# NC

### Framework

#### Permissibility and Presumption flow neg: A) If I know nothing about P, under a world where presumption flowed aff, I would presume both P and not P true without positive justification causing a contradiction B) Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### First is the skeptical question: In order to be normative ethics must not only identify what is good, but produce a binding obligation to act towards it. That cannot be infinitely questioned The only way to resolve this is for rules to be constitutive to the very being of agents and inescapable.

#### And Rational Agency is the only constitutively binding enterprise: A) To ask why do I reason, is to use reason to question reason, implicitly conceding its authority B) Reasoning whether to participate in a particular enterprise takes place outside of it, requiring a higher order system of Agency C) Agency is a precondition to acting because it requires that people recognize themselves as the cause of their actions.

#### And Agents must will Universizable maxims:

#### A) Absent being universal morality becomes arbitrary and fails to guide action B) Apriori principles like reason apply to everyone since they are independent of human experience and C) any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end and demand the value of my end be recognized by others. This also makes universalizability a side-constraint on ends-based frameworks. D) Absent universizability, action lacks a subject and reason isn’t practical, as we soly identify our intent with the end we are acting two, destroying the distinction between the two.

#### And, It’s impossible to will a violation of freedom since deciding to do would will incompatible ends since it logically universalizes willing a violation of your own freedom which prevents action.

Engstrom, Stephen. “Universal Legislation as the Form of Practical Knowledge.” N.d. Available from http://www.philosophie.uni-hd.de/md/philsem/engstrom\_vortrag.pdf.

Given the preceding considerations, it’s a straightforward matter to see how a maxim of action that assaults the freedom of others with a view to furthering one’s own ends results in a contradiction when we attempt to will it as a universal law in accordance with the foregoing account of the formula of universal law. Such a maxim would lie in a practical judgment that deems it good on the whole to act to limit others’ outer freedom, and hence their self-sufficiency, their capacity to realize their ends, where doing so augments, or extends, one’s own outer freedom and so also one’s own self-sufficiency. Now on the interpretation we’ve been entertaining, applying the formula of universal law involves considering whether it’s possible for every person—every subject capable of practical judgment—to share the practical judgment asserting the goodness of every person’s acting according to the maxim in question. Thus in the present case the application of the formula involves considering whether it’s possible for every person to deem good every person’s acting to limit others’ freedom, where practicable, with a view to augmenting their own freedom. Since here all persons are on the one hand deeming good both the limitation of others’ freedom and the extension of their own freedom, while on the other hand, insofar as they agree with the similar judgments of others, also deeming good the limitation of their own freedom and the extension of others’ freedom, they are all deeming good both the extension and the limitation of both their own and others’ freedom. These judgments are inconsistent insofar as the extension of a person’s outer freedom is incompatible with the limitation of that same freedom.

#### Prefer on Performativity: freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### Thus the standard is consistency with a system of equal and outer freedom:

#### Evaluate Intent first: [A] Consequences are infinitely regressive because they always produce more consequences [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through inductive reasoning based on observation of past events

### Offense

#### Negate—

#### [1] The aff uses politicians as a means to an end. You justify violating their negative right to privacy in order to achieve a broader right to know more agents.

#### [2] Its impossible to value the right of one agent over another: A) rights are negative side constraints so its illogical B) It implies we can aggregate agents which is a violation of freedom, consequentialist, and non universizable because there is no apriori distinction between them.

#### [3] All agents have a right to privacy. Trying to expose their morals is a violation of freedom.

Anderson-Gold, S. (2010). Privacy, Respect and the Virtues of Reticence in Kant. Kantian Review, 15(02), 28–42. doi:10.1017/s1369415400002429 ///AHS PB

Therefore there is a negative duty of respect for humanity to refrain from such actions as unnecessarily exposing and ridiculing the faults of others, by softening or keeping our judgements to ourselves. Nor should we be excessively interested in what does not concern public justice, that is, the private morality of others. Kant claims that ‘spying on the morals of others is by itself already an offensive inquisitiveness . . . which [is] a everyone can rightly resist as a violation of respect due to him’ (MM 6: 466). In particular Kant is concerned to remind us that not everything that is unconventional is immoral and that blind imitation of ‘mores’ can be contrary to the duty that we have to improve ourselves. He says: ‘to take scandal at what is merely unconventional but otherwise in itself good is a delusion . . . an error dangerous and destructive to virtue’ (MM 6: 464). This is because duties of self-perfection and enlightenment require us to develop and maintain a critical use of our own reason in community with others, not a timid deference to popular opinion. Resistance to ‘spying’ on one’s morals is ‘rightful’, and part of what it means to have a right to privacy. Acknowledging ‘zones’ of personal privacy, wherein we do not pry and seek to know the details of a person’s affairs, is a sign of respect. A certain social distance is due persons. Thus, a certain level of ‘good manners’ can be said to be ‘owed’ to others and to be part of our own moral development. This remains true even at the level of our response to the faults of others. Kant claims that the signs of respect that we afford others when they display certain moral failings can make them desire to be worthy. He cautions us even in confronting error in the ‘logical use’ of reason not to be harsh, not to accuse others publicly of absurdity or poor judgement. Rather Kant recommends a patient explanation of the ‘possibility’ of error so as to preserve the individual’s selfrespect. Far from being a rigid ‘individualist’ in his understanding of moral virtue, Kant demonstrates considerable insight into how certain types of ‘social virtues’ operate to support and promote virtue in others. Social virtues such as affability and hospitality may be but ‘tokens’ or indirect signs of underlying mental attitudes but they are not deceptions because, Kant assumes, mature individuals understand how such behaviours operate to produce good social relationships. Such social virtues bind us to others and create duties of reciprocity such as gratitude for favours rendered and thus these ‘virtues’ recreate themselves in others. Here Kant recognizes and affirms the ‘causal’ cultural relations that exist in the development of empirical character4 and our duties in relation to creating and maintaining those social empirical connections.