# K 1NC core [1:40+]

## Gun control is tied to racism. Legislation intended to disarm blacks was and continues to be a tool of white supremacy, Blanks ’15:

Blanks 6/22 (Jonathan, Research Associate in Cato’s Project on Criminal Justice and Managing Editor of [PoliceMisconduct.net](http://policemisconduct.net)) “Gun Control Will Not Save America from Racism”, Vice Magazine, 6/22/2015 DD
Like many criminal laws, **gun control legislation has disproportionately affected black people** and contributed to sky-high rates of incarceration for minorities in the US. As Radley Balko wrote in the Washington Post last year: Although white people occasionally do become the victims of overly broad gun laws...the typical person arrested for gun crimes is more likely to have black complexion.... Last year, **47.3 percent** of those **convicted for federal gun crimes were black — a** racial **disparity larger than any other** class of federal **crime**s**, including drug[s]** crimes. In a 2011 report on mandatory minimum sentencing for gun crimes, the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that blacks were far more likely to be charged and convicted of federal gun crimes that carry mandatory minimum sentences. They were also more likely to be hit with "enhancement" penalties that added to their sentences. In fact, the racial discrepancy for mandatory minimums was even higher than the aforementioned disparity for federal gun crimes in general. Balko's piece goes on to detail the case of Shaneen Allen, a black woman and single mother who legally owned a firearm in Pennsylvania. She was arrested in New Jersey for having that weapon during a routine traffic stop in October 2013. She faced a three-year mandatory minimum sentence despite a clean record and having committed no other crime. Allen fortunately received a pardon from Governor Chris Christie as her case gained national attention. Another story that made headlines was that of Marissa Alexander, a black woman who was convicted and sentenced to a mandatory minimum 20 years in prison in Florida after firing what she claims was a warning shot in self-defense against her estranged husband. After public agitation and much legal wrangling, Alexander was offered a plea bargain and was released from prison in January after serving three years. This evidence is anecdotal, to be sure, but **strict gun laws** with harsh penalties aimed at punishing violent criminals can also **ensnare** law-abiding people who make mistakes. That these laws often affect **people of color** is not at all new. **The history of gun control in this country** is long and **has usually been** directly or indirectly **tied to race.** After the Civil War, **disarming freed slaves became a priority of white Southern state governments** and roving bands of terrorists, like the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist organizations. In this environment, gun rights were viewed as an essential tool for freed slaves and other black Americans to take care of themselves and their families. In part to circumvent resistance from black Americans, Southern states created convict lease systems, not unlike old slave leasing systems, aimed at profiting off of captured black labor. As Nicholas Johnson describes in his book Negroes and the Gun: The Black Tradition of Arms, blacks who carried firearms to protect themselves were often pulled into this leasing system for violating concealed carry laws. As Johnson and other authors have noted, those laws, as well as vagrancy and other minor offenses, were almost exclusively enforced against blacks. In the years following Reconstruction, conflagrations like the coup d'état of Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1898, the Tulsa race riots in 1921, and the Rosewood Massacre in 1923 peppered the South as outgunned blacks fell victim to white mob violence. As Johnson explains in his book, some blacks were able to fend off small attacks on themselves or their homes, but white mob violence—and Jim Crow—ultimately prevailed as the dominant and unchallenged power structure. Fast-forward to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 60s. **Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.** committed himself to peaceful civil disobedience and political non-violence. He also **applied for a gun permit for personal protection** given continuous threats to his safety. **It was denied** because the local police were not required to issue him one. Such **discretion** comes from "may issue" gun permit **laws, still** in effect in states like New York and New Jersey, which **allow states or localities to determine whether** or not **an individual may carry a gun**, even if that person meets all the legal requirements. As UCLA law professor Adam Winkler wrote in the Atlantic and his book Gunfight: The Battle over the Right to Bear Arms, the "true pioneers of the modern gun-rights movement" were the infamous Black Panthers. Fed up with local authorities' abuse of blacks, **the [Black] Panthers openly**, audaciously, and legally **carried guns in public**, taking advantage of California's open-carry law. **The state reacted** to black militancy **by** passing a bill known as the Mulford Act in 1967, **repealing open carry**, signed by then-governor Ronald Reagan. Other states followed suit. In 1968, the federal Gun Control Act and Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Acts were passed—the first federal gun regulation in decades—in no small part as a reaction to the race riots of the era, according to Winkler. The **passage of these bills opened the floodgate to further federalization of** criminal laws and the **"tough on crime"** mindset that dominated late 20th century American politics. In tandem with the War on Drugs, the full force of government became focused on urban and inner city crime.

