac raises humanity to a formative position which configures all else to maintain itself against the flows of nature.

This posture towards existence is run in stark contrast to our alternative which is a project of active nihilism which understands being not as unitary subjects constituted by desire but rather understands desire itself as an autonomous and formative force shaped by desires we perceive in the world. Only this can enable the alt’s rejecting the attempt to have power over the world in the form mimetic violence in favor of power over the self in an affirmative act of joy – an ethic that finds pleasure within the inevitable insecurity that is constitutive of existence – only this can escape the trap of mimetic violence that plagues modernity.

Rather than take the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world

### ---L – Mimesis

We’re going for the ECOLOGICAL MIMESIS link – extend colebrook

Their attempt to reduce emissions is part and parcel of an attempt to format nature in accordance with our desire for maintenance.

<<<Cross-apply the cross ex of the 1AC when I asked them if the goal of the 1AC was to make nature sustainable, and they said yes>>>

This myth of a ‘true’ and ‘sustainable’ nature is not only a mere product of our limited spatial-temporal perspective, but also runs counter to the utter flux and contingency that constitutes the natural world.

Two impacts

1. Fragility – the approach of the 1AC locks us in a never-ending war against ecology which merely accelerates fragility. As new ruptures emerge and tech becomes ever more complex, risk spirals beyond control. No matter how hard we try, we will never be able to erase the basic maxim of complexity, eventually rendering the smallest hiccup terminally catastrophic. This turns the aff as it generates a positive feedback loop of natural fluctuation paradoxically ensuring the end of humanity.

2. Cleansing – Our imaginary world characterized by sustainability will inevitably face resistance in the form of underdeveloped countries unable to meet reduction quotas, great powers who view our policies as encroachment, corporations, and trump supporters who think you are a Chinese spy. As the agents of life, empires will launch wars against non-compliance. Imagine the Iraq war with soldiers in green masks. With CO2 as the enemy and the stakes being our existence as a species, all becomes permissible – paradoxically rendering catastrophe inevitable as crops turn to dust in the wake of carpet bombs, military ventures seize resources for innovation, soot initiates nuclear winter, and the stakes of the game force us into an any-means-necessary sprint towards extinction.

### ---L – Difference

The link we’re going for is DIFFERENCE – Colebrook – their project of unification necessitates an elimination of dissent – two implications:

1. General Xenophobia – globalization shuns difference in order to ensure the sustainability project by constructing a binary between the politically formed subject and its unformed counterpart, devalued and marked as inferior – this engrains racist and normative inclinations within the psyche of the liberal subject – this should be prior in your decision calculus as it disproportionally effects marginalized bodies

2. Queerness – the drive to return to the equilibrium of our ecosystem derives from a valorization of the organic, demonizing the non-natural queer subject and ensuring violence against deviance that poisons gains in their movement

Turns case – the induction of xenophobia within their scholarship generates internal fissures which fracture movements and grants their project a violent posture which ensures the re-calcification of bigoted hierarchies.

## Framework

### 2NR – Technocracy

#### Our interpretation is that you should evaluate the round based upon competing affect

#### All of debate operates on the level of affect – speaking activities can only function through affective persuasion. Foregoing this analysis means erasing the very existence of debate itself. Your ballot is not a referendum on the fiated plan but rather its affective impact derived from its presentation

#### This solves their theory arguments – it’s predictable and fair

#### We can lose framework and still win this debate – just evaluate the K as an impact turn

#### we have a technocracy disad to their interpretation – their understanding of fiat reduces the political field to one of rationality. Positing that winning cost/benefit analysis is the condition for plan passage flattens all consideration of emotion, persuasion, bias and the autonomy of affect. This prioritization of reason causes a demonization of the socius as a group of biased and emotive individuals who refuse to base opinions of reason. This induces a valorization of expertism, institutions and technocratic solutions to warming for they arise as the embodiment of what Nietzsche describes as the Cartesian king – a disembodied mass fronting pure reason. This tethers agency to institutions whilst legitimating the erasure of public deliberation for individuals are viewed as a plague of irrationality. This is uniquely true in context of the affirmative for their globalization project seeks to create a model of engagement for individuals to follow which alienates the actions of each member from internal desire – thereby mass producing subjects who maintain no interest in the movement and drop like flies.

#### Specifically, this causes a retreat back into debate instead of turning outward for it is the only space that exists through erasing the sticky web of social relations in favor of a tabula-rasa ethos of reason.

### AT – Fairness

It’s predictable – you wrote an aff about climate leadership – you should be able to defend against Ks of imperialism

Ks are key to level the playing field with teams without resources to constantly cut politics updates

This is a k of your impacts – if you can’t defend them you should probably lose

### 2NR – Spanos

#### this debate round should be a site of contestation of micro-political strategies

#### Next – on their framework offense – being-in-the-world determines how we engage in things like debate which means our interp turns theirs – [this was conceded in the 1ar which means there’s no way they can win the framework debate]

lbl

#### Next, Spanos – Debate has been collapsing since Vietnam - the assumptions we make in debate rest on a false view of the world that turn us into bureaucrats who don’t care about real problems – that turns all their policymaking standards – this also manifests itself in a managerialism of difference which evolves into things like the striking of all black judges deemed “not productive” for good policy debate.

#### Additionally, this card explains that they functionally have to win the K to go for framework – if we win that their worldview is bad, then it doesn’t matter whether their viewpoint is fair/educational because they’ll keep doing it in rounds and bring it into the outside world – [double bind: either debate doesn’t shape subjectivity and they can’t access their policymaking impacts or debate does shape subjectivity and even if they become policymakers they’ll do bad things like this 1ac in the real world]

# k – colebrook

## vs carbon tax

### notes

super brief explanation of the link

conception of nature – by viewing the environment as a sort of commodity that can be controlled (i.e. the ability + necessity for humans to shape nature so it is in ideal condition to benefit humanity) they just reassert human dominance over nature rather than viewing it as something that we exist as a part of – carbon tax in specific – by putting an economic price on carbon by viewing it as something that needs to be fixed to create a perfect sustainable market without unfairness/subsidies

use of policy tools – by formulating/imagining an alternative world wherein emissions are stabilized/etc, they reaffirm humanities ability to shape the world and nature

### 1nc – k

#### The spectre of the climate disaster functions as a new zone of investment in which humanity can legitimize itself as in a perfectly cohesive image. Reflecting a divine will to will, the affirmative reasserts the unity of being in a reactionary attempt to ward off contingency, ultimately resulting in endless foddering and chatter by masses of indifference

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 59-72

Questions, today, of climate and climate ethics—and even concerns regarding the sustainability and viability of this life of ours on earth— appear to present a new imaginary for political questions. One might say that it was only in the late twentieth century, with events such as the picturing of the earth from space, the possibility of nuclear annihilation of earthly life or the increasing speeds of new media allowing for the possibility of global audiences (such as the entire world viewing 9/11), that something like the problem of a global ethos would emerge. If there had always been a silent presupposed ‘we’1 in any ethical theory, then this virtual universalism would always struggle alongside moral valorizations of specified communities.2 How do we, from the particular world we inhabit, begin to think of life as such? It is the present sense of the planet as a whole, as a fragile bounded globe that might present us, finally, with the opportunity and imperative to think a genuine ethos. Now that we have a notion of climate that seems to break with the etymology of this specific inclination or latitude of the earth, and does so by gesturing to something like a sense of the earth as a region or inclination in itself, this might open a new imaginary of the globe. We might think of ethos as no longer bound to a territory within the planet; instead there might be the ethos of this globe of our own, that has no other region against which we might define ourselves or towards which we might direct our fantasies of another future. If there is something like climate change, perhaps it takes this form: not only a mutation of this climate (warming, depleting, becoming more volatile) but an alteration of what we take climate to be. One might want to suggest that as long as we think of climate in its traditional sense—as our specific milieu—we will perhaps lose sight of climate change, or the degree to which human life is now implicated in timelines and rhythms beyond that of its own borders. The figure of the globe appears to offer two ethical trajectories: on the one hand an attention to global interconnections and networks would expand responsibility and awareness beyond the figure of the isolated moral subject. Ethics may have to be considered beyond discursive, human and political modes (especially if one defines politics as the practice of a polity). On the other hand, the figure of the globe—considered as a figure—is intertwined with a tropology of interconnectedness, renewal, cyclic causality and organicism. This traditionally theological series of motifs, with the globe’s circularity reflecting a divine intentionality, is maintained today in many of the most profound and seemingly secular ecological theses, including the Gaia hypothesis and the global brain. It is the possibility of extinction or the end of human time that forces us to confront a new sense of the globe: far from being an unfortunate event that accidentally befalls the earth and humanity, the thought of the end of the anthropocene era is both at the heart of all the motifs of ecological ethics and the one idea that cannot be thought as long as the globe is considered in terms of its traditional and anthropocentric metaphors. The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagination to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exotically untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s environmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bodies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multitude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers (Hardt and Negri 2004). Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with a cognitive ~~paralysis~~ [inability] to think of any future that would not be one more chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term thinking; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corporations, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imaginary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring and unified. Perhaps—given the advent of globalism as a concrete event where there can now be no time, place or body that can live outside a certain destructive force field of events (such as the possibility of viral, political, economic and climactic terrors)—now is the time to think non-globally. The usual figures of the bounded earth, the ideally-self-balancing cosmos, the interconnectedness of this great organic home of ‘ours’ are modes of narrative self-enclosure that have shielded us from confronting the forces of the present. It is not surprising that ‘globalism’ is at once a term of mourning, signaling a world economy and politics that has taken every space and timeline into its calculative, cynical and rigid systematic maw at the same time as it signals a redemptive potential. We are, so various environmental and ecological imperatives remind us, always interconnected across and through this one living globe, this living world that environs us. The maxim, ‘act locally, think globally,’ should be reversed: there can be no encompassing global thought, for insofar as we think we are fragmented by various locales, figures, lexicons, disciplines and desire, but we nevertheless are caught up in a globe of action where no intent or prediction will be enough to secure or predict the outcome of any action. It was the great contribution of Lacanian psychoanalysis to point out that the visual figural unity of the human body—the bounded organism we see in the mirror—serves as a captivating lure that precludes us from confronting that ex-centric predicament of the speaking subject whose desire is never given in a living present but is articulated and dispersed in a time that is never that of a self-comprehending and self-affecting whole. Just as the spatial unity of the human body covers over the temporal dispersion of the speaking and desiring subject, so the delimited material object of the planet enables a misrecognition of the multiple systems, forces, timelines, planes and feedback loops that traverse what we imagine to be the single object of the globe. The advent of globalism— or the intensification of the world’s various modes of systemic interconnectedness and hyper-volatility—should, if anything, have prompted a destruction of the figure of the globe. And yet the opposite appears to be the case: even in the genre that is apparently most devoted to global catastrophe—the disaster movie—the globe is strangely reinforced and consolidated. A typical instance is Independence Day of 1996, in which an invasion of earth is initially viewed from the contained space of a US government control room, as though we will be able to have advance vision of ‘our’ end and limit from the point of view of a single screen and panel of experts. Perhaps today we might note that it is the physical image of the globe that serves as a reaction formation, precluding a thought of the consequences of globalism (if globalism remains the correct term for the increasingly evident and non-human complexities that are precluding any possibility of a global or comprehensive vision). If capitalism could once have been thought of as ‘a’ power imposed upon the globe then this is no longer the case. As the recent economic crises demonstrated capitalism is not a system, cannot be attributed to a body of interests, and is less a transcendent structure imposed upon organic life than it is just one of the many ways in which local, ill-considered, barely intentional forces of consumption and acquisition exceed the comprehension of any body (be that a physical, political, national or economic body). Marxist theory’s attempt to locate capitalism within history and within a theory of interests can be compared to a whole series of localizations and narrative therapies. Popular culture has for decades been giving a face and/or body to a series of diffuse and essentially ‘unglobable’ threats. Despite a series of calls for thinking in terms of distributed, de-centered and dispersed cognition, where we acknowledge that institutions, cultures and even organisms are not governed by a central organizing brain, the political imaginary remains wedded to organic figures. Popular culture has presented viral invasion more often than not in terms of an isolable and intruding body: conquering such threats can then be placed in a standard narrative of good and evil, self and other. Terrorism, too, is given a specific face in media culture (either the named Osama Bin Laden or an ethnically specified other). But it is not only popular culture that has been unable to confront a temporality and politics that is no longer that of contesting agents waging a war for the sake of a determined end. Lamenting the fall of modernity into a bio-politics that manages populations according to a general and quantifiable ‘life,’ Giorgio Agamben argues that it will be possible to arrive again at a genuine politics only by considering what Foucault failed to confront: the problem of sovereignty in modernity (Agamben 1998). That is, whereas Foucault was critical of the sovereign model of power, or power as an external and imposed body, Agamben’s critical concept of bio-politics wants to resist a modernity of diffused or capillary power, focusing again on how power establishes itself as a body. Agamben refuses the notion of the political and the polity as a universal or a given; the polity is constituted in and through human potentiality’s realization that it lacks any determined end. For Agamben, what needs to be recalled is the genesis or emergence of the political fold, the opening of something like a political space that then enables a distinction between that which is interior and that which is exterior to the polity. What counts as political is, for Agamben, itself not a political decision, and this is because ‘the polity’ or the opening of a space of what will become ‘our’ concern is an event, and one to which genuine thinking ought to (constantly) return. Today’s losses of commonality, or the absence of something like a global community, should prompt us to address that the global community or horizon is neither given nor guaranteed, but is nevertheless urgently required if we are not to lose sight altogether of our potentiality to be political, to open a political space. What bio-politics and its terrors force us to acknowledge is that our defining potentiality—for speaking together and opening up a political space— discloses itself most fully when it is not actualized. For bio-politics, too, bears the same double valence as globalism. It is precisely in the era of the bio-political, when all decisions regarding what we ought to do are grounded on maximizations of life that the passage from life to polity, and the political constitution of what counts as political life is forgotten. It is Auschwitz, modern hedonism, and the bio-political absence of a genuine political space of speech and decision that evidences the true nature of politics. Politics occurs not when bodies located in a world then decide to speak together, for politics is—through the event of speaking—the opening out of a world. Here, then, in this confrontation with a modern bio-politics that is criticized and lamented for being insufficiently political—insufficiently oriented to the opening and manifestation of a political space—Agamben gives the contemporary term ‘bio-politics’ a force that relates directly to the imaginary hyper-investment in the globe. Agamben, unlike the Foucault whom he criticizes for not confronting the relation between bare life and sovereignty, regards bio-politics in its various forms—both totalitarian managements of populations and democratic aims to increase a society’s happiness—as a loss of the political. As long as politics is focused on bare life, or the calculation of a living substance we will have retreated from the question of the potentiality of the political: man is not born as a political animal but becomes one, and he does so by creating a political space through speaking, opening up a world that is always his world. The Greek distinction between bios (or a life that is formed, bounded and oriented to what man might make of himself) and zoe (or mere bare life that, in modernity, becomes so much disposable waste and that increasingly becomes the subject of politics) is, for Agamben a difference that needs to be re-thought and re-inscribed. It is bios—created, formed, bounded, delimited life—that has been lost and that entails a loss of the political. How does this relate to globalism? Both Agamben’s critique of biopolitics and the reaction against globalism express a traditional and theological mourning for a loss of form. Globalism’s evils follow from its ravaging disrespect for limits and difference, its tendency to consume all previously distinct and specified nations and cultures into one vast calculative system without definition or limit. Not surprisingly the response to both globalism (seen as an inhuman, mindless and unbounded system) and to biopolitics (seen as a loss of the self-defining polity) has been the reaffirmation of the figure of the globe or bounded form. Agamben, for example, posits a series of positive manoeuvres that would ameliorate the biopolitical ravaging of the man of poiesis; these include a return to the active creation of man as a political living form as bios rather than zoe, as a being whose political nature has little or nothing to do with his mere life but requires creation. Not surprisingly, then, Agamben also wishes to retrieve a more authentic aesthetic encounter, where art is not passive spectatorship of an artist’s private invention but an opening out or disclosure of a created world. Here, art as poiesis or putting into distinct form would not be disengaged from collective praxis. Hardt and Negri, reacting more explicitly to a globalism that has precluded any active and intentional formation of a polity, call for the creation of a single, self-producing, self-aware and self-referring open whole of humanity: a single, continually re-productive body of man: In addition to envisioning revolution in ethical and political terms, we also conceive of it in terms of deep anthropological modification: of metissage and continuous hybridization of populations, of biopolitical metamorphosis. The first terrain of struggle is, from this point of view, the universal right to move, work and learn over the entire surface of the globe. Thus revolution, as we see it, is not only within Empire but also through Empire. It is not something which is fought against some implausible Winter Palace, but something which extends against all the central and peripheral structures of power, in order to empty them and subtract the capacity of production from capital. (Negri, Hardt and Zolo 27) We can pause here to note that what underpins Agamben’s call for a new politics and Hardt and Negri’s manifesto for a self-productive multitude is a figural globalism that is a variant of a traditional and theological organicism. That is, the figure of the globe—the ideally bounded sphere in which each point is in accord with the whole, and in which the whole is a dynamic and self-maintaining unity—harbours an axiology that privileges bios over zoe. What must be asserted as dominant and proper is a whole or bounded form that has no external or transcendent principle, no ordering that is given from without or that would elevate one point or term above another. Literal globalism, perceived as humanity’s alienation from itself and its earth through dead technical systems (such as the market, mechanization, computerization and speculation), is to be cured by figural globalism. Life as zoe, the mere life that lives on without a sense of itself, without a world and without form, is to be combated by life as bios: a properly political life of self-formation and speaking in common. Politics ought to be of, by and for the polity: thus, the call to immanence, whereby a body is not deflected by any power other than that of its own making is yet one more refusal to consider the predicament of a palpably non-sovereign power. Recall that for Agamben Foucault failed to consider the relationship between biopolitics and sovereign power, between power as instituted law that creates the border between law and non-law, or between governable life and the merely living. For Agamben the problem with biopolitics is that it is insufficiently directed towards bios: both totalitarian governments and democracies focus on well-being and happiness rather than confronting the problem that mere life does not proceed without some sort of gap or decision towards its proper world and end. If one were to recall the Greek attention to bios, or formed life, one might be able to retrieve something of the proper political potentiality that is covered over in modernity. Foucault, however, suggests an opposite path. The problem with biopolitics is not its inattention to bios or self-making but, rather, its maintenance of organic—or what I will refer to here as ‘global’—thinking. One could be misled by reading Foucault’s corpus backwards, concluding that his final thoughts on Greek and Hellenistic arts of the self would be the natural consequence of a theorization of biopolitics, leading to a retrieval of a poetics of the subject. But there are other possibilities indicated in his earliest criticisms of the concept of life. The problem with this concept, or more accurately this problem, is that its manner of folding an inside from an outside, or of producing a relation through which something like knowledge is possible, is—to use a Deleuzian term—its reactive reterritorializing quality. It is the concept of life as such, the life from which bounded beings emerge and against which they maintain themselves, that leads to a certain structure of ethics. Man becomes that being who is nothing more than a reflective structure, a being whose only law is that of giving a law to himself. The three concepts analyzed by Foucault that constitute the modern empirical-transcendental episteme are life, labour and language. It is because there is something in general called ‘life’ as a process of striving, self-production and self-maintenance that language and labor become the means through which man creates himself as an historical being. On the one hand Foucault suggests that this is in quite a specific sense the consequence of a refigured globe: the pre-modern space of knowledge had distributed beings in relations of analogy, such that the universal order of things was reflected in each living being. In classicism this book of nature, or experience of the earth as possessing its own sense that could be unfolded in various ways in each living form, gives way to an order that appears in representation and tabulation. Man, in classical thought, is not yet that being produced through the act of speech and labour that forms him in relation to a life in general that is only known after the event of its formation. In modernity the globe is no longer the book of nature or scene of readable order, becoming a site of ‘life’ that is now known as the enigmatic progression through which organisms and systems emerge: life is a process that can be read after the event of its ongoing acts of formation. Critically, then, this would suggest that with the politics of life itself something of the globe is lost or occluded. And this, indeed, is how ecological and anti-globalist theory understands both biopolitics and globalism more generally. What is lost is any sense of the earth as a living whole, as bearing a life and temporality of its own, within which human beings are located and towards which they ought to pay due respect and care. Yet despite the sense that globalism as a political event has erased all traditional and enchanted senses of the globe as a living whole that harbors its own order, the appeals to the figure and normativity of englobed life have become more intense than ever. If Agamben seeks to retrieve a sense of the world as that which man gives himself through speaking in common, and if Hardt and Negri aim to catalyze the self-expressing multitude, then they do so in thorough accord with a tradition and spirit of the self-evident beauty and worth of the organic globe. First, we can note the theological nature of this figure of the self-referring, self-creating living form that has no end or determination outside its own existence.3 Not only is this how the Christian God of monotheism was defined (as a potentiality that has no essence other being in pure act, never deflected from pure self-forming), it is also the case that theological poetics used the figure of the bounded sphere to express a divine intentionality of perfect accord, balance and (most importantly) self-reference. Such a form has its own temporality which is at once linear, organic and circular; it is a time of increasing creation and fruition, in which beings arrive at their proper form and in which the end concludes and discloses the reason of the whole. As an example we can think of Milton’s frequent references to the pendant world or balanced globe, contrasted with the boundless, formless and time-deprived chaos. The divine meets the human in John Donne’s frequent references to globes, circles, circumference and recovery, as though the earth’s form is that of the soul: Then, soul, to thy first pitch work up again; Know that all lines which circles do contain. For once that they the centre touch, do touch Twice the circumference, and be thou such (Donne 2000, 229). Second, this divine, organic and perfectly bounded form of immanent self reference can take the form of philosophy itself: that activity through which human reason refers back to, and redeems, itself by circling back and recognizing its own constitutive conditions. One could include here Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, Hegel’s philosophy of absolute self-reference, and more recent and supposedly scientific claims for ‘human’ understanding, such as Robert Wright’s recent claim that the monotheistic figure of God will, organically, evolve to become nothing more than that of human nature understanding itself as the origin of all the figures to which it was once enslaved (2010). Third, and finally, when current ecological theorists continue to refer to the environment—as that which environs or encloses—or call for a due reverence to an earth that bears its own balance and self-ordering, it is once again a figure of bounded form or bios that is maintained against a life that would be a force without sense of itself, a time without disclosure of fruition. The problem with this anti-globalization global tropology is twofold. First, it is inefficacious when one considers the nature of modern power. The twenty-first century is marked by an intensification of diffuse and destructive forces. The cold war and its threat of nuclear annihilation had already troubled the motif of life as a war of interests among bodies, for it was clearly possible that the trajectory of man for survival and dominance was the same path that would lead to his disappearance. The subsequent wave of annihilation threats, from the AIDS awareness of the 1980s, followed by increasing anxieties about global warming, food shortages, viral panics (SARS, bird flu, swine flu), terrorist organizations that no longer concerned themselves with a worldly survival, and then economic crises that exposed an absence of any centered or commanding viewpoint: all these serve to show that the image of the globe, of an interconnected whole, is a lure and an alibi. We have perhaps always lived in a time of divergent, disrupted and diffuse systems of forces, in which the role of human decisions and perceptions is a contributing factor at best. Far from being resolved by returning to the figure of the bounded globe or subject of bios rather than zoe, all those features that one might wish to criticize in the bio-political global era can only be confronted by a nonglobal temporality and counter-ethics. Second, it follows that far from being an ecological figure that will save us from the ravages of globalism, subjectivism and bio-politics, it is the image of the globe that lies at the center of an anthropocentric imaginary that is intrinsically suicidal. Of course, extinction and annihilation lie at the heart of all life. But accelerated and self-witnessing extinction can only be achieved by a global animal, a ‘man’ whose desire for survival and mastery is so frenzied that he consumes his own milieu. And he does so because his milieu is a globe. If, as recent ‘returns’ to phenomenology insist, the thinking and living being always has a world, and if that world is always a world of meaning—defined in terms of potentialities and the organism’s timeline—then we are truly global. We are bounded by our own living form, with a world of our own folded around our sensory- motor apparatus (Thomson 2007). But does not the phenomenon of a violent, life-annihilating and globe-destroying globalism present us with another possibility? Perhaps what we need is a zoopolitics: not a lament for the ways in which politics has taken hold of human populations as mere life, but a critique of the ways in which political thinking remains human all too human—repressing the utter contingency of life by insisting on the meaning and form of bios. Rather than criticize biopolitical modernity for rendering mere life as formless, calculative, and void of meaning and mindful creativity, we should cast both bios and zoe on the side of figural lures, and strive to think beyond all forms of life. Neither the mere life of animality nor the formed life of political man, our attention would be better directed to a multiple and divergent network of times and matters. That is, bio-politics ought to be criticized not for seizing upon bare or mere life—not for forgetting the human forming power that enables politics, not for regarding man as bios rather than zoe. Rather, the biopolitics that is hysterically and morally regarded as destructive of well-bounded life would still be captured by bios, by the good form of self-producing man and would be better directed towards forces beyond the human, beyond the organism and beyond the globe. The globe or earth as the planet that was blessed with the contingency of life, including the human species whose global imagination has done so much to create destructive systems beyond its own power and comprehension, cannot be saved. Insofar as it is imagined as a globe or living whole with its own order and proper potentiality that might be restored, the earth will continue to be sacrificed to the ~~blindness~~ [ignorance] of an organic thinking that can only insist upon its own self-evident value. One final feature of globalism that needs to be noted, and that might suggest a new counter-global temporality is that of information. There is no public sphere, no bordered polis in which circulating data may be reflected upon, and incorporated; there is no transcendental and procedural ideal of consensus that would emerge as an aspect of an all encompassing life-world. According to Habermas, and other theorists of discourse theory, insofar as one speaks or even insofar as one claims to know, an intersubjective claim is presupposed (Habermas 1991, 378); it would be a performative contradiction to say something that one did not also claim to be true (Apel 2001, 47). Insofar as one speaks one is already with an ideal domain of recognition that is procedurally, if not actually, intersubjective and global. But the actual fact of globalism destroys global inclusion, consensus and recognition. There is a glut of speech and a deficit of both recognition and the demand for recognition. The more global citizens seek and demand inclusion the less attention and media space becomes available: every tweet, blog, Facebook post and text message places more and more pressure on the bloated domain of available consumable information. Individual speech acts are not fragments of one grand communicating globe; rather, the excess of production is utterly destructive of any possibility of (even ideal) reception. Indeed, it is the surfeit of information, especially information regarding the limits of the globe (such as data about global warming, resource depletion, new speeds of viral mutation, terrorist cells without traceable command centers) that requires a micro-politics (if that term could be freed from the notion of a polis) and demands some mode of schizo-analysis. The latter would refer to a tracking of splits in forces, of divergent systems and incongruous fields. One may never free oneself from the figure of the globe, or even the globe as the notion of figure—the notion that ‘we’ give a world to ourselves through our own recuperating imagination. But if the present has the capacity to teach us anything it may be this: only a shattering of the globe, with an attention to forces that resist recuperation, incorporation and comprehension—forces that operate beyond intentionality and synthesis— only this radical destruction can save us from ourselves.

#### Attaching political will to shaping the environment exactly to their liking using subsidy cuts only re-entrenches human mastery, violently trying to quell excess – this ensures the failure of their planetary project

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PART II: MIMESIS AND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE WORLD AS SACRIFICIAL STANDING RESERVE. Generalized imitation has the power to create worlds that are perfectly disconnected from reality: at once orderly, stable, and totally illusory. (Dupuy 2011: 209) In order to navigate the creative and destructive mechanism of mimesis, I argue that it is first necessary to distinguish between mimetic projects that attempt to create new worlds regardless of the rest of the natural world and those that are grounded in planetary systems. Obviously, the opening quote of this section suggests that mimesis in our meaning-making practices has the capacity to create orderly but illusory worlds. This, I would argue, is the mimetic function of something like the truth regime of the global mobiles outlined above. Of course, such mimetic processes—ones that ignore the evolving planetary context—ultimately create a lot of violence toward the rest of the natural world because the world becomes standing reserve, separated out from moral concern as that which is used in the project to re-create the orderly world of contemporary globalized capitalism. One can also see this type of mimesis at work in (abstract) foundations of gender and sexuality roles that are defined as “normal” (usually as heteronormative), and into which our bodies are forced. These types of mimesis force life into specific channels. To some extent, religions have played a large role in this process as well. However, religion ought not to be seen only in a negative light. Religions and philosophies also reveal the mimetic structure of our very imaginings as grounded in evolutionary mimetic structures, and part of ecological healing is the re-cognition of such groundings. Refusal of our Mimetic Entanglement How did we begin to refuse our embeddedness in larger cosmic and evolutionary mimetic structures? When did humans begin to regard humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world? This is, of course, a question that obviously cannot be answered; but some wagers can be made. Rather than lay the blame of domination on sexism, racism, anthropocentrism, or any other isms as the critical theories that I am in debt to tend to do, I would lay it on an emergent transition resulting from the space of mimetic excess. My reasons for this are that if one travels down the rabbit hole of searching for the ultimate source of the logic of domination that leads to all isms, then one has already committed him/herself to the idea that humans are (at least from that point on) really separate from the rest of the natural world. Not to mention one is already then committed to laying blame for oppressions onto a scapegoat: patriarchy, heterosexism, speciesism, or racism. In order to re-read humans as always and already a part of the natural world, I follow an idea put forth by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2007). Bruce Martin sums up their insight well. He writes: Human reason ‘degenerated’ as it imitated the nature it came to dominate; in so doing it created a vicious, lifeless circle of domination perpetuated by a ‘rational’ society that has come to dominate the individual as much as ‘nature’ ever did. (Martin 2011: 116) In other words, we could attribute our forward looking and deliberating brains that emerged from the rest of the evolutionary process and more specifically out of lines of hominids, to the location of our eyes in front of our skulls, our ears on the side of our heads that give us honing abilities, and our upright posture that made it easier for our ancestors to hunt. Such features orient us toward critically examining the evidence and making decisions toward and about things that are not immediately present or in the distance. These features, along with our opposable thumbs, set us up eventually in a fairly dominant position vis-à-vis other animals and species on the planet. These moments of mimetic excess or spaces of creative emergence eventually lead to hominization. As Girard notes, “We can conceive of hominization as a series of steps that allow for the domestication of progressively increasing and intense mimetic effects, separated from one another by crises that would be catastrophes but also generative in that they would trigger the founding mechanism and at each step provide for more rigorous prohibition within the group, and for a more ritual canalization toward the outside” (1987: 96).6 In other words, at each emergent level, an inside/outside is created that marks sameness off from that which is other. The patterns of sameness that led to success would be mimicked—as any useful evolutionary adaptation is—and over time the genetic lines that survived would see differences in brain structures that lead to something like critical reflection. Far from being intentional, such a “dominating” position is an emergent phenomenon from the spaces of mimetic excess when our species began taking advantage of emergent possibilities (rather than necessarily falling into the same patterns of the past). Eventually, reason becomes the key in human success and in the domination over other humans and the rest of the natural world. The repetition of such narratives of dominations has led to the “isms” of our species rather than any sort of inherent capacities or tendencies, and it is this type of narrative that has led to the refusal of our mimetic embeddedness and to the type of human exceptionalism that we are so familiar with and critical of. This desire for control makes sense in an evolutionary context in which hominids and Homo sapiens have largely been at the whim of a nature “red in tooth and claw.” At a time before modern technologies, mastery of nature would be an essential component of survival. Humans would be the victims of a nature that was uncaring and unkind. Nature then becomes the ultimate victim and scapegoat that the logic of mastery then sacrifices. As Girard notes: The accusation makes the victim responsible for the disorder and catastrophe, in other words for the crisis, that afflicts the community. … [The mistreatment of the victim] is an aggressive reaction against a victim that would not be killed if it were not held responsible for the mimetic crisis. (1987: 38) One important point that helps to argue for something like nature as victim in the ways in which I am arguing here is the writings of Francis Bacon and other authors of the early scientific method and scientific revolution. There is no clear reason as to why natural science had to understand nature as dead matter, religion as somehow subjective opinion, and science as an objective adventure. Philosophical and other literary works such as Bacon's New Atlantis had to teach people that science would replace the church, that it was okay to experiment on other animals, and that this would lead to human progress (Merchant 1980). What some have termed “literary lynchings” and “literary sacrifices” had to prepare the euro-western imagination for treating nature as if it were merely standing reserve and for creating the human logic of domination.7 Though the contemporary logic of domination has long forgotten its founding myth, the religious, philosophical, and scientific attempts to make humans exceptional all participate in this story. This recognition can help us to argue for and re-inscribe our continuity with the rest of the natural world in ways that might open our meaning-making practices up toward planetary concerns. If we understand our whole thought process as dependent upon mimetic structures and processes found in the rest of the natural world, then we can begin to see even our meaning-making practices as emerging out of and addressing these types of structures. As Girard notes, “Order in human culture certainly does arise from an extreme of disorder, for such disorder is the disappearance of any and all contested objects in the midst of conflict, and it is at such a point that acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis and tends toward the unification of conflict against an adversary” (1987: 28–29). Just as order seems to emerge out of chaos in other biological systems, so too in our cultural and religious systems; and, Girard argues, these moments of mimetic frenzy require some type of scapegoat, ritual, or expulsion of adversary if order is to be restored (1987: 30). However, there is in much of Girardian thought too much fear of chaos, hybridity, and disorder. Such a fear, or at least a desire to project order onto disorder where no real order exists, is actually part of the problem of a projective form of mimesis that leads to more and more disorder (or so I am arguing). In other words, perhaps mimetic identification with the rest of the natural world could provide an alternative way in which we can appreciate our difference and recognize our continuity without the need for continuing mass ecological destruction in the name of the enforced (dis)order of human exceptionalism. From this understanding, religions and philosophies have captured within their meaning-making structures certain truths expressed in the form of human thinking that can be found in other systems of the rest of the natural world: the balance between chaos and order, the sacrifice necessary for life to continue, and the inherent impossibility of any ultimate order or peace in the worlds that we currently inhabit. As Eric Schneider, Dorion Sagan, and other scientists that discuss non-equilibrium thermodynamics argue, equilibrium—or in this case ultimate order and peace—means death (Schneider and Sagan 2006). Perhaps this last insight is the reason that humans strive for some sort of transcendent resolution: every part of our being cries out against the seeming injustice of predator–prey, creative–destructive cycles, so our reason forces us to produce some sort of order that we just have not arrived at yet, in the case of religions, or imposes a logic of order on the entire planet, in the case of sciences. In any event, this type of understanding could help us understand our current planetary crises in a way that is in continuity with the ongoing creative–destructive processes of the planet. \*\*\*\*\*\*The Earth as Sacrificial Standing Reserve: The Logic of Domination One thing I find promising about the mechanism of mimesis as Girard understands it is that it has the potential to help re-write human thinking, including religious imaginings and scientific logic and reasoning, into the rest of the evolving planetary community, even if Girard himself did not imagine such a re-writing. If our human thinking operates according to mimetic structures, then they are in continuity with other repetitive cycles and systems in the cosmos and planet—as I argued above. In particular, I think that Girard's discussion of mimetic crisis has something to offer in terms of thinking about our current, global ecological problems. Girard argues that paroxysm is the result of certain points of conflictual mimesis within communities (1987: 26). At some points in human histories, the energy of mimetic excess must be released in moments of violence or breakdown. The repetitions of roles—defined in terms of gender, sex, sexuality, race, nationality, and even humanity—are always imperfect and lead to some type of remainder that is other from the repetitive role performances. This mimetic excess must be dealt with or the loss of all order and fall into chaos is risked (Girard 1987: 7). Religions, and I would argue the logic of domination found in reductive materialism, positivism, and scientism, all have ways of dealing with mimetic excess and releasing the violence that builds up. As Girard notes, “All modern ideologies are immense machines that justify and legitimate conflicts that in our time could put an end to humanity” (1987: 31). In other words, these systems must deal with mimetic excess, but they always risk violence. This is where the concept of the scapegoat comes in: as mimetic release. If, as I have argued, one of the dominant ideologies through which humans create meaning-making practices in the contemporary process of globalization relies on the logic of domination via science and technology, then perhaps the mimetic excess, the moment of paroxysm, can be understood as climate change and all the other environmental disasters we are faced with at this planetary moment. In the case of the effects of climate change especially, the human “community thinks of itself as entirely passive vis-à-vis its own victim, whereas” the rest of the natural world “appears by contrast, to be the only active and responsible agent in the matter” (Girard 1987: 27). We have now become victims of the excess of our own desire to impose order on the world. The logic of domination that imposes human desires and values upon the rest of the natural world and sets it up as standing reserve for humans returns in the form of climate change, huge storms, cancers, droughts, heat waves, and other acts of “nature” or “God” over which we poor humans have no control. In this case, the evolutionary fear of nature, leading to the imposition of order through repetition of the place of humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world, is creating terror, disorder, and chaos that are rising to a planetary frenzy.8 This mimetic excess, this abject remainder is the space of chaos and complexity, of creativity and destruction; but this excess demands some sort of recognition at threat of even greater destruction and chaos. Current rituals of scapegoating and release of this mimetic excess, in my opinion, only lead to projections of repressed mimesis. That is, “where the self as subject is projected onto the external world. The result is often fear of the other and subsequent attempts to master or dominate it” (Martin 2011: 120). In this case, “reversal of domination requires ‘mimetic identification’—that is internalization of the external that honors the particularity or individuality of the other” (Martin 2011: 120). We need new rituals and ways of thinking that help us to leave open spaces for mimetic excess, for the abject, and for creative emergence of possibilities toward planetary alternatives. I end this article with some ideas of what that might look like. Previous Section Next Section PART III: TRANSHUMANITY AND THE PLANETARY FUTURE: MIMETIC EXCESS, ABJECTION, AND SITES OF TRANSFORMATION Only the damming of mimetic forces by means of the prohibition and the diversion of these forces in the direction of ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the reconciliatory effect of the surrogate victim. … The Sacred is Violence. (Girard 1987: 32) The seemingly simple insight that Girard articulates here, that the sacred is violence, is a hard pill to swallow for many contemporary minds. The idea that the ground of being, that god or ultimate reality is somehow supposed to be peace, harmony, or some type of wholeness, may be the very idea that leads to much ecological and human violence today. We seek in our repetitions of actions and roles to enforce some type of order and balance upon the world that just does not exist. This desire to enforce equilibrium on the planet is actually wreaking havoc on humans and the rest of the planetary community. What if we begin our meaning-making practices from a space that suggests we are always already mixed up in a creative–destructive process of planetary becoming and that there is no ultimate explanation, end, or goal toward which all life can be conformed. This is what I have articulated elsewhere as a viable agnostic, planetary theology (Bauman 2009, 2014). Here I articulate three components of our meaning-making practices that might help us create points of mimetic identification with the abject: human thinking as “lines of flight,” thinking toward the trans-human, and planetary ethics of the “not yet.”

#### Stabilization of emissions relegates solutions to the climate crisis into an unproven technocratic frame reliant on an impossible fantasy of homeostasis. This religious ideal of resiliency must be questioned ethically rather than technically

Boykoff et al 10 – Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, Colorado

(Maxwell, David Frame [Smith School for Enterprise and the Environment, Oxford], Samuel Randalls [Department of Geography, University College of London], “Discursive stability meets climate instability: A critical exploration of the concept of ‘climate stabilization’ in contemporary climate policy,” Global Environmental Change Vol. 20, pp. 53–64)

A parallel logic can be found in the work of economists. In this paper we are not specifically concerned with economic models per se, or with the differences in adaptation, impacts and mitigation analyses. We suggest that these economic analyses have broadly drawn from and supported climate stabilization discourses, usually as a heuristic that might guide decision-making. Within the framework outlined above, economists have attempted to identify an optimal and efficient approach that could give rise to a climate policy that was focused as much on a cost-effective stabilization target as reducing emissions to cause least harm. The economist William Nordhaus in 1977, for example, started to develop this now very familiar mode of reasoning in 1977. Using a highly simplified, heuristic model of the climate, and assuming a doubling of CO2 concentration as a reasonable upper limit to impose for the climatic response, Nordhaus (1977) examined the costs of controlling emissions that would meet this target. Indeed it is interesting that inasmuch as scientific work has frequently been guided by doubling concentration scenarios, so has economic work (Azar, 1998). Nordhaus explicitly made clear that the calculations were fraught with all kinds of uncertainties, but concluded that one could use a ‘best guess’ scenario since damages would be a roughly linear function of CO2 concentrations (Nordhaus, 1982).8 Bach, likewise, called for ‘‘[a] broad systems approach . . . to help define some ‘threshold’ value of CO2-induced climate change beyond which there would likely be a major disruption of the economic, social and political fabric of certain societies . . . An assessment of such a critical CO2-level ahead of time could help to define those climatic changes, which would be acceptable and those that should be averted if possible’’ (Bach, 1980, p. 4). Thus for an emerging set of economic formulations of the problem of climate change, the heuristic that would guide policy action would be one that took a fixed concentration target as a proxy for a climate target, that could then be used to analyze the costs and benefits of mitigating action to meet that target. A cost–benefit analysis of climate change would thus be possible. It is notable that this re-frames the debates from one of the costs and benefits of cutting emissions, to one that includes the costs and benefits of the resultant climate or as Oreskes et al. (2008) put it, the ‘‘carbon problem’’ becomes the ‘‘climate question.’’ Climates are to be efficiently managed. This is reflected, as they illustrate, in the Changing Climate report (National Academy, 1983) and also in the growing quantity of economic work in the early 1980s, especially as it related to energy and climate change. Boehmer-Christiansen (1994b) argues that climate policy has to be understood within changing energy politics. The late 1970s had seen rising energy prices fuelled by concerns about fossil fuel longevity of supply amidst a host of political interven- tions. A key question for energy politics in the 1980s was the declining price of fossil fuels, which questioned the role of the state in controlling energy supply/demand. Climate change offered a new means to tackle the fossil fuel industries and carbon constraints could highlight the need for nuclear solutions (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994b). From the late 1970s and early 1980s energy researchers were increasingly considering the technologies and economics of managing CO2 emissions that might significantly influence the climate. There were debates over whether climate change would become the main limiting factor for energy growth rather than peak oil scenarios (D’Arge and Kogiku, 1974; Nordhaus, 1974; Perry, 1982; Oreskes et al., 2008). Much depended upon assumptions of future resource availability and energy efficiency. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) concluded in work in 1983 that ‘‘transition to fast breeder nuclear reactors, centralized solar and coal synfuels must be made . . .’’ (as discussed by Wynne, 1984, p. 285) to establish a secure energy supply in the future. Climate change could offer an agenda for change (a lever) in the energy industry thus translating climate stabilization targets through political negotiations about energy growth and fossil fuel use (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a,b). A different example comes from a study by the German Federal Environmental Agency that examined energy efficiency, but concluded that growth could be disentangled from carbon emissions (Lovins and Lovins, 1982). Their confidence in technological developments led them to suggest that energy efficiency gains resulting in CO2 reductions would reduce the time pressure on climate scientists to find the climatic answer. Assumptions about energy demand and efficiency thus filtered into the cost analyses that would suggest which climate targets might be feasible in terms of energy costs and which stabilization targets were realistic in terms of energy growth. Climate stabilization discourse provided an interface (particularly for policy advice) between climate debates and energy debates, but the interface was increasingly vulnerable to the multiplicity of assumptions (climatic, economic and energy demand) being worked into them (see also Pielke et al., 2000). Cost–benefit analysis does not provide a simple answer to climate change, because it inherently requires value judgments about discounting, costs and uncertainties. This is particularly the case when estimating damages and adaptation costs (Demeritt and Rothman, 1999), which is why some early climate economics separated out the cost–benefits of prevention and adaptation policies (Thompson and Rayner, 1998, p. 292). Cost–benefit analysis inherits the uncertainties from the climate components, but has additional uncertainties resulting from the assumptions in the costs of mitigation pathways and impacts. But as Cohen et al. (1998) point out, the aggregation of global mean climate changes serves a technocratic agenda focused on emissions controls, an agenda whose social science the economists have most readily filled. Further, Cohen et al. (1998), using the example of the US, suggest that it is difficult to pose questions about ethics, development, aid, trade and responsibility to future generations, when the analysis is framed by balancing the economic benefits of releasing carbon versus the potential GDP costs and risks of environmental change. Or, Azar (1998, p. 312) suggests that alternative interpretations of the need to avoid dangerous climate change must be made rather than trying to solve the puzzle of the ‘‘optimal level of climate change.’’ The economic justification for climate action has therefore further embedded the approach to climate stabilization within climate policy. While this was acknowledged as a heuristic this had few repercussions, but useful heuristics can rapidly be translated into direct policy guidance. Climate stabilization was taken up in policy statements and analyses from the late 1980s as a prescriptive goal for climate policy and an aim for the campaigning of environmental non- governmental organizations (ENGOs). Partly this was borrowed from similar policy logics that had been applied to controlling ozone and nitrous oxides (Franz, 1997; Grundmann, 2006; Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005). There is also similarity with arms issues whereby one controls both the total stock of arms as well as the location of those arms (Prins and Rayner, 2007). Here we select just a few examples to illustrate the rise of climate stabilization as a policy goal (more recent examples were given in the introduction). A Dutch Ministry of Environment funded project concluded in 1988 with the need for climate stabilization, preferably at just 1 8C above pre-industrial temperatures, but certainly a maximum target of 400ppm CO2 concentration (Krause, 1988). Drawing from Irving Mintzer’s work a Common- wealth Group of Experts the following year also agreed that while there were uncertainties it was important to make substantial emission cuts to a level that would achieve ‘approximate stability’. They suggested that doubling CO2 concentrations should be postponed beyond 2075 thus restricting temperature increases in the order of 0.6–1.7 8C by 2060 on top of warming already committed to (Holdgate et al., 1989). An OECD report in 1992 also concluded with the need to identify appropriate targets for policy concluding that there were three possible science-based targets: stabilization of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at current levels; not allowing global mean temperature to rise more than 2 8C; or not allowing a rate of change faster than 0.1 8C per decade (Barrett, 1992). Indeed the report pointed out the problems of inferring emissions targets in the latter two cases given the uncertainties in extrapolating from temperature targets to emissions. Yet the latter two became the focus of discussions for the European Union (EU) and since 1996, the EU has put forward a maximum temperature target of 28C, which was originally approximated to a 550 ppm CO2e concentration target (cited in European Environment Agency, 1996). Tol (2007) amongst others has disputed this figure as being weakly supported by cost–benefit analysis, but regardless of the figures it is clear that climate stabilization is politically appealing in part because of the promise of reward for (potentially costly) actions taken now. The growing numbers of ENGOs since the 1970s, spurred on by ‘Earth Day’ in the US (Gottlieb, 1993), have assimilated these ideas into their discussions of climate change too. Partly this can be associated with a ‘quasi-religious’ ideal of stability (Kwiatkowska, 2001) that holds discursive power for engaging public and government attention to ‘save the planet’. A guiding ethos of climate stabilization is the imagined future, safe, secure, stable climate, which can be engineered by our actions now; but the flipside of this myth is that if action is not taken the future will be insecure, unsafe, and unstable.9 These equilibrium and stability myths thus share static responses and polarizing dynamics that are counterposed to an approach based upon resilience and the incorporation of surprise (Timmerman, 1986; see also Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). They reflect a project of bringing order to our existence and resonate with other environmental debates in the 1970s including that of population, not least in their demands for global management (Buttel et al., 1990; see also Sayre, 2008).10 Several examples of this polarized strategy can be highlighted. The ‘Stop Climate Chaos Coalition’ explicitly draws on an either/or approach to future climatic states in its declaration of a 2 8C threshold (climate chaos or calm—Stop Climate Chaos Coalition, 2009), while organizations such as Greenpeace have repeatedly made claims about the necessity of stabilizing global mean temperature, a figure frequently taken to be 2 8C (e.g. Kelly, 1990; see also Doyle, 2007). This is manifested directly in contemporary ENGOs such as 350.org, which is an international campaign to mitigate climate change through reducing and keeping atmo- spheric CO2 concentrations below 350 ppm. Climate stabilization has thus become an enduring myth, providing an easily graspable understanding of climate change, even though there are many questions about the framing of the problem, the accuracy of the figures and the implications for management. It has provided a ready interface between scientists, economists, policymakers and environmentalists, and it is this collective weaving that makes it so hard as a concept to disentangle from. Forsyth states that ‘‘assessments of frames should not just be limited to those that are labeled as important at present, but also seek to consider alternative framings that may not currently be considered important in political debates’’ (2003, p. 78). Con- sidered in this way, climate stabilization – as a framing concept – has focused attention for political and policy engagement in particular ways; among them are a broad focus on mitigation rather than adaptation, and on static quantification of an equilibrium response rather than more dynamic goals of decarbonizing energy systems. Our work here traces how this discourse has developed, and how it has been fixed (or stabilized) for policy aims; yet we argue that such a discourse is problematic in that it has been consistently resisted and contested by ‘unstable’ bio-physical processes. As climate stabilization has become a guiding concept for political action on climate change, it has encased policy in areas of intractable scientific uncertainty that create all kinds of problematic assumptions and prescriptions, which influence both climate science and environmental econom- ics. Climate stabilization presents a good example of how Levy et al. (2001) describe issue development and policy in accumulating stages from early simple, but rigid unscientific goals that are effective in anticipating policy, but which inevitably outlive their usefulness and are difficult to replace with more sophisticated goals because of the enduring socialization in the former. Scientists desiring action on climate change might have been concerned about any possible destabilization of the dominant framing, particularly as the reactionary discourses of vested interests opposed to decarbonization became stronger. With scientists and policymakers focused on the more immediate task of establishing the reality and (rough) magnitude of the problem, the stabilization-focused science-policy debate became an attractive approach and has guided many scientists, economists and policymakers into these modes of thinking. Tony Blair, in the quote at the start of the paper, suggests that stabilization provides a concept that has appealed to the instincts of scientists and economists. In terms of its historical genesis, however, stabilization is perhaps better conceived as a concept that emerged through an uneasy connecting of physical science, economics and policy thereby offering a framing of the question in a specific way that was amenable to these analyses. Climate stabilization became an intuitively reasonable heuristic during the 1980s because of a wide variety of intersecting intellectual heritages, a lack of alternatives, and model inadequacies. It has been valuable in that it has focused attention on diminishing negative human contributions to the changing climate; however, in so doing, it has encouraged policy to focus on considerations of long-term equilibrium targets, that may have posed comfortable predicaments for political and policy cycles, but have stymied short term action as policymakers wait for the answers that will solve all the questions about scientific, political, and economic uncertainty. Collectively, the recent 2008 UN COP14 provided numerous illustrations where climate negotiations have thus been lulled into contradictory unnerving comfort. For instance, former US Vice President Al Gore garnered rapturous applause when he ‘upped the ante’ of long-term promises by declaring ‘‘the truth is that the goals we are reaching toward are incredibly difficult, and even a goal of 450 parts per million, which seems so difficult today, is inadequate. We will soon need to toughen that goal to 350 parts per million’’ (Gore, 2008). Yet, at this meeting in Poznan, Poland, short-term agreements and actions remained a scarcity. A number of conclusions can therefore be drawn from this paper. First, we suggest that stabilization discourse has proved valuable for supporting particular scientific approaches to ‘solving’ climate change. Second, we argue that the focus on finding a scientific answer to the question of climate policy might be misplaced and that we also need a broader engagement with the ethics and politics of the science–economics hybrid of climate stabilization. Third, we posit that climate stabilization discourses may have led to unrealistic public expectations that leave open the possibility of future public and political critique. First, some research communities may actually benefit from the focus on stabilization since it gives their research agendas an apparent policy relevance that would otherwise be hard to defend. For instance, paleoclimate modeling – while valuable as a part of fundamental research programs and process understanding in geophysics, biodiversity and ecosystems research – perhaps benefits from a prominence accorded it by its claims to help constrain climate sensitivity (Hegerl et al., 2006; Schneider von Deimling et al., 2006; Crucifix, 2006) that would be hard to sustain if the global policy community were to reframe the question in terms of the relationship between 20th century attributable warming (Stott and Kettleborough, 2002) and expected 21st warming (Frame et al., 2006). Thus, from this perspective one might not expect some researchers to embrace the sort of reframing conversation we have in mind here. Scientific centres institutionalize these conceptualizations by organizing research groups to study the specific problem of the equilibrium response, such as, for example, the Climate Sensitivity group within the Hadley Centre. The establishments of groups primarily focused on climate sensitivity is a sensible response to explicit policy direction, but focus on climate sensitivity is, in turn, a response to the fact that stabilization and its attendant notions have become ‘obligatory passage points’ (Latour, 1987) in previous scientific enquiries and policy documents. The recurring and somewhat unreflectively accepted theme of climate stabilization in proposed policy frameworks is the thing that should be questioned. The levers open to today’s policymakers are primarily related to current and future sources of emissions, and very little of the infrastructure that provides those anthropogenic sources (or sinks) will be around on equilibrium response timescales. Natural sources and sinks in a new equilibrium are subject to considerable uncertainty. Thus, the policy focus needs to move from focusing on a more static quantification of the details of the equilibrium response – stabilization – to more dynamic formulations that seek to decarbonize energy systems on multi-decadal timescales. While establishing and subsequently meeting long-term climate targets may be one of a set of sufficient conditions for mitigating the worst outcomes of anthropogenic climate change, over the next several decades a much more important task is to achieve substantial decarbonization goals. Moreover, the present lack of enforcement mechanisms to curb carbon-based energy habits makes the achievement of long-term emissions reduction proposals even less likely. Second, the focus on long-term stabilization targets places scientific certainty and uncertainty at the centre of considerations of decarbonization and distinct from political perspectives. By framing action in such a way, further scientific inputs regarding links between GHG concentrations, emissions and temperature change can unearth more questions to be answered, rather than settling already existing ones (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). Therefore, greater scientific inputs actually can contribute to more complicated policy decision-making by offering up a greater supply of knowledge from which to develop and argue varying interpretations of that science (Sarewitz, 2004). The allure of the scientifically focused ‘climate stabilization’ discourses distracts attention from open political debate about the timescale, respective burdens and objectives of climate policy. Instead of posing these challenges and/or objections to particular actions as scientific ones, they can more effectively be treated as political ones (too), as well as ethical ones. Rayner notes, however, that ‘‘for good or ill, we live in an era when science is culturally privileged as the ultimate source of authority in relation to decision-making’’ (2006, p. 6); often, the focus on securing scientific certainty can effectively obstruct effective policy action (see also Oreskes, 2004). Also, as mentioned before, it contributes to dominant considerations of mitigation policies, often to the detriment of considerations for policy action on adaptation. Thus, assessments of anthropogenic climate stabilization have prema- turely foreclosed around fixed international policies on mitigation (e.g. Kyoto Protocol) and associated proposals/practices (e.g. targets and timetables, temperature rise ceiling of 2 8C and 450–550 ppm CO2 atmospheric concentration caps). Third, while the stabilization-based discourse may have been valuable in building broad policy actor and public engagement in climate mitigation, it has also fostered sub-optimal aims and unrealistic expectations. For instance, the ‘Stop Climate Chaos Coalition’ based in the UK has now involved over 11 million citizens, spanning a wide range of environmental and labour organizations as well as development charities and faith-based groups. However, their mission statement includes a call to support activities that ‘‘keep global warming below the two degrees (Celsius) danger threshold to protect people and the planet’’ (Stop Climate Chaos Coalition, 2009). While those claims-makers – barring medical science breakthroughs – will not be alive to defend their claims, there is irony in claiming intergenerational equity as the ethical requirement to stabilize the climate, when the attention remains focused on stability instead of preparing our grandchildren for new relations with their future climates (through already existing commitments to a certain amount of climate change). By critiquing stabilization we are not critiquing long-term thinking per se; we posit that this should be an open engagement rather than one tied predominantly to scientific targets and notions of stability. More- over the name Stop Climate Chaos has a strange Canute-ishness about it, as though we either could or should stand together on a beach and command, in the name of good climate governance, that change and variability cease. If climate can be stabilized in this sense, then clearly the level of DAI or stabilization target becomes an intensely political and ethical question, as the future global climates will effectively be determined by actors living in the early years of this century who design and implement such a policy (in this regard an international agreement is vital). It thus privileges and instantiates their conceptions of safe, dangerous and tolerable, silencing both current and future discontents.11 It also suggests some rational basis by which certain impacts are allowable, raising the opportunity for populations to demand either protection or compensation for a stable climate that has destabilized their livelihoods. Therefore any mitigation options pursued that aim to suck carbon out of the atmosphere cannot merely be seen as technologies to benignly stabilize the climate, but rather must be seen as active and heavily politicized interventions. Critical ethical and political dilemmas are therefore obscured within the technocratic calculability of climate stabilization policies. In this paper we have argued that the elegant attraction of ‘climate stabilization’ discourses has culminated in a focus on long- term mitigation targets and a cost-effective climate policy that does not address broader political and ethical questions about the timescale, actors and costs involved. It seems appropriate, scientifically, historically and socially, to question this discursive hegemony and open up debates on more productive and effective framings of climate policy. This paper therefore argues that while the climate stabilization discourse (and associated ways of thinking/proposing/acting) has been valuable in drawing greater attention to human influences on the global climate, it is time to explicitly move to more productive ways of considering minimizing detrimental impacts from human contributions to climate change.

#### The alternative is a restructuring of analysis away from the discourse of the anthropos in favor of the atomic explosion of the cosmic artisan

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 110-115

If the first feature of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the cosmos is that it is not cosmopolitical—for the cosmos can occur as the deterritorialization of non-human forces—the second is that (at least in this plateau) it bears a direct relation to music. But this is the case only if music is defined as the relations of qualities and differences, the power to form inflections and rhythms from which something like the human practice and culture of music emerged: The T factor, the territorializing factor, must be sought elsewhere: precisely in the becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody, in other words, in the emergence of proper qualities (color, odor, sound, silhouette…). Can this becoming, this emergence, be called Art? That would make the territory the result of art. The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark. Property, collective or individual, is derived from that even when it is in the service of war and oppression. … The expressive is primary in relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 316) There is a pre-human and pre-organic music that is generated from the differential relations among expressive qualities: the beating out of a rhythm establishes a pulse or band of time from which something like a meter might be organized. There is an articulation of sounds into tonal inflections that provides the condition for something like a scale or melody (or phonemes). Before there is something like a language— a repeatable and formalized set of relations—there must be the formation of qualities and the creation of differences. (One can think here of Freud’s example of his grandson establishing a pulsation of Fort-Da, opposing two sounds across space and time, securing a territory that then enables the forming of a body and its world.) And it is here that we can tie Deleuze and Guattari’s plateau on the refrain (where cosmos is conceptualized) with Deleuze’s idea of a differential mode of thinking. Deleuze and Guattari insist that there is an autonomy or differential power in expressive qualities. Relatively stable terms or beings are formed from pure predicates or qualities. One might say that ‘man’ as a rational animal who is defined through the speaking-seeing-eating figure of the face and voice has a political composition (for it determines relations among human bodies) but this occurs after the entering-into-relation of certain qualities. Man is an animal assembled through the speaking-seeing face (itself composed racially of skin colors), the commanding voice (again enabled through the composition of a phonematic spectrum) and the organized body (effected by bringing the hand-eye-brain complex into relation.) There is, in this respect, nothing political about the cosmos as long as we take politics to be the relations of the polity. On the contrary, the most important events are micro-political: how did this figure of political man (with the eye of judgment, voice of reason and body of labor) come to be composed from the forces of chaos? Such a determination would have been enabled by certain expressive qualities—the potentialities of sound in the voice, of light in the seeing eye, of conceptual configurations in the reasoning brain. Such qualities are synthesized and coordinated to produce the man of politics. To define the proper destiny of man to be that of a cosmo-political animal is to contain thinking within the already formed bounds of the organism. A differential politics, by contrast, approaches the cosmos as a radical deterritorialization, freeing expressive qualities from a human-all-too-human composition: For there is no imagination outside of technique. The modern figure is not the child or the lunatic, still less the artist, but the cosmic artisan: a homemade atomic bomb—it’s very simple really, it’s been proven, it’s been done. To be an artisan and no longer an artist, creator, or founder, is the only way to become cosmic, to leave the milieus and the earth behind. The invocation to the Cosmos does not at all operate as a metaphor; on the contrary, the operation is an effective one, from the moment the artist connects a material with forces of consistency or consolidation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 345) How might we think this meditation on the limits of cosmopolitanism in concrete terms? What would Deleuze and Guattari’s suggested cosmic release of matters mean, or—more accurately, since it is no longer a question of meaning or symbols—how might such deterritorialization work? Consider one of the problems of the twenty-first century: water. At once crucial to life, water is also one of the elements whose relations to human organisms and polities exposes crucial fragilities, including water borne infections, floods, drought, rising sea levels and melting ice caps. Water has, of course, been politicized. In the 2008 documentary Trouble the Water Hurricane Katrina was an event that could not simply be referred to as a natural disaster but exposed political distributions: the absence of decisions, intentions, attention and sympathy that affected a certain geographical region of America that was also, of course, a racial and sexual region. More broadly, and also in 2008, Flow: For Love of Water charted the various ways in which corporations sold, channeled, marketed, restricted and managed water sales and supplies—rendering this most basic of human elements into a key political weapon and structuring cause. Such cinematic events gesture towards a traditional cosmopolitanism, both in presenting the local plight of Katrina to a world audience as an indictment of America and in exposing certain globalizing markets (of water) to a population of general human concern. The response to such demonstrations of political mapping would be some form of cosmopolitical activism: such concerns would—as in twenty-first climate change rhetoric more generally—be those of viability, sustainability and the maintenance of humanity. How will we live on, into the future, if this most basic of elements becomes politicized, becomes a weapon or resource that is subject to plays of power among humans? Another politics of water is also possible, one that would be musical in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense (if music refers to the relations established among expressive qualities and their capacity to create forms, territories, identities and to open to the cosmos). We can begin by thinking about water’s elemental or musical qualities (its semi-autonomous power to enter into relations beyond human polities) through Roman Polanski’s Chinatown of 1974. Ostensibly a detective drama about the theft and re-channeling of water that is political in the most traditional of senses—to do with local contests and human interests—the film also allows water to become a visual quality. This is not when water is seen or made visible but when its absence or inhuman power takes over the screen: set in a heat-wave, the drama is shot through a heat haze in which the flows of human perspiration are matched with a barely discernible visual fluidity that takes the form of a slightly out of focus point of view. It is as though beyond the political plays of power something of the cosmic force of water—its resistance to human manipulation, its brutal and inhuman potentiality—threatens the person-to-person drama of the plot. Chinatown is at once about a cosmopolitics of water—about the ways in which corporate powers can take over local management and resources—at the same time as it is counter-political in its presentation of water as expressive or sensuous matter; water is not just represented as a human commodity but also takes over the formal elements of the screen, becoming an element from which the visual field is composed. A more specifically musical mode of cosmic deterritorialization occurs in the American composer Sebastian Currier’s Next Atlantis string quartet (Currier 2008).4 Here, sounds of water (which have been electronically synthesized, becoming almost melodic) are interspersed with sounds from the string quartet, which take on the quality of ‘becoming-water.’ At once the most formed and mannered of genres, the string quartet enters into relation not with the forces of the earth as territory (where water, say, is a humanized, nationalized quality) but with the cosmic force of water—its capacity to enter into variation and bear a sonic power beyond that of the polity. One might refer to such uses of the sounds of the cosmos as deterritorializing in a higher sense: the form of the work—its relations of varying sounds in dialogue—is also its matter, the work is the synthesis and forming—deforming of the elemental sound of water. Why would such an opening to the cosmos be worth anything today? Is not the urgency of twenty-first century climate change a condition of such intensity that one must manage, now, as efficiently and bureaucratically as possible the sustainability of human life? Perhaps climate change calls for the most cosmopolitical of responses: the taking hold of the world’s resources away from nation states and local polities for the sake of the viability of ongoing life. Such an imperative would, though, be in the name of the sustaining of human life, and of human life as it is already formed, already politicized and already organized. If we were to think otherwise, and if the crises of the twenty-first century were to prompt us to think at all it may be in a cosmic and inhuman mode, asking—at least beginning to ask—what the elements of this earth are, what force they bear, how we are composed in relation to those forces. If climate change politics has taught us anything to date—if it has, and if there is an ‘us’ or ‘we’ who might learn from, or be destroyed by, such events—it is that information and data directed to the maintenance of the polity has not yielded any affective response. Climate change skepticism is increasing, and this possibly because the cosmic force of destruction is now pushing beyond the political imagination, beyond our capacity to imagine ourselves and others like us in a future that will not be an extension of the present. Perhaps something other than a discursive politics among communicating individuals needs to open up to forces that are not our own, to consider the elemental and inhuman, so that it might be possible to think what life may be worthy of living on. Such an approach would require a thought of the cosmos—of life and its durations—that would be destructive of the polity, that would not return all elements and forces into what they mean for ‘us.’

### 1nc – case

#### Double Bind — either the harms are the 1ac are true and they cannot solve for their impacts before they control the levers of power which means you can vote negative on presumption OR their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which means you can vote negative on principle.

#### Their demand for a uniform rationality inculcates a violent technocratic eradication of irrationality while only recapitulating a tragic ontology of ressentiment.

Ossewaarde 10. Marinus Ossewaarde, Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Twente, “*The Tragic Turn in The Re-Imagination of Publics: Resentment and Ressentiment*,” Animus 14, 2010

For Nietzsche, the Heraclitean vision sees the truth about reality while tragedy subsequently transforms this unbearable absurdity of life into an aesthetic public, without masking the horror itself. The Socratic dialectic and its Apollonian publics intellectually involve people who are incited to search for the good in the realm of ideas, in spite of the phenomenological flux and absurdity of things. Dionysian publics do not try to check the becoming of reality, but instead, incite the participants to live it as art, by making them become part of the story itself. In Socratic dialogues, disputing friends critically question all established orders in their search for the rational or good order. Both the Dionysian and the Apollonian publics can disturb an established order and institutions. The urge to control drives bureaucracies, which, in order to effectively fix one type of reality, have to destroy all forms of publics that have the potential to upset order. In modern societies, bureaucracies impose an enlightenment model of rational order devoid of mythical content and uncertain self-knowledge, upon a reality that is thereby made fully intelligible, controllable and correctible. Nietzsche considers the European enlightenment as the modern successor to the Socratic myth-annihilation, which characterizes the Apollonian publics.8 The enlightenment movement’s confidence in the capacity of reason and its belief in the rational order of reality are Socratic in origin. However, Nietzsche suggests that the enlightenment goes steps further than Socrates in its annihilation of myth. Although Socrates ridicules and destroys the legendary tales of the tragedians, his dialogues are premised upon the myth of the Delphic oracle (which revealed that there was no one wiser than Socrates). And, although Socrates maintains that reason rather than myth is the foundation of European culture, reason, the nous, is itself a mythical entity (Nietzsche 2000: 72): the ‘voice of reason’ is the ‘divine voice’ of Socrates’ daimonion, which makes itself be heard in the dialogues (Nietzsche 2000: 75). In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, inspired by Nietzsche (c.f., Wellmer 1991: 3), maintain that the enlightenment movement postulates a vision of reason that is devoid of mythical content. Enlightenment reason, in its origin, seeks to make people think for themselves and to liberate them from their fears and superstitions, but, in the modernization process, it becomes an instrument that serves bureaucratic objectives, such as enforcing laws effectively, fixing a machine, or making a business run more efficiently.9 Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 57) emphasize that Nietzsche, like Hegel before him, had grasped this pathology of enlightenment reason that turns into a bureaucratic instrument. The reduction of the Socratic nous to an instrumental reason has far-reached political and cultural implications. Enlightenment reason provides the static concepts, mummified categories, classifications and catalogues that are required to construct bureaucratic limits and boundaries, which in turn rationally order reality (Honneth 2007: 70). Dialogical or democratic practices have no place in such a technical organization of reality. Bureaucracies, whose function is to implement the enlightenment or any other theoretical model of reality, have no need for the Socratic publics and consider dialogues and the need for intellectual justification rather troublesome and disorderly (Gouldner 1973: 76; Gardiner 2004: 35). The (potential) participants of Socratic dialogues are turned into bureaucratic subjects, like workers, consumers and clients, that is, into ‘spectators without influence’, whose lives are governed by the enlightened power elites and civil servants (Honneth 2007: 33). The identity of bureaucratic subjects is determined by typically large and powerful organizations, such as government agencies and enterprises (Mills 1956: 355). The Enlightenment movement is, in Nietzsche’s words (2000: 85), ‘the most illustrious opponent of the tragic world-view.’ Horkheimer and Adorno stress that the enlightenment movement, or perhaps more exactly, some kind of process deriving from it, eventually comes to substitute the plebeian entertainment of mass culture industries for the tragic art of the aesthetic publics. According to Nietzsche, bureaucratic subjects who live in a disenchanted world in which myths are annihilated by Apollonian reason cannot bear the horrific and absurd truth about their own existence.10 The subjects of the culture industries no longer have the opportunity to participate in enchanting tragic myths that cultivate powerful passions and the Dionysian will to live, which characterize Nietzsche’s ‘good European’. The entertainment provided by manufactured images and commodity forms, like music productions, films, television programmes and glossy magazines, ensures that the absurdity of life and the Dionysian abyss are forgotten (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007: 159).11 Being thoroughly rationalized, such subjects cannot develop the mythical imagination or a certain sensitivity that would have allowed them to ‘live the tragedy’ in and through the aesthetic publics. In a bureaucratic culture, subjects cannot experience, feel or live the tragic fate of the Dionysian hero, because, as Nietzsche (2000: 45) insists, shielded by bureaucracies, they are not ‘equipped for the most delicate and intense suffering.’ Bureaucracies expect and demand passive obedience from their subjects, which makes cultural movement nearly impossible. Such passive spectators or so-called ‘consumers of art’ (Shrum 1991: 349; 371), are, Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 155; 166) point out, deluded en masse, governed to take refuge in comfortable, boring and mindless bureaucratic forms of entertainment. Culture industries provide ready-made experiences to a passive public that is willing to buy them to fill the emptiness of a disenchanted world and appease the cowardly fear of living in the flux, which they explicitly experience in temporary relationships and the continuous flow of new products and changed consumption patterns. The experience of the flux can also be more implicit or unconscious, resulting in a sort of malaise, feeling of insecurity or restlessness. However, the escape from life into a manufactured dream-world of cultural productions does not really quench the thirst, as the Socratic dialogue and the Dionysian festival do, which, therefore, allows the culture industry to carry on with its provision of manufactured dream-worlds, to fill an emptiness that never decreases.

#### Their ecological project can only lead to a tyranny over the environment – real life sacrificed for artificial survival – kills value to life

Baudrillard 94. Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, CP ///brackets for clarity

Such a very American hallucination this ocean, this savannah, this desert, this virgin forest reconstituted in miniature, vitrified beneath their experimental bubble. In the true spirit of Disneyland's attractions, Biosphere 2 is not an experiment, but an experimental attraction. The most amazing thing is that they have reconstituted a fragment of artificial desert right in the middle of the natural desert (a bit like reconstituting Hollywood in Disneyworld). Only in this artificial desert there are neither scorpions nor Indians [[[there is nothing]]] to be exterminated; there are only extraterrestrials trained to survive in the very place where they destroyed another, far better adapted race, leaving it no chance. The whole humanist ideology - ecological, climatic, micro-cosmic and biogenetic - is summed up here, but this is of no importance. Only the sidereal, transparent form of the edifice means anything - but what? Difficult to say. As ever, absolute space inspires engineers, gives meaning to a project which has none, except the mad desire for a miniaturization of the human species, with a view perhaps to a future race and its emergence, of which we still dream. . . The artificial promiscuity of climates has its counterpart in the artificial immunity of the space: the elimination of all spontaneous generation (of germs, viruses, microbes), the automatic purification of the water, the air, the physical atmosphere (and the mental atmosphere too, purified by science). The elimination of all sexual reproduction: it is forbidden to reproduce in Biosphere 2; even contamination from life [Ie vivant] is dangerous; sexuality may spoil the experiment. Sexual difference functions only as a formal, statistical variable (the same number of women as men; if anyone drops out, a person of the same sex is substituted). Everything here is designed with a brain-like abstraction. Biosphere 2 is to Biosphere 1 (the whole of our planet and the cosmos) what the brain is to the human being in general: the synthesis in miniature of all its possible functions and operations: the desert lobe, the virgin forest lobe, the nourishing agriculture lobe, the residential lobe, all carefully distinct and placed side by side, according to the analytical imperative. All of this in reality entirely outdated with respect to what we now know about the brain - its plasticity, its elasticity, the reversible sequencing of all its operations. There is, then, behind this archaic model, beneath its futuristic exterior, a gigantic hypothetical error, a fierce idealization doomed to failure. In fact, the 'truth' of the operation lies elsewhere, and you sense this when you return from Biosphere 2 to 'real' America, as you do when you emerge from Disneyland into real life: the fact is that the imaginary, or experimental, model is in no way different from the real functioning of this society. Just as the whole of America is built in the image of Disneyland, so the whole of American society is carrying on - in real time and out in the open - the same experiment as Biosphere 2 which is therefore only falsely experimental, just as Disneyland is only falsely imaginary. The recycling of all substances, the integration of flows and circuits, non-pollution, artificial immunity, ecological balancing, controlled abstinence, restrained jouissance but, also, the right of all species to survival and conservation - and not just plant and animal species, but also social ones. All categories formally brought under the one umbrella of the law - this latter setting its seal on the ending of natural selection. It is generally thought that the obsession with survival is a logical consequence of life and the right to life. But, most of the time, the two things are contradictory. Life is not a question of rights, and what follows on from life is not survival, which is artificial, but death. It is only by paying the price of a failure to live, a failure to take pleasure, a failure to die that man is assured of survival. At least in present conditions, which the Biosphere principle perpetuates. This micro-universe seeks to exorcize catastrophe by making an artificial synthesis of all the elements of catastrophe. From the perspective of survival, of recycling and feedback, of stabilization and metastabilization, the elements of life are sacrificed to those of survival (elimination of germs, of evil, of sex). Real life, which surely, after all, has the right to disappear (or might there be a paradoxical limit to human rights?), is sacrificed to artificial survival. The real planet, presumed condemned, is sacrificed in advance to its miniaturized, air-conditioned clone (have no fear, all the earth's climates are air-conditioned here) which is designed to vanquish death by total simulation. In days gone by it was the dead who were embalmed for eternity; today, it is the living we embalm alive in a state of survival. Must this be our hope? Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we have to build this prophylactic one? What, then, is this species endowed with the insane pretension to survive - not to transcend itself by virtue of its natural intelligence, but to survive physically, biologically, by virtue of its artificial intelligence? Is there a species destined to escape natural selection, natural disappearance - in a word, death? What cosmic cussedness might give rise to such a turnabout? What vital reaction might produce the idea of survival at any cost? What metaphysical anomaly might grant the right not to disappear - logical counterpart of the remarkable good fortune of having appeared? There is a kind of aberration in the attempt to eternalize the species - not to immortalize it in its actions, but to eternalize it in this face-lifted coma, in the glass coffin of Biosphere 2.We may, nonetheless, take the view that this experiment, like any attempt to achieve artificial survival or artificial paradise, is illusory, not from any technical shortcomings, but in its very principle. In spite of itself, it is threatened by the same accidents as real life. Fortunately. Let us hope that the random universe outside smashes this glass coffin. Any accident will do if it rescues us from a scientific euphoria sustained by drip-feed.

#### The attempt to make the world transparent through information and research is self-defeating. More knowledge fails to change reality. Facts and evidence are uniquely dissuasive.