### (\_) White Fear about black bodies pervades American legislature – no usage of the state can delink from this, Socialist Worker ’12:

**: [**"When Racism Is the Law." *The Socialist Worker* 4 Apr. 2012: n. pag. Print. <http://socialistworker.org/2012/04/04/when-racism-is-the-law>]

**From** the harassment and **violence of police**, to a prosecutor's decision about who gets charged, **to the judges passing sentence** based on the politicians' tough-on-crime laws, **to the use of the ultimate punishment of death**--**at every stage,** the **U.S. criminal justice** system is a machine that **disproportionately victimizes** African Americans and other **people of color**. The statistical evidence of racial discrimination is so overwhelming that you'd think it must be against the law. But **racism *is* the law**. Author Michelle Alexander compares the U.S. justice system, with its systematic targeting of African Americans, to the laws that existed to preserve racial segregation in the U.S. South before the civil rights movement. We live in an era, she writes, of "the new Jim Crow."

**They continue:**

**RACISM IS the law of the land in so many** other **respects. It's true in the voting booths**--**voter ID laws** requiring people to present a photo identification at polling places has translated into lower African American turnouts**. It's true in the classroom, where Black middle-schoolers were nearly three times as likely to be suspended** as their white counterparts. African Americans aren't the only victims of racist laws. In the era of the U.S. government's "war on terror," **racial profiling and harassment** by law enforcement has become **[are]** an **ordinary** occurrence for Arabs and Muslims. Laws infringing on civil liberties that once would have been considered unconstitutional by mainstream political opinion are now supported by Democratic and Republican politicians alike. And Latino immigrants are bearing the brunt of a different racist hysteria. **Laws** that **invite racial profiling**--like Arizona's SB 1070, which authorized law enforcement to stop, detain and arrest anyone that officers had a "reasonable suspicion" was undocumented--have sent a wave of fear into immigrant communities. SB 1070 has been held up in the courts, but it inspired copycats, such as Alabama's HB 56, whose initial provisions not only empowered police to act as immigration agents, but criminalized anyone who rented to or employed suspected undocumented people. When you look at this overall picture, the truth is obvious: **"American justice" is a contradiction in terms**. Every inch of U.S. society is propped up by institutions that are racist and discriminatory to the core. Those in power depend on the suspicion and distrust that racism breeds to distract attention from the real purveyors of violence and the corporations that actually steal jobs by shutting down factories. But the massive reaction to Trayvon Martin's murder and the huge demonstrations against racism in recent weeks have shown that there's an antidote to suspicion: solidarity. Tens of thousands have raised their voices in protest around the country--because they look like Trayvon or they know someone who looks like Trayvon, and because they see how a system that promotes bigotry and hate has to be challenged.

## Affirming the enactment of gun-control assumes that the law will be applied in an equitable way. You cannot detach theory from its history – ethics must be informed by the injustice of empirical institutions, because the assumptions behind abstraction defy reality and legitimize oppression. Curry:[[1]](#footnote-1)

Asserted as axiom and sustained as a transformation in the "hearts and minds" of whites ad populum, the civil rights movement and its accompanying policy of integration continues to be understood as a fundamental shift in American race relations from an era of Jim Crowism and terrorism against Blacks during segregation to the more present day where racism is seen to be remnants of the past sustained by racial misunderstanding and collective ignorance. Following this logic, atonement theorists base[d] the possibility of racial reconciliation on an unfounded optimism rooted in the continuation of civil rights era reforms. For these scholars, racism is a question encountered at the extremities of unethical behavior. As presently understood, racism is a choice—an act of free will—to believe that skin color demarcates a real difference about that person and to treat said person or persons as inferior based on that difference. The racist act, then, becomes an attempt to realize in the world one's privations, not as an imaginative act, but an act cultivated by the realization that the world can in fact accept and support one's privations as reality. Thus the racist, as Fanon (1967) maintains is normal, not constrained by ethical calculations of morality, but empowered by them to not only act, but to act for the sake of "their" others. Traditionally we have taken ethics to be, as Henry Sedgwick claims, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what is right for them—or to seek to realize by voluntary action” (1981:1). This rational procedure is however at odds with the empirical reality the ethical deliberation must concern itself with. To argue, as is often done, that the government, its citizens, or white people should act justly, assumes that the possibility of how they could act defines their moral disposition. If a white person could possibly not be racist, it does not mean that the possibility of not being racist, can be taken to mean that they are not racist. In ethical deliberations dealing with the problem of racism, it is common practice to attribute to historically racist institutions, and individuals universal moral qualities that have yet to be demonstrated. This abstraction from reality is what frames our ethical norms and allows us to maintain, despite history or evidence, that racist entities will act justly given the choice. Under such complexities, **the** only ethical deliberation concerning racism must be antiethical, **or a judgment** refus[e to]ing write morality onto immoral entities. In the case of reparations, this would entail a prima facie rejection of atonement, because these theories assume the morality of historically immoral racist actors, be they governmental or individual. When morality is defined not by the empirical acts that demonstrate immorality, but the racial character of those in question, our ethics become nothing more than the apologetics of our tyrannical epoch.