Baudrillard 81. Jean, He is French, “*Simulacra and Simulations*,” pg. 79-81

We live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning. Consider three hypotheses. Either information produces meaning (a negentropic factor), but cannot make up for the brutal loss of signification in every domain. Despite efforts to reinject message and content, meaning is lost and devoured faster than it can be reinjected. In this case, one must appeal to a base productivity to replace failing media. This is the whole ideology of free speech, of media broken down into innumerable individual cells of transmission, that is, into "antimedia" (pirate radio, etc.). Or information has nothing to do with signification. It is something else, an operational model of another order, outside meaning and of the circulation of meaning strictly speaking. This is Shannon's hypothesis: a sphere of information that is purely functional, a technical medium that does not imply any finality of meaning, and thus should also not be implicated in a value judgment. A kind of code, like the genetic code: it is what it is, it functions as it does, meaning is something else that in a sense comes after the fact, as it does for Monod in Chance and Necessity. In this case, there would simply be no significant relation between the inflation of information and the deflation of meaning. Or, very much on the contrary, there is a rigorous and necessary correlation between the two, to the extent that information is directly destructive of meaning and signification, or that it neutralizes them. The loss of meaning is directly linked to the dissolving, dissuasive action of information, the media, and the mass media. The third hypothesis is the most interesting but flies in the face of every commonly held opinion. Everywhere socialization is measured by the exposure to media messages. Whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial. Everywhere information is thought to produce an accelerated circulation of meaning, a plus value of meaning homologous to the economic one that results from the accelerated rotation of capital. Information is thought to create communication, and even if the waste is enormous, a general consensus would have it that nevertheless, as a whole, there be an excess of meaning, which is redistributed in all the interstices of the social just as consensus would have it that material production, despite its dysfunctions and irrationalities, opens onto an excess of wealth and social purpose. We are all complicitous in this myth. It is the alpha and omega of our modernity, without which the credibility of our social organization would collapse. Well, the fact is that it is collapsing, and for this very reason: because where we think that information produces meaning, the opposite occurs. /////// Information devours its own content. It devours communication and the social. And for two reasons. 1. Rather than creating communication, it exhausts itself in the act of staging communication. Rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of meaning. A gigantic process of simulation that is very familiar. The nondirective interview, speech, listeners who call in, participation at every level, blackmail through speech: "You are concerned, you are the event, etc." More and more information is invaded by this kind of phantom content, this homeopathic grafting, this awakening dream of communication. A circular arrangement through which one stages the desire of the audience, the antitheater of communication, which, as one knows, is never anything but the recycling in the negative of the traditional institution, the integrated circuit of the negative. Immense energies are deployed to hold this simulacrum at bay, to avoid the brutal desimulation that would confront us in the face of the obvious reality of a radical loss of meaning. It is useless to ask if it is the loss of communication that produces this escalation in the simulacrum, or whether it is the simulacrum that is there first for dissuasive ends, to short-circuit in advance any possibility of communication (precession of the model that calls an end to the real). Useless to ask which is the first term, there is none, it is a circular process that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. The hyperreality of communication and of meaning. More real than the real, that is how the real is abolished. Thus not only communication but the social functions in a closed circuit, as a lure to which the force of myth is attached. Belief, faith in information attach themselves to this tautological proof that the system gives of itself by doubling the signs of an unlocatable reality. But one can believe that this belief is as ambiguous as that which was attached to myths in ancient societies. One both believes and doesn't. One does not ask oneself, "I know very well, but still." A sort of inverse simulation in the masses, in each one of us, corresponds to this simulation of meaning and of communication in which this system encloses us. To this tautology of the system the masses respond with ambivalence, to deterrence they respond with disaffection, or with an always enigmatic belief. Myth exists, but one must guard against thinking that people believe in it: this is the trap of critical thinking that can only be exercised if it presupposes the naivete and stupidity of the masses. 2. Behind this exacerbated mise-en-scène of communication, the mass media, the pressure of information pursues an irresistible destructuration of the social. Thus information dissolves meaning and dissolves the social, in a sort of nebulous state dedicated not to a surplus of innovation, but, on the contrary, to total entropy.\*1 Thus the media are producers not of socialization, but of exactly the opposite, of the implosion of the social in the masses. And this is only the macroscopic extension of the implosion of meaning at the microscopic level of the sign. This implosion should be analyzed according to McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, the consequences of which have yet to be exhausted. That means that all contents of meaning are absorbed in the only dominant form of the medium. Only the medium can make an event whatever the contents, whether they are conformist or subversive. A serious problem for all counterinformation, pirate radios, antimedia, etc. But there is something even more serious, which McLuhan himself did not see. Because beyond this neutralization of all content, one could still expect to manipulate the medium in its form and to transform the real by using the impact of the medium as form. If all the content is wiped out, there is perhaps still a subversive, revolutionary use value of the medium as such. That is and this is where McLuhan's formula leads, pushed to its limit there is not only an implosion of the message in the medium, there is, in the same movement, the implosion of the medium itself in the real, the implosion of the medium and of the real in a sort of hyperreal nebula, in which even the definition and distinct action of the medium can no longer be determined. Even the "traditional" status of the media themselves, characteristic of modernity, is put in question. McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, which is the key formula of the era of simulation (the medium is the message the sender is the receiver the circularity of all poles the end of panoptic and perspectival space such is the alpha and omega of our modernity), this very formula must be imagined at its limit where, after all the contents and messages have been volatilized in the medium, it is the medium itself that is volatilized as such. Fundamentally, it is still the message that lends credibility to the medium, that gives the medium its determined, distinct status as the intermediary of communication. Without a message, the medium also falls into the indefinite state characteristic of all our great systems of judgment and value. A single model, whose efficacy is immediate, simultaneously generates the message, the medium, and the "real." Finally, the medium is the message not only signifies the end of the message, but also the end of the medium. There are no more media in the literal sense of the word (I'm speaking particularly of electronic mass media) that is, of a mediating power between one reality and another, between one state of the real and another. Neither in content, nor in form. Strictly, this is what implosion signifies. The absorption of one pole into another, the short-circuiting between poles of every differential system of meaning, the erasure of distinct terms and oppositions, including that of the medium and of the real thus the impossibility of any mediation, of any dialectical intervention between the two or from one to the other. Circularity of all media effects. Hence the impossibility of meaning in the literal sense of a unilateral vector that goes from one pole to another. One must envisage this critical but original situation at its very limit: it is the only one left us. It is useless to dream of revolution through content, useless to dream of a revelation through form, because the medium and the real are now in a single nebula whose truth is indecipherable. The fact of this implosion of contents, of the absorption of meaning, of the evanescence of the medium itself, of the reabsorption of every dialectic of communication in a total circularity of the model, of the implosion of the social in the masses, may seem catastrophic and desperate. But this is only the case in light of the idealism that dominates our whole view of information. We all live by a passionate idealism of meaning and of communication, by an idealism of communication through meaning, and, from this perspective, it is truly the catastrophe of meaning that lies in wait for us. But one must realize that "catastrophe" has this "catastrophic" meaning of end and annihilation only in relation to a linear vision of accumulation, of productive finality, imposed on us by the system. Etymologically, the term itself only signifies the curvature, the winding down to the bottom of a cycle that leads to what one could call the "horizon of the event," to an impassable horizon of meaning: beyond that nothing takes place that has meaning for us but it suffices to get out of this ultimatum of meaning in order for the catastrophe itself to no longer seem like a final and nihilistic day of reckoning, such as it functions in our contemporary imaginary. Beyond meaning, there is the fascination that results from the neutralization and the implosion of meaning. Beyond the horizon of the social, there are the masses, which result from the neutralization and the implosion of the social. What is essential today is to evaluate this double challenge the challenge of the masses to meaning and their silence (which is not at all a passive resistance) the challenge to meaning that comes from the media and its fascination. All the marginal, alternative efforts to revive meaning are secondary in relation to that challenge. Evidently, there is a paradox in this inextricable conjunction of the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed [informe] or informed [informée] masses, or is it the masses who victoriously resist the media by directing or absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them? Sometime ago, in "Requiem for the Media," I analyzed and condemned the media as the institution of an irreversible model of communication without a response. But today? This absence of a response can no longer be understood at all as a strategy of power, but as a counterstrategy of the masses themselves when they encounter power. What then? Are the mass media on the side of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation of meaning, in the violence perpetrated on meaning, and in fascination? Is it the media that induce fascination in the masses, or is it the masses who direct the media into the spectacle? Mogadishu-Stammheim: the media make themselves into the vehicle of the moral condemnation of terrorism and of the exploitation of fear for political ends, but simultaneously, in the most complete ambiguity, they propagate the brutal charm of the terrorist act, they are themselves terrorists, insofar as they themselves march to the tune of seduction (cf. Umberto Eco on this eternal moral dilemma: how can one not speak of terrorism, how can one find a good use of the media there is none). The media carry meaning and countermeaning, they manipulate in all directions at once, nothing can control this process, they are the vehicle for the simulation internal to the system and the simulation that destroys the system, according to an absolutely Mobian and circular logic and it is exactly like this. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution. With one caution. We are face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand he responds with a double strategy. To the demand of being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance, that is to say, exactly the opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total dependence, passivity, idiocy. Neither strategy has more objective value than the other. The subject-resistance is today unilaterally valorized and viewed as positive just as in the political sphere only the practices of freedom, emancipation, expression, and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable and subversive. But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning precisely the practices of the masses that we bury under the derisory terms of alienation and passivity. The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of voting, producing, deciding, speaking, participating, playing the game a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood. But this strategy is more reflective of the earlier phase of the system, and even if we are still confronted with it, it is no longer the strategic terrain: the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and of the spoken word or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception. It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. This strategy (if one can still speak of strategy) prevails today, because it was ushered in by that phase of the system which prevails. To choose the wrong strategy is a serious matter. All the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation, on the resurrection of a subject of history, of the group, of the word based on "consciousness raising," indeed a "raising of the unconscious" of subjects and of the masses, do not see that they are going in the direction of the system, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech.

### 2nr – mimesis o/v

This debate is between two competing approaches to viewing the environment – while their approach conceptualizes nature as an irrational force that must be managed into submission by a unified humanity, the alternative understands being not as unitary subjects constituted by desire but rather understands desire itself as an autonomous and formative force, maintaining the possibility for moving humanity beyond domination into an acceptance of the flux and contingency which is at the core of nature.

[need LINK EXPLANATION here OR do it on the perm]

We are winning a linear disad to their conception of the climate which they have not sufficiently come to terms with which is the mimesis argument

First – key framing issue – they that non-compliance is inevitable – they will always have something against their goal – countries that view carbon emissions as key to their economy, Trump supporters that think you are a Chinese spy – it isn’t a question of whether they can solve this resistance but rather how they interact with it – this should frame the link level and their ability to solve – two reasons that leads to violence

First is ANTI-ECOLOGY – the approach of the 1AC locks us in a never-ending war against nature – the complex nature of nature necessities ever-more complex technology, spiraling risk out of control, rendering the smallest hiccup terminally catastrophic

This means EVEN IF they win the aff doesn’t lead to disaster in the short term it locks in a broader system that makes destruction inevitable – we don’t have to win that THEY SPECIFICALLY cause the impacts but rather that their cohesion of nature does

Second is CLEANSING – they will lash out violently against the inevitable resistance to their movement – as the agents of life, empires launch wars against non-compliance, akin to the Iraq war with soldiers in green masks. With CO2 as the enemy and the stakes being our existence as a species, all becomes permissible: crops turn to dust in the wake of carpet bombs, military ventures seize resources for innovation, soot initiates nuclear winter, and the stakes of the game force us into an any-means-necessary sprint towards extinction

Turns case – this destruction annihilates any chance at solving the environment – war is a magnifier for all of their impacts

The alternative is a comparatively better orientation – rather than taking the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world which affirms a pluralism of movements that do not desire perfection like the aff

By understanding being not as unitary subjects constituted by desire but rather desire itself as an autonomous and force, the alternative maintains the possibility for moving humanity beyond domination into an acceptance of the flux and contingency which is at the core of nature. Rather than take the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world

### 2nr – competing movements o/v

This debate is between two competing approaches to environmental movements in the face of the anthropocene – their movement is one that constructs humanity as a divine unified savior that will manage nature into rationality which can be counterposed against the alternative as a recognition of our inability to cohere the world and an affirmation of humility, constructing movements around intersecting desires rather than the unified imperative of the aff

[need LINK explanation here OR do it on the perm]

If we win that a construction of movements around intersecting desires is preferable to rational cohesion you vote neg

We are winning 2 disads to their approach:

The first is XENOPHOBIA – their project of coherency demands a fear of irrationality, instilling a xenophobia within the psyche – as the vanguard with the goal of a perfect rational politic, they will stop at nothing to reach their goal, inevitably purging populations marked as deviant in liberal wars

Think of the Cultural Revolution with the goal of creating only perfectly rational scholarship – they will always exclude any moment of irrationality, any vestige of traditional knowledge that could threaten their goal

Two impacts:

First is LASHOUT – they will always purge small pieces of deviance from their coalitionary agreements which preventing larger change – they will never be able to get other countries on board with their climate pact because the moment they suggest that they cut a few less emissions, take a little less blame, or do anything against their goal will be purged and marked as irrational, alienating them from their supposed “common goal” and ensuring non-compliance

Second is VIOLENCE – largely explained above – as the vanguard of a perfect politic, they will always purge deviance, marking women as “hysterical” or queers as deviant a la the Cultural Revolution as explained above

They have conceded a key impact framing argument which is that this violence disproportionally effects racialized bodies and sustains racism which is a moral imperative to reject and ethics necessarily come before extinction.

The second is the VALUE DA – they locate the locus for subject formation in the climate catastrophe, separating self-worth from individual desire. The plurality of ways that individuals desire action are homogenized under their framework to the one true way, framed as divine – this by definition eradicates the potential for value creation as we no longer can literally do what we subjectively value, rendering all debates lifeless alienated husks – think of forcing hard-core Libertarians to campaign for cap-and-trade

This is necessarily prior – even if they win that their movements are more effective questions of psychology and value are piror – material fixes to the squo only matter if those who experience the change have the capacity for joy – it doesn’t matter if they save some lives if we all wish we were dead

This turns case for two reasons: first is DISINTREST – they will never access movements because individual members have no investment in the project and therefore remain disinterested and leave as soon as is possible which means that the only chance at creating motivated movements and collective action is voting neg

You should ignore their enlightenment idealism in favor of the necessary realization of the alternative that not everyone is as hyped about their plan as they are

Second is PASSIVITY – they will always view their movement through the lens of insufficiency, ultimately turning inward and inducing passivity as our inability to cleanse being of contingency creates feelings of impotence, negating the will to act and internal link turning their activism arguments on framework

Now the alternative recognizes our inability to cohere humanity into one set movement, instead affirming intersections of desires in climate movements on an individual basis, creating a pluralism of movements that engage populations without rallying around a perfect solution. Rather than take the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world.

### 2nr – link explanation

The affirmative and the alternative are incommensurate - we’ll isolate a few links here

1. The framing page – taking actions for the sole sake of protecting humanity from anthropogenic warming is obviously mutually exclusive with the alternative’s refusal of the concept of the human
2. by formulating/imagining an alternative world wherein emissions are stabilized/etc, they reaffirm humanities ability to shape the world and nature and overcome flux – this link will be explained in depth on the framework debate
3. by viewing the environment as commodity that can be controlled through the ability and necessity for humans to change nature to benefit humanity they just reassert human dominance over nature rather than viewing it as something that we exist as a part of – the carbon tax in specific magnifies this link – by putting an economic price on carbon and by viewing it as something that needs to be fixed to create a perfect sustainable market without unfairness/subsidies

### 2nr – baudrillard 94

Sarcophagus DA – extend Baudrillard 94 – their attempt at security over the atmosphere is life-negating, locking life into a security bunker of eco-preservation where life is only valuable when it can be calculated and managed to precision, real life sacrificed for artificial survival – this infinite ressentiment and denial of life outweighs the aff – it’s a constant deferral of value to an unattainable future which guts the possibility for enjoying life. Ressentiment outweighs because it is the psychic state through which all impacts are filtered.

### 2nr – information k

extend baudrillard – The 1AC operates on an understanding of the debate that we criticize. Injection of more knowledge is uniquely dissuasive – if we win this there’s no way they can win the k – without a completing understanding of the world you should default to an acceptance of the inability to cohere knowledge

The impact turns case – information decreases meaning – the affirmative is MSNBC vs. FOX news in the global warming debate where each side produces all of the evidence in support of their position and everybody only becomes more adamant in their pre-existing political opinions. This accounts for the status quo nature of congress where ideologues are arbitrary and contrary – this turns all of their political engagement good arguments – that’s mcwhorter

You evaluate this prior to the affirmative because the form with which they present the 1AC should be evaluated before the content.

This turns case because the mass production of information is what spreads climate denialism

### 2nr – both baudrillards

extend baudrillard – The 1AC operates on an understanding of the debate that we criticize. Injection of more knowledge is uniquely dissuasive – if we win this there’s no way they can win the k – without a completing understanding of the world you should default to an acceptance of the inability to cohere knowledge

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### 2nr – framework

Our interpretation is that you should evaluate the round based upon competing affect

All of debate operates on the level of affect – speaking activities can only function through affective persuasion. Foregoing this analysis means erasing the very existence of debate itself. Your ballot is not a referendum on the fiated plan but rather its affective impact derived from its presentation

This solves their theory arguments – it’s predictable and fair

We can lose framework and still win this debate – just evaluate the K as an impact turn

we have a technocracy disad to their interpretation – their understanding of fiat reduces the political field to one of rationality. Positing that winning cost/benefit analysis is the condition for plan passage flattens all consideration of emotion, persuasion, bias and the autonomy of affect. This prioritization of reason causes a demonization of the socius as a group of biased and emotive individuals who refuse to base opinions of reason. This induces a valorization of expertism, institutions and technocratic solutions to warming for they arise as the embodiment of what Nietzsche describes as the Cartesian king – a disembodied mass fronting pure reason. This tethers agency to institutions whilst legitimating the erasure of public deliberation for individuals are viewed as a plague of irrationality. This is uniquely true in context of the affirmative for their globalization project seeks to create a model of engagement for individuals to follow which alienates the actions of each member from internal desire – thereby mass producing subjects who maintain no interest in the movement and drop like flies.

Specifically, this causes a retreat back into debate instead of turning outward for it is the only space that exists through erasing the sticky web of social relations in favor of a tabula-rasa ethos of reason.

### ---double bind

[At the top the 1AR has conceded] the double bind portion of the K – either the 1AC extinction impacts happen before they can get their hands on the levers of power which means you vote neg on presumption or the harms were constructed for alarmism which makes them war mongers –

Evaluate questions of form prior to questions of content. Before you can evaluate whether or not the substance of the 1AC is good you should evaluate whether or not the form in which it was read should exist. If we win our framework disads you vote neg even if we don’t win the K because they’re independent offense against the 1AC’s approach towards debate

### ---ressentiment o/w

Ressentiment outweighs – it creates subjects that live life through a depressed and pessimistic lens, always finding flaws in reality and deferring value to some unattainable future. Psychological wellbeing should come first because it preconfigures every other impact. One cannot enjoy material pleasures if they always view the world as insufficient. Overcoming ressentiment is a prior question to the ability to ever experience pleasure which is ultimately what we are all striving for.

## vs warming

### 1nc – k

#### The spectre of the climate disaster functions as a new zone of investment in which humanity can legitimize itself as in a perfectly cohesive image. Reflecting a divine will to will, the affirmative reasserts the unity of being in a reactionary attempt to ward off contingency, ultimately resulting in endless foddering and chatter by masses of indifference

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 59-72

Questions, today, of climate and climate ethics—and even concerns regarding the sustainability and viability of this life of ours on earth— appear to present a new imaginary for political questions. One might say that it was only in the late twentieth century, with events such as the picturing of the earth from space, the possibility of nuclear annihilation of earthly life or the increasing speeds of new media allowing for the possibility of global audiences (such as the entire world viewing 9/11), that something like the problem of a global ethos would emerge. If there had always been a silent presupposed ‘we’1 in any ethical theory, then this virtual universalism would always struggle alongside moral valorizations of specified communities.2 How do we, from the particular world we inhabit, begin to think of life as such? It is the present sense of the planet as a whole, as a fragile bounded globe that might present us, finally, with the opportunity and imperative to think a genuine ethos. Now that we have a notion of climate that seems to break with the etymology of this specific inclination or latitude of the earth, and does so by gesturing to something like a sense of the earth as a region or inclination in itself, this might open a new imaginary of the globe. We might think of ethos as no longer bound to a territory within the planet; instead there might be the ethos of this globe of our own, that has no other region against which we might define ourselves or towards which we might direct our fantasies of another future. If there is something like climate change, perhaps it takes this form: not only a mutation of this climate (warming, depleting, becoming more volatile) but an alteration of what we take climate to be. One might want to suggest that as long as we think of climate in its traditional sense—as our specific milieu—we will perhaps lose sight of climate change, or the degree to which human life is now implicated in timelines and rhythms beyond that of its own borders. The figure of the globe appears to offer two ethical trajectories: on the one hand an attention to global interconnections and networks would expand responsibility and awareness beyond the figure of the isolated moral subject. Ethics may have to be considered beyond discursive, human and political modes (especially if one defines politics as the practice of a polity). On the other hand, the figure of the globe—considered as a figure—is intertwined with a tropology of interconnectedness, renewal, cyclic causality and organicism. This traditionally theological series of motifs, with the globe’s circularity reflecting a divine intentionality, is maintained today in many of the most profound and seemingly secular ecological theses, including the Gaia hypothesis and the global brain. It is the possibility of extinction or the end of human time that forces us to confront a new sense of the globe: far from being an unfortunate event that accidentally befalls the earth and humanity, the thought of the end of the anthropocene era is both at the heart of all the motifs of ecological ethics and the one idea that cannot be thought as long as the globe is considered in terms of its traditional and anthropocentric metaphors. The word ‘globalism’ along with the word ‘biopolitics’ suffers from a curious double valence. As a descriptive term globalism can refer to the lost autonomy and destroyed difference among worlds: the formation of global media, markets and communications eliminated what was once a panorama of difference. Once upon a time the globe enjoyed divergent timelines and worldviews. Even if it was central to the colonialist imagination to romanticize the extent to which ‘other’ worlds were exotically untranslatable, mystical and embedded in a non-linear time, there is nevertheless a very real sense in which globalism has created an earth of a single time, single market and single polity. Globalism would be a mode of homogenization, disenchantment or rendering quantifiable that one could lament as having displaced an earlier world of distinct places for the sake of one quantifiable space. This reduction of distinction has significant material consequences; today, any particular country’s environmental or wage policies will directly alter the day to day life of bodies elsewhere on the globe. But global inclusion and simultaneity also trigger a series of imaginary ramifications. In positive terms this has been described by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in terms of a new multitude. Liberated from nation states and physical locales there can now be a humanity as such, a self-creating living labor that has no body other than that which it gives itself through its own immaterial productive powers (Hardt and Negri 2004). Thought less optimistically, one might say that the physical ability to occupy converging and synchronized worlds and times is coupled with a cognitive ~~paralysis~~ [inability] to think of any future that would not be one more chapter in a familiar collective narrative. This is evident in the terms that are used to describe the predicament of the globe. It is not only the case that events are materially and systemically linked, so that the volatile economies of even the smallest countries may precipitate global crises; it is also typical today to see all of financial history as similarly continuous and interconnected. This occurs both in short-term and long-term thinking; recent events have prompted the publication of a series of histories and genealogies, including the histories of debt, of money, of corporations, bonds and markets: all suggesting that the present is an expression and extension of a single history of something like ‘the’ globe (Ferguson 2008; Cashill 2010; Graeber 2011; Coggan 2012; Bakan 2005). Economic events are considered in relation to a past that we have been unable to think as anything other than differing by degree. Despite the new global conditions and linkages the 2008 cascade of economic crises were gauged to be either as bad as or worse than the great depression, while terms such as ‘recovery,’ ‘recession,’ ‘depression,’ and ‘crisis’ place the current state of play as a continuation of a past, a past that varies and recovers always in terms of one easily comprehended cycle. The lexicon deployed to assess and gauge the environment is similarly comforting in terms of its linear temporality and delimitation: Australia still refers to its condition as one of ‘drought,’ even when the period of insufficient rain and increasing desertification exceeds a decade; climate change policy refers to ‘mitigation,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘sustainability’ and ‘viability’—all of which enable one to think of management (however difficult) rather than cessation, rupture or incomprehension. One might say that the imaginary is, indeed, global. A literal globalism—the stark reality of there being no escape, no outside, nowhere else to flee now that the earth has been forced to yield ever more to the human desire for life—is coupled with an incompatible global figuration. Things will cycle back to recovery. The globe can be taken and assessed as an object and managed, saved, revived or given the respect and care that it deserves. If where we are is a globe, then it can be imagined as delimited, bounded, organically self-referring and unified. Perhaps—given the advent of globalism as a concrete event where there can now be no time, place or body that can live outside a certain destructive force field of events (such as the possibility of viral, political, economic and climactic terrors)—now is the time to think non-globally. The usual figures of the bounded earth, the ideally-self-balancing cosmos, the interconnectedness of this great organic home of ‘ours’ are modes of narrative self-enclosure that have shielded us from confronting the forces of the present. It is not surprising that ‘globalism’ is at once a term of mourning, signaling a world economy and politics that has taken every space and timeline into its calculative, cynical and rigid systematic maw at the same time as it signals a redemptive potential. We are, so various environmental and ecological imperatives remind us, always interconnected across and through this one living globe, this living world that environs us. The maxim, ‘act locally, think globally,’ should be reversed: there can be no encompassing global thought, for insofar as we think we are fragmented by various locales, figures, lexicons, disciplines and desire, but we nevertheless are caught up in a globe of action where no intent or prediction will be enough to secure or predict the outcome of any action. It was the great contribution of Lacanian psychoanalysis to point out that the visual figural unity of the human body—the bounded organism we see in the mirror—serves as a captivating lure that precludes us from confronting that ex-centric predicament of the speaking subject whose desire is never given in a living present but is articulated and dispersed in a time that is never that of a self-comprehending and self-affecting whole. Just as the spatial unity of the human body covers over the temporal dispersion of the speaking and desiring subject, so the delimited material object of the planet enables a misrecognition of the multiple systems, forces, timelines, planes and feedback loops that traverse what we imagine to be the single object of the globe. The advent of globalism— or the intensification of the world’s various modes of systemic interconnectedness and hyper-volatility—should, if anything, have prompted a destruction of the figure of the globe. And yet the opposite appears to be the case: even in the genre that is apparently most devoted to global catastrophe—the disaster movie—the globe is strangely reinforced and consolidated. A typical instance is Independence Day of 1996, in which an invasion of earth is initially viewed from the contained space of a US government control room, as though we will be able to have advance vision of ‘our’ end and limit from the point of view of a single screen and panel of experts. Perhaps today we might note that it is the physical image of the globe that serves as a reaction formation, precluding a thought of the consequences of globalism (if globalism remains the correct term for the increasingly evident and non-human complexities that are precluding any possibility of a global or comprehensive vision). If capitalism could once have been thought of as ‘a’ power imposed upon the globe then this is no longer the case. As the recent economic crises demonstrated capitalism is not a system, cannot be attributed to a body of interests, and is less a transcendent structure imposed upon organic life than it is just one of the many ways in which local, ill-considered, barely intentional forces of consumption and acquisition exceed the comprehension of any body (be that a physical, political, national or economic body). Marxist theory’s attempt to locate capitalism within history and within a theory of interests can be compared to a whole series of localizations and narrative therapies. Popular culture has for decades been giving a face and/or body to a series of diffuse and essentially ‘unglobable’ threats. Despite a series of calls for thinking in terms of distributed, de-centered and dispersed cognition, where we acknowledge that institutions, cultures and even organisms are not governed by a central organizing brain, the political imaginary remains wedded to organic figures. Popular culture has presented viral invasion more often than not in terms of an isolable and intruding body: conquering such threats can then be placed in a standard narrative of good and evil, self and other. Terrorism, too, is given a specific face in media culture (either the named Osama Bin Laden or an ethnically specified other). But it is not only popular culture that has been unable to confront a temporality and politics that is no longer that of contesting agents waging a war for the sake of a determined end. Lamenting the fall of modernity into a bio-politics that manages populations according to a general and quantifiable ‘life,’ Giorgio Agamben argues that it will be possible to arrive again at a genuine politics only by considering what Foucault failed to confront: the problem of sovereignty in modernity (Agamben 1998). That is, whereas Foucault was critical of the sovereign model of power, or power as an external and imposed body, Agamben’s critical concept of bio-politics wants to resist a modernity of diffused or capillary power, focusing again on how power establishes itself as a body. Agamben refuses the notion of the political and the polity as a universal or a given; the polity is constituted in and through human potentiality’s realization that it lacks any determined end. For Agamben, what needs to be recalled is the genesis or emergence of the political fold, the opening of something like a political space that then enables a distinction between that which is interior and that which is exterior to the polity. What counts as political is, for Agamben, itself not a political decision, and this is because ‘the polity’ or the opening of a space of what will become ‘our’ concern is an event, and one to which genuine thinking ought to (constantly) return. Today’s losses of commonality, or the absence of something like a global community, should prompt us to address that the global community or horizon is neither given nor guaranteed, but is nevertheless urgently required if we are not to lose sight altogether of our potentiality to be political, to open a political space. What bio-politics and its terrors force us to acknowledge is that our defining potentiality—for speaking together and opening up a political space— discloses itself most fully when it is not actualized. For bio-politics, too, bears the same double valence as globalism. It is precisely in the era of the bio-political, when all decisions regarding what we ought to do are grounded on maximizations of life that the passage from life to polity, and the political constitution of what counts as political life is forgotten. It is Auschwitz, modern hedonism, and the bio-political absence of a genuine political space of speech and decision that evidences the true nature of politics. Politics occurs not when bodies located in a world then decide to speak together, for politics is—through the event of speaking—the opening out of a world. Here, then, in this confrontation with a modern bio-politics that is criticized and lamented for being insufficiently political—insufficiently oriented to the opening and manifestation of a political space—Agamben gives the contemporary term ‘bio-politics’ a force that relates directly to the imaginary hyper-investment in the globe. Agamben, unlike the Foucault whom he criticizes for not confronting the relation between bare life and sovereignty, regards bio-politics in its various forms—both totalitarian managements of populations and democratic aims to increase a society’s happiness—as a loss of the political. As long as politics is focused on bare life, or the calculation of a living substance we will have retreated from the question of the potentiality of the political: man is not born as a political animal but becomes one, and he does so by creating a political space through speaking, opening up a world that is always his world. The Greek distinction between bios (or a life that is formed, bounded and oriented to what man might make of himself) and zoe (or mere bare life that, in modernity, becomes so much disposable waste and that increasingly becomes the subject of politics) is, for Agamben a difference that needs to be re-thought and re-inscribed. It is bios—created, formed, bounded, delimited life—that has been lost and that entails a loss of the political. How does this relate to globalism? Both Agamben’s critique of biopolitics and the reaction against globalism express a traditional and theological mourning for a loss of form. Globalism’s evils follow from its ravaging disrespect for limits and difference, its tendency to consume all previously distinct and specified nations and cultures into one vast calculative system without definition or limit. Not surprisingly the response to both globalism (seen as an inhuman, mindless and unbounded system) and to biopolitics (seen as a loss of the self-defining polity) has been the reaffirmation of the figure of the globe or bounded form. Agamben, for example, posits a series of positive manoeuvres that would ameliorate the biopolitical ravaging of the man of poiesis; these include a return to the active creation of man as a political living form as bios rather than zoe, as a being whose political nature has little or nothing to do with his mere life but requires creation. Not surprisingly, then, Agamben also wishes to retrieve a more authentic aesthetic encounter, where art is not passive spectatorship of an artist’s private invention but an opening out or disclosure of a created world. Here, art as poiesis or putting into distinct form would not be disengaged from collective praxis. Hardt and Negri, reacting more explicitly to a globalism that has precluded any active and intentional formation of a polity, call for the creation of a single, self-producing, self-aware and self-referring open whole of humanity: a single, continually re-productive body of man: In addition to envisioning revolution in ethical and political terms, we also conceive of it in terms of deep anthropological modification: of metissage and continuous hybridization of populations, of biopolitical metamorphosis. The first terrain of struggle is, from this point of view, the universal right to move, work and learn over the entire surface of the globe. Thus revolution, as we see it, is not only within Empire but also through Empire. It is not something which is fought against some implausible Winter Palace, but something which extends against all the central and peripheral structures of power, in order to empty them and subtract the capacity of production from capital. (Negri, Hardt and Zolo 27) We can pause here to note that what underpins Agamben’s call for a new politics and Hardt and Negri’s manifesto for a self-productive multitude is a figural globalism that is a variant of a traditional and theological organicism. That is, the figure of the globe—the ideally bounded sphere in which each point is in accord with the whole, and in which the whole is a dynamic and self-maintaining unity—harbours an axiology that privileges bios over zoe. What must be asserted as dominant and proper is a whole or bounded form that has no external or transcendent principle, no ordering that is given from without or that would elevate one point or term above another. Literal globalism, perceived as humanity’s alienation from itself and its earth through dead technical systems (such as the market, mechanization, computerization and speculation), is to be cured by figural globalism. Life as zoe, the mere life that lives on without a sense of itself, without a world and without form, is to be combated by life as bios: a properly political life of self-formation and speaking in common. Politics ought to be of, by and for the polity: thus, the call to immanence, whereby a body is not deflected by any power other than that of its own making is yet one more refusal to consider the predicament of a palpably non-sovereign power. Recall that for Agamben Foucault failed to consider the relationship between biopolitics and sovereign power, between power as instituted law that creates the border between law and non-law, or between governable life and the merely living. For Agamben the problem with biopolitics is that it is insufficiently directed towards bios: both totalitarian governments and democracies focus on well-being and happiness rather than confronting the problem that mere life does not proceed without some sort of gap or decision towards its proper world and end. If one were to recall the Greek attention to bios, or formed life, one might be able to retrieve something of the proper political potentiality that is covered over in modernity. Foucault, however, suggests an opposite path. The problem with biopolitics is not its inattention to bios or self-making but, rather, its maintenance of organic—or what I will refer to here as ‘global’—thinking. One could be misled by reading Foucault’s corpus backwards, concluding that his final thoughts on Greek and Hellenistic arts of the self would be the natural consequence of a theorization of biopolitics, leading to a retrieval of a poetics of the subject. But there are other possibilities indicated in his earliest criticisms of the concept of life. The problem with this concept, or more accurately this problem, is that its manner of folding an inside from an outside, or of producing a relation through which something like knowledge is possible, is—to use a Deleuzian term—its reactive reterritorializing quality. It is the concept of life as such, the life from which bounded beings emerge and against which they maintain themselves, that leads to a certain structure of ethics. Man becomes that being who is nothing more than a reflective structure, a being whose only law is that of giving a law to himself. The three concepts analyzed by Foucault that constitute the modern empirical-transcendental episteme are life, labour and language. It is because there is something in general called ‘life’ as a process of striving, self-production and self-maintenance that language and labor become the means through which man creates himself as an historical being. On the one hand Foucault suggests that this is in quite a specific sense the consequence of a refigured globe: the pre-modern space of knowledge had distributed beings in relations of analogy, such that the universal order of things was reflected in each living being. In classicism this book of nature, or experience of the earth as possessing its own sense that could be unfolded in various ways in each living form, gives way to an order that appears in representation and tabulation. Man, in classical thought, is not yet that being produced through the act of speech and labour that forms him in relation to a life in general that is only known after the event of its formation. In modernity the globe is no longer the book of nature or scene of readable order, becoming a site of ‘life’ that is now known as the enigmatic progression through which organisms and systems emerge: life is a process that can be read after the event of its ongoing acts of formation. Critically, then, this would suggest that with the politics of life itself something of the globe is lost or occluded. And this, indeed, is how ecological and anti-globalist theory understands both biopolitics and globalism more generally. What is lost is any sense of the earth as a living whole, as bearing a life and temporality of its own, within which human beings are located and towards which they ought to pay due respect and care. Yet despite the sense that globalism as a political event has erased all traditional and enchanted senses of the globe as a living whole that harbors its own order, the appeals to the figure and normativity of englobed life have become more intense than ever. If Agamben seeks to retrieve a sense of the world as that which man gives himself through speaking in common, and if Hardt and Negri aim to catalyze the self-expressing multitude, then they do so in thorough accord with a tradition and spirit of the self-evident beauty and worth of the organic globe. First, we can note the theological nature of this figure of the self-referring, self-creating living form that has no end or determination outside its own existence.3 Not only is this how the Christian God of monotheism was defined (as a potentiality that has no essence other being in pure act, never deflected from pure self-forming), it is also the case that theological poetics used the figure of the bounded sphere to express a divine intentionality of perfect accord, balance and (most importantly) self-reference. Such a form has its own temporality which is at once linear, organic and circular; it is a time of increasing creation and fruition, in which beings arrive at their proper form and in which the end concludes and discloses the reason of the whole. As an example we can think of Milton’s frequent references to the pendant world or balanced globe, contrasted with the boundless, formless and time-deprived chaos. The divine meets the human in John Donne’s frequent references to globes, circles, circumference and recovery, as though the earth’s form is that of the soul: Then, soul, to thy first pitch work up again; Know that all lines which circles do contain. For once that they the centre touch, do touch Twice the circumference, and be thou such (Donne 2000, 229). Second, this divine, organic and perfectly bounded form of immanent self reference can take the form of philosophy itself: that activity through which human reason refers back to, and redeems, itself by circling back and recognizing its own constitutive conditions. One could include here Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle, Hegel’s philosophy of absolute self-reference, and more recent and supposedly scientific claims for ‘human’ understanding, such as Robert Wright’s recent claim that the monotheistic figure of God will, organically, evolve to become nothing more than that of human nature understanding itself as the origin of all the figures to which it was once enslaved (2010). Third, and finally, when current ecological theorists continue to refer to the environment—as that which environs or encloses—or call for a due reverence to an earth that bears its own balance and self-ordering, it is once again a figure of bounded form or bios that is maintained against a life that would be a force without sense of itself, a time without disclosure of fruition. The problem with this anti-globalization global tropology is twofold. First, it is inefficacious when one considers the nature of modern power. The twenty-first century is marked by an intensification of diffuse and destructive forces. The cold war and its threat of nuclear annihilation had already troubled the motif of life as a war of interests among bodies, for it was clearly possible that the trajectory of man for survival and dominance was the same path that would lead to his disappearance. The subsequent wave of annihilation threats, from the AIDS awareness of the 1980s, followed by increasing anxieties about global warming, food shortages, viral panics (SARS, bird flu, swine flu), terrorist organizations that no longer concerned themselves with a worldly survival, and then economic crises that exposed an absence of any centered or commanding viewpoint: all these serve to show that the image of the globe, of an interconnected whole, is a lure and an alibi. We have perhaps always lived in a time of divergent, disrupted and diffuse systems of forces, in which the role of human decisions and perceptions is a contributing factor at best. Far from being resolved by returning to the figure of the bounded globe or subject of bios rather than zoe, all those features that one might wish to criticize in the bio-political global era can only be confronted by a nonglobal temporality and counter-ethics. Second, it follows that far from being an ecological figure that will save us from the ravages of globalism, subjectivism and bio-politics, it is the image of the globe that lies at the center of an anthropocentric imaginary that is intrinsically suicidal. Of course, extinction and annihilation lie at the heart of all life. But accelerated and self-witnessing extinction can only be achieved by a global animal, a ‘man’ whose desire for survival and mastery is so frenzied that he consumes his own milieu. And he does so because his milieu is a globe. If, as recent ‘returns’ to phenomenology insist, the thinking and living being always has a world, and if that world is always a world of meaning—defined in terms of potentialities and the organism’s timeline—then we are truly global. We are bounded by our own living form, with a world of our own folded around our sensory- motor apparatus (Thomson 2007). But does not the phenomenon of a violent, life-annihilating and globe-destroying globalism present us with another possibility? Perhaps what we need is a zoopolitics: not a lament for the ways in which politics has taken hold of human populations as mere life, but a critique of the ways in which political thinking remains human all too human—repressing the utter contingency of life by insisting on the meaning and form of bios. Rather than criticize biopolitical modernity for rendering mere life as formless, calculative, and void of meaning and mindful creativity, we should cast both bios and zoe on the side of figural lures, and strive to think beyond all forms of life. Neither the mere life of animality nor the formed life of political man, our attention would be better directed to a multiple and divergent network of times and matters. That is, bio-politics ought to be criticized not for seizing upon bare or mere life—not for forgetting the human forming power that enables politics, not for regarding man as bios rather than zoe. Rather, the biopolitics that is hysterically and morally regarded as destructive of well-bounded life would still be captured by bios, by the good form of self-producing man and would be better directed towards forces beyond the human, beyond the organism and beyond the globe. The globe or earth as the planet that was blessed with the contingency of life, including the human species whose global imagination has done so much to create destructive systems beyond its own power and comprehension, cannot be saved. Insofar as it is imagined as a globe or living whole with its own order and proper potentiality that might be restored, the earth will continue to be sacrificed to the ~~blindness~~ [ignorance] of an organic thinking that can only insist upon its own self-evident value. One final feature of globalism that needs to be noted, and that might suggest a new counter-global temporality is that of information. There is no public sphere, no bordered polis in which circulating data may be reflected upon, and incorporated; there is no transcendental and procedural ideal of consensus that would emerge as an aspect of an all encompassing life-world. According to Habermas, and other theorists of discourse theory, insofar as one speaks or even insofar as one claims to know, an intersubjective claim is presupposed (Habermas 1991, 378); it would be a performative contradiction to say something that one did not also claim to be true (Apel 2001, 47). Insofar as one speaks one is already with an ideal domain of recognition that is procedurally, if not actually, intersubjective and global. But the actual fact of globalism destroys global inclusion, consensus and recognition. There is a glut of speech and a deficit of both recognition and the demand for recognition. The more global citizens seek and demand inclusion the less attention and media space becomes available: every tweet, blog, Facebook post and text message places more and more pressure on the bloated domain of available consumable information. Individual speech acts are not fragments of one grand communicating globe; rather, the excess of production is utterly destructive of any possibility of (even ideal) reception. Indeed, it is the surfeit of information, especially information regarding the limits of the globe (such as data about global warming, resource depletion, new speeds of viral mutation, terrorist cells without traceable command centers) that requires a micro-politics (if that term could be freed from the notion of a polis) and demands some mode of schizo-analysis. The latter would refer to a tracking of splits in forces, of divergent systems and incongruous fields. One may never free oneself from the figure of the globe, or even the globe as the notion of figure—the notion that ‘we’ give a world to ourselves through our own recuperating imagination. But if the present has the capacity to teach us anything it may be this: only a shattering of the globe, with an attention to forces that resist recuperation, incorporation and comprehension—forces that operate beyond intentionality and synthesis— only this radical destruction can save us from ourselves.

#### Attaching political will to shaping the environment exactly to their liking using subsidy cuts only re-entrenches human mastery, violently trying to quell excess – this ensures the failure of their planetary project

Bauman 15. Whitney, Department of Religious Studies, Florida International University, Oxford JournalsArts & Humanities Jnl of the American Academy of Religion Volume 83, Issue 4Pp. 1005-1023. “Religion, Ecology, and the Planetary Other: Opening Spaces for Difference.” July 14, 2015.

PART II: MIMESIS AND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE WORLD AS SACRIFICIAL STANDING RESERVE. Generalized imitation has the power to create worlds that are perfectly disconnected from reality: at once orderly, stable, and totally illusory. (Dupuy 2011: 209) In order to navigate the creative and destructive mechanism of mimesis, I argue that it is first necessary to distinguish between mimetic projects that attempt to create new worlds regardless of the rest of the natural world and those that are grounded in planetary systems. Obviously, the opening quote of this section suggests that mimesis in our meaning-making practices has the capacity to create orderly but illusory worlds. This, I would argue, is the mimetic function of something like the truth regime of the global mobiles outlined above. Of course, such mimetic processes—ones that ignore the evolving planetary context—ultimately create a lot of violence toward the rest of the natural world because the world becomes standing reserve, separated out from moral concern as that which is used in the project to re-create the orderly world of contemporary globalized capitalism. One can also see this type of mimesis at work in (abstract) foundations of gender and sexuality roles that are defined as “normal” (usually as heteronormative), and into which our bodies are forced. These types of mimesis force life into specific channels. To some extent, religions have played a large role in this process as well. However, religion ought not to be seen only in a negative light. Religions and philosophies also reveal the mimetic structure of our very imaginings as grounded in evolutionary mimetic structures, and part of ecological healing is the re-cognition of such groundings. Refusal of our Mimetic Entanglement How did we begin to refuse our embeddedness in larger cosmic and evolutionary mimetic structures? When did humans begin to regard humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world? This is, of course, a question that obviously cannot be answered; but some wagers can be made. Rather than lay the blame of domination on sexism, racism, anthropocentrism, or any other isms as the critical theories that I am in debt to tend to do, I would lay it on an emergent transition resulting from the space of mimetic excess. My reasons for this are that if one travels down the rabbit hole of searching for the ultimate source of the logic of domination that leads to all isms, then one has already committed him/herself to the idea that humans are (at least from that point on) really separate from the rest of the natural world. Not to mention one is already then committed to laying blame for oppressions onto a scapegoat: patriarchy, heterosexism, speciesism, or racism. In order to re-read humans as always and already a part of the natural world, I follow an idea put forth by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2007). Bruce Martin sums up their insight well. He writes: Human reason ‘degenerated’ as it imitated the nature it came to dominate; in so doing it created a vicious, lifeless circle of domination perpetuated by a ‘rational’ society that has come to dominate the individual as much as ‘nature’ ever did. (Martin 2011: 116) In other words, we could attribute our forward looking and deliberating brains that emerged from the rest of the evolutionary process and more specifically out of lines of hominids, to the location of our eyes in front of our skulls, our ears on the side of our heads that give us honing abilities, and our upright posture that made it easier for our ancestors to hunt. Such features orient us toward critically examining the evidence and making decisions toward and about things that are not immediately present or in the distance. These features, along with our opposable thumbs, set us up eventually in a fairly dominant position vis-à-vis other animals and species on the planet. These moments of mimetic excess or spaces of creative emergence eventually lead to hominization. As Girard notes, “We can conceive of hominization as a series of steps that allow for the domestication of progressively increasing and intense mimetic effects, separated from one another by crises that would be catastrophes but also generative in that they would trigger the founding mechanism and at each step provide for more rigorous prohibition within the group, and for a more ritual canalization toward the outside” (1987: 96).6 In other words, at each emergent level, an inside/outside is created that marks sameness off from that which is other. The patterns of sameness that led to success would be mimicked—as any useful evolutionary adaptation is—and over time the genetic lines that survived would see differences in brain structures that lead to something like critical reflection. Far from being intentional, such a “dominating” position is an emergent phenomenon from the spaces of mimetic excess when our species began taking advantage of emergent possibilities (rather than necessarily falling into the same patterns of the past). Eventually, reason becomes the key in human success and in the domination over other humans and the rest of the natural world. The repetition of such narratives of dominations has led to the “isms” of our species rather than any sort of inherent capacities or tendencies, and it is this type of narrative that has led to the refusal of our mimetic embeddedness and to the type of human exceptionalism that we are so familiar with and critical of. This desire for control makes sense in an evolutionary context in which hominids and Homo sapiens have largely been at the whim of a nature “red in tooth and claw.” At a time before modern technologies, mastery of nature would be an essential component of survival. Humans would be the victims of a nature that was uncaring and unkind. Nature then becomes the ultimate victim and scapegoat that the logic of mastery then sacrifices. As Girard notes: The accusation makes the victim responsible for the disorder and catastrophe, in other words for the crisis, that afflicts the community. … [The mistreatment of the victim] is an aggressive reaction against a victim that would not be killed if it were not held responsible for the mimetic crisis. (1987: 38) One important point that helps to argue for something like nature as victim in the ways in which I am arguing here is the writings of Francis Bacon and other authors of the early scientific method and scientific revolution. There is no clear reason as to why natural science had to understand nature as dead matter, religion as somehow subjective opinion, and science as an objective adventure. Philosophical and other literary works such as Bacon's New Atlantis had to teach people that science would replace the church, that it was okay to experiment on other animals, and that this would lead to human progress (Merchant 1980). What some have termed “literary lynchings” and “literary sacrifices” had to prepare the euro-western imagination for treating nature as if it were merely standing reserve and for creating the human logic of domination.7 Though the contemporary logic of domination has long forgotten its founding myth, the religious, philosophical, and scientific attempts to make humans exceptional all participate in this story. This recognition can help us to argue for and re-inscribe our continuity with the rest of the natural world in ways that might open our meaning-making practices up toward planetary concerns. If we understand our whole thought process as dependent upon mimetic structures and processes found in the rest of the natural world, then we can begin to see even our meaning-making practices as emerging out of and addressing these types of structures. As Girard notes, “Order in human culture certainly does arise from an extreme of disorder, for such disorder is the disappearance of any and all contested objects in the midst of conflict, and it is at such a point that acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis and tends toward the unification of conflict against an adversary” (1987: 28–29). Just as order seems to emerge out of chaos in other biological systems, so too in our cultural and religious systems; and, Girard argues, these moments of mimetic frenzy require some type of scapegoat, ritual, or expulsion of adversary if order is to be restored (1987: 30). However, there is in much of Girardian thought too much fear of chaos, hybridity, and disorder. Such a fear, or at least a desire to project order onto disorder where no real order exists, is actually part of the problem of a projective form of mimesis that leads to more and more disorder (or so I am arguing). In other words, perhaps mimetic identification with the rest of the natural world could provide an alternative way in which we can appreciate our difference and recognize our continuity without the need for continuing mass ecological destruction in the name of the enforced (dis)order of human exceptionalism. From this understanding, religions and philosophies have captured within their meaning-making structures certain truths expressed in the form of human thinking that can be found in other systems of the rest of the natural world: the balance between chaos and order, the sacrifice necessary for life to continue, and the inherent impossibility of any ultimate order or peace in the worlds that we currently inhabit. As Eric Schneider, Dorion Sagan, and other scientists that discuss non-equilibrium thermodynamics argue, equilibrium—or in this case ultimate order and peace—means death (Schneider and Sagan 2006). Perhaps this last insight is the reason that humans strive for some sort of transcendent resolution: every part of our being cries out against the seeming injustice of predator–prey, creative–destructive cycles, so our reason forces us to produce some sort of order that we just have not arrived at yet, in the case of religions, or imposes a logic of order on the entire planet, in the case of sciences. In any event, this type of understanding could help us understand our current planetary crises in a way that is in continuity with the ongoing creative–destructive processes of the planet. \*\*\*\*\*\*The Earth as Sacrificial Standing Reserve: The Logic of Domination One thing I find promising about the mechanism of mimesis as Girard understands it is that it has the potential to help re-write human thinking, including religious imaginings and scientific logic and reasoning, into the rest of the evolving planetary community, even if Girard himself did not imagine such a re-writing. If our human thinking operates according to mimetic structures, then they are in continuity with other repetitive cycles and systems in the cosmos and planet—as I argued above. In particular, I think that Girard's discussion of mimetic crisis has something to offer in terms of thinking about our current, global ecological problems. Girard argues that paroxysm is the result of certain points of conflictual mimesis within communities (1987: 26). At some points in human histories, the energy of mimetic excess must be released in moments of violence or breakdown. The repetitions of roles—defined in terms of gender, sex, sexuality, race, nationality, and even humanity—are always imperfect and lead to some type of remainder that is other from the repetitive role performances. This mimetic excess must be dealt with or the loss of all order and fall into chaos is risked (Girard 1987: 7). Religions, and I would argue the logic of domination found in reductive materialism, positivism, and scientism, all have ways of dealing with mimetic excess and releasing the violence that builds up. As Girard notes, “All modern ideologies are immense machines that justify and legitimate conflicts that in our time could put an end to humanity” (1987: 31). In other words, these systems must deal with mimetic excess, but they always risk violence. This is where the concept of the scapegoat comes in: as mimetic release. If, as I have argued, one of the dominant ideologies through which humans create meaning-making practices in the contemporary process of globalization relies on the logic of domination via science and technology, then perhaps the mimetic excess, the moment of paroxysm, can be understood as climate change and all the other environmental disasters we are faced with at this planetary moment. In the case of the effects of climate change especially, the human “community thinks of itself as entirely passive vis-à-vis its own victim, whereas” the rest of the natural world “appears by contrast, to be the only active and responsible agent in the matter” (Girard 1987: 27). We have now become victims of the excess of our own desire to impose order on the world. The logic of domination that imposes human desires and values upon the rest of the natural world and sets it up as standing reserve for humans returns in the form of climate change, huge storms, cancers, droughts, heat waves, and other acts of “nature” or “God” over which we poor humans have no control. In this case, the evolutionary fear of nature, leading to the imposition of order through repetition of the place of humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world, is creating terror, disorder, and chaos that are rising to a planetary frenzy.8 This mimetic excess, this abject remainder is the space of chaos and complexity, of creativity and destruction; but this excess demands some sort of recognition at threat of even greater destruction and chaos. Current rituals of scapegoating and release of this mimetic excess, in my opinion, only lead to projections of repressed mimesis. That is, “where the self as subject is projected onto the external world. The result is often fear of the other and subsequent attempts to master or dominate it” (Martin 2011: 120). In this case, “reversal of domination requires ‘mimetic identification’—that is internalization of the external that honors the particularity or individuality of the other” (Martin 2011: 120). We need new rituals and ways of thinking that help us to leave open spaces for mimetic excess, for the abject, and for creative emergence of possibilities toward planetary alternatives. I end this article with some ideas of what that might look like. Previous Section Next Section PART III: TRANSHUMANITY AND THE PLANETARY FUTURE: MIMETIC EXCESS, ABJECTION, AND SITES OF TRANSFORMATION Only the damming of mimetic forces by means of the prohibition and the diversion of these forces in the direction of ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the reconciliatory effect of the surrogate victim. … The Sacred is Violence. (Girard 1987: 32) The seemingly simple insight that Girard articulates here, that the sacred is violence, is a hard pill to swallow for many contemporary minds. The idea that the ground of being, that god or ultimate reality is somehow supposed to be peace, harmony, or some type of wholeness, may be the very idea that leads to much ecological and human violence today. We seek in our repetitions of actions and roles to enforce some type of order and balance upon the world that just does not exist. This desire to enforce equilibrium on the planet is actually wreaking havoc on humans and the rest of the planetary community. What if we begin our meaning-making practices from a space that suggests we are always already mixed up in a creative–destructive process of planetary becoming and that there is no ultimate explanation, end, or goal toward which all life can be conformed. This is what I have articulated elsewhere as a viable agnostic, planetary theology (Bauman 2009, 2014). Here I articulate three components of our meaning-making practices that might help us create points of mimetic identification with the abject: human thinking as “lines of flight,” thinking toward the trans-human, and planetary ethics of the “not yet.”

#### Their conception of death as a biological end to life denies way in which death is co-constitutive of life, enabling the foundation for all social exclusions against deviancy

Robinson 12. Andrew Robinson, political theorist and activist based in the UK, “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard: The Rise of Capitalism & the Exclusion of Death” Ceasefire Magazine, March 30, 2012, <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-2/>

The passage to capitalism: Symbolic exchange – or rather, its suppression – plays a central role in the emergence of capitalism. Baudrillard sees a change happening over time. Regimes based on symbolic exchange (differences are exchangeable and related) are replaced by regimes based on equivalence (everything is, or means, the same). Ceremony gives way to spectacle, immanence to transcendence. Baudrillard’s view of capitalism is derived from Marx’s analysis of value. Baudrillard accepts Marx’s view that capitalism is based on a general equivalent. Money is the general equivalent because it can be exchanged for any commodity. In turn, it expresses the value of abstract labour-time. Abstract labour-time is itself an effect of the regimenting of processes of life, so that different kinds of labour can be compared. Capitalism is derived from the autonomisation or separation of economics from the rest of life. It turns economics into the ‘reality-principle’. It is a kind of sorcery, connected in some way to the disavowed symbolic level. It subtly shifts the social world from an exchange of death with the Other to an eternal return of the Same. Capitalism functions by reducing everything to a regime based on value and the production of value. To be accepted by capital, something must contribute value. This creates an immense regime of social exchange. However, this social exchange has little in common with symbolic exchange. It ultimately depends on the mark of value itself being unexchangeable. Capital must be endlessly accumulated. States must not collapse. Capitalism thus introduces the irreversible into social life, by means of accumulation. According to Baudrillard, capitalism rests on an obsession with the abolition of death. Capitalism tries to abolish death through accumulation. It tries to ward off ambivalence (associated with death) through value (associated with life. But this is bound to fail. General equivalence – the basis of capitalism – is itself the ever-presence of death. The more the system runs from death, the more it places everyone in solitude, facing their own death. Life itself is fundamentally ambivalent. The attempt to abolish death through fixed value is itself deathly. Accumulation also spreads to other fields. The idea of progress, and linear time, comes from the accumulation of time, and of stockpiles of the past. The idea of truth comes from the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Biology rests on the separation of living and non-living. According to Baudrillard, such accumulations are now in crisis. For instance, the accumulation of the past is undermined, because historical objects now have to be concealed to be preserved – otherwise they will be destroyed by excessive consumption. Value is produced from the residue or remainder of an incomplete symbolic exchange. The repressed, market value, and sign-value all come from this remainder. To destroy the remainder would be to destroy value. Capitalist exchange is always based on negotiation, even when it is violent. The symbolic order does not know this kind of equivalential exchange or calculation. And capitalist extraction is always one-way. It amounts to a non-reversible aggression in which one act (of dominating or killing) cannot be returned by the other. It is also this regime which produces scarcity – Baudrillard here endorses Sahlins’ argument. Capitalism produces the Freudian “death drive”, which is actually an effect of the capitalist culture of death. For Baudrillard, the limit to both Marx and Freud is that they fail to theorise the separation of the domains they study – the economy and the unconscious. It is the separation which grounds their functioning, which therefore only occurs under the regime of the code. Baudrillard also criticises theories of desire, including those of Deleuze, Foucault, Freud and Lacan. He believes desire comes into existence based on repression. It is an effect of the denial of the symbolic. Liberated energies always leave a new remainder; they do not escape the basis of the unconscious in the remainder. Baudrillard argues that indigenous groups do not claim to live naturally or by their desires – they simply claim to live in societies. This social life is an effect of the symbolic. Baudrillard therefore criticises the view that human liberation can come about through the liberation of desire. He thinks that such a liberation will keep certain elements of the repression of desire active. Baudrillard argues that the processes which operate collectively in indigenous groups are repressed into the unconscious in metropolitan societies. This leads to the autonomy of the psyche as a separate sphere. It is only after this repression has occurred that a politics of desire becomes conceivable. He professes broad agreement with the Deleuzian project of unbinding energies from fixed categories and encouraging flows and intensities. However, he is concerned that capitalism can recuperate such releases of energy, disconnecting them so they can eventually reconnect to it. Unbinding and drifting are not fatal to capitalism, because capitalism itself unbinds things, and re-binds things which are unbound. What is fatal to it is, rather, reversibility. Capitalism continues to be haunted by the forces it has repressed. Separation does not destroy the remainder. Quite the opposite. The remainder continues to exist, and gains power from its repression. This turns the double or shadow into something unquiet, vampiric, and threatening. It becomes an image of the forgotten dead. Anything which reminds us of the repressed aspects excluded from the subject is experienced as uncanny and threatening. It becomes the ‘obscene’, which is present in excess over the ‘scene’ of what is imagined. This is different from theories of lack, such as the Lacanian Real. Baudrillard’s remainder is an excess rather than a lack. It is the carrier of the force of symbolic exchange. Modern culture dreams of radical difference. The reason for this is that it exterminated radical difference by simulating it. The energy of production, the unconscious, and signification all in fact come from the repressed remainder. Our culture is dead from having broken the pact with monstrosity, with radical difference. The West continues to perpetrate genocide on indigenous groups. But for Baudrillard, it did the same thing to itself first – destroying its own indigenous logics of symbolic exchange. Indigenous groups have also increasingly lost the symbolic dimension, as modern forms of life have been imported or imposed. This according to Baudrillard produces chronic confusion and instability. Gift-exchange is radically subversive of the system. This is not because it is rebellious. Baudrillard thinks the system can survive defections or exodus. It is because it counterposes a different ‘principle of sociality’ to that of the dominant system. According to Baudrillard, the mediations of capitalism exist so that nobody has the opportunity to offer a symbolic challenge or an irreversible gift. They exist to keep the symbolic at bay. The affective charge of death remains present among the oppressed, but not with the ‘properly symbolic rhythm’ of immediate retaliation. The Church and State also exist based on the elimination of symbolic exchange. Baudrillard is highly critical of Christianity for what he takes to be a cult of suffering, solitude and death. He sees the Church as central to the destruction of earlier forms of community based on symbolic exchange. Baudrillard seems to think that earlier forms of the state and capitalism retained some degree of symbolic exchange, but in an alienated, partially repressed form. For instance, the imaginary of the ‘social contract’ was based on the idea of a sacrifice – this time of liberty for the common good. In psychoanalysis, symbolic exchange is displaced onto the relationship to the master-signifier. I haven’t seen Baudrillard say it directly, but the impression he gives is that this is a distorted, authoritarian imitation of the original symbolic exchange. Nonetheless, it retains some of its intensity and energy. Art, theatre and language have worked to maintain a minimum of ceremonial power. It is the reason older orders did not suffer the particular malaise of the present. It is easy to read certain passages in Baudrillard as if he is bemoaning the loss of these kinds of strong significations. This is initially how I read Baudrillard’s work. But on closer inspection, this seems to be a misreading. Baudrillard is nostalgic for repression only to the extent that the repressed continued to carry symbolic force as a referential. He is nostalgic for the return of symbolic exchange, as an aspect of diffuse, autonomous, dis-alienated social groups. Death: Death plays a central role in Baudrillard’s theory, and is closely related to symbolic exchange. According to Baudrillard, what we have lost above all in the transition to alienated society is the ability to engage in exchanges with death. Death should not be seen here in purely literal terms. Baudrillard specifies early on that he does not mean an event affecting a body, but rather, a form which destroys the determinacy of the subject and of value – which returns things to a state of indeterminacy. Baudrillard certainly discusses actual deaths, risk-taking, suicide and so on. But he also sees death figuratively, in relation to the decomposition of existing relations, the “death” of the self-image or ego, the interchangeability of processes of life across different categories. For instance, eroticism or sexuality is related to death, because it leads to fusion and communication between bodies. Sexual reproduction carries shades of death because one generation replaces another. Baudrillard’s concept of death is thus quite similar to Bakhtin’s concept of the grotesque. Death refers to metamorphosis, reversibility, unexpected mutations, social change, subjective transformation, as well as physical death. According to Baudrillard, indigenous groups see death as social, not natural or biological. They see it as an effect of an adversarial will, which they must absorb. And they mark it with feasting and rituals. This is a way of preventing death from becoming an event which does not signify. Such a non-signifying event is absolute disorder from the standpoint of symbolic exchange. For Baudrillard, the west’s idea of a biological, material death is actually an idealist illusion, ignoring the sociality of death. Poststructuralists generally maintain that the problems of the present are rooted in the splitting of life into binary oppositions. For Baudrillard, the division between life and death is the original, founding opposition on which the others are founded. After this first split, a whole series of others have been created, confining particular groups – the “mad”, prisoners, children, the old, sexual minorities, women and so on – to particular segregated situations. The definition of the ‘normal human’ has been narrowed over time. Today, nearly everyone belongs to one or another marked or deviant category. The original exclusion was of the dead – it is defined as abnormal to be dead. “You livies hate us deadies”. This first split and exclusion forms the basis, or archetype, for all the other splits and exclusions – along lines of gender, disability, species, class, and so on. This discrimination against the dead brings into being the modern experience of death. Baudrillard suggests that death as we know it does not exist outside of this separation between living and dead. The modern view of death is constructed on the model of the machine and the function. A machine either functions or it does not. The human body is treated as a machine which similarly, either functions or does not. For Baudrillard, this misunderstands the nature of life and death. The modern view of death is also necessitated by the rise of subjectivity. The subject needs a beginning and an end, so as to be reducible to the story it tells. This requires an idea of death as an end. It is counterposed to the immortality of social institutions. In relation to individuals, ideas of religious immortality is simply an ideological cover for the real exclusion of the dead. But institutions try to remain truly immortal. Modern systems, especially bureaucracies, no longer know how to die – or how to do anything but keep reproducing themselves. The internalisation of the idea of the subject or the soul alienates us from our bodies, voices and so on. It creates a split, as Stirner would say, between the category of ‘man’ and the ‘un-man’, the real self irreducible to such categories. It also individualises people, by destroying their actual connections to others. The symbolic haunts the code as the threat of its own death. The society of the code works constantly to ward off the danger of irruptions of the symbolic. The mortal body is actually an effect of the split introduced by the foreclosure of death. The split never actually stops exchanges across the categories. In the case of death, we still ‘exchange’ with the dead through our own deaths and our anxiety about death. We no longer have living, mortal relationships with objects either. They are reduced to the instrumental. It is as if we have a transparent veil between us. Symbolic exchange is based on a game, with game-like rules. When this disappears, laws and the state are invented to take their place. It is the process of excluding, marking, or barring which allows concentrated or transcendental power to come into existence. Through splits, people turn the other into their ‘imaginary’. For instance, westerners invest the “Third World” with racist fantasies and revolutionary aspirations; the “Third World” invests the west with aspirational fantasies of development. In separation, the other exists only as an imaginary object. Yet the resultant purity is illusory. For Baudrillard, any such marking or barring of the other brings the other to the core of society. “We all” become dead, or mad, or prisoners, and so on, through their exclusion. The goal of ‘survival’ is fundamental to the birth of power. Social control emerges when the union of the living and the dead is shattered, and the dead become prohibited. The social repression of death grounds the repressive socialisation of life. People are compelled to survive so as to become useful. For Baudrillard, capitalism’s original relationship to death has historically been concealed by the system of production, and its ends. It only becomes fully visible now this system is collapsing, and production is reduced to operation. In modern societies, death is made invisible, denied, and placed outside society. For example, elderly people are excluded from society. People no longer expect their own death. As a result, it becomes unintelligible. It keeps returning as ‘nature which will not abide by objective laws’. It can no longer be absorbed through ritual. Western society is arranged so death is never done by someone else, but always attributable to ‘nature’. This creates a bureaucratic, judicial regime of death, of which the concentration camp is the ultimate symbol. The system now commands that we must not die – at least not in any old way. We may only die if law and medicine allow it. Hence for instance the spread of health and safety regulations. On the other hand, murder and violence are legalised, provided they can be re-converted into economic value. Baudrillard sees this as a regressive redistribution of death. It is wrested from the circuit of social exchanges and vested in centralised agencies. For Baudrillard, there is not a social improvement here. People are effectively being killed, or left to die, by a process which never treats them as having value. On the other hand, even when capitalism becomes permissive, inclusive and tolerant, it still creates an underlying anxiety about being reduced to the status of an object or a marionette. This appears as a constant fear of being manipulated. The slave remains within the master’s dialectic for as long as ‘his’ life or death serves the reproduction of domination. A fatal ontology?: In Fatal Strategies, Baudrillard suggests an ontology which backs up his analysis of death. The world itself is committed to extremes and to radical antagonism. It is bored of meaning. There is an ‘evil genie’, a principle of Evil which constantly returns in the form of seduction. Historical processes are really pushed forward by this principle. All energy comes from fission and rupture. These cannot be replaced by production or mechanical processes. There is no possibility of a collective project or a coherent society, only the operation of such forces. Every order exists only to be transgressed and dismantled. The world is fundamentally unreal. This leads to a necessity of irony, which is to say, the slippage of meaning. Historically, the symbolic was confined to the metaphysical. It did not affect the physical world. But with the rise of models, with the physical world derived increasingly from the code, the physical world is brought within the symbolic. It becomes reversible. The rational principle of linear causality collapses. The world is, and always remains, enigmatic. People will give for seduction or for simulation what they would never give for quality of life. Advertising, fashion, gambling and so on liberate ‘immoral energies’ which hark back to the magical or archaic gamble on the power of thought against the power of reality. Neoliberalism is in some ways an ultimate release of such diabolical forces. People will look for an ecstatic excess of anything – even boredom or oppression. In this account, the principle of evil becomes the only fixed point. Desire is not inescapable. What is inescapable is the object and its seduction, its ‘principle of evil’. The object at once submits to law and breaks it in practice, mocking it. Its own “game” cannot be discerned. It is a poor conductor of the symbolic order but a good conductor of signs. The drive towards spectacles, illusions and scenes is stronger than the desire for survival.

#### The alternative is a restructuring of analysis away from the discourse of the anthropos in favor of the atomic explosion of the cosmic artisan

Colebrook 14. Dr. Claire Colebrook, Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English, Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Letters, Doctor of Philosophy, *Death of the PostHuman: Essays on Extinction Vol. 1*, Michigan Publishing – University of Michigan Library, Ann Arbor, 2014, p. 110-115

If the first feature of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the cosmos is that it is not cosmopolitical—for the cosmos can occur as the deterritorialization of non-human forces—the second is that (at least in this plateau) it bears a direct relation to music. But this is the case only if music is defined as the relations of qualities and differences, the power to form inflections and rhythms from which something like the human practice and culture of music emerged: The T factor, the territorializing factor, must be sought elsewhere: precisely in the becoming-expressive of rhythm or melody, in other words, in the emergence of proper qualities (color, odor, sound, silhouette…). Can this becoming, this emergence, be called Art? That would make the territory the result of art. The artist: the first person to set out a boundary stone, or to make a mark. Property, collective or individual, is derived from that even when it is in the service of war and oppression. … The expressive is primary in relation to the possessive; expressive qualities, or matters of expression, are necessarily appropriative and constitute a having more profound than being. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 316) There is a pre-human and pre-organic music that is generated from the differential relations among expressive qualities: the beating out of a rhythm establishes a pulse or band of time from which something like a meter might be organized. There is an articulation of sounds into tonal inflections that provides the condition for something like a scale or melody (or phonemes). Before there is something like a language— a repeatable and formalized set of relations—there must be the formation of qualities and the creation of differences. (One can think here of Freud’s example of his grandson establishing a pulsation of Fort-Da, opposing two sounds across space and time, securing a territory that then enables the forming of a body and its world.) And it is here that we can tie Deleuze and Guattari’s plateau on the refrain (where cosmos is conceptualized) with Deleuze’s idea of a differential mode of thinking. Deleuze and Guattari insist that there is an autonomy or differential power in expressive qualities. Relatively stable terms or beings are formed from pure predicates or qualities. One might say that ‘man’ as a rational animal who is defined through the speaking-seeing-eating figure of the face and voice has a political composition (for it determines relations among human bodies) but this occurs after the entering-into-relation of certain qualities. Man is an animal assembled through the speaking-seeing face (itself composed racially of skin colors), the commanding voice (again enabled through the composition of a phonematic spectrum) and the organized body (effected by bringing the hand-eye-brain complex into relation.) There is, in this respect, nothing political about the cosmos as long as we take politics to be the relations of the polity. On the contrary, the most important events are micro-political: how did this figure of political man (with the eye of judgment, voice of reason and body of labor) come to be composed from the forces of chaos? Such a determination would have been enabled by certain expressive qualities—the potentialities of sound in the voice, of light in the seeing eye, of conceptual configurations in the reasoning brain. Such qualities are synthesized and coordinated to produce the man of politics. To define the proper destiny of man to be that of a cosmo-political animal is to contain thinking within the already formed bounds of the organism. A differential politics, by contrast, approaches the cosmos as a radical deterritorialization, freeing expressive qualities from a human-all-too-human composition: For there is no imagination outside of technique. The modern figure is not the child or the lunatic, still less the artist, but the cosmic artisan: a homemade atomic bomb—it’s very simple really, it’s been proven, it’s been done. To be an artisan and no longer an artist, creator, or founder, is the only way to become cosmic, to leave the milieus and the earth behind. The invocation to the Cosmos does not at all operate as a metaphor; on the contrary, the operation is an effective one, from the moment the artist connects a material with forces of consistency or consolidation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 345) How might we think this meditation on the limits of cosmopolitanism in concrete terms? What would Deleuze and Guattari’s suggested cosmic release of matters mean, or—more accurately, since it is no longer a question of meaning or symbols—how might such deterritorialization work? Consider one of the problems of the twenty-first century: water. At once crucial to life, water is also one of the elements whose relations to human organisms and polities exposes crucial fragilities, including water borne infections, floods, drought, rising sea levels and melting ice caps. Water has, of course, been politicized. In the 2008 documentary Trouble the Water Hurricane Katrina was an event that could not simply be referred to as a natural disaster but exposed political distributions: the absence of decisions, intentions, attention and sympathy that affected a certain geographical region of America that was also, of course, a racial and sexual region. More broadly, and also in 2008, Flow: For Love of Water charted the various ways in which corporations sold, channeled, marketed, restricted and managed water sales and supplies—rendering this most basic of human elements into a key political weapon and structuring cause. Such cinematic events gesture towards a traditional cosmopolitanism, both in presenting the local plight of Katrina to a world audience as an indictment of America and in exposing certain globalizing markets (of water) to a population of general human concern. The response to such demonstrations of political mapping would be some form of cosmopolitical activism: such concerns would—as in twenty-first climate change rhetoric more generally—be those of viability, sustainability and the maintenance of humanity. How will we live on, into the future, if this most basic of elements becomes politicized, becomes a weapon or resource that is subject to plays of power among humans? Another politics of water is also possible, one that would be musical in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense (if music refers to the relations established among expressive qualities and their capacity to create forms, territories, identities and to open to the cosmos). We can begin by thinking about water’s elemental or musical qualities (its semi-autonomous power to enter into relations beyond human polities) through Roman Polanski’s Chinatown of 1974. Ostensibly a detective drama about the theft and re-channeling of water that is political in the most traditional of senses—to do with local contests and human interests—the film also allows water to become a visual quality. This is not when water is seen or made visible but when its absence or inhuman power takes over the screen: set in a heat-wave, the drama is shot through a heat haze in which the flows of human perspiration are matched with a barely discernible visual fluidity that takes the form of a slightly out of focus point of view. It is as though beyond the political plays of power something of the cosmic force of water—its resistance to human manipulation, its brutal and inhuman potentiality—threatens the person-to-person drama of the plot. Chinatown is at once about a cosmopolitics of water—about the ways in which corporate powers can take over local management and resources—at the same time as it is counter-political in its presentation of water as expressive or sensuous matter; water is not just represented as a human commodity but also takes over the formal elements of the screen, becoming an element from which the visual field is composed. A more specifically musical mode of cosmic deterritorialization occurs in the American composer Sebastian Currier’s Next Atlantis string quartet (Currier 2008).4 Here, sounds of water (which have been electronically synthesized, becoming almost melodic) are interspersed with sounds from the string quartet, which take on the quality of ‘becoming-water.’ At once the most formed and mannered of genres, the string quartet enters into relation not with the forces of the earth as territory (where water, say, is a humanized, nationalized quality) but with the cosmic force of water—its capacity to enter into variation and bear a sonic power beyond that of the polity. One might refer to such uses of the sounds of the cosmos as deterritorializing in a higher sense: the form of the work—its relations of varying sounds in dialogue—is also its matter, the work is the synthesis and forming—deforming of the elemental sound of water. Why would such an opening to the cosmos be worth anything today? Is not the urgency of twenty-first century climate change a condition of such intensity that one must manage, now, as efficiently and bureaucratically as possible the sustainability of human life? Perhaps climate change calls for the most cosmopolitical of responses: the taking hold of the world’s resources away from nation states and local polities for the sake of the viability of ongoing life. Such an imperative would, though, be in the name of the sustaining of human life, and of human life as it is already formed, already politicized and already organized. If we were to think otherwise, and if the crises of the twenty-first century were to prompt us to think at all it may be in a cosmic and inhuman mode, asking—at least beginning to ask—what the elements of this earth are, what force they bear, how we are composed in relation to those forces. If climate change politics has taught us anything to date—if it has, and if there is an ‘us’ or ‘we’ who might learn from, or be destroyed by, such events—it is that information and data directed to the maintenance of the polity has not yielded any affective response. Climate change skepticism is increasing, and this possibly because the cosmic force of destruction is now pushing beyond the political imagination, beyond our capacity to imagine ourselves and others like us in a future that will not be an extension of the present. Perhaps something other than a discursive politics among communicating individuals needs to open up to forces that are not our own, to consider the elemental and inhuman, so that it might be possible to think what life may be worthy of living on. Such an approach would require a thought of the cosmos—of life and its durations—that would be destructive of the polity, that would not return all elements and forces into what they mean for ‘us.’

### 1nc – technocracy

#### Double Bind — either the harms are the 1ac are true and they cannot solve for their impacts before they control the levers of power which means you can vote negative on presumption OR their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which means you can vote negative on principle.

#### Their demand for a uniform rationality inculcates a violent technocratic eradication of irrationality while only recapitulating a tragic ontology of ressentiment.

Ossewaarde 10. Marinus Ossewaarde, Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Twente, “*The Tragic Turn in The Re-Imagination of Publics: Resentment and Ressentiment*,” Animus 14, 2010

For Nietzsche, the Heraclitean vision sees the truth about reality while tragedy subsequently transforms this unbearable absurdity of life into an aesthetic public, without masking the horror itself. The Socratic dialectic and its Apollonian publics intellectually involve people who are incited to search for the good in the realm of ideas, in spite of the phenomenological flux and absurdity of things. Dionysian publics do not try to check the becoming of reality, but instead, incite the participants to live it as art, by making them become part of the story itself. In Socratic dialogues, disputing friends critically question all established orders in their search for the rational or good order. Both the Dionysian and the Apollonian publics can disturb an established order and institutions. The urge to control drives bureaucracies, which, in order to effectively fix one type of reality, have to destroy all forms of publics that have the potential to upset order. In modern societies, bureaucracies impose an enlightenment model of rational order devoid of mythical content and uncertain self-knowledge, upon a reality that is thereby made fully intelligible, controllable and correctible. Nietzsche considers the European enlightenment as the modern successor to the Socratic myth-annihilation, which characterizes the Apollonian publics.8 The enlightenment movement’s confidence in the capacity of reason and its belief in the rational order of reality are Socratic in origin. However, Nietzsche suggests that the enlightenment goes steps further than Socrates in its annihilation of myth. Although Socrates ridicules and destroys the legendary tales of the tragedians, his dialogues are premised upon the myth of the Delphic oracle (which revealed that there was no one wiser than Socrates). And, although Socrates maintains that reason rather than myth is the foundation of European culture, reason, the nous, is itself a mythical entity (Nietzsche 2000: 72): the ‘voice of reason’ is the ‘divine voice’ of Socrates’ daimonion, which makes itself be heard in the dialogues (Nietzsche 2000: 75). In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, inspired by Nietzsche (c.f., Wellmer 1991: 3), maintain that the enlightenment movement postulates a vision of reason that is devoid of mythical content. Enlightenment reason, in its origin, seeks to make people think for themselves and to liberate them from their fears and superstitions, but, in the modernization process, it becomes an instrument that serves bureaucratic objectives, such as enforcing laws effectively, fixing a machine, or making a business run more efficiently.9 Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 57) emphasize that Nietzsche, like Hegel before him, had grasped this pathology of enlightenment reason that turns into a bureaucratic instrument. The reduction of the Socratic nous to an instrumental reason has far-reached political and cultural implications. Enlightenment reason provides the static concepts, mummified categories, classifications and catalogues that are required to construct bureaucratic limits and boundaries, which in turn rationally order reality (Honneth 2007: 70). Dialogical or democratic practices have no place in such a technical organization of reality. Bureaucracies, whose function is to implement the enlightenment or any other theoretical model of reality, have no need for the Socratic publics and consider dialogues and the need for intellectual justification rather troublesome and disorderly (Gouldner 1973: 76; Gardiner 2004: 35). The (potential) participants of Socratic dialogues are turned into bureaucratic subjects, like workers, consumers and clients, that is, into ‘spectators without influence’, whose lives are governed by the enlightened power elites and civil servants (Honneth 2007: 33). The identity of bureaucratic subjects is determined by typically large and powerful organizations, such as government agencies and enterprises (Mills 1956: 355). The Enlightenment movement is, in Nietzsche’s words (2000: 85), ‘the most illustrious opponent of the tragic world-view.’ Horkheimer and Adorno stress that the enlightenment movement, or perhaps more exactly, some kind of process deriving from it, eventually comes to substitute the plebeian entertainment of mass culture industries for the tragic art of the aesthetic publics. According to Nietzsche, bureaucratic subjects who live in a disenchanted world in which myths are annihilated by Apollonian reason cannot bear the horrific and absurd truth about their own existence.10 The subjects of the culture industries no longer have the opportunity to participate in enchanting tragic myths that cultivate powerful passions and the Dionysian will to live, which characterize Nietzsche’s ‘good European’. The entertainment provided by manufactured images and commodity forms, like music productions, films, television programmes and glossy magazines, ensures that the absurdity of life and the Dionysian abyss are forgotten (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007: 159).11 Being thoroughly rationalized, such subjects cannot develop the mythical imagination or a certain sensitivity that would have allowed them to ‘live the tragedy’ in and through the aesthetic publics. In a bureaucratic culture, subjects cannot experience, feel or live the tragic fate of the Dionysian hero, because, as Nietzsche (2000: 45) insists, shielded by bureaucracies, they are not ‘equipped for the most delicate and intense suffering.’ Bureaucracies expect and demand passive obedience from their subjects, which makes cultural movement nearly impossible. Such passive spectators or so-called ‘consumers of art’ (Shrum 1991: 349; 371), are, Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 155; 166) point out, deluded en masse, governed to take refuge in comfortable, boring and mindless bureaucratic forms of entertainment. Culture industries provide ready-made experiences to a passive public that is willing to buy them to fill the emptiness of a disenchanted world and appease the cowardly fear of living in the flux, which they explicitly experience in temporary relationships and the continuous flow of new products and changed consumption patterns. The experience of the flux can also be more implicit or unconscious, resulting in a sort of malaise, feeling of insecurity or restlessness. However, the escape from life into a manufactured dream-world of cultural productions does not really quench the thirst, as the Socratic dialogue and the Dionysian festival do, which, therefore, allows the culture industry to carry on with its provision of manufactured dream-worlds, to fill an emptiness that never decreases.