### (\_) Your framework is just another link – speaking from an abstract, universal perspective is rooted in Western philosophies that attempt to conceal ethnic, racial, gendered, and sexual epistemic locations, leading to domination and hierarchy, Grosfoguel:

(Ramon, Associate Professor Ethnic Studies Department, Chicano/Latino Studies) "Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political Economy: Transmodernity, Decolonial Thinking, and Global Coloniality." TRANSMODERNITY: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World 1, no. 1, 4-6

The hegemonic Eurocentric paradigms that have informed **western philosophy** and sciences in the “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system” (Grosfoguel 2005; 2006b) for the last 500 hundred years **assume[s] a universal**istic**, neutral**, objective **point of view.** Chicana and black feminist scholars (Moraga and Anzaldúa 1983; Collins 1990) as well as Third World scholars inside and outside the United States (Dussel 1977) reminded us that we always speak from a particular location in the power structures. [but n]obody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical, and racial hierarchies of the “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system“. As feminist scholar Donna Haraway (1988) states, our knowledges are always situated. Black feminist scholars called this perspective “afro-centric epistemology” (Collins 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while Latin American Philosopher of Liberation Enrique Dussel called it “geopolitics of knowledge” (Dussel 1977) and, following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldúa (1987), I will use the term “body politics of knowledge.” This is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. In Western philosophy and sciences **the subject** that speaks **is always** hidden, concealed, **erased** from the analysis. The “ego-politics of knowledge” of Western philosophy has always privilege the myth of a non-situated “Ego”. Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to **produc[ing]**e **a myth about** a Truthful **universal knowledge that** covers up, that is, **conceals** who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the **structures of colonial** power/**knowledge** from which the subject speaks. It is important here to distinguish the “epistemic location” from the “social location.” The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial worldsystem consists in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemically like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved. I am not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. What I am claiming is that **all knowledges are epistemically located in** the dominant or the subaltern side of the **power relations** and that this is related to the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge is a Western myth. René Descartes, the founder of Modern Western Philosophy, inaugurates a new moment in the history of Western thought. He replaces God, as the foundation of knowledge in the Theo-politics of knowledge of the European Middle Ages, with (Western) Man as the foundation of knowledge in European Modern times. All the attributes of God are now extrapolated to (Western) Man. Universal Truth beyond time and space privileges access to the laws of the Universe, and the capacity to produce scientific knowledge and theory is now placed in the mind of Western Man. The Cartesian “Cogito ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am“) is the foundation of modern Western sciences. By producing a dualism between mind and body and between mind and nature, Descartes was able to claim non-situated, universal, Godeyed view knowledge. This is what the Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro- Gómez called the “point zero” perspective of **Eurocentric philosophies** (Castro-Gómez 2003). The “point zero” is the point of view that hides and conceals itself as being beyond a particular point of view, that is, the point of view that represents itself as being without a point of view. It is this “god-eye view” that always **hide**s its local and particular **perspective under** an **abstract universalism.** Western philosophy privileges “ego politics of knowledge” over the “geopolitics of knowledge” and the “body-politics of knowledge.” **Historically**, this has allowed **Western man** (the gendered term is intentionally used here) to represent his knowledge as the only one capable of achieving a universal consciousness, and to **dismiss non-Western knowledge as particularistic** and, thus, unable to achieve universality. **This** epistemic **strategy has been crucial for Western global designs.** By hiding the location of the subject of enunciation, European/Euro-American **colonial** expansion and **domination was able to construct a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus,** of **superior and inferior people** around the world. We went from the sixteenth century characterization of “people without writing” to the eighteenth and nineteenth-century characterization of “people without history,” to the twentieth-century characterization of “people without development” and more recently, to the early twenty-first-century of “people without democracy”. We went from the sixteenth-century “rights of people” (Sepúlveda versus de las Casas debate in the University of Salamanca in the mid-sixteenth century), to the eighteenth-century “rights of man” (Enlightenment philosophers), and to the late twentieth-century “human rights.” All of these are part of global designs articulated to the simultaneous production and reproduction of an international division of labor of core/periphery that overlaps with the global racial/ethnic hierarchy of Europeans/non-Europeans. However, as Enrique Dussel (1994) has reminded us, the Cartesian “Cogito ergo sum” was preceded by 150 years (since the [beginnings](http://hsld.debatecoaches.org/La%2BCanada/Zhao%2BNeg#63072018) of the European colonial expansion in 1492) of the European “ego conquistus” (“I conquer, therefore I am”). **The social**, economic, political **and historical conditions** of possibility for a subject **to assume** the arrogance of becoming God-like and put himself as **the foundation of all Truthful knowledge was the Imperial Being,** that is, **the subjectivity of those who are at the center of the world because they have already conquered it.** What are the decolonial implications of this epistemological critique to our knowledge production and to our concept of world-system?

## My alternative is to reject the racist legacy of gun control and engage in a genealogical excavation of erased perspectives, Medina:[[2]](#footnote-2)

Foucault opened the 1976 lectures in “Society Must be Defended with a discussion of “the insurrection of subjugated knowledges” In this discussion he high lights two different aspects of subjugated knowledges that are crucial to understand their critical potential, that is, the kind of insurrection that they can be mobilized to produce. In the first place, Foucault emphasizes that subjugated knowledges are “historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations” and that are dug up by new forms of scholarship. **By resurrecting** these **buried** and masked blocks of historical **knowledge,**the**critique of institutions,** discourses, **and** hegemonic**histories becomes possible.** For example, Foucault remarks that what made it possible to develop “an effective critique of the asylum or the prison” was the retrieval—through “the tools of scholarship”— of “blocks of historical knowledges” present but masked or buried in” functional and systematic ensembles”4 Theseblocks of **historical knowledge** make critique possible because they “**allow[s] us to see the dividing lines** in the confrontation and struggles that functional arrangements or systematic organizations are designed to mask.” The historical dimension of subjugated knowledges is crucial because it enables us to see, diachronically, **different substrata** or deposits **of** ongoing **epistemic subjugations by calling attention to** the social **struggles and conflicts that have been part of** the production of **institutions and discourses, but have become buried** in their interstices. In the second place, Foucault also highlights another key aspect of subjugated knowledges: they are “knowledges from below,” “unqualified or even disqualified knowledges.” The lack of sanction or pedigree, their marginalization and stigmatization, is a crucial part of the epistemological subordination or exclusion that makes them subjugated knowledges: they are “knowledges that have been disqualified as nonceptual knowledges.. as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity.”-’ But Foucault is quick to point out that these disqualified or unqualified knowledges should not be identified with “common knowledge or common sense,” which is excluded from the realm of science and erudition, but has great currency in mainstream epistemic markets. By contrast, asubjugated knowledge is the one that suffers a more pervasive social exclusion and stigmatization: “a knowledge that is local, regional, or differential, incapable of unanimity and which derives its power solely from the tact that it is different from all the knowledges that surround it.” These are knowledges that are not articulated or voiced in the proper way, knowledges without accepted credentials; in short, **knowledges without social currency** because of the history of epistemological exclusions and marginalizations that have kept them out of official markets for epistemic transactions. This second feature of subjugated knowledges is also what **makes social critique possible** bycalling into **question[ing] official and hegemonic knowledges and interrogating the exclusions** that **they rest on.** Thus, referring to his own genealogical critiques of institutions like the asylum or the hospital and of discourses such as psychiatry or medicine, Foucault remarks that “it is the reappearance of what people know at a local level, of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible” A perfect illustration of these two features of subjugated knowledges and their critical potential can be found in Ladelle McWhorter’s use of the local and for gotten blocks of historical knowledge which she uncovers in her genealogy of racism in the US. In her research of the eugenics movement McWhorter found that between 1927 and 1972 “poor people in Virginia were rounded up by the thousands and taken to Lynchburg and Staunton to be sterilized (— about 8,500 were forcibly sterilized, McWhorter tells us): In Virginia, and elsewhere, the memories are still there—scattered, in pieces, dispersed into this or that individual’s or family’s shame and pain—but still there. The knowledge of what was done to two generations of Virginia’s poor, her disabled, her nonconformists, her misfits, is a local knowledge shared by ordinary people (..J It is knowledge that for decades was not recognized as any kind of knowledge at all and that barely recognizes itself as such even now.3’ McWhorter points out that in the last twenty years “a small contingent of re searchers has disinterred a lot of the buried evidence to corroborate” the ignored, but not forgotten historical knowledge of that official campaign against the disabled and the vulnerabl&1 In this hidden but remembered historical knowledge from below we can appreciate the two aspects of subjugated knowledges which, according to Foucault, contribute to make critique possible: the buried but documentable historical knowledges and the locally scattered memories that were never allowed to amount to more than unqualified and dismissible experiences. As McWhorter puts By foregrounding historical material that hegemonic histories and official policies have de-emphasized or dismissed, they [the genealogical researchers] have created an erudite account of scientific racism and eugenics, and in so doing they have critiqued received views and called into question some aspects of the epistemologies that support them. As Foucault puts it, “it is the coupling together of the buried scholarly knowledge and knowledges that were disqualified by the hierarchy of erudition and sciences” that gives strength to genealogical critique What both of these forms ofsubjugated knowledges brings to the fore is the “historical knowledge of struggles,” “the memory of combats, the very memory that had until then been confined to the margins.” And this is exactly what the critical and transformative work of genealogical investigations consists in, according to Foucault: with the “coupling together of scholarly erudition and local memories,” genealogical investigations provide “a meticulous rediscovery of struggles and the raw memory of fights”; “this coupling [...] allows us to constitute a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of that knowledge in contemporary tactics.” **Genealogical investigations** can **unearth multiple paths** from buried or forgotten past struggles to the present; andthus they can **promot[ing]**e **a critical awareness** that things are as they are because **of a history of past struggles** that are hidden from view, **which can** have a great **impact** on how we confront **our struggles in the present.** As McWhorter’s genealogical investigations illustrate so well, “one consequence of that awareness is the recognition that today’s status quo was far from inevitable and need not persist into tomorrow.” ‘Genealogies are insurrections against hegemonic power/knowledge effects of discursive practices. Thus, for example, McWhorter’s **genealogical account** of racism in the US **is “an intellectual assault on the power-effects of institutionalized, entrenched,** and taken-for-grantedacademic, clinical, moralistic, and religious **discourses about racism”** And it is important to note that the possibilities of critique that are opened up by unearthing marginalized past struggles benefit not only those whose experiences and lives have been kept in the dark, but the entire social body, which can now become critically conscious of the heterogeneity of histories and experiences that are part of the social fabric.”