### 1nc – case

#### The attempt to make the world transparent through information and research is self-defeating. More knowledge fails to change reality. Facts and evidence are uniquely dissuasive.

Baudrillard 81. Jean, He is French, “*Simulacra and Simulations*,” pg. 79-81

We live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning. Consider three hypotheses. Either information produces meaning (a negentropic factor), but cannot make up for the brutal loss of signification in every domain. Despite efforts to reinject message and content, meaning is lost and devoured faster than it can be reinjected. In this case, one must appeal to a base productivity to replace failing media. This is the whole ideology of free speech, of media broken down into innumerable individual cells of transmission, that is, into "antimedia" (pirate radio, etc.). Or information has nothing to do with signification. It is something else, an operational model of another order, outside meaning and of the circulation of meaning strictly speaking. This is Shannon's hypothesis: a sphere of information that is purely functional, a technical medium that does not imply any finality of meaning, and thus should also not be implicated in a value judgment. A kind of code, like the genetic code: it is what it is, it functions as it does, meaning is something else that in a sense comes after the fact, as it does for Monod in Chance and Necessity. In this case, there would simply be no significant relation between the inflation of information and the deflation of meaning. Or, very much on the contrary, there is a rigorous and necessary correlation between the two, to the extent that information is directly destructive of meaning and signification, or that it neutralizes them. The loss of meaning is directly linked to the dissolving, dissuasive action of information, the media, and the mass media. The third hypothesis is the most interesting but flies in the face of every commonly held opinion. Everywhere socialization is measured by the exposure to media messages. Whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial. Everywhere information is thought to produce an accelerated circulation of meaning, a plus value of meaning homologous to the economic one that results from the accelerated rotation of capital. Information is thought to create communication, and even if the waste is enormous, a general consensus would have it that nevertheless, as a whole, there be an excess of meaning, which is redistributed in all the interstices of the social just as consensus would have it that material production, despite its dysfunctions and irrationalities, opens onto an excess of wealth and social purpose. We are all complicitous in this myth. It is the alpha and omega of our modernity, without which the credibility of our social organization would collapse. Well, the fact is that it is collapsing, and for this very reason: because where we think that information produces meaning, the opposite occurs. /////// Information devours its own content. It devours communication and the social. And for two reasons. 1. Rather than creating communication, it exhausts itself in the act of staging communication. Rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of meaning. A gigantic process of simulation that is very familiar. The nondirective interview, speech, listeners who call in, participation at every level, blackmail through speech: "You are concerned, you are the event, etc." More and more information is invaded by this kind of phantom content, this homeopathic grafting, this awakening dream of communication. A circular arrangement through which one stages the desire of the audience, the antitheater of communication, which, as one knows, is never anything but the recycling in the negative of the traditional institution, the integrated circuit of the negative. Immense energies are deployed to hold this simulacrum at bay, to avoid the brutal desimulation that would confront us in the face of the obvious reality of a radical loss of meaning. It is useless to ask if it is the loss of communication that produces this escalation in the simulacrum, or whether it is the simulacrum that is there first for dissuasive ends, to short-circuit in advance any possibility of communication (precession of the model that calls an end to the real). Useless to ask which is the first term, there is none, it is a circular process that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. The hyperreality of communication and of meaning. More real than the real, that is how the real is abolished. Thus not only communication but the social functions in a closed circuit, as a lure to which the force of myth is attached. Belief, faith in information attach themselves to this tautological proof that the system gives of itself by doubling the signs of an unlocatable reality. But one can believe that this belief is as ambiguous as that which was attached to myths in ancient societies. One both believes and doesn't. One does not ask oneself, "I know very well, but still." A sort of inverse simulation in the masses, in each one of us, corresponds to this simulation of meaning and of communication in which this system encloses us. To this tautology of the system the masses respond with ambivalence, to deterrence they respond with disaffection, or with an always enigmatic belief. Myth exists, but one must guard against thinking that people believe in it: this is the trap of critical thinking that can only be exercised if it presupposes the naivete and stupidity of the masses. 2. Behind this exacerbated mise-en-scène of communication, the mass media, the pressure of information pursues an irresistible destructuration of the social. Thus information dissolves meaning and dissolves the social, in a sort of nebulous state dedicated not to a surplus of innovation, but, on the contrary, to total entropy.\*1 Thus the media are producers not of socialization, but of exactly the opposite, of the implosion of the social in the masses. And this is only the macroscopic extension of the implosion of meaning at the microscopic level of the sign. This implosion should be analyzed according to McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, the consequences of which have yet to be exhausted. That means that all contents of meaning are absorbed in the only dominant form of the medium. Only the medium can make an event whatever the contents, whether they are conformist or subversive. A serious problem for all counterinformation, pirate radios, antimedia, etc. But there is something even more serious, which McLuhan himself did not see. Because beyond this neutralization of all content, one could still expect to manipulate the medium in its form and to transform the real by using the impact of the medium as form. If all the content is wiped out, there is perhaps still a subversive, revolutionary use value of the medium as such. That is and this is where McLuhan's formula leads, pushed to its limit there is not only an implosion of the message in the medium, there is, in the same movement, the implosion of the medium itself in the real, the implosion of the medium and of the real in a sort of hyperreal nebula, in which even the definition and distinct action of the medium can no longer be determined. Even the "traditional" status of the media themselves, characteristic of modernity, is put in question. McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, which is the key formula of the era of simulation (the medium is the message the sender is the receiver the circularity of all poles the end of panoptic and perspectival space such is the alpha and omega of our modernity), this very formula must be imagined at its limit where, after all the contents and messages have been volatilized in the medium, it is the medium itself that is volatilized as such. Fundamentally, it is still the message that lends credibility to the medium, that gives the medium its determined, distinct status as the intermediary of communication. Without a message, the medium also falls into the indefinite state characteristic of all our great systems of judgment and value. A single model, whose efficacy is immediate, simultaneously generates the message, the medium, and the "real." Finally, the medium is the message not only signifies the end of the message, but also the end of the medium. There are no more media in the literal sense of the word (I'm speaking particularly of electronic mass media) that is, of a mediating power between one reality and another, between one state of the real and another. Neither in content, nor in form. Strictly, this is what implosion signifies. The absorption of one pole into another, the short-circuiting between poles of every differential system of meaning, the erasure of distinct terms and oppositions, including that of the medium and of the real thus the impossibility of any mediation, of any dialectical intervention between the two or from one to the other. Circularity of all media effects. Hence the impossibility of meaning in the literal sense of a unilateral vector that goes from one pole to another. One must envisage this critical but original situation at its very limit: it is the only one left us. It is useless to dream of revolution through content, useless to dream of a revelation through form, because the medium and the real are now in a single nebula whose truth is indecipherable. The fact of this implosion of contents, of the absorption of meaning, of the evanescence of the medium itself, of the reabsorption of every dialectic of communication in a total circularity of the model, of the implosion of the social in the masses, may seem catastrophic and desperate. But this is only the case in light of the idealism that dominates our whole view of information. We all live by a passionate idealism of meaning and of communication, by an idealism of communication through meaning, and, from this perspective, it is truly the catastrophe of meaning that lies in wait for us. But one must realize that "catastrophe" has this "catastrophic" meaning of end and annihilation only in relation to a linear vision of accumulation, of productive finality, imposed on us by the system. Etymologically, the term itself only signifies the curvature, the winding down to the bottom of a cycle that leads to what one could call the "horizon of the event," to an impassable horizon of meaning: beyond that nothing takes place that has meaning for us but it suffices to get out of this ultimatum of meaning in order for the catastrophe itself to no longer seem like a final and nihilistic day of reckoning, such as it functions in our contemporary imaginary. Beyond meaning, there is the fascination that results from the neutralization and the implosion of meaning. Beyond the horizon of the social, there are the masses, which result from the neutralization and the implosion of the social. What is essential today is to evaluate this double challenge the challenge of the masses to meaning and their silence (which is not at all a passive resistance) the challenge to meaning that comes from the media and its fascination. All the marginal, alternative efforts to revive meaning are secondary in relation to that challenge. Evidently, there is a paradox in this inextricable conjunction of the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed [informe] or informed [informée] masses, or is it the masses who victoriously resist the media by directing or absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them? Sometime ago, in "Requiem for the Media," I analyzed and condemned the media as the institution of an irreversible model of communication without a response. But today? This absence of a response can no longer be understood at all as a strategy of power, but as a counterstrategy of the masses themselves when they encounter power. What then? Are the mass media on the side of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation of meaning, in the violence perpetrated on meaning, and in fascination? Is it the media that induce fascination in the masses, or is it the masses who direct the media into the spectacle? Mogadishu-Stammheim: the media make themselves into the vehicle of the moral condemnation of terrorism and of the exploitation of fear for political ends, but simultaneously, in the most complete ambiguity, they propagate the brutal charm of the terrorist act, they are themselves terrorists, insofar as they themselves march to the tune of seduction (cf. Umberto Eco on this eternal moral dilemma: how can one not speak of terrorism, how can one find a good use of the media there is none). The media carry meaning and countermeaning, they manipulate in all directions at once, nothing can control this process, they are the vehicle for the simulation internal to the system and the simulation that destroys the system, according to an absolutely Mobian and circular logic and it is exactly like this. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution. With one caution. We are face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand he responds with a double strategy. To the demand of being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance, that is to say, exactly the opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total dependence, passivity, idiocy. Neither strategy has more objective value than the other. The subject-resistance is today unilaterally valorized and viewed as positive just as in the political sphere only the practices of freedom, emancipation, expression, and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable and subversive. But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning precisely the practices of the masses that we bury under the derisory terms of alienation and passivity. The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of voting, producing, deciding, speaking, participating, playing the game a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood. But this strategy is more reflective of the earlier phase of the system, and even if we are still confronted with it, it is no longer the strategic terrain: the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and of the spoken word or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception. It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. This strategy (if one can still speak of strategy) prevails today, because it was ushered in by that phase of the system which prevails. To choose the wrong strategy is a serious matter. All the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation, on the resurrection of a subject of history, of the group, of the word based on "consciousness raising," indeed a "raising of the unconscious" of subjects and of the masses, do not see that they are going in the direction of the system, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech.

#### Vote neg on presumption – the net benefit is case

McWhorter 92. – assistant professor of philosophy at Northeast Missouri State University (Ladelle, “Guilt As Management Technology”, *Heidegger & The Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy*)

Thinking today must concern itself with the earth. Wherever we turn — on newsstands, on the airwaves, and in even the most casual of conversations everywhere — we are inundated by predictions of ecological catastrophe and omnicidal doom. And many of these predictions bear themselves out in our own experience. We now live with the ugly, painful, and impoverish­ing consequences of decades of technological innovation and expansion without restraint, of at least a century of disastrous "natural resource management" policies, and of more than two centuries of virtually unchecked industrial pollution — consequences that include the fact that millions of us on any given day are suffering, many of us dying of diseases and malnutrition that are the results of humanly produced ecological devastation; the fact that thousands of species now in existence will no longer exist on this planet by the turn of the century; the fact that our planet's climate has been altered, probably irreversibly, by the carbon dioxide and chloro­fluorocarbons we have heedlessly poured into our atmosphere; and the mind-boggling fact that it may now be within humanity's power to destroy all life on this globe. Our usual response to such prophecies of doom is to ignore them or, when we cannot do that, to scramble to find some way to manage our problems, some quick solution, some technological fix. But over and over again new resource management techniques, new solutions, new technologies disrupt delicate systems even further, doing still more damage to a planet already dangerously out of ecological balance. Our ceaseless interventions seem only to make things worse, to perpetuate a cycle of human activity followed by ecological disaster followed by human intervention followed by a new disaster of another kind. In fact, it would appear that our trying to do things, change things, fix things cannot be the solution, because it is part of the problem itself. But, if we cannot act to solve our problems, what should we do? Heidegger’s work is a call to reflect, to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger’s call and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach, if we still believe that thinking’s only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do — nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox; how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger’s call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, “the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.”‘ Heidegger’s work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human. What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater fuency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical envi¬ronmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness, a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery'. It would be easy to imagine that by ‘the mystery’ Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But ‘the mystery’ is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the relevation of new truths. Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together. Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.4 Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world. The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, “The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe.”‘ Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed. This dream of Hawking’s is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything. But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control the mystery, the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur. The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows — not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission — but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking — couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent — is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream. And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves — selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity — are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it — as rationally self- interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent — is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age. Those configurations of forces will resist this thinking. Their resistance will occur in many forms. However, one of the most common ways that modern calculative selfhood will attempt to reinstate itself in the face of Heidegger’s paradoxical call to think the earth is by employing a strategy that has worked so well so many times before: it will feel guilty. Those of us who are white know this strategy very well. Confronted with our racism, we respond not by working to dismantle the structures that perpetuate racism but rather by feeling guilty. Our energy goes into self-rebuke, and the problems pointed out to us become so painful for us to contemplate that we keep our distance from them. Through guilt we paralyze ourselves. Thus guilt is a marvelous strategy for maintaining the white racist self. Those of us who are women have sometimes watched this strategy employed by the caring, liberal-minded men in our lives. When we have exposed sexism, pressed our criticisms and our claims, we have seen such men — the ‘good’ men, by far the most responsive men — deflate, apologize, and ask us to forgive. But seldom have we seen honest attempts at change. Instead we have seen guilt deployed as a cry for mercy or pity on the status quo; and when pity is not forthcoming we have seen guilt turn to rage, and we have heard men ask, “Why are you punishing us?” The primary issue then becomes the need to attend to the feelings of those criticized rather than to their oppressive institutions and behaviors. Guilt thus protects the guilty. Guilt is a facet of power; it is not a reordering of power or a signal of oppression’s end. Guilt is one of the modern managerial self’s maneuvers of self-defense. Of course guilt does not feel that way. It feels like something unchosen, something we undergo. It feels much more like self-abuse than self-defense. But we are shaped, informed, produced in our very selves by the same forces of history that have created calculative, technological revealing. Inevitably, whenever we are confronted with the unacceptability of what is foundational for our lives, those foundations exert force to protect themselves. The exertion, which occurs as and in the midst of very real pain, is not a conscious choice; but that does not lessen — in fact it strengthens — its power as a strategy of self-defense. Calculative, technological thinking struggles to defend and maintain itself through us and as us. Some men feel guilty about sexism; many white people feel guilty about racism; most of us feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncracies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe should be changed. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint upon our lives, a seemingly permanent state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not respond to it simply by deploring our decadent life-styles and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. Heidegger’s call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. When we respond to Heidegger’s call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West (and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West) is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences. It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked the question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbors do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioral control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics in the modern world at least very frequently functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals. Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crises by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems — problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales, the destruction of the ozone, the rain forests, the wetlands — lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behavior better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In other words, when we respond to Heidegger’s call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns. Thus guilt — as affirmation of human agential power over against passive matter — is just another way of covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live with the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world. Thinking along Heidegger’s paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding “the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.” It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves.

### 2nr – mimesis o/v

This debate is between two competing approaches to viewing the environment – while their approach conceptualizes nature as an irrational force that must be managed into submission by a unified humanity, the alternative understands being not as unitary subjects constituted by desire but rather understands desire itself as an autonomous and formative force, maintaining the possibility for moving humanity beyond domination into an acceptance of the flux and contingency which is at the core of nature.

[need LINK EXPLANATION here OR do it on the perm]

We are winning a linear disad to their conception of the climate which they have not sufficiently come to terms with which is the mimesis argument

First – key framing issue – they that non-compliance is inevitable – they will always have something against their goal – countries that view carbon emissions as key to their economy, Trump supporters that think you are a Chinese spy – it isn’t a question of whether they can solve this resistance but rather how they interact with it – this should frame the link level and their ability to solve – two reasons that leads to violence

First is ANTI-ECOLOGY – the approach of the 1AC locks us in a never-ending war against nature – the complex nature of nature necessities ever-more complex technology, spiraling risk out of control, rendering the smallest hiccup terminally catastrophic

This means EVEN IF they win the aff doesn’t lead to disaster in the short term it locks in a broader system that makes destruction inevitable – we don’t have to win that THEY SPECIFICALLY cause the impacts but rather that their cohesion of nature does

Second is CLEANSING – they will lash out violently against the inevitable resistance to their movement – as the agents of life, empires launch wars against non-compliance, akin to the Iraq war with soldiers in green masks. With CO2 as the enemy and the stakes being our existence as a species, all becomes permissible: crops turn to dust in the wake of carpet bombs, military ventures seize resources for innovation, soot initiates nuclear winter, and the stakes of the game force us into an any-means-necessary sprint towards extinction

Turns case – this destruction annihilates any chance at solving the environment – war is a magnifier for all of their impacts

The alternative is a comparatively better orientation – rather than taking the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world which affirms a pluralism of movements that do not desire perfection like the aff

By understanding being not as unitary subjects constituted by desire but rather desire itself as an autonomous and force, the alternative maintains the possibility for moving humanity beyond domination into an acceptance of the flux and contingency which is at the core of nature. Rather than take the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world

### 2nr – competing movements o/v

This debate is between two competing approaches to environmental movements in the face of the anthropocene – their movement is one that constructs humanity as a divine unified savior that will manage nature into rationality which can be counterposed against the alternative as a recognition of our inability to cohere the world and an affirmation of humility, constructing movements around intersecting desires rather than the unified imperative of the aff

[need LINK explanation here OR do it on the perm]

If we win that a construction of movements around intersecting desires is preferable to rational cohesion you vote neg

We are winning 2 disads to their approach:

The first is XENOPHOBIA – their project of coherency demands a fear of irrationality, instilling a xenophobia within the psyche – as the vanguard with the goal of a perfect rational politic, they will stop at nothing to reach their goal, inevitably purging populations marked as deviant in liberal wars

Think of the Cultural Revolution with the goal of creating only perfectly rational scholarship – they will always exclude any moment of irrationality, any vestige of traditional knowledge that could threaten their goal

Two impacts:

First is LASHOUT – they will always purge small pieces of deviance from their coalitionary agreements which preventing larger change – they will never be able to get other countries on board with their climate pact because the moment they suggest that they cut a few less emissions, take a little less blame, or do anything against their goal will be purged and marked as irrational, alienating them from their supposed “common goal” and ensuring non-compliance

Second is VIOLENCE – largely explained above – as the vanguard of a perfect politic, they will always purge deviance, marking women as “hysterical” or queers as deviant a la the Cultural Revolution as explained above

They have conceded a key impact framing argument which is that this violence disproportionally effects racialized bodies and sustains racism which is a moral imperative to reject and ethics necessarily come before extinction.

The second is the VALUE DA – they locate the locus for subject formation in the climate catastrophe, separating self-worth from individual desire. The plurality of ways that individuals desire action are homogenized under their framework to the one true way, framed as divine – this by definition eradicates the potential for value creation as we no longer can literally do what we subjectively value, rendering all debates lifeless alienated husks – think of forcing hard-core Libertarians to campaign for cap-and-trade

This is necessarily prior – even if they win that their movements are more effective questions of psychology and value are piror – material fixes to the squo only matter if those who experience the change have the capacity for joy – it doesn’t matter if they save some lives if we all wish we were dead

This turns case for two reasons: first is DISINTREST – they will never access movements because individual members have no investment in the project and therefore remain disinterested and leave as soon as is possible which means that the only chance at creating motivated movements and collective action is voting neg

You should ignore their enlightenment idealism in favor of the necessary realization of the alternative that not everyone is as hyped about their plan as they are

Second is PASSIVITY – they will always view their movement through the lens of insufficiency, ultimately turning inward and inducing passivity as our inability to cleanse being of contingency creates feelings of impotence, negating the will to act and internal link turning their activism arguments on framework

Now the alternative recognizes our inability to cohere humanity into one set movement, instead affirming intersections of desires in climate movements on an individual basis, creating a pluralism of movements that engage populations without rallying around a perfect solution. Rather than take the epoch of climate change as a chance to reassert human will and rationality over nature, we take it as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world.

### 2nr – link explanation

The affirmative and the alternative are incommensurate - we’ll isolate a few links here

1. The framing page – taking actions for the sole sake of protecting humanity from anthropogenic warming is obviously mutually exclusive with the alternative’s refusal of the concept of the human
2. by formulating/imagining an alternative world wherein emissions are stabilized/etc, they reaffirm humanities ability to shape the world and nature and overcome flux – this link will be explained in depth on the framework debate
3. by viewing the environment as commodity that can be controlled through the ability and necessity for humans to change nature to benefit humanity they just reassert human dominance over nature rather than viewing it as something that we exist as a part of
4. by predicating life on a binaristic exclusion of death, and by claiming access to a secure world without [1ac impacts], they ensure an inability to live in the flux of now – by constantly securing ourselves against death we can never become content with the chaos of the status quo

### 2nr – death k

The link we’re going for is the 1AC’s CONCEPTION OF DEATH – extend robinson – to the 1AC the doctrine of life necessitates the prohibition of death.

Predicating life on a binaristic exclusion of death has a few impacts.

1. Ressentiment. Chaos is inevitable. The 1ac’s project of claiming access to a world sans the impacts ensures an inability to value now. This drive to security is a slippery slope in which we become never content with the status quo. This constantly defers value to an unattainable future which guts the possibility for enjoying life. Ressentiment outweighs because it is the psychic state through which all impacts are filtered.

2. Racism – there are two internal links

a. fear of death causes knee-jerk, xenophobic reactions when we perceive groups to be threatening the regime of biological life. The war in Iraq, the post-9/11 islamophobia, and the narrative of the “black thug” are all constructed out of a fear of death.

b. Their construction of death-as-biological submits to a trope that was used to justify the degradation of black and red bodies as less cognitive or ‘closer to death’ than the white counterparts. It elevates rational beings to an ontological pedestal while dispensing of those deemed less rational.

They cannot articulate the reasoning behind why some beings are privileged over others which is presumptive level defense.

In the context of the link, the alternative is a recognition of our inability to cohere the world against death and an affirmation of humility, constructing movements around intersecting desires rather than the unified imperative of eliminating all risk of death – by taking [1ac impacts] as an opportunity for the humble realization of the ineptitude of rationality as a filter through which we engage with the world, we affirm a pluralism of movements without the exclusion of the aff

### 2nr – technocracy

Our interpretation is that you should evaluate the round based upon competing affect

All of debate operates on the level of affect – speaking activities can only function through affective persuasion. Foregoing this analysis means erasing the very existence of debate itself. Your ballot is not a referendum on the fiated plan but rather its affective impact derived from its presentation

This solves their theory arguments – it’s predictable and fair

We can lose framework and still win this debate – just evaluate the K as an impact turn

we have a technocracy disad to their interpretation – their understanding of fiat reduces the political field to one of rationality. Positing that winning cost/benefit analysis is the condition for plan passage flattens all consideration of emotion, persuasion, bias and the autonomy of affect. This prioritization of reason causes a demonization of the socius as a group of biased and emotive individuals who refuse to base opinions of reason. This induces a valorization of expertism, institutions and technocratic solutions to warming for they arise as the embodiment of what Nietzsche describes as the Cartesian king – a disembodied mass fronting pure reason. This tethers agency to institutions whilst legitimating the erasure of public deliberation for individuals are viewed as a plague of irrationality. This is uniquely true in context of the affirmative for their globalization project seeks to create a model of engagement for individuals to follow which alienates the actions of each member from internal desire – thereby mass producing subjects who maintain no interest in the movement and drop like flies.

Specifically, this causes a retreat back into debate instead of turning outward for it is the only space that exists through erasing the sticky web of social relations in favor of a tabula-rasa ethos of reason.

### ---double bind

[At the top the 1AR has conceded] the double bind portion of the K – either the 1AC extinction impacts happen before they can get their hands on the levers of power which means you vote neg on presumption or the harms were constructed for alarmism which makes them war mongers –

Evaluate questions of form prior to questions of content. Before you can evaluate whether or not the substance of the 1AC is good you should evaluate whether or not the form in which it was read should exist. If we win our framework disads you vote neg even if we don’t win the K because they’re independent offense against the 1AC’s approach towards debate

### ---ressentiment o/w

Ressentiment outweighs – it creates subjects that live life through a depressed and pessimistic lens, always finding flaws in reality and deferring value to some unattainable future. Psychological wellbeing should come first because it preconfigures every other impact. One cannot enjoy material pleasures if they always view the world as insufficient. Overcoming ressentiment is a prior question to the ability to ever experience pleasure which is ultimately what we are all striving for.

### 2nr – information k

extend baudrillard – The 1AC operates on an understanding of the debate that we criticize. Injection of more knowledge is uniquely dissuasive – if we win this there’s no way they can win the k – without a completing understanding of the world you should default to an acceptance of the inability to cohere knowledge

The impact turns case – information decreases meaning – the affirmative is MSNBC vs. FOX news in the global warming debate where each side produces all of the evidence in support of their position and everybody only becomes more adamant in their pre-existing political opinions. This accounts for the status quo nature of congress where ideologues are arbitrary and contrary – this turns all of their political engagement good arguments – that’s mcwhorter

You evaluate this prior to the affirmative because the form with which they present the 1AC should be evaluated before the content.

This turns case because the mass production of information is what spreads climate denialism

## vs fopo adv

### 1nc – k

#### The aff’s political theology is the legacy of American Calvinism – a political religion sustained by the will to global dominance, belief in our destiny to manage the world, attempts to overcome past atrocities by new purifying actions, and belief in the idea that we are redeemed by sacred objects like the plan

Wellman 15. James, Professor and Chair of Comparative Religion at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. “Empire of Sacrifice: Violence and the Sacred in American Culture.” In Can We Survive Our Origins?: Readings in René Girard's Theory of Violence and the Sacred, Studies in Violence, Mimesis, & Culture

Continuing to explore and diversify Jon Pahl’s theme, I will argue that the seed of American preemption (i.e., the myth of American preeminence, insofar as it rests on violence—“containing” it, but also recycling it in the guise of preemptive aggression at home or abroad) lies in a form of religious sadism. Girard, by virtue of the defi nition of desire given in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, argues that the driving force of culture is, at its heart, “metaphysical desire.” He suggests that “mimetic desire,” whereby humans imitate the desire of the other and then use this mediator-model as a motivating source, 82 Jon Pahl and James Wellman are seeking to borrow from him godlike qualities and the power to exist in a godlike mode. Of course, for Girard, this ferocious need always “ends in enslavement, failure, and shame” (1961, 176). Since these desires are always just beyond reach, so that desire is thwarted and rivalries form, which in the end produce conflict and violence, and eventuate in scapegoating. Blood is shed, and through these confl icts, the archaic process of sacralizing the victim produces a new—if fragile and provisional—glow of unity and potential prosperity. The cycle of violence contained by sacrifice continues as a natural fl ow of cultural construction. We might protest against this bloody dynamic of history, but as Walter Benjamin remarked, “Th ere is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (Benjamin 1968, 256). Indeed, Girard argues that the sacralizing process is precisely the way in which this barbarism is transmogrifi ed into myth, so that the community’s “founding murder” becomes the community’s project of salvation. In America, the ongoing violence (against Native peoples, slaves, women, and minorities of every kind) has been authorized by a specific type of Christianity—an American Calvinism, which is enrolled and mobilized in the process of sacralizing and rationalizing forms of preemptive war, thus producing a myth that vindicates American forms of exceptionalist nationalism, and justifi es steps taken in pursuit of world domination. This particular species of American Calvinism, I will argue, acts as a seedbed for this desire for dominance, arising out of a metaphysical craving to mimic the mediator and become the divine sadist, whose dominance American leaders both seek and suffer from. Girard writes in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: We know that all victims of metaphysical desire seek to appropriate their mediator’s being by imitating him. The sadist wants to persuade himself that he has already attained his goal; he tries to take the place of the mediator and see the world through his eyes, in the hope that the play will gradually turn into reality. The sadist’s violence is yet another effort to attain divinity. (1961, 185) The empirical evidence for this peculiar American DNA is everywhere in plain sight. The Calvinist creed of the obligation of rebelling against unjust Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 83 tyranny is well documented in David Hackett Fischer’s Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (1989). Fischer paints a picture of the four primary folk cultures making up American culture. Fischer never describes them as religious cultures per se, but simply as “cultures”; and yet in each case, the heart of this civilization is the sacralization of revenge, and a desire to overcome past grievances—using the ferocity of the Calvinist God as a motive force for moving forward and dominating one’s rivals. Thus each culture in its own way uses theories of Reformed Calvinism to fi ght against forms of real or felt tyranny: the Puritans resisting the British; the Anglicans holding down the Catholics; the Quakers struggling against almost everyone; and the Scots-Irish against anyone not ScotsIrish. Th is latter group put it best: “The best enemy is a dead enemy.” Each group carries a strain of Calvinist theology that promoted the fi ght against tyranny and yearned, in one form or another, to dominate in the name of this God. And this Calvinist God (the one orthodox Calvinists worship and believe in) is indeed a ferocious and even sadistic god. Conservative evangelical theologians themselves—i.e., those defending strict Puritanevangelical theologies—admit the vengeful nature of this god. In fact, if they argue against it, they do so precisely because this theology “impugns the good character of God” (Olson 2011, 179). Roger Olson, speaking directly to the recent rise of an American-based younger generation of New Calvinists, describes their view of God as a picture in which God “ordains, designs, controls, and renders certain the most egregious evil acts such as the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a small child and genocidal slaughter of hundreds of thousands in Rwanda” (178). Olson warns against this image of God, but to no avail. For these “young, restless and Reformed Calvinists glory in a God who takes no prisoners—quite literally—proudly proclaiming a God that . . . only saves some when he could save all” (179). Many would blanch at these images, but the core texts of Calvinism, at least in the most extreme and unrevised versions, depict a sadistic—and impenitently Old Testament—God who arbitrarily commits acts of global genocide, whether in time or beyond time. As Girard argues: “Divine punishment is demystified by the gospels; its only place nowadays is in mythic imagination, to which modern scepticism remains strangely attached” (1987 [2003]: 195). We are curiously faithful in part because our primary metaphysical desire, mimetically enhanced, is to 84 Jon Pahl and James Wellman sacralize our violence as a way of maintaining our dominance and as a way of rationalizing the motive force of American exceptionalism. But more than that, the god desired is a god who is arbitrarily violent and who needs no justification for his violence. This god makes commands, chooses whom he wants, destroys whom he wants, using whatever means are necessary to get what he wants. Seen through this lens, a domestic or foreign policy that imitates these kinds of arbitrary divine rigor makes absolute sense. Thus, forms of violence and torture are normal and to be expected from such culturegenerated forms of mimesis: this is the way of the god. Early American fi gures in this form of Calvinism give us quintessential and spectacular exemplars of the movement. Th e eighteenth-century Reformed thinker and Calvinist Jonathan Edwards, the revivalist minister who spearheaded the First Great Awakening, who is oft en lauded as the greatest American theologian, and who is a hero to many of the New Calvinists, oft en chastised his fellow ministers that it was their duty to scare the hell out of their people—literally.10 Edwards famously did this by preaching “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” which literally imagined a god who would dangle the sinner over the fi res of hell, waiting for repentance from the sinner. In Edwards’s classic Religious Affections, he argued that even the devil can mimic the aff ections of conversion, further putting his congregation in a state of terror about that state of their salvation (Edwards 2009). How does one know if one is saved? In fact, Edwards, as well as his fellow ministers, terrifi ed their congregations to such an extent that suicides were reported across the Northeast region—a man in Edwards’s own congregation took his life. Not long aft erwards, the revival plateaued, at least in part because congregations had had enough of the manipulation. Edwards was shortly thereaft er dismissed from his pulpit. We see in this example a form of terror, a religious sadism, a way of coercing consent by dangling the possibility of arbitrary violence from which one has only one outlet—to give in to the same god who is simultaneously the source of the threat. In his chapter “Masochism and Sadism,” Girard, quite intentionally, puts masochism as the fi rst term of the two. He argues that the sadist “persecutes because he feels he is being persecuted.” Th e masochist becomes a sadist because he realizes “the key to the enchanted garden appears to be in the hands of the tormentor” (1961, 185). Th e tormentor in this case is “Yahweh, the God of revenge,” who condemns whom he wishes and saves Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 85 whomever he wants. This god legitimates an arbitrary form of terror, which the sadist seeks to mirror and model, in part to overcome his own fear and in part to express his sense of revenge. Th us, Girard makes clear that these characters are neither essentially good nor evil, but damaged persons, victims of their own metaphysical desire. He quotes Dostoevsky: “Do not hate the atheists, the professors of evil, the materialists, or even the wicked among them, for many are good, especially in our time” (190). Moral illumination means understanding the terror that haunts sadists, even in the midst of their persecution. We are, then, identifying Calvinism as the bulwark religion of America: a sadistic and sacrifi cial religion where one’s success is a marker of blessing and a providential promise of sacred acceptance. American exceptionalism is legitimated through sacral and sacrificial forms, and its arbitrary nature is hidden behind paeans raised to the glory of its promise, and to all who bow to its power. Disciplined moral action demands that one have victory; one must not be a victim, because this is the mark of defeat, both morally and in respect of one’s salvation. Grace is limited in this system and thus it must be sought, even though one can’t earn it, and yet one’s success is a sign of it, as are the sobriety and iron will of those who follow the creed. The warp and woof of masochism and sadism keeps many in its grip—another kind of Weberian “iron cage.” Preemptive aggression is thus a natural extension of this creed—when in doubt, act fi rst, ask for forgiveness later. Scots-Irish culture simply takes the victor’s right to an extreme, in an ethic of radical freedom whereby contests over scarce resources create an ecstasy of battle—as illustrated by the violence in American football and in military academies, and by the anger of Second Amendment rights groups. Scott Appleby’s “ecstatic asceticism” in which one’s joy is founded in solidarity with the power of the state, triumphant over all enemies, is a further extension of this sacrificial ethic (Appleby 1999). To sacrifice one’s life for this power sacralizes not only one’s own life but the life of the nation. Violence becomes a sacrament by which one wins glory for oneself, one’s family, and the state.11 This ecstatic asceticism reigns supreme in the ethic of the American military—deeply entrenched in the South and Midwest—which carries on the legacy of their Scots-Irish heritage. The Navy Seal 6 team that was able to find and “take out” Osama bin Laden code-named their target “Geronimo”—thus 86 Jon Pahl and James Wellman rehearsing an early episode of American Indian scapegoating involved in America’s “winning” of the West. Following this murder (in its own way, a founding murder), scenes were shown of various American military academies; cameras panned the literal dance of ecstasy, in which soldiers chanted together, “u.s.a., u.s.a., u.s.a.” Th e fervency of this sacramental ritual was as powerful as any I have ever witnessed. One might, once again, say: this is a kind of inverted gospel—in which the one who comes in peace and in the name of the Lord only arrives in and through the act of murder. And, of course, the model is not the Jesus of the Sermon on the Mount or of the Cross, but rather the apocalyptic Christ from the Book of Revelation, who comes on a white horse and tramples his enemies underfoot. This god is then interpreted as a Sovereign War God, a sadistic Master—and, of course, one who can and should be imitated in the pulpit, whether in church or in the White House. And, to be sure, there are many masochists who love this god, who love this kind of leadership, and who take pleasure in the demanding nature of this gospel. Again, we see an inverted gospel of peace—a powerful culture-construct (and cultureconstructing) god who motivates a righteous and unrelenting violence, as effi cient as it is arbitrary.

#### Their sacrilization of United States climate governance as a new God to save us from climate change guarantees constant violence and sacrifice of the outside in the name of the divine ethicality of the West.