## The role of the judge is to vote for the debater who better performs a geneology that brings subjugated perspectives to light, Medina 2:

**The critical task of the scholar** andtheactivistis to resurrect subjugated knowledges—that**is**, **to revive** hidden or **forgotten bodies of experiences and memories**—and to help produce insurrections of subjugated knowledges.4 In order to be critical and to have transformative effects, **genealogical investigations should aim at** these **insurrections**, which are **critical interventions that disrupt and interrogate epistemic hegemonies** and mainstream perspectives (e.g. official histories, standard interpretations, ossified exclusionary meanings, etc). Such insurrections involve the difficult labor of mobilizing scattered, marginalized publics and of tapping into the critical potential of their dejected experiences and memories. An epistemic **insurrection requires** a **collaborative relation between** genealogical **scholars**/activists **and** the **subjects who**se experiences and memories **have been subjugated**: those subjects by themselves **[and] may not** be able to **destabilize** the epistemic **status quo until** they are **given a voice** at the epistemic table (i.e. in the production of knowledge), that is, until room is made for their marginalized perspective to exert resistance, until past epistemic battles are reopened and established frameworks become open to con- te station. On the other hand, the scholars and activists aiming to produce insurrec- tionary interventions could not get their critical activity off the ground if they did not draw on past and ongoing contestations, and the lived experiences and memo- ries of those whose marginalized lives have become the silent scars of forgotten struggles.

**My method is most specific to our scholarly potential. And any uncertainty means you prefer it – it’s the only way we can find solutions since we need to be able to access different bodies of knowledge for doing so in the first place.**

### (\_) Cap genealogy interaction

**Even Marx recognized the historical dependence of capitalist structures on racism, Taylor ’11:**

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor 1/4/11 “Race, class and Marxism” socialistworker.org

While **Marx** did not write extensively on the question of slavery and its racial impact in societies specifically, he did write about the way in which European capitalism emerged because of its pilfering, rape and destruction, famously writing: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of Black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. He also **recognized the extent to which slavery was central to the world economy. He wrote: Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits**, etc. **Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value**; it is the colonies that have **created world trade**, and it is world trade that is **the pre-condition of large-scale industry.** Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy--the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations.