Pahl 15.Jon, Peter Paul and Elizabeth Hagan Professor of History and Director of MA Programs in The Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. “Empire of Sacrifice: Violence and the Sacred in American Culture.” In Can We Survive Our Origins?: Readings in René Girard's Theory of Violence and the Sacred, Studies in Violence, Mimesis, & Culture

American self-understanding has been brutally efficient in producing “innocent domination” (Pahl 2012b). Throughout American history, deathdealing, pursued as a matter of public policy, has been cloaked repeatedly in a sacralizing aura of rhetorical innocence. According to this “exceptionalist” narrative, usually asserted in direct contrast to the evidence, killing is an unfortunate accident, “collateral damage” in the otherwise noble history of American progress. American domination, even and especially where violently pursued, is innocent. Usually, this killing is dressed up as “sacrifice,” i.e., as heroic and costly self-dedication to an ideal or value (Denton-Borhaug 2011). The trope is remarkably mobile—and exceptionally slippery in the semantic ambiguities it generates. The “sacrifice” of others (and of American “boys”)—implying their bloody immolation (i.e., sacrifi ce in its archaic and original sense)—has been invoked as necessary across the centuries (Ebel 2010). The removal of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, the conquest of the Spanish in the South of North America, the revolution against the English across the 72 Jon Pahl and James Wellman Atlantic seacoast, and the pushback of the French to what became Canada were all justified, already in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, by rhetorics of “sacrifice” ( Jewett 2008). In the nineteenth century, the Civil War was described by both sides as a sacrifi cial struggle “upon the altar of the nation,” as Yale’s Harry Stout has aptly put it (Stout 2006). Most recently, the dawn of U.S. empire in the Philippines, the (belated) entry into World War I, the “good war” against the Axis Powers in World War II, the “Cold War” against the Soviet Union and Communist China (via proxies in Korea and Vietnam), and the military adventures in Iraq (twice) and in Afghanistan were all shrouded in sacralizing discourses of “sacrifi ce” (Stout 2006). American interventions have thus always been presented as exceptional necessities justifying exceptional measures. Such violence, no matter how sadistic, “preemptive,” and domination-driven, has been cloaked as “defensive” action, hence as innocent. Domination, so the exceptionalist narrative goes, is invariably “good” for the peoples Americans have invaded and fought. Religion itself has been pressed into service as a key component in an ongoing rationalization of violence-in-the-name-of-evolutionary-“progress” (progress being understood in racial, economic, nationalist, and gendered terms and marked by potent binaries of “us” versus “them”). Indeed, the production of sacralizing narratives out of violence tends to institute a civil religion parallel and rival to Christianity, operating essentially with transposed structures of thought and language (mis)appropriated from it. The thought of René Girard insightfully illuminates this trend in American history, since for Girard, such phenomena are to be understood most fundamentally as “regressions” characteristic of Christendom and its aftermath, to primitive archaic patterns programmed by our evolutionary history. In his most recent (and probably final) writings, especially I See Satan Fall Like Lightning; Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith; Evolution and Conversion; and especially Battling to the End, René Girard has emphasized insistently what he calls his “realist” approach to anthropology, while also taking a decidedly theological turn (Girard 2001, 2008, 2010; Girard and Vattimo 2010). For our purposes, Girard’s emphasis, in particular, on the historical actuality of a “founding murder” at the beginning of human civilization can point us toward a fully “realist” refusal to blink in the face of violence, or be deceived by its sacralizing disguises. Girard’s theological turn too can help us Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 73 to recognize in American history the dynamics of a paradoxical oscillation, of “apocalyptic” tenor, between a “crescendo towards extremes” of violence (producing domination) and what Pierpaolo Antonello has identifi ed as the “containments” of violence (presented as innocence)—a paradox operating via what Girard calls forms of “false transcendence” (Girard 2001, 46, 98–100, 119, 185). Th is “realist theology,” if we may so call it, embodies Girard’s most mature refl ections not only on human nature and Christianity, but also on an American culture that he called “home” for most of his adult life. It is true that the American empire (as Hardt and Negri observed [2008]) now operates as a global regime of transnational corporate power (one is tempted to say banking power). Yet the exchanges and flows (of weapons as well as cash) within this system are no less, for being global, part of a “sacrifi cial” economy than they were when tied to the nation-state and its policies (as is, in fact, still largely the case). Even more, the capacity of these sacrifi cial processes to produce victims has escalated, as Girard observes throughout Battling to the End—while also being at least temporarily contained in modern judicial rituals and systems of economic exchange. We have to understand here, however, that when violence is “contained,” for Girard, it is also redistributed and recycled around the body politic. What Girard helps us to realize, then, is that the system of false transcendence that marks American exceptionalism takes two primary forms. First, the ideological construct of innocent domination operates through overt, physical warfare rationalized and sanctifi ed as (noble) “sacrifi ce”—at which construction Americans have proven themselves to be exceptionally skilled, not least in recent decades. Secondly, the “false transcendence” of superordaining necessity and sacralized innocence is deployed in various forms of “cultural warfare.” Here, the battle is over symbols or “truth” more than actual physical territory. In these battles, what is “sacrifi ced” is not as evident (perhaps) as an actual human victim, but these ossifications of human reasoning that produce both the ideology of American exceptionalism and the false transcendence it secretes are, in the long run, no less destructive—are, indeed, perhaps more dangerous—than actual warfare. For ideological rigor mortis is the exact opposite of devotion to a living God (not to mention devotion to living human beings and commitment to alleviating their suff ering, insofar as possible). Such ideological certainty 74 Jon Pahl and James Wellman (which can have the function of masking a deeper want of assurance) marks a deep-lying strain in American history from its origins to the present. Of course, American history is not to be reduced to any single deconstructionist narrative of anti- or para-Christian American exceptionalism cloaking domination with innocence through the workings of a false transcendence. Th ere is also a deep stratum of trust (what Robert Putnam has identifi ed as “social capital”) manifest in spiritually grounded, pragmatically realistic, nonviolent movements for social change that give some empirical and cultural “heft ” to what Kant long since identifi ed as the conditions for perpetual peace, and that might collectively point (ironically enough) to the prospects for a Pax Americana.1 For the moment, however, we must explore and expand the fruitfulness of the present exercise in the application of Girardian theory. To which end, my colleague and I here present a series of four selected culture-readings, designed to illustrate the logic of sacred and “sacrifi cial” violence. In Guns We Trust: The Origins of American Exceptionalism Jon Pahl “American” identity, according to this reading of the culture-story, originated in murder. From the very beginning of European settlement, shifting alliances between indigenous tribal groupings and English settlers produced competing, and largely unresolved, charges of murder and injustice. For instance, in 1636 an English trader named John Oldham was murdered in Massachusetts Bay Colony. Th e English accused various Native Americans of the crimes. Th ese accusations were apparently driven less by the facts of the case than by the benefi ts that accrued to the English from playing on tribal rivalries that pitted the Mohegans and Narragansetts against the Pequots. English-speaking clergy preached repeated sermons demanding that the Pequots punish the murderers of Oldham, and when the Pequots refused and began carrying out raids on English villages, the English escalated the confl ict with an attack on the Pequot village in what is now Mystic, Connecticut, on May 26, 1637. Captain John Mason led a band of ninety English soldiers, accompanied by several hundred friendly Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 75 Narragansetts, and torched the entire village, killing hundreds of Pequots, most of whom were women, children, and the elderly. Commander of the attack John Mason explained the religious rationale for the mass murder aft erwards, claiming that God “laughed his Enemies and the Enemies of his People to scorn making them as a fi ery Oven. . . . Th us did the Lord judge among the Heathen, fi lling the Place with dead Bodies!” (Mason 1763, 10). A few decades later, Nathaniel Morton imagined the scene in vivid terms for readers, and explicitly justifi ed it as a “sacrifi ce”: it “was a fearful sight to see [the Pequots] thus frying in the Fire, and the streams of Blood quenching the Same; and horrible was the stink and scent thereof; but the Victory seemed a sweet Sacrifi ce, and they gave praise thereof to God, who had wrought so wonderfully for them, thus to enclose their Enemies” (Morton 1669, 101). In the coming years, New England’s Puritan settlers actually secured their dominance by promising free trade with various indigenous peoples in exchange for the severed heads and hands of murdered Pequots as tributes—thus establishing early connections between religion, violence, and commercial exchange in the “New World.” And lest the theological point be lost—namely, that encouraging the murder and dismembering of an enemy could be an act of love on the part of Christians committed to Enlightened moral values like not killing—William Bradford of Plymouth Plantation opined that “cutting off [Pequot] heads and hands, which the [Indians] sent to the English, [was] a testimony of their love and service” (Lipman 2008). In the decades to come, the English came to specialize in this method of dividing and conquering the fi rst peoples of North America. Th ey did so by using a murder as a pretext for more killing, although of course the killing was also legitimized by inquests, trials, and other legal procedures. Th e case of Sassamon—a “praying Indian” found dead near Plymouth in January of 1675—is the best-studied example. As a Christian, Sassamon was an ally of the English, although he also advised Wampanoag sachem Metacom (King Philip). Th ree Wampanoags were charged with Sassamon’s murder, tried in English courts, and found guilty and sentenced to death. Metacom protested, and eventually began organizing raids against English settlements. Th e confl ict escalated into total war—something Girard comments on with great insight in Battling to the End. Historian Francis Jennings has estimated 76 Jon Pahl and James Wellman that six of seven Native Americans and six of thirteen English in New England died during the war ( Jennings 1976). King Philip’s War, as it came to be called, ended with the death of Metacom in 1677. Aft er being captured by the English, he was fi rst tortured, then beheaded. His head was then displayed on a pole in Plymouth for decades. According to Jill Lepore, the war—triggered by the murder of Sassamon, and ending with the murder of Metacom—rigidifi ed cultural distinctions between “Indians” and “Americans,” and established a dualistic pattern for cultural confl ict that defi ned “American” identity (Lepore 1999). Murder, war, torture, destruction—the “sacrifice” of some to preserve others— these are the themes with which American history ought rightly to begin. Throughout the centuries, of course, Native Americans continued to bear much of the violence that fl owed from this us-them dualism and its sacrifi cial operations—from the Sand Creek Massacre of 1864 (led by Colonel [and Methodist Reverend] J. M. Chivington), to the Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890, to the repression of the AIM uprising in 1973, to untold murders and crushing poverty down to the present.2 All of this was done, of course, in the name of “progress”; in the name of the “modern” (if not putatively “Christian”) renunciation of “primitive” religion and ritual. It would not be diffi cult to trace the way this initial incident spiraled into ideological trajectories that take us quite directly to Iraq and Abu Ghraib.3 Instead, however, let us, with Girard’s help, draw out the historical and evolutionary signifi cance of this “founding murder.” He writes: Th e modern shedding of ritual brings to light the psychosocial substratum of ritual phenomena. We cry “scapegoat” to stigmatize all the phenomena of discrimination—political, ethnic, religious, social, racial, etc.—that we observe about us. We are right. We easily see now that scapegoats multiply wherever human groups seek to lock themselves into a given identity— communal, local, national, ideological, racial, religious, and so on. (Girard 2001, 160) It is the mobility and pluriform diversity of the religious phenomenon—the construction, within the gap created by the “secularization” of inherited traditions, of hybrid civil religions and of self-sacralizing “cultural religions” or “identities”—that has marked the modern world. Girard again draws the Violence and the Sacred in American Culture 77 conclusion: “All discourses on exclusion, discrimination, racism, etc. will remain superfi cial as long as they don’t address the religious foundations of the problems that besiege our society” (Girard 2001, 210). I have said something of the religious foundations of American violence in this brief excursion on the founding murder(s) in American history. For other case studies in the history of innocent domination, readers are invited to explore my book Empire of Sacrifi ce (2010a), which discusses in turn: the execution of the Quaker Mary Dyer on Boston Common in 1660; the sacrifi ces associated with slavery in North America, as outlined by Frederick Douglass; the ruthlessly mimetic “war on drugs” that is, in eff ect, a war on youth and adolescents in American policy; and (fi nally) the exclusion of women, gays, and lesbians from full participation in American society, in what I call the “sacrifi ce of sex.” Each of these trajectories off ers an enduring thread, open to a Girardian reading, throughout American history; and each demonstrates quite real “sacrifices” of ritual immolation illustrating America’s ideology of innocent domination, albeit in forms that are not immediately and evidently identifi able as religious. Other “sacrifi cial” trajectories of reading in American history are explored in my previous book, Shopping Malls and Other Sacred Spaces: Putting God in Place (2003), which tracks the ways shopping malls, Walt Disney World, or the suburban home—and especially domestic sanitation and lawn care—originate in a “desire to acquire” in America, and produce “sacred places” that reinforce what I call the “violence of banality.” But too many examples are wearisome. Th e point is the same in any event. Mimetic rivalries operate contagiously in America, through market and social systems that bear religious signifi cance without appearing to be religious. In other words, innocent domination stems from a false transcendence, the falsity of which is evidenced by the existence underneath a religious rhetoric of innocence of a brutal, and escalating, system of interrogations, surveillance, torture, prisons, military expansion, and weaponry, the ballistic capacity of which is matched only by its destructive intent (Bacevich 2010). Unfortunately, the most troubling and insidious of the forms of innocent domination is the way in which truth itself suff ers under the fi xed ideology of American exceptionalism. Th is is the case in the “warfare” between science and religion in America, which has been concentrated, with special heat, on the topic of evolution, and which deserves special attention.

#### Attaching political will to shaping the environment exactly to their liking using subsidy cuts only re-entrenches human mastery, violently trying to quell excess – this ensures the failure of their planetary project

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PART II: MIMESIS AND EXCEPTIONALISM: THE WORLD AS SACRIFICIAL STANDING RESERVE. Generalized imitation has the power to create worlds that are perfectly disconnected from reality: at once orderly, stable, and totally illusory. (Dupuy 2011: 209) In order to navigate the creative and destructive mechanism of mimesis, I argue that it is first necessary to distinguish between mimetic projects that attempt to create new worlds regardless of the rest of the natural world and those that are grounded in planetary systems. Obviously, the opening quote of this section suggests that mimesis in our meaning-making practices has the capacity to create orderly but illusory worlds. This, I would argue, is the mimetic function of something like the truth regime of the global mobiles outlined above. Of course, such mimetic processes—ones that ignore the evolving planetary context—ultimately create a lot of violence toward the rest of the natural world because the world becomes standing reserve, separated out from moral concern as that which is used in the project to re-create the orderly world of contemporary globalized capitalism. One can also see this type of mimesis at work in (abstract) foundations of gender and sexuality roles that are defined as “normal” (usually as heteronormative), and into which our bodies are forced. These types of mimesis force life into specific channels. To some extent, religions have played a large role in this process as well. However, religion ought not to be seen only in a negative light. Religions and philosophies also reveal the mimetic structure of our very imaginings as grounded in evolutionary mimetic structures, and part of ecological healing is the re-cognition of such groundings. Refusal of our Mimetic Entanglement How did we begin to refuse our embeddedness in larger cosmic and evolutionary mimetic structures? When did humans begin to regard humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world? This is, of course, a question that obviously cannot be answered; but some wagers can be made. Rather than lay the blame of domination on sexism, racism, anthropocentrism, or any other isms as the critical theories that I am in debt to tend to do, I would lay it on an emergent transition resulting from the space of mimetic excess. My reasons for this are that if one travels down the rabbit hole of searching for the ultimate source of the logic of domination that leads to all isms, then one has already committed him/herself to the idea that humans are (at least from that point on) really separate from the rest of the natural world. Not to mention one is already then committed to laying blame for oppressions onto a scapegoat: patriarchy, heterosexism, speciesism, or racism. In order to re-read humans as always and already a part of the natural world, I follow an idea put forth by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment (2007). Bruce Martin sums up their insight well. He writes: Human reason ‘degenerated’ as it imitated the nature it came to dominate; in so doing it created a vicious, lifeless circle of domination perpetuated by a ‘rational’ society that has come to dominate the individual as much as ‘nature’ ever did. (Martin 2011: 116) In other words, we could attribute our forward looking and deliberating brains that emerged from the rest of the evolutionary process and more specifically out of lines of hominids, to the location of our eyes in front of our skulls, our ears on the side of our heads that give us honing abilities, and our upright posture that made it easier for our ancestors to hunt. Such features orient us toward critically examining the evidence and making decisions toward and about things that are not immediately present or in the distance. These features, along with our opposable thumbs, set us up eventually in a fairly dominant position vis-à-vis other animals and species on the planet. These moments of mimetic excess or spaces of creative emergence eventually lead to hominization. As Girard notes, “We can conceive of hominization as a series of steps that allow for the domestication of progressively increasing and intense mimetic effects, separated from one another by crises that would be catastrophes but also generative in that they would trigger the founding mechanism and at each step provide for more rigorous prohibition within the group, and for a more ritual canalization toward the outside” (1987: 96).6 In other words, at each emergent level, an inside/outside is created that marks sameness off from that which is other. The patterns of sameness that led to success would be mimicked—as any useful evolutionary adaptation is—and over time the genetic lines that survived would see differences in brain structures that lead to something like critical reflection. Far from being intentional, such a “dominating” position is an emergent phenomenon from the spaces of mimetic excess when our species began taking advantage of emergent possibilities (rather than necessarily falling into the same patterns of the past). Eventually, reason becomes the key in human success and in the domination over other humans and the rest of the natural world. The repetition of such narratives of dominations has led to the “isms” of our species rather than any sort of inherent capacities or tendencies, and it is this type of narrative that has led to the refusal of our mimetic embeddedness and to the type of human exceptionalism that we are so familiar with and critical of. This desire for control makes sense in an evolutionary context in which hominids and Homo sapiens have largely been at the whim of a nature “red in tooth and claw.” At a time before modern technologies, mastery of nature would be an essential component of survival. Humans would be the victims of a nature that was uncaring and unkind. Nature then becomes the ultimate victim and scapegoat that the logic of mastery then sacrifices. As Girard notes: The accusation makes the victim responsible for the disorder and catastrophe, in other words for the crisis, that afflicts the community. … [The mistreatment of the victim] is an aggressive reaction against a victim that would not be killed if it were not held responsible for the mimetic crisis. (1987: 38) One important point that helps to argue for something like nature as victim in the ways in which I am arguing here is the writings of Francis Bacon and other authors of the early scientific method and scientific revolution. There is no clear reason as to why natural science had to understand nature as dead matter, religion as somehow subjective opinion, and science as an objective adventure. Philosophical and other literary works such as Bacon's New Atlantis had to teach people that science would replace the church, that it was okay to experiment on other animals, and that this would lead to human progress (Merchant 1980). What some have termed “literary lynchings” and “literary sacrifices” had to prepare the euro-western imagination for treating nature as if it were merely standing reserve and for creating the human logic of domination.7 Though the contemporary logic of domination has long forgotten its founding myth, the religious, philosophical, and scientific attempts to make humans exceptional all participate in this story. This recognition can help us to argue for and re-inscribe our continuity with the rest of the natural world in ways that might open our meaning-making practices up toward planetary concerns. If we understand our whole thought process as dependent upon mimetic structures and processes found in the rest of the natural world, then we can begin to see even our meaning-making practices as emerging out of and addressing these types of structures. As Girard notes, “Order in human culture certainly does arise from an extreme of disorder, for such disorder is the disappearance of any and all contested objects in the midst of conflict, and it is at such a point that acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis and tends toward the unification of conflict against an adversary” (1987: 28–29). Just as order seems to emerge out of chaos in other biological systems, so too in our cultural and religious systems; and, Girard argues, these moments of mimetic frenzy require some type of scapegoat, ritual, or expulsion of adversary if order is to be restored (1987: 30). However, there is in much of Girardian thought too much fear of chaos, hybridity, and disorder. Such a fear, or at least a desire to project order onto disorder where no real order exists, is actually part of the problem of a projective form of mimesis that leads to more and more disorder (or so I am arguing). In other words, perhaps mimetic identification with the rest of the natural world could provide an alternative way in which we can appreciate our difference and recognize our continuity without the need for continuing mass ecological destruction in the name of the enforced (dis)order of human exceptionalism. From this understanding, religions and philosophies have captured within their meaning-making structures certain truths expressed in the form of human thinking that can be found in other systems of the rest of the natural world: the balance between chaos and order, the sacrifice necessary for life to continue, and the inherent impossibility of any ultimate order or peace in the worlds that we currently inhabit. As Eric Schneider, Dorion Sagan, and other scientists that discuss non-equilibrium thermodynamics argue, equilibrium—or in this case ultimate order and peace—means death (Schneider and Sagan 2006). Perhaps this last insight is the reason that humans strive for some sort of transcendent resolution: every part of our being cries out against the seeming injustice of predator–prey, creative–destructive cycles, so our reason forces us to produce some sort of order that we just have not arrived at yet, in the case of religions, or imposes a logic of order on the entire planet, in the case of sciences. In any event, this type of understanding could help us understand our current planetary crises in a way that is in continuity with the ongoing creative–destructive processes of the planet. \*\*\*\*\*\*The Earth as Sacrificial Standing Reserve: The Logic of Domination One thing I find promising about the mechanism of mimesis as Girard understands it is that it has the potential to help re-write human thinking, including religious imaginings and scientific logic and reasoning, into the rest of the evolving planetary community, even if Girard himself did not imagine such a re-writing. If our human thinking operates according to mimetic structures, then they are in continuity with other repetitive cycles and systems in the cosmos and planet—as I argued above. In particular, I think that Girard's discussion of mimetic crisis has something to offer in terms of thinking about our current, global ecological problems. Girard argues that paroxysm is the result of certain points of conflictual mimesis within communities (1987: 26). At some points in human histories, the energy of mimetic excess must be released in moments of violence or breakdown. The repetitions of roles—defined in terms of gender, sex, sexuality, race, nationality, and even humanity—are always imperfect and lead to some type of remainder that is other from the repetitive role performances. This mimetic excess must be dealt with or the loss of all order and fall into chaos is risked (Girard 1987: 7). Religions, and I would argue the logic of domination found in reductive materialism, positivism, and scientism, all have ways of dealing with mimetic excess and releasing the violence that builds up. As Girard notes, “All modern ideologies are immense machines that justify and legitimate conflicts that in our time could put an end to humanity” (1987: 31). In other words, these systems must deal with mimetic excess, but they always risk violence. This is where the concept of the scapegoat comes in: as mimetic release. If, as I have argued, one of the dominant ideologies through which humans create meaning-making practices in the contemporary process of globalization relies on the logic of domination via science and technology, then perhaps the mimetic excess, the moment of paroxysm, can be understood as climate change and all the other environmental disasters we are faced with at this planetary moment. In the case of the effects of climate change especially, the human “community thinks of itself as entirely passive vis-à-vis its own victim, whereas” the rest of the natural world “appears by contrast, to be the only active and responsible agent in the matter” (Girard 1987: 27). We have now become victims of the excess of our own desire to impose order on the world. The logic of domination that imposes human desires and values upon the rest of the natural world and sets it up as standing reserve for humans returns in the form of climate change, huge storms, cancers, droughts, heat waves, and other acts of “nature” or “God” over which we poor humans have no control. In this case, the evolutionary fear of nature, leading to the imposition of order through repetition of the place of humanity as over and against the rest of the natural world, is creating terror, disorder, and chaos that are rising to a planetary frenzy.8 This mimetic excess, this abject remainder is the space of chaos and complexity, of creativity and destruction; but this excess demands some sort of recognition at threat of even greater destruction and chaos. Current rituals of scapegoating and release of this mimetic excess, in my opinion, only lead to projections of repressed mimesis. That is, “where the self as subject is projected onto the external world. The result is often fear of the other and subsequent attempts to master or dominate it” (Martin 2011: 120). In this case, “reversal of domination requires ‘mimetic identification’—that is internalization of the external that honors the particularity or individuality of the other” (Martin 2011: 120). We need new rituals and ways of thinking that help us to leave open spaces for mimetic excess, for the abject, and for creative emergence of possibilities toward planetary alternatives. I end this article with some ideas of what that might look like. Previous Section Next Section PART III: TRANSHUMANITY AND THE PLANETARY FUTURE: MIMETIC EXCESS, ABJECTION, AND SITES OF TRANSFORMATION Only the damming of mimetic forces by means of the prohibition and the diversion of these forces in the direction of ritual are capable of spreading and perpetuating the reconciliatory effect of the surrogate victim. … The Sacred is Violence. (Girard 1987: 32) The seemingly simple insight that Girard articulates here, that the sacred is violence, is a hard pill to swallow for many contemporary minds. The idea that the ground of being, that god or ultimate reality is somehow supposed to be peace, harmony, or some type of wholeness, may be the very idea that leads to much ecological and human violence today. We seek in our repetitions of actions and roles to enforce some type of order and balance upon the world that just does not exist. This desire to enforce equilibrium on the planet is actually wreaking havoc on humans and the rest of the planetary community. What if we begin our meaning-making practices from a space that suggests we are always already mixed up in a creative–destructive process of planetary becoming and that there is no ultimate explanation, end, or goal toward which all life can be conformed. This is what I have articulated elsewhere as a viable agnostic, planetary theology (Bauman 2009, 2014). Here I articulate three components of our meaning-making practices that might help us create points of mimetic identification with the abject: human thinking as “lines of flight,” thinking toward the trans-human, and planetary ethics of the “not yet.”

#### In the face of the 1AC’s mimetic act of violence we propose the alternative of active nihilism – a form of self-overcoming that instead of deferring the role of scapegoat onto something else, self-sacrifices as a rejoice in the agon of life

MacCormac 13. James, Masters of Arts in Theology and Religious Studies, Saint Mary‘s University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, April 2013. “Saved from Salvation: Friedrich Nietzsche in the Work of René Girard.” [brackets for gendered language]

God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, the murderers of all murderers, comfort ourselves? That which was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives — who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games will we need to invent? Isn't the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to seem worthy of it?57 The madman speaks of the momentous event but is unsure what will happen after it. Girard notes that in the madman‘s speech, ―[e]verything is presented in the form of questions, no affirmation is possible."58 These questions surrounding God‘s murder are what Nietzsche finds himself both proclaiming and responding to. Nietzsche‘s answer to the madman‘s plea is to actively affirm the world, a world that Girard sees as a potentially never-ending mimetic crisis, and to provide, tentatively, a model for this affirmation in the form of his ―Dionysian‖ prophet Zarathustra. Nietzsche’s World After God [The] Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of the twofold voluptuous delight, my "beyond good and evil," without goal, unless the joy of the circle is itself a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will toward itself-- do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?-- This world is the will to power -- and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power -- and nothing besides! - Nietzsche59 In this dramatic and abstract image Nietzsche outlines what he sees as the supreme problem for modern individuals -- the groundless, purposeless nature of reality - - and his strategy for dealing with that problem.60 As was suggested above, Nietzsche‘s central philosophical idea is ―the will to power,‖ which Nietzsche here claims as the ―name for this world,‖ and it is this identification and its consequences that Nietzsche sees as a solution. That the world is ―eternally self-destroying,‖ ―without goal,‖ and ―beyond good and evil marks it as one where to be nihilistic is to be truthful, for there is no final state to attain, no true measure of value. To seek wealth or pleasure or even peace in the world has been presented in the past as ultimate goals, safeguarded by firm role models, but Nietzsche believes that an honest human being can no longer see things this way. Some see that the world is ―eternally self-destroying‖ and so they despair -- these are the ―passive nihilists.‖ Without an ultimate goal, they succumb to a ―decline and recession of the power of spirit.‖61 To put it another way, the passive nihilists cease to strive to become something, whether through competition with others or themselves. Nietzsche sees Christianity as bringing nihilism to its fullest expression in humanity through its commitment to truth, and the Christianity of his time as representing a full flowering of passive nihilism. Christianity‘s search for truth, and identification of truth with God, leads to a sense that truth is beyond life, in heaven, and so beyond humans. Most do not know that they believe life to be meaningless, but they live in such a fashion. In contrast, others, a select few whom Nietzsche greatly admires (the ―free spirits‖ he often addresses), see clearly that life has nothing grounding it, and act creatively to pursue power over themselves and their environment. This is what Nietzsche calls ―active nihilism,‖ which he identifies with ―increased power of spirit.‖62 Nietzsche addresses these few active nihilists in his writing, and he names the world ―will to power‖ for them. He hopes that by acknowledging the desire for power as the paradoxical, ever-shifting foundation of life, the active nihilists can affirm life, rather than giving way to despair or attributing meaning to a transcendent and unattainable end. The obstacle to Nietzsche‘s affirmative quest is the great complex of fears which drag all people back to ultimate goals and simple answers, including those gilded with the complex language of philosophy. Uncertainty, insecurity, and, overwhelmingly, suffering are what create these fears, which Nietzsche names ―the spirit of gravity.‖ To succumb to gravity is inevitable, as all are involved in a web of power and influence (that is, all are involved in mimetic desire) -- but the free spirit seeks to always recognize the powers that compel and sustain her, and in doing so to find a way to both affirm the situation and create something new. This Nietzsche refers to as ―self-overcoming,‖ which, looking with a Girardian lens, I claim is an effort to escape the deadlock of mimetic desire, that ceaseless search for stability and safety. On Self-Overcoming "With Nietzsche, everything is mask. [...] Nietzsche didn't believe in the unity of a self and didn't experience it." - Gilles Deleuze63 Nietzsche‘s thought undermines the notion of a stable self, and attempts to find joy in the endless insecurity humans deal with throughout their lives. Self-overcoming is the name Nietzsche gives to the active affirmation of this insecurity and the endless opportunities for new creation it affords. From the point of view of self-overcoming, desires lead one to recreate one‘s self over and over, rather than confining one to a narrow, single role in life. This stands against notions of a ―true self‖ or soul hidden beneath the flux of consciousness, opposing what Descartes saw as the possibility of a sure foothold in the cogito. Nietzsche posits the world as an endless flow of conflicting forces (the will to power), taking over one another and trying to gain new powers and possibilities. Deleuze follows this perspective when he proclaims that ―everything is mask‖ for Nietzsche. This means that each thing identified as ―I‖ is fabricated, changeable, and without a definite structure. The will to power is the ―root‖ of the self, a ―self‖ being a particular configuration of forces, struggling to both preserve and surmount their current form, and to draw in other forces (whether ideas, persons, or nations). The self is overcome continually by creating, destroying, and experimenting with forms and habits, especially those most powerful habits which construct identity. This is happening at all times, though most are passive about this constant death and rebirth of one‘s self, never acknowledging how the encounter with new people and ideas affects them. As Girard might put it, we do not understand that our desire is mimetic, that it is not ours in any final sense. Acknowledging that we are constantly destroying and remaking ourselves, rather than believing we have a fixed essence, is Nietzsche‘s way of affirming the will to power, becoming its partner rather than its victim, a friend rather than a slave. This embodies Dionysian ―faith‖ by admitting the ―essential fact of our life,‖ which is procreation, eros, or creativity in the broadest sense. Life itself confides to Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra, ―I am that which must always overcome itself.” 64 The health or usefulness of a notion of self, of a given ―mask,‖ is determined by the particular forces at a given time and place. In the fullness of history, the self concept and role of ―humanity‖ too will not be perfected or ended, but instead overcome. The self that replaces ―humanity‖ is, for Nietzsche, the coming Übermensch, translated variously as ―super-man,‖ ―over-man,‖ or ―beyond-man.‖ The Nietzschean idea of creating, as Deleuze writes, "is to lighten, to unburden life, to invent new possibilities of life. The creator is legislator – dancer."65 The Übermensch is contrasted to the ―last man,‖ a figure who no longer wishes to improve, as [they believes [they are] experiencing the end point of all history, the aim of all human lives –- a figure who brings disaster (mimetic crisis) through modeling inactivity. This attitude is something Nietzsche feared was already present among the privileged classes of his time. It is worthwhile to pause at the idea of the Übermensch and see in it the configuration of a positive desire, one which is not trapped in mimetic struggles, though it still exists with them. The Übermensch comes after humanity, as the figure who understands and takes on the meaning of the will to power. Nietzsche argues that there have been a few exemplary men who have approached the next stage, being masters of themselves and others (Goethe being his favourite), but he does not locate the Übermensch anywhere in human history. The Übermensch is a creator -- of new values, new selves, new friends, new enemies, and most of all, new joy. Nietzsche imagined that the Übermensch would not struggle with or avoid self-overcoming, as his contemporaries seemed to, but will take it on as a joyful dance. An extension of the Nietzschean ideas about both religion and selves that I have been examining is the key idea that forms of life create forms of thought, whatever they may be named. Nietzsche claims that “Every philosophy is the philosophy of some stage of life,‖ 66 and it could be said further that each god also belongs to a stage of life. There is no grand cosmic plan to figure out, and so no absolute model, but instead many wills which seek to justify and affirm themselves and expand their powers. So the thinking, feeling creature calling itself ―human‖ looks to find ways to continue thinking and feeling, and to honour those above other possibilities. And, among humans, different humans develop philosophies (and religions) which help to affirm and expand their particular form of life. So warriors find a way of war, fisherman a way of fishing, and so on, each with their own models to imitate. Due to this there is no ―right way,‖ despite the protests of many systems of imitation and order, but only multiple expressions of a ―will to power‖ which characterizes all living things. So a way of life or a philosophy privileges and sustains a certain system of mimetic desire. When this is brought to bear upon the Christianity of Nietzsche‘s time, it can be seen why he eschews the Enlightenment ideal of a ―rational‖ critique, instead moving to a frowned upon mode of argumentation, ad hominem: he attacks persons rather than arguments. He asks ―what sort of person worships this sort of God?‖ and finds his answers that way, rather than asking other questions about God‘s possibility or necessity. For Nietzsche, the figure which expresses the God‘s powerlessness is a negatively configured Christian believer, understood by Nietzsche as an anti-Übermensch, a person who lives a life based around an unattainable central aim, the afterlife -- which seems to him to deny that life has any value here and now, and preclude any notions of creatively reconfiguring life. Though Nietzsche would not see it, this figure has, in the language of mimetic theory, misunderstood a defense of victims (the defenseless, weak, and defeated) as a command to remain static, wishing for a share of being without movement. For Nietzsche, Christianity is a tool of control and denial which contains a secret will to power. Yet its existence, and its affirmation of the importance of a commitment to truthfulness and discipline are essential tools that lead Nietzsche to his conceptualization of the ―will to power.‖ Arguably, Christianity is Nietzsche‘s greatest ally in his growth and also his greatest enemy in his quest for self overcoming. Yet the vitriol that grows and grows towards Christianity over the course of his career leaves out one peculiar target -- the figure of Jesus. Nietzsche imagines Jesus as a worthy opponent and figure, and attributes to him a doctrine of liberation like Nietzsche‘s own, beyond morals and guilt: ―Jesus said to his Jews: ‗The law was for servants;--love God as I love him, as his Son! What have we Sons of God to do with morals!‘‖67 It is in The Antichrist that Jesus is given full attention for the first time, alongside with Paul, who Nietzsche claims is truly to blame for the monstrous Christianity that Nietzsche opposes. In The Antichrist, Jesus is presented not quite as a hero, but one who is blameless for what others did with his example, and who was a spirit too free for his time (and so someone Nietzsche admires). Nietzsche not only sees Christians as not living up to Christ‘s example, but goes a step further, proclaiming with typical hyperbole that ―There was only one Christian, and he died on the cross.‖68 Nietzsche spares Jesus as an exemplary individual, one who did not truly found a religion, but told of a new way of life which broke with what had come before. As somebody who self-overcomes, and affects his society profoundly, Jesus is spared what so much of Christianity is subjected to by Nietzsche. This admiration overflows in his final days, when Nietzsche‘s sense of identity ends up slipping fluidly between that of his beloved Dionysus and The Crucified (Jesus) who is configured by Nietzsche as that god‘s structural cousin.69 Nietzsche‘s treatment of Jesus is notable for several reasons. It serves as a reminder that Nietzsche's contempt for Christianity is mixed with deep respect. It shows that Nietzsche is not an advocate for one single way of life, but for a single type of person, the ―free spirit‖ who finds [their] own way, and so affirms a plurality of models. Most importantly, Nietzsche‘s treatment of Jesus demonstrates that his configuration of Christianity is different from the one Girard attributes to him, in that Nietzsche does intuit another, ―healthy‖ version of it. In his quest to create new forms of life after the death of the Christian God, Nietzsche finds a new ―faith‖ in a god he called Dionysus, who commands humankind to create and say ―yes‖ to life, by embracing even destruction, and self-destruction (in the form of self-overcoming), a god who is prefigured by a Jesus imagined by Nietzsche as seeking no followers. This vision of human life, and of divinity, is a criticism of most forms of religion which emphasize the eternal stability of the law, the order given by the gods. Yet it is one which, surprisingly, has strong resemblance with Girard‘s own positive account of a liberating Christianity, which stands in contrast to other religions. In the next chapter, this resemblance will be brought into sharper focus, as Nietzschean selfovercoming is given a place in Girard‘s theory of sacrifice. Chapter 3 Better to Burn Out: Nietzsche’s Self-Sacrifice What is the New Testament? A handbook for those who are to be sacrificed. - Kierkegaard70 [T]he happiness of the spirit is this: to be anointed and through tears to be consecrated as a sacrificial animal. Did you know that? -Zarathustra71 The Gospel reveals "things hidden since the foundation of the world" and through the intermediary of Nietzsche this revelation begins to become self-aware. -Girard72 In order to give Nietzsche‘s work a fuller place as an ally to Girard‘s mimetic theory, an examination of Nietzsche using a more rigorous version of that same theory is necessary. In conjunction with the work of Tyler Roberts on Nietzsche‘s asceticism and accounts of Zarathustra‘s ―gift giving virtue‖, this chapter begins that examination. The emphasis of this analysis will be on the dual insight that Girard claims Nietzsche shares with him most strongly -- the importance of sacrificial victims (scapegoats) for religion, and Christianity‘s rejection of sacrificial victims. In Girard‘s view, Nietzsche is brilliant to see this but is also reprehensible for choosing to go back to a culture of victims. I propose, however, that this reading is lacking in proper Girardian insight, and 70 Soren Kierkegaard, Provocations: Spiritual Writings of Kierkegaard Compiled and translated by Charles E. Moore (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2003), 220. 71 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ―On the Famous Wise Men.‖ 72 Girard, ―Founding Murder,‖ 244. 44 Nietzsche‘s understanding of sacrifice can be a helpful supplement to Girard‘s, as Nietzsche sees that in the time after the death of the god (or, for Girard, the weakening of the sacred due to Christianity), a process unfolds where each human being becomes a new sort of sacrifice. It is this process that Nietzsche names ―self overcoming‖ throughout his work, which I show here. Each God is a Consuming Fire Before turning to Nietzsche, Girard‘s viewpoint must be reviewed once more, this time focusing on the image of fire in relation to sacrifice. To begin, I examine two images drawn from Girard‘s work on sacrifice in The Scapegoat. Girard is speaking of the Aztec sun god Teotihuacan and his role as destroyer of plagues. The god, in the role of a sacrifice, is killed in order to end the plague. Girard explains the consequence of this act: If then the epidemic recedes, the victim becomes divine in that he is burned and becomes one with the fire that instead of destroying him mysteriously transforms him into a force for good. The victim is thus transformed into that inextinguishable flame which shines on humanity. Where can this flame be found thereafter? The answer is immediately apparent. It can only be found in the sun, or maybe in the moon and the stars.73 This image of fire, and of the sun and stars, is one which appears in many different myths, which Girard appeals to later in the chapter as well. The role of the fire in religious ritual, especially sacrifice, is too vast to review here, as is the role of the sun and stars as the abode (or identity) of the gods. What is important to highlight in this paragraph is Girard‘s understanding of the fire as both transformative, by shifting a being from a lower 73 Girard, The Scapegoat, 60. 45 status to one of divinity and goodness in the eyes of the community, and centering, by stabilizing and giving the community a symbol of unity. Girard notes similar imagery when he analyzes Peter‘s betrayal of Jesus as recounted in the Gospels. Peter warms himself by a fire among other men and women, having followed at a distance after Jesus‘ arrest. Peter falls into a mimetic pattern, simply wanting to be one of the group. But his association with Jesus is known to one woman in the group, and she lets the others know it. It is then that Peter denies Jesus, for he realizes that his association with Jesus puts him outside the group. As much as Peter wishes to remain loyal, he is drawn to conform to the group, for, as Girard puts it, Peter ―cannot warm himself without wanting obscurely the being that is shining there, in this fire, and the being that is indicated silently by all the eyes staring at him, by all the hands stretched toward the fire.‖74 Girard explains that beyond the practical reasons of heat and light, the fire creates a community. The woman who addresses Peter acts to exclude him from the community. By noting that he was with Jesus she implies that he does not belong with them. Peter, being alone and confused after the loss of Jesus, or ―the collapse of his universe,‖75 is eager to join a new group. ―Hands and faces are turned toward the fire and in turn are lit by it; it is like a god‘s benevolent response to a prayer addressed to him. Because everyone is facing the fire, they cannot avoid seeing each other; they can exchange looks and words; a place for communion and communication is established.‖76 As the scene unfolds, Peter denies his former master in order to gain safety and community around the fire. Girard goes as far as to state that ―Peter makes Jesus his 74 The Scapegoat, 150. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid, 151. 46 victim...‖77 But the others know by his accent that Peter is not from Jerusalem, and that he came there following Jesus. They reject him in order to maintain the order strengthened and founded by the scapegoat mechanism. They tell each other, ―We are all of the same clan, we form one and the same group inasmuch as we have the same scapegoat.‖78 To return to Teotihuacan, let us consider the similarity between the fire and the god. The fire plays the role of illuminating and defining the boundaries of the community, and the great fire of the sun does this to an even greater degree, doing the same for the world. When the role of a sacrificed god like Teotihuacan is compared to a star or sun, the exaggeration shows how important the role is -- this god‘s sacrifice (that which makes sacred) has given order, and so a secure life, to the community, even to the world. The sacrificed god, despite the myths that surround him, is for Girard definitely a victim, one who was rejected violently. When Peter seeks to join the community by rejecting Jesus, he wants to defer this role of scapegoat. Not only does Peter wish to avoid pain, insecurity, and possible death, but, as Girard astutely notes, shame. ―Peter is ashamed of this Jesus whom all the world despises, ashamed of the model he chose, and therefore ashamed of himself.‖79 People often seek to avoid being rejected by their community in some way, and so betray certain commitments they have made. At the level of the grand, divine sacrifice of a Teotihuacan, those like Peter imagine that the god must have had some special power to be able to give his own life for the good of the community, something Peter 77 Ibid, 154. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid, 155. 47 cannot imagine having. For Girard this special power, this true being, is what we seek when we imitate others. The myths of those like Teotihuacan are a lie in that the victim did not choose to give himself for the cure of a plague, but instead was killed to found a new community (or to renew one). The Gospel account of Jesus is, in contrast to this, a ―true myth‖ in that it takes the same tale and reveals that the victim-god, the scapegoat, is innocent of any collective guilt, and did not want to become sacrifice for the community. Jesus is the only scapegoat to show this truth to his followers -- the sacrifice to end sacrifices. In doing so he founds a community of rejects, of wanderers whose center is elsewhere and invisible. But with such sacrifices ended, or at least encouraged to end, after this revelation, how is a community to be built? How is it to renew itself? For Girard this question remains unanswered in any concrete manner, and the great proliferation of answers put forward in the period after Christianity‘s ascent, and especially in the modern period, are a consequence of this revelation. The old ways fail not because they have no strength, but because: Henceforth we can no longer pretend not to know that the social order is built upon the blood of innocent victims. Christianity deprives us of the mechanism that formed the basis of the archaic social and religious order, ushering in a new phase in the history of mankind that we may legitimately call ―modern.‖ All the conquests of modernity begin there, as far as I am concerned, from that acquisition of awareness within Christianity.80 So the Gospels slowly remove the community‘s ability to build new ―fires‖ from victims by removing the ability to believe in the absolute power of those fires, and we return again to the loss of a stable self, both for the community and for persons. When 80 Girard, Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith, 26. 48 Girard discusses Nietzsche‘s approach to such victimage, he notices, with some (perhaps smirking) contempt that, ―[n]ot without coquetry he protests against his future canonization, but he prepares the way for it by setting out to become a living scandal. He behaves like a proper sacrificial beast."81 Girard is quite correct here. Nietzsche does indeed behave like a sacrifice, one who knows he is a sacrifice and one who will be ―canonized,‖ in other words, added to a list of those to imitate, a fire worthy of a community‘s respect and devotion. Giving Birth to a Dancing Star One must still have chaos within oneself, to give birth to a dancing star! - Zarathustra82 Indeed, we philosophers" and "free spirits" feel, when we hear the news that "the old god is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectations. At long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea." - Nietzsche83 Both in the voice of Zarathustra and under his own name, Nietzsche speaks of the joyous and terrifying freedom created in the wake of God‘s death. With the idea of both god and sacrifice as a fire still in mind, consider that Nietzsche‘s admonitions to overcome humanity, as well as one‘s self, are in a sense a call to self-sacrifice. The great ―open sea‖ of the world cries out for each person to act as a sacrifice, a makingsacred of human life, a fire to build around and to create new values. Where typically ―self sacrifice‖ is understood as oriented towards some definite future goal or the preservation of the status quo, this self-overcoming wishes to continually find new joy along with new suffering. To Nietzsche each person should burn, voluntarily, rather than deferring the role of scapegoat to another individual. As Girard often emphasizes,84 Nietzsche does not use religious, and specifically Christian, terms and tropes by accident. Nietzsche‘s world is saturated by Christianity, and so the themes he uses are direct from the mythological playbook, including, as Tyler Roberts puts it ―the discovery of a deep-seated sickness unto death; scales falling from eyes; brave and bleak periods of isolation; daily martyrdoms; the bite of hardheartedness, of discipline and desire; the flaming spirit; and, finally, the grace of renewal where one finds one's life and one's world transformed.‖85 It is of course the ―flaming spirit‖ that is most interesting here, and especially its link to Christianity: "Like the desert ascetics of early Christianity, Nietzsche seeks the transfiguration of the body into flaming spirit."86 The sacrificial Christianity that Girard describes is the historical struggle wherein the old way of a sacred center, with which both desire and violence can be channeled, is slowly overtaken by the realization that the old way and its accompanying role models are contingent, that there is ―no Greek or Jew‖ in Christ, which leads to a great freedom. But to live out freedom, one must still, even after this realization, choose and build order -- and so, as Girard shows us, one must sacrifice. If the revelation of Christianity begins to become self-aware in Nietzsche, as Girard claims, it is found most clearly in Nietzsche‘s efforts to sacrifice (that is, ―make sacred‖) his self continually, rather than allowing an external object to be the site of violent expulsion. In the process of this continual self-sacrifice, Nietzsche oscillates between a return to a purely competitive agon where the enemy is expelled, and one rooted in love, where each friend and enemy is both helped to grow and is helpful to growth. Roberts emphasizes the latter when he states: "Love, as Nietzsche understands it, is a rejoicing in the other, a directionality toward or desire for the other manifested in creative giving."87 Girard is right to warn against the Nietzsche who wants to paradoxically reinstate the old order of rank and death, aided by reading in Darwinian ideas popular at the time. Yet he ought to apply his own theory of Christianity‘s dialogue with the violent sacred to Nietzsche, which would clarify Nietzsche‘s role for his thought. The struggle between a ―bad‖ mimetic desire of the closed system and the ―good‖ mimetic desire of Girard‘s nonsacrificial Christianity is embodied explosively in Nietzsche‘s life and writing. At one level, Girard knows Nietzsche rejects a caricature of Christianity, not the "real thing." At the same time, Girard's most consistent statements attribute to Nietzsche a knowing rejection of the Judeo-Christian revelation in favour of violence. This rejection is present, yet it is not as informed as Girard suggests, as Nietzsche‘s disdain for victims comes from a vision of pity and victims rooted in a sacrificial Christianity, as Girard would put it. From Nietzsche‘s viewpoint, victims are praised for remaining victims, for waiting in devotion to a "sickly" reproduction of a Girardian "archaic religion," one which continues using the logic of the scapegoat, but does not allow for any movement or resolution to conflicts, as scapegoating is now shameful. Such a Christianity, which 87 Ibid, 195. 51 punishes the strong and aggressive while telling the poor and weak to remain in that state, is rightfully condemned. Had Nietzsche been able to conceive of a Christianity which includes Jesus' "good news" and a Jesus whose message included a community rather than only individuals ("idiots," like Nietzsche's childlike Christ),88 he might have arrived at views closer to Girard's. An emphasis on incarnation (the body) and divinity (as a creative joy), something more akin to a theosis, would match Nietzsche's longings. Roberts makes this point eloquently, sketching the sort of theology that approaches Nietzsche's Dionysus: ...a theology of the Cross can affirm a God who suffers with humanity, who is immersed, out of love, in the world-reality of the human. This God is closer to the repeated suffering and dying of Nietzsche's Dionysus than the impassible God who supports the dualism of the ascetic ideal. Contrary to Nietzsche's assertion, such a mystical theology would find in the imitation of Christ on the Cross not a means to another life, but an expression of love for this life -- a life in which the deepest suffering is intimately connected with the deepest affirmation.89 The dualism that Roberts refers to here maps onto Nietzsche‘s rejection of an otherworldly source of meaning and redemption for life. The incarnate god seeks not to condemn or give up on life, as Nietzsche fears, but instead to inspire recognition of the continual self-sacrifice each person must undergo in affirming life, which is both death and resurrection. To follow Christ becomes, in Nietzschean terms, a process of continual, affirmative self-overcoming. 88 ―Idiot‖ understood as one who does not belong to a community. As Bruce Ellis Benson notes in Pious Nietzsche, the Jesus portrayed in The Antichrist seems to be similar to the protagonist of Doestoevsky‘s The Idiot. 89 Roberts, Contesting Spirit, 183. 52 Further, Roberts identifies his analysis of Nietzsche with a "metaphoric postmodernity" which can easily be allied with Girard's work: "Whereas analytic postmodernity relegates all significations to the ultimately meaningless play of signifiers, metaphoric postmodernity reconnects the signifier to the signified through the body: signification is not purely linguistic; it is somatic, it speaks desire."90 The emphasis on "the body" which "speaks desire," beyond the purely linguistic, is just what a Girardian account seeks to recover in its emphasis on "the truth of the victim.‖ Missing from this insight, exemplified by the death of Jesus on the cross, is what could be called the "truth of the resurrected" -- that is, the truth of those who have overcome being a victim used for others‘ ―salvation,‖ and instead taken on an identity as living flame. The being who has followed a "holy desire" in a community she loves and desires to flourish is the rehabilitated victim who endures anguish and pain, never denying it in favour of some static "victory" or "other world." The victim‘s body, Nietzsche's body, and the body of the community, all speak and grow in desire, and all imitate each other in continuous, joyous creation by living, growing, and suffering without need of a transcendent guarantee, instead becoming flaming spirit. Nietzsche misses this most difficult challenge of engaging with others due to his great nausea in the face of human laziness and contempt, and a refusal to follow a god of pity, along with his own deep loneliness.91 He remains caught between his contempt for the Christian society of his day and his love of an idealized ancient Greece, neither of which he can truly affirm. In seeking to affirm life in an era which seems to idolize the weak and passive, he moves past his own teaching, the affirmation of everything, and decides to negate once more: ―The weak and the failures shall perish: first principle of our love of man. And they shall even be given every possible assistance.‖92 This statement from Nietzsche immediately brings to mind the charges of proto-Naziism often brought against him. As Tobin Siebers suggests, Nietzsche, if he is to be consistent, would need to affirm even Christianity93 and ―the weak and failures,‖ along with all aspects of life. For him to create a world where those who are intent on self-overcoming could flourish would involve not a new set of masters, but a new ethic of partnership, one that we catch a glimpse of in Nietzsche‘s own insight about religious community. In such a community he sees that: "Love gives the greatest feeling of power. To grasp to what extent not man in general but a certain species of man speaks here....this means no morality, obedience or activity produces that feeling of power that love produces; one does nothing bad from love, one does much more than one would do from obedience and virtue... Being helpful and useful and caring for others continually arouses the feeling of power."94 Yet Nietzsche rejected this community, despite seeming to understand it, and came to embody the violent and ugly aspects of sacrifice in himself rather than its unitive and joyous ones. Christopher Hamilton writes that Nietzsche: believed that to have a sense of such a fellowship was to reject the world in all its morally suspect manner. And he believed that to do this would be to reject the standing conditions of life in the only way we humans can live it, that is, as a life involving much that is morally reprehensible. For Nietzsche, that thought was disgusting, unworthy of human beings. He was trapped between a sense of common fellowship with other human beings, and a desire to affirm life as it actually is. Unable to do either, he tyrannized over his own nature, exercising, but seeking thereby to exorcise, the asceticism he abhorred, and murdering God in the process.95 In Hamilton‘s assessment we find another confirmation of Nietzsche‘s ascetic nature, cloaked though it may be in the rejection of the old God. Nietzsche acts as the sacrificer and sacrifice, the ―worshipper and worshipped‖ as Girard elsewhere claims, insofar as he does constantly overcome (sacrifice) himself, or at least struggles to do so.96 How this consistent self-overcoming is to be maintained while still respecting and interacting with others is unclear to Nietzsche -- he is trapped and alone because of his constant quest for a purely individual freedom and power, the only way he sees to ―affirm life as it actually is.‖ The Lonely Sun When this disgust for human fellowship comes out in Nietzsche‘s work, it stands in contrast to the passages where Nietzsche, or at least his creation Zarathustra, emphasizes the great value of friendship and gift giving. Two scholars have recently examined this in relation to politics, Romand Coles97 and Katrin Froese.98 Both examine 95 Hamilton, ―Murder of God,‖ 179. 96 This loneliness and rejection of community, and their connection with Nietzsche‘s sense of reality, are also taken up in Giles Fraser‘s Redeeming Nietzsche, the theme of gift and giving in Nietzsche‘s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Zarathustra can be seen as a sort of proto-Übermensch who acts out Nietzsche‘s ideal life (which is notably one still built on tragedy, comedy, and an appreciation for Christian symbolism). Coles focuses on the section of Zarathustra concerning ―The Gift Giving Virtue,‖ which Coles notes is the ―highest virtue‖ according to Zarathustra. The attitude here is one who gives out of fullness, who is compassionate in a sense which is positive for Nietzsche, rather than the parasitic ―pity‖ which he attributes to the popular morality of his time. Coles also focuses on an image of fire in Nietzsche‘s work, the sun, and connects it to this virtue.99 The great star, which burns and freely gives to the world, is what Zarathustra strives to be like. In keeping with the theme of self overcoming as self sacrifice, the sun burns and gives. It is a star like so many other gods -- steady, brilliant, and without need of support. Yet it is obvious that Zarathustra does not see an end to strife in the gift-giving virtue, but rather a noble way of negotiating with it, as Coles notes. How can one become the ―dancing star‖ Zarathustra wishes to be without a dancing partner, without others? To give and give without receiving would leave one ―giving‖ without any notion of what is received, or of who is receiving. More than this, the selfovercoming which Nietzsche assumes is necessary for life would seem to have no place. In Froese‘s work this is accounted for in her reading of Nietzsche‘s concept of eternal return as the great interconnectedness of all things.100 This interconnection is held in tension with Nietzsche‘s own aristocratic politics which he builds upon the notion of will to power. As Nietzsche sees it, a will always seeks a stable sovereignty, or, to put it another way, to be a star. Froese points out that Zarathustra‘s comments on friendship indicate the best are those wherein ―each stimulates the other‘s development and rather than a self-sustaining god dictating to another mortal. The porous self that Nietzsche acknowledges is one which can never really become a ―sun‖ or ―star‖ -- or rather, it can only become such a celestial body for those who are kept far away and who do not examine it too closely. This is a recreation of the image of the ―lords‖ on high in relation to the servants and slaves who take the gifts (and commands) of the god. Froese‘s emphasis on the fluid nature of the Nietzschean self, along with the interconnection of life as an eternal return, shows the weakness of Nietzsche‘s politics, which lack imagination. Both Coles and Froese see in the gift giving virtue the potential for another path in Nietzsche, one which Nietzsche himself did not follow, likely out of his stubborn loneliness. In this vision Zarathustra does find the companions he seeks, and more than this, helps create a style of life and community which encourages the generosity and agon which is so difficult to maintain. Julian Young, in his effort to reconstruct a proposed folk religion from Nietzsche‘s writing, suggests that the community which Nietzsche did imagine was one which gave positive role models for many different classes of people, held together by the pia fraus of the philosophers.102

### 1nc – case

#### Double Bind — either the harms are the 1ac are true and they cannot solve for their impacts before they control the levers of power which means you can vote negative on presumption OR their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which means you can vote negative on principle.

#### Their demand for a uniform rationality inculcates a violent technocratic eradication of irrationality while only recapitulating a tragic ontology of ressentiment.

Ossewaarde 10. Marinus Ossewaarde, Associate Professor in Sociology at the University of Twente, “*The Tragic Turn in The Re-Imagination of Publics: Resentment and Ressentiment*,” Animus 14, 2010

For Nietzsche, the Heraclitean vision sees the truth about reality while tragedy subsequently transforms this unbearable absurdity of life into an aesthetic public, without masking the horror itself. The Socratic dialectic and its Apollonian publics intellectually involve people who are incited to search for the good in the realm of ideas, in spite of the phenomenological flux and absurdity of things. Dionysian publics do not try to check the becoming of reality, but instead, incite the participants to live it as art, by making them become part of the story itself. In Socratic dialogues, disputing friends critically question all established orders in their search for the rational or good order. Both the Dionysian and the Apollonian publics can disturb an established order and institutions. The urge to control drives bureaucracies, which, in order to effectively fix one type of reality, have to destroy all forms of publics that have the potential to upset order. In modern societies, bureaucracies impose an enlightenment model of rational order devoid of mythical content and uncertain self-knowledge, upon a reality that is thereby made fully intelligible, controllable and correctible. Nietzsche considers the European enlightenment as the modern successor to the Socratic myth-annihilation, which characterizes the Apollonian publics.8 The enlightenment movement’s confidence in the capacity of reason and its belief in the rational order of reality are Socratic in origin. However, Nietzsche suggests that the enlightenment goes steps further than Socrates in its annihilation of myth. Although Socrates ridicules and destroys the legendary tales of the tragedians, his dialogues are premised upon the myth of the Delphic oracle (which revealed that there was no one wiser than Socrates). And, although Socrates maintains that reason rather than myth is the foundation of European culture, reason, the nous, is itself a mythical entity (Nietzsche 2000: 72): the ‘voice of reason’ is the ‘divine voice’ of Socrates’ daimonion, which makes itself be heard in the dialogues (Nietzsche 2000: 75). In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, inspired by Nietzsche (c.f., Wellmer 1991: 3), maintain that the enlightenment movement postulates a vision of reason that is devoid of mythical content. Enlightenment reason, in its origin, seeks to make people think for themselves and to liberate them from their fears and superstitions, but, in the modernization process, it becomes an instrument that serves bureaucratic objectives, such as enforcing laws effectively, fixing a machine, or making a business run more efficiently.9 Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 57) emphasize that Nietzsche, like Hegel before him, had grasped this pathology of enlightenment reason that turns into a bureaucratic instrument. The reduction of the Socratic nous to an instrumental reason has far-reached political and cultural implications. Enlightenment reason provides the static concepts, mummified categories, classifications and catalogues that are required to construct bureaucratic limits and boundaries, which in turn rationally order reality (Honneth 2007: 70). Dialogical or democratic practices have no place in such a technical organization of reality. Bureaucracies, whose function is to implement the enlightenment or any other theoretical model of reality, have no need for the Socratic publics and consider dialogues and the need for intellectual justification rather troublesome and disorderly (Gouldner 1973: 76; Gardiner 2004: 35). The (potential) participants of Socratic dialogues are turned into bureaucratic subjects, like workers, consumers and clients, that is, into ‘spectators without influence’, whose lives are governed by the enlightened power elites and civil servants (Honneth 2007: 33). The identity of bureaucratic subjects is determined by typically large and powerful organizations, such as government agencies and enterprises (Mills 1956: 355). The Enlightenment movement is, in Nietzsche’s words (2000: 85), ‘the most illustrious opponent of the tragic world-view.’ Horkheimer and Adorno stress that the enlightenment movement, or perhaps more exactly, some kind of process deriving from it, eventually comes to substitute the plebeian entertainment of mass culture industries for the tragic art of the aesthetic publics. According to Nietzsche, bureaucratic subjects who live in a disenchanted world in which myths are annihilated by Apollonian reason cannot bear the horrific and absurd truth about their own existence.10 The subjects of the culture industries no longer have the opportunity to participate in enchanting tragic myths that cultivate powerful passions and the Dionysian will to live, which characterize Nietzsche’s ‘good European’. The entertainment provided by manufactured images and commodity forms, like music productions, films, television programmes and glossy magazines, ensures that the absurdity of life and the Dionysian abyss are forgotten (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007: 159).11 Being thoroughly rationalized, such subjects cannot develop the mythical imagination or a certain sensitivity that would have allowed them to ‘live the tragedy’ in and through the aesthetic publics. In a bureaucratic culture, subjects cannot experience, feel or live the tragic fate of the Dionysian hero, because, as Nietzsche (2000: 45) insists, shielded by bureaucracies, they are not ‘equipped for the most delicate and intense suffering.’ Bureaucracies expect and demand passive obedience from their subjects, which makes cultural movement nearly impossible. Such passive spectators or so-called ‘consumers of art’ (Shrum 1991: 349; 371), are, Horkheimer and Adorno (2007: 155; 166) point out, deluded en masse, governed to take refuge in comfortable, boring and mindless bureaucratic forms of entertainment. Culture industries provide ready-made experiences to a passive public that is willing to buy them to fill the emptiness of a disenchanted world and appease the cowardly fear of living in the flux, which they explicitly experience in temporary relationships and the continuous flow of new products and changed consumption patterns. The experience of the flux can also be more implicit or unconscious, resulting in a sort of malaise, feeling of insecurity or restlessness. However, the escape from life into a manufactured dream-world of cultural productions does not really quench the thirst, as the Socratic dialogue and the Dionysian festival do, which, therefore, allows the culture industry to carry on with its provision of manufactured dream-worlds, to fill an emptiness that never decreases.

### 1nc – case k – climate coop

#### The discourse of international climate cooperation is not neutral but rather dissolves local politics and creates micro-fascist allegiance to technocratic elites

Carvalho 10. Anabela Carvalho, Departamento deCiências da Comunicação, Universidade do Minho, Campus de Gualtar, 9 FEB 2010, "Media(ted)discourses and climate change: a focus on political subjectivity and (dis)engagement" 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 172–179, March/April 2010

A large part of mainstream media stories about climate change are set in the context of high-profile intergovernmental meetings and advance the notion that the global is the appropriate political space for action. A study of the volume of print media coverage at a series of key moments since 1990 in Portugal has shown that the peaks coincided with international summits; in contrast, key national events, such as the public presentation of the Portuguese Climate Change Plan in 2001 and the presentation of the Portuguese Plan of Allocation of Emissions Allowances in 2004, received little media attention. Content analysis and discourse analysis of articles has also shown a disproportional representation of international politics, and that the media often (implicitly) constituted the **global into the appropriate locus of action**.55 Similarly, Olausson56 has maintained that mitigation was mainly represented as a transnational responsibility in Swedish media. Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui's5 analysis of newspaper coverage in Japan made visible that most peaks coincided with high-status international summits (national events only achieved significant attention when they were associated with media-oriented campaigns). Although this can partly be expected, given the relevance of international negotiations for the management of climate change, it can also be argued that the national and the local are the right levels to act. Yet, sustained analysis of the possibilities for local policy-making on climate change features only rarelyin the mainstream media. Hence, while climate change may be represented as a tragic threat, debate on the climate impacts of a new road or a new housing development does not necessarily take place in a meaningful way. There is an apparent disconnect between climate change and specific sources of greenhouse gas emissions and between the global and local scales. It is likely that this has influenced perceptions and ideas about the scale of climate change. Multiple surveys show that people tend to rank climate change higher as a problem for the world than as a problem for their own country or region.5, 57 Furthermore, **by constructing climate change primarily as a global political issue, these discourses construct citizen agency as minute.** **Citizens are likely to feel powerless to affect processes and decisions at the global level. Such a setting emphasizes the distance between ordinary citizens and decision-making and reinforces the image of climate politics as being reserved to the heads of the most powerful states**. As the management of climate change is, in most mediated discourses, the realm of (scientific and political) elites, citizens are constituted into spectators or bystanders.f **Perceptions of the politics of climate change and of one's roles therein are also inexorably intertwined with wider discourses on ‘globalization’**. Policy-makers, international organizations, and—most obviously—corporations have been representing the ‘mobility’ of capital and production across the world as ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ processes.58 This construction of globalization, which is left unquestioned by many of the mainstream media, omits responsibility for particular choices and leaves no scope for citizen participation and informed deliberation.

### 1nc – case k – heg

**The incessant productivity of hegemony is a drive toward its own destruction. American hegemonic power has surpassed the domain of being referentially related to any material reality and can now only identify with the image of its own destruction – God agrees**

**Pope 7.** yes, that pope. Professor of Language at York University, “Baudrillard’s Simulacrum: Of War, Terror, and Obituaries,” October 2007, International Journal of Baudrillard Studies: Volume 4, Number 3 //eek

Many of the obituaries printed some variance of the following quote: “It is almost they who did it, but we who wanted it… Without this deep complicity, the event would not have had such repercussions”.17 Baudrillard **indexes all the disaster movies that have as part of their narratives an attack on the US, and often the World Trade Center itself.** Elsewhere Baudrillard notes that “**if the cohesion of our societies was in the past maintained by the ‘imaginary’ of progress, it is maintained today by the ‘imaginary’ of catastrophe**”.18 Slavoj Zizek alludes to Baudrillard’s argument in noting the “libidinal investment” we had in the attack: “That is the rationale of the often-mentioned association of the attacks with Hollywood disaster movies: **the unthinkable which happened was the object of fantasy**, so that, in a way, **America got what it fantasized about,** and that was the biggest surprise”.19 It is the “biggest surprise” because we do not expect to actually receive, directly, what we fantasize about, and when we are confronted with the core of our fantasy we can only experience it as traumatic. Simply put, our fantasy of terrorism was supposed to remain just that. (The “we” I am repeatedly using is that of a strange sort of “collectivity”: the atomized masses, of which we are all part of some of the time, and none of us all the time. The use of this shifter is intended to affect the shock of recognition, to the extent that is possible given the sort of collectivity indexed.) Though the obituaries implicitly suggested otherwise, Baudrillard was not saying that **on September 11**, 2001, the US got what it deserved, merely that **we cannot simply pretend as though we did not ourselves fantasize the “destruction of a power hegemonic to that degree**”.20 We can certainly try to rewrite the past – that is the very dynamism, after all, of hyperreality – but we can just as well resist this tendency in indexing our having fantasized “9/11” before it actually happened: In this scene, from Die Hard: With a Vengeance (Die Hard III), the Wall Street subway station has just been bombed. Covered in dust, panic-stricken executives run about in images that can now but recall those from lower Manhattan on September 11, 2001. Other executives take a spectatorial position to what is occurring beneath them: Centred in the action of the bomb blast the film cuts to an office that overlooks the scene with its nameless executives – who never become protagonists in the diegesis – and back to the action. A few seconds later we rejoin these executives, whom are now even eating popcorn in taking in this scene from behind the office window. One asks how many fire trucks can be counted, to which another says “you guys, you guys”, suggesting that their questioning is getting in the way of proper spectatorship. Die Hard not only partakes of the fantasy of terrorism, it does so in a reflexive manner. These executives, behind their window, clearly stand in for us, behind the screen. In front of these images we, like these executives, feign a blasé attitude (“it’s nothing we haven’t seen before”), while attentively absorbing them – along with popcorn. Part of the humour of Die Hard: with a Vengeance is the way it exaggerates the nonchalance New Yorkers have to threats of terrorism, but this indifference – and so the reflexivity of this film – was only made possible through the interminable media discourse about terrorism. Behind our blasé attitude, this film suggests, lies enjoyment (and, perhaps, the reason for seeing this film). **When someone** like Baudrillard **confronts us with our own enjoyment, we feign shock and horror**. It is almost a law: **those that come closest to articulating** – and so potentially dissolving – **the kernel of our enjoyment are the most vilified**. Baudrillard, however, simply makes more explicit that around which Hollywood has built countless narratives. Later in the film the arch-terrorist, impersonating a city engineer, comes to survey the damage, and remarks: “Holy toledo! Somebody had fun”. Indexing his own enjoyment, he is also, as the previous scene with the executives makes clear, indexing our own. (The police officer with whom he converses himself references the first attack on the World Trade Center: “You were probably at the World Trade’s. You know what that mess was”.) **Though the US administration might not ponder to any degree the enjoyment of terrorism, they do appreciate Hollywood’s story-telling abilities, routinely consulting them on likely terrorist targets and practices**. But what they are ultimately consulting, of course, is our enjoyment as intuited by various Hollywood functionaries. Despite the extremely few deaths attributed to terrorism, at times in the 1980s, Joseba Zulaika notes, “over 80 per cent of Americans regarded terrorism as an “extreme” danger. In April of 1986, a national survey showed that terrorism was “the number one concern” for Americans”.21 Feeding this fire and/or being fed from it, from 1989 to 1992, four years in which not a single person died from terrorism in the US, 1322 new book titles with the subject “terrorism” emerged.22 One could say, as Zulaika does, that **in producing the discourse of terrorism Americans effectively called it into being**. One would want to know why, however, the discourse was in the first place produced. If one is inclined to answer that it was produced because it was a very effective way to keep audiences captive long enough to sell them to advertisers, one would still want to know why it exerted such power of fascination for these audiences. I would suggest that Baudrillard allows for such an understanding in his discernment of the challenge opened by America, and the American production of this discourse is perhaps a kind of realization of the challenge it had placed to the rest of the world. **America fantasized its own destruction, because it had set up the challenge, the “dare” (as so many American kids say and play every Saturday night). It was only waiting to see who would answer** – and, in its millenarian spirit, when. It is probably not a stretch to say that **the US, and the rest of the Western world, shares a kind of global popular culture – shaped first by the challenge, then by the mass media** (though the challenge is to some extent only articulated through the mass media) – with the terrorists of September 11, 2001. Baudrillard does not suggest, however, that having shared such fantasies entails that we should now feel guilty. In Cool Memories V he writes that simply because we shared a kind of collective unconscious with the terrorists, “it is ridiculous to condemn the ‘collusion’ of the Unconscious with any political act whatever, and hence to submit it to a moral judgement”. To suggest otherwise, he continues, is to “dream of a politically correct Unconscious”.23 Baudrillard once wrote that America “is the only remaining primitive society”24, which drew some attention at the time, and likewise had some obituaries crying foul. For the most part these critics were not aware that such a designation is, for Baudrillard, generally a form of flattery, if it does indeed become here more problematical. Primitive societies are for Baudrillard of the order of symbolic exchange and reversibility, of the pact and the challenge rather than the contract. To some extent he sees this in America: **If you approach this society with the nuances of moral, aesthetic, or critical judgement, you will miss its originality, which comes precisely from its defying judgement and pulling off a prodigious confusion of effects. To side-step that confusion and excess is simply to evade the challenge it throws down to you**… as with dream elements, **you must accept the way they follow one another, even if it seems unintelligible**… The distinctions that are made elsewhere have little meaning here.25 In a way **America has no concern for values enshrined and elaborated upon in European cultures, instead operating in a kind of primitive, ritualistic society, epitomized through driving culture and the rules of the road**. At the same time, however, **the pornographic obscenity of American culture ensures the elision of any secret, any play beyond the materialized object. America is a culture of paradox**: on the one hand, **its affirmative thinking renders it as far from the reversible play of seduction and the challenge as possible, while**, on the other, **its “defying judgement” indexes a society enjoying its lack of referentiality. American culture seems most obviously concerned with securing reality (and hegemony), while on the other it basks in the implosion of (its) power**. This is perhaps a definition for utopia, and Baudrillard accordingly takes up America’s primitive challenge, attempting to render its meaninglessness not through moral, aesthetic, or critical judgement, but through accepting and working through its perennial claim of achieved utopia. Its endless concern to “vindicate itself”26 as such a utopia opens up a senseless challenge – that mistakes itself for reality – to which Baudrillard responds through his “radical thought”. In short, Baudrillard takes up America’s challenge through a form of intellectual terrorism, one which should be rigorously differentiated, of course, from the suicidal act. For Baudrillard, indeed, **the terrorist act was and is not the only possible response to globalization**. Against commodity value, that which treats everything as series of equivalences, Baudrillard turned to anthropology’s discernment of cultures where “things are never exchanged directly one for another”.27 “It was a question”, he wrote, “of attempting to strip the object – but not just the object – of its status as commodity, to restore to it an immediacy, a brute reality which would not have a price put on it”.28 At this point one would no longer be in the realm of the contract, but that of the pact, a “dual, collusive relation”, wherein “the terms are reversible”.29 He suggests that “[i]t is perhaps utopian to claim to pass beyond value, but it is an operative utopia, an attempt to conceive a more radical functioning of things”,30 and one, we might note, that did not necessarily partake of acts of terrorism. He suggests that **we have perhaps “always” been “in a dual morality”: “There might be said to be a moral sphere, that of commodity exchange, and an immoral sphere, that of play or gaming, where all that counts is the event of the game itself and the advent of shared rules**”,31 as in seduction and gambling. **We might live in a fully simulated world, of copies without originals, but nonetheless** Baudrillard writes: “**symbolic exchange has always been at the radical base of things, and… it is on that level that things are decided**… Perhaps we are still in an immense potlatch”.32 Baudrillard claims he is not nostalgic for it, which is perhaps believable to the extent that we are, still, in such potlatch, however much we try to dis-acknowledge it. He does write that we cannot acknowledge it since “without the rituals, without the myths, we no longer have the means to do so”.33 Terrorism attempts to revive such means, but so does, Baudrillard elsewhere suggests, the odd seduction, the life-or-death gamble, and the work of theory. There is, in short, room for hope. III. THE TERROR OF MEANING, THE TERROR OF MEANINGLESSNESS In the wake of September 11, 2001, audiences heard that the motive for the terrorist acts was religious fundamentalism, a “perverted” branch of Islam that calls for jihad against any and all infidels. It is assumed “they” have a deep hatred of American and ‘Western’ “freedoms”. On one hand we are terrified by the sedimentation of meaning accrued through the long-serving Orientalist lens on the cultures of Islam: there is simply too much meaning, and we, along with today’s mass media, are incapable of performing digestion. Baudrillard writes that here “all distinctive marks will become anathema, suspect of masking or even, quite simply, signifying something, and hence potentially terroristic”.34 But perhaps, on the other hand, we (and the media) are ultimately terrified from the realization that there is no meaning to the suicide act itself, that it is but the simple, and stupid, assertion of singularity in the de-sphericized world of global consumption. In this sense I partially disagree with more traditional Leftist accounts of the “complexity” of the conditions that led to September 11. While I would not deny that one can (and in fact should) draw all sorts of historical and political links amongst the actors, none of these links provides any effective meaning to the suicide mission itself. Hollywood’s rendering of flight United 93, in the film of the same name, is perhaps correct in depicting the terrorists as constantly reciting prayers to Allah, but even as such it seems to confirm Zizek’s point that the terrorists only resolved the more fundamental deadlock of their belief in the suicidal act proper.35 Like most believers, religious or otherwise, they were not unquestionably assured as to the intricacies of their faith, but on the contrary acted in “fundamentalist” ways in order to resolve lingering doubt. News analyses and documentaries seem to take a certain relish, for instance, in reporting that suicide bombers believe they are but a bomb blast away from seventy-two virgins, but it is rather highly probable that Muslim fundamentalists do not unfailingly believe this – with the suicide mission itself undertaken as a way of shoring up and confirming this aspect of their belief, among others. From one angle “Islamic fundamentalism” is fundamentally meaningless, as, indeed, are all “leaps of faith”; it is only after the “leap” that the believer can, a posteriori, begin rationalizing his/her belief. The terrorist act, moreover, is a second leap that doubles the meaningless of the original leap of faith. From another angle, that of its situation in its economic and political context, “Islamic fundamentalism” is perhaps deeply meaningful, pointing towards a myriad of injustices in a world-system predicated on the exploitation of the environment and whole nations of people. Meaning here is also terrifying. But the context of Islamic fundamentalism is not discussed in the media. What is “reported” is a strain of religion which believes in the virgins, hates democracy, and wants women to wear veils, and that is willing to sacrifice the self – the foundation of liberal humanist Western societies – to accomplish its goals. In short, **the media is forever circling around the fundamental meaninglessness of the suicide act proper, while eliding the genuine injustices that move millions of people to take up oppositional stances to “Western” capitalist hegemony.** To accusations that he was somehow legitimating terrorism Baudrillard responded, in a Der Spiegel interview republished in this journal: I do not praise murderous attacks — that would be idiotic. Terrorism is not a contemporary form of revolution against oppression and capitalism. No ideology, no struggle for an objective, not even Islamic fundamentalism, can explain it. …I have glorified nothing, accused nobody, justified nothing. One should not confuse the messenger with his message. I have endeavored to analyze the process through which the unbounded expansion of globalization creates the conditions for its own destruction.36 **The attacks were a challenge, to America**, to be sure, **but also to the attempt at meaning**. It is, as the Right righteously insists, foolish to suggest that the attacks were some sort of response to global injustice, as if some sort of meaningful economy was already existent in which the attacks were easily inscribed. But it is also wrong, and for the same reasons, to – again Righteously – suggest that the attacks were directed against our “freedoms” and “way of life”. The suicidal acts were meaningless on two fronts: one, in the simulacra of mass media punditry and 24/7 “real time” coverage; two, in the desperate assertion (and revenge) of singularity in and against the de-sphericized processes of “globalization”. Since globalization is inseparable from the media, the second dimension of meaninglessness cuts to the heart of the first. And that was the point. Admitting that some things may have no meaning is difficult for the intellectual, of course. I am reminded of the moment in Dick Hebdige’s Subculture: The Meaning of Style, when he is trying to come to terms with the “meaning” of the punk appropriation of the swastika. What, after all, could that mean? He comes to the conclusion that there is, in fact, no meaning to be had: The signifier (swastika) had been willfully detached from the concept (Nazism) it conventionally signified, and although it had been re-positioned (as ‘Berlin’) within an alternative subcultural context, its primary value and appeal derived precisely from its lack of meaning: from its potential for deceit. It was exploited as an empty effect… The key to punk style remains elusive. Instead of arriving at the point where we can begin to make sense of the style, we have reached the very place where meaning itself evaporates.37 This seemingly most meaningful symbol – in the words of Stuart Hall, “that sign which, above all other signs, ought to be fixed”38 – turns out to repel meaning. (Punks were more often than not anti-racists.) One would think that this conclusion would give Hebdige some semiotic pause, enough even to reconsider changing the title of his book. Instead, at this very point, he begins exploring the theoretical developments of the Tel Quel brand of semiotics that emphasize the polysemic nature of any given term. At the moment he marks the fundamental nothingness and stupidity of the punk use of the swastika, he immediately goes on to emphasize its excessive and potentially “infinite range of meanings”.39 **He is right, of course, to reject the standard semiotic method of finding a determined or symptomatic meaning behind overt signifiers, but I am uneasy about immediately moving on to emphasize the “productivity” of language.40 Such incessant productivity is, after all, the condition of post-industrial postmodern capitalism**, and it is not at all clear that the punk appropriation of the swastika can be within this so easily subsumed: it may have more to do with a sort of expression of the very demise of any horizon of meaning than of the “pomo” productivity of language. **The endless performativity of “communicative capitalism**”41 – as in branding – **does**, of course, **hollow out meaning, but in the very process of doing so it believes itself full of it**. In wearing the swastika, by contrast, punks were not engaged in anything like branding. Hebdige concludes Subculture by noting how we, as academics, are condemned to “speak excessively about reality”,42 but this only seems to indicate that the productivity of language rests more with the academic than the object in question. It is the same with terrorism. Academics, politicians, and media pundits produce an endless whirligig – a performative productivity – of discourse about it, but the terrorist act, like the punk use of the swastika, is fundamentally meaningless. Rather than partake in this productivity (which is only ultimately in the service of Capital, not least in the production of books to be plugged on talk shows), or, at the least, **rather than justify one’s** (perhaps inevitable) **contributions to** such **productivity, one should rather mark the place where meaning implodes as causative force. This is not meant to advocate resignation**. Concerned academics should, again, continue to draw links between what occurred on September 11, 2001 and its global politico-economic context; there is truthful meaning there (unlike that of the Orientalist discourse). But this truth is ineffectual if it is not supplemented with an apprehension of the meaninglessness of the terrorist act proper; a rigorous separation must be maintained. IV. ABU GHRAIB: UPPING THE ANTE Baudrillard recently wrote of Jorge Luis Borges conjecture that **Hitler was on a suicidal mission, that, in wanting to be defeated, he “collaborated blindly with the inevitable armies that [would] annihilate him”. It is the same today, for “global, comfortable, imperial civilization**”: “[i]n the central solitude of those very people who profit by it, it is unlivable. And all are secretly won over to the forces that will destroy it”.43 In “Pornography of War”, written in response to the revelation and media dissemination of the photographs of prisoner abuse and torture **at Abu Ghraib**, Iraq, Baudrillard suggested that while the terrorist attacks of September 11 inflicted a humiliation on the US from the outside, here **we were confronted with the US exacting such humiliation on itself: “These scenes are the illustration of a power that, having reached its extreme point, no longer knows what to do with itself, of a power now aimless and purposeless since it has no plausible enemy and acts with total impunity**”.44 “**All it can do now”, he continues, “is inflict gratuitous humiliation… And it can only humiliate itself in the process, demean and deny itself in a kind of perverse relentlessness**”.45 I would not deny it. But what if, extrapolating and building on his own arguments from “The Spirit of Terrorism”, torturing the “Iraqi Other” – delusionally linked, for most Americans, with Al Qaeda – was a response, in the realm of the pact and symbolic exchange, to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001? If so, this is not simply a matter of the US “electrocuting itself”,46 but also the Other, in a kind of potlatch of humiliation opened up by America itself and responded to in the spectacle that was and is “9/11”. These photos are meant to be seen, and unlike other examples of torture, are signed: “I did this”, says Lyndee England with her stupid grin, “I’m making them pay”. Sent to their colleagues and friends these photos suggest a personalization of the challenge, and one gets the sense – in a wired world – that they were taken with the knowledge that others beyond the originally intended recipients would see them. In this way they England is also saying: “I did this to you (– how will you respond?)” The torturers give themselves the task of “making it personal”, in a sense desperately trying to give body and tangible form to the whole history of European and American humiliation of the Middle East, just as did the terrorists of September 11, 2001. I would contend Baudrillard even says this himself: And what is it, in fact, that we want to make these men confess? What secret are we trying to force out of them? We quite simply want them to tell us how it is – and in the name of what – that they are unafraid of death.47 What made them do what they did on “9/11”? What makes their Palestinian `brethren’ do the same? (Never mind, of course, that the poor Iraqi threatened with electrocution had nothing to do with it, since for racist American prison guards they are all “linked”).48 Zizek suggests that rather than being another expression for voyeurism, **the “scopic drive” is originally the drive to make oneself part of a scene offered up to the gaze of the Other**.49 **We do not begin as observers passively recording a reality in front of us, but are first and foremost embedded within a tableau observed by the gaze**. Paradoxically, then, **one in some manner produces the gaze through the scopic drive, in the activity of exposing oneself**. American torturers realized this in including themselves within their “abject tableaux”, as Baudrillard put it.50 **In the phenomenon of having one’s existence recorded by webcams, TV confessionals, and/or reality TV shows, the true horror is of not being observed. It is almost as if people only feel as though they exist in being so recorded, in producing and being offered up to the gaze; one almost hysterically grounds one’s existence in such iterative recordings**.51 In the case of the Abu Ghraib photographs, American torturers confirm their existence in the same moment that they humiliate those tortured. In having their photos taken alongside their victims these Americans produce the Other, here ever more rendered as the technological apparatus through which these images flow. Is this not the truth of YouTube confessionals, Flickr accounts, and weblogs? **Increasingly anxious that anyone is listening or watching, that there is any sort of collectivity in which one is embedded, one uploads a veritable flow of diarrheic images and words to not only ensure that someone is watching, but that** – as a result – **the Other, Society, is there.** The pictures from Abu Ghraib partake of this logic, while engaging in the realm of challenge and the collusive relation.