# Other

## Geneology First – Yancy

**Whiteness gains power in being unspoken and frames all of our values in ways that perpetuate it. Genealogical investigation is key and a prior question. Yancy[[3]](#footnote-3)**

A genealogical examination of whiteness, following the lead of Foucault and Nietzsche, involves showing how whiteness is not a natural given, or has to do with an ontology that cuts at the joints of nature, but a kind of historical emergence (Entstehung). Upon examination, whiteness, contrary to its historical performance as a natural occurring kind, emerges as a value code deployed by a certain raciated (white) group of people that delimits and structures what it deems intelligible, valuable, normal, abnormal, superior, inferior, beautiful, ugly, and so on. As the presumed sovereign voice, treating itself as hypernormative and unmarked, whiteness conceals its status as raciated, located, and positioned. Because of its presumed ahistorical stability and ontological “givenness,” whiteness is an appropriate target for genealogical examination. Commenting on the value, aim, and practical consequences of genealogy, Alexander Nehamas, with Nietzsche in mind, writes: Genealogy takes as its objects precisely those institutions and practices which, like morality, are usually thought to be totally exempt from change and development.It tries to show how such changes escape our notice and how it is often in the interest of these practices to mask their specific historical origins and character. As a result of this, genealogy has direct practical consequences because, by demonstrating the contingent character of the institutions that traditional history exhibits as unchanging, it creates the possibility of altering them. Nehamas’s point concerning how certain practices attempt to mask themselves is key to understanding whiteness; for the hegemony of whiteness is partly contingent upon its capacity to conceal or mask its own historicity, thus representing itself as universal, decontextual, and ahistorical.With equal insight, Fred Evans writes: The values and practices that genealogists evaluate present themselves as “universal” or as “true” in an unqualified sense. By revealing the value creating power that these values and practices serve and disseminate, however, genealogists show their “grounds” or basis—how it was possible for them to appear universal or true without qualification—and their limits, that is, their necessary partiality. In carrying out this critique, moreover, genealogy itself is a value-creating power, one opposed to the “life-denying” and hegemonic tendencies of practices that the genealogy attempts to critically evaluate and overcome.

## Extra ROB Card

**Challenging knowledge is political and has real effects. Mignolo[[4]](#footnote-4)**

As for what the knowledge is about, the associations of the term most familiar to the classically trained reader point to rational objects, and accordingly to natural reason as the organ for acquiring and possessing knowledge. In the gnostic context, however, “knowledge” has an emphatically religious or supranatural meaning and refers to objects which we nowadays should call those of faith rather than of reason .... Gnosis meant pre-eminently knowledge of God, and from what we have said about the radical transcendence of the deity it follows that “knowledge of God” is the knowledge of something naturally unknowable and therefore itself not a natural condition ....On the one hand it is closely bound up with revelationary experience, so that reception of the truth either through sacred and secret lore or through inner illumination replaces rational argument and theory ....onthe other hand, being concerned with the secrets of salvation, “knowledge” is not just theoretical information about certain things but is itself, as a modification of the human condition, charged with performing a function in the bringing about of salvation. Thus gnostic “knowledge” has an eminently practical object. (Jonas 1958, 34) We are obviously no longer at the beginning of the Christian era and salvation is not a proper term to define the practicality of knowledge, and neither is its claim to truth. But we need to open up the space that epistemology took over from gnoseology, and aim it not at God but at the uncertainties of the borders. Our goals are not salvation but decolonization, and transformations of the rigidity of epistemic and territorial frontiers established and controlled by the coloniality of power in the process of building the modern/ colonial world system

# Frontlines

1. Curry, Tommy J. "The Political Economy of Reparations: An Anti-Ethical Consideration of Atonement and Racial Reconciliation under Colonial Moralism." Race Gender and Class 18, no. 1 (2011): 125. < http://www.academia.edu/download/30638769/The\_Political\_Economy\_of\_Reparations.pdf > [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. José Medina, professor of philosophy and race at Vanderbilt University, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” October 2011, Foucault Studies, No. 12, pp. 9-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. George Yancy Prof. Philosophy @ Dusquene, “What White Looks Like,” 2004 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Mignolo, Walter [Argentine semiotician and professor at Duke]. Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking. Princeton University Press, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)