### 1nc – case k – ir

#### The aff’s wrong about everything

Bernstein et al 2K. (Steven Bernstein., Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven Weber, University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at Berkeley. “God Gave Physics the Easy Problems” European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43.)

A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the 'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful, high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet **the most relaxed** 'scientific' tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state - war is more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack stronger states - **are close to trivial**, have important exceptions, and for the most part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another 50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory in the Popperian sense. We suggest that the nature, goals and criteria for judging social science theory should be rethought, if theory is to be more helpful in understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for predictive theory rests on a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy in its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward 'tracking' of international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic, falsifiable hypothesis and large-n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a complementary fashion, to 'scientific' theory-testing. Newtonian Physics: A Misleading Model Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some phenomena - the trajectories of individual planets - can be predicted with a reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherendy unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table, the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking about trillions of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in other domains of social science, it is often **impossible** to assign metrics to what we think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964: especially Chapter 2). The concepts of **polarity**, relative power and the **balance of power** are among the most widely used independent variables, **but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures** for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better. Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of **deterrence outcomes**, and about the criteria for **democratic** **governance** and their application to specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus about terms and their measurement is **not merely the result of** intellectual anarchy or **sloppiness** - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, **it has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves**. Key terms in physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research. Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built on **'idealizations'**, that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but **implicit 'theories'** about actors and **contexts that do not exist** (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975; Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995: 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985: 55). **If** problems of definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we **would still** **find it** difficult, if not **impossible, to construct large enough samples** of comparable cases to permit statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the causes of wars, the **variation across time and the complexity of the interaction** among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory **extraordinarily low**. Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading. But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990: 131-50; Lustick, 1996: 505-18; Jervis, 1997).

### 1nc – case k – info dissuasive

#### Their ecological project can only lead to a tyranny over the environment – real life sacrificed for artificial survival – kills value to life

Baudrillard 94. Jean, The Illusion of the End, 1994, CP ///brackets for clarity

Such a very American hallucination this ocean, this savannah, this desert, this virgin forest reconstituted in miniature, vitrified beneath their experimental bubble. In the true spirit of Disneyland's attractions, Biosphere 2 is not an experiment, but an experimental attraction. The most amazing thing is that they have reconstituted a fragment of artificial desert right in the middle of the natural desert (a bit like reconstituting Hollywood in Disneyworld). Only in this artificial desert there are neither scorpions nor Indians [[[there is nothing]]] to be exterminated; there are only extraterrestrials trained to survive in the very place where they destroyed another, far better adapted race, leaving it no chance. The whole humanist ideology - ecological, climatic, micro-cosmic and biogenetic - is summed up here, but this is of no importance. Only the sidereal, transparent form of the edifice means anything - but what? Difficult to say. As ever, absolute space inspires engineers, gives meaning to a project which has none, except the mad desire for a miniaturization of the human species, with a view perhaps to a future race and its emergence, of which we still dream. . . The artificial promiscuity of climates has its counterpart in the artificial immunity of the space: the elimination of all spontaneous generation (of germs, viruses, microbes), the automatic purification of the water, the air, the physical atmosphere (and the mental atmosphere too, purified by science). The elimination of all sexual reproduction: it is forbidden to reproduce in Biosphere 2; even contamination from life [Ie vivant] is dangerous; sexuality may spoil the experiment. Sexual difference functions only as a formal, statistical variable (the same number of women as men; if anyone drops out, a person of the same sex is substituted). Everything here is designed with a brain-like abstraction. Biosphere 2 is to Biosphere 1 (the whole of our planet and the cosmos) what the brain is to the human being in general: the synthesis in miniature of all its possible functions and operations: the desert lobe, the virgin forest lobe, the nourishing agriculture lobe, the residential lobe, all carefully distinct and placed side by side, according to the analytical imperative. All of this in reality entirely outdated with respect to what we now know about the brain - its plasticity, its elasticity, the reversible sequencing of all its operations. There is, then, behind this archaic model, beneath its futuristic exterior, a gigantic hypothetical error, a fierce idealization doomed to failure. In fact, the 'truth' of the operation lies elsewhere, and you sense this when you return from Biosphere 2 to 'real' America, as you do when you emerge from Disneyland into real life: the fact is that the imaginary, or experimental, model is in no way different from the real functioning of this society. Just as the whole of America is built in the image of Disneyland, so the whole of American society is carrying on - in real time and out in the open - the same experiment as Biosphere 2 which is therefore only falsely experimental, just as Disneyland is only falsely imaginary. The recycling of all substances, the integration of flows and circuits, non-pollution, artificial immunity, ecological balancing, controlled abstinence, restrained jouissance but, also, the right of all species to survival and conservation - and not just plant and animal species, but also social ones. All categories formally brought under the one umbrella of the law - this latter setting its seal on the ending of natural selection. It is generally thought that the obsession with survival is a logical consequence of life and the right to life. But, most of the time, the two things are contradictory. Life is not a question of rights, and what follows on from life is not survival, which is artificial, but death. It is only by paying the price of a failure to live, a failure to take pleasure, a failure to die that man is assured of survival. At least in present conditions, which the Biosphere principle perpetuates. This micro-universe seeks to exorcize catastrophe by making an artificial synthesis of all the elements of catastrophe. From the perspective of survival, of recycling and feedback, of stabilization and metastabilization, the elements of life are sacrificed to those of survival (elimination of germs, of evil, of sex). Real life, which surely, after all, has the right to disappear (or might there be a paradoxical limit to human rights?), is sacrificed to artificial survival. The real planet, presumed condemned, is sacrificed in advance to its miniaturized, air-conditioned clone (have no fear, all the earth's climates are air-conditioned here) which is designed to vanquish death by total simulation. In days gone by it was the dead who were embalmed for eternity; today, it is the living we embalm alive in a state of survival. Must this be our hope? Having lost our metaphysical utopias, do we have to build this prophylactic one? What, then, is this species endowed with the insane pretension to survive - not to transcend itself by virtue of its natural intelligence, but to survive physically, biologically, by virtue of its artificial intelligence? Is there a species destined to escape natural selection, natural disappearance - in a word, death? What cosmic cussedness might give rise to such a turnabout? What vital reaction might produce the idea of survival at any cost? What metaphysical anomaly might grant the right not to disappear - logical counterpart of the remarkable good fortune of having appeared? There is a kind of aberration in the attempt to eternalize the species - not to immortalize it in its actions, but to eternalize it in this face-lifted coma, in the glass coffin of Biosphere 2.We may, nonetheless, take the view that this experiment, like any attempt to achieve artificial survival or artificial paradise, is illusory, not from any technical shortcomings, but in its very principle. In spite of itself, it is threatened by the same accidents as real life. Fortunately. Let us hope that the random universe outside smashes this glass coffin. Any accident will do if it rescues us from a scientific euphoria sustained by drip-feed.

#### The attempt to make the world transparent through information and research is self-defeating. More knowledge fails to change reality. Facts and evidence are uniquely dissuasive.

Baudrillard 81. Jean, He is French, “*Simulacra and Simulations*,” pg. 79-81

We live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning. Consider three hypotheses. Either information produces meaning (a negentropic factor), but cannot make up for the brutal loss of signification in every domain. Despite efforts to reinject message and content, meaning is lost and devoured faster than it can be reinjected. In this case, one must appeal to a base productivity to replace failing media. This is the whole ideology of free speech, of media broken down into innumerable individual cells of transmission, that is, into "antimedia" (pirate radio, etc.). Or information has nothing to do with signification. It is something else, an operational model of another order, outside meaning and of the circulation of meaning strictly speaking. This is Shannon's hypothesis: a sphere of information that is purely functional, a technical medium that does not imply any finality of meaning, and thus should also not be implicated in a value judgment. A kind of code, like the genetic code: it is what it is, it functions as it does, meaning is something else that in a sense comes after the fact, as it does for Monod in Chance and Necessity. In this case, there would simply be no significant relation between the inflation of information and the deflation of meaning. Or, very much on the contrary, there is a rigorous and necessary correlation between the two, to the extent that information is directly destructive of meaning and signification, or that it neutralizes them. The loss of meaning is directly linked to the dissolving, dissuasive action of information, the media, and the mass media. The third hypothesis is the most interesting but flies in the face of every commonly held opinion. Everywhere socialization is measured by the exposure to media messages. Whoever is underexposed to the media is desocialized or virtually asocial. Everywhere information is thought to produce an accelerated circulation of meaning, a plus value of meaning homologous to the economic one that results from the accelerated rotation of capital. Information is thought to create communication, and even if the waste is enormous, a general consensus would have it that nevertheless, as a whole, there be an excess of meaning, which is redistributed in all the interstices of the social just as consensus would have it that material production, despite its dysfunctions and irrationalities, opens onto an excess of wealth and social purpose. We are all complicitous in this myth. It is the alpha and omega of our modernity, without which the credibility of our social organization would collapse. Well, the fact is that it is collapsing, and for this very reason: because where we think that information produces meaning, the opposite occurs. /////// Information devours its own content. It devours communication and the social. And for two reasons. 1. Rather than creating communication, it exhausts itself in the act of staging communication. Rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of meaning. A gigantic process of simulation that is very familiar. The nondirective interview, speech, listeners who call in, participation at every level, blackmail through speech: "You are concerned, you are the event, etc." More and more information is invaded by this kind of phantom content, this homeopathic grafting, this awakening dream of communication. A circular arrangement through which one stages the desire of the audience, the antitheater of communication, which, as one knows, is never anything but the recycling in the negative of the traditional institution, the integrated circuit of the negative. Immense energies are deployed to hold this simulacrum at bay, to avoid the brutal desimulation that would confront us in the face of the obvious reality of a radical loss of meaning. It is useless to ask if it is the loss of communication that produces this escalation in the simulacrum, or whether it is the simulacrum that is there first for dissuasive ends, to short-circuit in advance any possibility of communication (precession of the model that calls an end to the real). Useless to ask which is the first term, there is none, it is a circular process that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. The hyperreality of communication and of meaning. More real than the real, that is how the real is abolished. Thus not only communication but the social functions in a closed circuit, as a lure to which the force of myth is attached. Belief, faith in information attach themselves to this tautological proof that the system gives of itself by doubling the signs of an unlocatable reality. But one can believe that this belief is as ambiguous as that which was attached to myths in ancient societies. One both believes and doesn't. One does not ask oneself, "I know very well, but still." A sort of inverse simulation in the masses, in each one of us, corresponds to this simulation of meaning and of communication in which this system encloses us. To this tautology of the system the masses respond with ambivalence, to deterrence they respond with disaffection, or with an always enigmatic belief. Myth exists, but one must guard against thinking that people believe in it: this is the trap of critical thinking that can only be exercised if it presupposes the naivete and stupidity of the masses. 2. Behind this exacerbated mise-en-scène of communication, the mass media, the pressure of information pursues an irresistible destructuration of the social. Thus information dissolves meaning and dissolves the social, in a sort of nebulous state dedicated not to a surplus of innovation, but, on the contrary, to total entropy.\*1 Thus the media are producers not of socialization, but of exactly the opposite, of the implosion of the social in the masses. And this is only the macroscopic extension of the implosion of meaning at the microscopic level of the sign. This implosion should be analyzed according to McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, the consequences of which have yet to be exhausted. That means that all contents of meaning are absorbed in the only dominant form of the medium. Only the medium can make an event whatever the contents, whether they are conformist or subversive. A serious problem for all counterinformation, pirate radios, antimedia, etc. But there is something even more serious, which McLuhan himself did not see. Because beyond this neutralization of all content, one could still expect to manipulate the medium in its form and to transform the real by using the impact of the medium as form. If all the content is wiped out, there is perhaps still a subversive, revolutionary use value of the medium as such. That is and this is where McLuhan's formula leads, pushed to its limit there is not only an implosion of the message in the medium, there is, in the same movement, the implosion of the medium itself in the real, the implosion of the medium and of the real in a sort of hyperreal nebula, in which even the definition and distinct action of the medium can no longer be determined. Even the "traditional" status of the media themselves, characteristic of modernity, is put in question. McLuhan's formula, the medium is the message, which is the key formula of the era of simulation (the medium is the message the sender is the receiver the circularity of all poles the end of panoptic and perspectival space such is the alpha and omega of our modernity), this very formula must be imagined at its limit where, after all the contents and messages have been volatilized in the medium, it is the medium itself that is volatilized as such. Fundamentally, it is still the message that lends credibility to the medium, that gives the medium its determined, distinct status as the intermediary of communication. Without a message, the medium also falls into the indefinite state characteristic of all our great systems of judgment and value. A single model, whose efficacy is immediate, simultaneously generates the message, the medium, and the "real." Finally, the medium is the message not only signifies the end of the message, but also the end of the medium. There are no more media in the literal sense of the word (I'm speaking particularly of electronic mass media) that is, of a mediating power between one reality and another, between one state of the real and another. Neither in content, nor in form. Strictly, this is what implosion signifies. The absorption of one pole into another, the short-circuiting between poles of every differential system of meaning, the erasure of distinct terms and oppositions, including that of the medium and of the real thus the impossibility of any mediation, of any dialectical intervention between the two or from one to the other. Circularity of all media effects. Hence the impossibility of meaning in the literal sense of a unilateral vector that goes from one pole to another. One must envisage this critical but original situation at its very limit: it is the only one left us. It is useless to dream of revolution through content, useless to dream of a revelation through form, because the medium and the real are now in a single nebula whose truth is indecipherable. The fact of this implosion of contents, of the absorption of meaning, of the evanescence of the medium itself, of the reabsorption of every dialectic of communication in a total circularity of the model, of the implosion of the social in the masses, may seem catastrophic and desperate. But this is only the case in light of the idealism that dominates our whole view of information. We all live by a passionate idealism of meaning and of communication, by an idealism of communication through meaning, and, from this perspective, it is truly the catastrophe of meaning that lies in wait for us. But one must realize that "catastrophe" has this "catastrophic" meaning of end and annihilation only in relation to a linear vision of accumulation, of productive finality, imposed on us by the system. Etymologically, the term itself only signifies the curvature, the winding down to the bottom of a cycle that leads to what one could call the "horizon of the event," to an impassable horizon of meaning: beyond that nothing takes place that has meaning for us but it suffices to get out of this ultimatum of meaning in order for the catastrophe itself to no longer seem like a final and nihilistic day of reckoning, such as it functions in our contemporary imaginary. Beyond meaning, there is the fascination that results from the neutralization and the implosion of meaning. Beyond the horizon of the social, there are the masses, which result from the neutralization and the implosion of the social. What is essential today is to evaluate this double challenge the challenge of the masses to meaning and their silence (which is not at all a passive resistance) the challenge to meaning that comes from the media and its fascination. All the marginal, alternative efforts to revive meaning are secondary in relation to that challenge. Evidently, there is a paradox in this inextricable conjunction of the masses and the media: do the media neutralize meaning and produce unformed [informe] or informed [informée] masses, or is it the masses who victoriously resist the media by directing or absorbing all the messages that the media produce without responding to them? Sometime ago, in "Requiem for the Media," I analyzed and condemned the media as the institution of an irreversible model of communication without a response. But today? This absence of a response can no longer be understood at all as a strategy of power, but as a counterstrategy of the masses themselves when they encounter power. What then? Are the mass media on the side of power in the manipulation of the masses, or are they on the side of the masses in the liquidation of meaning, in the violence perpetrated on meaning, and in fascination? Is it the media that induce fascination in the masses, or is it the masses who direct the media into the spectacle? Mogadishu-Stammheim: the media make themselves into the vehicle of the moral condemnation of terrorism and of the exploitation of fear for political ends, but simultaneously, in the most complete ambiguity, they propagate the brutal charm of the terrorist act, they are themselves terrorists, insofar as they themselves march to the tune of seduction (cf. Umberto Eco on this eternal moral dilemma: how can one not speak of terrorism, how can one find a good use of the media there is none). The media carry meaning and countermeaning, they manipulate in all directions at once, nothing can control this process, they are the vehicle for the simulation internal to the system and the simulation that destroys the system, according to an absolutely Mobian and circular logic and it is exactly like this. There is no alternative to this, no logical resolution. Only a logical exacerbation and a catastrophic resolution. With one caution. We are face to face with this system in a double situation and insoluble double bind exactly like children faced with the demands of the adult world. Children are simultaneously required to constitute themselves as autonomous subjects, responsible, free and conscious, and to constitute themselves as submissive, inert, obedient, conforming objects. The child resists on all levels, and to a contradictory demand he responds with a double strategy. To the demand of being an object, he opposes all the practices of disobedience, of revolt, of emancipation; in short, a total claim to subjecthood. To the demand of being a subject he opposes, just as obstinately and efficaciously, an object's resistance, that is to say, exactly the opposite: childishness, hyperconformism, total dependence, passivity, idiocy. Neither strategy has more objective value than the other. The subject-resistance is today unilaterally valorized and viewed as positive just as in the political sphere only the practices of freedom, emancipation, expression, and the constitution of a political subject are seen as valuable and subversive. But this is to ignore the equal, and without a doubt superior, impact of all the object practices, of the renunciation of the subject position and of meaning precisely the practices of the masses that we bury under the derisory terms of alienation and passivity. The liberating practices respond to one of the aspects of the system, to the constant ultimatum we are given to constitute ourselves as pure objects, but they do not respond at all to the other demand, that of constituting ourselves as subjects, of liberating ourselves, expressing ourselves at whatever cost, of voting, producing, deciding, speaking, participating, playing the game a form of blackmail and ultimatum just as serious as the other, even more serious today. To a system whose argument is oppression and repression, the strategic resistance is the liberating claim of subjecthood. But this strategy is more reflective of the earlier phase of the system, and even if we are still confronted with it, it is no longer the strategic terrain: the current argument of the system is to maximize speech, the maximum production of meaning. Thus the strategic resistance is that of the refusal of meaning and of the spoken word or of the hyperconformist simulation of the very mechanisms of the system, which is a form of refusal and of non-reception. It is the strategy of the masses: it is equivalent to returning to the system its own logic by doubling it, to reflecting meaning, like a mirror, without absorbing it. This strategy (if one can still speak of strategy) prevails today, because it was ushered in by that phase of the system which prevails. To choose the wrong strategy is a serious matter. All the movements that only play on liberation, emancipation, on the resurrection of a subject of history, of the group, of the word based on "consciousness raising," indeed a "raising of the unconscious" of subjects and of the masses, do not see that they are going in the direction of the system, whose imperative today is precisely the overproduction and regeneration of meaning and of speech.

### 2nr – o/v – k

They have conceded an ENTIRE THEORY OF DESIRE that makes it nearly impossible to vote aff – the nature of desire is one of mimesis – robust historical analyses indicate that the subject models desires towards external objects off of those projected by others in the global structure of mimeticism – violence today exists as the subject identifies an object of desire another has and attempts to attain it – this is evident in their sacralization of the United States as the arbiter of climate governance, demand that other countries mimic our actions, and scapegoating/use of force on countries that don’t comply

We’re going for the JOINT DOMINATION link – extend Wellman and Pahl – the affirmative is not benign co-operation but rather the extension of the liberal world order – this is simply a stage within the mimetic project of increasing liberal dominance with the US at the helm. The affirmative facilitates increased information sharing to satiate our need to be the divine arbitrator of desire.

First impact is INTERVENTIONISM – that’s Wellman and Pahl – so long as they are viewed as inferior in their actualization of government, the countries joining force with the US’s climate project are justified in invading other countries, deploying all necessary force for ensuring compliance, enabling use of force to create climate movements – They are the newest secret war in Cambodia – a secret genocide of millions of civilians actualized through sending arms to anti-communist forces and deploying Agent Orange – a chemical weapon still causing innumerable birth defects and suffering. Viewed as backwards nations that ‘lack’, empathy is removed and violence ensues. That generates regional instability as we overturn local practices that creates power vacuums that are historically filled by groups like ISIS which causes failed states and ensures a litany of hotspots that escalate to extinction faster than the aff. The underlying motives of domination are evident in [\_\_\_\_]

This justifies innumerable deaths under the euphemism of “collateral damage” and furthers their ambition to place the US on a pedestal as the divine arbiter of the mimetic cycle of desire, determining what the object of desire is and who will be scapegoated.

Second impact is VALUE DEFERRAL – the affirmative understands the world as constantly in need of tinkering, a view tainted by utter pessimism. This neurotic investment in locating flaws is a life-negating orientation that refuses to value the world until everything coincides with western models which constantly defers value to the future and prevents joy which is a precondition for their impacts – that’s MacCormac and Ossewaarde and you should cross apply it as a disad to their framework interp

Third impact is CLEANSING which independently turns case. Our imaginary world characterized by sustainability will inevitably face resistance in the form of underdeveloped countries unable to meet reduction quotas, great powers who view our policies as encroachment, corporations, and trump supporters who think you are a Chinese spy. As the agents of life, empires will launch wars against non-compliance. Imagine the Iraq war with soldiers in green masks. With CO2 as the enemy and the stakes being our existence as a species, all becomes permissible – paradoxically rendering catastrophe inevitable as crops turn to dust in the wake of carpet bombs, military ventures seize resources for innovation, soot initiates nuclear winter, and the stakes of the game force us into an any-means-necessary sprint towards extinction – that’s Bauman

The final impact is the WILL TO SAMENESS – that’s Pahl – their scholarship presumes that the world is only stable if it coincides with western models – this is evident in their affirmation of incorporation of China into the Western climate movement. Evident in their studies that rely on the comparative value of dominant governmental systems, voting affirmative endorses a drive to unify the world – this is evident when they say that [\_\_\_\_]

 This is based on a fundamental uneasiness when encountering difference that causes knee-jerk xenophobia and expulsion of the subaltern.

Independently, this is a reason to prima-facie refuse their studies for they are fueled by implicit bias to maintain the western order. – do the impact turns here

And that all turns case – it’s the same logic that justifies arguments made by policymakers about how other countries aren’t doing enough – their assumption that the US is always the leader is the same argument

our alternative is a form of active nihilism – rejecting the attempt to have power over others in the form mimetic violence in favor of power over the self in an affirmative act of joy – an ethic that finds pleasure within the inevitable insecurity that is constitutive of existence – only this can escape the trap of mimeticism that plagues modernity. In specific, our alternative bases itself upon a willingness to live with a plethora of structural logics and refuses the imposition of uniformity unto the globe. Instead of the futile alignment with the norm of US exceptionalism, we align with all outside of that structuring logic. Our radical refusal of the imposition of uniformity allows us to see the world through different models that unravels the strings of the US liberal world order. The alternative solves their internal links – it means that there is no incentive to attempt to master the environment or other countries.

### 2nr – o/v – bauman

They have conceded an ENTIRE THEORY OF DESIRE that makes it nearly impossible to vote aff – the nature of desire is one of mimesis – robust historical analyses indicate that the subject models desires towards external objects off of those projected by others in the global structure of mimeticism – violence today exists as the subject identifies an object of desire another has and attempts to attain it – this is evident in their sacralization of the United States as the arbiter of climate governance, demand that other countries mimic our actions, and scapegoating/use of force on countries that don’t comply

Extend Bauman 15 – the args it makes are functionally conceded

The aff’s attempt to shape the environment by meticulously planning out every factory and infrastructure development paradoxically terminates in its opposite

Thesis level claim: trying to master everything is terminally impossible – the transparency work proves but specifically attempts to prevent eco-doom by managing populations only ensure continual exploitation as we see the ocean as oil or a forest as lumber to make the infrastructure that they want – there will always be an outside that they must curb in which ensures continual eco-exploitation – this is an independent disad to their framework interp

This is an external impact – translated onto bodies it views them as a means to an end which leads to coal mines in terrible working conditions to extract more resources from the earth or concentration camps which turns all of their structural violence impacts because it makes them inevitable. With CO2 as the enemy and the stakes being our existence as a species, all becomes permissible – paradoxically rendering catastrophe inevitable as crops turn to dust in the wake of carpet bombs, military ventures sieze resources for innovation, soot initiates nuclear winter, and the stakes of the game force us into an any-means-necessary sprint towards extinction – all violence becomes permissible un der the nomenculture of collateral damage – that’s Wellman

And it turns case - Locks in a never-ending war against ecology merely accelerates fragility – as new ruptures emerge and tech becomes ever more complex, risk spirals beyond control. No matter how hard we try, we will never be able to erase the basic maxim of complexity, eventually rendering the smallest hiccup terminally catastrophic

Conceded uniqueness claim – the system collapses in on itself if it’s not sustained by management like the aff to sustain its ability to control populations which means voting neg solves all of their offense – forces the system to confront itself and collapse

our alternative in the context of the link is a form of active nihilism towards the environment – rejecting the attempt to have power over nature in the form tinkering with emissions in favor of power over the self in an affirmative act of joy – an ethic that finds pleasure within the inevitable insecurity that is constitutive of existence – only this can escape the trap of mimeticism that plagues modernity. In specific, our alternative bases itself upon a willingness to live with a plethora of structural logics and refuses the imposition of uniformity unto climate change. Instead of the futile alignment with an ideal environment through international cooperation, we align with all outside of that structuring logic. Our radical refusal of the imposition of uniformity allows us to see the world through different models that unravels the strings of the world order that sustains climate change. The alternative solves their internal links – it means that there is no incentive to attempt to master the environment or other countries.

The alternative is a floating PIK out of their attempt to influence the actions of other countries and create a sustainable environment – just eliminate fossil fuel subsidies without the telos of a perfect nature that is ideal for humans

### 2nr – framework – bauman

Our interpretation is that you should evaluate the round based upon competing affect

All of debate operates on the level of affect – speaking activities can only function through affective persuasion. Foregoing this analysis means erasing the very existence of debate itself. Your ballot is not a referendum on the fiated plan but rather its affective impact derived from its presentation

This solves their theory arguments – it’s predictable and fair

We can lose framework and still win this debate – just evaluate the K as an impact turn

Extend Bauman 15 –This myth of a ‘true’ and ‘sustainable’ nature is runs counter to the utter flux and contingency that constitutes the natural world – we have two disads to their attempt to reduce emissions and control IR through technocratic maintenance and imagination of an ideal world, the attempt to format nature to best benefit humans.

A. Locks in a never-ending war against ecology merely accelerates fragility – as new ruptures emerge and tech becomes ever more complex, risk spirals beyond control. No matter how hard we try, we will never be able to erase the basic maxim of complexity, eventually rendering the smallest hiccup terminally catastrophic.

B. Our imaginary world characterized by sustainability will inevitable face resistance in the form of undeveloped countries unable to meet reduction quotas, great powers who view our policies as encroachment, corporations, and trump supporters who think you are a Chinese spy. As the agents of life, empires will launch wars against non-compliance. Imagine the Iraq war with soldiers in green masks. With CO2 as the enemy and the stakes being our existence as a species, all becomes permissible – paradoxically rendering catastrophe inevitable as crops turn to dust in the wake of carpet bombs, military ventures sieze resources for innovation, soot initiates nuclear winter, and the stakes of the game force us into an any-means-necessary sprint towards extinction – independently takes out solvency

### 2nr – framework – ossewaarde

Our interpretation is that you should evaluate the round based upon competing affect

All of debate operates on the level of affect – speaking activities can only function through affective persuasion. Foregoing this analysis means erasing the very existence of debate itself. Your ballot is not a referendum on the fiated plan but rather its affective impact derived from its presentation

This solves their theory arguments – it’s predictable and fair

We can lose framework and still win this debate – just evaluate the K as an impact turn

we have a technocracy disad to their interpretation – their understanding of fiat reduces the political field to one of rationality. Positing that winning cost/benefit analysis is the condition for plan passage flattens all consideration of emotion, persuasion, bias and the autonomy of affect. This prioritization of reason causes a demonization of the socius as a group of biased and emotive individuals who refuse to base opinions of reason. This induces a valorization of expertism, institutions and technocratic solutions to warming for they arise as the embodiment of what Nietzsche describes as the Cartesian king – a disembodied mass fronting pure reason. This tethers agency to institutions whilst legitimating the erasure of public deliberation for individuals are viewed as a plague of irrationality. This is uniquely true in context of the affirmative for their globalization project seeks to create a model of engagement for individuals to follow which alienates the actions of each member from internal desire – thereby mass producing subjects who maintain no interest in the movement and drop like flies.

Specifically, this causes a retreat back into debate instead of turning outward for it is the only space that exists through erasing the sticky web of social relations in favor of a tabula-rasa ethos of reason.

### ---double bind

[At the top the 1AR has conceded] the double bind portion of the K – either the 1AC extinction impacts happen before they can get their hands on the levers of power which means you vote neg on presumption or the harms were constructed for alarmism which makes them war mongers –

Evaluate questions of form prior to questions of content. Before you can evaluate whether or not the substance of the 1AC is good you should evaluate whether or not the form in which it was read should exist. If we win our framework disads you vote neg even if we don’t win the K because they’re independent offense against the 1AC’s approach towards debate

### ---ressentiment o/w

Ressentiment outweighs – it creates subjects that live life through a depressed and pessimistic lens, always finding flaws in reality and deferring value to some unattainable future. Psychological wellbeing should come first because it preconfigures every other impact. One cannot enjoy material pleasures if they always view the world as insufficient. Overcoming ressentiment is a prior question to the ability to ever experience pleasure which is ultimately what we are all striving for.

### 2nr – heg

#### Conceding an entire theory of power relations and desire means you do not have an aff anymore – hegemony is founded upon a desire to exert dominance within the symbolic economy of power relations in which we can erect our status as over and above all else within the world stage.

#### IR is a symbolic status competition whereby we generate value from our capacity to win over the other. This system is self-defeating and generates a death-drive within hegemony that guarantees its own destruction. Our desire to ‘win’ within the game of geopolitics causes us to continually seek a David for our Goliath which is empirically true – continual small acts of poking-with-a-stick done by the US in the middle east

#### We desire a response so that we can again demonstrate our power. Identity becomes constructed around our defeat of everyone else e.g. mass foddering for Trump’s make America great again – always in contra-distinction to the other.

#### Turns case – kills international legitimacy as all countries that we attempt to exert power over begin to view us as needlessly belligerent and refuse cooperation or merely retaliate. Think containment in the SCS – we are too self-righteous to leave for that would decimate our sense of self which internal link turns every other aff advantage for cooperation over [space] becomes a structural impossibility as we are hell-bent upon winning the game.

#### Hegemony becomes impossibly unsustainable and the stakes of the game continually escalate until we reach the end-point of reducing all other countries to dust to demonstrate that no one but the US has the power to exert their will over the world.

### 2nr – ir – short

#### Framing issue – correlation not causation – they have to prove statistically significant causal linkages which Bernstein says is impossible in IR – multiple warrants:

#### Empirics – wars don’t occur in vacuums, people learn – you can’t hypo-test on an open system because there are too many variables – theories work until they don’t – we use deterrence now because appeasement failed in WWII – we used appeasement because deterrence failed in WWI – causal methods change over time

#### Definitional elasticity – polarity, rational actors, balance of power – ideological concepts that mean different things in different concepts – can’t quantify relative power which makes testing impossible

#### Sample size – not enough instances of war for general theories – about 100 things have been constant throughout all wars which makes testing any particular hypothesis impossible

#### This is terminal impact defense – they don’t meet basic scholarship standards – you should ignore specific scenarios and rhetorically powerful cards because their epistemological grounding is completely fabricated.

#### Presumption is better than risk logic because below a certain magnitude of risk, even the sign of the delta is uncertain – means minuscule advantages can be outweighed by minuscule side-effects, making low probability affs just as likely to be bad as good therefore unacceptable

### 2nr – ir

#### Framing issue – correlation not causation – their theory doesn’t meet basic scientific standards – when we had deterrence and great power war, we also had reality TV and LSD. They have to prove statistically significant causal linkages which Bernstein says is impossible in IR – multiple warrants:

#### First is empirics – wars don’t occur in vacuums, people learn, which means there’s no way you can hypo-test on an open system because there are too many variables – theories seem to work until they don’t: we’re using deterrence now because appeasement failed in WWII – we used appeasement because deterrence failed in WWI – the causal methods of the system change over time

#### Second is definitional elasticity – polarity, rational actors, balance of power, these are ideological concepts that can mean different things in different concepts – there’s no way to quantify relative power which makes testing impossible

#### Third is sample size – we don’t have enough instances of war to form general theories – there are about 100 things that have been constant throughout all of histories wars, which makes testing any particular hypothesis impossible

#### You should treat this as terminal impact defense – they don’t meet basic scholarship standards for their advantages – you should ignore specific scenarios and rhetorically powerful cards because their epistemological grounding is completely fabricated – presumption is better than risk logic because below a certain magnitude of risk, even the sign of the delta is uncertain - this means that minuscule advantages can be outweighed by minuscule side-effects, making low probability affs just as likely to be bad as good therefore unacceptable

### 2nr – baudrillard 94

Sarcophagus DA – extend Baudrillard 94 – their attempt at security over the atmosphere is life-negating, locking life into a security bunker of eco-preservation where life is only valuable when it can be calculated and managed to precision, real life sacrificed for artificial survival – this infinite ressentiment and denial of life outweighs the aff – it’s a constant deferral of value to an unattainable future which guts the possibility for enjoying life. Ressentiment outweighs because it is the psychic state through which all impacts are filtered.

### 2nr – information k

extend baudrillard – The 1AC operates on an understanding of the debate that we criticize. Injection of more knowledge is uniquely dissuasive – if we win this there’s no way they can win the k – without a completing understanding of the world you should default to an acceptance of the inability to cohere knowledge

The impact turns case – information decreases meaning – the affirmative is MSNBC vs. FOX news in the global warming debate where each side produces all of the evidence in support of their position and everybody only becomes more adamant in their pre-existing political opinions. This accounts for the status quo nature of congress where ideologues are arbitrary and contrary – this turns all of their political engagement good arguments – that’s mcwhorter

You evaluate this prior to the affirmative because the form with which they present the 1AC should be evaluated before the content.

This turns case because the mass production of information is what spreads climate denialism

### 2nr – both baudrillards

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This turns case because the mass production of information is what spreads climate denialism – Baudrillard 94 – their attempt at security over the atmosphere is life-negating, locking life into a security bunker of eco-preservation where life is only valuable when it can be calculated and managed to precision, real life sacrificed for artificial survival – this infinite ressentiment and denial of life outweighs the aff – it’s a constant deferral of value to an unattainable future which guts the possibility for enjoying life. Ressentiment outweighs because it is the psychic state through which all impacts are filtered.